The  Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, inserted various
articles in the Constitution to curtail, both directly and indirectly,
the  jurisdiction  of the Supreme Court and the High Courts to  review
the  constitutionality of laws.  Article 32A barred the Supreme  Court
from  considering  the  constitutional validity of any  State   law  in
proceedings  for  the  enforcement of fundamental  rights  unless   the
constitutional  validity of any Central law was also in issue in  such
proceedings.   Article  131A  gave  to  the  Supreme   Court  exclusive
jurisdiction  to  decide the constitutional validity of a Central  law
and  thus deprived the High Courts of their jurisdiction in respect of
the  same.  Article 144A provided that the minimum number of Judges of
the  Supreme  Court who shall sit for the purpose of  determining  the
constitutional validity of any Central law or State law shall be seven
and  required a special majority of two-thirds for the invalidation of
such  law.   Article  226A barred the High Courts  from   deciding  the
validity  of  any  Central law and article 228A  required  that   there
should  be  a  Bench  of  at least five  Judges  for   determining  the
constitutional  validity  of  any State law and prescribed  a   special
majority for a judgment invalidating such a law.

2.   It is considered that articles 32A, 131A and 228A cause, hardship
to  persons  living in distant parts in India.  Further,  article   32A
would  lead  to multiplicity of proceedings as cases relating  to  the
validity  of  a  State law which could be disposed of by  the   Supreme
Court  itself  have to be heard first by the High Court.  The  minimum
number  of Judges in every case wherein the constitutional validity of
a  law  is  involved, however unsubstantial the  challenge  might   be,
results  in valuable judicial time being lost in hearing and rejecting
submissions  that  have no substance.  The Supreme Court has, in  M/s.
Misrilal  Jain vs.  the State of Orissa and Others (AIR 1977 SC  1686)
expressed the hope that article 144A would engage the prompt attention
of  Parliament and would be amended so as to leave to the court itself
the  duty  to  decide how large a Bench should decide  any   particular
case.   In  fact, a number of cases have been held up in  the   Supreme
Court and High Courts as a result of the aforementioned articles.

3.   It is, therefore, proposed to omit articles 32A, 131A, 144A, 226A
and  228A.   It is also proposed to make special provisions to  enable
the  Supreme  Court and the High Courts to deal with pending cases  in
the  same manner as if the said articles had been omitted with  effect
from  the  1st February, 1977 (viz., the date on which those  articles
were  brought  into  force).  Necessary  consequential   amendments  to
articles 145, 228 and 366 are also proposed to be made.

4.   Article 31D confers special power on Parliament to enact  certain
laws  in  respect of anti-national activities.  It is considered  that
these powers of Parliament to make laws for dealing with anti-national
activities and anti-national associations are of a sweeping nature and
are capable of abuse.  It is, therefore, proposed to omit article 31D.

5. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.

NEW DELHI;                                       SHANTI BHUSHAN.

The 12th December, 1977.

THE CONSTITUTION (FORTY-THIRD AMENDMENT)
                        ACT, 1977