CHAPTER XVIII.



OF COMPENSATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICERS.



THE principle of compensation to those who render services to the

public, runs through the whole Constitution.



The senators and representatives shall receive a compensation for their

services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the

United States.



The president shall at stated times, receive for his services a

compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the

period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive

within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of

them.



The judges shall at stated times, receive for their services a

compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in

office.



In the early stages of society, founded on a slender population, before

any regular civil institutions took place, the tasks of government were

probably performed without stated emoluments. In time, however, it was

perceived that the public ought not to have their affairs administered

without making compensation to those who postponed their private

business for the general benefit. A compensation was therefore either

exacted or voluntarily rendered. The former is always irregular and

oppressive. We may refer as an illustration of it, to a practice which

in early times prevailed in almost all the kingdoms of Europe. The

monarch, for the supply of his court, his officers and attendants, was

in the habit of seizing provisions and impressing horses and carriages,

for which, an arbitrary and inadequate compensation was sometimes made,

but any compensation whatever was frequently withheld. [1] The practice,

though constantly complained of as a heavy grievance, equally

inconsistent with the rights of the subject, and the real convenience of

the crown, was not abolished in England till the restoration of Charles

II. The government of a country is relieved from the necessity of

exactions thus mutually injurious, by voluntary provisions on the part

of the general society.



In respect to executive and judicial officers, no question has ever

arisen: -- It seems to be universally agreed, that compensations should

be made for their services. The manner of making it is various, it is

sometimes done by fixed salaries, and sometimes by fees and perquisites,

which latter are exactly regulated as to the amount. Arguments are not

wanting in favour of each of these plans. If a salary is granted which

the officer is to receive, whether he does much or little of the

business within his sphere, there is danger of remissness but to render

him wholly dependant on the receipt of casual fees, would be

inconsistent with the dignity that ought always to accompany a great

executive or judicial office, and would tend to interrupt the dedication

of his time to his high and important duties. In those cases, salaries

are preferable. A legal remedy for neglect of duty may certainly be

found, ill addition to the public reprobation, which must always attend

upon it. But for inferior officers, not under the same control of public

opinion, or at least not to the same extent, the payments by those whose

business is transacted seems to form a proper fund.



In respect to the members of the legislature, our practice corresponds

with that of some, though not of all the nations of Europe. In one, to

which we are apt more frequently to look than any other, the ancient

usage has melted away, and the members of parliament now receive no

compensation for their attendance. The consequence is, that only men of

fortune can take seats in the house of commons. This is inconsistent

with the equality that ought to be found in a republic. Men of virtue

and talent, though depressed by poverty, ought to have the avenues to

public trust as open to them as to the most wealthy. We will venture to

add that the compensation ought to be liberal: a generous people, if it

is faithfully served, will never complain. But the compensation ought to

bear as exact a proportion as possible to the time employed. An act of

congress was passed a few years ago, [2] in which, a gross sum was

allotted for an entire session. The dissatisfaction it occasioned,

produced an early repeal.



The compensation of the president is not to be increased or diminished

while he is in office; the legislature shall neither bribe nor terrify

him in this mode. The compensations of judges shall not be diminished,

but there is no restraint on their being increased, because their

offices being in legal contemplation equivalent to offices for life;

since the law benignly calculates that a judge will always behave well;

the value of money may depreciate, and the salary become inadequate to

the support intended to be allowed.



It may be observed, that the president and judicial officers are to

receive their compensations at stated periods, the intention of which

is, that services shall not be paid for, before they are performed; but

no such restriction is imposed on the members of the legislature,

because it is presumed that they will not violate a principle so just,

and also, because from the uncertain duration of their sessions, no

stated period can be fixed.



The military power is also in this respect to be distinguished from

other executive offices; being liable to be employed in various places

where it may be difficult or impossible to be regularly supplied with

the means of discharging their pay, it would be impolitic to entitle

them to demand it at certain periods. Their compensations cannot be

diminished during the time for which they are engaged, because it would

be a breach of the contract: they may be increased, because the public

safety would not be endangered by it. Fortuitous additions, tending to

stimulate their exertions are allowed: an army is entitled to share in

some parts of what is taken from the enemy, which, according to the laws

of war, become the property of the captors. A rule, however, which in

modern practice is rather specious than profitable, for it is rarely

enforced; but to the navy the same principle is often productive of

great emolument; a discrimination having been long established between

maritime captures and those on shore, on a foundation not perceptibly

just. The property of peaceable and private individuals on the land is

seldom considered in modern times, as a just subject of confiscation,

although the owners are inhabitants of a hostile country; but at sea,

the merchant vessel, unarmed and unoffending, is the lawful prey of the

commissioned cruizer, and is condemned to his use, on being captured and

brought into the ports of his country. The amount of these additional

compensations is from time to time regulated by congress.



The appropriation for the support of the army and navy can be made only

by congress, and in respect to the army, as has been already observed,

for no longer time than two years. This may, at first view, appear

inconsistent with the practice of enlisting soldiers for a longer time,

but when we take a view of the whole political system and recollect that

this limitation has been adopted as a suitable check upon the possible

ill use of a regular army, we must allow a predominant operation to the

greater principle. The military contracts must be construed, in all

cases, as subject to the constitutional restriction, which must be

considered as a proviso introduced into every law that authorizes the

president to raise an army.



To disband an army entirely, must be a legislative act. To dismiss any

or all of the officers is, by the tenure of their commissions, within

the power of the president. It is the practice in many countries when an

army is reduced, to allow to the officers whose active services are no

longer required, half the amount of their pay during life. Such

compensations with us depend on the judgment of congress, and from that

quarter also must proceed those charitable provisions which seem fairly

due to the disabled and infirm soldier who has faithfully served his

country.



A recent instance has proved that the charge of ingratitude cannot

always be justly preferred against a republic.



Invited to revisit a country, to which in, early life he had rendered

splendid and successful service; the heroism of General La Fayette has

been rewarded, not merely by unbounded effusions of the public mind, but

with a pecuniary compensation equally honourable to the donors and to

the receiver.



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1. See Barrington on Stat. 183, 237, 289. Hume's History of Eng. vol. v.

346. 519; and in 12 Coke, 19, it is considered as a prerogative

inseparable from the person of the king, of which, even an act of

parliament cannot deprive him.



2. March 19, 1816.