CHAPTER VI 

   On Mutual Duties, and First, That of Not Injuring Others



1. Next come the duties which a man must practice toward other men. Some of 

them spring from the common obligation, by which the Creator willed that all 

men as such should be bound together. But some flow from a definite 

institution, introduced or received by men, or from a certain adventitious 

status of men. The first are to be practiced by every man toward every 

other; the second only toward certain persons, a certain condition or status 

being assumed. Hence one may call the former absolute duties, the latter 

conditional. 



2. Among the absolute duties, i.e., of anybody to anybody, the first place 

belongs to this one: let no one injure another. For this is the broadest of 

all duties, embracing all men as such. It is also the easiest, as consisting 

in mere refraining from action, unless the passions that resist reason have 

somehow to be checked at times. Again, it is likewise the most necessary 

duty, because without it the social life could in no way exist. For with the 

man who confers no benefit upon me, who makes no interchange even of the 

common duties with me, I can still live at peace, provided he injure me in 

no way. In fact, from the vast majority of men we desire nothing more than 

that. Benefits are generally exchanged by the few. But with the man who 

injures me, I cannot by any means live peaceably. For nature has implanted 

in each man so sensitive a love of self and one's own possessions, that one 

cannot help repelling by every means the man who essays to injure them.



3. Moreover, this same duty is a bulwark not only to what a man has by 

nature itself, for instance, life, body, members, chastity, freedom, but 

also to all that has been acquired through some institution and convention 

of men. Hence by this precept it is forbidden to carry off, spoil, injure, 

or withdraw from our use, in whole or in part, anything that by any 

legitimate title is ours. Consequently the same duty is understood to 

interdict any crimes by which injury is inflicted upon others, as bloodshed, 

wounding, beating, robbery. theft, fraud, violence, directly or indirectly, 

mediately or immediately and the like.



4. It follows also that, if a man has been hurt by another, or a loss 

inflicted in any way that can be properly laid to the other's charge, it 

must so far as possible be made good by him. For otherwise it would be a 

vain injunction, not to injure, or not to inflict loss, if the man who has 

actually been injured must swallow his loss, and his assailant can in 

security, and without refunding, enjoy the profit of the wrong he has done. 

For human depravity will never refrain from mutual injuries, unless there is 

the necessity of restitution. And it would be difficult for the man who has 

suffered loss to make up his mind to live at peace with the other, so long 

as he did not obtain reparation from him.



5. Although, properly speaking, loss appears to concern an injury to things, 

the word is however understood by us here in a broad sense, to include every 

injury, spoiling, diminishing, or taking away, of that which is already 

ours; or intercepting of that which by a perfect right we ought to have, 

whether this may have been given us by nature, or assigned us by act of man, 

or by a law; or, finally, any omission or refusal on the part of another to 

perform anything which he was bound to do for us in accordance with a 

perfect obligation. But if things due us under an imperfect obligation 

merely are intercepted, it is not considered that a loss has been inflicted, 

which must be made good. For it would be unseemly to consider it a loss not 

to have received, or to demand compensation for, such things as I could not 

expect from another except as a voluntary gift, and things which I cannot 

reckon my own, until I have received them.



6. Under the term loss, moreover, comes not only a thing of ours, or owed to 

us, which is injured, destroyed, or intercepted, but also the fruits which 

spring from it, whether they have been gathered in already, or are still 

hoped for, provided the owner would have gathered them in. But we must 

deduct the outlay necessary to the gathering in of the crops. Also the 

valuation of anticipated crops is raised or lowered, according as they arc 

nearer Ac uncertain outcome, or further from it. Finally also, whatever 

flows later from an injury, as by natural necessity, is regarded as an 

integral part of the damage.



7. It is moreover possible for a man to inflict toss upon another not only 

immediately and of himself, bat also through others- And a loss caused 

immediately by a man can be imputed to the other, because, by doing 

something, or not doing something, he was bound to do, he has contributed to 

that result. Sometimes, as between several who have concurred in the same 

act, one is regarded as the principal cause, another as an accessory; 

sometimes all are on an even footing. With regard to these, we must observe 

that they are bound to make good the loss only in case they were realty the 

cause of the loss, and were a factor in the whole loss, or a part thereof. 

But when a man did not contribute any real assistance to that act itself 

which occasioned the loss, and did not previously cause it to be undertaken, 

and did not share in the profit, although at the time of the act he may 

involve himself in some misdeed, still he will not be bound to make 

restitution for Ac loss. Examples are, those who rejoice at others' 

misfortunes, those who afterward praise or excuse the damage, and those who 

beforehand hope it may happen, and approve or applaud at the time.



8. When several concur in a single act from which damage results, the first 

responsibility will be his, who by his authority, or in some other way 

involving constraint, urged others to act. The doer of the deed, if it was 

not open to him to refuse his services, will be accounted a mere instrument. 

Whoever without constraint has committed a crime will himself be responsible 

first of all, and then the others who contributed to the crime; with this 

reservation, that if the first in order have already made restitution, the 

rest are exempt (which is not the case with penalties). If several have 

committed a crime by conspiracy, they are collectively responsible for the 

individuals, and individually for all their companions, so that if all are 

arrested, each is bound to contribute his proper share to make good the 

damage. Where only one is seized, and the rest escape, he will be bound to 

pay for them all. But where some of those arrested are insolvent, the rich 

ones will be responsible for the whole amount. If, however, several have 

concurred in a crime without a conspiracy, and it can be clearly 

distinguished how much each has contributed to the damage, each will be 

bound to make good that part alone which was due to himself. But if one has 

paid the whole amount, the rest are exempt from restitution.



9. Not alone the man who has injured another with malice aforethought, is 

bound to make good the damage, but also he who, without direct intention, 

has done so through neglect, or a fault which it was easy to avoid. For it 

is not the smallest part of sociability, to act so circumspectly that our 

intercourse does not become formidable or insufferable to others. And then, 

in consequence of a particular obligation, one is often required to use 

extraordinary diligence. In fact even the slightest fault can suffice to 

require restitution, provided the nature of the matter does not actually 

resent, as it were, the most exact diligence; or if the blame does not 

belong rather to the man who suffers the damage, than to him who causes it; 

or unless great excitement, or the circumstances of the case, do not admit a 

studied circumspection; for example, if one, while brandishing his arms in 

the heat of battle, should injure a man standing near him.



10. But whoever injures by mere chance, and without his own fault is not 

bound to make restitution. For nothing having been committed which can be 

laid to the man's charge, there is no reason why the unwilling agent should 

atone for an evil that was destined to happen, rather than the other, who 

has suffered it.



11. Another precept in agreement with natural equity is that, if my man has 

caused damage to another without my fault, I should make it good to the 

injured party, or surrender my man to him. For a slave is of course 

naturally liable for reparation of damage he has caused. But since he has no 

property of his own, from which reparation may be made, and his person 

belongs to the master, it is surely right that the master should either mend 

the damage or surrender the slave. For otherwise a slave would be given 

license to injure any persons at his pleasure, if damages could not be 

recovered either from himself, who has nothing, not even himself, or from 

his master. For if, on account of an injury, a master is ever so willing to 

punish the slave with blows or imprisonment, the injured cannot possibly be 

satisfied thereby.



12. The same principle also seems to be right with regard to our animals, 

that when, even without our fault, and being of themselves excited contrary 

to the nature of their kind, they have caused damage to another man, the 

master should either make good the damage, or surrender the animal. For if I 

had been injured by an animal living in its natural freedom, I could 

certainly repair my loss in any way, seizing or killing the beast, -- a 

right which evidently could not have been taken away by the fact of 

ownership on the part of another. And since the owner receives gain from the 

animal, while I have suffered a loss from the same, and since repairing a 

loss finds far greater favor than making gain, it is clear that I may 

rightly demand of the master of the animal, that he make good the loss, or 

else, if the animal is not worth so much in his estimation, deliver it up to 

me.



13. So then, if a man has without malice aforethought caused damage to 

another, he is bound to make a voluntary offer of restitution, and testify 

that he was far from any malice, that the injured party may not hold him an 

enemy, and on his side plan acts of hostility. But one who has injured 

another maliciously, is not only bound to make a free offer of restitution, 

but also to show his repentance, and ask pardon. On the other side, the 

injured, once he has obtained restitution, is bound to grant pardon to the 

penitent who begs for it, and to be reconciled to him. For he who is 

unwilling to rest satisfied with restitution and repentance, but sets out to 

avenge himself anyhow with his own hand, is only humoring the bitterness of 

his heart, and so for an empty reason breaking the peace among men. For this 

reason even the natural law condemns vengeance, which has no other end than 

to harm those who have injured us, and satisfy our feelings with their 

suffering. But it is proper that men should be the more inclined to forgive 

mutual offenses, the more frequently they themselves violate the laws of the 

supreme Deity, and hence have daily need of forgiveness themselves.