ON THE ART OF WAR BY



              NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

      CITIZEN AND SECRETARY OF FLORENCE TO 



          LORENZO DI FILIPPO STROZZI,

            A GENTLEMEN OF FLORENCE



                  SIXTH BOOK



ZANOBI: I believe it is well, since the discussion ought to be changed, that 

Battista take up his office, and I resign mine; and in this case we would 

come to imitate the good Captains, according as I have already learned here 

from the Lord, who place the best soldiers in the front and in the rear of 

the Army, as it appears necessary to them to have those who bravely enkindle 

the battle, and those in the rear who bravely sustain it. Cosimo, therefore, 

begun this discussion prudently, and Battista will prudently finish it. 

Luigi and I have come in between these. And as each one of us has taken up 

his part willingly, so too I believe Battista is about to close it.



BATTISTA: I have allowed myself to be governed up to now, so too I will 

allow myself (to be governed) in the future. Be content, therefore, (my) 

Lords, to continue your discussions, and if we interrupt you with these 

questions (practices), you have to excuse us.



FABRIZIO: You do me, as I have already told you, a very great favor, since 

these interruptions of yours do not take away my imagination, rather they 

refresh it. But if we want to pursue our subject I say, that it is now time 

that we quarter this Army of ours, since you know that everything desires 

repose, and safety; since to repose oneself, and not to repose safely, is 

not complete (perfect) repose. I am afraid, indeed, that you should not 

desire that I should first quarter them, then had them march, and lastly to 

fight, and we have done the contrary. Necessity has led us to this, for in 

wanting to show when marching, how an army turns from a marching formation 

to that of battle, it was necessary first to show how they were organized 

for battle. But returning to our subject I say, that if you want the 

encampment to be safe, it must be Strong and Organized. The industry of the 

Captain makes it organized: Arts or the site make it Strong. The Greeks 

sought strong locations, and never took positions where there was neither 

grottoes (caves), or banks of rivers, or a multitude of trees, or other 

natural cover which should protect them. But the Romans did not encamp 

safely so much from the location as by arts, nor ever made an encampment in 

places where they should not have been able to spread out all their forces, 

according to their discipline. From this resulted that the Romans were 

always able to have one form of encampment, for they wanted the site to obey 

them, and not they the site. The Greeks were not able to observe this, for 

as they obeyed the site, and the sites changing the formation, it behooved 

them that they too should change the mode of encamping and the form of their 

encampment. The Romans, therefore, where the site lacked strength, supplied 

it with (their) art and industry. And since in this narration of mine, I 

have wanted that the Romans be imitated, I will not depart from their mode of 

encamping, not, however, observing all their arrangements: but taking (only) 

that part which at the present time seems appropriate to me. I have often 

told you that the Romans had two Legions of Roman men in their consular 

armies, which comprised some eleven thousand infantry of forces sent by 

friends (allies) to aid them; but they never had more foreign soldiers in 

their armies than Romans, except for cavalry, which they did not care if 

they exceeded the number in their Legions; and that in every action of 

theirs, they place the Legions in the center, and the Auxiliaries on the 

sides. Which method they observed even when they encamped, as you yourselves 

have been able to read in those who write of their affairs; and therefore I 

am not about to narrate in detail how they encamped, but will tell you only 

how I would at present arrange to encamp my army, and then you will know 

what part of the Roman methods I have treated. You know that at the 

encounter of two Roman Legions I have taken two Battalions of six thousand 

infantry and three hundred cavalry effective for each Battalion, and I have 

divided them by companies, by arms, and names. You know that in organizing 

the army for marching and fighting, I have not made mention of other forces, 

but have only shown that in doubling the forces, nothing else had to be done 

but to double the orders (arrangements).



Since at present I want to show you the manner of encamping, it appears 

proper to me not to stay only with two Battalions, but to assemble a fair 

army, and composed like the Roman of two Battalions and as many auxiliary 

forces. I know that the form of an encampment is more perfect, when a 

complete army is quartered: which matter did not appear necessary to me in 

the previous demonstration. If I want, therefore, to quarter a fair (sized) 

army of twenty four thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry effectives, 

being divided into four companies, two of your own forces and two of 

foreigners, I would employ this method. When I had found the site where I 

should want to encamp, I would raise the Captain's flag, and around it I 

would draw a square which would have each face distant from it fifty arm 

lengths, of which each should look out on one of the four regions of the 

sky, that is, east, west, south and north, in which space I would put the 

quarters of the Captain. And as I believe it prudent, and because thus the 

Romans did in good part, I would divide the armed men from the unarmed, and 

separate the men who carry burdens from the unburdened ones. I would quarter 

all or a greater part of the armed men on the east side, and the unarmed and 

burdened ones on the west side, making the east the front and the west the 

rear of the encampment, and the south and north would be the flanks. And to 

distinguish the quarters of the armed men, I would employ this method. I 

would run a line from the Captain's flag, and would lead it easterly for a 

distance of six hundred eighty (680) arm lengths. I would also run two other 

lines which I would place in the middle of it, and be of the same length as 

the former, but distant from each of them by fifteen arm lengths, at the 

extremity of which, I would want the east gate to be (placed): and the space 

which exists between the two extreme (end) lines, I would make a road that 

would go from the gate to the quarters of the Captain, which would be thirty 

arm lengths in width and six hundred thirty (630) long ((since the Captain's 

quarters would occupy fifty arm lengths)) and call this the Captain's Way. I 

would then make another road from the south gate up to the north gate, and 

cross by the head of the Captain's Way, and along the east side of the 

Captain's quarters which would be one thousand two hundred fifty (1250) arm 

lengths long ((since it would occupy the entire width of the encampment)) 

and also be thirty arm lengths wide and be called the Cross Way. The 

quarters of the Captain and these two roads having been designed, therefore 

the quarters of the two battalions of your own men should begin to be 

designed; and I would quarter one on the right hand (side) of the Captain's 

Way, and one on the left. And hence beyond the space which is occupied by 

the width of the Cross Way, I would place thirty two quarters on the left 

side of the Captain's Way, and thirty two on the right side, leaving a space 

of thirty arm lengths between the sixteenth and seventeenth quarters which 

should serve as a transverse road which should cross through all of the 

quarters of the battalions, as will be seen in their partitioning. Of these 

two arrangements of quarters, in the first tents that would be adjacent to 

the Cross Way, I would quarter the heads of men-at-arms, and since each 

company has one hundred and fifty men-at-arms, there would be assigned ten 

men-at-arms to each of the quarters. The area (space) of the quarters of the 

Heads should be forty arm lengths wide and ten arm lengths long. And it is 

to be noted that whenever I say width, I mean from south to north, and when 

I say length, that from west to east. Those of the men-at-arms should be 

fifteen arm lengths long and thirty wide. In the next fifteen quarters which 

in all cases are next ((which should have their beginning across the 

transverse road, and which would have the same space as those of the 

men-at-arms)) I would quarter the light cavalry, which, since they are one 

hundred fifty, ten cavalrymen would be assigned to each quarter, and in the 

sixteenth which would be left, I would quarter their Head, giving him the 

same space which is given to the Head of men-at-arms. And thus the quarters 

of the cavalry of the two battalions would come to place the Captain's Way 

in the center and give a rule for the quarters of the infantry, as I will 

narrate. You have noted that I have quartered the three hundred cavalry of 

each battalion with their heads in thirty two quarters situated on the 

Captain's Way, and beginning with the Cross Way, and that from the sixteenth 

to the seventeenth there is a space of thirty arm lengths to make a 

transverse road. If I want, therefore, to quarter the twenty companies which 

constitute the two regular Battalions, I would place the quarters of every 

two companies behind the quarters of the cavalry, each of which should be 

fifteen arm lengths long and thirty wide, as those of the cavalry, and 

should be joined on the rear where they touch one another. And in every 

first quarter of each band that fronts on the Cross Way, I would quarter the 

Constable of one company, which would come to correspond with the quartering 

of the Head of the men-at-arms: and their quarters alone would have a space 

twenty arm lengths in width and ten in length. And in the other fifteen 

quarters in each group which follow after this up the Transverse Way, I 

would quarter a company of infantry on each side, which, as they are four 

hundred fifty, thirty would be assigned to each quarter. I would place the 

other fifteen quarters contiguous in each group to those of the cavalry with 

the same space, in which I would quarter a company of infantry from each 

group. In the last quarter of each group I would place the Constable of the 

company, who would come to be adjacent to the Head of the light cavalry, 

with a space of ten arm lengths long and twenty wide. And thus these first 

two rows of quarters would be half of cavalry and half of infantry. 



And as I want ((as I told you in its place)) these cavalry to be all 

effective, and hence without retainers who help taking care of the horses or 

other necessary things, I would want these infantry quartered behind the 

cavalry should be obligated to help the owners (of the horses) in providing 

and taking care of them, and because of this should be exempt from other 

activities of the camp, which was the manner observed by the Romans. I would 

also leave behind these quarters on all sides a space of thirty arm lengths 

to make a road, and I would call one of the First Road on the right hand 

(side) and the other the First Road on the left, and in each area I would 

place another row of thirty two double quarters which should face one 

another on the rear, with the same spaces as those which I have mentioned, 

and also divided at the sixteenth in the same manner to create a Transverse 

Road, in which I would quarter in each area four companies of infantry with 

the Constables in the front at the head and foot (of each row). I would also 

leave on each side another space of thirty arm lengths to create a road 

which should be called the Second Road on the right hand (side) and on the 

other side the Second Road to the left; I would place another row in each 

area of thirty two double quarters, with the same distances and divisions, 

in which I would quarter on every side four companies (of infantry) with 

their Constables. And thus there would come to be quartered in three rows of 

quarters per area the cavalry and the companies (of infantry) of the two 

regular battalions, in the center of which I would place the Captain's Way. 

The two battalions of auxiliaries ((since I had them composed of the same 

men)) I would quarter on each side of these two regular battalions with the 

same arrangement of double quarters, placing first a row of quarters in 

which I should quarter half with cavalry and half infantry, distant thirty 

arm lengths from each other, to create two roads which I should call, one 

the Third Road on the right hand (side), the other the Third on the left 

hand. And then I would place on each side two other rows of quarters, 

separate but arranged in the same way, which are those of the regular 

battalions, which would create two other roads, and all of these would be 

called by the number and the band (side) where they should be situated. So 

that all this part of the Army would come to be quartered in twelve rows of 

double quarters, and on thirteen roads, counting the Captain's Way and the 

Cross Way.



I would want a space of one hundred arm lengths all around left between the 

quarters and the ditch (moat). And if you count all those spaces, you will 

see, that from the middle of the quarters of the Captain to the east gate, 

there are seven hundred arm lengths. There remains to us now two spaces, of 

which one is from the quarters of the Captain to the south gate, the other 

from there to the north gate, each of which comes to be, measuring from the 

center point, six hundred thirty five (635) arm lengths. I then subtract 

from each of these spaces fifty arm lengths which the quarters of the 

Captain occupies, and forty five arm lengths of plaza which I want to give 

to each side, and thirty arm lengths of road, which divides each of the 

mentioned spaces in the middle, and a hundred arm lengths which are left on 

each side between the quarters and the ditch, and there remains in each area 

a space left for quarters four hundred arm lengths wide and a hundred long, 

measuring the length to include the space occupied by the Captain's 

quarters. Dividing the said length in the middle, therefore, there would be 

on each side of the Captain forty quarters fifty arm lengths long and twenty 

wide, which would total eighty quarters, in which would be quartered the 

general Heads of the battalions, the Chamberlains, the Masters of the camps, 

and all those who should have an office (duty) in the army, leaving some 

vacant for some foreigners who might arrive, and for those who should fight 

through the courtesy of the Captain. On the rear side of the Captain's 

quarters, I would create a road thirty arm lengths wide from north to south, 

and call it the Front Road, which would come to be located along the eighty 

quarters mentioned, since this road and the Cross Way would have between 

them the Captain's quarters and the eighty quarters on their flanks. From 

this Front road and opposite to the Captain's quarters, I would create 

another road which should go from there to the west gate, also thirty arm 

lengths wide, and corresponding in location and length to the Captain's Way, 

and I should call it the Way of the Plaza. These two roads being located, I 

would arrange the plaza where the market should be made, which I would place 

at the head of the Way of the Plaza, opposite to the Captain's quarters, and 

next to the Front Road, and would want it to be square, and would allow it a 

hundred twenty one arm lengths per side. And from the right hand and left 

hand of the said plaza, I would make two rows of quarters, and each row have 

eight double quarters, which would take up twelve arm lengths in length and 

thirty in width so that they should be on each side of the plaza, in which 

there would be sixteen quarters, and total thirty two all together, in which 

I would quarter that cavalry left over from the auxiliary battalions, and if 

this should not be enough, I would assign them some of the quarters about the 

Captain, and especially those which face the ditch.



It remains for us now to quarter the extraordinary pikemen and Veliti, which 

every battalion has; which you know, according to our arrangement, in 

addition to the ten companies (of infantry), each has a thousand 

extraordinary pikemen, and five hundred Veliti; so that each of the two 

regular battalions have two thousand extraordinary pikemen, and a thousand 

extraordinary pikemen, and five hundred Veliti; so that each of the two 

regular battalions have two thousand extraordinary pikemen, and a thousand 

extraordinary Veliti, and the auxiliary as many as they; so that one also 

comes to have to quarter six thousand infantry, all of whom I would quarter 

on the west side along the ditches. From the point, therefore, of the Front 

Road, and northward, leaving the space of a hundred arm lengths from those 

(quarters) to the ditch, I would place a row of five double quarters which 

would be seventy five arm lengths long and sixty in width: so that with the 

width divided, each quarters would be allowed fifteen arm lengths for length 

and thirty for width. And as there would be ten quarters, I would quarter 

three hundred infantry, assigning thirty infantry to each quarters. Leaving 

then a space of thirty one arm lengths, I would place another row of five 

double quarters in a similar manner and with similar spaces, and then 

another, so that there would be five rows of five double quarters, which 

would come to be fifty quarters placed in a straight line on the north side, 

each distant one hundred arm lengths from the ditches, which would quarter 

one thousand five hundred infantry. Turning then on the left hand side 

toward the west gate, I would want in all that tract between them and the 

said gate, five other rows of double quarters, in a similar manner and with 

the same spaces, ((it is true that from one row to the other there would not 

be more than fifteen arm lengths of space)) in which there would also be 

quartered a thousand five hundred infantry: and thus from the north gate to 

that on the west, following the ditches, in a hundred quarters, divided into 

ten rows of five double quarters per row, the extraordinary pikemen and 

Veliti of the regular battalions would be quartered. And so, too, from the 

west gate to that on the south, following the ditches, in exactly the same 

manner, in another ten rows of ten quarters per row, the extraordinary 

pikemen and Veliti of the auxiliary battalions would be quartered. Their 

Heads, or rather their Constables, could take those quarters on the side 

toward the ditches which appeared most convenient for themselves.



I would dispose the artillery all along the embankments of the ditches: and 

in all the other space remaining toward the west, I would quarter all the 

unarmed men and all the baggage (impedimenta) of the Camp. And it has to be 

understood that under this name of impedimenta ((as you know)) the ancients 

intended all those carriages (wagons) and all those things which are 

necessary to an Army, except the soldiers; as are carpenters (wood workers), 

smiths, blacksmiths, shoe makers, engineers, and bombardiers, and others 

which should be placed among the number of the armed: herdsmen with their 

herds of castrated sheep and oxen, which are used for feeding the Army: and 

in addition, masters of every art (trade), together with public wagons for 

the public provisions of food and arms. And I would not particularly 

distinguish their quarters: I would only designate the roads that should not 

be occupied by them. Then the other spaces remaining between the roads, which 

would be four, I would assign in general to all the impedimenta mentioned, 

that is, one to the herdsmen, another to Artificers and workmen, another to 

the public wagons for provisions, and the fourth to the armorers. The roads 

which I would want left unoccupied would be the Way of the Plaza, the Front 

Road, and in addition, a road that should be called the Center Road, which 

should take off at the north and proceed toward the south, and pass through 

the center of the Way of the Plaza, which, on the west side, should have the 

same effect as has the Transverse Road on the east side. And in addition to 

this a Road that should go around the rear along the quarters of the 

extraordinary pikemen and Veliti. And all these roads should be thirty arm 

lengths wide. And I would dispose the artillery along the ditches on the 

rear of the camp.



BATTISTA: I confess I do not understand, and I also do not believe that to 

say so makes me ashamed, as this is not my profession. None the less, I like 

this organization very much: I would want only that you should resolve these 

doubts for me. The one, why you make the roads and the spaces around the 

quarters so wide. The other, which annoys me more, is this, how are these 

spaces that you designate for quarters to be used.



FABRIZIO: You know that I made all the roads thirty arm lengths wide, so 

that a company of infantry is able to go through them in order (formation): 

which, if you remember well, I told you that each of these (formations) were 

twenty five to thirty arm lengths wide. The space between the ditch and the 

quarters, which is a hundred arm lengths wide, is necessary, since the 

companies and the artillery can be handled here, through which booty is 

taken, (and) when space is needed into which to retire, new ditches and 

embankments are made. The quarters very distant from the ditches are better, 

for they are more distant from the fires and other things that might be able 

to draw the enemy to attack them. As to the second question, my intention is 

not that every space designated by me is covered by only one pavilion, but is 

to be used as an all-round convenience for those who are quartered, with 

several or few tents, so long as they do not go outside its limits. And in 

designing these quarters, the men must be most experienced and excellent 

architects, who, as soon as the Captain has selected the site, know how to 

give it form, and divide it, and distinguishing the roads, dividing the 

quarters with cords and hatchets in such a practical manner, that they might 

be divided and arranged quickly. And if confusion is not to arise, the camp 

must always face the same way, so that everyone will know on which Road and 

in which space he has to find his quarters. And this ought to be observed at 

all times, in every place, and in a manner that it appears to be a movable 

City, which, wherever it goes, brings with it the same roads, the same 

houses, and the same appearance: which cannot be observed by those men who, 

seeking strong locations, have to change the form according to the 

variations in the sites. But the Romans made the places strong with ditches, 

ramparts, and embankments, for they placed a space around the camp, and in 

front of it they dug a ditch and ordinarily six arm lengths wide and three 

deep, which spaces they increased according to the (length of) time they 

resided in the one place, and according as they feared the enemy. For 

myself, I would not at present erect a stockade (rampart), unless I should 

want to winter in a place. I would, however, dig the ditch and embankment, 

not less than that mentioned, but greater according to the necessity. With 

respect to the artillery, on every side of the encampment, I would have a 

half circle ditch, from which the artillery should be able to batter on the 

flanks whoever should come to attack the moats (ditches). The soldiers ought 

also to be trained in this practice of knowing how to arrange an encampment, 

and work with them so they may aid him in designing it, and the soldiers 

quick in knowing their places. And none of these is difficult, as will be 

told in its proper place. For now I want to pass on to the protection of the 

camp, which, without the distribution (assignment) of guards, all the other 

efforts would be useless.



BATTISTA: Before you pass on to the guards, I would want you to tell me, 

what methods are employed when others want to place the camp near the enemy, 

for I do not know whether there is time to be able to organize it without 

danger.



FABRIZIO: You have to know this, that no Captain encamps near the enemy, 

unless he is disposed to come to an engagement whenever the enemy wants; and 

if the others are so disposed, there is no danger except the ordinary, since 

two parts of the army are organized to make an engagement, while the other 

part makes the encampment. In cases like this, the Romans assigned this 

method of fortifying the quarters to the Triari, while the Principi and the 

Astati remained under arms. They did this, because the Triari, being the 

last to combat, were in time to leave the work if the enemy came, and take 

up their arms and take their places. If you want to imitate the Romans, you 

have to assign the making of the encampment to that company which you would 

want to put in the place of the Triari in the last part of the army.



But let us return to the discussion of the guards. I do not seem to find in 

connection with the ancients guarding the camp at night, that they had 

guards outside, distant from the ditches, as is the custom today, which they 

call the watch. I believe I should do this, when I think how the army could 

be easily deceived, because of the difficulty which exists in checking 

(reviewing) them, for they may be corrupted or attacked by the enemy, so 

that they judged it dangerous to trust them entirely or in part. And 

therefore all the power of their protection was within the ditches, which 

they dug with very great diligence and order, punishing capitally anyone who 

deviated from such an order. How this was arranged by them, I will not talk 

to you further in order not to tire you, since you are able to see it by 

yourselves, if you have not seen it up to now. I will say only briefly what 

would be done by me. I would regularly have a third of the army remain armed 

every night, and a fourth of them always on foot, who would be distributed 

throughout the embankments and all the places of the army, with double 

guards posted at each of its squares, where a part should remain, and a part 

continually go from one side of the encampment to the other. And this 

arrangement I describe, I would also observe by day if I had the enemy near. 

As to giving it a name, and renewing it every night, and doing the other 

things that are done in such guarding, since they are things (already) 

known, I will not talk further of them. I would only remind you of a most 

important matter, and by observing it do much good, by not observing it do 

much evil; which is, that great diligence be used as to who does not lodge 

within the camp at night, and who arrives there anew. And this is an easy 

matter, to review who is quartered there, with those arrangements we have 

designated, since every quarter having a predetermined number of men, it is 

an easy thing to see if there are any men missing or if any are left over; 

and when they are missing without permission, to punish them as fugitives, 

and if they are left over, to learn who they are, what they know, and what 

are their conditions. Such diligence results in the enemy not being able to 

have correspondence with your Heads, and not to have co-knowledge of your 

counsels. If this had not been observed with diligence by the Romans, 

Claudius Nero could not, when he had Hannibal near to him, have departed 

from the encampment he had in Lucania, and go and return from the Marches, 

without Hannibal having been aware of it. But it is not enough to make these 

good arrangements, unless they are made to be observed by great security, 

for there is nothing that wants so much observance as any required in the 

army. Therefore, the laws for their enforcement should be harsh and hard, 

and the executor very hard. The Roman punished with the capital penalty 

whoever was missing from the guard, whoever abandoned the place given him in 

combat, whoever brought anything concealed from outside the encampment; if 

anyone should tell of having performed some great act in battle, and should 

not have done it; if anyone should have fought except at the command of the 

Captain, if anyone from fear had thrown aside his arms. And if it occurred 

that an entire Cohort or an entire Legion had made a similar error, in order 

that they not all be put to death, they put their names in a purse, and drew 

the tenth part, and those they put to death. Which penalty was so carried 

out, that if everyone did not hear of it, they at least feared it. And 

because where there are severe punishments, there also ought to be rewards, 

so that men should fear and hope at the same time, they proposed rewards for 

every great deed; such as to him who, during the fighting, saved the life of 

one of its citizens, to whoever first climbed the walls of enemy towns, to 

whoever first entered the encampment of the enemy, to whoever in battle 

wounded or killed an enemy, to whoever had thrown him from his horse. And 

thus any act of virtu was recognized and rewarded by the Consuls, and 

publicly praised by everyone: and those who received gifts for any of these 

things, in addition to the glory and fame they acquired among the soldiers, 

when they returned to their country, exhibited them with solemn pomp and 

with great demonstrations among their friends and relatives. It is not to 

marvel therefore, if that people acquired so much empire, when they had so 

great an observance of punishment and reward toward them, which operated 

either for their good or evil, should merit either praise or censure; it 

behooves us to observe the greater part of these things. And it does not 

appear proper for me to be silent on a method of punishment observed by 

them, which was, that as the miscreant was convicted before the Tribune or 

the Consul, he was struck lightly by him with a rod: after which striking of 

the criminal, he was allowed to flee, and all the soldiers allowed to kill 

him, so that immediately each of them threw stones or darts, or hit him with 

other arms, of a kind from which he went little alive, and rarely returned 

to camp; and to such that did return to camp, he was not allowed to return 

home except with so much inconvenience and ignominy, that it was much better 

for him to die. You see this method almost observed by the Swiss, who have 

the condemned publicly put to death by the other soldiers. Which is well 

considered and done for the best, for if it is desired that one be not a 

defender of a criminal, the better remedy that is found, is to make him the 

punisher of him (the criminal); for in some respects he favors him while 

from other desires he longs for his punishment, if he himself is the 

executioner, than if the execution is carried out by another. If you want, 

therefore, that one is not to be favored in his mistakes by a people, a good 

remedy is to see to it that the public judged him. In support of this, the 

example of Manlius Capitol that can be cited, who, when he was accused by 

the Senate, was defended so much by the public up to the point where it no 

longer became the judge: but having become arbiter of his cause, condemned 

him to death. It is, therefore, a method of punishing this, of doing away 

with tumults, and of having justice observed. And since in restraining armed 

men, the fear of laws, or of men, is not enough, the ancients added the 

authority of God: and, therefore, with very great ceremony, they made their 

soldiers swear to observe the military discipline, so that if they did the 

contrary, they not only had to fear the laws and men, but God; and they used 

every industry to fill them with Religion.



BATTISTA: Did the Romans permit women to be in their armies, or that they 

indulge in indolent games that are used to day?



FABRIZIO: They prohibited both of them, and this prohibition was not very 

difficult, because the exercises which they gave each day to the soldiers 

were so many, sometimes being occupied all together, sometimes individually, 

that no time was left to them to think either of Venery, or of games, or of 

other things which make soldiers seditious and useless.



BATTISTA: I like that. But tell me, when the army had to take off, what 

arrangements did they have?



FABRIZIO: The captain's trumpet was sounded three times: at the first sound 

the tents were taken down and piled into heaps, at the second they loaded 

the burdens, and at the third they moved in the manner mentioned above, with 

the impedimenta behind, the armed men on every side, placing the Legions in 

the center. And, therefore, you would have to have a battalion of 

auxiliaries move, and behind it its particular impedimenta, and with those 

the fourth part of the public impedimenta, which would be all those who 

should be quartered in one of those (sections of the camp) which we showed a 

short while back. And, therefore, it would be well to have each one of them 

assigned to a battalion, so that when the army moved, everyone would know 

where his place was in marching. And every battalion ought to proceed on its 

way in this fashion with its own impedimenta, and with a quarter of the 

public (impedimenta) at its rear, as we showed the Roman army marched.



BATTISTA: In placing the encampment, did they have other considerations than 

those you mentioned?



FABRIZIO: I tell you again, that in their encampments, the Romans wanted to 

be able to employ the usual form of their method, in the observance of 

which, they took no other consideration. But as to other considerations, 

they had two principal ones: the one, to locate themselves in a healthy 

place: to locate themselves where the enemy should be unable to besiege 

them, and cut off their supply of water and provisions. To avoid this 

weakness, therefore, they avoided marshy places, or exposure to noxious 

winds. They recognized these, not so much from the characteristics of the 

site, but from the looks of the inhabitants: and if they saw them with poor 

color, or short winded, or full of other infections, they did not encamp 

there. As to the other part of not being besieged, the nature of the place 

must be considered, where the friends are, and where the enemy, and from 

these make a conjecture whether or not you can be besieged. And, therefore, 

the Captain must be very expert concerning sites of the countries, and have 

around him many others who have the same expertness. They also avoided 

sickness and hunger so as not to disorganize the army; for if you want to 

keep it healthy, you must see to it that the soldiers sleep under tents, 

that they are quartered, where there are trees to create shade, where there 

is wood to cook the food, and not to march in the heat. You need, therefore, 

to consider the encampment the day before you arrive there, and in winter 

guard against marching in the snow and through ice without the convenience 

of making a fire, and not lack necessary clothing, and not to drink bad 

water. Those who get sick in the house, have them taken care of by doctors; 

for a captain has no remedy when he has to fight both sickness and the 

enemy. But nothing is more useful in maintaining an army healthy than 

exercise: and therefore the ancients made them exercise every day. Whence it 

is seen how much exercise is of value, for in the quarters it keeps you 

healthy, and in battle it makes you victorious. As to hunger, not only is it 

necessary to see that the enemy does not impede your provisions, but to 

provide whence you are to obtain them, and to see that those you have are 

not lost. And, therefore, you must always have provisions (on hand) for the 

army for a month, and beyond that to tax the neighboring friends that they 

provide you daily, keep the provisions in a strong place, and, above all, 

dispense it with diligence, giving each one a reasonable measure each day, 

and so observe this part that they do not become disorganized; for every 

other thing in war can be overcome with time, this only with time overcomes 

you. Never make anyone your enemy, who, while seeking to overcome you with 

the sword (iron), can overcome you by hunger, because if such a victory is 

not as honorable, it is more secure and more certain. That army, therefore, 

cannot escape hunger which does not observe justice, and licentiously consume 

whatever it please, for one evil causes the provisions not to arrive, and 

the other that when they arrive, they are uselessly consumed: therefore the 

ancients arranged that what was given was eaten, and in the time they 

assigned, so that no soldier ate except when the Captain did. Which, as to 

being observed by the modern armies, everyone does (the contrary), and 

deservedly they cannot be called orderly and sober as the ancients, but 

licentious and drunkards.



BATTISTA: You have said in the beginning of arranging the encampment, that 

you did not want to stay only with two battalions, but took up four, to show 

how a fair (sized) army was quartered. Therefore I would want you to tell me 

two things: the one, if I have more or less men, how should I quarter them: 

the other, what number of soldiers would be enough to fight against any 

enemy?



FABRIZIO: To the first question, I reply, that if the army has four or six 

thousand soldiers more or less, rows of quarters are taken away or added as 

are needed, and in this way it is possible to accommodate more or fewer 

infinitely. None the less, when the Romans joined together two consular 

armies, they made two encampments and had the parts of the disarmed men face 

each other. As to the second question, I reply, that the regular Roman army 

had about twenty four thousand soldiers: but when a great force pressed 

them, the most they assembled were fifty thousand. With this number they 

opposed two hundred thousand Gauls whom they assaulted after the first war 

which they had with the Carthaginians. With the same number, they opposed 

Hannibal. And you have to note that the Romans and Greeks had made war with 

few (soldiers), strengthened by order and by art; the westerners and 

easterners had made it with a multitude: but one of these nations serves 

itself of natural fury, as are the westerners; the other of the great 

obedience which its men show to their King. But in Greece and Italy, as 

there is not this natural fury, nor the natural reverence toward their King, 

it has been necessary to turn to discipline; which is so powerful, that it 

made the few able to overcome the fury and natural obstinacy of the many. I 

tell you, therefore, if you want to imitate the Romans and Greeks, the 

number of fifty thousand soldiers ought not to be exceeded, rather they 

should actually be less; for the many cause confusion, and do not allow 

discipline to be observed nor the orders learned. And Pyrrhus used to say 

that with fifteen thousand men he would assail the world.



But let us pass on to another part. We have made our army win an engagement, 

and I showed the troubles that can occur in battle; we have made it march, 

and I have narrated with what impedimenta it can be surrounded while 

marching: and lastly we have quartered it: where not only a little repose 

from past hardship ought to be taken, but also to think about how the war 

ought to be concluded; for in the quarters, many things are discussed, 

especially if there remain enemies in the field, towns under suspicion, of 

which it is well to reassure oneself, and to capture those which are 

hostile. It is necessary, therefore, to come to these demonstrations, and to 

pass over this difficulty with that (same) glory with which we have fought 

up to the present. Coming down to particulars, therefore, that if it should 

happen to you that many men or many peoples should do something, which might 

be useful to you and very harmful to them, as would be the destruction of 

the walls of their City, or the sending of many of themselves into exile, it 

is necessary that you either deceive them in a way that everyone should 

believe he is affected, so that one not helping the other, all find 

themselves oppressed without a remedy, or rather, to command everyone what 

they ought to do on the same day, so that each one believing himself to be 

alone to whom the command is given, thinks of obeying it, and not of a 

remedy; and thus, without tumult, your command is executed by everyone. If 

you should have suspicion of the loyalty of any people, and should want to 

assure yourself and occupy them without notice, in order to disguise your 

design more easily, you cannot do better than to communicate to him some of 

your design, requesting his aid, and indicate to him you want to undertake 

another enterprise, and to have a mind alien to every thought of his: which 

will cause him not to think of his defense, as he does not believe you are 

thinking of attacking him, and he will give you the opportunity which will 

enable you to satisfy your desire easily. If you should have present in your 

army someone who keeps the enemy advised of your designs, you cannot do 

better if you want to avail yourself of his evil intentions, than to 

communicate to him those things you do not want to do, and keep silent those 

things you want to do, and tell him you are apprehensive of the things of 

which you are not apprehensive, and conceal those things of which you are 

apprehensive: which will cause the enemy to undertake some enterprise, in 

the belief that he knows your designs, in which you can deceive him and 

defeat him. If you should design ((as did Claudius Nero)) to decrease your 

army, sending aid to some friend, and they should not be aware of it, it is 

necessary that the encampment be not decreased, but to maintain entire all 

the signs and arrangements, making the same fires and posting the same guards 

as for the entire army. Likewise, if you should attach a new force to your 

army, and do not want the enemy to know you have enlarged it, it is 

necessary that the encampment be not increased, for it is always most useful 

to keep your designs secret. Whence Metellus, when he was with the armies in 

Spain, to one who asked him what he was going to do the next day, answered 

that if his shirt knew it, he would bum it. Marcus Crassus, to one who asked 

him when he was going to move his army, said: "do you believe you are alone 

in not hearing the trumpets?" If you should desire to learn the secrets of 

your enemy and know his arrangement, some used to send ambassadors, and with 

them men expert in war disguised in the clothing of the family, who, taking 

the opportunity to observe the enemy army, and consideration of his 

strengths and weaknesses, have given them the occasion to defeat him. Some 

have sent a close friend of theirs into exile, and through him have learned 

the designs of their adversary. You may also learn similar secrets from the 

enemy if you should take prisoners for this purpose. Marius, in the war he 

waged against Cimbri, in order to learn the loyalty of those Gauls who lived 

in Lombardy and were leagued with the Roman people, sent them letters, open 

and sealed: and in the open ones he wrote them that they should not open the 

sealed ones except at such a time: and before that time, he called for them 

to be returned, and finding them opened, knew their loyalty was not 

complete. Some Captains, when they were assaulted have not wanted to go to 

meet the enemy, but have gone to assail his country, and constrain him to 

return to defend his home. This often has turned out well, because your 

soldiers begin to win and fill themselves with booty and confidence, while 

those of the enemy become dismayed, it appearing to them that from being 

winners, they have become losers. So that to whoever has made this 

diversion, it has turned out well. But this can only be done by that man who 

has his country stronger than that of the enemy, for if it were otherwise, 

he would go on to lose. It has often been a useful thing for a Captain who 

finds himself besieged in the quarters of the enemy, to set in motion 

proceedings for an accord, and to make a truce with him for several days; 

which only any enemy negligent in every way will do, so that availing 

yourself of his negligence, you can easily obtain the opportunity to get out 

of his hands. Sulla twice freed himself from his enemies in this manner, and 

with this same deceit, Hannibal in Spain got away from the forces of 

Claudius Nero, who had besieged him.



It also helps one in freeing himself from the enemy to do something in 

addition to those mentioned, which keeps him at bay. This is done in two 

ways: either by assaulting him with part of your forces, so that intent on 

the battle, he gives the rest of your forces the opportunity to be able to 

save themselves, or to have some new incident spring up, which, by the 

novelty of the thing, makes him wonder, and for this reason to become 

apprehensive and stand still, as you know Hannibal did, who, being trapped 

by Fabius Maximus, at night placed some torches between the horns of many 

oxen, so that Fabius is suspense over this novelty, did not think further of 

impeding his passage. A Captain ought, among all the other actions of his, 

endeavor with every art to divide the forces of the enemy, either by making 

him suspicious of his men in whom he trusted, or by giving him cause that he 

has to separate his forces, and, because of this, become weaker. The first 

method is accomplished by watching the things of some of those whom he has 

next to him, as exists in war, to save his possessions, maintaining his 

children or other of his necessities without charge. You know how Hannibal, 

having burned all the fields around Rome, caused only those of Fabius 

Maximus to remain safe. You know how Coriolanus, when he came with the army 

to Rome, saved the possessions of the Nobles, and burned and sacked those of 

the Plebs. When Metellus led the army against Jugurtha, all me ambassadors, 

sent to him by Jugurtha, were requested by him to give up Jugurtha as a 

prisoner; afterwards, writing letters to these same people on the same 

subject, wrote in such a way that in a little while Jugurtha became 

suspicious of all his counsellors, and in different ways, dismissed them. 

Hannibal, having taken refuge with Antiochus, the Roman ambassadors 

frequented him so much at home, that Antiochus becoming suspicious of him, 

did not afterwards have any faith in his counsels. As to dividing the enemy 

forces, there is no more certain way than to have one country assaulted by 

part of them (your forces), so that being constrained to go to defend it, 

they (of that country) abandon the war. This is the method employed by 

Fabius when his Army had encountered the forces of the Gauls, the Tuscans, 

Umbrians, and Samnites. Titus Didius, having a small force in comparison 

with those of the enemy, and awaiting a Legion from Rome, the enemy wanted 

to go out to meet it; so that in order that it should not do so, he gave out 

by voice throughout his army that he wanted to undertake an engagement with 

the enemy on the next day; then he took steps that some of the prisoners he 

had were given the opportunity to escape, who carried back the order of the 

Consul to fight on the next day, (and) caused the enemy, in order not to 

diminish his forces, not to go out to meet that Legion: and in this way, 

kept himself safe. Which method did not serve to divide the forces of the 

enemy, but to double his own. Some, in order to divide his (the enemy) 

forces, have employed allowing him to enter their country, and (in proof) 

allowed him to take many towns so that by placing guards in them, he 

diminished his forces, and in this manner having made him weak, assaulted 

and defeated him. Some others, when they wanted to go into one province, 

feigned making an assault on another, and used so much industry, that as 

soon as they extended toward that one where there was no fear they would 

enter, have overcome it before the enemy had time to succor it. For the 

enemy, as he is not certain whether you are to return back to the place 

first threatened by you, is constrained not to abandon the one place and 

succor the other, and thus often he does not defend either. In addition to 

the matters mentioned, it is important to a Captain when sedition or discord 

arises among the soldiers, to know how to extinguish it with art. The better 

way is to castigate the heads of this folly (error); but to do it in a way 

that you are able to punish them before they are able to become aware of it. 

The method is, if they are far from you, not to call only the guilty ones, 

but all the others together with them, so that as they do not believe there 

is any cause to punish them, they are not disobedient, but provide the 

opportunity for punishment. When they are present, one ought to strengthen 

himself with the guiltless, and by their aid, punish them. If there should 

be discord among them, the best way is to expose them to danger, which fear 

will always make them united. But, above all, what keeps the Army united, is 

the reputation of its Captain, which only results from his virtu, for 

neither blood (birth) or authority attain it without virtu. And the first 

thing a Captain is expected to do, is to see to it that the soldiers are 

paid and punished; for any time payment is missed, punishment must also be 

dispensed with, because you cannot castigate a soldier you rob, unless you 

pay him; and as he wants to live, he can abstain from being robbed. But if 

you pay him but do not punish him, he becomes insolent in every way, because 

you become of little esteem, and to whomever it happens, he cannot maintain 

the dignity of his position; and if he does not maintain it, of necessity, 

tumults and discords follow, which are the ruin of an Army. The Ancient 

Captains had a molestation from which the present ones are almost free, 

which was the interpretation of sinister omen to their undertakings; for if 

an arrow fell in an army, if the Sun or the Moon was obscured, if an 

earthquake occurred, if the Captain fell while either mounting or 

dismounting from his horse, it was interpreted in a sinister fashion by the 

soldiers, and instilled so much fear in them, that when they came to an 

engagement, they were easily defeated. And, therefore, as soon as such an 

incident occurred, the ancient Captains either demonstrated the cause of it 

or reduced it to its natural causes, or interpreted it to (favor) their own 

purposes. When Caesar went to Africa, and having fallen while he was putting 

out to sea, said, "Africa, I have taken you": and many have profited from an 

eclipse of the Moon and from earthquakes: these things cannot happen in our 

time, as much because our men are not as superstitious, as because our 

Religion, by itself, entirely takes away such ideas. Yet if it should occur, 

the orders of the ancients should be imitated. When, either from hunger, or 

other natural necessity, or human passion, your enemy is brought to extreme 

desperation, and, driven by it, comes to fight with you, you ought to remain 

within your quarters, and avoid battle as much as you can. Thus the 

Lacedemonians did against the Messinians: thus Caesar did against Afranius 

and Petreius. When Fulvius was Consul against the Cimbri, he had the cavalry 

assault the enemy continually for many days, and considered how they would 

issue forth from their quarters in order to pursue them; whence he placed an 

ambush behind the quarters of the Cimbri, and had them assaulted by the 

cavalry, and when the Cimbri came out of their quarters to pursue them, 

Fulvius seized them and plundered them. It has been very effective for a 

Captain, when his army is in the vicinity of the enemy army, to send his 

forces with the insignia of the enemy, to rob and burn his own country: 

whence the enemy, believing they were forces coming to their aid, also ran 

out to help them plunder, and, because of this, have become disorganized and 

given the adversary the faculty of overcoming them. Alexander of Epirus used 

these means fighting against the Illirici, and Leptenus the Syracusan 

against the Carthaginians, and the design succeeded happily for both. Many 

have overcome the enemy by giving him the faculty of eating and drinking 

beyond his means, feigning being afraid, and leaving his quarters full of 

wine and herds, and when the enemy had filled himself beyond every natural 

limit, they assaulted him and overcome him with injury to him. Thus Tamirus 

did against Cyrus, and Tiberius Gracchus against the Spaniards. Some have 

poisoned the wine and other things to eat in order to be able to overcome 

them more easily. A little while ago, I said I did not find the ancients had 

kept a night Watch outside, and I thought they did it to avoid the evils 

that could happen, for it has been found that sometimes, the sentries posted 

in the daytime to keep watch for the enemy, have been the ruin of him who 

posted them; for it has happened often that when they had been taken, and by 

force had been made to give the signal by which they called their own men, 

who, coming at the signal, have been either killed or taken. Sometimes it 

helps to deceive the enemy by changing one of your habits, relying on which, 

he is ruined: as a Captain had already done, who, when he wanted to have a 

signal made to his men indicating the coming of the enemy, at night with 

fire and in the daytime with smoke, commanded that both smoke and flame be 

made without any intermission; so that when the enemy came, he should remain 

in the belief that he came without being seen, as he did not see the signals 

(usually) made to indicate his discovery, made ((because of his going 

disorganized)) the victory of his adversary easier. Menno Rodius, when he 

wanted to draw the enemy from the strong places, sent one in the disguise of 

a fugitive, who affirmed that his army was full of discord, and that the 

greater part were deserting, and to give proof of the matter, had certain 

tumults started among the quarters: whence to the enemy, thinking he was 

able to break him, assaulted him and was routed.



In addition to the things mentioned, one ought to take care not to bring the 

enemy to extreme desperation; which Caesar did when he fought the Germans, 

who, having blocked the way to them, seeing that they were unable to flee, 

and necessity having made them brave, desired rather to undergo the hardship 

of pursuing them if they defended themselves. Lucullus, when he saw that 

some Macedonian cavalry who were with him, had gone over to the side of the 

enemy, quickly sounded the call to battle, and commanded the other forces to 

pursue it: whence the enemy, believing that Lucullus did not want to start 

the battle, went to attack the Macedonians with such fury, that they were 

constrained to defend themselves, and thus, against their will, they became 

fighters of the fugitives. Knowing how to make yourself secure of a town 

when you have doubts of its loyalty once you have conquered it, or before, 

is also important; which some examples of the ancients teach you. Pompey, 

when he had doubts of the Catanians, begged them to accept some infirm 

people he had in his army, and having sent some very robust men in the 

disguise of infirm ones, occupied the town. Publius Valerius, fearful of the 

loyalty of the Epidaurians, announced an amnesty to be held, as we will tell 

you, at a Church outside the town, and when all the public had gone there 

for the amnesty, he locked the doors, and then let no one out from inside 

except those whom he trusted. Alexander the Great, when he wanted to go into 

Asia and secure Thrace for himself, took with him all the chiefs of this 

province, giving them provisions, and placed lowborn men in charge of the 

common people of Thrace; and thus he kept the chiefs content by paying them, 

and the common people quiet by not having Heads who should disquiet them. 

But among all the things by which Captains gain the people over to 

themselves, are the examples of chastity and justice, as was that of Scipio 

in Spain when he returned that girl, beautiful in body, to her husband and 

father, which did more than arms in gaining over Spain. Caesar, when he paid 

for the lumber that he used to make the stockades around his army in Gaul, 

gained such a name for himself of being just, that he facilitated the 

acquisition of that province for himself. I do not know what else remains 

for me to talk about regarding such events, and there does not remain any 

part of this matter that has not been discussed by us. The only thing 

lacking is to tell of the methods of capturing and defending towns, which I 

am about to do willingly, if it is not painful for you now.



BATTISTA: Your humaneness is so great, that it makes us pursue our desires 

without being afraid of being held presumptuous, since you have offered it 

willingly, that we would be ashamed to ask you. Therefore we say only this 

to you, that you cannot do a greater or more thankful benefit to us than to 

furnish us this discussion. But before you pass on to that other matter, 

resolve a doubt for us: whether it is better to continue the war even in 

winter, as is done today, or wage it only in the summer, and go into 

quarters in the winter, as the ancients did.



FABRIZIO: Here, if there had not been the prudence of the questioner, some 

part that merits consideration would have been omitted. I tell you again 

that the ancients did everything better and with more prudence than we; and 

if some error is made in other things, all are made in matters of war. There 

is nothing more imprudent or more perilous to a Captain than to wage war in 

winter, and more dangerous to him who brings it, than to him who awaits it. 

The reason is this: all the industry used in military discipline, is used in 

order to be organized to undertake an engagement with your enemy, as this is 

the end toward which a Captain must aim, for the engagement makes you win or 

lose a war. Therefore, whoever know how to organize it better, and who has 

his army better disciplined, has the greater advantage in this, and can hope 

more to win it. On the other hand, there is nothing more inimical to 

organization than the rough sites, or cold and wet seasons; for the rough 

side does not allow you to use the plentitude (of your forces) according to 

discipline, and the cold and wet seasons do not allow you to keep your 

forces together, and you cannot have them face the enemy united, but of 

necessity, you must quarter them separately, and without order, having to 

take into account the castles, hamlets, and farm houses that receive you; so 

that all the hard work employed by you in disciplining your army is in vain. 

And do not marvel if they war in winter time today, for as the armies are 

without discipline, and do not know the harm that is done to them by not 

being quartered together, for their annoyance does not enable those 

arrangements to be made and to observe that discipline which they do not 

have. Yet, the injury caused by campaigning in the field in the winter ought 

to be observed, remembering that the French in the year one thousand five 

hundred three (1503) were routed on the Garigliano by the winter, and not by 

the Spaniards. For, as I have told you, whoever assaults has even greater 

disadvantage, because weather harms him more when he is in the territory of 

others, and wants to make war. Whence he is compelled either to withstand 

the inconveniences of water and cold in order to keep together, or to divide 

his forces to escape them. But whoever waits, can select the place to his 

liking, and await him (the enemy) with fresh forces, and can unite them in a 

moment, and go out to find the enemy forces who cannot withstand their fury. 

Thus were the French routed, and thus are those always routed who assault an 

enemy in winter time, who in itself has prudence. Whoever, therefore, does 

not want the forces, organization, discipline, and virtu, in some part, to 

be of value, makes war in the field in the winter time. And because the 

Romans wanted to avail themselves of all of these things, into which they 

put so much industry, avoided not only the winter time, but rough mountains 

and difficult places, and anything else which could impede their ability to 

demonstrate their skill and virtu. So this suffices to (answer) your 

question; and now let us come to treat of the attacking and defending of 

towns, and of the sites, and of their edifices.