CHAP. IV.



Of those things, which ought to precede war.



I. HOWEVER just reason we may have to make war, yet, as it inevitably brings 

along with it an incredible number of calamities, and oftentimes acts of 

injustice, it is certain, that we ought not to proceed too easily to a 

dangerous extremity, which may perhaps prove fatal to the conqueror himself.



II. The following are the measures, which prudence directs to be observed in 

these circumstances.



1. Supposing the reason of the war just in itself, yet the dispute ought to 

be about something of great consequence; since it is better even to 

relinquish part of our right, when the thing is not considerable, than to 

have recourse to arms to defend it.



2. We ought to have at least a probable appearance of success; for it would 

be a criminal temerity, to expose ourselves to certain destruction, and to 

run into a greater, in order to avoid a lesser evil.



3. Lastly, there should be a real necessity for taking up arms; that is, we 

ought not to have recourse to force; but when we can employ no milder method 

of recovering our right, or of defending ourselves from the evils, with 

which we are menaced.



III. These measures are agreeable not only to the principles of prudence, 

but also to the fundamental maxims of sociability, and the love of peace; 

maxims of no less force with respect to nations, than individuals. By these 

a sovereign must therefore be necessarily directed; justice obliges him to 

it, in consequence of the very nature and end of government. For, as he 

ought to take particular care of the state, and of his subjects, he should 

not expose them to the evils, with which war is attended, except in the last 

extremity, and when there is no other expedient left but that of arms.



IV. It is not therefore sufficient, that the war be just in itself, with 

respect to the enemy; it must also be so with respect to ourselves and our 

subjects. Plutarch informs us, "that, among the ancient Romans, when the 

Feciales had determined, that a war might be justly undertaken, the senate 

afterwards examined whether it would be advantageous to engage in it."



V. Now among the methods of deciding differences between nations without a 

war, there are three most considerable. The first is an amicable conference 

between the contending parties; with respect to which Cicero judiciously 

observes, "that this method of terminating a difference by a discussion of 

reasons on both sides is peculiarly agreeable to the nature of man; that 

force belongs to brutes, and that we never ought to have recourse to it, but 

when we cannot redress our grievances by any other method."



VI. The second way of terminating a difference between those who have not a 

common judge, is to put the matter to arbitration. The more potent indeed 

often neglect this method, but it ought certainly to be followed by those, 

who have any regard to justice and peace; and it is a way, that has been 

taken by great princes and people.



VII. The third method, in fine, which may be sometimes used with success, is 

that of casting lots. I say we may sometimes use this way; for it is not 

always lawful to refer the issue of a difference, or of a war, to the 

decision of lots. This method cannot be taken, except when the dispute is 

about a thing, in which we have a full property, and which we may renounce 

whenever we please. But in general, the obligation of the sovereign to 

defend the lives, the honor, and the religion of his subjects, as also his 

obligation to maintain the dignity of the state, are of too strong a nature 

to suffer him to renounce the most natural and most probable means of his 

own security, as well as that of the public, and to refer his case to 

chance, which in its nature is entirely precarious.



VIII. But if upon due examination he, who has been unjustly attacked, finds 

himself so weak, that he has no probability of making any considerable 

resistance, he may reasonably decide the difference by way of lot, in order 

to avoid a certain, by exposing himself to an uncertain danger; which, in 

this case, is the least of two inevitable evils.



IX. There is also another method, which has some relation to lots. This 

consists in single combats, which have often been used to terminate such 

differences, as were likely to produce a war between two nations. And 

indeed, to prevent a war, and its concomitant evils, I see no reason, that 

can hinder us from referring matters to a combat between a certain number of 

men, agreed upon by both parties. History furnishes us with several examples 

of this kind, as that of Turnus and Eneas, Menelaus and Paris, the Horatii 

and the Curiatii. 



X. It is a question of some importance, to know whether it be lawful thus to 

expose the interest of a whole state to the fate of those combats? It 

appears on the one hand, that by such means we spare the effusion of human 

blood, and abridge the calamities of war; on the other hand, it promiseth 

fairer, and looks like a better venture, to stand the shock even of a bloody 

war, than by one blow to risk the liberty and safety of the state by a 

decisive combat; since, after the loss of one or two battles, the war may be 

set on foot again, and a third perhaps may prove successful.



XI. However it may be said, that, if otherwise there is no prospect of 

making a good end of a war, and if the liberty and safety of the state are 

at stake; there seems to be no reason against taking this step, as the least 

of two evils.



XII. Grotius, in examining this question, pretends that these combats are 

not reconcileable to internal justice, though they are approved by the 

external right of nations; and that private persons cannot innocently expose 

their lives, of their own accord, to the hazard of a single combat, though 

such a combat may be innocently permitted by the state or sovereign, to 

prevent greater mischiefs. But it has been justly observed, that the 

arguments, used by this great man, either prove nothing at all, or prove at 

the same time, that it is never lawful to venture one's life in any combat 

whatever.



XIII. We may even affirm, that Grotius is not very consistent with himself, 

since he permits this kind of combats, when otherwise there is the greatest 

probability, that he, who prosecutes an unjust cause, will be victorious, 

and thereby destroy a great number of innocent persons. For this exception 

evinces, that the thing is not bad in itself, and that all the harm, which 

can be in this case, consists in exposing our own life, or that of others, 

without necessity, to the hazard of a single combat. The desire of 

terminating, or preventing a war, which has always terrible consequences, 

even to the victorious, is so commendable, that it may excuse, if not 

entirely justify those, who engage either themselves or others even 

imprudently in a combat of this kind. Be this as it may, it is certain that 

in such a case those, who combat by the order of the state, are entirely 

innocent; for they are no more obliged to examine whether the state acts 

prudently or not, than when they are sent upon an assault, or to fight a 

pitched battle.



XIV. We must however observe, that it was a foolish superstition in those 

people, who looked upon a set combat, as a lawful method of determining all 

differences, even between individuals, from a persuasion, that the Deity 

gave always the victory to the good cause; for which reason they called this 

kind of combat the judgment of God.



XV. But if after having used all our endeavours to terminate differences in 

an amicable manner, their remains no further hope, and we are absolutely 

constrained to undertake a war, we ought first to declare it in form.



XVI. This declaration of war, considered in itself, and independently of the 

particular formalities of each people, does not simply belong to the law of 

nations, taking this word in the sense of Grotius, but to the law of nature 

itself. Indeed prudence and natural equity equally require, that, before we 

take up arms against any state, we should try all amicable methods to avoid 

coming to such an extremity. We ought then to summon him, who has injured 

us, to make a speedy satisfaction, that we may see whether he will not have 

regard to himself, and not put us to the hard necessity of pursuing our 

right by force of arms.



XVII. From what has been said it follows, that this declaration takes place 

only in offensive wars; for, when we are actually attacked, that alone gives 

us reason to believe, that the enemy is resolved not to listen to an 

accommodation.



XVIII. From this it also follows, that we ought not to commit acts of 

hostility immediately upon declaring war, but should wait so long at least, 

as we can without doing ourselves a prejudice, until he, who has done us the 

injury, plainly refuses to give us satisfaction, and has put himself in a 

condition to receive us with bravery and resolution; otherwise the 

declaration of war would be only a vain ceremony. For we ought to neglect no 

means to convince all the world, and even the enemy himself, that it is only 

absolute necessity, that obliges us to take up arms for the recovery or 

defence of our just rights; after having tried every other method, and given 

the enemy full time to consider.



XIX. Declarations of war are distinguished into conditional and absolute. 

The conditional is that, which is joined with a solemn demand of 

restitution, and with this condition, that if the injury be not repaired, we 

shall do ourselves justice by arms. The absolute is that, which includes no 

condition; and by which we absolutely renounce the friendship and society of 

him, against whom we declare war. But every declaration of war, in whatever 

manner it be made, is of its own nature conditional;[1] for we ought always 

to be disposed to accept of a reasonable satisfaction, so soon as the enemy 

offers it; and on this account some writers reject this distinction of the 

declaration of war into conditional and absolute. But it may nevertheless be 

maintained, by supposing that he, against whom war is declared purely and 

simply, has already shown, that he had no design to spare us the necessity 

of taking up arms against him. So far therefore the declaration may, at 

least as to the form of it, be pure and simple, without any prejudice to the 

disposition, in which we ought always to be, if the enemy will hearken to 

reason. But this relates to the conclusion, rather than the commencement of 

a war; to the latter of which the distinction of conditional and absolute 

declarations properly belongs.



XX. As soon as war has been declared against a sovereign, it is presumed to 

be declared at the same time not only against all his subjects, who, in 

conjunction with him, form one moral person; but also against all those, who 

shall afterwards join him, and who, with respect to the principal enemy, are 

to be looked upon only as allies, or adherents.



XXI. As to the formalities, observed by different nations in declaring war 

they are all arbitrary in themselves. It is therefore a matter of 

indifference, whether the declaration be made by envoys, heralds, or 

letters; whether the sovereign in person, or to his subjects, provided the 

sovereign cannot plead ignorance of it.



XXII. With respect to the reasons why a solemn denunciation was required 

into such a war, as by the law of nations is called just; Grotius pretends 

it was, that the people might be assured, that the war was not undertaken by 

private authority, but by the consent of one or other of the nations, or of 

their sovereigns.



XXIII. But this reason of Grotius's seems to be insufficient; for are we 

more assured, that the war is made by public authority, when a herald for 

instance comes to declare it with certain ceremonies, than we should be, 

when we see an army upon our frontiers, commanded by a principal person of 

the state, and ready to enter our country? Might it not more easily happen, 

that one, or a few persons, should assume the character of herald, than that 

a single man should, of his own authority, raise an army, and march at the 

head of it to the frontiers, without the sovereign's knowledge?



XXIV. The truth is, the principal end of a declaration of war, or at least 

what has occasioned its institution, is to let all the world know, that 

there was just reason to take up arms, and to signify to the enemy himself, 

that it had been, and still was, in his power to avoid it. The declarations 

of war, and the manifestos published by princes, are marks of the due 

respect they have for each other, and for society in general, to whom by 

such means they give an account of their conduct, in order to obtain the 

public approbation. This appears particularly by the manner in which the 

Romans made those denunciations. The person sent for this purpose took the 

gods to witness, that the nation, against whom they had declared war, had 

acted unjustly, by refusing to comply with what law and justice required.



XXIV. Lastly it is to be observed, that we ought not to confound the 

declaration with the publication of war. This last is made in favor of the 

subjects of the prince, who declares the war, and to inform them, that they 

are henceforth to look upon such a nation, as their enemy, and to take their 

measures accordingly.







1. See above, numb. xviii.