CHAP. VI.



Of the immediate source, and foundation of sovereignty.



I. THOUGH what has been said in the fourth chapter concerning the structure 

of states is sufficient to show the original and source Of sovereignty; as 

well as its real foundation; yet, as this is one of those questions, on 

which political writers are greatly divided, if will not be amiss to examine 

it somewhat more particularly; and what remains still to be said upon this 

subject will help to give us a more complete idea of the nature and end of 

sovereignty.



II. When we inquire here into the source of sovereignty, our intent is to 

know the nearest and immediate source of it; now it is certain; that the 

supreme authority, as well as the title, on which this power is established, 

and which constitutes its right, is derived immediately from the very 

covenants, which constitute civil society, and give birth to government.



III. And indeed, upon considering the primitive state of man, it appears 

most certain, that the appellations of sovereigns and subjects, masters and 

slaves, are unknown to nature. Nature has made us all of the same species, 

all equal, all free and independent of each other; in short she was willing 

that those on whom she has bestowed the same faculties, should have all the 

same rights. It is therefore beyond all doubt, that, in this primitive state 

or nature, no man has of himself an original right of commanding others, or 

any tide to sovereignty.



IV. There is none but God alone, that has, in consequence of his nature and 

perfections, a natural, essential, and inherent right of giving laws to 

mankind, and of exercising an absolute sovereignty over them. The case is 

otherwise between man and man; they are in their own nature as independent 

of one another, as they are dependent on God. This liberty and in dependence 

is therefore a right naturally belonging to man, of which it would be unjust 

to deprive him against his will.



V. But if this be the case, and there is yet a supreme authority subsisting 

amongst mankind, whence can this authority arise, unless it be from the 

compacts or covenants, which men have made amongst themselves upon this 

subject? For, as we have a right of transferring our property to another by 

a covenant; so, by a voluntary submission, a person may convey to another, 

who accepts of the renunciation, the natural right he bad of disposing of 

his liberty and natural strength.



VI. It must therefore be agreed, that sovereignty resides originally in the 

people, and in each individual with regard to himself; and that it is the 

transferring and uniting the several rights of individuals in the person of 

the sovereign, that constitutes him such, and really produces sovereignty. 

It is beyond all dispute for example, that, when the Romans chose Romulus 

and Numa for their kings, they must have conferred upon them, by this very 

act, the sovereignty, which those princes were not possessed of before, and 

to which they had certainly no other right, than what was derived from the 

election of the people.



VII. Nevertheless, though it be evident, that the immediate original of 

sovereignty is owing to human covenants, yet nothing can hinder us from 

affirming, with good ground, that it is of divine, as well as human right.



VIII. And indeed right reason having made it plainly appear, after the 

multiplication of mankind, that the establishment of civil societies and of 

a supreme authority was absolutely necessary for the order, tranquillity, 

and preservation of the species, it is as convincing a proof, that this 

institution is agreeable to the designs of Providence, as if God himself had 

declared it to mankind by a positive revelation. And, since God is 

essentially fond of order, he is doubtless willing, that there should be a 

supreme authority upon earth, which alone is capable of procuring and 

supporting that order amongst mankind, by enforcing the observance of the 

laws of nature.



IX. There is a beautiful passage of Cicero to this purpose.[1] Nothing is 

more agreeable to the supreme Deity, that governs this universe, than civil 

societies lawfully established.



X. When therefore we give to sovereigns the title of God's vicegerents upon 

earth, this does not imply, that they derive their authority immediately 

from God; but it signifies only, that by means of the power lodged in their 

hands, and with which the people have invested them, they maintain, 

agreeably to the views of the Deity, both order and peace, and thus procure 

the felicity of mankind.



XI. But if these magnificent titles add a considerable lustre to 

sovereignty, and render it more respectable, they afford likewise, at the 

same time, an excellent lesson to princes. For they cannot deserve the title 

of God's vicegerents upon earth, but inasmuch as they make use of their 

authority pursuant to the views and purposes, for which they were entrusted 

with it, and agreeably to the intention of the Deity, that is, for the 

happiness of the people, by using all their endeavors to inspire them with 

virtuous principles. 



XII. This without doubt is sufficient to make us look upon the original of 

government, as sacred; and to induce subjects to show submission and respect 

to the person of the sovereign. But there are political writers, who carry 

the thing further, and maintain that it is God, who confers immediately the 

supreme power on princes, without any intervention or concurrence of men.



XIII. For this purpose, they make a distinction betwixt the cause of the 

state, and the cause of sovereignty. They confess indeed, that states are 

formed by covenants, but they insist, that God himself is the immediate 

cause of the sovereignty. According to their notions, the people, who choose 

to themselves a king, do not by this act confer the supreme authority upon 

him, they only point out the person, whom heaven is to entrust with it. Thus 

the consent of the people to the dominion of one or more persons, may be 

considered as a channel, through which the supreme authority flows, but is 

not its real source.



XIV. The principal argument, which these writers adopt, is, that, as neither 

each individual amongst a number of free and independent people, nor the 

whole collective multitude, are in any wise possessed of the supreme 

authority, they cannot confer it on the prince. But this argument proves 

nothing. It is true, that neither each member of the society, nor the whole 

multitude collected, are formally invested with the supreme authority, such 

as we behold it in the sovereign, but it is sufficient, that they possess it 

virtually, that is, that they have within themselves all, that is necessary 

to enable them, by the concurrence of their free will and consent, to 

produce it in the sovereign.



XV. Since every individual has a natural right of disposing of his natural 

freedom according as he thinks proper, why should he not have a power of 

transferring to another that right, which he has of directing himself? Now 

is it not manifest, that, if all the members of this society agree to 

transfer this right to one of their fellow members, this cession will be the 

nearest and immediate cause of sovereignty? It is therefore evident, that 

there are, in each individual, the seeds as it were of the supreme power. 

The case is here very near the same, as in that of several voices, collected 

together, which by their union produces a harmony, that was not to be found 

separately in each. 



XVI. But it will be here objected, that the scripture itself says, that 

every man ought to be subject to the supreme powers, because they are 

established by God.[2] I answer with Grotius, that men have established 

civil societies, not in consequence of a divine ordinance, but of their 

voluntary motion, induced by the experience they had of the incapacity, 

which separate families were under, of defending themselves against the 

insults and attacks of human violence. Thence (he adds) arises the civil 

power, which St. Peter, for this reason calls a human power,[3] though in 

other parts of scripture it bears the name of a divine institution,[4] 

because God has approved of it as an establishment useful to mankind.[5] 



XVII. The other arguments in favor of the opinion we have been here refuting 

do not even deserve our notice. In general it may be observed, that never 

were more wretched reasons produced upon this subject, as the reader may be 

easily convinced by reading Puffendorf on the Law of Nature and Nations, 

who, in the chapter corresponding to this, gives these arguments at length, 

and fully refutes them.[6]



XVIII. Let us therefore conclude, that the opinion of those, who pretend 

that God is the immediate cause of sovereignty, has no other foundation, 

than that of adulation and flattery, by which, in order to render the 

authority of sovereigns more absolute, they have attempted to render it 

independent of all human compact, and dependant only on God, But were we 

even to grant, that princes held their authority immediately of God, yet the 

consequences, which some political writers want to infer, could not be drawn 

from this principle. 



XIX. For since it is most certain, that God could never entrust princes with 

this supreme authority, but for the good of society in general, as well as 

of individuals, the exercise of this power must necessarily be limited by 

the very intention, which the Deity had in conferring it on the sovereign; 

insomuch that the people would still have the same right of refusing to obey 

a prince, who, instead of concurring with the views of the Deity, would on 

the contrary endeavour to cross and defeat them, by rendering his people 

miserable, as we shall prove more particularly hereafter.







1. Nihil est illi principi Deo, qui omnem hunc mundum regit, quod quidam in 

terri fiat acceptius, quam consilia catusque hominum jure sociati, qua 

civitates appellantur Sem. Sip. cap. 3. 



2. Rom. xiii.



3. Ep. i. chap. ii. ver. 13.



4. Rom. xiii. 1.



5. Grotius on the Right of War and Peace, book i. chap. iv. § 7, 12. No. 3. 

See above, No. 7, and following.



6. See the Law of Nature and Nations, book vii. chap. iii.