are given of attacks on the liberty and the property of others. * For there it is evident, that the transgressor of the rights of men intends to make use of the person of others as a mean barely, without taking notice that they, as rational beings, ought always to be considered at the same time as ends, that is, only as such, as must be able to contain in themselves the end of the very same action.*

Thirdly, with regard to the casual (meritorious) duty towards one's self, it is not sufficient, that the action is not repugnant to the humanity in our person, as end in itself, it must harmonise therewith also. Now there are in humanity predispositions to greater perfection, which pertain to the end of nature in respect of the humanity in our subject; to neglect these might however subsist with the preservation of humanity, as end in itself, but not with the promoting of this end.

Fourthly, concerning the meritorious duty towards others, the natural end, which all men propose, is their own felicity. Humanity would indeed subsist, were one not to contribute to the felicity of another, but also not to lessen it intentionally; however it is

* Let it by no means be imagined, that the trivial, *quod tibi non vis fieri etc.* can serve here for a rule or principle. For it is, though with different limitations, but derived from the foregoing principle; it cannot be a universal law, for it comprehends not the ground either of the duties towards one's self, or of the duties of love towards others, (for many would willingly agree, that others should not befriend them, provided they were but freed from conferring a benefaction on others.) or, finally, of the duties owe to others; for the criminal would from this ground argue against the judge who punishes him, etc.
but a negative and not a positive consension with humanity, as end in itself, when every one does not endeavour to forward the ends of others, as much as he can. For the ends of the subject, which is an end in itself, must, if that representation of humanity shall have every effect on me, be my ends likewise, as much as possible.

This principle of humanity and of every rational being in general, as end in itself, (which is the chief limiting condition of the liberty of the actions of every man,) is not borrowed from experience, in the first place, by reason of its universality, as it refers to all rational beings in general, concerning which to determine any thing no experience suffices: secondly, because therein humanity is not represented as end of man (subjectively) that is, as an object, which one, of one's self, actually makes one's end, but as an objective end, which, whatever ends we may have, ought as a law to constitute the chief limiting condition of all subjective ends, consequently must spring from pure reason. The ground of all practical legislation lies objectively in the rule and the form of the universality, which makes it capable of being a law (at all events a law of nature), (according to the first principle) but subjectively in the end; the subject of all ends however is every rational being, as end in itself (according to the second principle: to this now is consequential the third practical principle of the will, as chief condition of its agreement with universal practical rea-
reason, the idea of the will of every rational being as an universally legislative will.

According to this principle all maxims, which cannot consist with the proper universal legislation of the will, are rejected. The will is then not subjected to the law entirely, but subjected in such a manner, that it must be considered as self-legislative too, and on that account first subjected to the law (of which it may contemplate itself as even author).

The imperatives, according to the preceding mode of representation, namely, the universal legality of actions similar to an order of nature, or the universal prerogative of end in itself of rational beings, excluded by their commanding authority all mixture of any interest whatever, as spring, because they were represented as categorical; they were however assumed as categorical, only, because such like must be assumed, if one would explain the conception of duty. But that there are practical positions which command categorically, could not be proved by themselves, and cannot yet be done here; however one thing might have been done, namely, that the renunciation of all interest in the volition out of duty, as the specifical mark of distinction between the categorical and the hypothetical imperative, be notified in the imperative itself, by any one determination, which it contains, and this takes place in the present third formule, to wit, the idea of the will of every rational being, as an universally legislative will.
For when we conceive such a one, though a will, which ranks under laws, may still by means of an interest be bound to this law, a will, which is itself supremely legislative, cannot possibly depend so much on any one interest; for such a dependent will would need another law still, to limit the interest of its self-love to the condition of a validity for an universal law.

Therefore the principle of every human will, as an universally legislative will by all its maxims,* if it were otherwise perfectly clear, would be very opposite to the categorical imperative, as it, just for the sake of the idea of the universal legislation, grounds itself upon no interest and therefore among all possible imperatives can be the only unconditional one; or still better, when we reverse the position, if there is a categorical imperative, (that is, a law for every will of a rational being,) it can command, to do from the maxim of its will only, as such, every thing, which at the same time can have itself as universally legislative for its object; for then only is the practical principle and the imperative, which it obeys, unconditional, because it can have no interest at all at the bottom.

When we take a retrospect of all the efforts, which have hitherto been made, in order to discover the principle of morality, it is no wonder why they collectively could not but fail. Man was considered as bound to laws

* I need not here give examples to illustrate this principle, as those, which explain the categorical imperative and its formule, may all serve for this purpose.
by his duty, but it never occurred, that he is subjected but to his own and yet universal legislation, and that he is bound to act conformably to his own, but, according to the end of nature, legislative, will only. For, were he thought as bound but to one law (whatever it be), this must carry with it some one interest or other as incentive or coaction, because it did not arise as a law from his will, but this was legally necessitated by something else, to act in a certain manner. By this quite necessary consequence however, all labour to find a chief ground of duty was irretrievably lost. For duty never resulted, but only necessity of action from a certain interest. This might now be either a proper or a foreign interest. But then the imperative must fall out to be conditional, and could not at all be fit for the moral commandment. I shall therefore name this principle the autonomy of the will, in contradistinction to every other, which I for that reason count to the heteronomy.

The conception of every rational being, who must consider himself by all the maxims of his will as universally legislative, in order from this point of view to judge himself and his actions, leads to a very fecund conception of his, namely that of a kingdom of ends.

I understand by a kingdom the systematical conjunction of different rational beings by common laws. As laws determine the ends according to their universal validity, so, when the personal difference of rational beings, as also all the matter of their private ends, is abstracted from, a whole of all ends (as well
of rational beings as ends in themselves, as of the proper ends, which every one may propose to himself,) may be conceived in a systematical connection, that is, a kingdom of ends, which is possible according to the above principles.

For all rational beings rank under the law, that every one of them shall treat himself and others not as means barely, but always at the same time as ends in themselves. Hereby arises however a systematical conjunction of rational beings by common objective laws, that is, a kingdom which, since these laws have in view the reference of these beings one to another, as ends and means, may be denominated a kingdom of ends (though indeed but an ideal).

A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member, when he is therein universally legislative, but also subjected himself to these laws. He belongs thereto as a Sovereign, when he as legislative is not subjected to any will of another.

The rational being must contemplate himself always as legislative in a kingdom of ends possible by liberty of the will, whether it be as a member, or as a Sovereign. But he cannot fill the place of the latter by the maxim of his will merely, but then only, when he is a totally independent being, without wants and limitation of his faculties adequate to the will.

Morality consists in the reference of all actions to the legislation, by which only a kingdom of ends is possible. This legislation however must be in every rational being himself,
self, and arise from his will, whose principle then is, To perform no action according to another maxim, than so, that that can consist with this being a universal law, and therefore so only, that the will can contemplate itself at the same time as universally legislative by its maxim. If the maxims are not by their nature necessarily concordant with the objective principle of rational beings, as universally legislative, the necessity of the action according to that principle is named practical necessitation, that is, duty. Duty is not incumbent on the Sovereign in the kingdom of ends, but it is by all means on every member, and on all of them in an equal measure.

The practical necessity, according to this principle, to act, that is, duty, rests not at all upon feelings, incitements and inclinations, but merely on the relation which rational beings bear one to another, in which the will of a rational being must always be considered at the same time as legislative, because it could not else conceive them as ends in themselves. Reason, therefore, refers every maxim of the will as universally legislative to every other will, and also to every action towards itself, and this not for the sake of any other practical motive whatever or future advantage, but from the idea of the dignity of a rational being, who obeys no law, but that, which he at the same time gives himself.

In the kingdom of ends every thing has either a price, or a dignity. What has a price, something else can be put in its place, as an equivalent; whereas that, which is raised
raised above all price, consequently admits of no equivalent, has a dignity.

What refers to the universal human inclinations and necessities, has a marketprice; that, which, without presupposing a necessity, is agreeable to a certain taste, that is, a complacency in the mere play of the powers of our mind to no end, a price of affection, but that, which constitutes the condition, on which only something can be an end in itself, has not merely a relative value, that is, a price, but an intrinsic value, that is, DIGNITY.

Now morality is the condition, on which only a rational being can be an end in itself; because it is possible but by it to be a legislative member in the kingdom of ends. Therefore morality and humanity, so far as it is susceptible of the other, are that only which has dignity. Address and diligence in labour have a marketprice; wit, a lively imagination, and humour, a price of affection: whereas veracity in promising, and benevolence from principle, (not from instinct,) have an intrinsic value: Neither nature, nor art contains any thing which, were they wanting, could be put in their place; for their value consists not in the effects which follow, not in the advantage and use, which they afford, but in the sentiments, that is, the maxims of the will, which are ready to manifest themselves in this manner in actions, though the consequences should not be favourable to them. These actions require no recommendation from any subjective disposition or taste whatever, to consider them with immediate favour and compla-
complacency; no immediate propension or feeling for them: they exhibit the will, which performs them, as an object of immediate reverence, to which nothing but reason is required, to impose them on the will, not to obtain them from it by flattery, which, with regard to duties, would be a contradiction. This estimation enables to cognise the value of such a cast of mind, as a dignity, and puts it infinitely above all price, with which it can be neither computed, nor compared, without a violation, in a manner, of its sacredness.

What is it, now, which entitles the moral good mindedness or virtue to have so great pretensions? It is nothing less than the share, which it procures the rational being in the universal legislation, and hereby renders him fit to be a member in the possible kingdom of ends, to which he is destined by his own nature, as end in itself, and for that reason as legislative in the kingdom of ends, in regard of all laws of nature as free, obedient to those only, which he himself gives and according to which his maxims can belong to an universal legislation (to which he at the same time submits himself). For nothing has a value, but what the law determines to it.

The legislation itself, however, which determines all value, must on that account have a dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparably valuable, for which the word reverence only furnishes the suitable expression of the estimation, in which a rational being holds it. Autonomy is therefore the ground of
of the dignity of the human and of every rational nature.

The three mentioned modes, to represent the principles of morality, are at bottom but so many formules of the same law, one of which unites in itself the other too. However there is a distinction in them, which is rather subjectively than objectively, practical, namely, for the purpose of bringing an idea of reason (according to a certain analogy) nearer to intuition and thereby to feeling. All maxims have

1. A form, which consists in the universality, and here the formule of the moral imperative is expressed thus, That the maxims must be so chosen, as if they should be valid as universal laws;

2. A maxim, to wit, an end, and the formule runs thus, That the rational being, as an end according to his nature, by consequence as an end in itself, must serve every maxim for limiting condition of all merely relative and arbitrable ends.

3. A complete determination of all maxims by the formule, That all maxims from the proper legislation shall harmonise, with a possible kingdom of ends, as a kingdom of nature.* The progression is made here, as by the categories of the unity of the form of the will, (its universality,) of the plurality of

* Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends, Moral as a possible kingdom of nature. There the kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea, for the explication of what exists. Here it is a practical idea, to bring to pass that, which does not exist, but which may by our actions become actual, and indeed conformably to this very idea.
the matter, (the objects, that is, the ends,) and of the totality of the system of it. It is better however, in this moral judgment, always to proceed according to the strict method, and to build upon the universal formule of the categorical imperative, namely, Act according to that maxim, which can at the same time constitute itself an universal law. But in order to procure an inlet into the minds for the moral law, it is very useful to carry the same action through the said three conceptions, and to let it approach, as much as possible, towards intuition.

We may now end with what we began, to wit, the conception of an unconditionally good will. That will is absolutely good, which cannot be bad, consequently whose maxim, were it made an universal law, never can jar with itself. Its chief law is this principle: Always act according to that maxim, whose universality as a law thou canst at the same time will; this is the only condition, on which a will can never be inconsistent with itself, and such an imperative is categorical. As the validity of the will, as an universal law for possible actions, has analogy to the universal connection of the existence of things according to universal laws, which is the formal of nature in general, so the categorical imperative may be thus expressed also: Act according to maxims, which at the same time can have themselves as universal laws of nature for object. Thus stands the formule of an absolutely good will.

Rational
Rational nature distinguishes itself from other natures, by proposing an end for itself. This would be the matter of every good will. But, as in the idea of an absolutely good will without a restricting condition (of the attaining of this or of that end), every end to be effected, must be entirely abstracted from, (as that would make every will but negatively good,) so the end here must be thought, not as an end to be effectuated, but a self-sufficient end, consequently but negatively, that is, which must never be acted against, nor esteemed as a mean barely, but always as an end at the same time in every volition. This cannot be but the subject of all possible ends, because this is at the same time the subject of a possible absolutely good will; for this cannot, without implying a contradiction, be less valued than another object. The principle, Act in reference to every rational being (thyself and others) so, that thy maxim may at the same time be valid as an end in itself, is therefore identical at the bottom with the principle, Act according to that maxim, which comprises in itself at the same time its proper universal validity for every rational being. For, that I shall limit my maxim in the use of the means to every end to the condition of its universal validity, as a law for every subject, says as much, as that the subject of ends, that is, the rational being himself, must never ground the maxims of actions as a mean barely, but as chief limiting condition in the use of all means, that is, always as an end at the same time.

Hence
Hence follows indisputably, that every rational being, as end in itself, must consider himself in regard of all laws, to which he may be subjected, at the same time as universally legislative, because this very fitness of his maxims for universal legislation distinguishes him as an end in itself, in like manner, as this his dignity (prerogative) will have it so in preference to all mere beings of nature, that he must always take his maxims, if I may so express myself, from the point of view of himself, but at the same time of every other rational being as legislative, (who is on that account named person). In this manner is a world of rational beings, \textit{(mundus intelligibilis)} as a kingdom of ends, possible, and that by the proper legislation of all the persons as members. Accordingly every rational being must act, as if he were always by his maxims a legislative member in the universal kingdom of ends. The formal principle of these maxims is, Act as if thy maxim should at the same time serve for an universal law (of all rational beings). A kingdom of ends is but possible according to the analogy with a kingdom of nature, but that according to maxims only, that is, rules imposed on one's self, this according to laws only of efficient causes externally necessitated. Notwithstanding which, the whole of nature, though it is considered as a machine, yet, so far as it has reference to rational beings, as their ends, is for this reason denominated a kingdom of nature. Such a kingdom of ends would actually be brought about by maxims, \textit{were they universally\ldots}
sally observed, whose rule the categorical imperative of all rational beings prescribes. But, though the rational being, notwithstanding he himself should punctually observe this maxim, cannot expect, that every other will on that account be true to it, or that the kingdom of nature, and its order conformable to end, will harmonise with him, as a suitable member, to bring to pass a kingdom of ends possible by himself, that is to say, will favour his expectation of felicity; the law, Act according to maxims of an universally legislative member of a merely possible kingdom of ends, remains in its full force, because it is categorically commanding. And herein consists the paradox, That the dignity of humanity merely, as a rational nature, without any other end whatever to be accomplished by it, or advantage, consequently the reverence for a mere idea, should serve for an indispensable precept of the will, and that the sublimity of it directly consists in their independence of the maxim on all such springs, and the worthiness of every rational subject to be a legislative member in the kingdom of ends; else he would need to be represented as subjected but to the natural law of his wants. Though the kingdom of nature, as well as that of ends, should be thought as united under a Sovereign, and the latter should thereby remain no longer a mere idea, but obtain true reality, that would indeed receive by this the accession of a strong spring, but never an augmentation of its intrinsic value; for, this notwithstanding, even this only illimited law-giver
giver must always be represented, as if he judged the value of rational beings but according to their disinterested conduct prescribed by themselves from that idea merely. The essence of things is not altered by their external relations, and what only, without thinking of the latter, constitutes the absolute value of man, according to this must he be judged, by whomsoever it be, even by the Supreme Being himself. Morality then is the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, that is, the possible universal legislation by the maxims of the will. The action, which can consist with the autonomy of the will, is licit; what doth not agree with it, is illicit. The will, whose maxims necessarily harmonise with the laws of autonomy, is a sacred, absolutely good will. The dependence of a will not absolutely good on the principle of autonomy (the moral necessitation) is obligation. This cannot therefore extend to a sacred being. The objective necessity of an action from obligation is named duty.

It may now be easily explained from what has been briefly said, how it happens, that, though we conceive by the conception of duty a subjection to the law, we thereby represent to ourselves at the same time a certain sublimity and dignity in that person, who discharges all his duties. For there is indeed no sublimity in him, so far as he is subjected to the moral law, but by all means, so far as he, with regard to the very same law, is at the same time legislative, and but on that account subordinate to it. We have likewise shown...
above, that neither fear, nor inclination, but merely reverence for the law, is that spring, which can give the action a moral value. Our own will, so far as it acts but under the condition of universal legislation possible by its maxims, this will, I say, possible to us in idea, is the proper object of reverence, and the dignity of humanity consists in this very ability of being universally legislative, though on condition of being subjected itself at the same time to this legislation.

The Autonomy of the Will

As chief Principle of Morality.

Autonomy of the will is that quality of the will, by which it is a law to itself (independently on every quality of the objects of volition). The principle of autonomy then is, Not to chuse otherwise, than so, that the maxims of one's choice are at the same time comprehended as an universal law in the same volition. That this practical rule is an imperative, that is, the will of every rational being is of necessity bound to it as a condition, cannot be proved by the mere dissection of the conceptions comprised in it, because it is a synthetic position; we would need to pursue our researches beyond the cognition of objects to a critic of the subject, that is, to pure practical reason, for this synthetic position,
position, which commands positively, must be cognised totally à priori, but this business does not belong to the present section. However, it may be perfectly evinced by the mere dissection of the conceptions of morality; that the said principle of autonomy is the only principle of moral: For by that operation it is found, that its principle must be a categorical imperative, but this commands nothing more or less, than does directly this autonomy.

The Heteronomy of the Will

as

the Source of all spurious Principles of Morality.

When the will seeks the law that is to determine it any where else, than in the fineness of its maxims for its own universal legislation; consequently, when it, prosecuting its inquiries without itself, seeks that law in the quality of any one of its objects whatever, the result is always heteronomy. The will then doth not give itself the law, but the object by its relation to the will gives the law to the will. This relation, whether it rests upon inclination, or upon representations of reason, allows but hypothetical imperatives to become possible: I ought to do something, because I have a mind to do something else. Whereas the moral, consequently categorical imperative says, I ought to act so or so, though I should have a mind to nothing else. For example, that says, I ought not to lie, if I wish to pre-
serve my credit; but this, I ought not to lie, though it should not be productive of the smallest disgrace to me. The latter must therefore abstract so far from every object, that this shall have no influence at all on the will; in order that practical reason (will), not merely foreign interest, may administer, and show its chief legislation by its own commanding authority. I ought, for instance, to endeavour to promote the happiness of others; not as if I had an interest in it, (whether by immediate inclination, or any one complacency indirectly by reason,) but merely because the maxim, which excludes it, cannot be comprehended in the same volition as an universal law.
HUMAN reason, as well here, as every-where else in its pure use, took hitherto, so long as a critic was wanting to it, every possible wrong way; ere it succeeded in finding out the right one.

All principles, which arise from heteronomy, are either empirical or rational. The former, from the principle of felicity, are built upon either the physical or the moral feeling, the latter, from the principle of perfection, either upon its conception of reason, as possible effect, or upon the conception of a self-sufficient perfection (the will of God), as determining cause of our will.

Empirical principles are by no means fit for a foundation of moral laws. For the universality, by which moral laws ought to be valid for all rational beings without distinction, the unconditional practical necessity, which is thereby imposed on them, vanishes, when their ground is taken from the peculiar economy or disposition of human nature, or from the casual circumstances attending it. The principle of proper felicity, however, is the most repudiable, not merely because it is false, and that experience contradicts the pretence, that welfare depends on good conduct, and not merely
merely because it contributes nothing at all to the founding of morality, as it is totally different to make a happy man, and to make a good man, to make him prudent and skillful in attending to his own interest, and to make him virtuous; but, because it bottoms morality upon springs; which undermine it, and destroy its whole sublimity, as they put the motive causes of virtue and those of vice into the same class and teach, only how to make the best calculation, but blot out entirely the specific distinction between them; whereas the moral feeling or sentiment, this opiniative peculiar sense (however superficial the reference to it is, as those, who cannot think, believe to help themselves by feeling, even in what concerns universal laws merely, however little feelings, which, according to the degree, are by nature infinitely different from one another, furnish an equal standard of good and of bad, nay, one by his feeling cannot judge at all for others in a valid manner), this opiniative peculiar sense * remains nearer to morality and to its dignity, by doing virtue the honour to ascribe to her immediately the complacency, and the high esteem for her, and, as it were, does not say to her face, that it is not her beauty, but interest or profit, which binds us to her.

* I reckon the principle of the moral feeling to that of felicity, because every empirical interest, by the agreeableness, which yields but something, whether it be immediately and without a view to advantage, or in consideration of this, promises an addition to welfare. In like manner must one reckon, with Hutcheson, the principle of participation in the happiness of others to the same moral sense adopted by him.

Among
Among the rational principles or grounds of reason, of morality, the ontological conception of perfection, (however void, however vague, consequently useless it is, to find out in the immense field of possible reality the greatest sum suitable to us, how much soever it has, in order to distinguish the reality, in agitation at present, specifically from every other, an inevitable propensity to go in a circle, and cannot avoid to presuppose in secret the morality, which it ought to explain,) the ontological conception of perfection is better than the theological, to derive it from a divine all-perfect will, not merely because we cannot apprehend its perfection immediately, but can derive it from our conceptions only, among which that of morality is the most eminent, but because, when we do not do this, (as it were done, would be a gross circle in explaining) the yet remaining conception of this will from the attributes of ambition and desire of dominion, combined with the dreadful representations of potency and of emulation, must lay the foundation of a system of morals, which is directly opposed to morality.

But were I obliged to choose between the conception of the moral sense and that of perfection in general, (both which do not derogate, at least, from morality, though they as foundations are not at all fit to support it), I would determine for the latter, because it withholds, at least, the decision of the question from the sensitive faculty and appeals to the tribunal of pure reason, and though it even decides nothing
nothing here, it preserves unadulterated the indefinite idea (of a will good in itself) for a nearer determination.

Besides I believe I may be excused from a prolix refutation of all these systems. Their reutation is so easy, it is in all probability so well understood by those, whose office requires of them to declare themselves for one of these theories, (as auditors may not brook the delay of the judgment), that it would be but a very superfluous labour. But what interests us more at present, is, to know, That these principles set forth nothing but heteronomy of the will as the first ground of morality, and for that reason must of necessity miss their aim.

Wherever an object of the will must be laid as a foundation, in order to prescribe to the will the rule, which determines it, the rule is nothing but heteronomy; the imperative is conditional, if or because one wills this object, one ought to act so or so; consequently it never can command morally, that is categorically. Whether the object determine the will by means of inclination, as in the principle of proper felicity, or by means of reason directed to objects of our possible will in general, in the principle of perfection, the will never determines itself immediately by the representation of the action, but only by the spring, which the foreseen effect of the action produces; I ought to do something, because I will something else, and here another law must be laid as a foundation in my subject, according to which I of necessity will this
this other thing, which law again requires an imperative, to limit this maxim. For, as the incentive, which the representation of an object possible by our powers is, according to the natural quality of the subject, to exercise on his will, belongs to the nature of the subject, whether it be to the sensitive faculty, (inclination and taste,) or to understanding and to reason, which, according to the peculiar economy of their nature, exercise themselves on an object with complacency; so nature gives the law, which, as such, must not be cognised and proved by experience only, consequently it is in itself contingent and thereby unfit for an apodictical practical rule, such as the moral rules must be, but it is always heteronomy only of the will, the will does not give itself the law, but a foreign incentive gives it, by means of a nature of the subject's, disposed for the receptibility of this incentive.

The absolutely good will, whose principle must be a categorical imperative, comprises, then, with regard to all objects indeterminately, merely the form of volition in general; as autonomy, that is, fitness of the maxim of every good will, to constitute itself an universal law, which the will of every rational being imposes on himself, without forming a basis of any other spring or interest whatever.

How such a synthetic practical position à priori is possible, and why it is necessary, are problems, whose solution lies no longer within the sphere of the metaphysics of morals.
no, nor have we maintained its truth here, much less pretended to have a proof of it in our power. We showed but by unfolding the conception of morality, about to be in universal use, That an autonomy of the will adheres to it, or rather founds it. Whoever then holds morality something, and not a chimerical idea without truth, must at the same time admit the above-mentioned principle of it. This section, as well as the first, is analytical merely. That morality now is no fancy, which follows when the categorical imperative together with the autonomy of the will is true and as a principle à priori absolutely necessary, requires to be evinced by a possible synthetical use of pure practical reason, but which we dare not hazard, without letting a critic of this faculty of reason itself precede, of which we have to trace in the following and last section the principal lineaments sufficient for our purpose.
SECTION LII.

TRANSITION FROM THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS TO THE CRITIC OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON.

The Conception of Liberty is the Key to the Exposition of the Autonomy of the Will.

The will is a species of causality of living beings, so far as they are rational, and liberty is that property of this causality, that it can be efficient independently on foreign causes determining it; in the same manner as the necessity of nature is the property of the causality of all irrational beings, to be determined to activity by the influence of extraneous causes.

The above exposition of liberty is negative, and therefore of no use, in order to perspect its essence: however a positive conception, which is more abundant and fructuous, arises out of it. As the conception of a causality carries with it that of laws, according to which, by something, which we denominate cause, something else, namely, the effect, must be posited or laid down; so liberty, though it is not indeed a property of the will according to laws natural, is not for that reason entirely lawless, but must rather be a causality according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar sort; for otherwise a free will would be a nonentity. The necessity of nature
nature is a heteronomy of efficient causes; for every effect is possible but according to the law, that something else determines the efficient cause to causality; What then can the liberty of the will be, but autonomy, that is, the property of the will, to be a law to itself? But the position, The will is in all actions a law to itself, denotes but the principle, to act according to no other maxim, than what can have itself as an universal law for object. But this is exactly the formulæ of the categorical imperative and the principle of morality: therefore a free will and a will under moral laws are identical.

When liberty of the will is presupposed, morality together with its principle follows, by the mere dissection of its conception. However the latter is always a synthetic position: an absolutely good will is that, whose maxim can always comprehend itself, contemplated as an universal law, in itself, for that property of the maxim cannot be found by dissection of the conception of an absolutely good will. But such synthetic positions are possible but by both cognitions being conjoined by the connection with a third, wherein they are both to be met with. The positive conception of liberty creates this third, which cannot be, as in physical causes, of the nature of the sensible world, (in whose conception the conceptions of something as cause, in relation to something else as effect, coincide). What this third is, which liberty points out to us, and of which we have an idea a priori, cannot be yet shown, nor the deduction
tion of the conception of liberty from pure practical reason, and with it the possibility of a categorical imperative, rendered conceivable, but requires still some preparing.

Liberty must be presupposed as a Property of the Will of all rational Beings.

It is not enough, that we ascribe liberty to our will, whatever be the ground, if we have not sufficient reason to attribute the same liberty to all rational beings likewise. For as morality serves us for a law as rational beings merely, it must be valid for all rational beings too, and as it must be derived from the property of liberty only, so liberty must be evinced to be a property of the will of all rational beings, and it is not enough, to prove it from certain optimative experiences of human nature (though this is impossible and it can be proved a priori only,) but it must be proved as an activity of rational beings in general who are endowed with a will. Every being, which cannot act but under the idea of liberty, is on that account, in a practical view, actually free, that is, all laws, which are inseparably conjoined with liberty, are valid for it, as much, as if its will in itself even were declared free and valid in theoretical philosophy.* I maintain, That we

* I adopt this method, sufficient to our purpose, of but assuming liberty as laid as a foundation in idea merely by rational beings in their actions, in order not to be obliged to prove liberty in its theoretical view also. For though the latter should even be left undecided, those laws are valid for a being, which cannot act otherwise, that under the idea of its liberty, laws, which would bind a being, were it actually free. We can therefore ease ourselves here of a burden, which lies heavy upon the theory.
must necessarily lend to every rational being, who has a will, the idea of liberty, under which only he acts. For in such a being we cogitate a reason, which is practical, that is, has causality in regard of its objects. Now a reason cannot possibly be thought, which, with its own consciousness in respect of its judgments, receives a direction, from any thing else, for then the subject would ascribe the determination of judgement, not to this reason, but to an incitement. Reason must consider itself as author of its principles, independently on foreign influences, consequently it must, as practical reason, or as the will of a rational being, be contemplated by itself as free; that is, the will cannot be a proper will but under the idea of liberty, and must therefore be attributed in a practical view to all rational beings.

Of the Interest which is inseparable from the Ideas of Morality.

We have at last reduced the precise conception of morality to the idea of liberty; but we cannot prove this, as something actual, in ourselves and in human nature; we perceive that we must but presuppose it, if we would conceive a being as rational, and endued with consciousness of his causality with regard to actions, that is, a will, and thus we find, that for the same reason we must attribute to that being endued with reason and a will this property, to wit, to determine himself to action under the idea of his liberty. The
The consciousness of a law of action, however, flows from the presupposition of these ideas: that the subjective principles of actions, i.e. maxims, must always be so adopted, that they may be valid objectively too, that is, universally as principles, consequently may serve for our own universal legislation. But why ought I to subject myself as a rational being in general to this principle; consequently thereby all other beings also, endowed with reason? I grant, that no interest spurs me on to this, for that would yield no categorical imperative; I must however of necessity take an interest in this, and perspect, how that happens; for this ought is properly a volition, which is valid for every rational being on condition that reason were practical with him without impediments; for beings who, like us, are affected by a sensitive acuity, as springs of another sort, with whom that, which reason of itself would do; doth not always happen, that necessity of action is named but ought, and the subjective necessity is distinguished from the objective one.

Thus it seems; as if we presupposed in the idea of liberty but the moral law, namely, the principle of the autonomy of the will itself, and could not prove its reality and objective necessity of itself, and in that we would gain something very considerable indeed, b. having determined the genuine principle, at least more precisely, than had otherwise been done, but with respect to its validity, and the practical necessity of subjecting ourselves to it, we would have made no progress; for we could give
give no satisfactory answer to him, who inquired, why the universal validity of our maxim, as a law, must be the limiting condition of our actions, and whereupon we found the value we set on this mode of acting, which value must be so great, that there can be no higher interest, and how it happens, that thereby only man believes to feel his personal worth, in comparison of which, that of any agreeable situation whatever is to be held of no consequence at all.

It is true we find, that we can take an interest in a personal quality, which carries with it no interest whatever of the state, if that makes us but capable to participate this, in case reason should effectuate the distribution of it, that is, that the mere worthiness of being happy, even without the motive, to partake of this felicity, can interest of itself: but this judgment is in fact but the effect of the foreseen importance of moral laws, (when we separate ourselves by the idea of liberty from all empirical interest,) but, that we ought to separate ourselves from this, that is, to contemplate ourselves as free in acting, and nevertheless hold ourselves subjected to certain laws, in order to find a value in our person merely, which can make good to us every loss of what gives a value to our state, and how this is possible, consequently wherefore the moral law binds, we cannot yet perspect in such a manner.

A sort of circle occurs here, it must be freely acknowledged, which, it would seem, there is no getting out of. We suppose ourselves in
in the order of efficient causes as free, for the purpose of cogitating ourselves in the order of ends under moral laws, and we cogitate ourselves afterwards as subjected to these laws, because we have attributed to ourselves the liberty of the will, for liberty and proper legislation of the will are both autonomy, consequently alternate conceptions, of which however the one cannot on that account be used to explain the other and to give a ground of it, but at most, in order, in a logical view, to reduce seemingly different representations of the very same object to a single conception (like different fractions of equal contents to the smallest expression).

An expedient however remains for us still, namely, to investigate, Whether, when we conceive ourselves as efficient causes à priori, by liberty, we do not occupy another station, than when we represent ourselves according to our actions as effects, which we see before us.

There is an observation, to which no great subtilty of thought is requisite, but which the most common understanding may be supposed to make, though, in its own way, by an obscure distinction of judgment, which it names feeling, to wit, That all representations, which occur to us without our arbitrament, (like those of the senses,) enable us to cognize the objects in no other manner, than as they affect us, whereby, what they may be in themselves, remains unknown to us, consequently that, as to this species of representations, we can thereby attain, even with the
greatest attention and clearness, of which the understanding is capable, merely the cognition of the phenomena, but never of the things in themselves. As soon as this distinction is made, (perhaps by the distinction observed between the representations, which are given us from elsewhere, and by which we are passive, and those, which we beget ourselves only, and whereby we evince our activity,) it follows of course, that besides the phenomena something else, which is not phenomenon, must still be granted and supposed, namely, the things in themselves, though we naturally concede, that, as they never can be known to us, but only as they affect us, we can neither get nearer to them, nor ever know how they are in themselves. This must furnish a distinction, though rude, between a sensible world and an intelligible one, the former of which, according to the difference of the sensitive faculty in many contemplators of the world, may be very different, while the latter, which forms its basis, always remains the same. Even man, according to the knowledge, which he has of himself by internal sensation, dares not presume to cognize himself, as he is in himself. For as he doth not create himself, and receives his conception, not à priori, but empirically, it is natural, that he can get information of himself by the internal sense and consequently but by the phenomenon of his nature, and the manner in which his consciousness is affected, but he must of necessity, besides this quality of his own subject composed of mere phenomena,
menta, assume something else lying as a foundation, namely, his I, as its nature may be in itself, and therefore to count himself, with respect to the mere perception and receptibility of sensations, to the sensible world, but in regard of what may be pure activity in him, (of that, which attains consciousness not at all by affection of the senses, but immediately,) to the intelligible world, which he however knows no farther.

Such a conclusion must the man of reflection infer of all things that may occur to him; it is perhaps to be met with in even the most common understanding, which, as you know, is very much inclined always to expect relatively to objects of sense something invisible, active of itself, but marrs it again, by immediately (if I may use the word in this acceptation) sensualising this invisible, that is, wishing to render it an object of intuition, and is thereby not in the smallest degree wiser.

Man actually finds in himself a faculty, by which he distinguishes himself from all other things, ay, from himself, so far as he is affected by objects, and this faculty is reason. This, as pure self-activity, is elevated above the understanding even, which, though it is a self-activity likewise, and does not contain, like sense, representations merely, which arise but when one is affected by things (consequently passive), cannot produce any other conceptions from its activity, than what serve to bring the sensible representations under rules merely and thereby to unite them in one consciousness, without which use of the sensitive faculty
faculty it could cogitate nothing at all, whereas reason under the name of ideas discovers a spontaneity so pure, that it thereby goes far beyond what the sensual faculty can furnish it, and shows its most important business in distinguishing the sensible, and the intelligible, world one from another, and thereby pointing out to the understanding its limits.

Wherefore a rational being must contemplate himself, as an intelligence, (therefore not on the side of his inferior powers,) not as pertaining to the sensible world, but to the intelligible; consequently he has two stations from which he can consider himself, and cognise laws of the use of his powers, and by consequence all his actions, first, so far as he belongs to the sensible world; under laws of nature (heteronomy), secondly, as belonging to the intelligible world, under laws, which are founded, independently on nature, not empirically, but in reason merely.

As a rational being consequently appertaining to the intelligible world, man can never conceive the causality of his own will, but under the idea of liberty; for independence on the determinate causes of the sensible world (such as reason must always attribute to itself) is liberty. With the idea of liberty is now inseparably combined the conception of autonomy, but with this the universal principle of morality, which in idea forms the basis of all the actions of rational beings, in the same manner as the law of nature of all phenomena.

We have now removed the suspicion, which we caused above, that a secret circle was involved
volved in our inference from liberty to the autonomy and from this to the moral law, that we laid the idea of liberty as a foundation but for the sake of the law, in order to infer this afterwards from liberty, consequently could give no ground at all for the moral law, but only beg the question, which good-minded souls would willingly grant us, but which we could never set forth as an evincible position. For we at present perceive, that, when we think ourselves free, we transpose ourselves as members to the intelligible world, and cognise the autonomy of the will, together with its consequence, morality; but if we think ourselves obliged, we consider ourselves as belonging at once to the sensible world and to the intelligible.

How is a categorical Imperative possible?

The rational being reckons himself as intelligence to the intelligible world, and, merely as an efficient cause pertaining to this, does he name his causality a will. On the other side he is conscious to himself of his being a part of the sensible world too, in which his actions are met with as mere phenomena of that causality, but whose possibility cannot be perspected from this causality, which we do not know, but instead of which those actions, as determined by other phenomena, namely, appetitions and inclinations, must be considered as belonging to the sensible world. As a mere member of the intelligible world all my actions would therefore be perfectly conformable to the principle of the au-
tonomy of the pure will; as a mere part of the sensible world they must be taken to be totally conformable to the natural law of appetitions and inclinations, consequently to the heteronomy of the will. (The former would rest upon the chief principle of morality, the latter upon felicity). As the intelligible world, however, comprehends the ground of the sensible, consequently its laws also, therefore in regard of my will (which appertains to the intelligible world entirely) is immediately legislative, and of course must be conceived as such, so I cognise myself as an intelligence, though on the other hand as a being belonging to the sensible world, yet subjected to the law of the former, that is, reason, which comprises its law in the idea of liberty, and therefore to the autonomy of the will, consequently I must consider the laws of the intelligible world as imperatives for me and the actions conformable to this principle as duties.

And thus are categorical imperatives possible, by the idea of liberty making me a member of an intelligible world, whereby, were I such only, all my actions would always be conformable to the autonomy of the will, but as I intuit, that is, immediately apprehend, myself at the same time as a member of the sensible world, ought to be conformable thereto, which categorical ought (or shall) represents a synthetic position à priori, by superadding to my will affected by sensible appetites the idea of the very same pure will practical of itself but belonging to the intelligible world, which will comprises the chief condition of
of the former according to reason; nearly in the same manner, as are superadded to the intuitions of the sensible world conceptions of the understanding, which of themselves signify nothing but legal forms in the general, and thereby render possible synthetical positions à priori, upon which rests all cognition of nature.

The practical use of common human reason confirms the rightness of this deduction. There is nobody, even the greatest villain, if he is but a little accustomed to exercise reason, who does not wish, when one gives him examples of rectitude of intentions, of resolution and constancy in the observance of good maxims, of participation and of universal benevolence, (and besides, combined with great sacrifices of interest and conveniences,) that he too were equally well-minded. But on account of his inclinations and incitements he cannot well bring it about in himself; he however wishes, at the same time, to be free from such inclinations, which are burdensome to him. He therefore proves by this, that he, with a will devested of incentives of the sensitive faculty, transposes himself in thought to a quite different order of things, than that of his appetites in the field of the sensitive faculty, because he can expect from that wish no pleasure of the appetites, consequently no satisfactory state for any one of his actual or even imaginable inclinations, (for the idea, which drew the wish from him, would thereby lose its preferableness,) but only a greater intrinsic value of his person. He believes however to be this better person, when he transposes himself
himself to the station of a member of the intelligible world, to which the idea of liberty, that is, independence on determining causes of the sensible world, involuntarily necessitates him, and wherein he is conscious to himself of a good will, which for his bad will, as a member of the aspectable world, according to his own avowal, constitutes the law, whose authority he knows, while he transgresses it. The moral ought, then, is proper necessary volition as a member of an intelligible world, and is thought by him as ought but so far, as he contemplates himself at the same time as a member of the sensible world.

Of the utmost Boundary of all practical Philosophy.

Men conceive themselves as to the will as free. Hence all the judgments on actions as such, as ought to have been performed, though they are not performed. However this liberty is no conception of experience, and cannot be so, because it always remains, though experience shows the opposite of those postulations, which are represented on the presupposition of it as necessary. It is on the other hand just as necessary, that all that happens, shall be infallibly determined according to laws natural, and this necessity of nature is likewise no conception of experience, because it carries with itself the conception of necessity, consequently of a cognition a priori. But this conception of a nature is confirmed by experience, and must inevitably be presupposed,
supposed, if experience, that is, coherent cognition of objects of sense according to universal laws, shall be possible. Hence liberty is but a conception of reason, that is, an idea, whose objective reality is in itself doubtful, but nature, a conception of understanding, which proves and must of necessity prove its reality by examples of experience.

Though a dialectic of reason springs from this, as in regard of the will the liberty attributed to it seems to be inconsistent with the necessity of nature, and, in this separation of ways, reason in the speculative view finds the way of the necessity of nature more beaten and more useful, than that of liberty; so in the practical view the path of liberty is the only one, upon which it is possible to make use of our reason in our actions; therefore it is as impossible for the most subtil philosophy, as for the most common human reason, to set aside liberty by reasoning. The common reason of man must then presuppose, That no real contradiction is met with between liberty and necessity of nature in the same human actions, for it can just as little renounce the conception of nature, as that of liberty.

This seeming contradiction, however, must be convincingly removed, though it should never be comprehended, how liberty is possible. For, if the thought of liberty contradicts itself, or even nature, which is equally necessary, it must absolutely be renounced for the necessity of nature.

But it is impossible to avoid this contradiction, if the subject, who thinks himself free,
conceived himself in the same sense, or in the very same relation, when he names himself free, as when he supposes himself with a view to the same action subjected to the law of nature. For which reason it is an indispensable problem of speculative philosophy, At least to show, that its illusion on account of the contradiction rests upon this, to wit, that we cogitate man in another sense and relation, when we name him free, than when we hold him, as a part of nature, subjected to these its laws, and that both can not only subsist together, but must be thought as necessarily united in the same subject, because a ground could not otherwise be given, why we should incumber reason with an idea, which, though it should without contradiction admit to be united with another sufficiently ascertained, involves us in an affair, whereby reason in its theoretical use is very much confined. But this duty is incumbent on the speculative philosophy merely, in order that it may clear the way for the practical. Thus the philosopher is not left to choose, whether he will remove the seeming contradiction, or leave it untouched; for in the latter case the theory is in this bonum vacans, in possession of which the fatalist may put himself with reason and turn out all moral from its putative property occupied without a title.

However it cannot yet be said, that the bounds of practical philosophy begin here. For that ending of the dispute belongs not at all to it, but it requires nothing of speculative reason, but to terminate this disagreement, wherein
it implicates itself in theoretical questions, in order that practical reason may have quiet and security against external attacks, which might dispute with it the ground, upon which it is to build,

But the just claim, even of the common reason of mankind, to the liberty of the will, is founded upon the consciousness and the granted presupposition of the independence of reason on causes determined subjectively merely, which collectively taken constitute what belongs to sensation merely, by consequence under the universal denomination of sensiveness or sensitive faculty.* Man, who considers himself in such a manner as intelligence, thereby puts himself into another order of things and into a relation to determining grounds of a quite different sort, when he thinks himself an intelligence endowed with a will, consequently with causality, than when he perceives himself as a phenomenon in the sensible world (which he actually is), and subjects his causality, according to external determination, to laws natural. He soon discovers now, that both can, nay must, have place at the same time. For, that a thing as phenomenon, (pertaining to the sensible world,) is subjected to certain laws, of which the very same, as a thing or a being in itself, is independent, involves not the smallest contradiction; but that he must represent and think himself in this twofold manner, rests, as to

* The proper word here is sensualitas, but which unfortunately has so different a meaning in our language, that I care not venture to introduce it in this sense.
the first, upon the consciousness of himself as a subject affected by senses, as to the second, upon the consciousness of himself as an intelligence, that is, as independent in the use of reason on sensible impressions, (consequently as belonging to the intelligible world). Hence it is that man assumes to himself a will, which allows nothing, that belongs to his appetites and inclinations, to be put to its account, and on the contrary thinks actions, which can be performed but by slighting all appetites and sensible stimulations, as possible by itself, nay, even as necessary. Its causality lies in him as an intelligence and in the laws of the effects and actions according to principles of an intelligible world, of which he knows nothing further, than that therein reason only, and indeed pure reason independent on the sentient faculty, gives the law, as also as he is there but as an intelligence the proper self (as man, on the other hand, but the phenomenon of himself), those laws concern him immediately and categorically, so that that, to which egg on inclinations and incentives (consequently the whole nature of the sensible world) cannot derogate in the least from the laws of his will, as an intelligence, insomuch that he neither ascribes the former to his proper self, that is, his will, nor answers for them, but he by all means answers for the indulgence, which he may give them, when he allows them, to the detriment of the rational laws of the will, influence on his maxims.

Practical
Practical reason, by *thinking* itself in an intelligible world, overleaps not at all its boundaries, but it would by all means go beyond them, should it either *see* or *feel* itself therein. The former is but a negative thought, which with regard to the sensible world, gives laws to reason, in the determination of the will; and but in this one point positive, namely, that that liberty, as negative determination, is at the same time combined with a (positive) faculty and even with a causality of reason, which we term a will, so to act, that the principle of the actions shall be conformable to the essential quality of a cause of reason, that is, the condition of the universal validity of the maxim, as a law. Did practical reason however fetch an *object of the will*, that is, a motive cause from the intelligible world, it would then go beyond its boundaries, and arrogate to itself to know something, of which it has no knowledge. The conception of an intelligible world is therefore but a *station*, which reason finds itself obliged to take beyond the phenomena, *in order to cogitate itself as practical*, which, were the influence of the sensitive faculty determining for man, would not be possible, but which is necessary, unless the consciousness of himself, as an intelligence, consequently as a cause rational and active through reason, that is, a free efficient cause, shall be denied him. This thought indeed occasions the idea of another order and legislation, than that of the mechanism of nature, which affects the sensible world, and renders necessary the conception of an intelligible
gible world, (that is, the whole rational nature, as a thing in itself), but without the least pretension to think farther conformably to this, than according to its formal condition merely, that is, the universality of the maxims of the will, as laws, consequently the autonomy of the will, which only can consist with its liberty; whereas all laws that are determined to an object, yield heteronomy, which can be met with but in laws of nature and also affect but the sensible world.

But reason, should it undertake to explain to itself how pure reason can be practical, which is identical with the problem, to explain, how liberty is possible, would then overlap all its boundaries.

For we can explain nothing, but what we can reduce to laws, whose object can be given in any one possible experience. But liberty is a mere idea, whose objective reality can in nowise be shown according to laws natural, consequently not in any possible experience whatever, which therefore, because an example of it can never be produced according to any one analogy, never can be comprehended, or even but perspected. It is valid but as a necessary presupposition of reason in a being, who believes to be conscious to himself of a will, that is, a faculty different from the mere appetitive faculty, (namely, to determine himself to action as an intelligence, consequently according to laws of reason, independent on instincts), But where determination according to laws of nature ceases, there ceases likewise all explanation, and nothing remains,
remains, but defence, that is, answering or refuting the objections of those, who pretend to have looked farther into the nature of things, and therefore boldly declare liberty impossible. One needs but point out to them, that the opiniative contradiction discovered therein by them lies nowhere, but in this, to wit, that, as they, in order to render valid the law of nature, in regard to human actions, must necessarily contemplate man as a phenomenon, and now, when it is required of them, that they shall cogitate him as an intelligence, of course as a thing in itself, they always continue to contemplate him as a phenomenon still, in which case the separation of his causality (that is, his will) from all natural laws of the sensible world would indeed be a contradiction in one subject, but which ceases, if they would but bethink themselves, and admit, as reasonable, that the things in themselves (though hidden) must form the basis of the phenomena; of the laws of the effect of which things it cannot be required, that they should be the same with those, under which rank their phenomena.

The subjective impossibility of explaining the liberty of the will, is identical with the impossibility of discovering and rendering comprehensible an interest,* which man may

* Interest is that, whereby reason becomes practical, that is, a cause determining the will. Hence it is said but of a rational being, that he takes an interest in something, reasonless creatures feel but sensible impulses. Reason then takes an immediate interest in the action only, when the universal validity of its maxim is a sufficient determinative of the will. Such an interest only is pure. When it can take
take in moral laws; and yet he actually takes an interest therein, for which we name the foundation in us the moral feeling, that has been falsely given out by some as the standard of our moral judgment, but which must rather be considered as the subjective effect that the law has on the will, where to reason only gives the objective grounds.

In order to will that, to which reason only prescribes the ought or shall to the sensitively affected rational being, belongs indeed a faculty of reason, to infuse a feeling of pleasure or of complacency in the discharging of duty, consequently a causality of it, to determine the sensitiveness conformably to its principles. But it is totally impossible, to perspect, that is, to render conceivable à priori, how a mere thought, which comprises nothing sensible even, shall produce a feeling of pleasure or displeasure: for that is a peculiar sort of causality, of which, as of all causality, we can determine nothing at all à priori, but must therefore consult experience only. As this however can furnish no relation of the cause to the effect, as between two objects of experience, but here pure reason by mere ideas (which yield no object whatever for experience) must be the cause of an effect, which it is true
determine the will but by means of another object of apperception, or under the presupposition of a peculiar feeling of the subject, reason takes but a mediate interest in the action, and, as reason of itself only can discover neither an object of the will, nor a peculiar feeling upon which it bottoms without experience, so the latter interest would be but empirical and not a pure interest of reason. The logical interest of reason (to promote its introspections) is never immediate, but presupposes designs of its use.
lies in experience, so the explication, how
and why the universality of the maxim as a
law, consequently morality, interests us, is
for us men totally impossible. So much only
is certain, That it has not validity for us, be-
cause it interests, (for that is heteronomy and
dependence of practical reason on the sensitive
faculty, to wit, on a feeling forming the ba-
sis, whereby it could never be morally legis-
lative,) but that it interests, because it is valid
for us as men, as it arose from our will as an
intelligence, consequently from our proper
self; but what belongs to the mere phenome-
non, is of necessity subordinated by reason to
the quality of the thing in itself (or noumenon.)

The question then, How a categorical im-
perative is possible, may be so far answered,
as the sole presupposition can be laid down,
on which only it is possible, namely, the
idea of liberty, as also that the necessity of
this presupposition can be perspected, which
is sufficient to the practical use of reason, that
is, the conviction of the validity of this impe-
rativen, consequently of the moral law, but
no human reason can ever perspect how this
presupposition itself is possible. But of the
presupposition of the liberty of the will of an
intelligence the autonomy of the will, as the
formal condition, on which only it can be de-
termined, is a necessary consequence. To
presuppose this liberty of the will, is not only
(without falling into a contradiction with the
principle of the necessity of nature in the con-
nection of the phenomena of the sensible world)
perfectly possible, (as speculative philosophy
Vol. I. I can
can shew,) but to bottom all one's arbitrable actions, as condition, upon it practically, that is, in idea, is without farther condition necessary for a rational being, who is conscious to himself of his causality by reason, consequently of a will (which is distinct from appetites). But to explain, How pure reason, without other springs, which may be taken from any thing else, is of itself practical, that is, how the mere principle of the universal validity of all its maxims as laws (which indeed would be the form of a pure practical reason,) without all matter (object) of the will, in which one might previously take any one interest, can furnish a spring for itself, and occasion an interest, which would be named purely moral, or in other words, How pure reason can be practical, all human reason is totally unable, and all trouble and labour are lost in the attempt. It is the same as if I should endeavour to find out, how liberty itself as causality of a will is possible. For there I quit the philosophical ground of exposition, and have no other. It is true I might now wander in the intelligible world, in the world of intelligences, which still remains to me; but, though I have an idea of it, which has its good ground, I have not the smallest knowledge of it, and can never attain this by all the efforts of my natural faculty of reason. It signifies but a something, which remains, when I have excluded from the determinatives of my will all that appertains to the sensible world, merely in order to limit the principle of the motive causes to the field of sensitiveness,
by bounding it, and by showing, that it doth not comprehend in itself all in all, but that without it there is still more: this more, however, I know not farther. Of pure reason, which conceives this ideal, there remains for me, after the separation of all matter, that is, cognition of objects, nothing but the form, namely the practical law of the universal validity of the maxims, and, according to this, to think reason in reference to a pure intelligible world as the possible efficient cause, that is, as determining the will; the spring here must be totally wanting; the spring then would need to be this idea of an intelligible world itself, or that, in which reason would take an interest originally; but to render which comprehensible, is directly the problem that we cannot solve.

Here is now the utmost boundary of all moral investigation; to determine which, however, is of the greatest importance, in order that reason may not search, on the one side, in the sensible world, in a manner pernicious to morals, after the chief motive cause and a conceivable but empirical interest, but on the other side, in order that it may not feebly flap its wings, without being able to stir, in the space of transcendent * conceptions, which is empty for it, and lose itself among fancies. However the idea of a pure intelligible world, as a whole of all intelligences, to which we ourselves belong as rational beings,

* See the translator's preface (page xxviii) to The Principles of Critical Philosophy.
(though on the other hand members of the sensible world at the same time), always remains a useful and licit idea for the behoof of a rational belief, though all science ends at the bounds of this idea, in order, by the grand ideal of an universal kingdom of ends in themselves, (rational beings,) to which we can but then belong, when we carefully conduct ourselves according to maxims of liberty, as if they were laws of nature, to induce us to take a great interest in the moral law.

To conclude, The speculative use of reason, in regard to nature, leads of absolute necessity to some one chief cause of the world or other; the practical use of reason, with a view to liberty, leads to absolute necessity likewise, but only to the laws of the actions of a rational being, as such. Now it is an essential principle of all use of our reason, to push its cognition to the consciousness of its necessity, (for without this it would not be cognition of reason). But it is just as essential a limitation of the very same reason, that it can perspect the necessity, neither of that, which exists, or which happens, nor of that which ought to happen, unless a condition, on which it either exists, happens, or ought to happen, be laid as a foundation. In this manner however is, by the constant inquiry concerning the condition, the contentment of reason but longer delayed. Hence it seeks restlessly the unconditional necessary, and finds itself obliged to suppose it, without any means whatever of rendering it comprehensible to itself; happy enough, if it can discover but the conception,