Date: Tue, 4 Feb 1997 20:11:08 -0800 (PST)
From: Fred Foldvary <ffoldvar@jfku.edu>
Would this be an complete definition of "human action"?:
Purposeful and willful activities performed by persons, consisting of
means to achieve ends. Action involves gain and cost.
Fred Foldvary
Date: Thu, 06 Feb 1997 12:02:09 +0800
From: Pat Gunning <gunning@cc.nchulc.edu.tw>
Fred Foldvary wrote:
> > Would this be an complete definition of "human action"?:
> > Purposeful and willful activities performed by persons, consisting of
> means to achieve ends. Action involves gain and cost.
> > Fred Foldvary
Date:
Wed, 5 Feb 1997 07:51:54 -0800 (PST)
From:
Joseph Salerno <jsale@earthlink.net>
Query to Richard Ebeling: Where in *Human Action* (or elsewhere) does Mises
characterize the logic of choice as "itself a subcategory of a more general
logic of action"? Mises (H.A., pp. 3, 127) does say:
"[M]odern subjectivist economics . . . converted the theory of market prices
into a general theory of human choice."
"The general theory of choice and preference . . . is the science of every
kind of human action. Choosing determines all human decisions."
"No treatment of economic problems proper can avoid starting from acts of
choice. . . ."
"What counts for praxeology is only the fact that acting man chooses between
alternatives."
Joe Salerno
Subject:
Re: Choice vs. Action?
Date:
5 Feb 1997 17:21:18 -0500
From:
"Richard Ebeling" <richard.ebeling@ac.hillsdale.edu>
Reply to: RE>Choice vs. Action?
Dr. Salerno asked for references to Mises suggesting that the logic of choice
was a subcategory of a wider logic of action.
I am glad Dr. Salerno has raised this point because he has made me rethink my
way of phrasing that. Because he is right; there is no passage, to my
knowledge, in which Mises expresses the relationship between "choice" and
"action" in the way I stated it.
So, with Dr. Salerno's permission, let me state the same point a little
differently.
First, please note that Mises calls his treatise "Human Action," not "Human
Choice." And I think this is not by mistake. "Action" is the broader term in
that it clearly distinguishes human activity from what in some places Mises
refers to as mere "reflex." It also emphasizes the purposeful and intentionist
quality of human conduct, as distinct from the subject matter of many of the
natural sciences.
On pages 13-14 of "Human Action" (3rd ed.), Mises specifies the prerequistes
for human action. Given that "Acting man is eager to substitute a more
satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory" one, then for an action
to occur:
1. "The incentive that impels a man to act is always some uneasiness."
2. "His mind imagines conditions which suit him better, and his action aims at
bringing about this desired state."
3. "But to make a man act, uneasiness and the image of a more satisfactory
state alone are not sufficient. A third condition is required: the expectation
that purposeful behavior has the power to remove or at least to alleviate the
felt uneasiness. In the absense of this condition no action is feasible."
Please notice the activist qualities in these three points: First, a man
reflects upon his situation and concludes that it is less than satisfactory
(he feels "uneasiness,"); second,he fantasizes in his mind about circumstances
that he can imagine as preferable to the one he is in, or believes he will be
in, if some alternative state of affairs cannot be brought into existence;
and, third, searches for and identifies things of the world as useful means.
That it is the active human mind that identifies objects or things of the
world as possible means and categorizies and arranges them as means in a
created plan-of-action:
"A means is what serves to the attainment of any end, goal, or aim. Means are
not given in the universe; in this universe there exist only things. A thing
becomes a means when human reason plans to employ it for the attainment of
some end and human action really employs it for this purpose. Thinking man
sees the servicableness of things, i.e., their ability to minister to his
ends, and acting man makes them means. It is of primary importance to realize
that parts of the external world become means only through the operation of
the human mind and its offshoot, human action. . . It is human meaning and
action which transforms them into means. . .Economics is not about things and
tangible material objects; it is about men, their meanings and actions. Goods,
commodities, wealth and all the other notions of conduct are not elements of
nature; they are elements of human meaning and conduct. He who wants to deal
with them must not look at the external world; he must search for them in the
meaning of acting men." ("Human Action," page 92)
Compare this with the logic of choice as defined, for example in Lionel
Robbins' "An Essay on the Nature and Signficance of Economic Science" (2nd
ed., 1935)
""[W]hen time and the means for achieving ends are limited and capable of
alternative application, and the ends are capable of being distinguished in
order of importance, then behavior necessarily assumes the form of choice.
Every act which involves time and scarce means for the achivement of one end
involves the relinguishment of their use for the achievement of another. It
has an economic aspect(page 14). . .Here, then, is the unity of subject of
Economic Science, the forms assumed by human behavior in disposing of scarce
means(page 15). . .Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses." (page
16)
None of this is inconsistent with Mises' explanation of the prerequistes for
human action. And I in no way mean to imply that it is inconsistent.
Given the ends chosen by men and given the means at their disposal they
attempt as best they can to maximize their satisfactions.
But from whence come the given, ranked ends and the given means that are
allocated among those competing ends for maximum effect for attaining the most
highly perferred states of affairs? Mises' point is that they are themselves
created by the active human being. Man creates his own ends (imagined
preferred states of affairs) and sees usefulness in things around him (and
assigns those things a meaning as means of various sorts for the pursuit of
his ends).
Thus the logic of choice--the allocating of scarce means for the service of
ranked ends--results from the prior and preceeding mental activity that
creates the "given" ends-means framework. The logic of action is that prior
mental activity--the creation of ends, the selection of means, the designing
of plans (which involves the mental process of ranking the ends and deciding
the best uses for the selected means, in the context of the courses of action
imagined and constructed in the human mind).
Mises makes this very clear that acting man creates his ends and means, makes
his own profit opportunities and costs in his essay on "Profit and Loss"
published in "Planning for Freedom." (3rd ed. 1974):
""The fact that in the frame of the market economy entrepreneurial profit and
loss are determined by arithmetical operations has misled many people. They
fail to see that essential items that enter into calculation are estimates
emanating from the entrepreneur's specific understanding of the future state
of the market. . .It is the entrepreneurial decision that creates either
profit or loss. It is mental acts, the mind of the entrepreneur, from which
profits ultimately originate. Profit is a product of the mind, a success in
anticipating the future state of the market." (pages 120 and 126).
The entrepreneur imagines future states of affairs in the form of consumer
demands; he sees potentials in the objects around him as means of production;
and he designs plans-of-action--his chosen process and period(s) of
production. That is what makes the market ever-changing and dynamic. The
entrepeneur makes his own alternatives, creates his own trade-offs, as he
imagines future consumer wants, as he images the uses and availabilities of
means of production, and as he imagines the possible conduct of his potential
rivals in the quest for sales.
And what is true for the entrepreneur in the narrow sense, is true for each
and every acting human being, since in a world of inescapable uncertainty
there is, as Mises emphasized, the entrepreneurial element in every man's
conduct.
Choice, in the Robbinsian sense, therefore, resides "within" the wide context
of that logic of action which is the imaginings of ends, the mental making of
things in the external world into means and the designing of the plans into
which the allocational process of the ends-means framework is the next logical
step if the plans selected are to be (hopefully) brought to fruition.
I hope I've clarified what I meant.
If I may add one more thing to an already long message. And one that has
nothing directly to do with the subject under discussion. I have just read Dr.
Salerno's essay on "International Monetary Theory" in "The Elgar Companion to
Austrian Economics" ed. by Peter Boettke. I consider it the finest concise
exposition of Ludwig von Mises' contribution to the monetary approach to the
balance of payments and the purchasing power parity theory. And he not only
clearly and carefully explains Mises' arguments, he also contrasts it to
alternative approaches, such as Gustav Cassel's. Anyone interested in this
aspect of Mises' work can do no better than to begin with this superb
contribution by Dr. Salerno.
Richard M. Ebeling
Ludwig von Mises Professor
of Economics
Hillsdale College
Hillsdale, Michigan 49242
Tele: (517) 437-7341 (office)
Fax: (517) 437-3923 (office)
Tele and Fax:
(517) 439-9232
E-Mail: Richard.Ebeling@ac.Hillsdale.
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 1997 20:11:08 -0800 (PST)
From: Pat Gunning
I was planning to add to your definition of human action but Richard
Ebeling has described action with such eloquence that I cannot add much
except the following. We will probably find later in _Human Action_ that
it is wise to use the term "image" or "imaginary construction" to refer
to the actor's thoughts about a future state of removed uneasiness.
"Image" should be understood in a broad sense because blind people are
also capable of acting.
--
Pat Gunning
http://stsvr.showtower.com.tw/~gunning/welcome
http://web.nchulc.edu.tw/~gunning/pat/welcome
Date: Thu, 06 Feb 1997 08:52:53 EST
From: Steven Horwitz <SHOR@MUSIC.STLAWU.EDU>
Pat wrote:
>>I was planning to add to your definition of human action but Richard
>Ebeling has described action with such eloquence that I cannot add much
>except the following. We will probably find later in _Human Action_ that
>it is wise to use the term "image" or "imaginary construction" to refer
>to the actor's thoughts about a future state of removed uneasiness.
>"Image" should be understood in a broad sense because blind people are
>also capable of acting.
Interesting choices of words here. The "image" of course recalls
Boulding's book of the same title and the whole issue of "imaginary
constructions" for our projections of the future bring to mind people
like Shackle. My point, I think, is that it is not hard to see how
the more radical subjectivists could find much to like in Human Action,
as Lachmann's most favorable review of it suggests. Indeed, Lachmann's
JEL piece "From Mises to Shackle" seems plausible on this reading of
Mises.
Steven Horwitz
Eggleston Associate Professor of Economics
St. Lawrence University
Canton, NY 13617
TEL (315) 379-5731
FAX (315) 379-5819
EMAIL shor@music.stlawu.edu
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 1997 07:15:05 -0800 (PST)
From: Fred Foldvary <ffoldvar@jfku.edu>
To: AustrianECON@agoric.com
Subject: Re: HASG:Chap1
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On Thu, 6 Feb 1997, Pat Gunning wrote:
> Fred Foldvary wrote:
> > > > Would this be an complete definition of "human action"?:
> > I was planning to add to your definition of human action but Richard
> Ebeling has described action with such eloquence that I cannot add much
> except the following. We will probably find later in _Human Action_ that
> it is wise to use the term "image" or "imaginary construction" to refer
> to the actor's thoughts about a future state of removed uneasiness.
> "Image" should be understood in a broad sense because blind people are
> also capable of acting.
Thanks. How is this?:
Human action:
Purposeful and willful activities performed by persons, consisting of
means to achieve ends. Action involves subjective gain and cost. The
actor imagines options that remove uneasiness or improve his condition,
and chooses that option that in his judgment has the greatest net gain.
Fred Foldvary
Date: 6 Feb 1997 10:06:10 -0500
From: "Richard Ebeling" <richard.ebeling@ac.hillsdale.edu>
Subject: Re: Re[2]- HASG-Chap1
Reply to: RE>Re[2]: HASG:Chap1
On the topic of Mises' views on a uniform structure and logic to human thought
in contrast to the notion of polylogism:
Mises was influenced in this view by Ernst Cassirer. Unfortunately, several
years ago I lost a large part of my personal library, including almost all my
books by Cassirer, and I cannot remember which one of Cassirer's books in
which this is expressed. But it is one that Mises footnotes in one of the
essays in "Epistemological Problems of Economics." And I do remember that
Cassirer's emphasis on this point was in the introduction to the book.
And just a footnote to Dr. Horwitz's reference to Kenneth Boulding's book,
"The Image." The same concept and a similar use of the idea can be found in
Alfred Schutz's "Reflections on the Problem of Relevence" (Yale University
Press, 1970)
Richard M. Ebeling
Ludwig von Mises Professor
of Economics
Hillsdale College
Hillsdale, Michigan 49242
Tele: (517) 437-7341 (office)
Fax: (517) 437-3923 (office)
Tele and Fax:
(517) 439-9232 (home)
E-Mail: Richard.Ebeling@ac.Hillsdale.edu
Date: Fri, 07 Feb 1997 15:16:25 +0800
From: Pat Gunning <gunning@cc.nchulc.edu.tw>
Fred Foldvary wrote:
>
> Thanks. How is this?:
> > Human action:
> > Purposeful and willful activities performed by persons, consisting of
> means to achieve ends. Action involves subjective gain and cost. The
> actor imagines options that remove uneasiness or improve his condition,
> and chooses that option that in his judgment has the greatest net gain.
At the risk of being redundant, I would add "expected" between
"greatest" and "net." It helps us keep time in mind.
--
Pat Gunning
http://stsvr.showtower.com.tw/~gunning/welcome
http://web.nchulc.edu.tw/~gunning/pat/welcome
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 1997 11:18:05 -0800 (PST)
From: GREG RANSOM <GRANSOM@ucrac1.ucr.edu>
Notice how this current project on AustECON to provide
a definition of 'human action' mirrors the project of analytic
philosophers (and Plato!) to provide conceptual 'analyses'
of such things as 'explanation', 'knowledge', 'morality', 'causation',
e.g. In the widest sense one can tellingly describe these efforts
as constructivistic and scientistic (in the widest sense). All
of these efforts are widely recognized to have failed -- although the
career building game of analysis building and counter-example
critique continues at a geometric rate of growth. A general account
of why these efforts are bound to fail is found in the work of
Ludwig Wittgenstein (e.g. _The Blue and the Brown Book_ and _Philosophical
Investigations_). The deep structure of Wittgenstein's case against
the conceptual analysis project as a deep similarity to Hayek's
case against constructivism and scientism -- and to the Hayek/Mises
case against central planning and explanatory strategy of mathematical
economics.
Greg Ransom
Dept. of Philosophy
UC-Riverside
gransom@ucrac1.ucr.edu
http://members.aol.com/gregransom/hayekpage.htm
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 1997 06:55:41 -0800 (PST)
From: Fred Foldvary <ffoldvar@jfku.edu>
Thanks, Pat; I will adopt your suggestion to my definition.
Fred
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 1997 14:22:46 -0700
From: harms@hackvan.com (T. B. Harms)
Subject: Re: HASG:Chap1
Pat Gunning,
>What follows is a rough summary of Mises ideas in Chapter 1 (p. 11-29)
>of Human Action (1966), along with some questions for thought. These
>items may provide the basis for further discussion.
>[...]
>_On the Definition of Human Action_
>>Human action, or purposeful behavior, "is in sharp contrast to
>unconscious behavior..."(11) Unconscious behavior is a datum, like other
>facts of the external world. The study of human action (praxeology)
>differs from psychology by the fact it is a science of means, not of
>ends.(12, 15)
Here is a point where I strongly disagree with Mises. I approve of his
characterizing the distinctly human qualities of action as deliberative,
but he errs in tying deliberation so closely with consciousness. The two
are, I propose, only loosely linked, with consciousness facilitating
language and language enabling deliberation.
Human action is to my thinking not categorically distinguishable from other
vertibrate action by an immediate and peculiar quality (such as
consciousness), but rather by the qualitative difference in freedom
(flexibility in both means and ends) provided by the broad context of
language which produces and sustains intellect. Actions are not
deliberative (personal) vs nondeliberative (animal) by virtue of the frame
of mind in the moment they are realized in behavior, but rather as the
degree to which their formation is a consequence of intellectual
consideration, both real and potential. The spectrum between conscious and
unconscious is not decisive as to what makes human action special against
other animal action. The specialness is a *general* property of conceptual
knowledge, which we gain by means of language.
Tracy Bruce Harms
Lake County, California
Date: Sun, 09 Feb 1997 12:19:42 +0800
From: Pat Gunning <gunning@cc.nchulc.edu.tw>
T. B. Harms wrote:
> Here is a point where I strongly disagree with Mises. I approve of his
> characterizing the distinctly human qualities of action as deliberative,
> but he errs in tying deliberation so closely with consciousness.
Tracy, let me begin with some quotes from H.A.
"Action...is a person's the conscious adjustment to the state of the
university that determine his life."(11)
"The field of our science is human action, not the psychological events
which result in action...Whether an action stems from clear
deliberation, or from forgotten memories and suppressed desires which
from submerged regions, as it were, direct the will, does not influence
the nature of the action."(11)
"The term 'unconscious' as used by praxeology and the terms
'subconscious' and 'unconscious' as applied by psychoanalysis belong to
two different systems of thought and research."(H.A., 11)
I don't see any conflict between (1) your views stated here as well as
those stated in your subsequent report of Paul Munz's work and (2)
Mises's description of "acting man." Perhaps you can conceive of Munz
and Mises as complementary. Or perhaps you can use your knowledge of
Munz to embellish praxeology.
---
I suspect that the statement that provoked your remarks is the
following:
On 2-2, Pat Gunning wrote (HASG:Chap1):
> "What distinguishes man from beasts is precisely that he adjusts his
> behavior deliberatively."(H.A., 17) Man is not a puppet of his appetites. When
> we interpret animal behavior, we think otherwise.(16)
If we read the context of the first passage in H.A. more carefully we
see that Mises should have, or meant to, write on p. 17 that "What
distinguishes man from beasts [_given that_ we interpret animal behavior
based on the assumption that the animal yields to the impulse which
prevails at the moment] is precisely that he adjusts his behavior
deliberatively." Note that the last full paragraph on p. 16 begins with
"We interpret..."
It seems to be a challenge to find out how Mises would have dealt with
Munz's specific interpretation of the difference between human and
animal. But I don't think that the issue is fundamental to the
praxeological system and to the definition of "conscious" in praxeology.
Conscious behavior, from the viewpoint of the subject, implies a
subject's awareness that she is the chooser of the behavior. Unconscious
behavior, from the viewpoint of the subject, means that the behavior is
not chosen and must be taken as a datum, like the prevailing wind. An
example of unconscious behavior may be a reflex, or a tendency stemming
from one's childhood to associate a particular physical characteristic
with some personality trait -- such as looking old with being senile.
Do animals perform conscious behavior? To the extent that they do, they
are human actors. We're talking here about the definition of action, not
of the distinction between humans and animals. Mises writes about that
distinction in an effort to clarify what is evident intuitively, or
apriori. I am not convinced that Mises's strategy is either wise or
effective. But I think that is what he is aiming at.
--
Pat Gunning
http://stsvr.showtower.com.tw/~gunning/welcome
http://web.nchulc.edu.tw/~gunning/pat/welcome
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 1997 18:15:35 -0800 (PST)
From: Fred Foldvary <ffoldvar@jfku.edu>
> ... with consciousness facilitating
> language and language enabling deliberation.
> ...
> (flexibility in both means and ends) provided by the broad context of
> language which produces and sustains intellect.
> ... The specialness is a *general* property of conceptual
> knowledge, which we gain by means of language.
Can you tell us how this propostion regarding language is warranted,
i.e. briefly what is the reasoning and evidence for it?
Fred Foldvary
Date: Sat, 8 Feb 1997 04:29:44 -0700
From: harms@hackvan.com (T. B. Harms)
>> ... with consciousness facilitating
>> language and language enabling deliberation.
>> ...
>> (flexibility in both means and ends) provided by the broad context of
>> language which produces and sustains intellect.
>> ... The specialness is a *general* property of conceptual
>> knowledge, which we gain by means of language.
>>Can you tell us how this propostion regarding language is warranted,
>i.e. briefly what is the reasoning and evidence for it?
>>Fred Foldvary
My strongest inspiration on this has been from Peter Munz; see esp. the
Introduction to _Philosophical Darwinism_, where he writes:
I will propose a completely different theory of the func-
tioning of consciousness in its relation to language and the
reasons for its selection and adaptive retention. The theory
is based upon the consideration that animals -- and I am here
including the human animal -- can manage perfectly well without
consciousness. Goal-directed behavior can be produced by neural
systems of various levels of complexity without consciousness
and without conscious representation of the goal or of the
stimulus which triggers the behaviour toward the goal. (p 17)
In parallel I have been studying perceptual control theory, a well-defined
branch of cybernetics which greatly amplifies this claim that
goal-directedness is a property of basic neural systems and not privileged
to humans nor dependent upon consciousness.
On the same page Munz continues:
[...] Consciousness without language is neither here nor
there [...]
The case of the human animal is different. [...] Once
[consciousness] is linked to language, it plays an entirely
novel role. To start with, it produces inhibitions and
scepticism as to triggered responses and delays actions and
goal-directed behaviour. Such language-linked consciousness
makes the human animal less adaptive, not more adaptive.
[Note from Harms: following Cziko I'd here prefer "adapted"
over "adaptive".] The question then arises why it has been
selected for and retained in spite of the fact that initially
it retards responses and appears to be a disadvantage. The
answer to this question is to be found in the peculiar way
in which it is linked to language. Inchoate consiousness,
I propose to argue, is a consciousness which we share with
many other animals; but in human beings it becomes the cause
of the evolution of a specifically human form of language
which is qualitatively different from all other pre-human
forms of communication.
The heart of Munz' argument is too lengthy to quote, and I'm too tired to
undertake a summarization. I hope that these passages give a bit of the
flavor of the thinking behind my previous posting.
While I follow Munz in emphasizing that there is a basic and enormous
difference between this philosophy and that of Wittgenstein, I agree with
Greg Ransom that thanks to Wittgenstein and Kuhn (heck -- I'll even add
Derrida) we have an improved understanding of language, specifically in
regard to the structural impossibility of intellectually comprehending it
as an item in its completeness. This inability to contemplate language
"from outside" is close kin to Hayek's assertion that no mind can
comprehend a structure more detailed than it itself is, and to the broadly
Austrian insight that the knowledge embodied in the market is fundamentally
distributed and thus in its details beyond the scope of any analyst *even
in theory*. These patterns contribute to my thoughts being contrary to
Mises on the point in question: Language is highly parallel to money in
being intractibly cultural, and whatever makes language possible also
shares this extendedness and fuzziness.
I can agree with Mises that "action is a manifestation of man's will", and
I especially endorse his insistence on methodological dualism. But I
cannot accept his conceptualization of will as it comes across to me in
_Human Action_, the basic reason being that I see *all* behavior falling on
the same side of the methodological dualism. The difference between
distinctively human action (including economic action) and non-deliberative
action cannot be an absence of *purpose* in the sense which makes
methodological dualism required. I agree with Mises that we need a
different methodology for dealing with purpose-laden subjects, and I agree
with him that the study of human action is rightfully distinct from the
life science in general, but I disagree that the former is the demarcation
required by the latter.
I have gone on far longer than I planned, and must end this now no matter
whether it is composed well enough or not.
Tracy Bruce Harms
Lake County, California