TUESDAY, June 24, 1788.



Mr. WYTHE arose, and addressed the chairman; but he spoke so very low that 

his speech could not be fully comprehended. He took a cursory view of the 

situation of the United States previous to the late war, their resistance to 

the oppression of Great Britain, and the glorious conclusion and issue of 

that arduous conflict. To perpetuate the blessings of freedom, happiness, 

and independence, he demonstrated the necessity of a firm, indissoluble 

union of the states. He expatiated on the defects and inadequacy of the 

Confederation, and the consequent misfortunes {587} suffered by the people. 

He pointed out the impossibility of securing liberty without society, the 

impracticability of acting personally, and the inevitable necessity of 

delegating power to agents. He then recurred to the system under 

consideration. He admitted its imperfection, and the propriety of some 

amendments. But the excellency of many parts of it could not be denied by 

its warmest opponents. He thought that experience was the best guide, and 

could alone develop its consequences. Most of the improvements that had been 

made in the science of government, and other sciences, were the result of 

experience. He referred it to the advocates for amendments, whether, if they 

were indulged with any alterations they pleased, there might not still be a 

necessity of alteration.



He then proceeded to the consideration of the question of previous or 

subsequent amendments. The critical situation of America, the extreme danger 

of dissolving the Union, rendered it necessary to adopt the latter 

alternative. He saw no danger from this. It appeared to him, most clearly, 

that any amendments which might be thought necessary would be easily 

obtained after ratification, in the manner proposed by the Constitution, as 

amendments were desired by all the states, and had already been proposed by 

the several states. He then proposed that the committee should ratify the 

Constitution, and that whatsoever amendments might be deemed necessary 

should be recommended to the consideration of the Congress which should 

first assemble under the Constitution, to be acted upon according to the 

mode prescribed therein.



[The resolution of ratification proposed by Mr. Wythe was then read by the 

clerk; which see hereafter in the report of the committee to the 

Convention.]



Mr. HENRY, after observing that the proposal of ratification was premature, 

and that the importance of the subject required the most mature 

deliberation, proceeded thus: --



The honorable member must forgive me for declaring my dissent from it; 

because, if I understand it rightly, it admits that the new system is 

defective, and most capitally; for, immediately after the proposed 

ratification, there comes a declaration that the paper before you is not 

intended to violate any of these three great rights -- the liberty of 

religion, liberty of the press, and the trial by jury. What is the inference 

{588} when you enumerate the rights which you are to enjoy? That those not 

enumerated are relinquished. There are only three things to be retained -- 

religion, freedom of the press, and jury trial. Will not the ratification 

carry every thing, without excepting these three things? Will not all the 

world pronounce that we intended to give up all the rest? Every thing it 

speaks of, by way of rights, is comprised in these things. Your subsequent 

amendments only go to these three amendments.



I feel myself distressed, because the necessity of securing our personal 

rights seems not to have pervaded the minds of men; for many other valuable 

things are omitted: -- for instance, general warrants, by which an officer 

may search suspected places, without evidence of the commission of a fact, 

or seize any person without evidence of his crime, ought to be prohibited. 

As these are admitted, any man may be seized, any property may be taken, in 

the most arbitrary manner, without any evidence or reason. Every thing the 

most sacred may be searched and ransacked by the strong hand of power. We 

have infinitely more reason to dread general warrants here than they have in 

England, because there, if a person be confined, liberty may be quickly 

obtained by the writ of habeas corpus. But here a man living many hundred 

miles from the judges may get in prison before he can get that writ.



Another most fatal omission is with respect to standing armies. In our bill 

of rights of Virginia, they are said to be dangerous to liberty, and it 

tells you that the proper defence of a free state consists in militia; and 

so I might go on to ten or eleven things of immense consequence secured in 

your bill of rights, concerning which that proposal is silent. Is that the 

language of the bill of rights in England? Is it the language of the 

American bill of rights, that these three rights, and these only, are 

valuable? Is it the language of men going into a new government? Is it not 

necessary to speak of those things before you go into a compact? How do 

these three things stand? As one of the parties, we declare we do not mean 

to give them up. This is very dictatorial -- much more so than the conduct 

which proposes alterations as the condition of adoption. In a compact there 

are two parties -- one excepting, and another proposing. As a party, we 

propose that we shall secure these three things; {589} and before we have 

the assent of the other contracting party, we go into the compact, and leave 

these things at their mercy.



What will be the consequence? Suppose the other states shall call this 

dictatorial. They will say, Virginia has gone into the government, and 

carried with her certain propositions, which, she says, ought to be 

concurred in by the other states. They will declare that she has no right 

to dictate to other states the conditions on which they shall come into the 

Union. According to the honorable member's proposal, the ratification will 

cease to be obligatory unless they accede to these amendments. We have 

ratified it. You have committed a violation, will they say. They have not 

violated it. We say, we will go out of it. You are then reduced to a sad 

dilemma -- to give up these three rights, or leave the government. This is 

worse than our present Confederation, to which we have hitherto adhered 

honestly and faithfully. We shall be told we have violated it, because we 

have left it for the infringement and violation of conditions which they 

never agreed to be a part of the ratification. The ratification will be 

complete. The proposal is made by the party. We, as the other, accede to it, 

and propose the security of these three great rights; for it is only a 

proposal. In order to secure them, you are left in that state of fatal 

hostility which I shall as much deplore as the honorable gentleman. I exhort 

gentlemen to think seriously before they ratify this Constitution, and 

persuade themselves that they will succeed in making a feeble effort to get 

amendments after adoption.



With respect to that part of the proposal which says that every power not 

granted remains with the people, it must be previous to adoption, or it 

will involve this country in inevitable destruction. To talk of it as a 

thing subsequent, not as one of your unalienable rights, is leaving it to 

the casual opinion of the Congress who shall take up the consideration of 

that matter. They will not reason with you about the effect of this 

Constitution. They will not take the opinion of this committee concerning 

its operation. They will construe it as they please. If you place it 

subsequently, let me ask the consequences. Among ten thousand implied powers 

which they may assume, they may, if we be engaged in war, liberate every one 

of your slaves if they please. And this must and will be done by men, a 

majority of whom have not {590} a common interest with you. They will, 

therefore, have no feeling of your interests. It has been repeatedly said 

here, that the great object of a national government was national defence. 

That power which is said to be intended for security and safety may be 

rendered detestable and oppressive. If they give power to the general 

government to provide for the general defence, the means must be 

commensurate to the end. All the means in the possession of the people must 

be given to the government which is intrusted with the public defence. In 

this state there are two hundred and thirty-six thousand blacks, and there 

are many in several other states. But there are few or none in the Northern 

States; and yet, if the Northern States shall be of opinion that our slaves 

are numberless, they may call forth every national resource. May Congress 

not say, that every black man must fight? Did we not see a little of this 

last war? We were not so hard pushed as to make emancipation general; but 

acts of Assembly passed that every slave who would go to the army should be 

free. Another thing will contribute to bring this event about. Slavery is 

detested. We feel its fatal effects -- we deplore it with all the pity of 

humanity. Let all these considerations, at some future period, press with 

full force on the minds of Congress. Let that urbanity, which I trust will 

distinguish America, and the necessity of national defence, -- let all 

these things operate on their minds; they will search that paper, and see if 

they have power of manu-mission. And have they not, sir? Have they not power 

to provide for the general defence and welfare? May they not think that 

these call for the abolition of slavery? May they not pronounce all slaves 

free, and will they not be warranted by that power? This is no ambiguous 

implication or logical deduction. The paper speaks to the point: they have 

the power in clear, unequivocal terms, and will clearly and certainly 

exercise it. As much as I deplore slavery, I see that prudence forbids its 

abolition. I deny that the general government ought to set them free, 

because a decided majority of the states have not the ties of sympathy and 

fellow-feeling for those whose interest would be affected by their 

emancipation. The majority of Congress is to the north, and the slaves are 

to the south.



In this situation, I see a great deal of the property of the people of 

Virginia in jeopardy, and their peace and tranquility {591} gone. I repeat 

it again, that it would rejoice my very soul that every one of my 

fellow-beings was emancipated. As we ought with gratitude to admire that 

decree of Heaven which has numbered us among the free, we ought to lament 

and deplore the necessity of holding our fellowmen in bondage. But is it 

practicable, by any human means, to liberate them without producing the most 

dreadful and ruinous consequences? We ought to possess them in the manner we 

inherited them from our ancestors, as their manumission is incompatible with 

the felicity of our country. But we ought to soften, as much as possible, 

the rigor of their unhappy fate. I know that, in a variety of particular 

instances, the legislature, listening to complaints, have admitted their 

emancipation. Let me not dwell on this subject. I will only add that this, 

as well as every other property of the people of Virginia, is in jeopardy, 

and put in the hands of those who have no similarity of situation with us. 

This is a local matter, and I can see no propriety in subjecting it to 

Congress.



With respect to subsequent amendments, proposed by the worthy member, I am 

distressed when I hear the expression. It is a new one altogether, and such 

a one as stands against every idea of fortitude and manliness in the states, 

or any one else. Evils admitted in order to be removed subsequently, and 

tyranny submitted to in order to be excluded by a subsequent alteration, are 

things totally new to me. But I am sure the gentleman meant nothing but to 

amuse the committee. I know his candor. His proposal is an idea dreadful to 

me. I ask, does experience warrant such a thing from the beginning of the 

world to this day? Do you enter into a compact first, and afterwards settle 

the terms of the government? It is admitted by every one that this is a 

compact.



Although the Confederation be lost, it is a compact, constitution, or 

something of that nature. I confess I never heard of such an idea before. 

It is most abhorrent to my mind. You endanger the tranquillity of your 

country, you stab its repose, if you accept this government unaltered. How 

are you to allay animosities? -- for such there are, great and fatal.



He flatters me, and tells me that I could influence the people, and 

reconcile them to it. Sir, their sentiments are {592} as firm and steady as 

they are patriotic. Were I to ask them to apostatize from their native 

religion, they would despise me. They are not to be shaken in their opinions 

with respect to the propriety of preserving their rights. You never can 

persuade them that it is necessary to relinquish them. Were I to attempt to 

persuade them to abandon their patriotic sentiments, I should look on myself 

as the most infamous of men.



I believe it to be a fact that the great body of yeomanry are in decided 

opposition to it. I may say with confidence that, for nineteen counties 

adjacent to each other, nine tenths of the people are conscientiously 

opposed to it. I may be mistaken, but I give you it as my opinion; and my 

opinion is founded on personal knowledge, in some measure, and other good 

authority. I have not hunted popularity by declaiming to injure this 

government. Though public fame might say so, it was not owing to me that 

this flame of opposition has been kindled and spread. These men never will 

part with their political opinions. If they should see their political 

happiness secured to the latest posterity, then, indeed, they may agree to 

it. Subsequent amendments will not do for men of this cast. Do you consult 

the Union in proposing them? You may amuse them as long as you please, but 

they will never like it. You have not solid reality -- the hearts and hands 

of the men who are to be governed. 



Have gentlemen no respect to the actual dispositions of the people in the 

adopting states? Look at Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. These two great 

states have raised as great objections to that government as we do. There 

was a majority of only nineteen in Massachusetts. We are told that only ten 

thousand were represented in Pennsylvania, although seventy thousand had a 

fight to be represented. Is not this a serious thing? Is it not worth while 

to turn your eyes, for a moment, from subsequent amendments to the situation 

of your country? Can you have a lasting union in these circumstances? It 

will be in vain to expect it. But if you agree to previous amendments, you 

shall have union, firm and solid.



I cannot conclude without saying that I shall have nothing to do with it, 

if subsequent amendments be determined upon. Oppressions will be carried on 

as radically by the majority when adjustments and accommodations will be 

held up. I {593} say, I conceive it my duty, if this government is adopted 

before it is amended, to go home. I shall act as I think my duty requires. 

Every other gentleman will do the same. Previous amendments, in my opinion, 

are necessary to procure peace and tranquillity. I fear, if they be not 

agreed to, every movement and operation of government will cease; and how 

long that baneful thing, civil discord, will stay from this country, God 

only knows: When men are free front restraint, how long will you suspend 

their fury? The interval between this and bloodshed is but a moment. The 

licentious and wicked of the community Will seize with avidity every thing 

you hold. In this unhappy situation, what is to be done? It surpasses my 

stock of wisdom. If you will, in the language of freemen, stipulate that 

there are rights which no man under heaven can take from you, you shall have 

me going along with you; not otherwise.



[Here Mr Henry informed the committee that he had a resolution prepared, to 

refer a declaration of rights, with certain amendments to the most 

exceptionable parts Of the Constitution, to the other states in the 

confederacy, for their consideration, previous to its ratification, The 

clerk than read the resolution, the declaration of rights, and amendments, 

which were nearly the same as those ultimately proposed by the Convention; 

which see at the conclusion.]



Mr. HENRY then resumed the subject. I have thus candidly submitted to you, 

Mr. Chairman, and this committee, what occurred to me as proper amendments 

to the Constitution, and a declaration of rights containing those 

fundamental, unalienable privileges, which I conceive to be essential to 

liberty and happiness. I believe that, on a review of these amendments, it 

will still be found that the arm of power will be sufficiently strong for 

national purposes, when these restrictions shall be a part of the 

government. I believe no gentleman who opposes me in sentiments will be able 

to discover that any one feature of a strong government is altered; and at 

the same time your unalienable rights are secured by them. The government 

unaltered may be terrible to America, but can never be loved till it be 

amended. You find all the resources of the continent may be drawn to a 

point. In danger, the President may concentre to a point every effort of the 

continent. If the government be constructed to satisfy the people, and 

remove their apprehensions, the wealth and the Strength of the continent 

will go where {594} public utility shall direct. This government, with these 

restrictions, will be a strong government, united with the privileges of the 

people. In my weak judgment, a government is strong when it applies to the 

most important end of all governments -- the rights and privileges of the 

people. In the honorable member's proposal, jury trial, the press and 

religion, and other essential rights, are not to be given up. Other 

essential rights -- what are they? The world will say that you intended to 

give them up. When you go into an enumeration of your rights, and stop that 

enumeration, the inevitable conclusion is, that what is omitted is intended 

to be surrendered.



Anxious as I am to be as little troublesome as possible, I cannot leave 

this part of the subject without adverting to one remark of the honorable 

gentleman. He says that, rather than bring the Union into danger, he will 

adopt it with its Imperfections. A great deal is said about disunion, and 

consequent dangers. I have no claim to a greater share of fortitude than 

others; but I can see no kind of danger. I form my judgment on a single 

fact alone -- that we are at peace with all the world; nor is there any 

apparent cause of a rupture with any nation in the world. Is it among the 

American states that the cause of disunion is to be feared? Are not the 

states using all their efforts for the promotion of union? New England 

sacrifices local prejudices for the purposes of union. We hear the necessity 

of the union, and predilection for the union, reëchoed from all parts of the 

continent; and all at once disunion is to follow! If gentlemen dread 

disunion, the very thing they advocate will inevitably produce it. A 

previous ratification will raise insurmountable obstacles to union. New York 

is an insurmountable obstacle to it, and North Carolina also. They will 

never accede to it, till it be amended. A great part of Virginia is opposed 

most decidedly to it as it stands. This very spirit, which will govern us in 

these three states, will find a kindred spirit in the adopting states. Give 

me leave to say that it is very problematical if the adopting states can 

stand on their own legs. I hear only on one side, but as far as my 

information goes, there are heartburnings and animosities among them. Will 

these animosities be cured by subsequent amendments?



Turn away from America, and consider European politics. {595} The nations 

there which can trouble us are, France, England, and Spain. But at present 

we know for a certainty that those nations are engaged in very different 

pursuits from American conquests. We are told by our intelligent ambassador, 

that there is no such danger as has been apprehended. Give me leave then to 

say, that dangers from beyond. the Atlantic are imaginary.



From these premises, then, it may be concluded that, from the creation of 

the world to this time, there never was a more fair and proper opportunity 

than we have at this day to establish such a government as will permanently 

establish the most transcendent political felicity. Since the revolution, 

there has not been so much experience. Since then, the general interests of 

America have not been better understood, nor the Union more ardently loved, 

than at this present moment. I acknowledge the weakness of the old 

Confederation. Every man says that something must be done. Where is the 

moment more favorable than this? During the war, when ten thousand dangers 

surrounded us, America was magnanimous. What was the language of the little 

state of Maryland? "I will have time to consider. I will hold out three 

years. Let what may come, I will have time to reflect." Magnanimity appeared 

every where. What was the upshot? America triumphed. Is there any thing to 

forbid us to offer these amendments to the other states? If this moment goes 

away unimproved, we shall never see its return.



We now act under a happy system, which says that a majority may alter the 

government when necessary. But by the paper proposed, a majority will 

forever endeavor in vain to alter it. Three fourths may. Is not this the 

most promising time for securing the necessary alteration? Will you go into 

that government, where it is a principle that a contemptible minority may 

prevent an alteration? What will he the language of the majority? Change the 

government. Nay, seven eighths of the people of America may wish the change; 

but the minority may come with a Roman veto, and object to the alteration. 

The language of a magnanimous country, and of freemen, is, Till you remove 

the defects, we will not accede. It would be in vain for me to show that 

there is no danger to prevent our obtaining those amendment, if you are not 

convinced already. If the other states {596} will not agree to them, it is 

not an inducement to union. The language of this paper is not dictatorial, 

but merely a proposition for amendments. The proposition of Virginia met 

with a favorable reception before. We proposed that convention which met at 

Annapolis. It was not called dictatorial. We proposed that at Philadelphia. 

Was Virginia thought dictatorial? But Virginia is now to lose her 

preminence. Those rights of equality to which the meanest individual in the 

community is entitled, are to bring us down infinitely below the Delaware 

people. Have we not a right to say, Hear our propositions! Why, sir, your 

slaves have a right to make their humble requests. Those who are in the 

meanest occupations of human life have a right to complain. What do we 

require? Not preëminence, but safety -- that our citizens may be able to sit 

down in peace and security under their own fig-trees. I am confident that 

sentiments like these will meet with unison in every state; for they will 

wish to banish discord from the American soil. I am certain that the warmest 

friend of the Constitution wishes to have fewer enemies -- fewer of those 

who pester and plague him with opposition. I could not withhold from my 

fellow-citizens any thing so reasonable. I fear you will have no union, 

unless you remove the cause of opposition. Will you sit down contented with 

the name of union, without any solid foundation?



Mr. Henry then concluded, by expressing his hopes that his resolution would 

be adopted, and added, that, if the committee should disapprove of any of 

his amendments, others might be substituted.



Gov. RANDOLPH. Mr. Chairman: once more, sir, I address you; and perhaps it 

will be the last time I shall speak concerning this Constitution, unless I 

be urged by the observations of some gentlemen. Although this is not the 

first time that my mind has been brought to contemplate this awful period, 

yet I acknowledge it is not rendered less awful by familiarity with it. Did 

I persuade myself that those fair days were present which the honorable 

gentleman described, -- could I bring my mind to believe that there were 

peace and tranquillity in this land, and that there was no storm gathering 

which would burst, and that previous amendments could be retained, -- I 

would concur with the honorable gentleman; for nothing but the fear of 

inevitable {597} destruction would lead me to vote for the Constitution in 

spite of the objections I have to it. But, sir, what have I heard to-day? I 

sympathized most warmly with what other gentlemen said yesterday, that, let 

the contest be what it may, the minority should submit to the majority. With 

satisfaction and joy I heard what he then said -- that he would submit, and 

that there should be peace if his power could procure it. What a sad reverse 

to-day! Are we not told, by way of counterpart to language that did him 

honor, that he would secede? I hope he will pardon, and correct me if I 

misrecite him; but if not corrected, my interpretation is, that secession by 

him will be the consequence of adoption without previous amendments.



[Here Mr. HENRY explained himself, and denied having said any thing of 

secession, but that he said, he would have no hand in subsequent amendments; 

that he would remain and vote, and afterwards he would have no business 

here.]



I see, continued his excellency, that I am not mistaken in my thoughts. The 

honorable gentleman says, he will remain and vote on the question, but after 

that he has no business here, and that he will go home. I beg to make a few 

remarks on the subject of secession. If there be in this house members who 

have in contemplation to secede from the majority, let me conjure them, by 

all the ties of honor and duty, to consider what they are about to do. Some 

of them have more property than I have, and all of them are equal to me in 

personal rights. Such an idea of refusing to submit to the decision of the 

majority is destructive of every republican principle. It will kindle a 

civil war, and reduce every thing to anarchy and confusion. To avoid a 

calamity so lamentable, I would submit to it, if it contained greater evils 

than it does.



What are they to say to their constituents when they go home? "We come here 

to tell you that liberty is in danger, and, though the majority is in favor 

of it, you ought not to submit." Can any man consider, without shuddering 

with horror, the awful consequences of such desperate conduct? I entreat men 

to consider and ponder what good citizenship requires of them. I conjure 

them to contemplate the consequences as to themselves as well as others. 

They themselves will be overwhelmed in the general disorder. I did not think 

that the proposition of the honorable gentleman {598} near me (Mr. White) 

could have met with the treatment it has. The honorable gentleman says there 

are only three rights stipulated in it. I thought this error might have been 

accounted for at first; but after he read it, the continuance of the mistake 

has astonished me. He has wandered from the point. [Here he read Mr. Whitens 

proposition.] Where in this paper do you discover that the people of 

Virginia are tenacious of three rights only? It declares that all power 

comes from the people, and whatever is not granted by them, remains with 

them; that among other things remaining with them, are liberty of the press, 

right of conscience, and some other essential rights. Could you devise any 

express form of words, by which the rights contained in the bill of rights 

of Virginia could be better secured or more fully comprehended? What is the 

paper which he offers in the form of a bill of rights? Will that better 

secure our rights than a declaration like this? All rights are therein 

declared to be completely vested in the people, unless expressly given away. 

Can there be a more pointed or position reservation?



That honorable gentleman, and some others, have insisted that the abolition 

of slavery will result from it, and at the same time have complained that 

it encourages its continuation. The inconsistency proves, in some degree, 

the futility of their arguments. But if it be not conclusive, to satisfy the 

committee that there is no danger of enfranchisement taking place, I beg 

leave to refer them to the paper itself. I hope that there is none here 

who, considering the subject in the calm light of philosophy, will advance 

an objection dishonorable to Virginia -- that, at the moment they are 

securing the rights of their citizens, an objection is started that there is 

a spark of hope that those unfortunate men now held in bondage may, by the 

operation of the general government be made free. But if any gentleman be 

terrified by this apprehension, let him read the system. I ask, and I will 

ask again and again, till I be answered, (not by declamation,) Where is the 

part that has a tendency to the abolition of slavery? Is it the clause which 

says that "the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states 

now existing shall think proper to admit shall not be prohibited by Congress 

prior to the year 1808"? This is an exception from the power of regulating 

commerce, and the restriction {599} is only to continue till 1808. Then 

Congress can, by the exercise of that power, prevent future importations; 

but does it affect the existing state of slavery? Were it right here to 

mention what passed in convention on the occasion, I might tell you that the 

Southern States, even South Carolina herself, conceived this property to be 

secure by these words. I believe, whatever we may think here, that there was 

not a member of the Virginia delegation who had the smallest suspicion of 

the abolition of slavery. Go to their meaning, Point out the clause where 

this formidable power of emancipation is inserted.



But another clause of the Constitution proves the absurdity of the 

supposition, The words of the clause are, "No person held to service or 

labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, 

in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such 

service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom 

such service or labor may be due." Every one knows that slaves are held to 

service and labor. And when authority is given to owners of slaves to 

vindicate their property, can it be supposed they can be deprived of it? If 

a citizen of this state, in consequence of this clause, can take his runaway 

slave in Maryland, can it be seriously thought that, after taking him and 

bringing him home, he could be made free?



I observed that the honorable gentleman's proposition comes in a truly 

questionable shape, and is still more extra? ordinary and unaccountable for 

another consideration -- that, although we went article by article through 

the Constitution, and although we did not expect a general review of the 

subject, (as a most comprehensive view had been taken of it before it was 

regularly debated,) yet we are carried back to the clause giving that 

dreadful power, for the general welfare, Pardon me, if I remind you of the 

true state of that business. I appeal to the candor of the honorable 

gentleman, and if he thinks it an improper appeal, I ask the gentlemen 

here, whether there be a general, indefinite power of providing for the 

general welfare? The power is, "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, 

and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and 

general welfare," so that they can only raise money by these means, in order 

to provide for the general welfare. No man who reads it can say it is 

general, as the honorable gentleman represents {600} it. You must violate 

every rule of construction and common sense, if you sever it from the power 

of raising money, and annex it to any thing else, in order to make it that 

formidable power which it is represented to be.



The honorable gentleman say's there is no restraint on the power of issuing 

general warrants. If I be tedious in asking where is that power, you will 

ascribe it to him who has put me to the necessity of asking. They have no 

such power given them: if they have, where is it?



Again he recurs to standing armies, and asks if Congress cannot raise such. 

Look at the bill of rights provided by the honorable gentleman himself, and 

tell me if there be no great security by admitting it when necessary. It 

says that standing armies should be avoided in time of peace. It does not 

absolutely prohibit them. Is there any clause in it, or in the 

Confederation, which prevents Congress from raising an army? No: it is left 

to the discretion of Congress. It ought to be in the power of Congress to 

raise armies, as the existence of society might, at some future period, 

depend upon it. But it should be recommended to them to use the power only 

when necessary. I humbly conceive that you have as great security as you 

could desire from that clause in the Constitution which directs that money 

for supporting armies will be voted for every two years -- as, by this 

means, the representatives who will have appropriated money unnecessarily, 

or imprudently, to that purpose, may be removed, and a new regulation made. 

Review the practice of the, favorite nation of the honorable gentleman. In 

their bill of rights there is no prohibition of a standing army, but only 

that it ought not to be maintained without the consent of the legislature. 

Can it be done here without the consent of the democratic branch? Their 

consent is necessary to every bill, and money bills can originate with them 

only. Can an army, then, be raised or supported without their approbation?



[His excellency then went over all the articles of Mr. Henry's proposed 

declaration of rights, and endeavored to prove that the rights intended to 

be thereby secured were either provided for in the Constitution itself, or 

could not be infringed by the general government, as being unwarranted by 

any of the powers which were delegated therein; for that it was in vain to 

provide against the exercise of a power which did not exist.] 



He then proceeded to examine the nature of some of the amendments proposed 

by the honorable gentleman. As to {601} the reservation of rights not 

expressly given away, he repeated what he had before observed of the 2d 

article of the Confederation, that it was interpreted to prohibit Congress 

from granting passports, although such a power was necessarily incident to 

that of making war. Did not this, says he show the vanity of all the federal 

authority? Gentlemen have displayed great wisdom in the use they make of the 

experience of the defects in the old Confederation. When we see the defect 

of that article, are we to repeat it? Are those gentlemen zealous friends to 

the Union, who profess to be so here, and yet insist on a repetition of 

measures which have been found destructive to it? I believe their 

professions, but they must pardon me when I say their arguments are not 

true.



[His excellency then read the 2d amendment proposed, respecting the number 

of representatives.]



What better security have you under these words than under the clause in the 

paper before you? This puts it in the power of your representatives to 

continue the number of it in that paper. They may always find a pretext to 

justify their regulations concerning it. They may continue the number at 

two hundred, when an augmentation would be necessary.



As to the amendment respecting direct taxation, the subject has been so 

fully handled, and is so extensive in its nature, that it is needless to 

say any thing of it.



The 4th amendment goes on the wide field of indiscriminate suspicion that 

every one grasps after Offices, and that Congress will create them 

unnecessarily. Perhaps it will exclude the most proper from offices of 

great importance to the community.



[Here he read the 5th amendment.] -- I beg the honorable gentleman to tell 

me on what subject Congress will exercise this power improperly. If there be 

any treachery in their view, the words in this amendment are broad enough to 

allow it. It is as good a security in this Constitution, as human ingenuity 

can devise; for if they intend any treachery, they will not let you see it.



[Here he read the 7th and 8th amendments.] -- I have never hesitated to 

acknowledge that I wished the regulation of commerce had been put in the 

hands of a greater body than it is in the sense of the Constitution. But I 

appeal to {602} my colleagues in the federal Convention, whether this was 

not a sine qua non of the Union. Of all the amendments, this is the most 

destructive, which requires the consent of three fourths of both houses to 

treaties ceding or restraining territorial rights. This is priding in the 

Virginia sovereignty, in opposition to the majority. This suspected 

Congress, these corrupt sixty-five and corrupt twenty-six, are brought so 

low they cannot be trusted, lest they should have it in their power to lop 

off part of Virginia -- cede it, so as that it should become a colony to 

some foreign state. There is no power in the Constitution to cede any part 

of the territories of the United States. The whole number of Congress, being 

unanimous, have no power to suspend or cede territorial rights. But this 

amendment admits, in the fullest latitude, that Congress have a right to 

dismember the empire.



His amendment respecting the militia is unnecessary. The same powers rest in 

the states by the Constitution. Gentlemen were repeatedly called upon to 

show where the power of the states over the militia was taken away, but they 

could not point it out.



[He read the 12th amendment.] -- Will this be a melioration of the 

Constitution? I wish to know what is meant by the words police and good 

government! These words may lead to complete tyranny in Congress. Perhaps 

some gentlemen think that these words relate to particular objects, and that 

they will diminish and confine their power. They are most extensive in their 

significations, and will stretch and dilate it, and all the imaginary 

horrors of the honorable gentleman will be included in this amendment.



[He read the 13th amendment.] -- I was of this opinion myself; but I 

informed you before why I changed it.



[He read the 14th amendment.] -- If I were to propose an amendment on this 

subject, it would be to limit the word arising. I would not discard it 

altogether, but define its extent. The jurisdiction of the judiciary in 

cases arising under the system, I should wish to be defined, so as to 

prevent its being extended unnecessarily: I would restrain the appellate 

cognizance as to fact, and prevent oppressive and vexatious appeals.



[He read the 15th amendment.] -- The right of challenging and excepting, I 

hope, has clearly appeared to the committee to be a necessary appendage of 

the trial by jury itself.



Permit me now to make a few remarks on the proposal of {603} these 

amendments, previous to our ratification. The first objection arises from 

the paper itself. Can you conceive, or does any man believe, that there are 

twelve, or even nine, states in the whole Union, that would subscribe to 

this paper? -- a paper fraught with, perhaps, more defects than the 

Constitution itself. What are we about to do? To make this the condition of 

our coming into this government. I hope gentlemen will never agree to this. 

If we declare that these amendments, and a bill of rights containing twenty 

articles, must be incorporated into the Constitution before we assent to 

it, I ask you whether you may not bid a long farewell to the Union? It will 

produce that deplorable thing -- the dissolution of the Union -- which no 

man yet has dared openly to advocate. No, say the gentlemen, because 

Maryland kept off three years from the confederacy, and no injury happened. 

This very argument carries its own refutation with it. The war kept us 

together, in spite of the discordance of the states. There is no war now. 

All the nations of Europe have their eyes fixed on America, and some of them 

perhaps cast wistful looks at you. Their gold may be tried, to sow disunion 

among us. The same bandage which kept us before together, does not now 

exist. Let gentlemen seriously ponder the calamitous consequences of 

dissolving the Union in our present situation. I appeal to the great 

Searcher of hearts, on this occasion, that we behold the greatest danger 

that ever happened hanging over us; for previous amendments are but another 

name for rejection. They will throw Virginia out of the Union, and cause 

heartaches to many of those gentlemen who may vote for them. But let us 

consider things calmly. Reflect on the facility of obtaining amendments if 

you adopt, and weigh the danger if you do not. Recollect that many other 

states have adopted it, who wish for many amendments. I ask you if it be not 

better to adopt, and run the chance of amending it hereafter, than run the 

risk of endangering the Union. The Confederation is gone; it has no 

authority. If, in this situation, we reject the Constitution, the Union will 

be dissolved, the dogs of war will break loose, and anarchy and discord will 

complete the ruin of this country. Previous adoption will prevent these 

deplorable mischiefs. The union of sentiments with us in the adopting states 

will render subsequent amendments easy. I therefore rest my happiness with 

perfect confidence on this subject.



{604} Mr. GEORGE MASON. Mr. Chairman, with respect to commerce and 

navigation, he has given it as his opinion that their regulation, as it now 

stands, was a sine qua non of the Union, and that without it the states in 

Convention would never concur. I differ from him. It never was, nor in my 

opinion ever will be, a sine qua non of the Union.



I will give you, to the best of my recollection, the history of that 

affair. This business was discussed at Philadelphia for four months, during 

which time the subject of commerce and navigation was often under 

consideration; and I assert that eight states out of twelve, for more than 

three months, voted for requiring two thirds of the members present in each 

house to pass commercial and navigation laws. True it is, that afterwards it 

was carried by a majority as it stands. If I am right, there was a great 

majority for requiring two thirds of the states in this business, till a 

compromise took place between the Northern and Southern States; the Northern 

States agreeing to the temporary importation of slaves, and the Southern 

States conceding, in return, that navigation and commercial laws should be 

on the footing in which they now stand. If I am mistaken, let me be put 

right. Those are ray reasons for saying that this was not a sine qua non of 

their concurrence. The Newfoundland fisheries will require that kind of 

security which we are now in want of. The Eastern States therefore agreed, 

at length, that treaties should require the consent of two thirds of the 

members present in the Senate.



Mr. DAWSON. Mr. Chairman, when a nation is about to make a change in its 

political character, it behoves it to summon the experience of ages which 

have passed, to collect the wisdom of the present day, to ascertain clearly 

those great principles of equal liberty which secure the rights, liberties, 

and properties, of the people. Such is the situation of the United States at 

the moment we are about to make such a change.



The Constitution proposed for the government of the United States has been a 

subject of general discussion. While many able and honorable gentlemen 

within these walls have, in the development of the various parts, delivered 

their sentiments with that freedom which will ever mark the citizens of an 

independent state, and with that ability which will prove to the world their 

eminent talents, I, sir, although {605} urged by my feelings, have forborne 

to say any thing on my part, from a satisfactory impression of the 

inferiority of my talents, and from a wish to acquire every information 

which might assist my judgment in forming a decision on a question of such 

magnitude. But, sir, as it involves in its fate the interest of so 

extensive a country, every sentiment which can be offered deserves its 

proportion of public attention. I shall therefore avoid any apology for now 

rising, although uncommon propriety.might justify it, and rather trust to 

the candor of those who hear me. Indeed, I am induced to come forward, not 

from any apprehension that my opinion will have weight, but in order to 

discharge that duty which I owe to myself, and to those I have the honor to 

represent.



The defects of the articles by which we are at present confederated have 

been echoed and reëchoed, not only from every quarter of this house, but 

from every part of the continent. At the framing of those articles, a 

common interest excited us to unite for the common good. But no sooner did 

this principle cease to operate, than the defects of the system were 

sensibly felt. Since then, the seeds of civil dissension have been gradually 

opening, and political confusion has pervaded the states. During the short 

time of my political life, having been fully impressed with the truth of 

these observations, when a proposition was made by Virginia to invite the 

sister states to a general convention, at Philadelphia, to amend these 

defects, I readily gave my assent; and when I considered the very 

respectable characters who formed that body, -- when I reflected that they 

were, most of them, those sages and patriots under whose banners, and by 

whose counsels, we had been rescued from impending danger, and placed among 

the nations of the earth, -- when I also turned my attention to that 

illustrious character, to immortalize whose memory Fame shall blow her trump 

to the latest ages, -- I say, when I weighed all these considerations, I was 

almost persuaded to declare in favor of the proposed plan, and to exert my 

slender abilities in its favor, But when I came to investigate it 

impartially, on the immutable principles of government, and to exercise that 

reason with which the God of nature hath endowed me, and which I will ever 

freely use, I was convinced of this important, though melancholy truth, -- 

that the greatest men may err, and that {606} their errors are sometimes of 

the greatest magnitude. I was persuaded that, although the proposed plan 

contains many things excellent, yet, by the adoption of it as it now 

stands, the liberties of America in general, the property of Virginia in 

particular, would be endangered.



These being my sentiments, -- sentiments which I offer with the diffidence 

of a young politician, but with the firmness of a republican, which I am 

ready to change when I am convinced they are founded in error, but which I 

will support until that conviction, -- I should be a traitor to my country, 

and unworthy that freedom for which I trust I shall ever remain an advocate, 

were I to declare my entire approbation of the plan as it now stands, or 

assent to its ratification without previous amendments.



During the deliberations of this Convention, several gentlemen of eminent 

talents having exerted themselves to prove the necessity of the union by 

presenting to our view the relative situation of Virginia to the other 

states, the melancholy representation made to-day, and frequently before, by 

an honorable gentleman, (Gov. Randolph,) of our state, reduced, in his 

estimation, to the lowest degree of degradation, must now haunt the 

recollection of many gentlemen in this committee. How far he has drawn the 

picture to the life, or where it is too highly colored, rests with them to 

determine. To gentlemen, however, sir, of their abilities, the task was 

easy, and perhaps I may add unnecessary. It is a truth admitted on all 

sides, and I presume there is not a gentleman who hears me who is not a 

friend to a union of the thirteen states. 



But, sir, an opinion has gone abroad (from whence it originated, or by whom 

it is supported, I will not venture to say) that the opponents to the paper 

on your table are enemies to the union. It may not, therefore, be improper 

for me to declare, that I am a warm friend to a firm, federal, energetic 

government; that I consider a confederation of the states, on republican 

principles, as a security to their mutual interests, and a disunion as 

injurious to the whole; but t shall lament exceedingly, when a confederation 

of independent states shall be converted into a consolidated government; 

for, when that event shall happen, I shall consider the history of American 

liberty as short as it has been brilliant, and we shall afford one more 

proof to the favorite maxim of tyrants, that "mankind cannot govern 

themselves."



{607} An honorable gentleman (Col. H. Lee) came forward some days since, 

with all the powers of eloquence and all the warmth of enthusiasm. Alter 

descanting on some military operations to the south, of which he was a 

spectator, and pronouncing sentence of condemnation on a Mr. Shays, to the 

north, -- as a military character he boldly throws the gauntlet, and defies 

the warmest friend to the opposition to come forth and say that the friends 

to the system on your table are not also friends to republican liberty.



Arguments, sir, in this house, should ever be addressed to the reason, and 

should be applied to the system itself, and not to those who either support 

or oppose it. I, however, dare come forth, and tell that honorable 

gentleman, not with the military warmth of a young soldier, but with the 

firmness of a republican, that, in my humble opinion, had the paper now on 

your table, and which is so ably supported, been presented to our view ten 

years ago, (when the American spirit shone forth in the meridian of glory, 

and rendered us the wonder of an admiring world,) it would have been 

considered, as containing principles incompatible with republican liberty, 

and therefore doomed to infamy.



Having, sir, made these loose observations, and having proved, I flatter 

myself, to this honorable Convention, the motives from which my opposition 

to the proposed system originated, I may now be permitted to turn my 

attention, for a very few moments, to the system itself; and to point out 

some of the leading parts most exceptionable, in my estimation -- my 

original objections to which have not been removed by the debate, but rather 

confirmed.



If we grant to Congress the power of direct taxation, if we yield to them 

the sword, and if we also invest them with the judicial authority, two 

questions, of the utmost importance, immediately present themselves to our 

inquiries -- whether these powers will not be oppressive in their 

operations, and, aided by other parts of the system, convert the thirteen 

confederated states into one consolidated government; and whether any 

country as extensive as North America, and where climates, dispositions, and 

interests, are so essentially different, can be governed under one 

consolidated plan, except by the introduction of despotic principles.



The warmest friends, sir, to the government, -- some of those who formed, 

signed, and have recommended it, -- some {608} of those who have 

enthusiastically supported it in every quarter of this continent, -- have 

answered my first query in the affirmative: they have admitted that it 

possesses few federal features, and will ultimately end in a consolidated 

government -- a truth which, in my opinion, they would have denied in vain; 

for every article, every section, every clause, and almost every line, 

proves that it will have this tendency; and if this position has, during the 

course of the long and learned debates on this head, been established to the 

satisfaction of the Convention, I apprehend that the authority of all 

eminent writers on the subject, and the experience of all ages, cannot be 

controverted, and that it will be admitted that no government formed on the 

principles of freedom can pervade all North America.



This, sir, is my great objection -- an objection general in its nature, 

because it operates on the whole system; an objection which I early formed, 

which I flattered myself would have been removed, but which, I am obliged to 

say, has been confirmed by the observations which have been made by many 

learned gentlemen, and which would be tedious for me now to recapitulate.



That the legislative, executive, and judicial powers should be separate and 

distinct, in all free governments, is a political fact so well established, 

that I presume I shall not be thought arrogant, when I affirm that no 

country ever did, or ewer can, long remain free, where they are blended. All 

the states have been in this sentiment when they formed their state 

constitutions, and therefore have guarded against the danger; and every 

schoolboy in politics must be convinced of the propriety of the observation; 

and yet, by the proposed plan, the legislative and executive powers are 

closely united; the Senate, who compose one part of the legislature, are 

also, as council to the President, the supreme head, and are concerned in 

passing laws which they themselves are to execute.



The wisdom, sir, of many nations has induced them to enlarge the powers of 

their rulers; but there are very few instances of the relinquishment of 

power, or the abridgment of authority, on the part of the governors. The 

very 1st clause of the 8th section of the 1st article, which gives to 

Congress the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, excises," 

&c., appears to me to be big with unnecessary {609} danger, and to reduce 

human nature, to which I would willingly pay a compliment did not the 

experience of all ages rise up against me, to too great a test. The 

arguments, sir, which have been urged by some gentlemen, that the impost 

will defray all expenses, in my estimation cannot be supported; and common 

sense will never assent to the assertions which have been made, that the 

government will not be an additional expense to this country. Will not the 

support of an army and navy -- will not the establishment of a multiplicity 

of offices in the legislative, executive, and particularly the judiciary 

departments, most of which will be of a national character, and must be 

supported with a superior degree of dignity and credit -- be prodigious 

additions to the national expense? And, sir, if the states are to retain 

even a shadow of sovereignty, the expense thence arising must also be 

defrayed, and will be very considerable.



I come now, sir, to speak of a clause to which our attention has been 

frequently called, and on which many gentlemen have already delivered their 

sentiments -- a clause, in the estimation of some, of little consequence, 

and which rather serves as a pretext for scuffling for votes; but which, in 

my opinion, is one of the most important contained in the system, and to 

which there are many and weighty objections. I refer to the clause 

empowering the President, by and with the consent of two thirds of the 

senators present, to make treaties. If, sir, the dismemberment of the 

empire, if the privation of the most essential national rights, and the 

very existence of a people, depend on this clause, surely, sir, it merits 

the most thorough investigation; and if, on that investigation, it appears 

that those great rights are endangered, it highly behoves us to amend it in 

such a manner as will prevent the evils which may arise from it as it now 

stands, My objections to it do not arise from a view of the particular 

situation of the western part of this state, although certainly we are 

bound, by every principle, to attend to the interest of our fellow-citizens 

in that quarter; but from an apprehension that the principle pervades all 

America, and that, in its operation, it will be found highly injurious to 

the Southern States. It will, I presume, be readily admitted that the 

dismemberment of empire is the highest act of sovereign authority, the 

exercise of which can be authorized {610} only by absolute necessity. 

Exclusive, then, sir, of any consideration which arises from the particular 

system of American politics, the guard established against the exercise of 

this power is by far too slender.



The President, with the concurrence of two thirds of the Senate present, may 

make a treaty, by which any territory may be ceded, or the navigation of any 

river surrendered; thereby granting to five states the exercise of a right 

acknowledged to be the highest act of sovereignty -- to fifteen men, not the 

representatives of the country to be ceded, but, as has already happened, 

men whose interest and policy it may be to make such surrender. Admitting, 

for a moment, that this point is as well guarded by the proposed plan as by 

the old Articles of Confederation, (to which, however, common sense can 

never assent,) have we not already had cause to tremble, and ought we not to 

guard against the accomplishment of a scheme to which nothing but an 

inattention to the general interest of America, and a selfish regard to the 

interest of particular states, could have given rise? Surely, sir, we ought; 

and since we have already seen a diabolical attempt made to surrender the 

navigation of a river, the source of which is as yet unknown, and on which 

depends the importance of the southern part of America; since we have every 

reason to believe that the same principle which at first dictated this 

measure, still exists, and will forever operate; it is our duty -- a duty 

which we owe to ourselves, which we owe to the southern part of America, and 

which we owe to the natural rights of mankind -- to guard against it in such 

manner as will forever prevent its accomplishment. This, sir, is not done by 

the clause, nor will it rest on that sure footing which I wish, and which 

the importance of the subject demands, until the concurrence of three 

fourths of all the senators shall be requisite to ratify a treaty respecting 

the cession of territory, the surrender of the navigation of rivers, or the 

use of all the American seas.



That sacred palladium of liberty, the freedom of the press, (the influence 

of which is so great that it is the opinion of the ablest writers that no 

country can remain long in slavery where it is unrestrained,) has not been 

expressed; nor are the liberties of the people ascertained and protected by 

any declaration of rights; that inestimable privilege, (the most important 

which freemen can enjoy,) the trial by jury in all {611} civil cases, has 

not been guarded by the system; -- and while they have been inattentive to 

these all-important considerations, they have made provision for the 

introduction of standing armies in time of peace. These, sir, ever have 

been used as the grand machines to suppress the liberties of the people, and 

will ever awaken the jealousy of republicans, so long as liberty is dear, 

and tyranny odious, to mankind.



Congress, sir, have the power to declare war, and also to raise and support 

armies; and if we suppose them to be a representation of the states, the 

nexus imperii of the British constitution is here lost. There the king has 

the power of declaring war, and the Parliament that of raising money to 

support it. Governments ought not to depend on an army for their support, 

but ought to be so formed as to have the confidence, respect, and affection 

of the citizens. Some degree of virtue, sir, must exist, or freedom cannot 

live. A standing army will introduce idleness and extravagance, which will 

be followed by their sure concomitant vices. In a country extensive like 

ours, the power of the sword is more sensibly felt than in a small 

community. The advantages, sir, of military science and discipline cannot be 

exerted unless a proper number of soldiers are united in one body, and 

actuated by one soul. The tyrant of a single town, or a small district, 

would soon discover that a hundred armed soldiers were a weak defence 

against ten thousand peasants or citizens; but ten thousand well-disciplined 

soldiers, will command, with despotic sway, millions of subjects, and will 

strike terror into the most numerous populace. It was this, sir, which 

enabled the pretorian bands of Rome, whose number scarcely amounted to ten 

thousand, after having violated the sanctity of the throne by the atrocious 

murder of a most excellent emperor, to dishonor the majesty of it, by 

proclaiming that the Roman empire -- the mistress of the world -- was to be 

disposed of, to the highest bidder, at public auction; -- and to their 

licentious frenzy may be attributed the first cause of the decline and fall 

of that mighty empire. We ought, therefore, strictly to guard against the 

establishment of an army -- whose only occupation would be idleness; whose 

only effort the introduction of vice and dissipation; and who would, at some 

future day, deprive user our liberties, as a reward for past favors, by the 

introduction of some military despot.



{612} I had it in contemplation to have made some observations on the 

disposition of the judicial powers; but, as my knowledge in that line is 

confined, and as the subject has been so ably handled by other gentlemen, 

and the defects clearly developed, and as their arguments remain unanswered, 

1 shall say nothing on that head. The want of responsibility to the people 

from their representatives would furnish matter of ample discussion; but I 

pass it over in silence, only observing that it is a grand, and indeed a 

daring fault, and one which sanctions with security the most tyrannic edicts 

of a despotic ruler. The ambiguous terms in which all rights are secured to 

the people, and the clear and comprehensive language used when power is 

granted to Congress, also afford matter for suspicions and objections; but 

the able manner in which my very worthy, my very eloquent, and truly 

patriotic friend and coadjutor, whose name shall ever be hallowed in the 

temple of liberty, has handled this subject, would render any observations 

from me tedious and unnecessary.



Permit me, then, to conclude by reminding gentlemen who appeal to history to 

prove the excellence of the proposed plan, that their mode of comparison is 

unjust. "Wealth and extent of territory," says the great Montesquieu, "have 

a relation to government, and the manners and customs of the people are 

closely connected with it." The same system of policy which might have been 

excellent in the governments of antiquity would not, probably, suit us at 

the present day. The question, therefore, which should be agitated, is, not 

whether the proposed Constitution is better or worse than those which have 

from time to time existed, but whether it is calculated to secure our 

liberties and happiness at the present stage of the world.



For my own part, after an impartial investigation of it, and after a close 

attention and candid consideration of the arguments, which have been used, I 

am impressed with an opinion that it is not. I am persuaded that, by 

adopting it, and then proposing amendments, that unfortunate traveller, 

Liberty, is more endangered than the union of the states will be by first 

proposing these amendments. I am so far an enthusiast, in favor of liberty, 

that I never will trust the sacred deposit to other hands, nor will I 

exchange it for any earthly consideration; and I have such a fixed aversion 

to the bitter {613} cup of slavery, that, in my estimation, a draught is not 

sweetened, whether administered by the hand of a Turk, a Briton, or an 

American.



Impressed, then, sir, with these sentiments, and governed by these 

principles, I shall decidedly give my vote in favor of previous amendments. 

But, sir, should the question be decided contrary to my wishes, the first 

wish of my heart is, that the decision may promote the happiness and 

prosperity of the country so dear to us all.



Mr. GRAYSON. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen have misrepresented what I said on the 

subject of treaties. On this ground let us appeal to the law of nations. How 

does it stand? Thus -- that Without the consent of the national legislature, 

dismemberment cannot be made. This is a subject in which Virginia is deeply 

interested, and ought to be well understood. It ought to be expressly 

provided that no dismemberment should take place without the consent of the 

legislature. On this occasion, I beg leave to introduce an instance 

mentioned on the floor of Congress. Francis, king of France, was taken by 

the Spaniards at the battle of Pavia. He stipulated to give up certain 

territories, to be liberated. Yet the stipulation was not complied with, 

because it was alleged that it was not made by the sovereign power. Let us 

apply this. Congress has a right to dismember the empire. The President may 

do it, and the legislature may confirm it. Let gentlemen contradict it if 

they can. This is one of the highest acts of sovereignty, and I think it of 

the utmost importance that it should be placed on a proper footing. There is 

an absolute necessity for the existence of the power. It may prevent the 

annihilation of society by procuring a peace. It must be lodged somewhere. 

The opposition wish it to be put in the hands of three fourths of the 

members of both houses of Congress. It would be then secure. It is not so 

now.



The dangers of disunion were painted in strong colors. How is the fact? It 

is this -- that, if Virginia thinks proper to insist on previous 

amendments, joined by New York and North Carolina, she can procure what 

amendments she pleases. What is the geographical position of these states? 

New York commands the ocean. Virginia and North Carolina join the Spanish 

dominions. What would be the situation, then, of the Other states? They 

would be topographically {614} separated, though politically, connected with 

one another. There would be no communication between the centre and the 

component parts. While those states were thus separated, of what advantage 

would commercial regulations be to them? Yet will gentlemen pretend to say 

that we must adopt first, and then beg for amendments? I see no reason in 

it. We undervalue our own importance. Consider the vast consequence and 

importance of Virginia and North Carolina. What kind of connection would the 

rest of the states form? They would be carrying states, without Having any 

thing to carry. They could have no communication with the other Southern 

States. I therefore insist that, if you are not satisfied with the paper as 

it stands, it is as clear to me as that the sun shines, that, by joining 

these two states, you may command such amendments as you may think necessary 

for the happiness of the people.



The late Convention were not empowered totally to alter the present 

Confederation. The idea was to amend. If they lay before us a thing quite 

different, we are not bound to accept it. There is nothing dictatorial in 

refusing it: we wish to remove the spirit of party. In all parts of the 

world there is a reciprocity in contracts and compacts. If one man makes a 

proposition to another, is he bound to accept it?



Six or seven states have agreed to it. As it is not their interest to stand 

by themselves, will they not with open arms receive us? Tobacco will always 

make our peace with them. I hope, then, that the honorable gentleman will 

find, on a reconsideration, that we are not at all in that dangerous 

situation he represented. In my opinion, the idea of subsequent amendments 

is preposterous. They are words without meaning. The little states will not 

agree to an alteration. When they find themselves on an equal footing with 

the other states in the Senate, and all power vested in them, -- the 

executive mixed with the legislative, -- they will never assent. Why are 

such extensive powers given to the Senate? Because the little states gained 

their point. In every light I consider subsequent amendments as unwise and 

impolitic.



Considering the situation of the continent, this is not a time for changing 

our government. I do not think we stand so secure with respect to other 

nations as to change our government. The nations of Europe look with 

watchful eyes {615} on us, and with reason; for the West India islands 

depend on our motions. When we have strength, importance, and union, they 

will have reason to tremble for their islands. Almost all the governments of 

the world have been formed by accident. We are now, in time of peace, 

without any real cause, changing our government. We ought to be cool and 

temperate, and not act like the people of Denmark, who gave up their 

liberties, in a transport of passion, to the crown. Let us therefore be 

cautious, and deliberate before we determine.



What is the situation of Virginia? She is rich when her resources are 

compared with those of others. Is it right for a rich nation to consolidate 

with a poor one? By no means. It was right for Scotland to unite with 

England, as experience has shown. Scotland only pays forty-eight thousand 

pounds, when England pays four shillings in the pound, which amounts to two 

million pounds. In all unions where a rich state is joined with a poor one, 

it will be found that the rich one will pay in that disproportion. A union 

between such nations ought never to take place, except in peculiar 

circumstances, and on very particular conditions, How is it with Virginia? 

It is politic for her to unite, but not on any terms. She will pay more than 

her natural proportion, and the present state of the national debt renders 

it an object. She will also lose her importance. She is now put in the same 

situation as a state forty times smaller.



Does she gain any advantage from her central situation, by acceding to that 

paper? Within ten miles of Alexandria the centre of the states is said to 

be. It has not said that the ten miles square will be there. In a monarchy, 

the seat of government must be where the monarch pleases. How ought it to be 

in a republic like ours? -- now in one part, and at another time in another, 

or where it will best suit the convenience of the people. Then I lay it down 

as a political right that the seat of government ought to be fixed by the 

Constitution, so as to suit the public convenience.



Has Virginia any gain from her riches and commerce? What does she get in 

return? I can see what she gives up, which is immense. The little states 

gain in proportion as we lose. Every disproportion is against us. If the 

effects of such a contrariety of interests be happy, it must be 

extraordinary and wonderful. From the very nature of the paper, {616} one 

part, whose interest is different from the other, is to govern it. What will 

be our situation? The Northern States are carrying states. We are considered 

as productive states. They will consequently carry for us. Are manufactures 

favorable to us? If they reciprocate the act of Charles II., and say that 

no produce of America will be carried in any foreign bottom, what will be 

the consequence? This -- that all the produce of the Southern States will be 

carried by the Northern States on their own terms, which must be very high.



Though this government has the power of taxation, and the most important 

subject of the legislation, there is no responsibility any where. The 

members of Delaware do not return to Virginia to give an account of their 

conduct. Yet they legislate for us. In addition to this, it will be 

productive of great expenses. Virginia has assumed an immense weight of 

private debt, and her imports and exports are taken away. Judge, then, how 

such an accumulation of expenses will accommodate us. I think that, were it 

not for one great character in America, so many men would not be for this 

government. We have one ray of hope. We do not fear while he lives; but we 

can only expect his fame to be immortal. We wish to know who, besides him, 

can concentrate the confidence and affections of all America.



He then concluded by expressing hopes that the proposition of his honorable 

friend would be acceded to.



Mr. MADISON. Mr. Chairman, nothing has excited more admiration in the world 

than the manner in which free governments have been established in America; 

for it was the first instance, from the creation of the world to the 

American revolution, that free inhabitants have been seen deliberating on a 

form of government, and selecting such of their citizens as possessed their 

confidence, to determine upon and give effect to it. But why has this 

excited so much wonder and applause? Because it is of so much magnitude, and 

because it is liable to be frustrated by so many accidents. If it has 

excited so much wonder that the United States have, in the middle of war and 

confusion, formed free systems of government, how much more astonishment. 

and admiration will be excited, should they be able, peaceably, freely, and 

satisfactorily, to establish one general {617} government, when there is 

such a diversity of opinions and interests -- when not cemented or 

stimulated by any common danger! How vast must be the difficulty of 

concentrating, in one government, the interests, and conciliating the 

opinions, of so many different, heterogeneous bodies!



How have the confederacies of ancient and modern times been formed? As far 

as ancient history describes the former to us, they were brought about by 

the wisdom of some eminent sage. How was the imperfect union of the Swiss 

cantons formed? By danger. How was the confederacy of the United Netherlands 

formed? By the same. They are surrounded by dangers. By these, and one 

influential character, they were stimulated to unite. How was the Germanic 

system formed? By danger, in some degree, but principally by the overruling 

influence of individuals.



When we consider this government, we ought to make great allowances. We must 

calculate the impossibility that every state should be gratified in its 

wishes, and much less that every individual should receive this 

gratification. It has never been denied, by the friends of the paper on the 

table, that it has defects; but they do not think that it contains any real 

danger. They conceive that they will, in all probability, be removed, when 

experience will show it to be necessary. I beg that gentlemen, in 

deliberating on this subject, would consider the alternative. Either nine 

states shall have ratified it, or they will not. If nine states will adopt 

it, can it be reasonably presumed, or required, that nine states, having 

freely and fully considered the subject, and come to an affirmative 

decision, will, upon the demand of a single state, agree that they acted 

wrong, and could not see its defects -- tread back the steps which they have 

taken, and come forward, and reduce it to uncertainty whether a general 

system shall be adopted or not? Virginia has always heretofore spoken the 

language of respect to the other states, and she has always been attended 

to. Will it be that language to call on a great majority of the states to 

acknowledge that they have done wrong? Is it the language of confidence to 

say that we do not believe that amendments for the preservation of the 

common liberty, and general interests, of the states, will be consented to 

by them? This is the language neither of confidence nor respect. Virginia, 

when she speaks respectfully, will be as much attended {618} to as she has 

hitherto been when speaking this language.



It is a most awful thing that depends on our decision -- no less than 

whether the thirteen states shall unite freely, peaceably, and unanimously, 

for security of their common happiness and liberty, or whether every thing 

is to be put in confusion and disorder. Are we to embark in this dangerous 

enterprise, uniting various opinions to contrary interests, with the vain 

hope of coming to an amicable concurrence?



It is worthy of our consideration that those who prepared the paper on the 

table found difficulties not to be described in its formation: mutual 

deference and concession were absolutely necessary. Had they been inflexibly 

tenacious of their individual opinions, they would never have concurred. 

Under what circumstances was it formed? When no party was formed, or 

particular proposition made, and men's minds were calm and dispassionate. 

Yet, under these circumstances, it was difficult, extremely difficult, to 

agree to any general system.



Suppose eight states only should ratify, and Virginia should propose 

certain alterations, as the previous condition of her accession. If they 

should be disposed to accede to her proposition, which is the most favorable 

conclusion, the difficulty attending it will be immense. Every state which 

has decided it, must take up the subject again. They must not only have the 

mortification of acknowledging that they had done wrong, but the difficulty 

of having a reconsideration of it among the people, and appointing new 

conventions to deliberate upon it. They must attend to all the amendments, 

which may be dictated by as great a diversity of political opinions as 

there are local attachments. When brought together in one assembly, they 

must go through, and accede to, every one of the amendments. The gentlemen 

who, within this house, have thought proper to propose previous amendments, 

have brought no less than forty amendments, a bill of rights which contains 

twenty amendments, and twenty other alterations, some of which are improper 

and inadmissible. Will not every state think herself equally entitled to 

propose as many amendments? And suppose them to be contradictory! I leave it 

to this Convention whether it be probable that they can agree, or agree to 

{619} any thing but the plan on the table; or whether greater difficulties 

will not be encountered than were experienced in the progress of the 

formation of the Constitution.



I have said that there was a great contrariety of opinions among the 

gentlemen in the opposition. It has been heard in every stage of their 

opposition. I can see, from their amendments, that very great sacrifices 

have been made by some of them. Some gentlemen think that it contains too 

much state influence; others, that it is a complete consolidation; and a 

variety of other things. Some of them think that the equality in the Senate 

is nor a defect; others, that it is the bane of all good government. I 

might, if there were time, show a variety of other cases where their 

opinions are contradictory. If there be this contrariety of opinions in this 

house, what contrariety may not be expected, when we take into view thirteen 

conventions equally or more numerous! Besides, it is notorious, from the 

debates which have been published, that there is no sort of uniformity in 

the grounds of the opposition.



The state of New York has been adduced. Many in that state are opposed to it 

from local views. The two who opposed it in the general Convention from that 

state are in the state Convention. Every step of this system was opposed by 

those two gentlemen. They were unwilling to part with the old Confederation. 

Can it be presumed, then, sir, that gentlemen in this state, who admit the 

necessity of changing, should ever be able to unite in sentiments with those 

who are totally averse to any change?



I have revolved this question in my mind with as much serious attention, and 

called to my aid as much information, as I could, yet I can see no reason 

for the apprehensions of gentlemen; but I think that the most happy effects 

for this country would result from adoption, and if Virginia will agree to 

ratify this system, I shall look upon it as one of the most fortunate 

events that ever happened for human nature, t cannot, therefore, without the 

most excruciating apprehensions, see a possibility of losing its blessings. 

It gives me infinite pain to reflect that all the earliest endeavors of the 

warmest friends of their country to introduce a system promotive of our 

happiness, may be blasted by a rejection, for which I think, with my 

honorable friend, that previous amendments are but another name. The 

gentlemen in opposition {620} seem to insist on those amendments, as if they 

were all necessary for the liberty and happiness of the people. Were I to 

hazard an opinion on the subject, I would declare it infinitely more safe, 

in its present form, than it would be after introducing into it that long 

train of alterations which they call amendments. 



With respect to the proposition of the honorable gentleman to my left, (Mr. 

Wythe,) gentlemen apprehend that, by enumerating three rights, it implied 

there were no more. The observations made by a gentleman lately up, on that 

subject, correspond precisely with my opinion. That resolution declares that 

the powers granted by the proposed Constitution are the gift of the people, 

and may be resumed by them when perverted to their oppression, and every 

power not granted thereby remains with the people, and at their will. It 

adds, likewise, that no right, of any denomination, can be cancelled, 

abridged, restrained, or modified, by the general government, or any of its 

officers, except in those instances in which power is given by the 

Constitution for these purposes. There cannot be a more positive and 

unequivocal declaration of the principle of the adoption -- that every 

thing not granted is reserved. This is obviously and self-evidently the 

case, without the declaration. Can the general government exercise any power 

not delegated? If an enumeration be made of our rights, will it not be 

implied that every thing omitted is given to the general government? Has not 

the honorable gentleman himself admitted that an imperfect enumeration is 

dangerous? Does the Constitution say that they shall not alter the law of 

descents, or do those things which would subvert the whole system of the 

state laws? If it did, what was not excepted would be granted. Does it 

follow, from the omission of such restrictions that they can exercise 

powers not delegated? The reverse of the proposition holds. The delegation 

alone warrants the exercise of any power.



With respect to the amendments proposed by the honorable gentleman, it ought 

to be considered how far they are good. As far as they are palpably and 

insuperably objectionable they ought to be opposed. One amendment he 

proposes is, that any army which shall be necessary shall be raised by the 

consent of two thirds of the states. I most devoutly wish that there may 

never be an occasion for having {621} a single regiment. There can be no 

harm in declaring that standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to 

liberty, and ought to be avoided, as far as it may be consistent with the 

protection of the community. But when we come to say that the national 

security shall depend, not on a majority of the people of America, but that 

it may be frustrated by less than one third of the people of America, I ask 

if this be a safe or proper mode. What parts of the United States are most 

likely to stand in need of this protection? The weak parts, which are the 

Southern States. Will it be safe to leave the United States at the mercy of 

one third of the states -- a number which may comprise a very small 

proportion of the American people? They may all be in that part of America 

which is least exposed to danger. As far as a remote situation from danger 

would render exertions for public defence less active, so far the Southern 

States would be endangered.



The regulation of commerce, he further proposed, should depend on two thirds 

of both houses. I wish I could recollect the history of this matter; but I 

cannot call it to mind with sufficient exactness. But I well recollect the 

reasoning of some gentlemen on that subject. It was said, and I believe with 

truth, that every part of America does not stand in equal need of security. 

It was observed that the Northern States were most competent to their own 

safety. Was it reasonable, asked they, that they should bind themselves to 

the defence of the Southern States, and still be left at the mercy of the 

minority for commercial advantages? Should it be in the power of the 

minority to deprive them of this and other advantages, when they were bound 

to defend the whole Union, it might be a disadvantage for them to 

confederate.



These were his arguments. This policy of guarding against political 

inconveniences, by enabling a small part of the community to oppose the 

government, and subjecting the majority to a small minority, is fallacious. 

In some cases it may be good; in others it may be fatal. In all cases, it 

puts it in the power of the minority to decide a question which concerns the 

majority. 



I was struck with surprise when I heard him express himself alarmed with 

respect to the emancipation of slaves. Let me ask, if they should even 

attempt it, if it will not be {622} a usurpation of power. There is no 

power to warrant it, in that paper. If there be, I know it not. But why 

should it be done? Says the honorable gentleman, for the general welfare: it 

will infuse strength into our system. Can any member of this committee 

suppose that it will increase our strength? Can any one believe that the 

American councils will come into a measure which will strip them of their 

property, and discourage and alienate the affections off five thirteenths of 

the Union? Why was nothing of this sort aimed at before? I believe such an 

idea never entered into any American breast, nor do I believe it ever will 

enter into the heads of those gentlemen who substitute unsupported 

suspicions for reasons.



I am persuaded that the gentlemen who contend for previous amendments are 

not aware of the dangers which must result. Virginia, after having made 

opposition, will be obliged to recede from it. Might not the nine states 

say, with a great deal of propriety, "It is not proper, decent, or right, in 

you, to demand that we should reverse what we have done. Do as we have done; 

place confidence in us, as we have done in one another; and then we shall 

freely, fairly, and dispassionately consider and investigate your 

propositions, and endeavor to gratify your wishes. But if you do not do 

this, it is more reasonable that you should yield to us than we to you. You 

cannot exist without us; you must be a member of the Union.



The case of Maryland, instanced by the gentleman, does not hold. She would 

not agree to confederate, because the other states would not assent to her 

claims of the western lands. Was she gratified? No; she put herself like the 

rest. Nor has she since been gratified. The lands are in the common stock of 

the Union.



As far as his amendments are not objectionable, or unsafe, so far they may 

be subsequently recommended -- not because they are necessary, but because 

they can produce no possible danger, and may gratify some gentlemen's 

wishes. But I never can consent to his previous amendments, because they are 

pregnant with dreadful dangers.



Mr. HENRY. Mr. Chairman, the honorable gentleman who was up some time ago 

exhorts us not to fall into a repetition of the defects of the 

Confederation. He said we ought not to declare that each state retains every 

power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not expressly delegated, because 

{623} experience has proved the insertion of such a restriction to be 

destructive, and mentioned an instance to prove it. That case, Mr. Chairman, 

appears tome to militate against himself. Passports would not be given by 

Congress -- and why? Because there was a clause in the Confederation which 

denied them implied powers. And says he, Shall we repeat the error? He asked 

me where was the power of emancipating slaves. I say it will be implied, 

unless implication be prohibited. He admits that the power of granting 

passports will be in the new Congress without the insertion of this 

restriction; yet he can show me nothing like such a power granted in that 

Constitution. Notwithstanding he admits their right to this power by 

implication, he says that I am unfair and uncandid in my deduction that they 

can emancipate our slaves, though the word emancipation is not mentioned in 

it. They can exercise power by implication in one instance, as well as in 

another. Thus, by the gentleman's own argument, they can exercise the power, 

though it be not delegated.



We were then told that the power of treaties and commerce was the sine qua 

non of the Union; that the little states would not confederate otherwise. 

There is a thing not present to human view. We have seen great concessions 

from the large states to the little states. But little concessions from the 

little states to the great states will be refused. He concedes that great 

concessions were made in the great Convention. Now, when we speak of rights, 

and not of emoluments, these little states would not have been affected. 

What boon did we ask? We demanded only rights which ought to be unalienable 

and sacred. We have nothing local to ask. We ask rights which concern the 

general happiness. Must not justice bring them into the concession of these? 

The honorable gentleman was pleased to say that the new government, in this 

policy, will be equal to what the present is. If so, that amendment will not 

injure that part.



He then mentioned the danger that would arise from foreign gold. We may be 

bribed by foreign powers if we ask for amendments, to secure our own 

happiness. Are we to be bribed to forget our own interests? I will ask, if 

foreign gold be likely to operate, where will it be? In the seat of 

government, or in those little channels in which the state {624} authority 

will flow? It will be at the fountain of power, where bribery will not be 

detected. He speaks of war and bloodshed. Whence do this war and bloodshed 

come? I fear it, but not from the source he speaks of. I fear it, sir, from 

the operation and friends of the federal government. He speaks with contempt 

of this amendment. But whoever will advert to the use made repeatedly, in 

England, of the prerogative of the king, and the frequent attacks on the 

privileges of the people, notwithstanding many legislative acts to secure 

them, will see the necessity of excluding implications. Nations who have 

trusted to logical deduction have lost their liberty.



The honorable gentleman last up agrees that there are defects, and by and 

by, he says there is no defect. Does not this amount to a declaration that 

subsequent amendments are not necessary? His arguments, great as the 

gentleman's abilities are, tend to prove that amendments cannot be obtained 

after adoption. Speaking of forty amendments, he calculated that it was 

something like impracticability to obtain them. I appeal, therefore, to the 

candor of the honorable gentleman, and this committee, whether amendments be 

not absolutely unattainable, if we adopt; for he has told us that, if the 

other states will do like this, they cannot be previously obtained. Will the 

gentleman bring this home to himself? This is a piece of information which I 

expected. The worthy member who proposed to ratify has also proposed that 

what amendments may be deemed necessary should be recommended to Congress, 

and that a committee should be appointed to consider what amendments were 

necessary. But what does it all come to at last? That it is a vain project, 

and that it is indecent and improper. I will not argue unfairly, but I will 

ask him if amendments are not unattainable. Will gentlemen, then, lay their 

hands on their hearts, and say that they can adopt it in this shape? When we 

demand this security of our privileges, the language of Virginia is not that 

of respect! Give me leave to deny. She only asks amendments previous to her 

adoption of the Constitution.



Was the honorable gentleman accurate, when he said that they could exist 

better without us than we could without them? I will make no comparison. But 

I will say that the states which have adopted will not make a respectable 

{625} appearance without us. Would he advise them to refuse us admission 

when we profess ourselves friends to the Union, and only solicit them to 

secure our rights? We do not reject a connection with them. We only declare 

that we will adopt it, if they will but consent to the security of rights 

essential to the general happiness.



He told you to confine yourselves to amendments which were indisputably 

true, as applying to several parts of the system proposed. Did you hear any 

thing like the admission of the want of such amendments from any one else? I 

will not insist on any that does not stand on the broad basis of human 

rights. He says there are forty. I say there is but one half the number, for 

the bill of rights is but one amendment.



He tells you of the important blessings which he imagines will result to us 

and mankind in general from the adoption of this system. I see the awful 

immensity of the dangers with which it is pregnant. I see it. I feel it. I 

see beings of a higher order anxious concerning our decision. When I see 

beyond the horizon that bounds human eyes, and look at the final 

consummation of all human things, and see those intelligent beings which 

inhabit the ethereal mansions reviewing the political decisions and 

revolutions which, in the progress of time, will happen in America, and the 

consequent happiness or misery of mankind, I am led to believe that much of 

the account, on one side or the other, will depend on what we now decide. 

Our own happiness alone is not affected by the event. All nations are 

interested in the determination. We have it in our power to secure the 

happiness of one half of the human race. Its adoption may involve the misery 

of the other hemisphere.



[Here a violent storm arose, which put the house in such disorder, that Mr. 

Henry was obliged to conclude.]



Mr. NICHOLAS proposed that the question should be put at nine o'clock next 

day.



He was opposed by Mr. CLAY.



Mr. RONALD also opposed the motion, and wished amendments to be prepared by 

a committee, before the question should be put.



Mr. NICHOLAS contended that the language of the proposed ratification would 

secure every thing which gentlemen desired, as it declared that all powers 

vested in the {626} Constitution were derived from the people, and might be 

resumed by them whensoever they should be perverted to their injury and 

oppression; and that every power not granted thereby remained at their will. 

No danger whatever could arise; for, says he, these expressions will become 

a part of the contract. The Constitution cannot be binding on Virginia, but 

with these conditions. If thirteen individuals are about to make a contract, 

and one agrees to it, but at the same time declares that he understands its 

meaning, signification, and intent, to be, (what the words of the contract 

plainly and obviously denote,) that it is not to be construed so as to 

impose any supplementary condition upon him, and that he is to be exonerated 

from it whensoever any such imposition shall be attempted, -- I ask whether, 

in this case, these conditions, on which he has assented to it, would not be 

binding on the other twelve. In like manner these conditions will be binding 

on Congress. They can exercise no power that is not expressly granted them.



Mr. RONALD. Mr. Chairman, I came hither with a determination to give my vote 

so as to secure the liberty and privileges of my constituents. I thought 

that a great majority argued that amendments were necessary. Such is my 

opinion; but whether they ought to be previous or subsequent to our 

adoption, I leave to the wisdom of this committee to determine. I feel an 

earnest desire to know what amendments shall be proposed, before the 

question be put. One honorable gentleman has proposed several amendments. 

They are objected to by other gentlemen. I do not declare myself for or 

against those amendments; but unless I see such amendments, one way or the 

other, introduced, as will secure the happiness of the people, and prevent 

their privileges from being endangered, I must, though much against my 

inclination, vote against this Constitution.



Mr. MADISON conceived that what defects might be in the Constitution might 

be removed by the amendatory mode in itself. As to a solemn declaration of 

our essential rights, he thought it unnecessary and dangerous -- 

unnecessary, because it was evident that the general government had no power 

but what was given it, and that the delegation alone warranted the exercise 

of power; dangerous, because an enumeration which is not complete is not 

safe. Such an enumeration could not be made, within any compass of time, 

{627} as would be equal to a general negation, such as his honorable friend 

(Mr. Wythe) had proposed. He declared that such amendments as seemed, in his 

judgment, to be without danger, he would readily admit, and that he would be 

the last to oppose any such amendment as would give satisfaction to any 

gentleman, unless it were dangerous.