| No | Author/No. | Title | Yr | Mo | Da |
|---|
| 1 | A Federalist | General Introduction: A Dangerous Plan of
Benefit only to the "Aristocratick Combination" | 1787 | Nov | 26 |
| 2 | William Grayson | "We have been told of Phantoms" | 1788 | Jun | 11 |
| 3 | Unsigned | New Constitution Creates a National
Government, Will not Abate Foreign Influence, Dangers of Civil War and
Despotism | 1788 | Mar | 7 |
| 4 | Patrick Henry | Foreign Wars, Civil Wars, and Indian Wars —
Three Bugbears | 1788 | Jun | 5 |
| 5 | An Observer | Scotland and England — A Case in
Point | 1787 | Dec | 3 |
| 6 | Centinel #11 | The Hobgoblins of Anarchy and Dissentions
Among the States | 1788 | Jan | 16 |
| 7 | Philanthropos | Adoption of the Constitution Will Lead to
Civil War | 1787 | Dec | 6 |
| 8 | A Federal Republican | "The Power Vested in Congress of
Sending Troops for Suppressing Insurrections Will Always Enable Them to
Stifle the First Struggles of Freedom" | 1788 | Mar | 5 |
| 9 | Montezuma | A Consolidated Government is a Tyranny | 1787 | Oct | 17 |
| 10 | A Farmer | On the Preservation of Parties, Public
Liberty Depends | 1788 | Mar | 18 |
| 11 | Agrippa | Unrestricted Power Over Commerce Should
not be Given the National Government | 1787 | Dec | 14-28 |
| 12 | Cincinnatus | How Will the New Government Raise Money? | 1787 | Nov | 29 |
| 13(1) | A Farmer | The Expense of the New Government (Part 1) | 1788 | Jan | 11 |
| 13(2) | Unsigned | The Expense of the New Government (Part 2) | 1787 | Oct | 17 |
| 14 | Cato #3 | Extent of Territory Under Consolidated
Government Too Large to Preserve Liberty or Protect Property | 1787 | Oct | 25 |
| 15 | Unsigned | Rhode Island is Right! | 1787 | Dec | 7 |
| 16 | Alfred | Europeans Admire and Federalists Decry the
Present System | 1787 | Dec | 25 |
| 17 | Brutus | Federalist Power Will Ultimately Subvert
State Authority | | | |
| 18-20 | An Old Whig | What Does History Teach? (Part 1) | 1787 | Nov | 27 |
| 18-20 | A Newport Man | What Does History Teach? (Part 2) | 1788 | Mar | 17 |
| 21 | Centinel | Why the Articles Failed | 1787 | Oct | 5 |
| 22 | Candidus | Articles of Confederation Simply Requires
Amendments, Particularly for Commercial Power and Judicial Power;
Constitution Goes Too Far | 1787 | Dec | 6 |
| 23(1) | Brutus #7 | Certain Powers Necessary for the Common
Defense, Can and Should be Limited (Part 1) | 1788 | Jan | 3 |
| 23(2) | Brutus #8 | Certain Powers Necessary for the Common
Defense, Can and Should be Limited (Part 2) | 1788 | Jan | 10 |
| 24 | Brutus #9 | Objections to a Standing Army (part 1) | 1788 | Jan | 17 |
| 25 | Brutus #10 | Objections to a Standing Army (part 2) | 1788 | Jan | 24 |
| 26 | A Farmer and Planter | The Use of Coercion by the New Government
(Part 1) | 1788 | Apr | 1 |
| 27 | John Humble | The Use of Coercion by the New Government
(Part 2) | 1787 | Oct | 29 |
| 28 | Unsigned | The Use of Coercion by the New Government
(Part 3) | 1788 | Jan | 16 |
| 29(1) | A Democratic Federalist | Objections to National Control of the
Militia (Part 1) | 1787 | Oct | 23 |
| 29(2) | Pennsylvania Minority | Objections to National Control of the
Militia (Part 2) | 1787 | Dec | 12 |
| 30-31 | Cato Uticensis | A Virginia Antifederalist on the Issue of
Taxation | 1787 | Oct | 31 |
| 32 | Brutus #5 | Federal Taxation and the Doctrine of
Implied Powers (Part 1) | 1787 | Dec | 13 |
| 33 | Brutus #6 | Federal Taxation and the Doctrine of
Implied Powers (Part 2) | 1787 | Dec | 27 |
| 34 | Patrick Henry | The Problem of Concurrent Taxation | 1788 | Jun | 5 |
| 35 | George Mason | Federal Taxing Power Must be Restrained | 1788 | Jun | 4 |
| 36 | Federal Farmer | Representation and Internal Taxation | | | |
| 37 | Federal Farmer | Factions and the Constitution | | | |
| 38(1) | Brutus Junior | Some Reactions to Federalist Arguments
(Part 1) | 1787 | Nov | 8 |
| 38(2) | A Countryman | Some Reactions to Federalist Arguments
(Part 2) | 1788 | Jan | 10 |
| 38(3) | A Countryman | Some Reactions to Federalist Arguments
(Part 3) | 1788 | Feb | 14 |
| 39 | A Farmer | Appearance and Reality — The Form is
Federal; The Effect is National | 1788 | Apr | 15 |
| 40(1) | Philadelphiensis | On the Motivations and Authority of the
Founding Fathers (1) | | | |
| 40(2) | An American | On the Motivations and Authority of the
Founding Fathers (2) | | | |
| 40(3) | A Farmer and Planter | On the Motivations and Authority of the
Founding Fathers (3) | | | |
| 40(4) | Patrick Henry | On the Motivations and Authority of the
Founding Fathers (4) | | | |
| 40(5) | Centinel | On the Motivations and Authority of the
Founding Fathers (5) | | | |
| 40(6) | Yeomanry of Massachusetts | On the Motivations and Authority of the
Founding Fathers (6) | | | |
| 41-43 | Federal Farmer | "The Quantity of Power the Union Must
Possess is One Thing, the Mode of Exercising the Powers Given is Quite a
Different Consideration" (Part 1) | | | |
| 41-43 | Federal Farmer | "The Quantity of Power the Union Must
Possess is One Thing, the Mode of Exercising the Powers Given is Quite a
Different Consideration" (Part 2) | | | |
| 44 | Deliberator | What Congress Can Do; What a State Can Not | 1788 | Feb | 20 |
| 45 | Sydney | Powers of National Government Dangerous to
State Government; New York as an Example | 1788 | Jun | 13 |
| 46 | An Old Whig | "Where Then is the Restraint?" | 1788 | Nov | 2 |
| 47 | Centinel | "Balance" of Departments not
Achieved under New Constitution | 1787 | Oct | 5,24 |
| 48 | Leonidas | No Separation of Departments Results in No
Responsibility | 1788 | Jul | 30 |
| 49 | Massachusettensis | On Constitutional Conventions (Part 1) | 1788 | Jan | 29 |
| 50 | An Old Whig | On Constitutional Conventions (Part 2) | 1787 | Nov | 27 |
| 51 | Aristocrotis | Do Checks and Balances Really Secure the
Rights of the People? | 1788 | | |
| 52 | Consider Arms, ... | On the Guarantee of Congressional Biennial
Elections | 1788 | Apr | 9 |
| 53 | Amicus | A Plea for the Right of Recall | 1788 | Aug | 28 |
| 54(1) | Brutus #3 | Apportionment and Slavery: Northern and
Southern Views (1) | | | |
| 54(2) | Rawlins Lowndes | Apportionment and Slavery: Northern and
Southern Views (2) | 1788 | Jan | 16-18 |
| 54(3) | Cato #6 | Apportionment and Slavery: Northern and
Southern Views (3) | | | |
| 54(4) | A Georgian | Apportionment and Slavery: Northern and
Southern Views (4) | 1787 | Nov | 15 |
| 55 | Federal Farmer | Will the House of Representatives be
Genuinely Representative? (Part 1) | | | |
| 56 | Federal Farmer | Will the House of Representatives be
Genuinely Representative? (Part 2) | | | |
| 57 | Federal Farmer | Will the House of Representatives be
Genuinely Representative? (Part 3) | | | |
| 58 | Federal Farmer | Will the House of Representatives be
Genuinely Representative? (Part 4) | | | |
| 59 | Vox Populi | The Danger of Congressional Control of
Elections | 1787 | Oct | 30 |
| 60 | John F. Mercer | Will the Constitution Promote the
Interests of Favorite Classes? | 1788 | | |
| 61 | Federal Farmer | Questions and Comments on the
Constitutional Provisions Regarding the Election of Congressmen | | | |
| 62 | Brutus #16 | On the Organization and Powers of the
Senate (Part 1) | 1788 | Apr | 10 |
| 63 | Federal Farmer | On the Organization and Powers of the
Senate (Part 2) | | | |
| 64 | Cincinnatus | On the Organization and Powers of the
Senate (Part 3) | 1787 | Nov | 22 |
| 65 | Gilbert Livingston, John Lansing | On the Organization and Powers of the
Senate (Part 4) | 1788 | Jun | 24 |
| 66 | Joseph Taylor, ... | From North Carolina | | | |
| 67 | Cato | Various Fears Concerning the Executive
Department | 1787 | Nov | 8 |
| 68 | William Grayson | On the Mode of Electing the President | 1788 | Jun | 18 |
| 69 | Federal Farmer | The Character of the Executive Office | | | |
| 70 | An Old Whig | The Powers and Dangerous Potentials of His
Elected Majesty | 1787 | Dec | 11 |
| 71(1) | Luther Martin | The Presidential Term of Office (1) | | | |
| 71(2) | Agrippa #18 | The Presidential Term of Office (2) | 1788 | Feb | 5 |
| 71(3) | A Customer | The Presidential Term of Office (3) | 1788 | Mar | 13 |
| 72 | Republicus | On the Electoral College; On Reeligibility
of the President | 1788 | Mar | 1 |
| 73 | William Penn | Does the Presidential Veto Power Infringe
on the Separation of Departments? | 1788 | Jan | 3 |
| 74 | Philadelphiensis | The President as Military King | 1788 | Feb | 6 |
| 75 | Hampden | A Note Protesting the Treaty-Making
Provisions of the Constitution | 1788 | Feb | 16 |
| 76-77 | Federal Farmer | An Antifederalist View of the Appointing
Power Under the Constitution | | | |
| 78-79 | Brutus #15, 16 | The Power of the Judiciary (Part 1) | 1788 | Mar | 20 |
| 80 | Brutus #11 | The Power of the Judiciary (Part 2) | 1788 | Jan | 31 |
| 81 | Brutus #12, 14 | The Power of the Judiciary (Part 3) | 1788 | Feb | 7,28 |
| 82 | Brutus #14, 15 | The Power of the Judiciary (Part 4) | 1788 | Mar | 6,20 |
| 83 | Luther Martin | The Federal Judiciary and the Issue of
Trial by Jury | | | |
| 84 | Brutus | On the Lack of a Bill of Rights | | | |
| 85 | Plebian | Concluding Remarks: Evils Under
Confederation Exaggerated; Constitution Must be Drastically Revised
Before Adoption | | | |