Letters of Agrippa, I-XI



                MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE



              November 1787-January 1788



______



The Agrippa letters appear to have been written by James Winthrop, who was 

register of probate in Middlesex when these letters were written. Although 

preoccupied with the interests of Massachusetts, they reflect the principled 

selfishness that is the ground of Agrippa's argument. The letters fall into 

two distinct sets, the first set (I-XI) were addressed to the people of 

Massachusetts, the second (XII-XVI) to the Massachusetts Convention.



______



                          I



                   23 November 1787



To the People.



Many inconveniencies and difficulties in the new plan of government have 

been mentioned by different writers on that subject. Mr Gerry has given the 

publick his objections against it, with a manly freedom. The seceding 

members from the Pennsylvania Assembly also published theirs. Various 

anonymous writers have mentioned reasons of great weight. Among the many 

objections have been stated the unlimited right of taxation -- a standing 

army -- an inadequate representation of the people -- a right to destroy the 

constitution of the separate states, and all the barriers that have been set 

up in defence of liberty -- the right to try causes between private persons 

in many cases without a jury; without trying in the vicinity of either 

party; and without any limitation of the value which is to be tried. To none 

of these or any other objections has any answer been given, but such as have 

acknowledged the truth of the objection while they insulted the objector. 

This conduct has much the appearance of trying to force a general sentiment 

upon the people.



The idea of promoting the happiness of the people by opposing all their 

habits of business, and by subverting the laws to which they are habituated, 

appears to me to be at least a mistaken proceeding. If to this we add the 

limitations of trade, restraints on its freedom, and the alteration of its 

course, and transfer of the market, all under the pretence of regulation for 

federal purposes, we shall not find any additional reason to be pleased with 

the plan.



It is now conceded on all sides that the laws relating to civil causes were 

never better executed than at present. It is confessed by a warm federalist 

in answer to mr. Gerry's sensible letter, that the courts are so arranged at 

present that no inconvenience is found, and that if the new plan takes place 

great difficulties may arise. With this confession before him, can any 

reasonable man doubt whether he shall exchange a system, found by experience 

to be convenient, for one that is in many respects inconvenient, and 

dangerous? The expense of the new plan is terrifying, if there was no other 

objection. But they are multiplied. Let us consider that of the 

representation.



There is to be one representative for every thirty thousand people. Boston 

would nearly send one, but with regard to another there is hardly a county 

in the state which would have one. The representatives are to be chosen for 

two years. In this space, when it is considered that their residence is from 

two hundred to five [hundred?] miles from their constituents, it is 

difficult to suppose that they will retain any great affection for the 

welfare of the people. They will have an army to support them, and may bid 

defiance to the clamours of their subjects. Should the people cry aloud the 

representative may avail himself of the right to alter the time of election 

and postpone it for another year. In truth, the question before the people 

is, whether they will have a limited government or an absolute one?



It is a fact justified by the experience of all mankind from the earliest 

antiquity down to the present time, that freedom is necessary to industry. 

We accordingly find that in absolute governments, the people, be the climate 

what it may, are [in] general lazy, cowardly, turbulent, and vicious to an 

extreme. On the other hand, in free countries are found in general, 

activity, industry, arts, courage, generosity, and all the manly virtues.



Can there be any doubt which to choose? He that hesitates must be base 

indeed.



A favourite objection against a free government is drawn from the 

irregularities of the Greek and Roman republicks. But it is to be considered 

that war was the employment which they considered as most becoming freemen. 

Agriculture, arts, and most domestick employment were committed chiefly to 

slaves. But Carthage, the great commercial republick of antiquity, though 

resembling Rome in the form of its government, and her rival for power, 

retained her freedom longer than Rome, and was never disturbed by sedition 

during the long period of her duration. This is a striking proof that the 

fault of the Greek and Roman republicks was not owing to the form of their 

government, and that the spirit of commerce is the great bond of union among 

citizens. This furnishes employment for their activity, supplies their 

mutual wants, defends the rights of property, and producing reciprocal 

dependencies, renders the whole system harmonious and energetick. Our great 

object therefore ought to be to encourage this spirit. If we examine the 

present state of the world we shall find that most of the business is done 

in the freest states, and that industry decreases in proportion to the 

rigour of government.



                                               Agrippa.



                          II



                   27 November 1787



To the People of Massachusetts.



In the Gazette of the 23d instant, I ascertained from the state of other 

countries and the experience of mankind, that free countries are most 

friendly to commerce and to the rights of property. This produces greater 

internal tranquillity. For every man, finding sufficient employment for his 

active powers in the way of trade, agriculture and manufactures, feels no 

disposition to quarrel with his neighbour, nor with the government which 

protects him, and of which he is a constituent part. Of the truth of these 

positions we have abundant evidence in the history of our own country. Soon 

after the settlement of Massachusetts, and its formation into a 

commonwealth, in the earlier part of the last century, there was a sedition 

at Hingham and Weymouth. The governour passing by at that time with his 

guard, seized some of the mutineers and imprisoned them. This was complained 

of as a violation of their rights, and the govemour lost his election the 

next year; but the year afterwards was restored and continued to be 

re-elected for several years. The government does not appear to have been 

disturbed again till the revocation of the charter in 1686, being a period 

of about half a century.



Connecticut set out originally on the same principles, and has continued 

uniformly to exercise the powers of government to this time.



During the last year, we had decisive evidences of the vigour of this kind 

of government. In Connecticut, the treason was restrained while it existed 

only in the form of conspiracy. In Vermont, the conspirators assembled in 

arms, but were suppressed by the exertions of the militia, under the 

direction of their sheriffs. In New-Hampshire, the attack was made on the 

legislature, but the insurrection was in a very few hours suppressed, and 

has never been renewed. In Massachusetts, the danger was, by delay, suffered 

to increase. One judicial court after another was stopped, and even the 

capital trembled. Still, however, when the supreme executive gave the 

signal, a force of many thousands of active, resolute men, took the field, 

during the severities of winter, and every difficulty vanished before them. 

Since that time we have been continually coalescing. The people have applied 

with diligence to their several occupations, and the whole country wears one 

face of improvement. Agriculture has been improved, manufactures multiplied, 

and trade prodigiously enlarged. These are the advantages of freedom in a 

growing country. While our resources have been thus rapidly increasing, the 

courts have set in every part of the commonwealth, without any guard to 

defend them; have tried causes of every kind, whether civil or criminal, and 

the sheriffs, have in no case been interrupted in the execution of their 

office. In those cases indeed, where the government was more particularly 

interested, mercy has been extended, but in civil causes, and in the case of 

moral offences, the law has been punctually executed. Damage done to 

individuals, during the tumults, has been repaired, by judgment of the 

courts of law, and the award has been carried into effect. This is the 

present state of affairs, when we are asked to relinquish that freedom which 

produces such happy effects.



The attempt has been made to deprive us of such a beneficial system, and to 

substitute a rigid one in its stead, by criminally alarming our fears, 

exalting certain characters on one side, and villifying them on the other. I 

wish to say nothing of the merits or demerits of individuals; such arguments 

always do hurt. But assuredly my countrymen cannot fail to consider and 

determine who are the most worthy of confidence in a business of this 

magnitude. -- Whether they will trust persons, who have, from their cradles, 

been incapable of comprehending any other principles of government, than 

those of absolute power, and who have, in this very affair, tried to deprive 

them of their constitutional liberty, by a pitiful trick. They cannot avoid 

prefering those who have uniformly exerted themselves to establish a limited 

government, and to secure to individuals all the liberty that is consistent 

with justice, between man and man, and whose efforts, by the smiles of 

Providence, have hitherto been crowned with the most splendid success. After 

the treatment we have received, we have a right to be jealous, and to guard 

our present constitution with the strictest care. It is the right of the 

people to judge, and they will do wisely to give an explicit instruction to 

their delegates in the proposed convention, not to agree to any proposition 

that will, in any degree, militate with that happy system of government 

under which Heaven has placed them.



                                               Agrippa.



November 24, 1787.



                         III



                   30 November 1787



To the People.



It has been proved, from the clearest evidence, in two former papers, that a 

free government, I mean one in which the power frequently returns to the 

body of the people, is in principle the most stable and efficient of any 

kind; that such a government affords the most ready and effectual remedy for 

all injuries done to persons and the rights of property. It is true we have 

had a tender act. But what government has not some law in favour of debtors? 

The difficulty consists in finding one that is not more unfriendly to the 

creditors than ours. I am far from justifying such things. On the contrary I 

believe that it is universally true, that acts made to favour a part of the 

community are wrong in principle. All that is now intended is, to remark 

that we are not worse than other people in that respect which we most 

condemn. Probably the inquiry will be made, whence the complaints arise. 

This is easily answered. Let any man look round his own neighbourhood, and 

see if the people are not, with a very few exceptions, peaceable and attached 

to the government; if the country had ever within their knowledge more 

appearance of industry, improvement and tranquillity; if there was ever more 

of the produce of all kinds together for the market; if their stock does not 

rapidly increase; if there was ever a more ready vent for their surplus; and 

if the average of prices is not about as high as was usual in a plentiful 

year before the war. These circumstances all denote a general prosperity. 

Some classes of citizens indeed suffer greatly. Two descriptions I at 

present recollect. The publick creditors form the first of these classes and 

they ought to, and will be provided for. Let us for a moment consider their 

situation and prospects. The embarrassments consequent upon a war, and the 

usual reduction of prices immediately after a war, necessarily occasioned a 

want of punctuality in publick payments. Still however the publick debt has 

been very considerably reduced, not by the dirty and delusive scheme of 

depreciation, but the nominal sum. Applications are continually making for 

purchases in our eastern and western lands. Great exertions are making for 

clearing off the arrears of outstanding taxes, so that the certificates for 

interest on the state debt have considerably increased in value. This is a 

certain indication of returning credit. Congress this year disposed of a 

large tract of their lands towards paying the principal of their debt. 

Pennsylvania has discharged the whole of their part of the continental debt. 

New-York has nearly cleared its state debt, and has located a large part of 

their new lands towards paying the continental demands. Other states have 

made considerable payments. Every day from these considerations the publick 

ability and inclination to satisfy their creditors increases. The exertions 

of last winter were as much to support publick as private credit. The 

prospect therefore of the publick creditors is brightening under the present 

system. If the new system should take effect without amendments, which 

however is hardly probable, the increase of expense will be death to the 

hopes of all creditors both of the continental and of the state. With 

respect however to our publick delays of payment we have the precedent of 

the best established countries in Europe.



The other class of citizens to which I alluded was the ship-carpenters. All 

agree that their business is dull; but as nobody objects against a system of 

commercial regulations for the whole continent, that business may be 

relieved without subverting all the ancient foundations and laws which have 

the respect of the people. It is a very serious question whether giving to 

Congress the unlimited right to regulate trade would not injure them still 

further. It is evidently for the interest of the state to encourage our own 

trade as much as possible. But in a very large empire, as the whole states 

consolidated must be, there will always be a desire of the government to 

increase the trade of the capital, and to weaken the extremes. We should in 

that case be one of the extremes, and should feel all the impoverishment 

incident to that situation. Besides, a jealousy of our enterprising spirit, 

would always be an inducement to cramp our exertions. We must then be 

impoverished or we must rebel. The alternative is dreadful.



At present this state is one of the most respectable and one of the most 

influential in the union. If we alone should object to receiving the system 

without amendments, there is no doubt but it would be amended. But the case 

is not quite so bad. New-York appears to have no disposition even to call a 

convention. If they should neglect, are we to lend our assistance to compel 

them by arms, and thus to kindle a civil war without any provocation on 

their part. Virginia has put off their convention till May, and appears to 

have no disposition to receive the new plan without amendments. Pennsylvania 

does not seem to be disposed to receive it as it is. The same objections are 

made in all the states, that the civil government which they have adopted 

and which secures their rights will be subverted. All the defenders of this 

system undertake to prove that the rights of the states and of the citizens 

are kept safe. The opposers of it agree that they will receive the least 

burdensome system which shall defend those rights.



Both parties therefore found their arguments on the idea that these rights 

ought to be held sacred. With this disposition is it not in every man's mind 

better to recommit it to a new convention, or to Congress, which is a 

regular convention for the purpose, and to instruct our delegates to confine 

the system to the general purposes of the union, than to endeavour to force 

it through in its present form, and with so many opposers as it must have in 

every state on the continent. The case is not of such pressing necessity as 

some have represented. Europe is engaged and we are tranquil. Never 

therefore was an happier time for deliberation. The supporters of the 

measure are by no means afraid of insurrections taking place, but they are 

afraid that the present government will prove superiour to their assaults.



                                               Agrippa.



                         IV



                    3 December 1787



To the People.



Having considered some of the principal advantages of the happy form of 

government under which it is our peculiar good fortune to live, we find by 

experience, that it is the best calculated of any form hitherto invented, to 

secure to us the rights of our persons and of our property, and that the 

general circumstances of the people shew an advanced state of improvement 

never before known. We have found the shock given by the war in a great 

measure obliterated, and the publick debt contracted at that time to be 

considerably reduced in the nominal sum. The Congress lands are fully 

adequate to the redemption of the principal of their debt, and are selling 

and populating very fast. The lands of this state, at the west, are, at the 

moderate price of eighteen pence an acre, worth near half a million pounds 

in our money. They ought, therefore, to be sold as quick as possible. An 

application was made lately for a large tract at that price, and continual 

applications are made for other lands in the eastern part of the state. Our 

resources are daily augmenting.



We find, then, that after the experience of near two centuries our separate 

governments are in full vigour. They discover, for all the purposes of 

internal regulation, every symptom of strength, and none of decay. The new 

system is, therefore, for such purposes, useless and burdensome.



Let us now consider how far it is practicable consistent with the happiness 

of the people and their freedom. It is the opinion of the ablest writers on 

the subject, that no extensive empire can be governed upon republican 

principles, and that such a government will degenerate to a despotism, 

unless it be made up of a confederacy of smaller states, each having the 

full powers of internal regulation. This is precisely the principle which 

has hitherto preserved our freedom. No instance can be found of any free 

government of considerable extent which has been supported upon any other 

plan. Large and consolidated empires may indeed dazzle the eyes of a distant 

spectator with their splendour, but if examined more nearly are always found 

to be full of misery. The reason is obvious. In large states the same 

principles of legislation will not apply to all the parts. The inhabitants 

of warmer climates are more dissolute in their manners, and less industrious, 

than in colder countries. A degree of severity is, therefore, necessary with 

one which would cramp the spirit of the other. We accordingly find that the 

very great empires have always been despotick. They have indeed tried to 

remedy the inconveniences to which the people were exposed by local 

regulations; but these contrivances have never answered the end. The laws 

not being made by the people, who felt the inconveniences, did not suit 

their circumstances. It is under such tyranny that the Spanish provinces 

languish, and such would be our misfortune and degradation, if we should 

submit to have the concerns of the whole empire managed by one legislature. 

To promote the happiness of the people it is necessary that there should be 

local laws; and it is necessary that those laws should be made by the 

representatives of those who are immediately subject to the want of them. By 

endeavouring to suit both extremes, both are injured.



It is impossible for one code of laws to suit Georgia and Massachusetts. 

They must, therefore, legislate for themselves. Yet there is, I believe, not 

one point of legislation that is not surrendered in the proposed plan. 

Questions of every kind respecting property are determinable in a 

continental court, and so are all kinds of criminal causes. The continental 

legislature has, therefore, a right to make rules in all cases by which 

their judicial courts shall proceed and decide causes. No rights are 

reserved to the citizens. The laws of Congress are in all cases to be the 

supreme law of the land, and paramount to the constitutions of the 

individual states. The Congress may institute what modes of trial they 

please, and no plea drawn from the constitution of any state can avail. This 

new system is, therefore, a consolidation of all the states into one large 

mass, however diverse the parts may be of which it is to be composed. The 

idea of an uncompounded republick, on an average, one thousand miles in 

length, and eight hundred in breadth, and containing six millions of white 

inhabitants all reduced to the same standard of morals, or habits, and of 

laws, is in itself an absurdity, and contrary to the whole experience of 

mankind. The attempt made by Great-Britain to introduce such a system, 

struck us with horrour, and when it was proposed by some theorist that we 

should be represented in parliament, we uniformly declared that one 

legislature could not represent so many different interests for the purposes 

of legislation and taxation. This was the leading principle of the 

revolution, and makes an essential article in our creed. All that part, 

therefore, of the new system, which relates to the internal government of 

the states, ought at once to be rejected.



                                               Agrippa.



                          V



                   11 December 1787



To the People.



In the course of inquiry it has appeared, that for the purposes of internal 

regulation and domestick tranquillity, our small and separate governments 

are not only admirably suited in theory, but have been remarkably successful 

in practice. It is also found, that the direct tendency of the proposed 

system, is to consolidate the whole empire into one mass, and, like the 

tyrant's bed, to reduce all to one standard. Though this idea has been 

stated in different parts of the continent, and is the most important trait 

of this draft, the reasoning ought to be extensively understood. I therefore 

hope to be indulged in a particular statement of it.



Causes of all kinds, between citizens of different states, are to be tried 

before a continental court. This court is not bound to try it according to 

the local laws where the controversies happen; for in that case it may as 

well be tried in a state court. The rule which is to govern the new courts, 

must, therefore, be made by the court itself, or by its employers, the 

Congress. If by the former, the legislative and judicial departments will be 

blended; and if by the Congress, though these departments will be kept 

separate, still the power of legislation departs from the state in all those 

cases. The Congress, therefore, have the right to make rules for trying all 

kinds of questions relating to property between citizens of different 

states. The sixth article of the new constitution provides, that the 

continental laws shall be the supreme law of the land, and that all judges 

in the separate states shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution 

or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. All the state officers 

are also bound by oath to support this constitution. These provisions cannot 

be understood otherwise than as binding the state judges and other officers, 

to execute the continental laws in their own proper departments within the 

state. For all questions, other than those between citizens of the same 

state, are at once put within the jurisdiction of the continental courts. As 

no authority remains to the state judges, but to decide questions between 

citizens of the same state, and those judges are to be bound by the laws of 

Congress, it clearly follows, that all questions between citizens of the 

same state are to be decided by the general laws and not by the local ones.



Authority is also given to the continental courts, to try all causes between 

a state and its own citizens. A question of property between these parties 

rarely occurs. But if such questions were more frequent than they are, the 

proper process is not to sue the state before an higher authority; but to 

apply to the supreme authority of the state, by way of petition. This is the 

universal practice of all states, and any other mode of redress destroys the 

sovereignty of the state over its own subjects. The only case of the kind in 

which the state would probably be sued, would be upon the state notes. The 

endless confusion that would arise from making the estates of individuals 

answerable, must be obvious to every one.



There is another sense in which the clause relating to causes between the 

state and individuals is to be understood, and it is more probable than the 

other, as it will be eternal in its duration, and increasing in its extent. 

This is the whole branch of the law relating to criminal prosecutions. In 

all such cases the state is plaintiff, and the person accused is defendant. 

The process, therefore, will be, for the attorney-general of the state to 

commence his suit before a continental court. Considering the state as a 

party, the cause must be tried in another, and all the expense of the 

transporting witnesses incurred. The individual is to take his trial among 

strangers, friendless and unsupported, without its being known whether he is 

habitually a good or a bad man; and consequently with one essential 

circumstance wanting by which to determine whether the action was performed 

maliciously or accidentally. All these inconveniences are avoided by the 

present important restriction, that the cause shall be tried by a jury of 

the vicinity, and tried in the county where the offence was commited. But by 

the proposed derangement, I can call it by no softer name, a man must be 

ruined to prove his innocence. This is far from being a forced construction 

of the proposed form. The words appear to me not intelligible, upon the idea 

that it is to be a system of government, unless the construction now given, 

both for civil and criminal processes, be admitted. I do not say that it is 

intended that all these changes should take place within one year, but they 

probably will in the course of a half a dozen years, if this system is 

adopted. In the mean time we shall be subject to all the horrors of a 

divided sovereignty, not knowing whether to obey the Congress or the state. 

We shall find it impossible to please two masters. In such a state frequent 

broils will ensue. Advantage will be taken of a popular commotion, and even 

the venerable forms of the state be done away, while the new system will be 

enforced in its utmost rigour by an army. I am the more apprehensive of a 

standing army, on account of a clause in the new constitution which empowers 

Congress to keep one at all times; but this constitution is evidently such 

that it cannot stand any considerable time without an army. Upon this 

principle one is very wisely provided. Our present government knows of no 

such thing.



                                               Agrippa.



                         VI



                   14 December 1787



To the People.



To prevent any mistakes, or misapprehensions of the argument, stated in my 

last paper, to prove that the proposed constitution is an actual 

consolidation of the separate states into one extensive commonwealth, the 

reader is desired to observe, that in the course of the argument, the new 

plan is considered as an intire system. It is not dependent on any other 

book for an explanation, and contains no references to any other book. All 

the defences of it, therefore, so far as they are drawn from the state 

constitutions, or from maxims of the common law, are foreign to the purpose. 

It is only by comparing the different parts of it together, that the meaning 

of the whole is to be understood. For instance --



We find in it, that there is to be a legislative assembly, with authority 

to constitute courts for the trial of all kinds of civil causes, between 

citizens of different states. The right to appoint such courts necessarily 

involves in it the right of defining their powers, and determining the rules 

by which their judgment shall be regulated; and the grant of the former of 

those rights is nugatory without the latter. It is vain to tell us, that a 

maxim of common law requires contracts to be determined by the law existing 

where the contract was made: for it is also a maxim, that the legislature 

has a right to alter the common law. Such a power forms an essential part of 

legislation. Here, then a declaration of rights is of inestimable value. It 

contains those principles which the government never can invade without an 

open violation of the compact between them and the citizens. Such a 

declaration ought to have come to the new constitution in favour of the 

legislative rights of the several states, by which their sovereignty over 

their own citizens within the state should be secured. Without such an 

express declaration the states are annihilated in reality upon receiving 

this constitution -- the forms will be preserved only during the pleasure of 

Congress.



The idea of consolidation is further kept up in the right given to regulate 

trade. Though this power under certain limitations would be a proper one for 

the department of Congress; it is in this system carried much too far, and 

much farther than is necessary. This is, without exception, the most 

commercial state upon the continent. Our extensive coasts, cold climate, 

small estates, and equality of rights, with a variety of subordinate and 

concurring circumstances, place us in this respect at the head of the union. 

We must, therefore, be indulged if a point which so nearly relates to our 

welfare be rigidly examined. The new constitution not only prohibits 

vessels, bound from one state to another, from paying any duties, but even 

from entering and clearing. The only use of such a regulation is, to keep 

each state in complete ignorance of its own resources. It certainly is no 

hardship to enter and clear at the custom house, and the expense is too 

small to be an object.



The unlimitted right to regulate trade, includes the right of granting 

exclusive charters. This, in all old countries, is considered as one 

principal branch of prerogative. We find hardly a country in Europe which 

has not felt the ill effects of such a power. Holland has carried the 

exercise of it farther than any other state; and the reason why that country 

has felt less evil from it is, that the territory is very small, and they 

have drawn large revenues from their colonies in the East and West Indies. 

In this respect, the whole country is to be considered as a trading company, 

having exclusive privileges. The colonies are large in proportion to the 

parent state; so that, upon the whole, the latter may gain by such a system. 

We are also to take into consideration the industry which the genius of a 

free government inspires. But in the British islands all these circumstances 

together have not prevented them from being injured by the monopolies 

created there. Individuals have been enriched, but the country at large has 

been hurt. Some valuable branches of trade being granted to companies, who 

transact their business in London, that city is, perhaps, the place of the 

greatest trade in the world. But Ireland, under such influence, suffers 

exceedingly, and is impoverished; and Scotland is a mere bye-word. Bristol, 

the second city in England, ranks not much above this town in population. 

These things must be accounted for by the incorporation of trading 

companies; and if they are felt so severely in countries of small extent, 

they will operate with tenfold severity upon us, who inhabit an immense 

tract; and living towards one extreme of an extensive empire, shall feel the 

evil, without retaining that influence in government, which may enable us to 

procure redress. There ought, then, to have been inserted a restraining 

clause which might prevent the Congress from making any such grant, because 

they consequentially defeat the trade of the out-ports, and are also 

injurious to the general commerce, by enhancing prices and destroying that 

rivalship which is the great stimulus to industry.



                                               Agrippa.



                         VII



                   18 December 1787



To the People.



There cannot be a doubt, that, while the trade of this continent remains 

free, the activity of our countrymen will secure their full share. All the 

estimates for the present year, let them be made by what party they may, 

suppose the balance of trade to be largely in our favour. The credit of our 

merchants is, therefore, fully established in foreign countries. This is a 

sufficient proof, that when business is unshackled, it will find out that 

channel which is most friendly to its course. We ought, therefore, to be 

exceedingly cautious about diverting or restraining it. Every day produces 

fresh proofs, that people, under the immediate pressure of difficulties, do 

not, at first glance, discover the proper relief. The last year, a desire to 

get rid of embarrassments induced many honest people to agree to a 

tender-act, and many others, of a different description, to obstruct the 

courts of justice. Both these methods only increased the evil they were 

intended to cure. Experience has since shewn, that, instead of trying to 

lessen an evil by altering the present course of things, every endeavour 

should have been applied to facilitate the course of law, and thus to 

encourage a mutual confidence among the citizens, which increases the 

resources of them all, and renders easy the payment of debts. By this means 

one does not grow rich at the expense of another, but all are benefited. The 

case is the same with the states. Pennsylvania, with one port and a large 

territory, is less favourably situated for trade than the Massachusetts, 

which has an extensive coast in proportion to its limits of jurisdiction. 

Accordingly a much larger proportion of our people are engaged in maritime 

affairs. We ought therefore to be particularly attentive to securing so 

great an interest. It is vain to tell us that we ought to overlook local 

interests. It is only by protecting local concerns, that the interest of the 

whole is preserved. No man when he enters into society, does it from a view 

to promote the good of others, but he does it for his own good. All men 

having the same view are bound equally to promote the welfare of the whole. 

To recur then to such a principle as that local interests must be 

disregarded, is requiring of one man to do more than another, and is 

subverting the foundation of a free government. The Philadelphians would be 

shocked with a proposition to place the seat of general government and the 

unlimited right to regulate trade in the Massachusetts. There can be no 

greater reason for our surrendering the preference to them. Such sacrifices, 

however we may delude ourselves with the form of words, always originate in 

folly, and not in generosity.



Let me now request your attention a little while to the actual state of 

publick credit, that we may see whether it has not been as much 

misrepresented as the state of our trade.



At the beginning of the present year, the whole continental debt was about 

twelve millions of pounds in our money. About one quarter part of this sum 

was due to our foreign creditors. Of these France was the principal, and 

called for the arrears of interest. A new loan of one hundred and twenty 

thousand pounds was negotiated in Holland, at five per cent. to pay the 

arrears due to France. At first sight this has the appearance of bad 

economy, and has been used for the villainous purpose of disaffecting the 

people. But in the course of this same year. Congress have negotiated the 

sale of as much of their western lands on the Ohio and Missisippi, as amount 

nearly to the whole sum of the foreign debt; and instead of a dead loss by 

borrowing money at five per cent. to the amount of an hundred and twenty 

thousand pounds, in one sum, they make a saving of the interest at six per 

cent. on three millions of their domestick debt, which is an annual saving 

of an hundred and eighty thousand pounds. It is easy to see how such an 

immense fund as the western territory may be applied to the payment of the 

foreign debt. Purchasers of the land would as willingly procure any kind of 

the produce of the United States as they would buy loan office certificates 

to pay for the land. The produce thus procured would easily be negotiated 

for the benefit of our foreign creditors. I do not mean to insinuate that no 

other provision should be made for our creditors, but only to shew that our 

credit is not so bad in other countries as has been represented, and that 

our resources are fully equal to the pressure.



The perfection of government depends on the equality of its operation, as 

far as human affairs will admit, upon all parts of the empire, and upon all 

the citizens. Some inequalities indeed will necessarily take place. One man 

will be obliged to travel a few miles further than another man to procure 

justice. But when he has travelled, the poor man ought to have the same 

measure of justice as the rich one. Small inequalities may be easily 

compensated. There ought, however, to be no inequality in the law itself, 

and the government ought to have the same authority in one place as in 

another. Evident as this truth is, the most plausible argument in favour of 

the new plan is drawn from the inequality of its operation in different 

states. In Connecticut, they have been told that the bulk of the revenue 

will be raised by impost and excise, and therefore they need not be afraid 

to trust Congress with the power of levying a dry tax at pleasure. New-York, 

and Massachusetts, are both more commercial states than Connecticut. The 

latter, therefore, hopes that the other two will pay the bulk of the 

continental expense. The argument is in itself delusive. If the trade is not 

over-taxed, the consumer pays it. If the trade is over-taxed, it languishes, 

and by the ruin of trade the farmer loses his market. The farmer has in 

truth no other advantage from imposts than that they save him the trouble of 

collecting money for the government. He neither gets or loses money by 

changing the mode of taxation. The government indeed finds it the easiest 

way to raise the revenue; and the reason is that the tax is by this means 

collected where the money circulates most freely. But if the argument was 

not delusive, it ought to conclude against the plan, because it would prove 

the unequal operation of it, and if any saving is to be made by the mode of 

taxing, the saving should be applied towards our own debt, and not to the 

payment of the part of a continental burden which Connecticut ought to 

discharge. It would be impossible to refute in writing all the delusions 

made use of to force this system through. Those respecting the publick debt, 

and the benefit of imposts, are the most important, and these I have taken 

pains to explain. In one instance indeed, the impost does raise money at the 

direct expense of the seaports. This is when goods are imported subject to a 

duty, and re-exported without a drawback. Whatever benefit is derived from 

this source, surely should not be transferred to another state, at least 

till our own debts are cleared. 



Another instance of unequal operation is, that it establishes different 

degrees of authority in different states, and thus creates different 

interests. The lands in New-Hampshire having been formerly granted by this 

state, and afterwards by that state, to private persons, the whole authority 

of trying titles becomes vested in a continental court, and that state loses 

a branch of authority, which the others retain, over their own citizens.



I have now gone through two parts of my argument, and have proved the 

efficiency of the state governments for internal regulation, and the 

disadvantages of the new system, at least some of the principal. The 

argument has been much longer than I at first apprehended, or, possibly, I 

should have been deterred from it. The importance of the question has, 

however, prevented me from relinquishing it.



                                               Agrippa.



                        VIII



                   25 December 1787



To the People.



It has been proved, by indisputable evidence, that power is not the grand 

principle of union among the parts of a very extensive empire; and that when 

this principle is pushed beyond the degree necessary for rendering justice 

between man and man, it debases the character of individuals, and renders 

them less secure in their persons and property. Civil liberty consists in 

the consciousness of that security, and is best guarded by political 

liberty, which is the share that every citizen has in the government. 

Accordingly all our accounts agree, that in those empires which are commonly 

called despotick, and which comprehend by far the greatest part of the 

world, the government is most fluctuating, and property least secure. In 

those countries insults are borne by the sovereign, which, if offered to one 

of our governours, would fill us with horrour, and we should think the 

government dissolving.



The common conclusion from this reasoning is an exceedingly unfair one, that 

we must then separate, and form distinct confederacies. This would be true 

if there was no principle to substitute in the room of power. Fortunately 

there is one. This is commerce. All the states have local advantages, and in 

a considerable degree separate interests. They are, therefore, in a 

situation to supply each other's wants. Carolina, for instance, is inhabited 

by planters, while the Massachusetts is more engaged in commerce and 

manufactures. Congress has the power of deciding their differences. The most 

friendly intercourse may therefore be established between them. A diversity 

of produce, wants and interests, produces commerce, and commerce, where 

there is a common, equal and moderate authority to preside, produces 

friendship.



The same principles apply to the connection with the new settlers in the 

west. Many supplies they want, for which they must look to the older 

settlements, and the greatness of their crops enables them to make payments. 

Here, then, we have a bond of union which applies to all parts of the 

empire, and would continue to operate if the empire comprehended all 

America.



We are now, in the strictest sense of the terms, a federal republick. Each 

part has within its own limits the sovereignty over its citizens, while some 

of the general concerns are committed to Congress. The complaints of the 

deficiency of the Congressional powers are confined to two articles. They 

are not able to raise a revenue by taxation, and they have not a complete 

regulation of the intercourse between us and foreigners. For each of these 

complaints there is some foundation, but not enough to justify the clamour 

which has been raised. Congress, it is true, owes a debt which ought to be 

paid. A considerable part of it has been paid. Our share of what remains 

would annually amount to about sixty or seventy thousand pounds. If, 

therefore. Congress were put in possession of such branches of the impost as 

would raise this sum in our state, we should fairly be considered as having 

done our part towards their debt; and our remaining resources, whether 

arising from impost, excise, or dry tax, might be applied to the reduction 

of our own debt. The principal of this last amounts to about thirteen 

hundred thousand pounds, and the interest to between seventy or eighty 

thousand. This is, surely, too much property to be sacrificed; and it is as 

reasonable that it should be paid as the continental debt. But if the new 

system should be adopted, the whole impost, with an unlimited claim to 

excise and dry tax, will be given to Congress. There will remain no adequate 

fund for the state debt, and the state will still be subject to be sued on 

their notes. -- This is, then, an article which ought to be limited. We can, 

without difficulty, pay as much annually as shall clear the interest of our 

state debt, and our share of the interest on the continental one. But if we 

surrender the impost, we shall still, by this new constitution, be held to 

pay our full proportion of the remaining debt, as if nothing had been done. 

The impost will not be considered as being paid by this state, but by the 

continent. The federalists, indeed, tell us, that the state debts will all 

be incorporated with the continental debt, and all paid out of one fund. In 

this, as in all other instances, they endeavour to support their scheme of 

consolidation by delusion. Not one word is said in the book in favour of 

such a scheme, and there is no reason to think it true. Assurances of that 

sort are easily given, and as easily forgotten. There is an interest in 

forgetting what is false. No man can expect town debts to be united with 

that of the state; and there will be as little reason to expect, that the 

state and continental debts will be united together.



                                               Agrippa.



                         IX



                   28 December 1787



To the People.



We come now to the second and last article of complaint against the present 

confederation, which is, that Congress has not the sole power to regulate 

the intercourse between us and foreigners. Such a power extends not only to 

war and peace, but to trade and naturalization. This last article ought 

never to be given them; for though most of the states may be willing for 

certain reasons to receive foreigners as citizens, yet reasons of equal 

weight may induce other states, differently circumstanced, to keep their 

blood pure. Pennsylvania has chosen to receive all that would come there. 

Let any indifferent person judge whether that state in point of morals, 

education, energy is equal to any of the eastern states; the small state of 

Rhode-Island only excepted. Pennsylvania in the course of a century has 

acquired her present extent and population at the expense of religion and 

good morals. The eastern states have, by keeping separate from the foreign 

mixtures, acquired, their present greatness in the course of a century and 

an half, and have preserved their religion and morals. They have also 

preserved that manly virtue which is equally fitted for rendering them 

respectable in war, and industrious in peace.



The remaining power for peace and trade might perhaps be safely enough 

lodged with Congress under some limitations. Three restrictions appear to me 

to be essentially necessary to preserve the equality of rights to the 

states, which it is the object of the state governments to secure to each 

citizen, ist. It ought not to be in the power of Congress either by treaty 

or otherwise to alienate part of any state without the consent of the 

legislature. 2d. They ought not to be able by treaty or other law to give 

any legal preference to one part above another. 3d. They ought to be 

restrained from creating any monopolies. Perhaps others may propose 

different regulations and restrictions. One of these is to be found in the 

old confederation, and another in the newly proposed plan. The third seems 

to be equally necessary.



After all that has been said and written on this subject, and on the 

difficulty of amending our old constitution so as to render it adequate to 

national purposes, it does not appear that any thing more was necessary to 

be done, than framing two new articles. By one a limited revenue would be 

given to Congress with a right to collect it, and by the other a limited 

right to regulate our intercourse with foreign nations. By such an addition 

we should have preserved to each state its power to defend the rights of the 

citizens, and the whole empire would be capable of expanding, and receiving 

additions without altering its former constitution. Congress, at the same 

time, by the extent of their jurisdiction, and the number of their officers, 

would have acquired more respectability at home, and a sufficient influence 

abroad. If any state was in such a case to invade the rights of the Union, 

the other states would join in defence of those rights, and it would be in 

the power of Congress to direct the national force to that object. But it is 

certain that the powers of Congress over the citizens should be small in 

proportion as the empire is extended; that, in order to preserve the 

balance, each state may supply by energy what is wanting in numbers. 

Congress would be able by such a system as we have proposed to regulate 

trade with foreigners by such duties as should effectually give the 

preference to the produce and manufactures of our own country. We should 

then have a friendly intercourse established between the states, upon the 

principles of mutual interest. A moderate duty upon foreign vessels would 

give an advantage to our own people, while it would avoid all the 

[dis]advantages arising from a prohibition, and the consequent deficiency of 

vessels to transport the produce of the southern states.



Our country is at present upon an average a thousand miles long from north 

to south, and eight hundred broad from the Missisippi to the Ocean. We have 

at least six millions of white inhabitants, and the annual increase is about 

two hundred and fifty thousand souls, exclusive of emigrants from Europe. 

The greater part of our increase is employed in settling the new lands, 

while the older settlements are entering largely into manufactures of 

various kinds. It is probable, that the extraordinary exertions of this 

state in the way of industry for the present year only, exceed in value five 

hundred thousand pounds. The new settlements, if all made in the same tract 

of country, would form a large state annually; and the time seems to be 

literally accomplished when a nation shall be born in a day. Such an immense 

country is not only capable of yielding all the produce of Europe, but 

actually does produce by far the greater part of the raw materials. The 

restrictions on our trade in Europe, necessarily oblige us to make use of 

those materials, and the high price of labour operates as an encouragement to 

mechanical improvements. In this way we daily make rapid advancements 

towards independence in resources as well as in empire. If we adopt the new 

system of government we shall by one rash vote lose the fruit of the toil 

and expense of thirteen years, at the time when the benefits of that toil 

and expense are rapidly increasing. Though the imposts of Congress on 

foreign trade may tend to encourage manufactures, the excise and dry tax 

will destroy all the beneficial effects of the impost, at the same time that 

they diminish our capital. Be careful then to give only a limited revenue, 

and the limited power of managing foreign concerns. Once surrender the 

rights of internal legislation and taxation, and instead of being respected 

abroad, foreigners will laugh at us, and posterity will lament our folly.



                                               Agrippa.



                          X



                     1 January 1788



To the People.



Friends and Brethren,



It is a duty incumbent on every man, who has had opportunities for inquiry, 

to lay the result of his researches on any matter of publick importance 

before the publick eye. No further apology will be necessary with the 

generality of my readers, for having so often appeared before them on the 

subject of the lately proposed form of government. It has been treated with 

that freedom which is necessary for the investigation of truth, and with no 

greater freedom. On such a subject, extensive in its nature, and important 

in its consequences, the examination has necessarily been long, and the 

topicks treated of have been various. We have been obliged to take a 

cursory, but not inaccurate view of the circumstances of mankind under the 

different forms of government to support the different parts of our 

argument. Permit me now to bring into one view the principal propositions on 

which the reasoning depends.



It is shewn from the example of the most commercial republick of antiquity, 

which was never disturbed by a sedition for above seven hundred years, and 

at last yielded after a violent struggle to a foreign enemy, as well as from 

the experience of our own country for a century and an half; that the 

republican, more than any other form of government is made of durable 

materials. It is shewn from a variety of proof, that one consolidated 

government is inapplicable to a great extent of country; is unfriendly to 

the rights both of persons and property, which rights always adhere 

together; and that being contrary to the interest of the extreme of an 

empire, such a government can be supported only by power, and that commerce 

is the true bond of union for a free state. It is shewn from a comparison of 

the different parts of the proposed plan, that it is such a consolidated 

government.



By article 3, section 2, Congress are empowered to appoint courts with 

authority to try civil causes of every kind, and even offences against 

particular states; by the last clause of article 1, section 8, which defines 

their legislative powers, they are authorized to make laws for carrying into 

execution all the "powers vested by this constitution in the government of 

the United States, or in any department or officer thereof;" and by article 

6, the judges in every state are to be bound by the laws of Congress. It is 

therefore a complete consolidation of all the states into one, however 

diverse the parts of it may be. It is also shewn that it will operate 

unequally in the different states, taking from some of them a greater share 

of wealth; that in this last respect it will operate more to the injury of 

this commonwealth than of any state in the union; and that by reason of its 

inequality it is subversive of the principles of a free government, which 

requires every part to contribute an equal proportion. For all these reasons 

this system ought to be rejected, even if no better plan was proposed in the 

room of it. In case of a rejection we must remain as we are, with trade 

extending, resources opening, settlements enlarging, manufactures 

increasing, and publick debts diminishing by fair payment. These are mighty 

blessings, and not to be lost by the hasty adoption of a new system. But 

great as these benefits are, which we derive from our present system, it has 

been shewn, that they may be increased by giving Congress a limited power to 

regulate trade, and assigning to them those branches of the impost on our 

foreign trade only, which shall be equal to our proportion of their present 

annual demands. While the interest is thus provided for, the sale of our 

lands in a very few years will pay the principal, and the other resources of 

the state will pay our own debt. The present mode of assessing the 

continental tax is regulated by the extent of landed property in each state. 

By this rule the Massachusetts has to pay one eighth. If we adopt the new 

system, we shall surrender the whole of our impost and excise, which 

probably amount to a third of those duties of the whole continent, and must 

come in for about a sixth part of the remaining debt. By this means we shall 

be deprived of the benefit arising from the largeness of our loans to the 

continent, shall lose our ability to satisfy the just demands on the state. 

Under the limitations of revenue and commercial regulation contained in 

these papers, the balance will be largely in our favour; the importance of 

the great states will be preserved, and the publick creditors both of the 

continent and state will be satisfied without burdening the people. For a 

more concise view of my proposal, I have thrown it into the form of a 

resolve supposed to be passed by the convention which is shortly to set in 

this town.



     "Commonwealth of Massachusetts.



     Resolved, That the form of government lately proposed

     by a federal convention, held in the city of Philadelphia, is

     so far injurious to the interests of this commonwealth, that

     we are constrained by fidelity to our constituents to reject

     it; and we do hereby reject the said proposed form and

     every part thereof. But in order that the union of these

     states may, as far as possible, be promoted, and the

     federal business as little obstructed as may be, we do

     agree on the part of this commonwealth, that the

     following addition be made to the present articles of

     confederation.



     "XIV. The United States shall have power to regulate the

     intercourse between these states and foreign dominions,

     under the following restrictions; viz ist. No treaty,

     ordinance, or law shall alienate the whole or part of any

     state, without the consent of the legislature of such state.

     2d. The United States shall not by treaty or otherwise

     give a preference to the ports of one state over those of

     another; Nor, 3d create any monopolies or exclusive

     companies; Nor, 4th, extend the privileges of citizenship

     to any foreigner. And for the more convenient exercise of

     the powers hereby and by the former articles given, the

     United S[t]ates shall have authority to constitute

     judicatories, whether supreme or subordinate, with

     power to try all piracies and felonies done on the high

     seas, and also all civil causes in which a foreign state, or

     subject thereof actually resident in a foreign country and

     not being British absentees, shall be one of the parties.

     They shall also have authority to try all causes in which

     ambassadours shall be concerned. All these trials shall be

     by jury and in some sea-port town. All imposts levied by

     Congress on trade shall be confined to foreign produce

     or foreign manufactures imported, and to foreign ships

     trading in our harbours, and all their absolute prohibitions

     shall be confined to the same articles. All imposts and

     confiscations shall be to the use of the state in which they

     shall accrue, excepting in such branches as shall be

     assigned by any state as a fund for defraying their

     proportion of the continental. And no powers shall be

     exercised by Congress but such as are expressly given by

     this and the former articles. And we hereby authorize our

     delegates in Congress to sign and ratify an article in the

     foregoing form and words, without any further act of this

     state for that purpose, provided the other states shall

     accede to this proposition on their part on or before the

     first day of January, which will be in the year of our Lord

     1790. All matters of revenue being underthe controul of

     the legislature, we reccommend to the general court of

     this commonwealth, to devise, as early as may be, such

     funds arising from such branches of foreign commerce, as

     shall be equal to our part of the current charges of the

     continent, and to put Congress in possession of the

     revenue arising therefrom, with a right to collect it, during

     such term as shall appear to be necessary for the

     payment of the principal of their debt, by the sale of the

     western lands."



By such an explicit declaration of the powers given to Congress, we shall 

provide for all federal purposes, and shall at the same time secure our 

rights. It is easier to amend the old confederation, defective as it has 

been represented, than it is to correct the new form. For with what ever 

view it was framed, truth constrains me to say, that it is insiduous in its 

form, and ruinous in its tendency. Under the pretence of different branches 

of the legislature, the members will in fact be chosen from the same general 

description of citizens. The advantages of a check will be lost, while we 

shall be continually exposed to the cabals and corruption of a British 

election. There cannot be a more eligible mode than the present, for 

appointing members of Congress, nor more effectual checks provided than our 

separate state governments, nor any system so little expensive, in case of 

our adopting the resolve just stated, or even continuing as we are. We shall 

in that case avoid all the inconvenience of concurrent jurisdictions, we 

shall avoid the expensive and useless establishments of the Philadelphia 

proposition, we shall preserve our constitution and liberty, and we shall 

provide for all such institutions as will be useful. Surely then you cannot 

hesitate, whether you will chuse freedom or servitude. The object is now 

well defined. By adopting the form proposed by the convention, you will have 

the derision of foreigners, internal misery, and the anathemas of posterity. 

By amending the present confederation, and granting limited powers to 

Congress, you secure the admiration of strangers, internal happiness, and 

the blessings and prosperity of all succeeding generations. Be wise then, 

and by preserving your freedom, prove, that Heaven bestowed it not in vain. 

Many will be the efforts to delude the convention. The mode of judging is 

itself suspicious, as being contrary to the antient and established usage of 

the commonwealth. But since this mode is adopted, we trust, that the numbers 

[members?] of that venerable assembly will not so much regard the greatness 

of their power, as the sense and interest of their constituents. And they 

will do well to remember that even a mistake in adopting it, will be 

destructive, while no evils can arise from a total, and much less, probably, 

from such a partial rejection as we have proposed.



I have now gone through my reasonings on this momentous subject, and have 

stated the facts and deductions from them, which you will verify for 

yourselves. Personal interest was not my object, or I should have pursued a 

different line of conduct. Though I conceived that a man who owes allegiance 

to the state is bound, on all important occasions, to propose such inquiries 

as tend to promote the publick good; yet I did not imagine it to be any pan 

of my duty to present myself to the fury of those, who appear to have other 

ends in view. For this cause, and for this only, I have chosen a feigned 

signature. At present all the reports concerning the writer of these papers 

are merely conjectural. I should have been ashamed of my system if it had 

needed such feeble support as the character of individuals. It stands on the 

firm ground of the experience of mankind. I cannot conclude this long 

disquisition better than with a caution derived from the words of 

inspiration. Discern the things of your peace now in the days thereof, 

before they be hidden from your eyes. 



                                               Agrippa.



                         XI



                     8 January 1788



To the People.



My last Address contained the outlines of a system fully adequate to all the 

useful purposes of the union. Its object is to raise a sufficient revenue 

from the foreign trade, and the sale of our publick lands, to satisfy all 

the publick exigencies, and to encourage, at the same time, our internal 

industry and manufactures. It also secures each state in its own separate 

rights, while the continental concerns are thrown into the general 

department. The only deficiencies that I have been able to discover in the 

plan, and in the view of federalists they are very great ones, are, that it 

does not allow the interference of Congress in the domestick concerns of the 

state, and that it does not render our national councils so liable to 

foreign influence. The first of these articles tends to guard us from that 

infinite multiplication of officers which the report of the Convention of 

Philadelphia proposes. With regard to the second, it is evidently not of 

much importance to any foreign nation to purchase, at a very high price, a 

majority of votes in an assembly, whose members are continually exposed to a 

recall. But give those members a right to sit six, or even two, years, with 

such extensive powers as the new system proposes, and their friendship will 

be well worth a purchase. This is the only sense in which the Philadelphia 

system will render us more respectable in the eyes of foreigners. In every 

other view they lose their respect for us, as it will render us more like 

their own degraded models. It is a maxim with them, that every man has his 

price. If, therefore we were to judge of what passes in the hearts of the 

federalists when they urge us, as they continually do, to be like other 

nations, and when they assign mercenary motives to the opposers of their 

plan, we should conclude very fairly, that themselves wish to be provided 

for at the publick expense. However that may be, if we look upon the men we 

shall find some of their leaders to have formed pretty strong attachments to 

foreign nations. Whether those attachments arose from their being educated 

under a royal government, from a former unfortunate mistake in politicks, or 

from the agencies for foreigners, or any other cause, is not in my province 

to determine. But certain it is. that some of the principal fomenters of 

this plan have never shewn themselves capable of that generous system of 

policy which is founded in the affections of freemen. Power and high life 

are their idols, and national funds are necessary to support them.



Some of the principal powers of Europe have already entered into treaties 

with us, and that some of the rest have not done it, is not owing, as is 

falsely pretended, to the want of power in Congress. Holland never found any 

difficulty of this kind from the multitude of sovereignties in that country, 

which must all be consulted on such an occasion. The resentment of Great 

Britain for our victories in the late war has induced that power to restrain 

our intercourse with their subjects. Probably an hope, the only solace of 

the wretched, that their affairs would take a more favourable turn on this 

continent, has had some influence on their proceedings. All their 

restrictions have answered the end of securing our independence by driving 

us into many valuable manufactures. Their own colonies in the mean time have 

languished for want of an intercourse with these states. The new settlement 

in Nova Scotia has miserably decayed, and the West India Islands have 

suffered for want of our supplies, and by the loss of our market. This has 

affected the revenue; and however contemptuously some men may affect to 

speak of our trade, the supply of six millions of people is an object worth 

the attention of any nation upon earth. Interest in such a nation as Britain 

will surmount their resentment. However their pride may be stung, they will 

pursue after wealth. Increase of revenue to a nation overwhelmed with a debt 

of near two hundred and ninety millions sterling is an object to which 

little piques must give way; and there is no doubt that their interest 

consists in securing as much of our trade as they can.



These are topicks from which are drawn some of the most plausible reasons 

that have been given by the federalists in favour of their plan, as derived 

from the sentiments of foreigners. We have weighed them and found them 

wanting. That they had not themselves full confidence in their own reasons 

at Philadelphia is evident from the method they took to bias the state 

Convention. Mess'rs Wilson and M'Kean, two Scottish names, were repeatedly 

worsted in the argument. To make amends for their own incapacity, the 

gallery was filled with a rabble, who shouted their applause, and these 

heroes of aristocracy were not ashamed, though modesty is their national 

virtue, to vindicate such a violation of decency: Means not less criminal, 

but not so flagrantly indecent, have been frequently mentioned among us to 

secure a majority. But those who vote for a price, can never sanctify wrong, 

and treason will still retain its deformity. 



                                               Agrippa.