Introduction

          

               There were several reasons why the militia system of military defense

          developed in the New World.  First, most of the colonies were too underpopulated

          to afford a standing military system.  Few could afford to allocate a significant por-

          

          tion of their able-bodied manpower to a standing army.  They lacked a sufficient

          tax base to be able to bear the costs of a standing military.  Many citizens philo-

          

          sophically opposed having a standing army, thinking it destructive of liberties.  If

          the Crown provided the soldiers, it could assume a significant role in the affairs of

          the colonies.  Most of the New England colonies harbored secrets, especially

          regarding the degree to which their state-established religion was in communion

          with the Church of England.  Some also thought that citizens were free only when

          they shouldered the burden of their own defense.

               From the viewpoint of the Crown, if the colonists wished to undertake the

          grand adventure, abandon their own homes, and move to a savage new world, they

          had better be prepared to protect themselves.  The Crown was constantly in debt

          and had little, if any, extra money to dedicate to an army across the Atlantic.  Many

          of the colonists had fallen into disfavor with the crown, notably the Calvinist

          religious dissenters who settled New England, and the king cared little about what

          their fate.

               Yet, the colonists faced constant dangers from all sides, ranging from

          Britain's various traditional enemies, such as Spain and France, to the native

          aborigine.  Therefore, the colonies reverted to the military organization of an earlier

          time, the militia system as used at the beginning of modern Europe.  While the

          European militias had atrophied and could, at best, be considered a vestigial organ

          of the state, the American militias had become vibrant military, social, and fraternal

          organizations necessary to the very existence of the colonies.  No king would

          attempt to stave off his enemies on the continent, but the French and English kings

          depended almost exclusively upon their North American colonial militias. 

          Nowhere was the militia system as well organized as in Puritan New England.

               When the Puritans landed in New England they wished to found their own

          city on the hill, secular paradise, or land of the chosen people.  Initially, the

          Pilgrims courted the indigenous Amerindians and became friends with the

          Wampanoags.  The Massachusetts colony was wholly separatist and wanted

          nothing more than to be left alone.  In the earliest years there was virtually no need

          for a strong military system.  The friendship was short-lived, for the Europeans

          never did quite master the skill of being good neighbors to the Amerindians and

          leaving them alone.  Within ten years the Puritans had come to regard themselves

          as the new Zion and the Amerindians as Canaanites.  They did not regard

          themselves as interlopers, but as God's chosen people for whom the new land had

          been prepared, and which they could develop without limitation.  Like the Jews of

          the Exodus, the Puritans did not spare the Canaanites.  Within ten years after the

          Puritans initially landed those at Boston had formed a mighty militia system.

               Three separate, and often mutually distrustful, authorities vied for control

          of the New England militias.  First, each colony had its own militia organization

          which was identical with, or responsible to, the colonial legislature and/or gover-

          

          nor.  Second, the New England colonies having created a unified military plan

          known as the New England Confederation, placed their individual militias under

          this regional authority.  At various times the individual colonial authorities refused

          to cooperate and release militiamen to assist the general authority.  Massachusetts

          refused to assist the other members in the first Narragansett War (1645-50) when

          it was not especially threatened, but demanded assistance from the other colonies

          when in 1675 in the second Narragansett War it was sacked and pillaged.  Third,

          the mother country was the ultimate sovereign authority that periodically intervened

          in local militia affairs.  As with most other aspects of colonial policy, England

          generally neglected the colonies, but on occasion it attempted to impose its will on

          its dependencies.  The colonial militias usually provided for virtually all of their

          own colonies' defense and this freed the English standing army for larger and, to

          the mother nation, more important duties.  In general, the colonies were delighted

          to receive money, materials, equipment, and arms from England, but they disliked

          the brutal discipline and elitist attitude of the professional officer corps and they

          held the army in disdain for it was essentially useless in frontier warfare against

          savages who did not follow the rules of European warfare.  They especially resent-

          

          ed English intrusion into the appointment of militia officers.

               The New England Puritans of c.1630 were displeased with the English

          militia system for a variety of reasons.  Charles I had reorganized the English

          militia, creating a far more elitist and disciplined organization than his father,

          James I, had possessed.  He brought veteran professional military men, many the

          veterans of several continental European wars, to train and discipline the raw

          militia recruits.  He also introduced new weapons and required that existing

          weapons, most long neglected and in a sad state of disrepair, be properly mended. 

          He angered the Puritans by requiring that, following church services on Sundays,

          the train bands were to engage in such sports as "archery, running, wrestling,

          leaping, football playing, casting the sledge hammer and playing at cudgels."  The

          Puritans regarded this as a sacrilegious violation of the Sabbath which they argued

          was to be a day of rest and not of praying and playing games.  Thus, Charles added

          a religious question to the existing legal and constitutional questions concerning his

          reorganization of the militia.  Charles I bragged that his reorganized train band sys-

          

          tem was "the perfect militia."  

               The English Puritan brethren had rejected the militia policies of Charles

          I and in the bitter debate in the parliamentary session of 1628 railed hard against

          the imposition of tyrannical standards on an essentially civilian body.  Those

          Puritans who sailed with John Winthrop in 1630 had an idea of a militia constituted

          in a way quite different from the Stuart train bands.  There was no question that

          they would create a militia, for they were well aware of the massacre of the ill-

          prepared Virginians at the hands of the Indians in 1622.  But they did not agree

          with Charles I that his idea of a train band was a perfect militia.

               The Charter of New England of 1620 created a militia primarily as an

          instrument to contain "Rebellion, Insurrection and Mutiny" against the crown.  The

          militia was also to "encounter, expulse, repel and resist by Force of Arms" by "all

          ways and meanes" whatever foreign or native forces might be directed against the

          colony.  The charter made the president the militia commander, although the assent

          of council was needed to deploy the militia.  Council was to make appropriate laws

          for enrollment, training and discipline of the militia.  The charter required the

          president and council to supply arms, ammunition and other goods of war.

               The New England Puritans first hired professional military men to equip,

          drill and train the militia, but these men were veteran soldiers who were not

          Puritans and did not share the religious vision of the city on the hill.  They had a

          particular dislike for the demand the Puritan made that they be allowed to elect

          officers, an idea inconceivable to professional military men.  They were also

          expensive, both in terms of pay and in terms of the discontent they fostered in the

          colony.  Jost Weillust, a German artillery specialist, left the Massachusetts Bay

          Colony almost immediately, having acquired no love for the new land and perhaps

          overcome by homesickness.  Daniel Patrick and John Underhill lasted somewhat

          longer, but they were never comfortable with the spartan life of New England

          Puritanism.  Both were accused of having committed adultery with young women

          of the community and were asked to leave.  Underhill and the Puritans parted

          company on less than friendly terms.  He observed with disgust that the Puritans

          were, at best, "soldiers not accustomed to war" who were "unexpert in the use of

          their arms."  The political authorities of New England decided that henceforth they

          would hire only Puritans, whether they were military veterans or not.

               There were many demands for money to fund various governmental

          activities and the tax base was small.  One of the larger items in the defense

          budgets was the erection and maintenance of frontier fortifications.  To save money

          the militias were originally all volunteer organizations.  Many militiamen objected

          to their deployment in construction and maintenance of forts and places of refuge. 

          However, when the governments failed to recruit enough volunteers to complete

          the work, they turned to the draft to fill out the quota of volunteer workmen.  The

          draft depleted the resources of many militia companies.

               Beginning with the Mayflower Compact of 11 November 1620 the New

          England colony had been founded upon a social contract.  The colonists believed

          that the only way free men could be brought to obey the law was to base the law

          upon a contract upon which all agreed.  The New England Puritans had a strong

          sense of democracy and they demanded broad based political participation in all

          decision making.  The social contract had a natural law, Scriptural base.  Each man

          agreed to give up his own interest and benefits voluntarily to the greater community

          in exchange for protection and congeniality.  Among free men no amount of

          coercion could replace voluntary consent of the governed as the cornerstone of the

          polity.  The congregational churches, election of ministers and magistrates, creation

          of state and town governments, and organization of the militia were all arranged

          contractually.  Thomas Hooker, one of the most important of the Puritan theorists,

          argued that a man who desired to live a good life in a Christian polity must

          "willingly binde and ingage himself to each member of that society . . . or else a

          member actually he is not."  Each man under contract viewed himself as the

          author of law and the creator of order.

               This contractual model extended to the founding and operation of the

          militia.  The major application of the contractual principle extended to recruiting

          and training a militia in New England and with the popular election of militia

          officers.  The New England militia was a contractual or covenanted organization,

          based on the principle of voluntary collectivism.  A contractual militia was no

          threat to civil liberties, freedom or civil rights, especially when tied to Scripture. 

          The contract limited deployment of troops and militiamen argued that no govern-

          

          mental power could force them to serve beyond the boundaries of their own colony,

          and only rarely beyond their own region.

               In times of trials and external threats the Puritans frequently called for

          fasting among the entire community as a means of supporting their militiamen. 

          Fasting served as communal expiation for their un-Christian divisiveness within the

          ranks of the faithful.  It also served to assist in communal re-dedication to their

          sacred covenant.  As late as the 1760s, while Boston was under the yoke of

          British occupation forces who were being quartered in private homes, Governor

          Bernard called for "a general fast, to be kept the sixth of April next" offered up so

          that "God would be graciously pleased to continue us, the enjoyment of all our

          invaluable privileges, of a civil and religious nature."

               The British authorities intensely disliked this democratic practice.  When

          Sir Charles Hardy in 1756 was raising troops for his attack on the French fort at

          Crown Point he complained bitterly about the practice of the militiamen electing

          their own officers.

          

          Pray, my Lord, where have these men come from?  Under the vote for raising the Men . . .

          the Men have it in their own Choice & are supported in it by a law of the Colony from

          whence they came, and the Consequence is plain . . . . The present Method is attendant with

          great Delays . . . . Captains of the Regulars will think it hard to be commanded by Field

          Officers of the Provincials & the Field Officers will likewise think so in having them on

          equal foot . . . . All Men raised in the Provinces for his Majesty's Service should be raised

          by the Commander in Chief who may give blank Commissions in such Numbers he thinks

          proper, to the several Governors, to fill up with the Names of such Persons as may be

          qualified . . . . 

          

               In the other colonies the officers were appointed by the governors, propri-

          

          etors or legislature.  In practice it made little difference because the New

          Englanders were generally much persuaded to recruit officers from among the

          better class, which frequently translated to the religious hierarchy.  There was no

          discernable difference between the military and the social structure of the

          community.

               As early as 1632 Governor Winthrop noted that the people had demanded

          the right of free men to select their own officers.  He was able to delay the grant

          of this right temporarily, for the Puritans had long since decided that free men who

          could elect their own ministers and political leaders could certainly be entrusted

          with the selection of militia officers.  Besides, it was their very lives, and not the

          life of the governor, they were entrusting to their elected officers.  The legislature

          bided its time, waiting to force the governor's hand at the first opportunity.  That

          opportunity came in 1636 as the colony prepared for war with the Pequot Indians. 

          The Massachusetts General Court enacted legislation allowing each regiment and

          company to nominate its own officers, subject to ratification by the council.  In

          practice, this confirmation was ordinarily automatic.  The militia units responded

          immediately by holding elections and sending in the names for approval.  The

          requirements for becoming an officer, in addition to election, were correct church

          membership and status as freemen.  In a few cases, the militia units would send

          up more names than were actually needed, or additional names after council had

          questioned a name, but frequently these additional names were found to be

          disqualified on some ground.  In 1643 the general court fully yielded its power

          to appoint militia offices, although it still appointed sergeant major general, the

          highest office in the New England colonies.  However, the company sergeant-

          majors, were made elective.

               As late as the American Revolution the practice of election of officers

          came under criticism of several experienced military and some legislators from the

          middle and southern colonies.  General George Washington, for example, disliked

          the practice of electing officers because he believed that it was misplaced

          democracy, was wholly inappropriate to the martial spirit, and that it subverted

          attempts to foster military temperament.  During the war Washington cashiered

          several officers because they had fraternized too much with their men.  Such

          fraternal relations, Washington reasoned, would subvert discipline, while doing

          nothing to create a spirit of command.  He argued that the only way to select

          officers was to test the military prowess and competence and learning in the art of

          war.

               While the English regarded the Puritans as hopelessly democratic, the

          colony of Massachusetts Bay still had a rigid class structure, seen nowhere better

          than in its militia organization.  The wealthy citizens who could afford the

          equipment organized as cavalry, which became the elite units within the militia. 

          The underclass, on the other hand, supplied the foot soldiers.  These were men for

          the most part who could barely afford to buy the most basic weapons that the law

          required them to supply.  The many men who were so poor that they could not

          otherwise afford arms were provided guns at public expense, but only in exchange

          for performing public service.  John Shy likened their obligation to labor to pay for

          their arms to the English working class which had to labor in the working-houses

          to compensate for charitable support.

               The chief military commanders ordinarily held the position of colonial

          governor, a title well established in England.  His military deputies carried the title

          of councillors.  In time of actual war in New England the governors frequently

          asked for and received the support of various town and city officials, men who

          often doubled as militia officers.  Together, these men constituted the council of

          war.

               By 1641 both the home government and various local authorities in New

          England had come to the conclusion that a militia was indispensable for the

          protection of the inhabitants.  A publication entitled An Abstract of the Laws of

          New England as They are Now Established concluded that for the best protection

          of the county, "First, a law [is] to be made for the training of all the men in the

          country fit to bear arms, unto the exercise of military discipline. . . ."  The only

          other measure suggested for colonial defense was  "and withal, another law to be

          made for the maintenance of military officers and forts." 

               The New England Confederation, formed in 1643, was a primarily

          military organization consisting of New Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, Connecti

          cut, New Haven, Cornwall [Maine], and King's Province [a disputed area in

          southern New England].  This was essentially the same area as James II reorga

          nized in 1686-89 as the Dominion of New England.  It was devised as for "mutual

          safety and welfare," a self-defense program based on the colonial militias of these

          member provinces.  Delegates met in Boston and adopted a written constitution

          which formed The United Colonies of New England.  Each colony retained its own

          system of managing internal affairs.  Questions of war and peace were decided by

          eight commissioners representing Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut and New

          Haven.  Any six commissioners constituted a working majority.  The commission

          ers met at least once a year and more frequently if there were problems brewing

          within its area of design.

               Expenses for the defensive system were borne by the colonies in

          proportion to the male population between ages 16 and 60, that is, of men of the

          proper age to serve in the militia.  Massachusetts certainly bore the bulk of the

          expenses and had the vast majority of men subject to militia service, yet its

          commissioners carried no greater weight than the smaller colonies.  The confedera-

          

          tion would make, or at least approve, all appointments of officers and designate an

          overall commander-in-chief.  Ordinarily, confederation troops were to be under the

          command of the ranking officer of the colony in which the troops were presently

          deployed.

               In 1653 the council met at Boston to consider "what number of soldiers

          might be requisite, if God called the Collonies to make warr against the Dutch." 

          It named as captain commander John Leverett of Boston and apportioned its force

          of 500 as follows:  Massachusetts Bay, 333;  Plymouth, 60;  Connecticut, 65;  and

          New Haven, 42.

               A major problem occurred for the confederation in 1653 when Massachu

          setts Bay refused to approve a war against the Dutch.  Without its men and

          monetary contributions the union could not operate effectively.  Initially,

          Massachusetts opposed the admission of Narragansett Bay [Rhode Island] and

          Cornwall [Maine] because the inhabitants held heterodox religious views.  After

          1664, when New Haven was annexed to Connecticut, the quotas and representation

          of the two confederation members was combined.  At that point the constitution

          was amended to allow for meetings once ever three years instead of annually.  The

          federation simultaneously went into a precipitous declined, but it revived briefly

          after a major threat from the native aborigine appeared.  Between 1645 and 1650,

          and again in 1675, it waged war on the Narragansetts.  It operated most success-

          

          fully during King Philip's War (1675-76), coordinating the defense of the region. 

          In 1684 the charter of Massachusetts Bay was withdrawn and the confederation

          came to an end.

               The Confederation had assumed the power to negotiate arms and

          gunpowder contracts, and to contract for maintenance and repair of the confederati-

          

          on's arms.  Arms and supplies were to be stored in several convenient locations,

          with access to these materials of war granted to all members.  It had sought the

          authority to declare war on Amerindian tribes on behalf of all members and to

          regulate the Indian trade and license Indian traders.  It had sought the power to

          negotiate alliances with the various Amerindian tribes and to send negotiators to

          settle inter-tribal disputes.  The confederation legally could take no action until at

          least six members approved, although this was not always the actual case.

               New England was more than sufficiently rich to sustain its militia.  When

          it deployed men on the frontier it found that a town could feed, house, and

          otherwise provide for a considerable number of men.  Most towns could contribute

          a company or two of militia to the general effort while retaining sufficient strength

          to defend themselves.  Most towns had one or more fortified buildings that served

          as a base of operations when the militia was deployed in the area;  and as places of

          refuge if the town came under Amerindian attack.

               New England frequently offered its militiamen various incentives for

          performing their duties well.  Although these colonies did not have large blocks of

          land to donate (as Virginia did) but they did offer occasional bounties in land,

          notably in Maine.  The colonies generally did not have to offer scalp bounties in

          order to mobilize militiamen, but again, on occasion, they did so.  Too, there were

          possibilities of militiamen obtaining plunder;  and others obtained money from the

          sales of Amerindian captives as slaves.

               In 1688 the King James II was expelled, nominally because he kept a

          standing army in violation of Parliament's orders and for being sympathetic to

          Roman Catholics and to the French.  Parliament passed a Mutiny Act, setting up

          courts-martial and imposing military law for  periods of up to six months.  There

          was no appeal to either the courts or Parliament and we may view this action as the

          beginning of true, sovereign parliamentary supremacy.

               The Glorious Revolution brought a Bill of Rights, that, among other

          things, provided that the king could not keep a standing army in the time of peace. 

          Parliament would fund the military on an annual basis through the conventional

          budgetary process.  In April 1689 the colonists of New England decided to endorse

          in the change of government by ousting royalist and reactionary Governor Edmund

          Andros.  The provincial authorities also ordered the arrest of royalist officers serv-

          

          ing in Andros's army.  Without their leaders, the army dissolved.  A popular leader,

          Jacob Leisler, declared himself to be acting lieutenant-governor, to serve until the

          pleasure of Parliament become known.  Dutch settlers in Albany (who were also

          under Andros's control) refused to recognize Leisler's dubious claim, choosing to

          rule themselves through a popularly elected town assembly.  Only a militia

          remained to protect the borders, restrain and pacify the Amerindians and maintain

          order.

               The Dominion of New England "fulfilled the expectations of the Lords of

          Trade as a solution  of the  colonial  problem  of defense."  It checked Indian

          encroachments and strengthened the alliance with the Iroquois.  Andros's

          garrisoning of the frontier and his aggressive military ventures "made New England

          formidable to its enemies."  When the Dominion of New England collapsed, the

          new government in England delayed the formulation of imperial policy for the

          defense of the colonies.      The Lords of Trade were insisting on reestablishing a

          consolidated government over the northern colonies, which they interpreted to

          include New England, New York, and New Jersey, under a single governor-

          general.  However, this plan of reconsolidation was left unresolved because of the

          effective opposition led by the New England agents in London.  The New

          England Puritans could claim victory only to the extent that they had succeeded in

          maintaining their status as a separate colonies.  Still, for a variety of good reasons,

          substantial opinion existed for re-establishing the Dominion.  There was general

          agreement that any new dominion must shed its autocratic features.  On 25 January

          1691, a group of forty-five of the leading citizens of Massachusetts petitioned the

          King to appoint "a Governor and Council over us to administer the Government

          with an elected Assembly  . . . and as many of the little provinces as seem good to

          you may be united under one Governor for mutual defence and security."  In July

          1691 New York Governor Henry Sloughter, claiming that he had the backing of the

          council and General Assembly, expressed the same desire.  On 14 May 1692

          William Phips (1651-1695) arrived at Boston carrying a parliamentary commission

          naming him as captain-general, governor and commander in chief of the militia for

          Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, the King's Province,

          Massachusetts and New Hampshire estates.  This was a plan the New England

          colonies opposed with great vigor because these provinces claimed that they alone

          controlled their own militias.  They claimed there was no legal provision for

          subordinating the provincial militias to any exterior authority.

               Meanwhile, the colonists sought to create a military union on their own,

          prompted by the French and Indian hostilities along the New York and Maine

          frontiers in 1689.  These incursions caught the northern colonies unprepared.  To

          meet the emergency, attempts were made to reinstate a regional military union of

          much the same sort as the New England Confederation.  Mutual military support

          was the theme of the times.  In July 1689 Massachusetts Governor Bradstreet

          requested that Connecticut authorities to "be ready to yield all necessary assistance

          when  desired  according to the rules of our ancient union and confederation." 

          But the Confederation was not revitalized.  Robert Livingston, writing from

          Hartford, speaking for many, argued that "it will be very requisite that the united

          Colonies take Inspection of all affairs with us, since their interest and ours are so

          inseparable . . . "

               Connecticut and Rhode Island would not allow Phips to recruit volunteers,

          let alone draft men, from their militia on grounds that their charters granted them

          exclusive and inviolable rights to control and deploy their own militias.  Phips

          appealed to the king, arguing that "you will not be soe unmindfull of your old

          neighbours."  This failed to yield any results.  The Rhode Island Assembly refused

          to recognize Phips as commander over the colony's militia and petitioned the crown

          for recognition of its charter rights.  The Attorney General and Committee of Trade

          agreed to uphold Rhode Island's constitutional stand, but reaffirmed the Attorney

          General's opinion of 1690 that the crown retained the power to appoint a

          commander in chief over any part of a colony's militia.  Thus, in time of invasion

          the king or his delegate could take charge of whatever forces required.  Phips made

          no overt move to assume command over the militia of the colonies.

               In May 1693, the crown ordered Benjamin Fletcher, governor of

          Pennsylvania, West Jersey, and New York, to take command of the Connecticut

          militia for an expedition against Canada.  It told Phips to "consult and advise" with

          Fletcher.  East Jersey and Pennsylvania refused to respond to Fletcher's demands

          for money and troops.  In October 1693 Fletcher, accompanied by two members

          of the New York Council, traveled to Hartford to establish his commission as

          commander of the Connecticut militia.  Having learned of Fletcher's intentions

          earlier, the Connecticut General Court dispatched Fitz-John Winthrop to England

          to secure confirmation of the charter.  The General Court took the position that

          Fletcher's commission could not supersede the powers that the Connecticut Charter

          granted to the colony over its own over the militia.  "We are still willing to doe our

          proportion with our neighbours in such public charge wherein we are equally

          concerned," the Connecticut General Court informed Fletcher, but other colonies

          must do their share.  Connecticut argued that it had already done more than its part

          by contributing to the garrisons at Albany and Deerfield.

               Fletcher, in a letter to the Lords of Trade, warned that Connecticut's

          obstinacy would lead to a French victory in North America.  "These People of

          Connecticut are in a greate fright the noise of a Quo Warranto or A sharp Letter

          from theire Majesties will reduce Them the wisest and Richest of them Desire to

          bee under the Kings imediate Government."  Fletcher called a general conference

          of the governors to obtain pledges of troops and financial aid from each colony. 

          The Board of Trade authorized to Fletcher to issue a call for troops from New

          York, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. 

          Moreover, the crown authorized the appointment of a chief commander to order the

          combined provincial militias in time of war.  The crown also ordered the colonies

          to contribute troops or other assistance upon request of the governor of New York.

               Several of the colonies were outraged at this assertion of English power

          over the colonial militias.  The Rhode Island Assembly resolved that "in time of

          peace, and when the danger is over, the militia within each of the said provinces

          ought, as we humbly conceive, to be under the government and disposition of the

          respective Governors of the Colonies, according to their Charters."  Another

          negative provincial reaction was financial.  For example, the Maryland House of

          Delegates only reluctantly voted a small appropriation and elusively talked of the

          possibility of future free will donations.   The London Board of Trade consid-

          

          ered the establishment of a colonial military union to be of paramount importance.

               On 30 September 1696 the Board considered various proposals along that

          line from the colonies.  John Nelson, Governor Fletcher of New York and

          Governor Nicholson of Maryland offered plans that, while intriguing, were also

          insufficient or unacceptable.  The Board concluded that in wartime all provincial

          militia should be placed under one a single authority who would bear the title of

          captain general, who would be invested with the powers of a royal governor.

               American colonial representatives then appeared before the Board of

          Trade, but they were unable to agree on a united front that they would present

          before the board.  Edmund Harrison, Henry Ashurst, William Phips, representing

          New England and Daniel Coxe of New York argued for the creation of a governor

          general with civil as well as well as military jurisdiction.   Fitz-John Winthrop reit-

          

          erated Connecticut's position based upon the charter rights it held that precluded

          tampering with its militia.  Chidley Brooke and William Nicoll of New York

          favored a stronger union than any yet proposed.  The Board of Trade feared the

          consequences of voiding the charters of Rhode Island and Connecticut without due

          legal process.  Thus, the Board decided to recommend a military union super-

          

          imposed by the Crown.  In February 1697 an order by the king-in-council directed

          the establishment of a military union of the four New England colonies, New York,

          and West New Jersey under a captain-general.

               The first appointment of captain-general went to Richard Coote, first Earl

          of Bellomont in the Irish peerage.  Bellomont had powerful support, for among

          those backing him were William III, Lord Shrewsbury and Sir Henry Ashurst.  It

          was a good appointment for Bellomont was acceptable to the New England and

          New York.  While his political title was Governor of New York, Massachusetts

          and New Hampshire, in reality  Bellomont received command over all the militia

          of the northern colonies.  That command could be exercised only during wartime. 

          Bellomont did not reach New York until April 1698 and did not take over the reins

          of the Massachusetts government until May 1699.  Unfortunately, his first great

          commitment was not military but criminal.  He arrived just in time to become

          embroiled in the Captain Kidd affair.  He had no success in gaining recognition

          of his military powers in Rhode Island.  Whatever chance he may have had to

          succeed there initially was soon lost as he became obsessed with enforcement of

          the highly unpopular Navigation Acts.  More destructive yet, he became entangled

          in the complex politics, largely of New York, that had also undone his predecessor,

          Benjamin Fletcher.  Bellomont died suddenly in March 1701, and with him died

          also the plan for military unity.

               Renewed call for a central military authority for New England came as the

          colonies prepared to enter Queen Anne's War.  Joseph Dudley had received his

          commission in 1702 as Governor of Massachusetts and New Hampshire.  With this

          was his appointment as captain general with authority over all the New England

          militia in time of war.  He was also vice-admiral of Rhode Island.  Dudley found

          it impossible to weld together an inter-colonial military system.  New England had

          two objections to his appointment.  First, there had objections to his previous

          service as the first governor of the Dominion of New England.  He was also closely

          tied to the established high church party in England.  Rhode Island and Connecticut

          remained recalcitrant concerning their charter privileges.  Connecticut refused to

          send troops beyond the frontier of the Connecticut Valley during the early phase

          of Queen Anne's War.  Connecticut disbanded its militia in 1704 without Dudley's

          authorization.  When told to obey the orders of the Massachusetts Governor,

          Connecticut refused.  In late 1706 and early 17077 Dudley appealed to Fitz-John

          Winthrop, begging him to use his powers of persuasion to enlist the support of

          Connecticut in the combined provincial expedition being assembled to capture Port

          Royal in Acadia.  Winthrop replied that the Connecticut Assembly would not

          cooperate because there was nothing about that expedition that would benefit the

          colony.  Rhode Island also denied Dudley's military authority over its militia. 

               Professor John Shy, a leading critic of the American colonial militia

          system, observed that, about 1710, "it would be wrong to idealize the New England

          militia, but it would be equally mistaken not to recognize that there the institution

          had retained its vitality."  Toward the end of Queen Anne's War (1702-1713)

          Governor Joseph Dudley could boast that his militia system had achieved two

          goals.  First, it successfully defended its own frontiers and most settlements from

          French and Amerindian attack.  Second, it had supplied significant troop strength

          to assist the English expeditions against French Canada.

                                           The Political Pulpit

          

               Military exercise was closely associated with the Sabbath, with drills often

          following church services.  The Puritan clergy had no problem with being closely

          connected to the military since Calvinism accepted the Old Testament view of God

          as the warring Jehovah ready to smite his enemies and protect those with whom he

          had a covenant.  Many a sermon given on militia day began with the words of

          second Chronicles, to be "ready prepared for war."  Exercise with arms was a

          godly thing for a man to do as well as being a way to train one's self physically.

               John Calvin (1509-1564), founder of Puritanism, had taught that war is

          the way of life in the material world, with God's people pitted against the devil and

          his minions.  God's people must be ever militant and constantly armed in a

          physical, as well as material, sense.  Christian warfare is certainly not confined to

          the spiritual realms, but finds real struggles in worldly combat.  Some Christians

          will experience only spiritual tests while others will be called to the front in war. 

          Calvin obscures any differences to be found between physical and spiritual

          warfare.  The Christian in every sense is called upon to gird his loins, take hold of

          his shield, and don his armor.  Every Christian is a soldier and has a role in the

          army of Christ.

          

          And Paul, after he has warned us that our struggle is not with flesh and blood, but with the

          princes of the air, with the powers of darkness, and spiritual wickedness (Eph. 6:12),

          forthwith bids us put on that armor capable of sustaining so great and dangerous a contest

          (Eph. 6:13).  We have been forewarned that an enemy relentlessly threatens us, an enemy

          who is the very embodiment of rash boldness, of military prowess, of crafty wiles, of untiring

          zeal and haste, of every conceivable weapon and of skill in the science of warfare.

          

               As Puritanism expanded in England and gained adherents so Calvin's call

          to arms found support in religious writings.  The eminent preacher John Downame

          ( -1652) produced an important and influential tract, The Christian Warfare, in

          1609, in which he warned that Christians must not grow too fond of the material

          world for it is the arena of combat between the devil and God.  He urges each man

          to become a soldier of Christ in both the physical and physical senses.  Each reborn

          Christian will be awakened to the knowledge that he must stand firm physically and

          spiritually in face of God's enemies.  It was Downame who popularized the image

          of Nehemiah's workers who worked on the temple while girding his loins against

          the enemy.  All Christians must emulate Nehemiah by being both worker and

          militiaman.  He urged all the faithful to heed the words of Paul in Ephesians (6:11):

          "Put on the whole armor of God that ye be able to stand against the assaults of the

          devil."

               What would the Lord God permit his people do if their enemies burned

          their crops, slaughtered their cattle, abducted their wives and children, and killed

          and tortured the inhabitants of the land He had given them?  One early work

          answered the question by calling the people to arms.  Captain Edward Johnson

          (1599-1672) was a joiner by vocation, preacher by avocation, and militiaman by

          necessity.  He became an expert in the use of artillery and was founder of the new

          settlement of Woburn.  He wrote his masterpiece The Wonder-Working Providence

          of Sion's Saviour in New England about 1653, partially to persuade others to join

          his settlement and largely to extol the greatness of God who had delivered His

          people out of bondage and into the new promised land.  Johnson saw the migration

          in military terms, calling the settlers soldiers employed in God's service.  To

          Johnson's way of thinking, God in holy scripture had provided all the military

          knowledge that His people needed to defeat the devil's forces.  The Bible was the

          only book on military tactics and strategy humans needed. Johnson's book used

          military terminology and vocabulary familiar to the men of his time.  He dwelled,

          with some obvious delight and pleasure, on the bloodier parts of the Old

          Testament, showing that God intended that war be unrelenting and filled with

          slaughter of Satan's followers.

               Johnson's biblical and practical arguments, following Calvin and Down-

          

          ame, influenced nearly all ministers and writers for the next hundred years.  Later

          writers followed both Johnson's form and substance.  He effectively combined

          Biblical rhetoric with law of the colonies, giving justification to the natural

          inclination that men have to kill their enemies.  Other works followed.

               A generation later, during King Philip's War, preachers suggested that the

          saints take refuge behind "protective shields of spiritual walls."  Some, perhaps

          more practical, interpreted this as meaning that the towns ought to build stockades. 

          Some of the elders suggested building a wall eight feet high stretching from the

          Charles to the Concord River.

               The more worldly clergy agreed with the politicians about the efficacy of

          a physical wall, suggesting in their sermons that the correct model was found in the

          Book of Nehemiah.  This leader labored mightily in constructing the walls of the

          temple, building them as strong as materials and technology permitted.  While

          engaged in this labor, Nehemiah and his men remained armed, ready to unsheath

          the sword in their own defense.  Just as the Christian put on his spiritual armor, so

          he also was to arm himself physically. Proper physical facilities combined with

          a well-trained citizen army would create all the protection God's people would need

          to survive.

               There were certain practical aspects of combining military training with

          Sunday services. Preachers could subject their flock to prolonged sermons that

          often took several hours to deliver.  Puritans endured these homilies because they

          were the center of the religious service and because they represented an exercise

          in literacy and literature.

               Politics and religion entered into militia service and organization.  During

          the religious quarrel over the Anne Hutchinson heresy, some men refused to march

          with their units as long as Pastor John Wilson served as a chaplain, while others

          indicated their unwillingness to serve if Wilson were dismissed.

               New England's ministers argued that the Christian defense of true religion

          was vitally interconnected with the defense of the colonies.  Both matters could be

          advanced by combining arms with a Calvinist interpretation of biblical text.  Many

          chose to back their words with action by marching as chaplains with the troops

          during war or punitive expeditions against the Amerindians.

               On 3 June 1678, Boston minister Samuel Nowell (1634-1688) delivered

          a discourse to his congregation based on the image of biblical patriarch Abraham

          as the first great man of arms fighting in the Lord's cause.  He promised that

          abundant blessings would flow upon such men as served faithfully in the militia. 

          Typical of the second generation political pulpit, following Johnson, was Nowell's

          "Abraham in Arms" in which he described the importance of the armed citizenry.

          

          God's vineyards hath no other walls, but only our Souldiery, that and our Poverty.  We have

          no walled towns, as they have in other places, our Forts and Castles are contemptible.  We

          have not any bank of money to hire Souldiers;  our strength by sea is small & for friendship

          and favour in the world with any that should help us, is not much, or our friends lye too far

          off to help us in time of need.

          

          Nowell continued, suggesting that, with God's help, there was no obstacle that

          could overcome the arms of the Puritans.  God's people were clad in spiritual armor

          that no arrow could penetrate or spear violate.

          

               Cotton Mather (1663-1728) was one of the best known political-religious

          philosophers of Puritanism and arguably the finest and most influential American

          theologian of the period.  On 1 September 1689 he delivered a long and powerful

          sermon urging his fellow Puritan to smite their Amerindian adversaries, justifying

          the punitive expedition on biblical grounds.  Like his Calvinist predecessors,

          Mather thought it was the duty of all believers, but especially the elect, to defend

          their own territory.  Incursions into their land was caused by Satan, in his disguise

          as the French king, and his devils under the guise of papist soldiers.  These legions

          of the prince of darkness had seduced the innocent savages into playing their evil

          game.  Protestants must rise and do battle with such evil figures.  Mather followed

          St. Augustine on his doctrine of the just war, seeing the wars against the French

          and their Amerindian allies as the children of light pitted against the children of

          darkness.  Mather referred to the Amerindians variously as Canaanites, Medianites,

          and "barbarous heathen."  Those killed or maimed in such a campaign might expect

          a stern but just God to reward them for their sacrifices on His behalf.

               During King William's War of 1689-1697, Reverend Benjamin

          Wadsworth (1670-1737) offered a blessing to the militiamen who were marching

          toward French positions in the North, entitled "A Letter of Wholesome Counsels

          Directed to Christian Souldiers Going Forth to War," exhorting them to behave as

          warriors of biblical times.  The war generally inspired ministers to focus upon

          worldly strife and the temporal duties of the militiaman to an extent not seen in

          more than a generation.  This emphasis was to be repeated in later wars with

          France, so much so that one might think that each new generation of pastors had

          dusted off and delivered again the famous sermons of this generation.

               King George's War (1740-1748) again brought forth support for the militia

          from the New England political pulpit.  On 1 August 1745, Nathaneal Walter

          (1711-1776) delivered a powerful sermon at the Old Boston Church, "The

          Character of a True Patriot," in which he dwelled on the subject of the Christian's

          dual duty of serving God and his king by entering into combat with the devil and

          his earthly legions.  Thomas Prince (1687-1758) followed on 27 November 1746

          with a condemnation of cowards and a promise of sainthood to true patriot

          militiamen, delivered at the South Church in Boston.  On 17 June 1745, Jared

          Eliot (1685-1763), pastor at Killingworth, repeated the same basic themes to the

          militiamen of his congregation.

               In 1732 Oliver Peabody introduced the heroic image of David the warrior

          king into the literature of the New England pulpit.  Beginning with 2 Samuel 1:18,

          Peabody developed the image of the godly youth who slew Goliath and taught his

          people the use of arms.  David trained his men in news ways of waging war, which

          lessons were still valuable to the militia of New England.  Peabody described the

          ideally trained militiaman.

          

          [H]e will be a finished soldier, that can find, fight and conquer his enemies in the thicket of

          the Woods; and immediately fall into a marshalled and regular Army, or into a disciplined

          troop, and fight and overcome in an open Field; and also excel again on the Mighty Deep,

          and understand the best Manner of fighting on the sea.

          

               In 1741 William Hooper (1674-1767), a late Puritan clergyman, delivered

          a sermon entitled "Christ the Life of True Believers and their Appearance in Glory"

          in which he argued that men who failed to defend their native land had little chance

          of gaining salvation.  True Christians were required to take up arms against the

          heathen (Amerindians) and heretics (Roman Catholic French).

               After news of clashes with the French and their occupation of the Ohio

          Territory was received, all the northern colonies called for a day of fasting and

          prayer that the land might be delivered from the French and their Amerindian allies. 

          In Newark, New Jersey, on 1 January 1755, Reverend Aaron Burr (1716-1767)

          delivered a long sermon calling upon "the Lord Jehovah . . . to smite his enemies

          as in the days of old."  Burr thought that, should the Protestants unite in their effort

          and make appropriate offerings and prayerful petitions to God, they would surely

          be rewarded with victory.

               New England's clergy was not going to be outdone by a mainstream

          Protestants from New Jersey.  Reverend Samuel Checkley (1723-1768) preached

          a major and lengthy sermon, "The Duty of God's People When Engaged in War,"

          in Boston soon after to the local militia.  So popular was that discourse among the

          local politicians that he was invited to deliver it to militia units throughout the

          province of Massachusetts.  William Currie (1709-1803) preached a similar

          sermon at Radnor Church on 7 January 1747.

               Reverend Peter Clark (1694-1768) prepared a sermon with a theme similar

          to Checkley's.  Entitled "Religion to be Minded Under the Greatest Perils of Life,"

          this discourse also exhorted Christians to do their duty, including faithful service

          in the militia.

               Clark's and Checkley's sermons were buttressed by a powerful sermon

          delivered by Reverend Sylvanus Conant (1720-1777) in his "The Art of War, the

          Gift of God."  In the Old Testament, God had drawn a blueprint for victory in wars

          in which His people defended divine justice.  God had instructed the Hebrew

          people in the art of war and inspired their leaders to use even the most unorthodox

          tactics to win against their enemies.  The art of war, it seems, was born in the mind

          of the Heavenly Father, to be used to advance His causes.  An anonymously

          written and printed largely religious discourse on much the same themes appeared

          about this same time under the title, "New England's Misery, the Procuring Cause

          and a Strong Remedy."

               Reverend Samuel Cooper (1725-1783) delivered another powerful and

          politically charged sermon before the governor of Massachusetts in the summer of

          1759.  Militia service, he argued, was the duty of every Christian male.  He thought

          that the most severe legal penalties and social ostracism could be directed against

          those who shirked their duty.  Cooper assured the governor that he was properly

          discharging the functions of his office when he sent the militia into battle against

          God's enemies and the unconverted heathen.

               Samuel Chandler's (1723-1768) Thanksgiving Day sermon, given on 29

          November 1759, reminded the faithful that they must rejoice in the defeat of the

          papist French and be prepared at all times to repel false religion because God

          required that "true religion" be defended, if necessary by force of arms.  Good

          Christians could be godly soldiers in righteous causes.

               The surrender of Montreal occasioned an extensive response from the

          New England pulpit.  The Seven Years' War being now terminated, we should

          expect to hear the kind of sermon preached by Reverend Amos Adams (1728-

          1775), at Roxbury, Massachusetts, on 25 October, and Nathaniel Appleton a few

          days later.  While the principal theme of these sermons was thanksgiving for the

          safe return of many militiamen, victory over their ancient enemy, and the end of a

          long and costly war, the preachers universally used the occasion to exhort the

          citizen-soldiers to be prepared to continue to serve whenever danger threatened the

          country.

               On 6 March 1763, Pastor John Brown (1715-1766) preached a sermon on

          religious liberty and political freedom in which he urged all Christians to take up

          arms against the marauding Amerindians.  In doing so, they were doing God's work

          and defending His people.  Likewise, Protestants must rejoice in the defeat of the

          Catholic French and be ever vigilant lest they return to North America to threaten

          Protestantism.

               When Anglican minister Anthony Benezet (1713-1784) delivered in

          Philadelphia a sermon entitled "Thoughts on the Nature of War and Its Repugnancy

          to Christian Life," the congregation virtually rebelled.  The newspapers

          summarized the sermon and it was printed by one of the larger and more prominent

          publishers of the day.  Reaction to the sermon, especially in New England was

          strong, appearing in various sermons, especially those delivered before militia

          companies, such as the Ancient Artillery Company of Boston.

               A recent historian concluded that "the combined emphasis upon

          aggressive Christian combat, which received the imprimatur of Bible and minister

          . . . shaped the expectations of New England's earliest settlers in the seventeenth

          century."  The ministers adopted an aggressive style, used strong rhetoric, depicted

          heroic biblical figures fighting God's wars, and painted glorious pictures of the

          triumph of good over evil.  Discussion of great biblical war heroes was designed,

          of course, to inspire parallel lives among the militiamen of New England.

               We may summarize the themes of the political pulpit as follows.  First,

          war spiritualizes the soldier by making him ponder his own mortality and his

          relationship to his Creator whom he might soon meet.

               Second, it brought each man into contact with the heroic figures of the Old

          Testament who then offered him a choice of role models for his own life, just as

          others may have been inspired by stories of the saints.  The clergy stopped just

          short of condemning those who were cowardly in battle, but most agreed with

          Increase Mather that courage was a manifestation of God's grace, given to the elect. 

          Many sermons emphasized the importance of behaving bravely in performance of

          all duties, especially militia duty.

               Third, it produced an archetype in ancient Israel and presented the parallel

          so clearly that all could see that New England constituted the New Jerusalem and

          the saints inhabiting the land were the new Chosen People.

               Fourth, it reminded all that the Second Coming of Christ and what are

          generally known as millennial events were hard by the door, close at hand.  Man

          should never stray from this vision when there would be the final clash between

          God and Satan, the Battle of Armageddon (Rev. 16:16).  Even that battle had its

          archetypes in the victories of Barak over the Canaanites and of Gideon over the

          Midianites.  The battles in this new world just might be some of the tribulations

          noted in the apocalyptic view of St. John the Divine as immediately preceding this

          final battle.

               Fifth, ministers reminded the officers that the Bible offered the best and

          most reliable guide to many things, not the least important of which are military

          tactics and strategy.  The men should take great comfort when their elected officers

          opted to follow the great leaders of the Jewish Bible.  There were, according to the

          ministers, great parallels between the way the native aborigine fought and the way

          enemies of Israel had waged war.  Men should choose their officers for their virtue,

          godliness and intimate knowledge of scripture.

               Sixth, it was the duty of every man to learn his trade and to practice it with

          patience and skill, but to also be a soldier in the Army of God.  We may recall the

          early emphasis, especially in Johnson, on Nehemiah and his men working on the

          temple while standing guard over their nation.  In short, it was godly to be expert

          in war (2 Tim. 2:3), every Israelite in God's service is a man of war.

               Seventh, the clergy revived the notion that had plagued St. Augustine, St.

          Thomas Aquinas, and most of the commentators in the new field of international

          law, namely, what is the just war?  It was clear that these men would not entertain

          the possibility that no war is just as was the premise of the pacifist sects, such as

          the Society of Friends.  Quakers became an object of frequent parody and ridicule. 

          Any war against God's enemies, notably the devil and his legions, would clearly be

          just.  Likewise, wars against false religion, notably papism, were justified.  The

          clergy appointed itself judge over such determination and classification.  Few, if

          any, of New England's wars were found to be unjustified.

               Eighth, wars must also be fought justly, although there are notable biblical

          examples of Israel slaughtering all the enemy.  It is much better to be

          magnanimous in victory and charitable in peace.  Neither should one fight an

          offensive war, although the clergy universally classified wars of retaliation and

          punishment as justified.  A defensive war is lawful beyond dispute.  Reverend

          Increase Mather (1639-1723), president of Harvard, commented on the just war.

          

          And in some cases men may be called to ingage in an Offensive War.  This may be Lawful

          when their Liberties, Properties and Possessions are invaded. . . . Only it is to be

          remembered that an Offensive War is not to be undertaken but with the Consent and

          Authority of the Magistrates. The reason is because war is an act of Vindictive Justice and

          therefore must have the Countenance of those who are by their Office Revengers to Execute

          wrath on them that do Evil.

          

               Not all commentators agreed with Mather that the magistrates alone

          should decide when a war was justified.  Some wished to engage the clergy since

          the question was a moral one.  Others wished that the process would be more

          democratic, involving the whole community.  The latter view was derived from

          William of Ockham, a favorite of Martin Luther, who had argued that all moral and

          theological decisions should be made by the whole body of the faithful.

               Three men in addition to Nehemiah stand as archetypes of the military

          heroism required of New England militiamen.  Abraham was the first great

          religious general and an archetype of Jesus Christ.  Joshua completed the mission

          initially assigned to Moses, expelling the Canaanites from the Promised Land. 

          David was the favored of God, prophet, poet and priest, but it was David the

          youthful military genius and conqueror of Goliath upon which the Puritan clergy

          dwelled.  The preachers reminded the people how David instructed his flock in the

          use of arms and urged them to learn the use of the bow (2 Sam. 1: 17-27).

               Woven upon biblical imperatives, the minister's words commanded a

          central position in the militia rituals.  During his service as a militiaman in 1686,

          bookseller John Dunton (1659-1733) recalled the prayer meetings.  They began

          with a

          

          solemn prayer in the field upon the day of training, [which] I never knew but in New

          England, where it seems to be a common custom.  About three o'clock, both our exercise and

          prayers being over, we had a very noble dinner to which all the clergy were invited.

          

               Later militiamen recalled hearing and being inspired by such sermons. 

          Sergeant David Holden (1738-1803) recalled serving in the Massachusetts militia

          and hearing sermons on the righteous cause and just war being fought against the

          French and their Amerindian allies.  As a young man much afraid of death or

          permanent injury, Uriah How (1738-1758) kept a journal in which he recorded his

          innermost thoughts.  How thought that the many sermons he heard while on service

          relieved him of much apprehension.  Presumably, when he was killed in his

          twentieth year, he had been better prepared to meet his Maker because of the

          messages he had heard.  David B. Perry, born in 1741, was a teenager in the

          Seven Years War and much afraid of what might be his fate in battle.  He, too, felt

          comforted by the message of the preachers who accompanied the militia.  When he

          entered the patriot cause in the American Revolution, Perry urged his fellow

          soldiers to attend religious services, relating his own experience with the clergy in

          the earlier war.  Two other privates in the Massachusetts militia, men who served

          in both the Seven Years War and the Revolution, felt themselves to have been

          much inspired by the call to action issued by New England clergymen before and

          during enlistment.

               General Seth Pomeroy (1706-1777) and General Rufus Putnam (1738-

          1824) thought that their men in both the Seven Years War and the War for

          Independence had achieved far greater peace of mind than most other militiamen

          and soldiers because of the comfort offered by militantly military clergy who

          accompanied their troops.

               Funerals of prominent militia officers and of enlisted men killed in battle

          offered occasions to combine military parades with martial sermons.  The dead

          man's comrades turned out in large numbers to parade and accompany the deceased

          to the grave.  The precedent of firing volleys of musket shots over the grave seems

          to have been common practice by 1630.  The clergy utilized the opportunity of such

          a funeral to laud the Christian soldier who serves God by smiting His enemies. 

          Clergy frequently compared the wearing of physical armor in military service to the

          assumption of the armor of God in baptism.  During the funeral service the

          deceased put away his metal armor and weapons to assume the spiritual armor of

          grace that God bestowed on His elect.

               Each colony in New England set aside one or more days for training and

          disciplining the citizen-soldiers.  This custom had been inherited from medieval

          England where similar days had been set aside for like purpose in each shire. 

          When training day laws went unenforced the militias lapsed into mobs that were

          unable to coordinate their activities on the field of battle and were unwilling to

          obey their officers.  Occasionally, part of the training days was set aside to repair

          and build fortifications.  A chaplin opened and closed the day with a prayer and

          occasionally with a sermon.  The minister also enforced morality laws to such a

          degree that public drunkenness was all but unknown and the camp followers that

          commonly accompanied men in arms were also nowhere to be found.

               During the French and Indian War a New York correspondent of the

          London-based Public Advertiser praised the moral character of the New England

          militiamen.

          

          We put no Confidence in any other Troops than theirs; and it is generally lamented that the

          British veterans were not put into Garrison and New England Irregulars sent to the Ohio. 

          Their men fight from Principle and always succeed.  The Behaviours of the New England

          Provincials at Albany is equally admirable and satisfactory.  Instead of the Devastations

          committed by the [British regular] Troops in 1746, not a single Farmer has lost a Chicken

          or even a Mess of Herbs.  They have five Chaplains and maintain the best Order in Camp. 

          Public Prayers, Psalm-singing and Martial Exercises engrossed their whole Time at Albany. 

          Twice a week they have Sermons and are in the very best frame of Mind for an Army,

          looking for success in a Dependence upon Almighty God . . . . Would to God the New

          England Disposition in this Respect were catching.

          

               The number of annual training days was fixed by law and varied

          considerably according to time and place.  In 1631 the Massachusetts militia was

          so enthusiastic about training days that it mustered weekly.  Within a year the

          enthusiasm waned and musters were then held monthly.  By 1637 the interest had

          continued to decline and consequently drills were held only eight times a year. 

          Subsequent changes in the law reduced the obligation to six times a year and then

          just four.  Emergencies changed the militiamen's minds and prompted them to take

          muster more seriously.  During King Philip's War the Massachusetts militia

          mustered every Sunday and one additional day per week.

               Training days became social occasions.  Whole families attended. The

          women folk prepared the means which were taken in common.  The children

          enjoyed a rare opportunity, at least in rural areas, to socialize and to play with large

          numbers of other children.  Many young, single men met their future wives at these

          gatherings.  Occasionally, a church or public building had to be repaired and this

          was done as a part of, or adjunct to, training days.  A British officer described

          New England training under the watchful eye of five chaplains who assumed

          responsibility for the mortality and general decorum.  

               To Jeffery Amherst's seasoned, professional officers the Americans were

          utterly ill-mannered and ungentlemanly.  They ignored class distinctions which

          were all important among the British officer corps.  They reported to Amherst that

          the officers joined their men in carousing and carrying on, often into the wee hours

          of the morning.  The militia officers were as bad as the men, engaging in all manner

          of outrageous behavior.  They often wore costumes and unacceptable, non-military

          clothing.  Many officers failed to wear insignia or distinctive uniforms that would

          identify them amongst their men.  Moreover, they failed to obey even the most

          rudimentary rules of sanitation.  Men and officers alike stank for they failed to

          bathe or change and wash their clothing.

                                        The Massachusetts Militia

          

               In traditional studies, and in most secondary sources, the Massachusetts

          militia is viewed as a simple and logical extension of the colony, but unworthy of

          in-depth study because it was less innovative than most other aspects of American

          Puritan development.  At most Massachusetts slightly modified the traditional

          English Puritan train band model as befitted the necessities of the new world. 

          During the entirety of the Old Charter period of Massachusetts history, that is,

          1629-1684, the colony struggled to define the precise limits on popular

          participation in government and church.  The militia was drawn into this debate,

          perhaps reluctantly, as both actor and subject acted upon.  We have discussed much

          of the origin of the Massachusetts militia above while discussing the general

          emergence of the New England Puritan militia.

               The governor was commander-in-chief of the province.  Direction of

          military affairs is naturally an executive function.  He theoretically was required to

          lead troops in battle.  He ordered the disposition of troops and alone decided what

          points to garrison.  He could sound an alarm and call out the militia.  He might be

          assisted by a Council of war, generally appointed by the General Court.  Often

          militia officers served in the legislature and they brought with them an intimate

          knowledge of military situations in all parts of the province.  By the end of Phips'

          term as governor the precedent was well established of regarding various assistants,

          deputy and lieutenant governors, legislators and militia officers as an informal

          council of war.

               The legislature retained the right to make the laws with respect to the

          militia and to fund the it.  The General Court jealously guarded its prerogative to

          legislate in great detail concerning liability for service, arms required, inspection

          of arms and equipment, frequency of training and appointment, or at least

          confirmation, of officers.  The legislature also created courts martial, prescribed

          punishment for various infractions and ensured subordination of the military to

          civilian authority.  It supported the militia by offering bounties on Amerindian

          scalps when pressures on the frontier became too great.  It also attempted to keep

          the frontier populated by forbidding desertion of frontier towns, primarily in order

          to retain a buffer between the unsettled frontier and the cities.  Eventually, it

          allowed the colony's troops to assist other colonies.  It also forbade the

          impressment of militiamen by force or trickery.

               Even before the first religious dissenters settled in Massachusetts, white

          adventurers had sacked Amerindian villages as far north as Maine.  Some slave

          traders had raided the villages, taken some natives captive and sold them into the

          slave trade.  Some villages along the coast, especially near Cape Cod, had already

          been deserted as the reputation of the ruthless traders grew.  Many Amerindians

          had died of a plague a few years before the Pilgrims arrived in 1620, and this may

          account in some large measure for their inability to meet and expel the new wave

          of invaders.  The Pilgrims were shocked to discover that Samoset greeted the first

          party to land in English.

               In 1626, in preparation for the voyage to populate what became the town

          of Boston, the founders prepared a list of military equipment which they considered

          indispensable to equip the projected 100 militiamen.

          

          3 drums, to each 2 pairs of heads

          2 ensignes

          2 partizans, for captain and lieutenant

          3 halberts

          80 bastard musketts, with snaphaunces, 4 ffoot in the barrel

          6 longe fowling pieces with bastard muskett boare, 6 ffoote longe

          4 longe fowling pieces, with bastard muskett boare, 5.5 ffoote longe

          10 ffull musketts, 4 ffoote barrel, with match-locks

          90 bandoleers, for musketts, each with a bullett bagge

          10 horne flaskes, for longe fowling pieces, each with a bullett bagge

          100 swords and belts

          60 corselets & 60 pikes;  20 half-pikes

          12 bbls powder, 8 bbls for the forts;  4 for small shotte

          8 pieces of land ordnance for the forts

               namely, 2 demie culverings, 30 c. weight a peace

               3 sackers, each weighing 25 c. weight

          

          The bandoleers were belts which each held 12 rounds of ammunition and a leather

          covered priming box.  Ten bandoleers were of standard musket size and were

          stamped M, while two others were for bastard musket size and were stamped B. 

          All bandoleers were purchased at pence each from John Grace of London.  Twenty

          of the suits of armor were ordered from Thomas Stevens, Buttolph Lance, London. 

          Armor consisted of corsalet, back, breast, culet, gorget, tases, and helmet, all

          varnished black.  Four suits of armor were equipped with closed-visor helmets

          instead of the open type common to this period.

               In 1628 the General Court of Massachusetts created a fundamental charter

          which established political and legal authority in the colony, including power over

          the militia.  The Charter recognized that safety and the peace could not be

          maintained without a well organized militia.   It observed that "Piety cannot be

          maintained without church ordinances and officers, nor justice without laws and

          magistrates, no more can our safety and peace be preserved without military orders

          and officers."  The "well ordered of the militia is a matter of great concernment

          to the safety and welfare of this commonwealth."  In 1628 John Endecott (c.1588-

          1655) emigrated to Massachusetts with sixty English colonists, joining those

          already at Salem.  When the colony was properly organized he became, in 1630,

          the first head of the provincial militia.  His expedition against the Pequots helped

          to provoke the First Pequot War, which began in 1637.  Between 1644 and his

          death on 15 March 1655 he served as governor.

               In the first report extant from Governor Cradock, dated 16 February 1629,

          the colony reported that it was attempting to spread Christian Gospel among the

          natives.  Cradock reported considering enlisting friendly Christian Indians into the

          colony's militia.  In its response to Cradock, dated 17 April 1629, the New England

          Company did nothing to encourage the military enlistment of natives, although it

          commended him on his attempt to convert them.

               The Charter of Massachusetts Bay of 1629 directed that the governor and

          company provide the inhabitants with "Armour, Weapons, Ordnance, Municon,

          Powder, Shott . . . and all Manner of Clothing, Implements, Furniture, Beastes,

          Cattle, Horses, mares, Marchandizes, and all other Thinges necessarie for the saide

          Plantacon and for their Use and Defence."  The charter gave the governor the

          power to impose martial law, to build and maintain forts and other facilities and to

          maintain stores of arms and materials of war.  More specifically, the charter

          required that the

          

          Governor of our said Province or Territory for the time being shall have full Power by

          himselfe or by any Chief Comander or other Officer or Officers to be appointed by him from

          time to time to traine, instruct, Exercise and Governe the Militia there and for the speciall

          Defence and safety of Our said Province or Territory to assemble in Martial Array and put

          in Warlike posture the Inhabitants of Our said Province or Territory and to lead and Conduct

          them and with them to Encounter, Expulse, Repell, Resist and pursue by force of Armes as

          well by sea as by Land within or without the limitts of Our said Province or Territory and

          alsoe to kill, slay, destroy and Conquer by all fitting wayes Enterprises and meanes

          whatsoever all and every such Person and Persons as shall at any time hereafter Attempt or

          Enterprize the destruccon, Invasion, Detriment or Annoyance of Our said Province or

          Territory . . . .

          

               In March 1631 the Court of Assistance of Massachusetts Bay ordered that

          all men, including indentured servants, but excluding magistrates and ministers,

          equip themselves with guns within two weeks.  They were to have a minimum of

          20 bullets, a length of match a pound of gunpowder and other necessary

          accoutrements.  If a man did not already own a gun the colony would advance him

          the money and he would have to pay it back within a reasonable time.  If a man

          could not pay for his gun the town would hire him, or hire him out to another man,

          until the cost of the gun was repaid.  Farmers might pay for their arms in country

          produce.  No one was to travel, except within Boston, unless one was armed with

          a gun.  Militia companies were all ordered to muster and drill on Sundays.  In

          1632 the militia musters were reduced to just one every month.  The undated text

          of the first militia act of the colony of Massachusetts Bay read,

          

          Section 1.  Forasmuch as the well ordering of the militia is a matter of great concernment to

          the safety and wellfare of this Commonwealth It is ordered by this Court and the authority

          there of. . . .

          Section 9.  Every person above the age of sixteen years shall duly attend all military

          exercises and service, as training, watching, warding under the penalty of five shillings for

          every fault, except magistrates, deputies and officers of court, elders and deacons,  the

          president and fellows,  students and officers of Harvard  College, and professed  school

          masters, physicians, chirourgeons allowed by the magistrates, treasurers, surveyor generals,

          public notary, masters of ships and other vessels above twenty tons, fishermen constantly

          employed at all fishing seasons, Constant herdsmen, and such other as, for bodily infirmity

          or other just cause shall by any County Court, or Court of Assistant (after notice of the partys

          desired to the chief officer of the Company to which he belongs) be discharged; also one

          servant of every magistrate and teaching elder, and the son and servant of the major general

          for the time being, also such as dwell at remote farms, shall be exempt from watching in the

          town, but shall watch and ward as their chief officer shall direct otherwise; and all farms

          distant above four miles from the place of exercising the Company, or have a ferry to pass

          over, that have about twenty acres of land in tillage, and twenty head of great cattle upon

          such farms, shall upon reasonable allowance to the Company, have one man exempted from

          ordinary trainings.

               The object of immediate concern for the militiamen of Massachusetts was the

          Pequot Indians.  By 1635 the men of Massachusetts Bay were expanding rapidly into the

          distant Connecticut Valley and thus came into conflict with the indigenous land holders, the

          Pequots.  When the Pequots killed seven of the interlopers, Massachusetts responded by

          mustering its militia, attacking the Pequots and killing several hundred of them.  The

          survivors took refuge with other tribes.  After this tribe was contained the colonial militia

          had to deal with the Narragansetts and their allies the Wampanoags, and the Abenakis and

          Penobscotts, allies of the French in Canada.  The elitist Puritans had no trouble identifying

          the Amerindians as heathens and allies of the evil one.  In turn the native Americans

          regarded the Puritans as unprincipled warriors who had no regard for their unwritten rules

          of conventional warfare.  As the Chosen People, the Puritans thought they had an unbridled

          right to claim any territory they desired in their Promised Land. 

               In 1635 the legislature ordered that militia fines be used to purchase arms for those

          too poor to provide their own guns.  On 9 September 1636 the provincial legislature voted

          to "limit ye election of Military Officers in ye several Towns to such only as are of ye trained

          bands and so thereby all such Freemen as are exempt from ordinary training should be barred

          from having any votes in such elections."  In 1636 officers elected by militia companies

          were still subject to legislative and executive approval.

               In 1636 the colony of New Plymouth revised its law regarding indentured servants. 

          One provision concerned the militia.  "No servant coming out of his time or other single

          person be suffered to keep house," the law read, "till such time as he be completely provided

          for of arms and ammunition."

               In 1637 the legislature ordered that a long list of classes of persons accused of

          various eccleastical and civil offenses, including blasphemy, religious heterodoxy, rape,

          sodomy and theft, "bee disarmed."  The apparent intention of the legislation was to deny

          arms to criminals and heretics because these were the symbol of freemen.  On 24 April 1638

          Governor John Winthrop incorporated the Military Company of Massachusetts, guaranteeing

          that "no officer should be put up[on them but of their own free choice."  Each enlisted man

          was given 500 acres and each officer 1000 acres of land.  The militia company was renamed

          the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company on 2 September 1700.  In 1639 the

          legislature exempted from militia duty a number of classes of trades, including ships'

          carpenters, fishermen during season, and millers, but required them to maintain firearms.

               The community was the basic unit of many activities, including militia service. 

          Towns were the basic units of military organization wherein men armed and trained

          themselves for war.  Initially, all Boston area militias were rather democratic although the

          officers reflected the basic Calvinist hierarchy of church and state.  All able-bodied males

          served in the militia, excepting certain governmental officials, but including indentured

          servants and slaves.  The regiment was first noted in 1636 when Captain John Underhill

          brought the companies from Roxbury, Dorchester, Weymouth and Hingham under a single,

          unified command and integrated it with the South Boston Militia and other city militia

          companies.  After 1637 men could nominate and elect their own officers from among the

          town's freemen, subject only to the (almost automatic) approval of town council.

               The average militiaman was little concerned about organization beyond his own

          company for it was in this basic unit that he socialized, trained, elected their own officers

          and fought when called into actual service.  Most commoners were armed merely with pikes

          and some small cutting instrument, such as sword or scalping knives.  A few of the wealthier

          citizens own match-locks and even fewer had wheel-locks.  The companies marched out on

          the greens, often located convenient to the churches or town meeting houses, there to drill

          under the appreciative and watchful eyes of their families.

               On 13 January 1639 the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company of Boston was

          formed and the democratic pattern was broken.  The militia unit was organized as an elitist

          organization, comprised exclusively of the prominent townsmen and was drawn largely from

          the harbor communities.  To be accepted into this company was a certain indication that one

          had arrived socially.  It emulated a similar elitist company in London and remained,

          throughout its history, largely self-regulating.  John Winthrop was made an honorary colonel

          and first nominal commander.  It was the oldest company of artillery militia in the nation.

               The men of Massachusetts were not always perfect citizens or part-time soldiers. 

          Captain Underhill recorded that, upon sounding an alarm, he was amazed to see that his

          trained bands "knew not how to behave."  They often missed the legally mandated training

          days and failed to accept discipline or to maintain their arms in good working order.  Those

          who failed to attend musters, maintain proper equipment and arms, or otherwise follow the

          militia law, paid fines which the town authorities put to good use buying flags and banners,

          drums and bugles and other impedimenta.

               Towns served as vehicles for many forms of communal action.  They performed

          what was then considered social welfare and engaged in various forms of social action.  The

          principal function the town undertook was defense of home, citizen and community through

          the organization and maintenance of a militia.  The militia also served a social function of

          social integration.  To expedite their obligations, the town governments maintained watch-

          houses, supplies of gunpowder and flints and match, extra weapons and spare gun parts and

          armories, the latter often located in the basements of town meeting houses.

               In 1634 Ensign Richard Morris entered into a political dispute with his commander

          and resigned his commission.  In other cases, men displayed culpable, if not criminal,

          disregard for safety.  In one incident in Watertown, a servant brought his loaded weapon to

          the training field.  After going through the manual of arms and marching for a while with the

          loaded piece, he accidentally discharged it, wounding himself and three others.  Captain

          Underhill noted that such carelessness with arms was not especially uncommon. 

               Wars served as a vehicle to obtain slaves and servants according to an order of the

          General Court in 1641.  The law held there was to be no involuntary servitude, including

          "bond slavery, villeinage or captivity" in the colony "unless it be lawful captives taken in just

          wars."

               Despite the failures which made them easy targets for their critics, past and

          present, the militia performed major services.  They served watch in the city wards and

          mounted the towers for seaward watch on Beacon Hill and at the Town Gate.  Captain

          Underhill led the militia to the distant Connecticut frontier there to assist their neighbors in

          the Pequot Indian War.  In 1642 the legislature received warning of the possibility of a major

          attack from Amerindians allied with the French.  Militia training was increased.  The

          legislature took certain steps to close some gaps in the basic militia act.  One amendment to

          the basic militia act required that even those who were not required to muster had to provide

          themselves with arms.  "All persons exempt from training who yet are to find arms and are

          able to use them, shall appear with their compleat arms before the Military Commander

          twice in the year to bee exercised, . . . except physicians, church elders, scholars and sur-

          

          geons."  The legislature also ordered "that every smith in this jurisdiction, laying aside all

          other business, do with all speed, attend the repairing of arms . . . of the several towns."

               In the same year the legislature moved to stem the trade in firearms, gunpowder

          and bullets to the Amerindians.  The illegal arms trade had provided the natives with the

          wherewithal to massacre the settlers and defeat the militia.  It noted that earlier legislation

          had failed to prevent arms from falling into the hands of the native aborigine.  If any man

          was caught selling or bartering guns he was to pay a fine of œ10 for each firearm sold;  œ5

          for each pound of gunpowder;  and 40 shillings for each pound of lead, shot or bullets. 

          In 1640 the colony of New Plymouth had imposed a fine of œ20 "upon any that shall give,

          trade, truck or exchange with the natives any kind of military arms, or guns of any length or

          sort whatsoever."

               In 1643 the General Court created a new provincial militia law.  The preamble

          contained a strong endorsement of both morality and the value of a trained militia.  "As piety

          cannot be maintained without church ordinances and officers, nor justice without laws and

          magistracy, no more can our safety and peace be preserved without military orders and

          officers."  Exemptions from the law were provided for students at Harvard College,

          schoolmasters, ministers of approved congregations, physicians, certain fishermen and

          magistrates.  All other freemen were to muster four to six days a year for inspection and

          training.  The Massachusetts militia was organized along county lines, the first provincial

          militia to be organized in this territorial manner.  The county officers included a captain, one

          lieutenant, an ensign, three sergeants and three corporals.  Initially, a company consisted of

          64 men, but the number was eventually increased to 100.  A new company could be formed

          anytime a unit of one hundred militiamen could be found.  The election of officers was

          provided for by law, but only a complete company was granted this right.  This proved to be

          an effective incentive to maintain full company strength.

          

          All persons of any Trayned Band, both freemen and others, who have taken the oath of

          residents, or shall take the same, and being no covenant servant in household with any other,

          shall have their votes in nomination of those persons who are to bee appointed captaines, or

          other inferior officers of the same band, provided they nominate none but such as shall be

          freemen.

          

               In 1643, following the failure of some militia officers and units in the

          Pequot War, the General Court set up an advisory committee on military prepared-

          

          ness that could also act decisively in emergencies.  It was staffed primarily with

          county militia captains and other presumably learned men of war.

               In 1644 the legislature passed legislation, not part of the militia act, which

          nonetheless had implications for that legislation.  For reasons of personal safety

          and protection, "all inhabitants . . . are to have arms in their houses ready fixed for

          service."  The legislature lamented the "neglect of ye arms of ye country" and

          ordered all inhabitants to have repaired all arms that were out of order.  It also

          ordered the Surveyor General to import or otherwise obtain quality arms and to

          offered these arms at cost to all who might need decent guns.

               On 14 May 1645 the Massachusetts Assembly passed a law which

          required that all young men between the ages of 10 and 16 years practice with arms

          under the supervision of officers designated by the principal officers of the militia. 

          They were to trained in the use of pikes, bows and arrows and guns.  In the earliest

          years one-third of a militia company was armed with pikes and the remainder with

          fire-locks.  Pikes proved to be useless in deep woods combat and all men were soon

          equipped with fire-locks, but tomahawks, scalping knives and other edged weapons

          which were useful in hand-to-hand combat were added as standard equipment. 

          "All inhabitants, seamen as well as others, are to have armes in their howses fitt for

          service, with pouder, bullets, match, as other souldiers;  and ye fishermen, shipp

          carpenters & others not exempted by lawe shall watch . . . and traine twice a yeere

          according to order."

               Companies were constituted of 64 men.  No company with less than a full

          roster of men was permitted to elect its own officers, a most important prerogative

          on the time and place.  After the clerk certified to the General Court that a company

          had its required membership, the men "shall have liberty to choose sergeants and

          other inferior officers."  These officers swore an oath to "trayne them in the use of

          armes, eight dayes in the yeere."

               This pre-militia training was designed to make certain that all young men

          had adequate familiarity with the common militia weapons.  The Assembly also

          ordered that the great militia be called out annually for minimal training.  The

          Assembly assumed that the citizenry would own its arms and would be familiar

          with the basic care and operation of these weapons.  The annual inspection would

          ascertain which citizens had failed to provide weapons.  The discipline would

          insure that each man would know where and how to form in case of emergency. 

          Training time was set at eight days, with advance notice of six days.

               The watch mandated in the law was designed principally to look for the

          approach of enemies from any direction.  As a secondary function the watch was

          to look for crime in progress and to resist violence.  If the watch came upon an

          enemy or criminal the men were to capture, or if necessary kill, the culprits.  If their

          force was inadequate to contain the menace they were to fire warning shots to

          attract the attention of others.  Citizens were expected to grab their own arms and

          rush to the assistance of the watchmen.  Watch began "halfe an hower after sonne

          setting" and continued until dawn.  Men were to be armed with muskets or pikes.

               The General Court also ordered "that all Scotsmen, Negers & Indians,

          inhabiting with or servants to the English, from the age of 16 to 60 yeares, shall be

          listed."  These men were to be mustered, disciplined and trained with the rest of the

          company.  Those who loved at such a distance as to be inconvenienced to travel to

          train with their companies were permitted to gather, if at least 12 in number, and

          train themselves six times a year; or to train with other companies if they lived

          close to another militia company than to their own.

               In 1645 the legislature instituted two interesting changes of policy.  First,

          the legislature ordered that musket and pistol balls were to be supplemented with

          swan shot.  Swan shot is commonly known in contemporary literature as

          buckshot and is used to discharge a relatively broad pattern, increasing the chances

          of even a poor marksman hitting his target in dense brush.  Today it is used for

          hunting medium size game in urban areas because it does not carry nearly as far as

          a single ball.  Muskets of the colonial period would have discharged about two

          ounces of shot pellets about the size of a pea.  These shot could do considerable

          damage to man or even several men in a small group at ranges of 50 or more yards. 

          Second, the legislature ordered that small children, those under the age of 16, were

          to acquaint themselves with arms.  It suggested that children begin pre-induction

          militia training by practicing with scaled-down bows and arrows, small pikes and

          miniature guns.

               On 12 August 1645 the Assembly provided for the recruitment and special

          training of an elite corps.  This select militia was to consist of the thirty best men

          from each of the larger militia units.  Their training concentrated on tracking,

          capturing and expelling hostile Amerindians and the French woodsmen, the

          courriers de bois.  They were to be prepared to move against hostile elements

          within thirty minutes of receiving a call from the authorities.  They were to keep

          their arms, powder, match and accoutrements fresh and ready.  The reference in

          the law to "fresh Match" tells us that they were armed with matchlock arms instead

          of flintlock or snaphaunce lock arms.  These select militiamen were the forerunners

          of the Minute Men of fame at Lexington and Concord.

               In 1647 the legislature made a number of changes to the militia act.  The

          first alteration allowed those militiamen residing in the outlying areas to deduct

          their travel time to and from militia muster from the eight days they were required

          to serve annually.  Another new provision to the militia law that allowed "the

          militia officers of each Company . . . with the advise and consent of such soldiers

          as are allowed their Votes in Choice of their Officers, shall, from time to time,

          appoint days for training their companys, so that there shall be eight days appointed

          for the same every year."  Another amendment attempted to provide some

          standardization of arms.  Henceforth, militiamen could not fulfill the obligation to

          provide arms with just any gun.  "No musket shall be allowed for service under

          bastard musket bore and not under 3'9" in length, nor any piece above 4'3" and

          every soldier is to be furnished with [a] priming wire, worm and scourer, fitted to

          ye bore of his musket."  Finally, an additional law also made provision for

          armourers.  "Upon any Military Expedition . . . all Smiths and other work Men are

          to attend the repairing of arms and other necessaries and may not refuse such pay

          as the Country affords."  In the same year the list of those exempted from militia

          service included: the students and faculty of Harvard; school masters; notary

          publics; physicians and surgeons; masters of ships at sea; millers; ferrymen;

          herdsmen and nearly all political and public officers.  However, all except

          magistrates, physicians and teachers were to be provided with arms.  The colony

          provided that those who could not afford arms were to be provided with them, but

          the poor may be required to perform public service or barter what they may have

          in excess to obtain the public arms.  On 20 May 1647 the legislature repealed the

          act of 9 September 1636 and allowed all freemen, and not just those required to

          attend militia musters, to vote on officers of the various militia companies.

               On 27 May 1652 the Massachusetts Assembly decided to expand the

          obligation to serve in the militia.  Heretofore, Afro-Americans, whether freemen

          or slaves, were not enrolled in the militia.  Amerindians who lived in peace with the

          colonists had also been exempted.  The new act included "Negroes, Scotsmen and

          Indians living with, or in servitude to" the colonists were obliged to serve in the

          militia beginning at age 16 years.  The inclusion of Scotsmen referred to indented

          captives, taken by Oliver Cromwell's forces at the Battle of Dunbar.  The General

          Court ordered that "all Scotsmen, Negroes and Indians inhabiting with, or servants

          to, the English" be mustered with the militia.  However, just five years later, the

          legislature passed a law which prohibited blacks, whether free or enslaved, and

          Amerindians from joining the militia in the interests of "the better ordering and

          settling of severall cases in the military companyes."

               By 1655 the colony had established minutemen and we find references to

          their training and deployment.  In 1656 the Assembly passed substantial new

          legislation relative to the militia.  The amendments provided substantial penalties

          for avoidance of militia duty.  Only those previously exempted and anyone

          exempted by the courts could escape the impact of the militia law.  The militia

          law was not all inclusive.  As with the 1643 militia act, exceptions were made for

          the following: magistrates, court officers and their chief deputies, deacons of the

          Church, and the faculty and students at Harvard College.  Certain civilians whose

          services were indispensable were exempted.  These included ferrymen, millers, and

          fishermen and herdsmen who were permanently employed at their trades.  Those

          frontiersmen who lived at too great a distance from a militia company to muster

          conveniently were also exempted.  Smiths and carpenters, physicians and surgeons

          were exempted from regular service, but could be drafted when their special talents

          were needed.  Naturally the disabled were exempted from militia service.  The law

          made particular reference to the release of those who had a "natural or personal

          impediment" such as "want of years, greatness of age, defect of mind, failing of

          senses, or impotence of limbs."  Those exempt from militia discipline still had to

          provide themselves with a musket.  No man might join the militia "but as are of

          honest and good report and freemen."  Shortages of manpower caused the enlist-

          

          ment of men as young as sixteen years.

               In 1660 a new militia act required "every person above the age of sixteen

          years" to train except the usual civil and occupational list and "one servant of every

          magistrate and teaching elder, and the sons and servants of the Major General."  No

          mention was made of Amerindians or persons of color.  Additional training

          requirements were added, with specifics left to the military commanders.

               Initially, the colony had tried to fill all its militia obligations and

          requirements with volunteers and when this failed it had created a system of

          obligatory militia service.  The system which proved to be reasonable and

          durable was one of universal militia service supplemented with a secondary system

          of drafting militiamen to serve as artificers and garrison troops at forts.  The

          General Court placed great value in forts so a remarkable amount of the

          militiaman's time was spent in garrison duty in static fortifications.

               In ordinary times regiments were to drill once every three years, with the

          militia officers to work out the schedule.  The legislature then fixed specific

          dates between 1641 and 1651 and again between 1671 and 1676.  Some counties

          failed to muster their militia for regimental meetings and some general gatherings

          were devoted to other activities, such as repair of fixed fortifications.  The

          training paid off.  In 1680 Jasper Danckaerts, who was unimpressed with the drill

          of the New York militia, complimented the military order and discipline he saw in

          Massachusetts.

               The General Court in 1665 decided that much "mischief" among the

          natives had been brought on by excessive drinking of alcoholic beverages so it

          prohibited absolutely the sale of any intoxicating substance to them.  All the Indian

          trade was henceforth to be conducted in licensed trading houses.  Finally, seeing

          that the natives had no sense of permanent conveyances of land, and that they

          became warlike when cheated out of their lands in order yo to satisfy debts to the

          traders, the Court forbade the sale of Indian land without its express approval.

               By 1687 it was evident that the colony had to enact an adequate militia law

          for its own protection.  The gave assembly the reasons for creating the Militia Act

          of 1687.  "Whereas it is absolutely necessary that the inhabitants throughout this

          Territory and Dominion be well armed and trained up in the art military, as well for

          the honour and service of his most excellent Majesty as for the preservation and

          defence thereof from any violence or invasion whatsoever, Be it therefore enacted

          by the Governour and Council and it is hereby enacted and ordained by the

          authority of the same . . . ."  The law provided for universal free male public

          obligation to serve in the militia.  The law provided, "That no person whatsoever

          above sixteen years of age remain unlisted. . . ."  If the man could enlist himself,

          that was fine, but if not self-enrolled, the obligation fell upon "masters, mistresses,

          or employers, under the captain or other officers in the respective places of their

          abode . . . ."  Men had the choice of serving in regiments of foot or horse.  After a

          young man turned age sixteen he must enlist within "the space of six weeks, on

          penalty of forty shillings, and so for every six weeks such persons shall remain

          unlisted."

               Each man was responsible for obtaining and maintaining his own

          weapons, supplies and accoutrements.  "And that every foot soldier be provided

          with a well-fixed musket, the barrel not under three foot in length and the bore for

          a bullet of twelve to the pound, a collar of bandoliers or cartouch box with twelve

          charges of powder and bullets at the least, and a sword, or, if the officer so appoint,

          with a good pike and sword . . . ."  The militiamen had to present their arms and

          equipment on demand.  He "so shall appear when and where appointed, upon

          penalty of six shillings for his default in not appearing and four shillings for want

          of each charge of powder or bullets, musket, pike, sword, bandoliers or cartouch

          box, so as the whole penalty for any person at one time exceed not ten shillings. .

          . ."

               The law provided that if a militiaman wanted to perform his service on

          horseback that the cavalryman also had to equip himself. As applied to cavalry, the

          law said "that every soldier belonging to the horse shall, when and where

          commanded, appear and be provided with a good serviceable horse covered with

          a good saddle, with holsters, breastplate and crupper, and case of good pistols and

          sword, and half a pound [of] powder, and twenty sizeable bullets, on penalty of ten

          shillings for each time absence and six shillings for default of each the particulars

          above mentioned, so as the whole penalty for one time exceed not fifteen shillings." 

          Even though the cavalryman had to provide his own pistols he still had to own a

          shoulder arm.  "And every trooper [shall] have at his usual place of abode a well

          fixed carabine, with belt and swivel, on penalty of ten shillings, which they shall

          bring into the field when commanded, upon penalty of answering the same at a

          court martial."

               Some militiamen might not be able to afford the required arms.  There

          were some very poor families in early Massachusetts.  Providing arms for several

          males, father and sons, placed a considerable burden on some families.  The law, 

          

          Provided nevertheless, that if any person who is to provide arms or ammunition cannot

          purchase them by such means as he hath, he shall bring to the clerk of the company so much

          corn or other merchantable goods as by apprizement of the clerk and two of the company

          mutually chosen by them shall be judged of a greater value by a fifth part than such arms and

          ammunition is of; and thereupon shall be excused from the penalty for want of arms and

          ammunition, but not from appearance, until he be provided for and furnished, which the said

          clerk shall do as soon as may be, by sale of such goods, and render the overplus if any be to

          the party.  But if any person be not able to provide himself arms and ammunition, through

          his mere poverty, if he be single, he shall be put to service by any justice of the peace, to

          procure him estate to purchase arms with, and his master shall find him arms during his

          service; if otherwise, the selectmen, townsmen or overseers shall provide and furnish him

          with arms and ammunition at the publick charge of the town, the which arms shall be kept

          by the clerk of each respective company, well fixed and fitted for service, under the care and

          inspection of the chief military officers there.

          

               The law wished to provide local authorities with reliable and permanent

          militia company rosters.  Therefore, any person wishing to move had to make the

          appropriate notification to his militia unit commander.  "And it is further enacted

          by the authority aforesaid, That no person so listed as aforesaid shall depart thence

          without a discharge from the commander of the company or troop where listed, on

          penalty of forty shillings; and that no commander of any company or troop shall

          refuse, when desired, to give a discharge in writing to any that is removing his

          abode out of the precincts, under the penalty of œ5."

               Proper equipment and uniforms were important to militia companies,

          partially to give the men a sense of pride in the units, and partially to assist in

          identifying the various units.  "The Colonels of the respective Regiments, or other

          chief officers, shall once every year, at the least, issue out their warrants to their

          inferiour officers, commanding them to make diligent search and inquiry in their

          several precincts, that all be duly listed, armed and equipped, and to return to them

          such defects as shall be found, to the end the same may be reformed, on penalty of

          one hundred pounds."     Flags and musical instruments were also extremely

          important to the militia units as they were to regular military units.  Men marched

          to the beat of drums and both drums and trumpets conveyed orders and assign-

          

          ments.  Flags identified various companies and served as a rallying point, especially

          after a battlefield was obscured by the haze produced by gunpowder.  Thus, the law

          required that,  "all Captains of companies of foot or troops of horse shall, within

          six months from and after publication of this act, provide for their companies and

          troops, drums, drummers and colours, trumpets, trumpeters and banners, at their

          own charge, under penalty of ten pounds, and so for every six months such

          commanders shall remain unprovided . . . ."

               Although custom and practice varied widely, in early Massachusetts

          various non-commissioned officers and important musicians were paid.  "All

          trumpeters and drummers lately in service, or that shall by the several captains be

          put into that service, shall hold and attend the said service during the captain's

          pleasure, upon the salary of forty shillings per annum for a trumpeter and twenty

          shillings per annum for a drummer finding their trumpet and drum, and twenty

          shillings for a trumpeter and ten shillings for a drummer if the captain find them,

          upon penalty of forty shillings."  If the militia fines were insufficient to provide the

          necessary equipment, town authorities had to find the funds to buy whatever was

          needed.  The law provided that "in case the fines and forfeitures for defaults

          allowed to the captains as aforesaid shall fall short of the charge of providing

          drums, drummers and colours, the account thereof being given to the chief field

          officer and by him allowed, the sum wanting shall be supplied and satisfied by the

          select men, townsmen or overseers out of the moneys raised or to be raised to

          defray other public charge in each respective town."

               Officers were to drill, inspect, discipline and exercise their militia charges

          regularly.  "And that three times in every year, or oftener if command be given by

          his Majesty's Captain General or Commander-in-chief for the time being, the

          several companies and troops in each Regiment shall meet at the next and most

          convenient place to be appointed by their respective officers, to be then and there

          by them mustered and exercised."  Failure to exercise an officer's responsibilities

          could bring considerable penalties.  "And it is further enacted by the authority

          aforesaid, That once every year, or oftener if thereunto commanded, each particular

          captain, or lieutenant, where no captain is appointed, shall give to his field officer,

          and the field officer to his Majesty's said Captain General or Commander-in-chief

          for the time being, fair written rolls of their respective companies and regiments. 

          And if any field officer, captain or other inferiour officer or soldier shall neglect

          or contemn performing the lawful commands of their respective superiour officers,

          he or they shall be punished by fine, cashiering or other punishment, according to

          the discretion of a court martial."

               Men who failed to assume all their responsibilities, as we have seen, were

          subject to fines.  The Militia Act provided for the disposition and distribution of

          militia fines. "That the several fines and forfeitures mentioned in this act and not

          declared in what manner they shall be recovered and how disposed of, that all such

          as do relate to any person under the degree of a captain shall be to the respective

          captains, to defray the charge of their companies or troops, and to be levied before

          the next exercising day, by distress and sale of the offender's goods, by the

          captain's warrant to the clerk; but if the offender be a servant the owner's goods

          shall be liable to the distress and sale as aforesaid so that satisfaction may be made:

          and for all other penalties mentioned in this act, the same shall be levied by distress

          and sale of the offender's goods and chattels, by warrant from the chief field

          officers in the respective places or from his Majesty's Captain General or

          Commander-in-chief for the time being; one half thereof shall be to our sovereign

          lord the King, his heirs and successors, for and toward the support of his

          government here, the other half to the informer."

               Standing watch was among the most unpopular duties a militiaman might

          draw, but, on the frontier and along the coast-line, it was among the most important

          duties to which he might be entrusted.  When Amerindians might attack, or French

          or other hostile navies might land in wartime, watch duty was standard fare.  Not

          surprisingly, the law provide, "That all persons listed as aforesaid shall readily

          attend and serve on the watch when appointed, under the penalty of three shillings

          for each default and that it shall and may be lawful for any captain or other

          commission officer under the degree of a captain, in their captain's absence, to

          grant warrants of distress against any persons whatsoever that shall absent

          themselves from their duty on the watch or night guards, they keeping an exact

          account of all sums and forfeitures levied and received thereby, which they are to

          render to their superiour officers when required: provided always, that no trooper

          shall be obliged to watch or ward but under the command of his proper officer, and

          in his proper arms."

               Firing arms was a standard method of issuing warnings and summoning

          aid.  Spurious and random firing after nightfall were more than a minor

          inconvenience;  they misled, even deceived an unsuspecting population.  Thus, the

          act provided "that no person whatsoever presume to fire any small arms after eight

          of the clock at night, unless in case of an alarm, insurrection or other lawful

          occasion; and in either of the said cases, four muskets or small arms distinctly fired,

          or, where great guns are, the firing of one great gun and two muskets or small arms

          distinctly, and beating of drum, shall be taken for an alarm; and every person that

          shall neglect his duty in taking and giving forward any alarm by firing as aforesaid,

          or shall be guilty of firing any small arms after eight of the clock at night . . . ." 

          The man engaging in the illicit or frivolous firing of arms "shall be fined or

          otherwise punished at the discretion of a court martial, not extending to life or

          limb."  Men were to assume that the firing of arms after sundown were call to arms

          and all militiamen must respond immediately.  "And in case of such alarm, every

          soldier is immediately to repair armed to his colours or court of guard, upon the

          penalty of five pounds."  

               The law also restricted the arbitrary discharge of large guns from ships in

          the harbor.  "And for the better prevention of false alarms, that no captain, master

          or commander of any ship or vessel riding at anchor in any [of] the harbors, ports

          or bays within this Dominion, or any other person, fire any gun after eight of the

          clock at night, under penalty of forty shillings for every gun so fired, to be levied

          by warrant from the chief officer, not under the degree of a captain, (who is hereby

          impowered to administer an oath and give judgment thereupon,) by distress or sale

          of the offender's goods, or for want of distress the said chief officer is hereby

          impowered to commit such offender to jail, there to remain until payment of the

          same; and that in case the said officer shall not perform his duty therein, he shall

          forfeit ten pounds, to be levied by warrant from the Governor or Commander-in-

          chief for the time being: provided always, that this clause shall in no ways concern

          or extend to any captain or officer of any of his Majesty's ships of war, for their

          firing at setting of the watch."

               There were exemptions from militia service.  Naturally, professional and

          enlisted military officers and enlisted soldiers were exempted.  Most others on the

          exemption list were civil officers, including, "all the members of his Majesty's

          council, justices of the peace, sheriffs, coroners, and all officers of courts; treasur-

          

          ers, surveyors and deputy surveyors; the clerks belonging to the surveyor's office;

          and one servant of every member of the council. . . .; as also all officers imployed

          about his Majesty's revenue."  Also exempted were "ministers ; the president,

          fellows, students and officers of Harvard college; professors and allowed

          schoolmasters; physicians and chirurgeons [surgeons]; masters of ships and other

          vessels above twenty tons, in actual employ; constant fishermen and herdsmen."

          

               By the time the assembly had passed the Militia act of 1687, some

          militiamen had decided to question the right of government to draft them for any

          service, and many refused to report for garrison and maintenance duties.  Threat-

          

          ened by this near universal revolt the legislature provided for a method of escaping

          from the draft.  One could hire a substitute for a minimal payment.  Consequently,

          the real burden of serving unpleasant and boring duty details fell on the poorest

          citizens and the non-citizens, the unemployed, transients and freebooters.  Men

          with certain skills, such as carpenters and smiths, were more liable for the draft

          than most militiamen simply because the work on fortifications required their

          services.  One could also reduce one's chances of being drafted by contributing

          supplies and arms to the common cause.

               Militia officers in Massachusetts were popularly elected.  Every soldier,

          as well as those exempted by the law from militia discipline, was allowed to

          participate in the election.  Any freeman might stand for election.  The troops

          having fewer than 64 members had officers appointed by the Assembly.  The

          assembly encouraged smaller units to merge their troops, primarily to allow for the

          election of officers.   When there was a tie, or when more than one man was

          elected to a particular rank, the man with the greatest seniority in the militia was

          chosen as senior officer.  The Governor of the Colony or his designate served as

          the Major-General of the colonial militia.  Officers might be required to present a

          certificate from their parsons, identifying them as part of the elect.  The General

          Court was never pleased by the democratic selection process and after 1664 it

          increasingly meddled into the officer selection process, exercising its power to

          "nominate, choose and appoint" the militia officer class.  Those wishing to serve

          as officers might petition the General Court, providing it with recommendations

          and testimonials relative to their alleged qualifications.  These papers were

          similar to those prepared for officers nominated democratically in earlier times. 

          The Court still later chose to rotate militia officers with mixed results.  After 1645

          the General Court increasingly guarded its prerogative militia powers.  In

          October 1687, Governor Edmund Andros usurped the power to appoint all civil

          officers, including those of the provincial militia.  His "despotic rule" continued

          through February 1689 when the people of Boston, "as their contribution to the

          Glorious Revolution," removed him from authority.  

               The sergeant major-general was the highest ranking militia officer in the

          colony.  He could always replace officers in the field, an obvious military necessity

          when officers were killed, wounded or otherwise rendered incapable of serving. 

          When the Sergeant Major-General of the militia called the unenrolled troops into

          service or into joint military training camps, he would decide the order of rank

          among the eligibles in each rank.  His own family was exempted from militia drill

          and assembly, and he received other privileges commensurate with his rank and

          importance.   He or his designate negotiated with the officers of neighboring

          colonial militias.

               When the colony needed the services of the militia, a signal consisting of

          firing of four muskets, ringing of church bells or other pre-decided alarm, would

          call the assembly.  Any man failing to respond was to be fined œ5 sterling. 

          Excepting a decision made by the Major-General, a local committee consisting of

          the officers of the militia units could decide to hold the militia or to dismiss it.

               Local officers, whether elected or appointed, had primary responsibilities

          for the organization and discipline of the militia companies.  The county captain

          was the principal militia officer in each county.  He was charged with inspecting

          the arms carried by militiamen and checking the people attending church or

          otherwise travelling to make certain that they were armed.  At times the county

          militia units paid his salary from militia fines and at other times he General Court

          paid his stipend.   On occasion the General Court or Sergeant Major-General

          might send militia captains as emissaries to various Amerindian chiefs and villages. 

          They might also act as mediators, negotiators or arbitrators in Amerindian affairs

          and disputes.  They sometimes negotiated the release of caucasian captives and

          hostages.

               The sergeant-major assisted the county captain.  He assessed fines, sought

          out delinquents, supervised drills and generally ordered the company's military

          business.  In times of crisis he led the forces and could, if necessary, impress goods

          into the public service.  The county militia clerk was assigned the most

          unpleasant tasks.  So unpopular was the position that the General Court mandated

          that clerks serve when elected or appointed or pay a stiff fine.  He called roll at

          militia musters and reported those who failed to attend.  He also kept the equipment

          roster, noting any deficiencies and levying fines on those under-equipped and he

          made arrangements for the poor to work on public projects to pay for militia

          equipment that they could not afford.  He added various charges to the fines that

          were not paid immediately.  In return he received one-quarter of all fines and

          generally received a kick-back or legal commission on purchases of supplies and

          equipment.

               The militia law required that each man supply himself with at least a

          pound of gunpowder and twenty bullets.  If the gun was a firelock, at least a foot

          of match rope must be supplied, and if a flintlock, spare flints were in order.  In

          addition militiamen usually carried a hatchet or tomahawk, scalping knife or

          sword and knapsack and cartridge belt.

               Cavalry units were formed as auxiliaries to the regular militia.  Initially,

          they served as scouts with infantry, but they rapidly developed into effective

          combat units.   First organized in units of thirty mounted men, cavalry units were

          expanded into units based on seventy men.   Units with forty or more mounted

          men could nominate their own officers.  These were the elite militiamen.  Only

          freemen who were admitted to full citizenship, and, usually, were Puritans, could

          join the mounted militia.  An applicant or his family had to own property valued

          at no less than œ100 in order to serve in the cavalry.  He had to equip himself with

          saddle, bridle, holster, pistol or carbine and sword and provide his own horse. 

          In return he received may privileges not accorded infantry militiamen.  He could

          not be drafted, but had to volunteer, for service outside the colony.  He paid no

          ferry charges or head rate poll tax.

               The General Court encouraged these militiamen living on or near the

          frontier in sparsely populated areas to develop mounted militia units to expedite

          muster and organizational time.  As long as the cavalry was properly utilized they

          proved to be effective.  When they were misused and improperly deployed, as in

          King Philip's War, they suffered enormously and were nearly disbanded. 

          Frontiersmen usually valued their riding horses highly and were often unwilling to

          use their best horses in combat because of the possibility of injury.  On the other

          hand, some militiamen were frequently guilty of overloading the horses so that the

          animals died en route to battles, or were so slower by the weight that they offered

          little advantage over foot soldiers.

               Cavalry units were not created or prepared for use against the native

          aborigine.  The eastern and northern Indians did not begin to acquire large

          quantities of horses until about 1725 and by 1740 an Amerindian living in these

          areas who possessed no horse was a rarity.  But even after acquiring horses, these

          tribes rarely used them to advantage in war.

               The Wampanoag tribe has been peaceful, even friendly, toward the

          European settlers under Massasoit, and there were few problems as long as he

          lived.  On Massasoit's death in 1661 he was briefly followed by his elder son

          Alexander.  Upon Alexander's death King Philip, Massasoit's second son, became

          the sachem of the Wampanoags.  A proud and talented, even charismatic, but

          brooding, man,  King Philip had long envied the physical possessions of the

          Europeans and loathed their encroachment on the Wampanoag's ancestral lands. 

          He mourned the passing of tribal autonomy and independence, especially with their

          growing dependence, even addition, to the white man's goods.  He thought that he

          was to be joined by the Narragansett tribe of Rhode Island, which resented what

          they considered preferential treatment of the rival Mohican tribe.  The Narragansett

          and Wampanoag tribes, traditional enemies, had found new reasons to bury the

          hatchet.  King Philip's War began in June 1675 when Wampanoag warriors

          attached and destroyed the frontier town of Swansea, thirty miles form Plymouth. 

          Plymouth Plantation and Massachusetts militiamen hurried to the scene.  The

          Narrgansetts watched and waited and while the Mohican and Pequot tribes assisted

          the colonists.

               The militia immediately gained the upper hand.  They drove Philip from

          the Mount Hope Peninsula and trapped them in a dismal swamp.  The militia was

          too poorly led and disciplined to close the trap and Philip escaped, enlisting the

          Nipmuck tribe of central Massachusetts during his escape.  In December 1675 the

          militia made a second mistake.  Unable to get the Narraganset to make any clear

          statement of commitment they moved against their principal fortified town.  This

          settled the issue and, with the Narragansetts now among the belligerents, other

          tribes joined the war.  One tribe or another pillaged nearly every small frontier

          town and outlying farm.  Finally, Brookfield was destroyed.  They laid waste the

          Connecticut Valley.  Militia sent in pursuit of raiders frequently fell victim to

          ambushes.

               On 10 February 1676 the Amerindians burned Lancester and eleven days

          later destroyed much of Medfield.  On 13 March they successfully attached Groton,

          which was burned after it inhabitants fled.  Providence and Warwick, Rhode

          Island, and Simsbury, Connecticut, were abandoned.  The Massachusetts towns of

          Andover, Woburn, Sudbury, Bridgewater, Hadley, Hatfield, Springfield and

          Marlboro were all successfully attacked.  Urban areas had to provide for

          increasingly large numbers of refugees and prices of foodstuff rose as crops were

          burned and cattle and horses slaughtered in the fields. But the militia was learning

          the military supplies arrived from England.  The Amerindians had no outside

          sources of supply and no sense of planning for a prolonged war.  Militia had

          burned their crops and killed many of best warriors.  Hunger, malnutrition and

          disease took horrible tolls.  On 12 August 1676 the militia trapped and killed Philip

          near Plymouth, where the war had begun.  The war dragged on with sporadic

          attacks as late as the summer of 1677 in Maine.  In a most unconventional tactic for

          the Amerindians, the Pequots made their last stand in a fort near present-day

          Mystic, Connecticut, as did the Wampanog allies of King Philip on Rhode Island

          in 1675.

               Colonial militia leaders had learned some expensive lessons.  They saw

          the value of hiring other Indians to track and scout.  They changed their principal

          weapons.  King Philip's War marked the end of the European pike as a principal

          militia weapon in American.  Amerindians were much more intimidated by the

          thunder and novelty of firearms than they were by pikes creating light infantry and

          of abandoning obsolete and useless equipment and accoutrements which added

          nothing and only burdened the militia-man  They learned to make war in

          Amerindian fashion in the deep woods.  A few months of actual service proved to

          be infinitely more useful than years of militia muster and marching.  It was King's

          Philip's war that changed the American militia from a European para-military

          organization into an Indian fighting machine.  The American Revolution would

          force the militia to reverse that pattern.

               Much has been written of the barbarous behavior of the Amerindians

          during King Philip's War, but little has been written of the devastating effect it had

          on the natives.  The New England militia had realized that, if properly armed,

          equipped, united and led, the natives just might win the war.  The Christian natives,

          derisively called "Praying Indians," represented an enormous reservoir of strength

          if Philip could rally them to his cause.  Many of the converts owned firearms, some

          had money and supplies, most knew the whites and their battle tactics well, and

          many were sympathetic to at least some of Philip's causes.  Some caucasian leaders

          thought that the converts were not to be trusted, and it was just a matter of time

          before they joined Philip.  They were almost certain to spy on the whites and report

          weaknesses in deployment of troops and fortifications that Philip could exploit. 

          One preacher summed up this opinion:  "We have been nourishing vipers."  While

          standing firm against this opinion initially, to the point of defending the Christian

          Indians, the magistrates saw their authority undermined, and their position eroded,

          as a few cases of treason and spying were uncovered.  So the praying Indians were

          murdered, their property confiscated, and their buildings burned and cattle killed. 

          More converts defected and joined Philip, precipitating more reprisals.  By the time

          the dreadful war was over perhaps as many as 3000 supposedly friendly Indians

          had been murdered, scattered, dispossessed of land and property, or otherwise

          alienated and injured.

               Had it not been for the more than three thousand allies, notably from

          among the Mohican and Natick tribes, the settlers might not have withstood the

          initial Amerindian assault.  Had these native Americans joined Philip, he might

          well have exterminated the settlers.  Yet most were rewarded by having their crops

          wasted, homes burned and possessions plundered.  Many were relocated from their

          homes just before harvest time, leaving them to starve.  At the suggestion of John

          Eliot, some were exiled to the barren (and by now misnamed) Deer Island in

          Boston Harbor.  Relief supplies to these displaced persons was slow in coming and

          many perished of exposure and starvation.  It was the general opinion of the period

          diarists that the praying Indians never returned to their former level of prosperity. 

          By 1677 the General Court had consolidated the praying Indians into just four

          villages and they were not permitted to leave their own villages without express

          permission from the Court.  In 1681 the number of towns was reduced to three. 

          Those who remained in Massachusetts had be instructed in Christianity.  They were

          strongly encouraged to wear their hair short in the manner of the English and

          abandon their scalp lock style.  They were forbidden to carry firearms, required to

          obtain travel permits, and prohibited from entertaining strangers in their homes. 

          Rebellious and rogue Amerindians could be enslaved and sent to the West Indies

          or imprisoned.

               On 2 June 1685, the General Court of New Plymouth enacted its final

          militia law.  The law required militia service of all able-bodied freemen and

          indentured servants and mandated attendance at periodic military training sessions. 

          Exempted were physicians, magistrates, ministers, school masters, the colony's

          secretary, clerks of courts, sheriffs, constables, herdsmen, millers, masters of ships,

          seamen, and heads of households who had three or more sons enlisted in the

          militia.  Physicians could write letters of exemption for those who were physically

          unable to serve, whether on a permanent or temporary basis.  The royal charter

          of 17 October 1691 formally incorporated Plymouth and Maine within

          Massachusetts, ending the necessity for a separate body of laws for these colonies.

               In 1680, Massachusetts Governor Simon Bradstreet wrote to the London

          Company concerning the militia.  The militia was not selective, but it enlisted all

          men except "Negroes and slaves whom wee arme not."  In 1693 the General

          Court again affirmed that all blacks and Amerindians were to be "exempted from

          all trainings."  An Act for regulating the militia was adopted on 22 November

          1693.

          

          Whereas, for the honor and service of their majesties, and for the security of this their

          province against any violence of invasion whatsoever, it is necessary that due care be taken

          that the inhabitants thereof be armed, trained and in a suitable posture and readiness for the

          ends aforesaid, and that every person may know his duty and be obliged to perform the same,

          Be it therefore enacted by His Excellency the Governor, Council and Representatives in

          General Court Assembled, and it is ordained and enacted by the authority of the same. . . 

          Sec. 1.  That all male Persons from sixteen years of age to sixty . . . shall bear arms and duely

          attend all musters and military exercises of the respective troops and companies where they

          are enlisted or belong, allowing three month's time to every son next after coming to sixteen

          years of age, and every servant so long after his time is out, to provide themselves with arms

          and ammunition, &c.

          Section 12.  That the persons hereafter named be exempted from all trainings, viz., . . .

          indians and negroes.

          Section 26.  That all persons exempted by this law from trainings shall, notwithstanding, be

          provided with arms and ammunition compleat, upon the same penalty as those that are

          obliged to train.

          

               The main tactics employed by Amerindians were offensive: surprise and

          destruction by deception.  They preferred to attack in superior numbers and

          retreated when the odds went against them.  They liked to surround an enemy and

          strike at dawn.  One authority believes that they did not develop either tactics or

          strategy and were wholly predictable in behavior because they lacked the social

          structure to develop and execute advanced or complicated maneuvers; and they had

          not developed the imagination necessary to conceive of new methods of warfare. 

          One of the greatest reasons for their downfall across North America was their

          inability to cooperate with other tribes, especially those who had been traditional

          enemies.  Even their direction by European officers, English or French, did not

          change their way of fighting.  Caucasian officers who were successful with the

          Amerindians in war found they had to follow the Amerindian practices rather than

          try to change them.  The greatest influence that European officers exercised was

          in getting the Amerindians to make occasional raids during winter, as in 1704 on

          Deerfield, Massachusetts.

               In 1672 the militia of Massachusetts numbered 15,000 men, although only

          6000 of these men had the right to vote or to hold political office.  More men

          could vote on their militia officers than could vote on their political officers.  The

          patience and organization paid off.  Jasper Danckaerts who severely criticized the

          New York militia in 1680 found the militia in Boston to be most impressive.  In

          1678 the colony restricted shooting and arms practice near public or privately

          owned buildings for the protection of the citizenry.  In 1692 the General

          Assembly repeated the orders concerning the arming of the militia, but restricted

          the bearing of arms when the carriage might cause alarm or violate the general

          peace.

               Local militia companies were financed by militia fines.  The company

          clerks collected the fines.  They purchased the various supplies, such as firewood,

          gunpowder, match, flints, lead and food with these funds.  On occasion they

          purchased arms and supplies for poor freemen.  The General Court imposed

          various duties and imposts to shore up the militia treasury at various times.  It

          also kept some expenses low by engaging in price fixing and by setting legal

          charges for services.  Still, supplies were often insufficient for the needs of the

          militia.  For example, on 23 January 1694 Charles Frost reported to the General

          Court that, "for the great want of Shoes and Stockings our soldiers here, several of

          them, are incapable of service for want thereof."  Nathaniel Saltonstall agreed,

          reporting on the same date that his men were in great need of snowshoes for winter

          service and "ammunition, provisions and cloathing."

               During the winter of 1694-95 Lieutenant-governor Stoughton carried on

          involved correspondence with governor and council in Connecticut, trying to work

          out details of the defense of the region around Deerfield and along the Connecticut

          River.  The principal issue discussed was how, when and under what conditions the

          militias of the two colonies could cooperate in the defense of an area of common

          concern.  In 1696 the General Court named one commissioner and authorized the

          governor to name a second commissioner to carry out negotiations with

          Connecticut and Rhode Island to defend the same frontier areas.

               In 1695-96 the home government requested that Massachusetts send

          troops to assist in the defense of New York.  The legislature demurred and

          Governor Stoughton was delighted to hide behind it, writing that the requested aid

          could not be provided conveniently.  For his part, Stoughton was delighted to have

          a scapegoat when pressured by the British authorities.

               In 1702, perhaps in anticipation of full war, Queen Anne sent instructions

          to Governor Dudley.  "All planters and Christian servants,"  she ordered, must "be

          well and fitly provided with arms."  The entire militia was to be put in a state of

          absolute readiness and even indentured servants were to be fully armed against the

          expected invasion of the French and their Amerindian allies.  All militia were to be

          mustered, trained and placed under adequate discipline.  Still, the queen warned,

          "you are to take special care that neither the frequency nor the unreasonableness

          of remote marches, musters and trainings be an unnecessary impediment to the

          affairs of the inhabitants."  Martial law was to be proclaimed only in case of

          extreme emergency and with the consent of council.

               In 1704 the French and their Amerindian allies destroyed the town of

          DeerfieId, on the Connecticut River in Massachusetts.  The little town already had

          a history of tragedies.  It was nearly annihilated in 1676 during King Philip's War,

          and in 1694 a raiding party of French and Indians had barely been beaten off.  As

          a result several of its 41 houses were fortified, and a sentry had been posted nightly

          since war resumed.  On the last night of February 1704 a mixed party of 200

          Canadians and 140 Abenakis and Christianized Indians of Caughnawaga attacked,

          under the command of Captain Hertel de Rouville, veteran of the last war.  The

          village contained two hundred and seventy settlers as well as twenty militiamen

          from neighboring towns, all apparently asleep.  The surprise was complete, but the

          slaughter not as heavy as might have been expected.  Thirty-eight inhabitants were

          massacred and seventeen houses went up in flames, but at least half of the others

          found refuge in one or another of the fortified places.  There was enough resistance

          for the Indians to lose eight warriors, and the Canadians three militiamen.  One

          hundred and eleven prisoners were taken and sent north to French Canada at

          daybreak.  The surviving villagers pursued the retreating raiders and inflicted thirty

          additional casualties on the enemy.  For their part the Massachusetts militia lost

          nine men and failed to recover any captives.  On the 300 mile journey to Montreal,

          sixteen of the prisoners were killed, with several being burned at the stake, and two

          reportedly starved to death.  The most famous captives were the family of the

          Reverend John Williams.  The baby was killed at the outset, and Mrs. Williams was

          killed on the march, along with their Negro slave.  Three sons, two daughters, and

          Rev. Williams survived the long trek.  Eventually almost all the Deerfield survivors

          were ransomed and exchanged with Massachusetts.  The notable exceptions were

          a few children, including Eunice, daughter of Rev. Williams.  Even Governor

          Vaudreull could not obtain her release from the Indians.  She remained with the

          Caughnawaga converts, converted to Roman Catholicism, married one of the

          Indians, and had two children.  Thirty-six years later she was reunited with her

          brothers and sister for a visit, but the gulf was so great that she returned to

          Caughnawaga to live out the remainder of her eighty-nine years.  Rev. Williams

          published an account of the massacre and capture which has remained the primary

          source of first-hand information on this event.

               The governor and legislature set up a system of town-fortresses all along

          the 250 mile border with Canada.  Each town had its own militia.  The linking and

          communication was provided by select militia which communicated on horseback,

          weather permitting, and on snowshoes during the winter.  These strategic hamlets

          served as bases to launch attacks as well as defensive positions and havens for the

          population in times of trouble.  This system, combined with strategic alliances with

          the League of the Iroquois and the general debility of the Amerindians allied to the

          French, served well to protect the colony.  During Queen Anne's War (1702-1713)

          the monarch inquired of Governor Joseph Dudley, "how many [men] are fit to bear

          arms in the militia."  It is unfortunate that his response cannot be located.

               During this same time period Massachusetts used ranging units of

          minutemen, forts and regular militia, but it still cost the province about œ1000 for

          each Amerindian killed  In 1707 the legislature decided that blacks living in the

          province were getting a free protection while whites had to serve in the militia.  The

          legislature passed an "act for the regulating of free negroes."  It read in part, 

          "Whereas in the several towns and precincts within this province there are several

          free negroes and mulattos, able of body, and fit for labour,  who are not charged

          with trainings, watches, and other services required of her Majesty's subjects,

          whereof they have share in the benefit."  Section three provided that "all free male

          negroes or mulattos, of the age of sixteen years and upwards, able of body, in case

          of alarm, shall make their appearance at the parade of the military company of the

          precinct wherein they dwell, and attend such service as the first commission officer

          of such company shall direct, during the time the company continues in arms, on

          pain of forfeiting the sum of twenty shillings to the use of the company, or

          performing eight days labor as afore

          said, without reasonable excuse made and accepted for not attending."  It ordered

          that blacks be required to "do service equivalent to trainings."  The legislature

          specifically mentioned substituting public service, such as highway maintenance

          for militia service.  In times of crisis blacks were to report to the militia assembly

          to serve in whatever capacity they might be ordered.  Failure to do public service

          was penalized by a fine of five shillings and failure to muster in times of emerg-

          

          ency subjected a black man to public service of eight days.

               Massachusetts raised 550 militiamen to avenge the Deerfield Massacre. 

          Command devolved on Colonel Benjamin Church, now 65 years of age and not in

          the best of health.  Church decided not to pursue the Deerfield hostages, but to

          destroy the Abenakis by striking at the their towns and villages from Penobscot to

          Port Royal.  Church's militia sailed out of Boston on May 21, 1704.  Raiding along

          the way, they killed a few Indians and captured others, including the half-breed

          daughter of Baron de St. Castin, who had returned to France.  The expedition

          burned Grand Pr‚ on the Bay of Fundy and reached Port Royal, but at a council of

          war on July 14 Church and his fellow officers decided it was too strong to be taken

          with men, equipment and materials on hand.  The force returned home with a

          hundred prisoners, mostly Abenakis, having lost only six men.  Actually the militia

          had fought few, if any, real battles and achieved little except for the taking of

          prisoners and the burning and looting of the Amerindian towns.  This was the fifth

          and last Indian expedition of Colonel Church.

               Legislative leaders of Massachusetts were highly irritated at New York by

          this time.  The colony had refused to participate in the expedition and the British

          authorities had done little to encourage New York to participate.  The cost in men

          and money had been borne exclusively by New England, and that meant, primarily

          by Massachusetts.  What was much worse, Albany merchants were carrying on a

          quiet, but effective and profitable, trade with St. Lawrence River Indians. 

          Moreover, plunder taken on Amerindian raids in Maine, New Hampshire, and

          Massachusetts turned up for resale in Albany shops.

               A lull now developed, and it was French Governor Vaudreuil who opened

          negotiations for an exchange of prisoners in May, 1705.  He controlled 117 New

          Englanders and he claimed to know of 70 more among his Amerindian allies. 

          Massachusetts sent up to Quebec 70 prisoners, mostly Amerindians, but received

          only 60 caucasians in return.  Vaudreuil claimed that his Amerindians were

          independent allies.  Although he claimed to have used his best arguments and

          powers of persuasion he had failed to convince them to yield their captives.  In ill

          humor, legislators in Massachusetts now accused their own commissioner, Samuel

          Vetch, of prolonging the exchange business in order to carry on trade as a war

          profiteer among the enemy.  Actually Vetch was carrying a secret letter to

          Vaudrenil from Governor Dudley proposing a truce of neutrality between the two

          provinces.  Vaudreuil received it favorably but insisted on two conditions: that

          New York and the other northern English colonies be included, and that the

          English give up their fishing rights off Newfoundland.  The first was difficult to

          comply with; and the second was impossible.  Additionally, Vaudreuil continued

          to argue that he could not persuade his Amerindian allies to surrender their pris-

          

          oners.

               Governor Dudley had sought help from England to capture Port Royal in

          Acadia and obtained nothing.  English authorities clung stubbornly to the belief

          that the colonists could and should prosecute the war on or near their own soil. 

          Colonel Church's failure against Canada focused even greater attention on the

          issue.  Although some Boston merchants were trading illegally with the French and

          their Amerindian allies, most supported strong prosecution of the war in Canada. 

          Boston fishermen were frequently driven away from fishing grounds off

          Newfoundland by French privateers operating out of Port Royal.  Finally in 1707

          Dudley asked the General Court to authorize and underwrite yet an enterprise

          against Port Royal.  Two regiments were called for, vessels were to be impressed,

          an English frigate in port was to be used's and neighboring colonies were to be

          invited to join.  The expedition sailed on May 13.  New Hampshire contributed 60

          men, and Rhode Island 80.  With the two Massachusetts regiments there was a

          grand total of 1,076 soldiers and about 450 sailors.  Colonel John March was the

          commander, facing a military problem quite different from his frontier service.  The

          volunteer militia were landed in two parties and without much trouble drove the

          advanced French forces back into the fort, commanded by Governor Daniel

          d'Auger de Subercase.  The New England militia arranged itself in a long

          semicircle and camped.

               Soon after the militia disintegrated into a wrangling, unmanageable mob. 

          The officers did not know how to conduct a siege, and the soldiers, losing all

          confidence in them, reverted to behaving like the civilians that they actually were. 

          After three councils of war about proceeding or giving up, the noble force

          decamped for Casco Bay.  Colonel March sent an apologetic message to Governor

          Dudley, who, although deeply disappointed, demanded that March make another

          attempt at once.  Accordingly Dudley dispatched to Maine a hundred recruits,

          another frigate, and three members of the provincial council to advise March.  The

          expedition returned to Port Royal in August and found that the French also had

          been reinforced.  For a week there was repeated skirmishing in the open, with

          several casualties, but no decision.  Once more the New Englanders withdrew. 

          Boston was loud in its condemnation and demanded court-martial proceedings, but

          with officers accusing one another there were hardly enough left to serve as judges.

          The discreditable wrangling eventually dissipated itself.

               Border raids resumed in 1708.  In midsummer Governor Vaudreuil put

          together a force of one hundred Canadians and three hundred Christian Indians

          under Hertel de Rouville, of Deerfield fame.  They were to be joined en route by

          eastern Indians and sweep the frontier once more.  But the reinforcements did not

          appear, and many of the mission Indians turned back after experiencing what they

          considered to be evil omens.  With his force reduced almost by half, De Rouville

          decided to strike at Haverhill, Massachusetts, on the north side of the Merrimac

          River.  The village contained about thirty houses, perhaps one hundred and fifty

          people, and thirty militia in a picket fort.  Just before dawn on August 29 the

          French and Indians struck.  They met a spirited resistance as most of the inhabitants

          fired from their houses.  The raiders tried to burn them out but were not successful. 

          Stubborn fighting persisted for several hours.  Relief troops came and tried to

          ambush the enemy, but killed only nine and wounded eighteen.  After the attackers

          withdrew, the village counted up sixteen dead and three taken prisoner.

               Late in 1706 Samuel Vetch had embarked for England.  A 38 year-old

          Scot, he was married to Robert Livingston's daughter.  Vetch was a newcomer to

          Massachusetts commerce, but he had seen enough of the war to become convinced

          that nothing effectively against Canada could be accomplished without military aid

          and leadership from home.  The idea was prevalent in New York, of course, but

          Vetch had the energy and persuasiveness to present the glorious enterprise to

          influential government officials.  There was something in it for himself as well. 

          However, it took him two years to extract a favorable decision.  He promised that

          2500 colonial troops would co-operate, although his authority for making such a

          statement is surely suspect.  Vetch thought it best if two battalions of regulars and

          six warships were dispatched from England with a regular military commander-in-

          chief to lead the attack on Quebec.  Governor Dudley supported the idea, and so

          did Lord Lovelace, who was being sent to New York as governor to replace the

          corrupt Cornbury.  The Board of Trade was slowly convinced by the end of 1708,

          and its recommendation was adopted by the ministry and the queen in February

          1709.  For his effort Vetch was given a colonel's commission to direct colonial

          preparations and was promised the governorship of Canada after it was taken. 

          With Colonel Francis Nicholson, recently governor of Virginia, Vetch sailed for

          Boston.

               Fifteen hundred men from New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and

          Pennsylvania, including the regular Independent Companies, were to rendezvous

          at Albany in May for an advance on Montreal.  The Iroquois were to be brought

          into the campaign if at all possible.  New England was to raise a thousand men to

          join with the English forces for an attack by sea on Quebec and Port Royal.  Vetch

          was effective in arousing enthusiasm in all the northern colonies except Quaker

          Pennsylvania.  Despite the sudden death of Governor Lovelace, New York moved

          with alacrity under Lieutenant Governor Ingoldsby and chose to participate actively

          in this campaign.  John Schuyler was sent off to the Iroquois with gifts.  Colonel

          Nicholson was accepted to command the forces gathering at Albany.  Never had

          the northern colonies co-operated so harmoniously and energetically, for they were

          all convinced that driving the French out of North America was the only means of

          achieving permanent peace.  Although Pennsylvania had refused to furnish men,

          volunteers from the other colonies more than offset the defection.  Everything was

          in readiness and anticipation high, but the British fleet and troops did not appear. 

          In October Vetch learned that officials in London had quietly abandoned his

          scheme.  Vetch cursed the day and returned an embittered man who had failed

          largely because he had not engaged in court politics and aristocratic intrigues. 

          When the action at Port Royal did occur, the effort was chiefly the work of royal

          marines, and it was Port Royal, not Quebec, that would be the target.  When Front

          Royal surrendered on 2 October 1710, American militia and volunteers had played

          at best a minuscule part.  Vetch contented himself with a royal governorship at Port

          Royal, now renamed Annapolis Royal and his garrison troops were British

          regulars, not militia.

               In 1715 a militia unit under Captain John Lovewell engaged a body of

          Amerindians in the Massachusetts territory of Maine.  The Amerindians on

          Lovewell's militia, which broke ranks and pursued the attacker.  He led them into

          an ambush in which the Amerindians killed many militiamen both from musket fire

          and in the hand to hand combat that followed.  Lovewell's Fight, as the action was

          known, changed militia tactics somewhat, showing the great value of sustaining

          discipline.  In 1733 the legislature passed a act regarding the ownership of a

          militia gun.

          

          Act for Regulating the Militia.  Every Soldier and other Householder shall always be supplied with

          a well fixed Firelock Musket of Musket or a Bastard Musket Bore, the Barrel not less than 3 foot and

          a half long, or other good Fire Arms to the satisfaction of the Commission Officers of the Company,

          a Cartouch Box, one pound of good Powder, 20 Bullets fit for his Gun and 12 Flynts, a good Sword

          or Cutlass, a Worm and Priming Wire, fit for his Gun, on Penalty of 6 Shillings.

          

               In 1723, following the departure of Governor Shute, the legislature and

          the new governor, Dummer, clashed with the legislature over control of the militia. 

          Dummer accused the assembly of trying "draw off the forces" so the legislature

          assured Dummer that it merely meant to "draw off the pay and sustenance" of the

          military.  Seeing that the power of the purse, as the house viewed it, meant, in

          reality, that the assembly would control the militia, Dummer answered that, while

          the legislature did have the power to appropriate money for all purposes, military

          included, he would not countenance any interference with his duties under the

          colonial charter to control the militia.

               The legislature was not through.  It began to demand the submission of the

          journals and other records of field commanders that it authorized committee

          members to examine in detail and report to the whole body.  The legislature had

          mandated that such journals be kept as early as Shute's administration, but it was

          not until it clashed with Dummer that it began its examination.  Heretofore, the

          only reports required of militia commanders had been those routinely submitted in

          all colonies to the governor in his capacity as supreme military commander.

               The situation was impossible, of course.  By involving the legislature so

          heavily in day to day operations, the legislature tended to undermine military

          discipline.  If an officer was dissatisfied with his orders or assignment it appeared

          he could go over the governor's head and appeal to the assembly.  Legislative

          tampering might suggest that advancement might come more rapidly by catering to

          the legislature than to the governor.  If the officers and men had carried out a

          mission under gubernatorial orders, would the legislature withhold their pay or

          punish them?  It had occasionally blocked pay and expense vouchers when it

          suspected financial irregularities, but it was nearly impossible to do so for policy

          reasons.  Neither could the legislature withhold militia supplies and materials of

          war and thus weaken the colony in order to enforce its will on the governor and his

          militia.  Even some responsible legislative leaders saw that by allowing politics to

          enter into military decisions and the deployment and discipline of the militia, the

          legislature had also invited insubordination.  What it could, and did, do was to use

          its power of the purse to control the building, maintenance and garrisoning of forts,

          fortresses and fortified positions.  It could also withhold appropriations and

          authorization for expeditions into other colonies.

               In early 1724 the legislature decided that it would issue pay and vouchers

          to militia units only after it had examined its journals and checked its muster rolls. 

          It had come to the realization that it could not challenge the governor on policy

          matters, but it was determined to exercise as fully as possible what powers it did

          have.  The reports that Shute and then Dummer sent regarding the legislature's

          interference with the military for a time put the colony's charter.  Indeed, it was at

          this time that the English government issued the Explanatory Charter, settling

          several problems in favor of the privy council.  The home government thought

          Massachusetts had a surfeit of democracy and that its congress was attempting to

          usurp traditional and legal executive powers.  It restrained itself from demanding

          a reduction in real legislative power, being quite satisfied that the legislature would

          return to its traditional and legal powers.

               By 1739 the freeholders of Boston had become concerned with their de-

          

          fense, holding that a defenseless town invited war.  The press in Pennsylvania,

          a colony that had no militia act of its own, reported with some considerable envy

          that Massachusetts had newly enacted its fundamental militia law.  The new law

          required that

          

          Every inlisted soldier and other householder (except troopers) shall be always provided with a well-

          fixed flintlock musket, of musket or bastard musket bore; the barrell not less than three foot and a

          half long, or other good firearm, to the satisfaction of the Commissioned Officers of the Company;

          a knapsack; a cartouch box; one pound of good powder; 20 bullets fit for his gun; and 12 flints; a

          good sword or cutlass; a worm and priming wire fit for a gun. A penalty of six shilling for want of

          such arms as hereby required, and two shillings for each other defect , and the like sum for every

          four weeks he shall remain unprovided; the fine to be paid by parents for their sons under their

          command; for their servants, other than servants upon wages.

          

               When England declared war (War of Jenkins' Ear) on Spain on 19 October

          1739, the American colonies were assigned quotas of volunteer militia to be

          recruited.  The Massachusetts legislature offered a bounty for enlistments, but still

          had trouble filling even half Governor Belcher's quota.  To increase popular

          participation, colonial militia volunteers were to be allowed to continue to elect

          their inferior officers.  Officers and men would have rank and pay, and were to be

          armed and clothed, in measure equal to their professional British military

          counterparts.  They were to "have their just share and proportion of all plunder or

          booty gained from the enemy, according to their services."  After the war they

          were to be permitted to retain their arms and uniforms for military duty.  Some

          500 volunteers from Massachusetts, along with volunteers from Rhode Islander,

          filled five ships when they left Boston harbor.  After the British bloody defeat

          during the attack on Cartagena, West Indies, survivors barely filled one ship upon

          return.  The colonists lost 153 officers and 30 transport commanders and untold

          numbers of enlisted men both to enemy fire and fever.  Approximately ten

          percent of the volunteers had survived.

               On 25 October 1743 France signed a treaty known as the Second Family

          Compact with Spain and on 15 March 1744 joined Spain's war against England. 

          The French made an unsuccessful assault on Annapolis Royal [Port Royal], Nova

          Scotia, in 1744.  With a real threat to its security the legislature of Massachusetts

          took several steps to provide for the colony's defense.  It increased military

          appropriations and increased militia training.  And it appointed a new commander.

               Sir William Pepperrell (1696-1759) was a prosperous merchant who spent

          much of his time in Boston and had served in the Massachusetts legislature and on

          the governor's council.  Already a colonel in the Massachusetts militia, he recruited

          and commanded the New England volunteer militia which, in cooperation with the

          British Royal Navy, on 17 June 1745, captured Louisbourg, now in Nova Scotia. 

          In 1746 Pepperrell was made a baronet, a title never bestowed heretofore to an

          American-born British subject.  Because of this success, between 1754 and 1759,

          the British confirmed his command of all military forces of Massachusetts.

               In June 1745 Sir Peter Warren's fleet, along with Pepperrell's land forces,

          captured Fort Louisbourg and Sir William Johnson led his Iroquois warriors into

          Canada.  The French retaliated by burning Saratoga in late November 1745. 

          Massachusetts militia participated, primarily as volunteers, in the successful siege

          of Louisbourg, a French stronghold in Canada.  the Board of Trade congratulated

          Governor William Shirley (1694-1771) for his part in recruiting volunteers,

          equipping the troops and organizing the expedition.

               Immediately, the Massachusetts legislature began lobbying for the return

          of its provincial militia.  While the militia was fighting at Louisbourg raids on the

          frontier had increased and the legislature wished to deploy the militiamen in

          defense of their own homes.  After the French incited Indian raids into Maine,

          all the New England colonies declared war on the Amerindian tribes allied with the

          French.  In late August 1745 the French allied tribes broke their treaty of

          neutrality with the Six Nations.  Shirley supported the legislature's demand for

          the return of the militia, informing the English that the militia volunteers were "to

          be discharged as soon as the expedition be over."  The militia was successful in

          repelling both French and Amerindian invasions thereafter, although calls for assis-

          

          tance continued to pour into Shirley's office until the end of the war.  Some frontier

          towns demanded troops to garrison various forts and towns.  Shirley agreed that

          hereafter no soldier would be sent out of the province for a period greater than one

          year, and additional militia would be enlisted, trained and equipped to replace any

          volunteer or impressed militiamen serving elsewhere.

               In April 1746 three British regiments relieved the volunteer colonial

          militiamen at Louisbourg.  The British home war office conceived of another

          assault on Canada, with two armies leaving the colonies to attack the French.  One

          army would move up the St. Lawrence River toward Quebec while the second

          would attack Montreal by way of Lake Champlain.  Advertisements appeared in

          newspaper throughout the colonies, asking for enlistments of three, five, and seven

          years.  Massachusetts offered volunteers œ30 and a blanket and exemption from all

          impressment for two years following their return.  For its part, the home govern-

          

          ment offered bounties in the form of land around Louisbourg to survivors of the

          expedition.

               The legislature argued that the militiamen would do better staying at home

          to defend against Amerindian raids.  Governor Shirley disagreed.  He argued that

          the tribes allied to the French had long been the greatest threat to the New England

          provinces and that the best way to end that threat was to carry the war into their

          villages.  By striking at the heart of the problem the Amerindian threat would be

          destroyed for all times.  This was properly an American cause and should be

          carried out by militia volunteers.  The British demanded that 4300 men be

          recruited from the colonies, but they themselves were unable to release any troops

          from home because all available men were fighting on the Continent.  The war

          ended with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle signed on 18 October 1748.

               The Louisbourg matter was not quite finished.  A pamphlet appeared

          which was extensively reviewed, extracted and debated in the New England

          newspapers.  The anonymous author contended that there was no clear

          authorization from Britain to undertake the mission; that the authorities knew that

          the war was going to end and that Louisbourg would be returned to the French; and

          that the New England colonies had incurred enormous expenses which the mother

          country would not refund.  Quite serious was the charge that the militia had been

          illegally and illicitly removed from the province, leaving its borders open for attack

          and leaving the inhabitants at the mercy of the marauders.  The first obligation of

          the militia was the protection of the home folks, and not to act as a reservoir of

          trained manpower for military operations beyond the colonies' borders.  Weakening

          of the colony's defenses to provide troops for service in any foreign land was

          unconscionable.  Moreover, the impressment or recruitment of militiamen for

          dreary and unproductive foreign service had a deleterious effect on morale in the

          militia.  The same certainly could have been said of the recruitment of troops for

          the ill-fated West Indian campaign.

               In 1754 the Massachusetts General Court decided to create two laws

          dealing with offenses committed within the military, to be administered by courts-

          martial, and extended for an indefinite period of time.  The Press Act dealt with the

          pilferage of arms, supplies and equipment.  The Mutiny Acts applied to crimes

          which were uniquely military, such as mutiny, sedition and desertion, and

          conspiracy to commit these forbidden acts.  Although many had been passed

          previously, no mutiny act had ever been applied in time of peace, and all of them

          heretofore, carried a one year limitation [unless the enlistment ended earlier], and

          expired after 365 days unless re-enacted.  Mutiny acts specifically refused to

          exempt men from the provisions of civilian due process.  Courts-martial might

          recommend a death sentence, but it could not be imposed without the concurrence

          of the provincial governor acting in his capacity as commander in chief of the

          colony's military.  Puritanical New England lawmakers concluded from their study

          of the Holy Bible that the good book limited corporal punishment to 39 lashes.  The

          law implied, if not specifically allowed, that militia units apply certain punishments

          including the lash within the noted limits.  They also might impose the running of

          a gauntlet and riding the wooden horse and perhaps a few other relatively minor

          physical punishments.  Greater penalties were reserved to the civilian courts and

          political authorities.

               Desertion had occasionally been a problem before imposition of the

          Mutiny Act, but these were usually handled by the officers.  Colonel Richard Sykes

          related an incident that had happened in the earliest days of the Seven Years War. 

          It concerned "a person that was willing to enlist under me and accordingly I

          enlisted him and paid him his Bounty, but he took the first opportunity to desert

          and I missed him instantly and advertised him and [offered a reward] of 20

          shillings sterling for taking him before a magistrate."

               In the autumn of 1754 Governor Shirley wrote to the Earl of Halifax to

          report that he had experiences great difficulties during the previous summer raising

          800 men to deal with the French who he was "certain had made a considerable

          progress in building forts" within Massachusetts.  He also reported that the French

          had begun to establish permanent settlements within the province and that he was

          hard-pressed to recruit men to build and man the forts designed to protect the

          colony from further encroachments by the French.  In November 1754 the Board

          of Trade appointed Shirley to command two new American regiments and gave him

          the order to recruit, and draft if necessary, 1000 Americans to serve.  Moreover, the

          Board of Trade ordered that militia regiments be raised in Virginia, North Carolina,

          Maryland, and Pennsylvania and placed under the command of Sir Peter Halket and

          Colonel Dunbar.  At the same time Shirley was forced to deal with a problem

          that also plagued Pennsylvania authorities: enlistment of indentured apprentices

          and servants.  The province had recently had good luck with its efforts to recruit

          men, but

          

          the great Dispute on this recruiting Service has been enlisted Servants.  The [debate] has been carried

          on to a great Height in Pennsylvania and Maryland.  I have always declared it was my opinion that

          His Majesty has an undoubted right to the voluntary services of His Subjects.

          

               In 1757 the British hoped to raise in the Colonies a substantial American

          force to join the British regulars in the war on the French in Canada. 

          Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire were jointly assigned quotas of 30,000

          men of the 12,000 men respectively.  Massachusetts had been assigned by far the

          largest single quota of any of the British colonies in North America.  This was not

          a good time for the colony to be asked to carry such a large burden.  Lieutenant-

          governor Spencer Phips had found it necessary to ask the Assembly to pay the

          volunteers who had returned from Albany, New York, in the summer of 1757,

          following the abandonment of that campaign by the British army.  The Earl of

          Loudoun could not pay the Massachusetts militia and volunteers because he had

          barely enough money to pay his won regular army troops.  The legislature refused

          to increase taxation, especially to pay for a lost campaign, so the province was

          forced to issue paper money to pay the troops.

               The Massachusetts provincial mutiny law was suspended in 1757 when

          Lord Loudoun placed the militia and provincial volunteers under the British Mutiny

          Act.  This law carried far more severe penalties that the provincial law had ever

          imagined.  Under the British act the possibility of appeal of a sentence to civilian

          authorities was impossible.  This law had already created a draconian system, based

          upon inhuman and brutal discipline.  Sentences imposed under it included the

          brutal whipping, and even execution, of some of the enlisted men.  The provincial

          law had limited physical punishment to thirty-nine lashes, the traditional biblical

          number given to Jesus Christ before the crucifixion.  Under the British law as many

          as a thousand lashes might be imposed.  To many provincials, this really meant that

          the law sanctioned execution by whipping.  Even army surgeons were more likely

          to revive a man who had become senseless than they were to intervene to restrict

          the imposition of sentences.

               The British military system had long been based upon the creation and

          maintenance of an absolute dichotomy between men and officers.  The

          implementation of this distinction began with an absolute refusal of officers to

          learn even the first names of their men.  The officers were taught to regard the

          enlisted men as low-life types, devoid of a real human nature, morality and

          sentiment.  Most officers believed that enlisted men were capable of reacting to,

          and were necessarily restrained only by, the harshest possible physical punishment. 

          This practice stood in stark contrast to the New England tradition in which enlisted

          men and officers alike shared religious services, food and drink, and a faith in

          democratic practices.

               It is certainly possible that the imposition of martial law on Americans

          were among the true causes of the climate of opinion that led to the Revolution and

          the Declaration of Independence.

               During the French and Indian War, Massachusetts had enlisted many

          slaves.  At least on militia company showed blacks on its rolls.  In 1763

          Reverend Jeremy Belknap, an early opponent of slavery, noted that the number of

          slaves in Massachusetts had undergone a precipitous decline because so many had

          enlisted in the militia, or served as volunteers, and had won their freedom by

          serving in the recent war.  Still others had won their freedom, or merely escaped,

          by enlisting in the army or navy.

               We may think of the militias of the southern colonies exclusively when we

          think of the containment of slaves, but northern militias also had a certain

          responsibility in that area as well.  Josiah Quincy, Jr., described the slave patrols

          of Massachusetts, on which he served.  Local committees, as in South Carolina,

          were wholly responsible for enforcement of slave laws.  The committees consisted

          of three justices of the peace who were empowered to enlist militiamen as a posse

          comitatus, arrest slaves for virtually any reason and tray and punish a slave at the

          place of arrest.  A convicted slave had no recourse to appeal or any other trial.

               The British army, always hungry for manpower, used the New England

          volunteer militia in the French and Indian War as a reservoir of trained manpower

          upon which to draw for recruits.  British recruiting officers often neglected to

          explain that enlistment was for life.  Garrison troops were much more likely to be

          kept beyond their terms of enlistment and pressured into agreeing to serving in the

          regular army than those troops assigned to combat duty.  The walls of a fortress

          kept the enemy out, but made the commander a dictator within, holding for him all

          those who entered its ramparts.  

               The governor of Massachusetts, Thomas Pownall, wrote to William Pitt

          in England, arguing against the deceitful and damaging practice of recruiting his

          citizens into the regular army.  He used language that he knew would appeal to an

          English gentlemen, arguing that recruitment had been among the sons of the best

          people of New England, when, in fact, he knew that to his own people these class

          distinctions meant little or nothing.  Pownall knew that the people of Massachusetts

          were far too democratic in spirit to care whether those impressed or enlisted under

          false pretenses or with less than full disclosure were themselves, or were the sons

          of, farmers, tradesmen, merchants or gentlemen.

          

          I beg leave, sir, to inform you that most of these soldiers in the ranks are freeholders, who

          pay taxes;  that these are the sons of some of our representatives, the sons of some of our

          militia colonels, and the sons of many of our field officers, and other officers now doing duty

          as privates in the number I have this year raised.  And that the sons of some of our principal

          merchants, who pays œ500 sterling per annum taxes, were impressed for the same.

          

          The real point Pownall was making was that his people believed that military

          service was to be undertaken only when there was a threat and the freemen could

          not long remain free if they allowed themselves to be enlisted into a system where

          even the most rudimentary freedoms were lost.  After a war Americans believed

          that the military should be disbanded, or at least reduced substantially, and

          volunteers and militia should return to their homes and to normalcy.  By reducing

          the military presence and dismissing most of the men, England would be

          guaranteed an effective fighting force should it be needed again.  By continuing to

          bind a free people to an archaic, draconian and authoritarian military system,

          England risked alienating those on whom it had depended in the past, on whom it

          must depend in the future for defense in North America.

               The American, and especially the New England, colonists had endured

          many infringements of their liberty by 1775.  As early as the 1760s the anonymous

          authors of the Journal of the Times, presumed to have been written in Boston,

          boasted that there were "30,000 men between Boston and New York ready to take

          up arms" in order to "throw off the dependance" upon Great Britain unless the

          mother country improved relations.  They disliked many of the English remedial

          remedies taken to insure continued hegemony over the colonies.  The English had

          interrupted shipping and required that the colonies trade only with the Mother

          Nation or her other colonies.  The Quebec Act, extending full religious toleration

          to the French-Canadians who were Roman Catholics, did not set well with the

          prejudiced colonial Protestants.  They did not like the Quartering Act which

          allowed for the billeting of the King's soldiers in any home or ship.  The Port Act

          had thrown hundreds of seamen and longshoremen out of employment.  General

          Gage's troops cut off the city's provisions by sea, but they arrived by land in a wide

          variety of carts, wagons, and other conveyances.

               Of the many acts Americans considered intolerable none was more odious

          than the Quartering Act. American intellectuals recalled Machiavelli's warning that

          standing armies in times of peace are most likely to get into mischief and to brawl

          with the civilian population.  A New England minister in 1768 had noted that

          "wherever troops are quartered, the civil authority should have a strict eye over

          them."  The Boston Evening Post and other newspapers of the 1760s and 1770s

          frequently reported that soldiers quartered had committed various atrocities against

          the population.  One great objection to quartering of troops in peacetime was that

          it violated the English Bill of Rights and was thus viewed as an "intolerable

          grievance" to freemen.

          

          One great objection to the quartering of troops in the body of a town is the danger the

          inhabitants will be in of having their morals debauched.  The ear being accustomed to oaths

          and imprecations, will be the less shocked at the profanity and the frequent spectacles of

          drunkenness, exhibited in our streets, greatly countenances this shameful and ruinous vice. 

          The officers of the army are not backward in resenting the smallest disrespect offered

          themselves by a soldier, and such offenses are severely punished, but it seems the name of

          God may be dishonored with horrid oaths and blasphemies. . . .

          

               Adding to the increasingly hostile atmosphere was the position and

          attitude of Governor Thomas Hutchinson (1711-1780).  He seemed bent on

          promoting confrontation by advocating and enforcing policies that seemed to have

          been designed expressly to alienate the people of Massachusetts Bay.  A fifth-

          generation descendant of Anne Hutchinson, Thomas was the son of a wealthy

          merchant who entered politics in 1737.  He represented Massachusetts at the

          Albany Conference, having served as a delegate in the General Court and as judge. 

          By 1756 he was considered the most able man in Governor William Shirley's

          administration.  In 1758 he became lieutenant-governor and in 1760 chief justice

          of the superior court.  He was a staunch conservative who opposed the growing

          sentiments for independence, such as opposition to the Writs of Assistance and the

          Stamp Act Congress.  When Governor Bernard returned to England in 1769,

          Hutchinson became acting governor, and, in 1771, governor.  He defended the

          absolute sovereignty of the British parliament over the colonies.  The fact that his

          family had long lived in the colony caused many to think him traitor to his own. 

          Benjamin Franklin caused some thirteen politically incriminating letters to made

          public.  Despite this embarrassment, and the formal request of the General Court

          that he resign and leave the colony, he remained in power through the Boston Tea

          Party.  The latter event was precipitated in some large measure because Hutchinson

          had insisted on collecting the hated tax on the East India Tea Company's popular

          product.  Finally, Thomas Gage assumed office on 1 June 1774 and Hutchinson left

          for England, never to return to America.  By this time, the stage for open rebellion

          and insurrection was well set.  Hutchinson's conservatism was well expressed after

          he settled in England in a rejoinder he wrote in response to the Declaration of

          Independence.

               Meanwhile, the French were enjoying the English discomfort.  Their

          observers and political analysis knew that the Americans were well prepared and

          well armed and were spoiling for a confrontation.  They seemed to have been

          amused at the naivety of the English who were ignoring the obvious signs warning

          that trouble lay ahead.  As early as 1774 the French newspapers observed that the

          militias of New England were prepared to repel force with force.  The French press

          reported that Massachusetts Bay could muster 119,600 militiamen "all of good will

          and prepared to act if they must."

               For its part the English press had little but disdain for their provincial

          cousins. The London Publick Advertiser of January 1775 had belittled the military

          prowess of the colonials.  No American force could begin to think realistically of

          challenging the British force, the finest standing army in the world.  Each

          disciplined British soldier was worth several of the backwoods militiamen.  There

          was no true standing army, but if one should be formed each trained English soldier

          would be worth at least two of their opponents.  The Advertiser's reporter declared,

          "The Americans, though in general of our stock, appear to me to have for the most

          part degenerated from the native valor as well as [the] robust make of the men in

          this country."

               By the spring of 1775 the city was like a tinder pile, ready to be set ablaze

          by a single incident.  Governor Gage had inherited a time-bomb from Governor

          Hutchinson and seemed to have no idea how to defuse it.  The citizens had been

          fired up by earlier confrontations such as the Boston Massacre and the Boston Tea

          Party.  The Sons of Liberty, the Committee of Correspondence and other patriotic

          propagandists were agitating among the population.  The city had split its loyalties

          between the growing cause for independence and the united empire loyalists. 

          Clashes between the growing the two native groups occurred daily.  Patriots had

          good intelligence.  Men like John Hancock, Francis Shaw and Paul Revere

          entertained the cream of the young and ambitious British officer corps, quietly, but

          efficiently, milking information on the number, arms, spirit and disposition of

          British troops.

               In addition to serving as Governor of Massachusetts, Thomas Gage

          (c.1719-1787) was supreme commander of the King's forces in America.  He had

          arrived initially in America to serve on Braddock's ill-fated expedition and

          afterwards fought successfully against the French.  In 1760 he had been appointed

          governor at Montreal, and in 1763 became supreme commander at New York.  His

          immediate charge in 1774 was to quiet agitation against various parts of the

          Intolerable Acts.  He had been provided with 4000 troops in Boston to keep the

          peace.  He pondered his alternatives.  Could he respond by using purely political

          means as governor or need he use the military force at his disposal as commander? 

          Should he remain in Boston holding city, or should he move his troops into the

          countryside, pacifying the entire state?  The decisions were difficult, but little

          might Gage have imagined how important these decisions would become.

               Meanwhile, the Massachusetts colonial militia, long fallen into disuse and

          disorganization, was revitalized, equipped and drilled.  The colonial militia

          marched and the English marines and regular army troops counter-marched.  Each

          observed the other.  While many senior British officers dismissed the rustic citizen-

          soldiers as suitable only to deal with the native aborigine, other officers saw a

          purpose in the militia training.  If nothing else the gatherings patriotism.  These

          factors proved to be far more important to the future of the nation than the actual

          military training and practice the meetings generated.

               The British officials had good intelligence.  There were more than

          enough Tory spies and other Loyalists to keep Gage and his staff informed of the

          events transpiring in the country.  The British could observe the development of

          things in Boston first hand.  When the British did nothing to prevent the citizen-

          soldiers from organizing these trained bands became ever more bold.  Their

          governing body, the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, met in Cambridge

          without British consent or legal authority.  The Congress empowered the

          Committee of Safety, headed by John Hancock, to call out the entire state militia

          if the events of the day required. Hancock divided the militia into the regular

          citizen-soldiers and the select group, the Minutemen, who were to respond to any

          emergency at a moment's notice.  Both militia groups were clearly extra-legal. 

          There was no threat from foreign enemy or Amerindians.  The reconstituted militia

          was wholly designed to counter English power.

               None of this had been lost on Gage or on most of his officers.  He opted

          to use some military measures against the colonists.  Gage knew what military

          measures were being taken in both the city and the surrounding countryside.  Some

          of the militia appropriated some of the colony's artillery.  The Congress voted to

          equip a militia of no less than 15,000 men.  A powder magazine and armory were

          set up in Concord.  The Congress appointed five generals -- Artemas Ward, Seth

          Pomeroy, John Thomas, William Heath and Jedediah Preble -- to head the trained

          bands.  Gage decided that things had gone too far.  The rebels must be disarmed. 

          There was no end to their potential for military power.

               The English colonial authorities considered taking away the colonials'

          arms, but rejected this idea because it was impossible to do.  On 15 December 1774

          Gage wrote to the Earl of Dartmouth, "Your Lordship's idea of disarming certain

          Provincials would doubtless be consistent with Providence and Safety; but it

          neither is, or has been, practicable without

          having recourse to force and being Master of the Colony."  In London, William

          Pitt, Earl of Chatham, on 20 February 1775, had moved that the House of Lords

          address the king, asking that the problems be resolved and a way found to establish

          the peace.  Pitt asked that the "fatal acts of the last session be repealed."  On 1

          February 1775 he had moved a provisional act for settling the disputes in America,

          but the bill was rejected.  Conflict seemed to be inevitable.

               In February 1775 Colonel Thomas Leslie led has 64th North Staffordshire

          regiment to seize the militia supplies.  Leslie had no thought of provoking war. 

          When the militia of the greater Salem are mustered and confronted the British

          troops, Leslie withdrew.  The supplies remained in colonial hands.  The Minutemen

          had achieved their purpose.  All knew that this was the first, unfinished chapter. 

          A more active commander or more aggressive troops or an accident might make the

          next encounter more memorable.

               The Committee of Safety in February 1775 ordered the commanders of the

          town militias to assemble one-quarter of their men and to occupy and hold a long

          list of vital points of communication and security.  On 28 June this list was

          expanded and the Committee created 23 militia companies of 50 men each to guard

          the seacoast and to watch for English naval activities.  By January 1776 the militia

          was ordered to form eight additional companies to guard coastal locations not

          covered by the first order.

               The militia supplies at Salem were moved to what the Committee of

          Safety thought were more secure quarters at Concord.  The Congress resolved that

          any time the British high command moved 500 or more of its troops out of Boston

          this act would be considered to be hostile to the colony.  The Congress authorized

          the Committee of Safety to act in defense of the colony and its citizens.  Force

          against a large troop deployment was automatically defined as a defensive act. 

          There was no authorization of offensive action.

               On 15 April 1775 General Gage acted.  He issued orders to his elite

          troops, men especially selected out of all regular army units under Gage's

          command.  They were to train for a search and destroy mission.  The command

          extended to over 700 select men.  The Committee of Safety and Massachusetts

          Congress watched and waited.  The British reported that on the eighteenth of April

          the following companies were committed to action: "the grenadiers of his army and

          the light infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith of the Tenth

          Regiment, and Major Pitcairn, of the Marines . . . and the next morning eight

          companies of the Fourth and the same number of the Twenty-third and Forty-ninth,

          and some marines, marched under the command of Lord Percy to support the other

          detachment."

               On the night of 18 April 1775 Paul Revere and William Dawson received

          word.  They must cross Boston harbor, past H. M. S. Somerset, and prepared to

          spread the alarm.  Revere, a Boston silversmith, had been responsible for the

          popular copperplate depicting the colonists' view of the Boston Massacre of 5

          March 1770.  He was a trusted courier for the Committee of Safety and had

          arranged to set in motion a warning system should the British authorities decide to

          move against the revolutionary leaders.  Dr. Joseph Warren, chair of the

          Massachusetts Committee of Safety, ordered Revere to issue the warning, saying

          that the British troops were preparing to march from Boston.  Using a small

          rowboat he had secreted, Revere avoided detection by British naval patrols.  He

          borrowed a horse in Charlestown and set out for Concord.  Initially blocked by

          British patrols along the Cambridge Road, Revere rode through Medford, arriving

          at about midnight at Lexington.  At the home owned by Reverend Jonas Clarke,

          Revere awakened John Hancock and Samuel Adams.  Warren had also sent

          William Dawes to Roxbury.  Joined by Dr Samuel Prescott of Concord, Revere and

          Dawes set out to spread the alarm along the whole line of communities in which

          Minutemen were awaiting news of British movements, especially those guarding

          the militia supplies at Concord.  Intercepted by a British patrol, Revere was

          captured, Dawes fled back toward Lexington, but Prescott escaped to carry the

          message to Lincoln and Concord.  Revere convinced his captors that the entire

          countryside was already alarmed and gathering under arms and they would be at

          great risk in holding him.  The British officer in charge released Revere who then

          returned to Lexington and there rescued vital papers that Hancock had left behind. 

          There he saw the first shots fired.

               Samuel Adams and John Hancock authorized the sounding of the general

          alarm.  For the next sixteen hours the militia responded.  Lexington awakened, the

          word spread toward Concord.  Through the night as the British column moved

          forward, news of their march was eliciting a colonial response.  The quick trip

          across the Charles River in boats was the easy part for the British troops.  They

          disembarked into knee deep cold water.  Then they assembled at arms for two

          hours.  They marched waist deep through the biting cold of a backwater.  As they

          marched northward they became aware that surprise was not their ally.  Church

          bells and other sounds of the night served notice that their mission was uncovered. 

          In command was Colonel Francis Smith of the Tenth Lincolnshires.  Second in

          command was Marine Major John Pitcairn. If not the senior commander at least his

          second inspired confidence.

               Daylight began to break as the column neared Lexington.  By now the

          horse hoof beats translated into silhouettes of horse and rider.  The sound of the

          ringing bells translated into armed men gathering informally into armed units.  "The

          country had been much alarmed," Gage reported, "By the firing of guns and ringing

          of bells."  He then dispatched two companies to secure two important bridges. 

          The semi-lit fields seemed to be filled with human beings headed toward their

          rendez-vous with destiny.  Pitcairn dispatched a messenger to Gage in Boston.  He

          told of the premature discovery of his mission and asked for additional troops.

               As the column entered Lexington they saw before them two companies of

          Minutemen.  Battle order was formed on the close end of the town green.  There

          was no surprise, only discomfort at the approaching moment of decision.  Captain

          John Parker of Lexington sized up the situation correctly.  The first confrontation

          would not be recorded in Lexington.  Gage later reported that his army "found a

          body of the country people drawn up under arms on a green close to the road; and

          upon the king's troops marching up to them, in order the enquire the reason of their

          being so assembled, they went off in great confusion."  Pitcairn wanted no battle

          for his part either.  But his orders were clear.  All militia under arms were to be

          detained and disarmed and/or taken into custody.  Pitcairn turned his column to cut

          off the retreat of the militia.  A shot rang out.  No one save the person who pulled

          the trigger will ever know who bears the responsibility for the start of the war. 

          Gage reported it was probably the Americans who fired first.  "Several guns were

          fired upon the kings' troops from behind a stone wall and also from the meeting

          house, and other houses, by which one man was wounded, and major Pitcairn's

          horse shot in two places."

               After the first anonymous shot the British line fired in volleys.  The troops

          broke rank and charged the militiamen.  Pitcairn struggled to restore order and stop

          the firing.  Eight Americans lay dead on the Lexington green.  There were no

          remarkable British casualties.  The column reformed and marched on toward

          Concord and the military supplies stored there.  Reuben Brown, saddler of

          Concord, had ridden to Lexington for news.  He returned to report to the colonials

          that the British had fired on the militia at Lexington.  The militia readied itself for

          the British troops.  The militia at Concord had received reinforcements.  The

          Lincoln militia had arrived and advance notice was received that yet other militia

          units were due to arrive momentarily.  The militia marched out to meet the British

          troops and escorted them into the village.  The citizen-soldiers occupied the high

          ground beyond their muster field.  The British began to ransack the town.  The

          militia from Acton, Carlisle and Chelmsford arrived, swelling the colonial ranks. 

          Captain Isaac Davis, the gunsmith, spotted smoke arising for the town and

          concluded that the British were burning the town.  He led his Acton militia in the

          charge and the battle was engaged.

               This time there was no doubt who fired first.  The British loosed volley

          after volley.  Davis had made his last gun, for he was probably the first to fall to the

          British troops at Concord.  The streets turned into slaughter pens.  The militia

          ignored military formation so familiar to the disciplined English troops.  They

          fanned out and fired not in volleys but on individual initiative at selected targets. 

          Their aimed precision drove the best of Gage's command back.  The lines broke

          and the English fled in disarray.  Back to Lexington they raced.

               The account of the action was published in a local newspaper and was

          widely reprinted for weeks after in nearly all the newspaper in other areas of the

          nation.  This American account claimed the British commander cried,

          

          "Disperse you Rebels -- Damn you! Throw down your Arms and dispense." Upon which the Troops

          huss'd, and immediately one or two Officers discharged their Pistols, which were instantaneously

          followed by the Firing of four or five of the Soldiers,then there seemed to be a general discharge

          from the whole Body.

          

          There are a number of extant depositions taken from Americans who witnessed the

          massacre.  They differ slightly in the report of the exact words spoken by the

          British commander, and whether it was the commander or his lieutenant who gave

          the order to fire.  For example, Elijah Sanderson claimed that he was present on

          Lexington common and he "heard one of the regulars say, 'damn them, we will

          have them' and immediately the regulars shouted aloud, ran and fired upon the

          Lexington company." Simon Winthrop "observed an officer at the head of the said

          troops, flourishing his sword, and with a loud voice, giving the word, 'fire -- fire'

          which was instantly followed by a discharge of arms." John parker, commander of

          the Lexington militia, claimed that "I immediately ordered our militia to disperse

          and not to fire."  The "regular troops were on the march from Boston, in order to

          take the province stores at Concord" and upon his order not to fire the British

          "troops made their appearance and rused furiously, fired upon and killed eight of

          our party."  A number of members of Parker's militia signed a common affidavit,

          which claimed that "about five o'clock in the morning, hearing our drum beat we

          proceeded toward the parade" grounds where they formed.  Seeing that "a large

          body troops were marching toward us" they heard orders from Parker to offer no

          resistance "At which time the company began to disperse.  Whilst our backs were

          turned on the troops, we were fired on by them, and a number of our men were

          instantly killed."  Levi Mead and Levi Harrington reported that "two of the regulars

          whom took to be officers, fired a pistol or two on the Lexington company, which

          was dispersing,  and they were immediately followed by several vollies from the

          regulars."

               William Draper reported that "the commanding officer, as I took him, gave

          the command to fire upon the said troops, 'fire, fire, fire' and immediately they fired

          before any of captain Parker's company fired." Thomas Fessenden gave this

          account.  "I saw three officers on horseback advance to the front of the said

          regulars, when one of them, being within six rods of the said militia, cried out,

          'disperse you rebels, immediately,' on which he brandished his sword over his head

          three times; meanwhile the second officer, who was about two rods behind him,

          fired a pistol, pointed at said militia, and the regulars kept huzzaing till he had

          finished brandishing his sword, and when he had thus finished brandishing his

          sword, he pointed it down toward the said militia, and immediately on which, the

          said regulars fired a volley at the militia." After the initial shots were fired "the said

          militia dispersed every way as fast as they could and while they were dispersing,

          the regulars kept firing at them incessantly."

               Meanwhile, several companies of British troops which had moved beyond

          the town returned.  They had seen and heard the battle at the bridge.  As they

          returned the militia covered them, but did not fire.  The citizen-soldiers seemed

          willing to avoid further hostilities if possible.  Colonel Smith assembled his

          Lincolnshire companies. They could see ever more militiamen arriving.  They

          seemed to be aware that news of the two bloody confrontations was spreading

          among the new arrivals.  As they finally left town at about high noon the British

          fired a parting volley at the militia.  This act of contempt was the immediate cause

          of the Battle of the Nineteenth of April 1775.

               The citizen-soldiers knew better than to attempt to fight the British

          regulars on their own terms.  They did not form a line of attack.  They hid behind

          rocks and trees, behind fences, wood piles and outbuildings.  They fired, retreated,

          reloaded and fired again.  Gage reported that "on the return of the troops from

          Concord, they were very much annoyed, and had several men killed and wounded,

          by rebels firing from behind walls, ditches, trees and other ambushes." The British

          troops that were put to flight by the citizen-soldiers of Massachusetts were quite

          probably the finest in the world.  But they had retreated.  Many threw away their

          weapons and back packs and ran.  As the harried British troops arrived back in

          Lexington, at the sight of the first blood, they were joined by some 2000 fresh

          troops under Lord Percy.  Percy had recruited three loyalist guides from Boston:

          Thomas Beaman of Petersham; Samuel Murray of Brookfield; and Edward

          Winslow, Jr., of Plymouth.  The early morning call for assistance had been

          answered.  But the calm was short lived.  Percy brought several small cannon and

          fired at the Americans with these.  Gage reported, "the rebels were for a while

          dispersed; but as soon as the troops resumed their march, they began to fire upon

          them again from behind stone walls and houses, and kept up in that manner a

          scattering fire during the whole of their march of 15 miles, by which means several

          were killed and wounded."  As the combined forces returned to Boston they found

          the citizen-soldiers were positioned along the road just as they had been with the

          smaller column.  They were bold in their harassment. Occasionally, the column

          stopped to fire back or to set up light artillery wherewith to sweep the colonial

          lines.  But the muskets were highly inaccurate at the distance between the column

          on the road and the colonials in their hiding places.  There were seldom enough

          men concentrated to justify the use of even the small artillery pieces in the British

          command.

               Although Gage had twice reported only that "several" men were killed or

          wounded, the British suffered 72 killed and many more wounded on that fateful

          day.  Gage even reported that "such was the cruelty and barbarity of the rebels that

          they scalped and cit off the ears of some of the wounded men."  Superior

          marksmanship and the use of rifles rather than the New England fowling pieces

          would have inflicted even more casualties.  These were not backwoodsmen or

          hunters whose lives depended upon proper and accurate use of their guns.  They

          were merchants, tradesmen, clergymen and farmers who had far less experience

          with aimed, precision firing than had their backwoods cousins.  Moreover, their

          fowling pieces were not rifled arms.  One American wrote to an English

          newspaper that "had the people had time to have alarmed the country, and to have

          collected their militia, it is probable that the retreat of the regulars would have been

          totally cut off."  Perhaps the most significant fact noted about this engagement

          was that the Massachusetts militia had turned out no less than 3763 Americans

          even though the patriots had received only a few hours' notice.

               A few days after the incidents, General Gage appeared before the

          Selectmen of Boston.  He reported that "there was a large body of men in arms"

          and that he was prepared to take whatever action was necessary to maintain might

          be injured in any resulting confrontation.  The patriots claimed that "20 or 30

          thousand men . . . surrounded Boston and shut in the British soldiers and cut off all

          supplies of fresh provisions."  Gage demanded that the inhabitants give up their

          arms and place them, with tags denoting individual ownership attached thereunto,

          in a public hall in Boston.  Later, "the arms aforesaid at a suitable time would be

          return'd to the owners."  The inhabitants did bring in 1778 firearms, 634 pistols,

          973 bayonets and 38 blunderbusses.

               Boston became an armed camp.  Patriots bragged that the "militia at

          present consists of 17 or 20 thousand men" all under "strict military discipline plus

          another "20 or 30 thousand farmers who hold themselves ready to march at a

          minute's warning."  In short, "all the yeomanry are under arms as a militia." 

          Reports of the militia spontaneously rising were received from as far away as

          Virginia.  There, reports of the events at Lexington and Concord had spurred the

          people into preparedness.

          

          We shall therefore in a few weeks have about 8000 volunteers (about 1500 of which are

          horse) all completely equipped at their own expence, and you may depend are as ready to

          face death in defence of their civil and religious liberty as any men under heaven.  These

          volunteers are but a small part of our militia; we have in the whole about 100,000 men.  The

          New England provinces have at this day 50,000 of as well trained soldiers as any in Europe,

          ready to take the field at a day's warning, it is as much as the more prudent and moderate

          among them can do, to prevent the more violent from crushing General Gage's little army. 

          But I still hope there is justice and humanity, wisdom and sound policy, sufficient in the

          British nation to prevent the fatal consequences that must inevitably follow the attempting

          to force by violence the tyrannical acts of which we complain.  It must involve you in utter

          ruin, and us in great calamities, which I pray heaven to avert, and that we may once more

          shake hands in cordial affection as we have hitherto done, and as brethren ought ever to do.

          . . . Messrs. Hancock and Adams passed through this city a few days ago . . . about 1000 of

          our inhabitants went out to meet them, under arms . . . . By last accounts from Boston, there

          were before the town 15,000 or 20,000 brave fellows to defend their country, in high spirits

          . . . . Should the King's troops attack, the inhabitants will be joined with 70,000 or 80,000

          men at very short notice. . . .

          

               The English press at first discounted the possibility of real and open

          rebellion, preferring to think that the skirmishes were acts of isolated insolence. 

          By mid-July the English press was reporting that "the Town of Boston was

          surrounded by a large body of Rebel Provincials and that all communication with

          the Country was cut off."  An American correspondent of a London newspaper

          reported that all New England was an armed camp.

          

          Several companies of New England men are actually arrived in this town [New York].  I

          conversed with one of them, who told me he had left his farm to come to our assistance;  and

          one of their Captains assured our people, that if they wanted men, they could furnish us with

          ten thousand in three days time.  They exercise to admiration:  it is true they have not that

          sprightly and foppish appearance of regular forces when nicely powdered; however, they are

          hardy, can endure fatigue, and have made themselves masters of the essential parts of

          military skill.  Four New England governments have two hundred thousand of these soldiers

          in arms;  they are a sober, good kind of people, strong pedestrians, and think it a part of their

          religious duty to defend their charters . . . .

          

               Things in Boston after the conflict at Concord went from bad to worse. 

          Gage accused some Bostonians of being incendiaries and ordered that "all Persons.

          . . should immediately lay down their arms" and desist from "burning houses."  In

          Charles Town some 350 houses burned in one night.  Gage let it be known that the

          king was still willing to pardon all rebels except John Adams and John Hancock. 

          On 17 May a fire broke out and "it was the officers order not to call fire, one

          having threatened to beat out a man's brains that did."  A letter from Charles

          Town dated 19 May 1775 noted that Gage "agreed, on delivering up their arms,

          they should come out with their effects."  Unfortunately for the colonists, "it is

          complied with on their part;  on his there is a shocking failure."  The British

          marines had little respect for the militiamen whom they had easily dispersed. 

          British troops broke into John Hancock's house and "plundered" his possessions

          and  also the same night began to "pillage and break down" the fences of other

          homes.  Meanwhile, "the first Embarkation of Troops from Ireland, consisting

          of three Regiments of Infantry and one of Light Cavalry, was arrived at Boston"

          and would quickly disperse the rebels.

               Colonel Joseph Palmer of Braintree, a member of the Committee of

          Safety, grasped the meaning and importance of the events that had transpired.  His

          dispatched a veteran post rider, Israel Bissel to outlying areas even to Connecticut

          to inform them of the confrontation. Bissel understood all too well the importance

          of the information he carried.  He did not stop after riding to Connecticut.  He

          spread the word south to New York, into New Jersey and on to Philadelphia. 

          Within ten days virtually all the inhabitants of the middle and upper souther

          colonies knew what had happened in Massachusetts.  Virginia received the news

          with great interest.  Lord Dunmore had attempted to seize militia supplies in that

          colony. n Colonel George Washington had dispersed the militia rather than

          confront the British troops and start the war of rebellion in Virginia.  Now that the

          first shot had been fired Virginia prepared to defend its right to keep and bear arms.

               The Massachusetts Provincial Congress had its version of the story of the

          events at Lexington and Concord.  "Hostilities are at length commenced in this

          colony by the troops under the command of General Gage," the assembly reported,

          "and it being of the greatest importance that an early, true and authentic account"

          be made available, the legislative body published the following.

               

          [A] body of the king's troops . . . were secretly landed at Cambridge, with an apparent design to take

          or destroy the military and other stores, provided for this colony, and deposited at Concord -- that

          some inhabitants of the colony... travelling peacefully on the road... were seized and greately abused

          by armed men...that the regular troops on their way to Concord, marched into the said town of

          Lexington, and the said [militia] company, on their approach, began to disperse -- that,

          notwithstanding this, the regulars rushed on with great violence and first began hostilities, by firing

          on said Lexington company, whereby they killed eight, and wounded several others -- that the

          regulars continued their fire, until those of the said company, who were neither killed or wounded

          had made their escape -- that ... the detachment then marched to Concord, where a number of

          provincials were again fired on by the troops, two of them killed and several wounded, before the

          provincials fired on them.... To give a particular account of the ravages of the troops, as they

          retreated from Concord to Charlestown, would be difficult ....

          

               On 21 April 1775 the Committee of Safety voted to raise 8000 volunteers

          from among the militia to serve for seven months.  Two days later the Provincial

          Congress increased the authorization to include 13,600 men.  Ultimately, the

          colony decided that a force of 30,000 men, including all active forces and reserve

          militia.  The militia was divided into three classes: the Minutemen, who were to

          respond immediately to any threat from British or Amerindian threats; the regular

          militia, who acted as back-up forces and a reserve from which to draw volunteers,

          and, later on, as a reservoir for the state drafts; and the invalid corps of those who,

          through injury, infirmity or age, could not serve in ordinary circumstances, but

          which constituted a final line of defense.  Massachusetts actually raised 17,000

          men in 1775.  The Committee of Safety chose the principal officers and the men

          elected their officers inferior to full colonel.  In May 1775 the Committee ordered

          2000 volunteers to report to Boston to assist in lifting the siege, and it ordered the

          towns to muster and hold in indefinite reserve one-half of the active militia.  The

          Committee was not prepared to feed, clothe, house and otherwise provide for a

          greater number in and around Boston, but wished to have a larger force available

          immediately in case of major military action with the British.  The force sent to

          Boston, along with militia, volunteers and others from Connecticut, New

          Hampshire and Rhode Island fought the Battle of Bunker Hill on 17 June 1775.

               One of the earliest clashes between Massachusetts militia nd British forces

          occurred immediately after the British march on Lexington and Concord, just off

          a neck of land near Boston Harbor.  A band of militia, calling themselves "true

          sons of liberty," challenged the seamen aboard the Lively Frigate on 20 April at

          about five o'clock in the morning.  Both sides exchanged shots from both muskets

          and small swivel guns loaded with grape shot.  A British sailor on the ship

          reported, "The Americans had 25 killed and 30 wounded, whom they left on

          shore."  American fire "killed two and wounded many more."  After exchanging

          fire for about an hour, "we sailed for Boston with colours flying."

          

               Leaving no doubt as to the cause of the conflict between the colonies and

          the mother nation, on 6 July 1775, representatives from Massachusetts introduced

          to the Continental Congress a document drafted by Thomas Jefferson and John

          Dickinson, the "Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms."  The

          document described how General Gage's troops disarmed the compliant citizen-

          soldiers of Boston.

          

          The inhabitants of Boston being confined within that town by the general their governor, and

          having, in order to procure their dismission, entered into a treaty with him, it was stipulated

          that the said inhabitants having deposited their arms with their own magistrates, should have

          liberty depart, taking with them their other effects.  They accordingly delivered up their

          arms, but in open violation of honour, in defiance of the obligation of treaties, which even

          savage nations esteemed sacred, the governor ordered the arms deposited as aforesaid, that

          they might be preserved for their owners, to be seized by a body of soldiers; detained the

          greatest part of the inhabitants of the town, and compelled the few who were permitted to

          retire, to leave their most valuable effects behind.  By this perfidy wives are separated from

          their husbands, children from their parents, and the aged and sick from their relations and

          friends, who wish to attend and comfort them, and those who have been used to live in

          plenty and even elegance, are reduced to deplorable distress.

          

               The French press reacted with delight upon receiving the news of the com-

          

          mencement of hostilities in Massachusetts Bay.  It referred to the English as

          "tyrants" and expressed pleasure that the conflict had turned bloody. They report-

          

          ed that the militia "breathed the same courage, the same desire of defending their

          rights and their liberties... to the last individual."  The Press reported that women

          were joining the militia.  It reported a company of "Amazons" who had "taken up

          arms to second their husbands in defense of their rights."  And it relayed tales of

          citizen-soldiers performing impossible feats, such as militiamen firing, reloading

          and firing at a rate of eleven shots per minute.  The French perceived our militia

          as invincible.

               There was no patriot standing army in Massachusetts when the Revolution

          began.  All able-bodied men were more or less enrolled in militia companies, about

          thirty in all, with companies ranging in size from between 200 to 700 men each. 

          The militiamen were divided into two classes.  The active list encompassed all

          able-bodied males between ages sixteen and fifty.  There were many exemptions

          from this enrollment on this list, including religious leaders and conscientious

          objectors, civil officers and others engaged in vital occupations, such as arms

          makers and ferry operators.  This list was supplemented by the alarm list which

          included all males between sixteen and sixty-five not enrolled on the active list. 

          There were few exemptions from this list for it was to be used only in cases of

          extreme emergency at such time as all available men who could fight had to be

          mustered.  This list was of significance when an enemy attacked during a period

          when most, if not all, regular militiamen were absent from town.  The active list

          mustered eight times a year for training lasting from three to seven days at each

          muster, and the alarm list was supposed to muster twice a year, although it

          complied with the law so only on rare occasion.  General officers of each list were

          appointed by civil authorities, but the non-commissioned officers and officers

          inferior to full colonel were elected as had been traditional.  The musters rarely

          produced much real military training in the sense of a European army of the time.

               Each man was theoretically responsible for providing his own arms,

          ammunition, accoutrements and equipment.  The selectmen of the community were

          supposed to make provision for arming the poor, but did so only occasionally. 

          There was no uniformity of bore or caliber of the arms, so providing standard

          ammunition was essentially impossible.  The most that could be done was to

          provide bar lead from which the men cast their own bullets and kegs of gunpowder

          from which men made cartridges or filled their powder horns.  There were no

          uniforms, with most militiamen wearing much the same clothing that they wore at

          home.

               During the early years of the Revolution, the army was largely drawn from

          volunteers among the active list.  The active list militiamen often fought as units

          in the first months of the Revolution, and intermittently thereafter.  As the war

          dragged on, volunteers, and even impressments through state drafts, drew almost

          equally on the two lists.  By 1780 the distinction between the lists had been lost and

          hence the practice of keeping the lists separate was discontinued.  Colonels of the

          militia, often referred to as county lieutenants, enjoyed considerable latitude in

          drafting men for service in the Continental Line, or assigning men to various other

          duties.  The principal limitation on military commanders was demographic.  State

          law in Massachusetts, as in most New England states, required that levees be

          assigned according to the population of the various towns and districts.

               Following the orders of Congress, in the fall of 1775, the legislature of

          Massachusetts enacted a new militia law.  The colony was ordered to provide each

          inhabitant with a good musket.  Public officers were to arrange to collect arms from

          private holders and to distribute these to such of the militia men who had none of

          their own.  Those militia men who brought their own arms were to receive a bounty

          of ten shillings.

               On 16 January 1776 the Massachusetts General Council ordered men

          between the ages 16 and 50 years of age be enrolled in the militia, provide their

          own weapons under penalty of law, elect their own officers and muster and train

          several times a year.  It also resolved that "free Negroes who have served

          faithfully in the Army at Cambridge may be reenlisted therein, but no others."

               Black militiamen presented a problem for the Massachusetts militia. 

          Initially, the colony had enlisted free blacks, which effectively meant any person

          of color since only a very few slaves were maintained there.  In 1775 General

          George Washington expressed his preference that no "stroller, Negro or vagabond"

          be enlisted.  On 20 May 1775 the Massachusetts Council of Safety "resolved that

          ... no slaves shall be admitted into this army upon any consideration" and refused

          free blacks on the ground their admission would be "inconsistent with the

          procedures that are to be supported" meaning that they would "reflect dishonor on

          this colony." By  the summer 1777 several legislatures in New England began to

          have second thoughts about cutting off a prime source of strong manpower. 

          Recruits were had to find, so they offered cash bounties to free Afro-Americans

          and offered freedom to slaves who enlisted and served for their full terms.  Urged

          on by Alexander Hamilton, who favored racially integrated militias, the states

          found a useful reservoir of manpower within the black community.

               The Battle of Bunker Hill followed the British occupation of Boston. 

          During May 1775 both the Americans and the British had built up their strength

          around Boston.  Three British general arrived to assist Gage, Sir William Howe

          (1729-1814), Sir Henry Clinton (1738-1795), and John Burgoyne (1722-1792). 

          Howe, the illegitimate son of King George I, had a brilliant early military career. 

          He led the special battalion in the successful assault on Quebec in 1759.  Returning

          to England, he stood for a seat in the House of Commons, winning in 1758.  He

          had opposed British coercive policies against the colonies.  He fought at the Battle

          of Bunker Hill and almost immediately thereafter replaced General Thomas Gage,

          who was recalled to England, as the supreme British commander in America. 

          Although he consistently defeated George Washington, his failures to follow up

          after victories combined with his failure to support Burgoyne led to rumors that he

          secretly supported the rebel cause.

               Sir Henry Clinton was the son of the governor of New York, so his

          military career had begun as a member of the New York militia.  He served during

          the Seven Years War in Germany, rising to the rank of major-general by 1772.  He

          served at the Battle of Bunker Hill and was knighted and promoted to lieutenant-

          general for his action during the Battle of Long Island in 1776.  When William

          Howe resigned his command in 1778 Clinton was appointed to serve as supreme

          British commander in America.  He decided to try to win in the South and so

          shifted the major theater of operations to Charleston, South Carolina.  Clinton

          resigned in 1781 after a long standing quarrel with General Charles Cornwallis,

          which some historians believe contributed to the latter's loss at Yorktown.

               Commonly known as "Gentleman Johnny," Burgoyne was a politician and

          playwright as well as military leader of promise who had first distinguished himself

          in campaigns in Portugal in 1762.  He served in the House of Commons between

          1763 and 1775.  He accepted a commission in 1776, serving as a lieutenant-

          general.  After his defeat at Saratoga he returned to England in disgrace and

          resigned his commission.  He served briefly, 1782-83, as commander-in-chief in

          Ireland.  Thereafter he occupied his time writing.

               On 12 June Gage offered amnesty to all rebels except Samuel Adams and

          John Hancock, placed the city under martial law and declared all rebels under arms

          to be traitors.  Learning that Gage planned to fortify Dorchester Heights, the

          Massachusetts Council of War ordered the militia to build fortifications on Bunker

          Hill, later changed to Breed's Hill, overlooking Boston Harbor from Charlestown

          peninsula.  On 17 June Gage discovered the Americans and ordered his ships in the

          harbor to begin to shell their position.  After the tide was correct for landing, Gage

          ordered his troops to disembark and commerce a frontal assault on the American

          position.  The official American version of the battle described the way the patriots

          waited on the British troops before firing. "The provincials within their entrench-

          

          ments impatiently waited the attack of the enemy and reserved their fire till they

          came within 10 or 12 rods, and then began a furious discharge of small arms."  The

          militia repeated this tactic during the second and third British charge.  General

          Howe moved 2400 troops into the battle, but withering fire from the militia twice

          drove them back.  Reinforced by Clinton, Howe ordered a bayonet charge which

          routed the militia commanded by Colonel William Prescott and Dr. Joseph Warren.

          Warren was killed as were 100 other Americans, with 276 wounded and 30 taken

          prisoner.  British losses were staggering, with 1054 report casualties, or 42% of the

          British troops engaged.  Moreover, American marksmen concentrated their fire on

          the officer corps and a large proportion of those killed were commissioned

          officers.  The British stopped at the end of peninsula and several days later

          General George Washington arrived to take supreme command.

               The armed force of the state, and of the nation, at this point consisted

          solely of volunteers drawn from the militia; and of the militia, in various sub-

          divisions.  The volunteers were treated in exactly the same way as the militia,

          receiving only basic subsistence pay.  The men provided their own weapons,

          clothing, accoutrements and supplies.  Massachusetts allowed the men $4 each for

          overcoats during the winter of 1775-76.  There was not as yet any realization

          among the men that a prolonged struggle lay before them.  As at the beginning of

          any way, men were overcome by sentiments of patriotism and spurred to action by

          propaganda efforts, such as Thomas Paine's The Crisis and the Declaration of

          Independence.

               On 21 January 1776 the state legislature authorized the recruitment of 728

          volunteers, to be drawn primarily from the militias of Hampshire and Berkshire

          counties, to serve in Canada.  The militia was clearly not authorized to march

          beyond the border of the new nation.  There were some questions about the

          deployment of militia in other states, although mutual aid pacts and traditional

          understandings seemed to grant full authorization for deployment of Massachusetts

          militia within the rest of the New England states.  Deployment of the militia in New

          York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania or elsewhere was of questionable legality.  But

          there was no question that volunteers would have to be drawn for any service

          outside the United Colonies, just as volunteers had been drawn for British service

          against the French over the previous century.  The militia was the principal, but not

          sole, source of volunteers.  The legislature offered a bounty of 40 shillings to each

          volunteer.  Service and payments were authorized for one year's service, 21 January

          1776 through 1 January 1777.

               Early in 1776 the Massachusetts legislature enacted a new militia law,

          thereby repealing all previous acts.  Appointment of general and field officers

          became the provenance of the state legislature.  The militia encompassed all males. 

          It was divided into two classes, the active and the alarm lists.  The alarm list was

          comprised of those who would serve as minutemen, ready and able to go into

          action immediately upon notice of an emergency.  Regardless of class, each man

          was required to provide himself, at his own expense, with a suitable firearm;

          priming wire and brush; bayonet, sword, hatchet or tomahawk; knife; tow for

          wadding; canteen; knapsack; blanket; and ammunition.  Theoretically, a man could

          plead extreme poverty and expect to have the selectmen of the town provide him

          with such equipment as he could not afford.  In practice, guns were so scarce that

          many militiamen, even among those who could afford them, were unable to procure

          any firearms.  The local committees of safety first confiscated arms from non-

          associators, which meant from those who refused to sign the new oath of loyalty

          to the United States.  The committees also sought to purchase local citizenry any

          superfluous arms; and to contract with various tradesmen to manufacture arms.

          

               In early June 1776 the Continental Congress ordered Massachusetts to

          supply 3000 militia to reinforce the continental army then in Canada.  Soon after,

          the Congress requested 2000 additional militia to march to New York to the relief

          of the inhabitants there.

               In November 1776 the legislature added to the militia law certain

          provisions.  Patriotism and nationalistic sentiments may have attracted militiamen

          initially, but the realities of war soon diminished the enthusiasm of all but the most

          hardy and ardent patriots.  A draft became the inevitable alternative.  One-quarter

          of all militiamen were to be designated as potential draftees.  Those designated

          might be selected by lot or marked as prospective draftees at the time of their

          enlistment.  In any event, those drafted could be called up at any time to serve three

          months with the Continental Line.  Short enlistment periods constantly hampered

          the efforts of the regular officers.  Those who failed to report for militia duty and

          musters were subject to moderate fines.  Those who had been designated for the

          draft, and who failed to report within twenty-four hours of notice, could be fined

          œ10  If he failed to report at the time his unit marched off to war he could be fined

          œ12.  During his actual service a private was paid œ4 per month, with non-

          commissioned officers paid slightly more.  Chronic offenders, and those unable to

          pay militia fines, could be jailed.  Deserters could be court-martialed and even

          executed upon conviction.

               On 20 January 1776 the legislature authorized the enlistment of 4368 men

          to serve with the Continental Line until 1 April 1776 at the pay of œ3 per month. 

          Each town was assigned a quota, to be filled by volunteer militiamen, if possible,

          and by draft if necessary.  In June the legislature authorized the enlistment of

          5000 men for the Line from among both the active and the alarm militia lists.  Of

          these 5000 men, 3000 were to be sent to Canada.  To attempt to avoid drafting men

          to serve outside the United Colonies, a bounty of œ7 was offered to volunteers. 

          The remaining 2000 men called up were to serve in New York, and to volunteers

          a bounty of œ3 was offered.  In both cases, men who provided their own weapons

          were to be allowed six shillings and twelve shillings for a blanket and supplies. 

          Filling the quota for the Canadian expedition proved to be most difficult so on 12

          July the legislature authorized a draft, the first state draft to be used to recruit men

          to fight on foreign soil.  If a man was drafted and refused to march, or to furnish

          a substitute, he was to be fined œ3, with provision made for additional œ3 fines.

               On 9 July 1776 the legislature authorized two additional regiments for

          service in Canada.  The legislature, noting the previous failure to attract volunteers,

          immediately moved to a draft, and authorized militia officers to choose every

          twenty-fifth man from both the regular and alarm militia lists,  and notify them of

          their obligation to serve on the Canadian expedition. Men drafted were to serve

          until 1 December 1776.  In September the legislature ordered that one-fifth of the

          militia list, regular and alarm, were to be drafted for serve in New York and New

          Jersey.  This time service was to be "until recalled."  Those who failed to report

          were to be fined œ10 and those who failed to march, or to furnish a substitute, were

          to be fined an additional œ10 and jailed.  Additional calls for drafts from the

          militia were made on 30 November, for 90 day service in New York.

               As the ranks of the militia were depleted by the several drafts, so the local

          responsibilities were increased.  The militia had sole responsibility for the seacoast

          watch, for garrisoning various forts and fortified points against both the

          Amerindians and British forces and protecting vital military stores and

          manufactories engaged in the production of materials badly needed for the conduct

          of the war.  The Committee of Safety estimated that these responsibilities required

          the active services of between 3500 and 4000 militiamen.  And, in case of real

          attack, more militiamen would be required to fight.  Some militia were actually

          enlisted, usually for periods of from 30 to 90 days, to serve at various garrisons and

          fortresses.  Throughout the war the legislature continually resorted to the draft to

          fill these positions, and, on the average, 3500 militiamen were on active local

          duty.

               In September 1776 the Continental Congress voted to raise 88 battalions

          of 726 men each, to constitute a regular army.  Enlistments were for the "duration

          of the war," although it later modified that service, reducing enlistments to three

          years.  Massachusetts was assigned fifteen, later raised to eighteen, regiments. 

          Once again the militia, in both forms, became the source of voluntary recruitment,

          supplemented quickly by a draft.  Since states were required to clothe and equip

          their own quotas, Massachusetts had the right to pick its own uniforms. 

          Massachusetts provided each soldier with two linen hunting shirts, two pairs of

          pants, a waistcoat made of wool or leather with long sleeves, one pair of breeches, 

          hat of wool or leather, two additional shirts, two pairs of stockings and two pairs

          or shoes or boots.  The state legislature placed a cost of $20 per man of this

          clothing allowance.  It also provide the following arms:  a musket with ramrod

          and bayonet, a worm and priming brush, bayonet scabbard and belt, sword or

          tomahawk, cartridge bag or box sufficient to hold 15 rounds of ammunition, 100

          swan [or buck] shot, jack-knife, one pound of powder, lead sufficient to make 40

          bullets, knapsack, canteen and one blanket.  This was substantially the same

          equipment required of militiamen under the state Militia Act of 1776.  In practice,

          most men brought their own arms and accoutrements, and the state made allowance

          for such equipment.  Men were allowed one penny per mile for travel to the point

          of rendez-vous, and 20 shillings per month pay for a private.

               Massachusetts had an enormously difficult time in filling its initial quota

          of fifteen regiments, and never did fill the later quota of eighteen regiments.  In

          January 1777 the Committee of Safety and legislature concurred that there was a

          great need to muster all militiamen so that conscripts to fill the national quota could

          be located.  Thus, the legislature ordered that each county lieutenant or colonel

          muster his militia company and hold them until the quota was filled.  It began by

          offering an enlistment bounty of œ20.  Finally, the officers were told to draft

          every seventh man to fill the regiments.  General Washington asked the state to

          recruit and equip a battalion of artillery.  In March 1777 the legislature offered a

          bounty of œ20 to each recruit for artillery service, although the bounty was reduced

          to œ15/10/0 for those who did not have their own small arms and accoutrements. 

          When the ranks had not been filled by 15 May the legislature authorized the militia

          officers were to draft enough men to fill the artillery battalion, with service to be

          only until 10 January 1778.  Those failing or refusing to report, or to furnish a

          substitute, were subjected the rather standard fine of œ10, which penalty was

          increased to one year in jail if the miscreant totally disobeyed the law.  This time,

          the legislature added an additional penalty, a fine of œ10, to be levied against the

          officers and selectmen who failed or refused to follow the law to the letter.  Even

          the handicapped and disabled were required, under the same penalties, to provide

          a substitute.

               By August, the state was still having problems keeping the ranks of the

          Continental Line filled, so it again called up the militia and increased penalties

          from œ10 to œ15.  General officers, especially those hold the rank of general, were

          to be dismissed if they failed fill their quotas from among the militia and

          volunteers.  Towns, through their local committees of safety and selectmen, which

          failed to recruit their full quotas from among the local militia were subject to

          individual fines of from œ4 to œ6 per deficiency per month.  On 17 April 1778 the

          legislature, having reached the end of its patience, and under considerable pressure

          from Congress, ordered that towns which had not filled their quotas were be fined

          œ150 for each man they were short on the date of accounting, set as 20 May 1778. 

          Failures of men to report or provide substitutes were increased on 20 April 1778

          to œ20.  On the same day, fines to be levied against militia officers and town

          selectmen were also increased to œ10 per month for each deficiency.  Some of the

          fines were returned to the towns by offering them bonuses of œ30 for each new

          man recruited by 20 May 1778.  As the quotas were filled, the legislature

          discovered that the drafting of one man out of each seven militiamen was

          insufficient to raise the numbers needed to fill fifteen regiments.  Fifteen hundred

          additional men were required, so the bounty for volunteers was raised to $300, so

          as relieve some pressure on the hard-pressed towns and local militia units.

               By 9 June 1778 the legislature found it necessary to raise 2000 additional

          men.  To make the enlistment more attractive, the legislature voted to allow

          conscripts to serve for only nine months instead of the three years that Congress

          had mandated.  Recruiting officers were given a $10 bonus for each new recruit

          they signed.  To sweeten the offer of $300 bounty the state offered 100 acres of

          land.  By volunteers were increasingly difficult to locate, so the draft was re-

          imposed.  Men who were, by handicap, age or infirmity, unable to serve had to find

          substitutes within 24 hours or be assessed a fine of œ45, and inability to pay might

          bring legal action against one's property, goods or estate.  Towns which failed to

          fill their quotas could be assessed a one-time fine of œ20 plus œ15 per month for

          each deficiency.  Conversely, towns were allowed a bonus of œ120 for each new

          recruit.  If the quotas remained unfilled on 1 August 1778, towns could be fined

          œ350 for each deficiency.

               On 5 June 1780 the legislature called for 3934 men to serve in the

          continental line for the term of six months.  Any man drafted who refused to report,

          or who was unfit for duty, had to either furnish a substitute or be subject to a fine

          of œ150 and possible imprisonment.  Pay was 40 shillings a month.  It now was

          payable in silver or gold as an added inducement to join the army for few men were

          willing to accept the virtually worthless script.  Subordinate officers who failed to

          fill their quotas could be fined up to œ100 and commanding officers could be

          dismissed for similar failings.

               By December 1780 the terms of enlistment of those volunteers and

          draftees from the militia who had been signed in 1776 and 1777 were expiring and

          additional men were needed to fill the Massachusetts quota.  Additionally,

          desertions, casualties, sickness, injuries and other factors had severely reduced the

          number of active soldiers.  The legislature assigned a state-wide quota of 4240

          men, apportioned according to population to the local towns and cities.  Under

          the Act of 2 December 1780, towns were ordered to divide all inhabitants into

          as many groups as they were short in their quotas, with each group to choose one

          of its number in any way they chose.  If a group failed to produce a man who was

          acceptable by 31 January 1781, then the town had to hire a man irrespective of cost

          or inconvenience.  Local authorities and town councils were again threatened with

          fines for failures to fill the ranks.  The legislature gave the towns until 31 January

          1781 to find the necessary conscripts so again the militia companies were ordered

          out and a draft imposed.  

               By law of 26 February 1781 towns were ordered to form their militiamen

          into as many groups as they were deficient in their quotas for the continental line. 

          Each group was responsible for providing on recruit for the army.  In cases where

          the groups of the town militias failed to produce the required recruits, fines were

          levied and recruitment numbers were increased.  This draft was followed by a

          second draft from the militia completed on 30 June 1781.  Towns deficient in

          filling their quotas by the end of October 1781 were assessed œ128/9/6 for each

          delinquency.  In March 1782 the state was still deficient by 1500 men, and the

          legislature imposed larger quotas on the town militia companies.  

               Fines, imposed costs, penalties, bonuses, threats and appeals to patriotism

          had all failed miserably to fill the state's quota of soldiers.  At the end of the

          Revolution, Massachusetts reported that it had 4370 active soldiers in national ser-

          

          vice whereas the state's quota on that date had been 8350 men in continental

          service.  In 1790 Secretary of War Knox reported to Congress that, although

          Massachusetts and New Hampshire had been assigned a quota of 88 battalions,

          Massachusetts had never supplied more than 7816 men at a time, that being in

          1777.  According to General Knox by war's end, Massachusetts had only 3730 men

          in continental service, or about 600 fewer than the state had previously claimed.

               The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided that "The People have

          a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence."  The purpose of this

          provision was clear enough.  The state was going to take the legal step to guarantee

          to the people the right whose violation had sparked the beginning of the

          Revolution.  The right was an individual guarantee which benefitted the people,

          but, as it had been in medieval Europe, the right to bear arms also benefitted

          government as much as, if not more than, the citizenry.  Not only had the militia

          been a source of trained manpower for continental line, it had functions of its own

          to serve, duties which were at the very heart of the rationale of the creation and

          maintenance of the militia.

               In 1777 as the British force of 10,000 veterans and mercenaries under

          General John Burgoyne prepared to cut the new nation in half with his march from

          Canada south through New York, there was general alarm sounded throughout

          New England.  The political authorities of the various New England states

          concluded that this was to be the year that the British would make their major

          moves.  They now had mustered a powerful land force, with regular British troops

          having been supplemented by Hessian mercenaries.  it was uncertain on how many

          fronts other than New York they might move against.  In January 1777 the

          Massachusetts legislature created a select militia unit of 2000 militiamen to serve

          in any of the states of New England until 21 April.  In April the Committee of

          Safety dispatched two companies of militia to march to Rhode Island.  On the

          one hand, the legislature supported the effort by offering a bounty of 20 shillings

          a month greater bounty than was offered for continental service for marching with

          the militia; and on the other hand, it provided severe penalties for failing to report

          as directed.  Reports of threatened British and Tory action brought an emergency

          call, so the militia of the nearest Massachusetts county, Bristol, were ordered to

          muster and march as soon as possible to Rhode Island until the militiamen ordered

          out earlier arrived.  On 30 April the Committee of safety, with legislative

          authorization, dispatched 1500 men to Fort Ticonderoga, to counter any move

          Burgoyne's force might make in that direction.  The militia units were to serve at

          the fort for two months.

               In May 1777 the legislature authorized the deployment of two regiments

          of militia at Boston for one year.  There was the possibility that these and other

          militia might have to be deployed elsewhere in New England.  The militia

          resisted, having had its ranks diminished by the drafts to fill the continental line. 

          The legislature countered by offering a $10 bonus to all militiamen who would

          volunteer for state service before 10 June for the one year term of service.  By that

          date the two regiments, consisting of 1500 militiamen departed for service, which,

          as it turned out, was to be in Rhode Island.  The militiamen were most unhappy

          at being ordered to serve so far away from their own homes, and in another state. 

          The legislature quickly rescinded the previous order and asked that volunteers be

          drawn from the two militia regiments to serve "in New England" for a term of two

          months.  On 27 June it changed the term of enlistment from two to six months. 

          The ranks were apparently filled and these militiamen served their full term in

          Rhode Island.

               In July 1777 the officers in charge of the militias of Hampshire and

          Berkshire Counties, Massachusetts, received orders to muster "all available men"

          and march to Fort Edward, there to reenforce the northern continental army.  On

          6 August the legislature sent 2000 militiamen to again reenforce the northern army,

          but this act was suspended when one-sixth of the militia of seven Massachusetts

          counties was drafted, to serve until 1 December 1777.  The militia called into this

          service were to be paid œ2/10/0 per month.

               In September 1777 the legislature ordered that 3000 militia were to be

          called out immediately for "secret service."  In December 1777, the legislature

          ordered one-half of the militia units of the counties of Middlesex, Worcester,

          Hampshire and Berskire, and part of the militia of Essex County, to "join the army"

          for a one month tour of duty.  The militia soon discovered that the primary reason

          this order had been issued was to draw out the militia and, from it, to recruit

          volunteers for the continental line.  The legislature had authorized payment of a

          bonus to volunteers of œ12/20/0 above the pay offered by the line.

               Burgoyne's once fine army surrendered on 17 October 1777, by the

          Convention of Saratoga.  By terms of the agreement, the vast majority of the 5700

          prisoners of war were to be taken to Boston, and from there, sent to England, with

          the proviso that they would not serve again in the war.  Responsibility to the care

          of the P.O.W.'s fell in large on the Massachusetts militia.  Many townspeople were

          afraid that the prisoners might escape and wreak havoc; and other patriots would

          have assaulted, possibly murdered, them, on account of real or imagined extra-legal

          injuries caused by British or Tory forces.  The legislature and Committee of Safety

          authorized the muster of 1000 Massachusetts militia to guard them.  In January

          1778 the legislature drafted 800 militiamen to serve as guards.  It is unclear

          whether the full compliment of militia had failed to muster or if the militiamen had

          assumed their tour of duty had expired and went home.  In March the legislature

          issued a third call for militiamen to guard the prisoners.  Failure to report for guard

          duty subjected one to a fine of œ10, and one was still considered to be a militiaman

          and could still be called for guard or other duty immediately after the fine was

          levied.

               In April 1778 the legislature dispatched 1300 Massachusetts militiamen

          to the defense of the Hudson River.  Almost immediately after that deployment, the

          legislature sent 200 militiamen to Rhode Island.  Increasingly severe penalties were

          levied for failures to serve.  Even a man inspected and certified physically unfit for

          military duty had to procure a substitute at his own expense.  If a poor invalid was

          unable to find a volunteer substitute and too destitute to buy one, he might be sent

          to prison for up to eight months.  Moreover, even after an invalid had provided a

          substitute his name remained on the militia list and he might have to do the same

          again.  Officers had no discretion, and an officer found delinquent, which often

          meant sympathetic to the plight of a poor man, he might be found guilty of neglect

          of duty and be fined œ30.  The legislature provided a bounty for each man enlisted

          or drafted of œ30.  The men were paid the prevailing wages given to privates in the

          continental line, plus a state bonus of 40 shillings a month.

               In 1778 most recruitment effort directed at volunteers, and most

          deployment of Massachusetts militia, was for service within Rhode Island.  In June

          1778, Massachusetts sent 1800 militiamen to Rhode Island, to serve for six months. 

          To soften the impact of the order, the legislature paid those called out œ4/13/0 a

          month above the wages received by the continental line.  Tons were offered a

          bonus of œ14 for each militiaman sent out of state.  On 16 June the legislature

          sent out 250 more militiamen to Rhode Island, to serve only three weeks, until the

          remainder of 1800 men from the earlier call arrived.

               In April 1779 Rhode Island again asked Massachusetts for assistance from

          its militia.  Massachusetts responded by sending out a regiment to serve for eleven

          months.  Pay was œ10 above the allowance given by Congress to those serving in

          the continental line.  Protests about high taxes, inflation of the state currency and

          service outside their own state prompted the legislature to increase the allowance

          to œ16 above national wages.  Additionally, the legislature offered each man a

          bounty of œ30 and a new suit of clothes.  Recruiting officers received a bonus of

          30 shillings for each militiaman enlisted.  The state still imposed fines and penalties

          for officers, political officials and men if any man failed to march with his militia

          regiment.  Just three days after the first assignment of militiamen to service in

          Rhode Island the legislature sent out a call for 500 additional men to march to

          Rhode Island.  On 8 June the legislature ordered 800 militiamen to muster, and

          assigned them to duty for eight months in Rhode Island.  The legislature increased

          the penalties for failure to report to œ30 per incident.

               On 26 June 1780 the legislature made an emergency appeal for 4726

          volunteer militiamen to enlist for three months' service to march to the Hudson

          River in New York.  Few volunteers were available so a draft ensued.  Officers,

          civil officials and men refusing to march were subjected to fines of up to œ300. 

          During the summer of 1780 Massachusetts twice sent militiamen to Rhode Island. 

          In the first case 1200 militia were enlisted for forty days' service.  Several months

          later an additional 500 militia were drafted for five months' service.

               The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 made all able-bodied males over

          age 16 members of the militia.  All militiamen, including those who could not vote

          in local and state elections because of their age, were eligible to elect officers

          because "youths will be more tractable under officers of their own choice." 

          Articles X and XVII of the Constitution read,

          

          X. Each individual of the society has a right to be protected in it by the enjoyment of life,

          liberty and property, according to standing laws.  He is obliged, consequently, to contribute

          his share to the expense of this protection; to give his personal service, or an equivalent,

          when necessary; but no part of the property of any individual can, with justice, be taken from

          him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative body

          of the people. . . .

          

          XVII.  The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence.  And, as

          in the time of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be maintained without

          the consent of the legislature;  and the military power shall always be held in an exact

          subordination to the civil authority and be governed by it.

          

               The state's Bill of Rights of 1780 provided for militia duty:

          

          Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life,

          liberty and property, according to standing laws.  He is obliged, consequently, to contribute

          his share to the expense of the protection; to give his personal service, or an equivalent,

          when necessary.

          

               On 14 December 1780 the selectmen of Grafton submitted a petition to

          the General Court in Boston, asking that a pension be granted for George Gire, an

          African-American living in the city.  Apparently, Gire had received a pension of

          40 shillings per year for his service in the French and Indian War, but, for some

          reason, it was terminated in June 1779.  The selectmen asked that the pension be

          restored for Gire was aged and infirm and had served his militia well during the

          war.

               On 30 June 1781 the legislature again sent militia into New York, for

          service on the Hudson River.  This time 2700 militia marched to the defense of

          West Point.  Washington had requested that the militia take the place of some of

          his regular troops, which regular continental line were dispatched to swell

          Washington's force at the siege of Yorktown.

               One of the last actions of the Massachusetts militia was the suppression

          of Shays' Rebellion of 1787.  Staged by debtors, largely farmers from western

          Massachusetts, it was comprised of nearly all former soldiers and militiamen of the

          Revolution.  The followers od Daniel Shays (c.1747-1825) demanded an easy

          money policy and an extension of credit and reduction of taxes, past and present. 

          During the early 1780's the state legislature had been dominated by merchants and

          others of the upper class.  The wealthier citizens were much concerned about the

          depreciation of the currency through the issuance of paper money unbacked by

          bullion.  The legislature imposed heavy taxation and refused to stay debts of the

          poorer members of society, many of whom were serving for as little as 40 shillings

          a month in the continental line and state militia.  Imprisonment for debt had become

          common by 1785, so in 1786 mobs of Shays' followers began to close the rural

          courts which imposed the law.  The state governor was James Bowdoin (1726-

          1790), an early and ardent patriot and Boston merchant, and president of the state

          constitutional convention of 1779.  Bowdoin was horrified at the threat to law and

          order that he perceived in Shays' Rebellion and asked the legislature to take strong

          action against it.  On 25 January 1787 the legislature authorized the use of the

          militia to suppress anarchy.  Many of the wealthier citizens contributed liberally to

          the support of this force and on 4 February it dealt Shays' followers a crushing

          blow at Petersham.  Shays' Rebellion had been suppressed by General Benjamin

          Lincoln, the general who surrendered about 5000 men under his command on 12

          May 1780 to the British at Charleston, South Carolina, the largest single loss of

          men during the entire Revolution.  The courts dealt out harsh sentences, but a more

          liberal government, elected soon after the suppression of the revolt, gave pardons

          to Shays and other leaders and provided son debt relief.

                                         The Connecticut Militia

          

               The Dutch were supposedly the first Europeans to explore the Connecticut

          about 1614, and they constructed a settlement at Windsor in 1634.  A bitter winter

          claimed many lives and the settlement did not endure.

               Connecticut was founded on the democratic principles of Reverend

          Thomas Hooker, views shared and perhaps developed first by Roger Williams in

          Rhode Island.  However, the democratic principles Hooker espoused were far

          removed from the understanding of democracy of the next century.  Hooker had

          been born in England, probably about 1586 in Marefield, Leicester, studied for the

          Anglican ministry at Queen's College, Cambridge, developed strong Puritan

          leanings, was exiled in 1633, emigrated to Massachusetts Bay, established a

          congregation at Newtown, and moved to Hartford in 1636.

               Hooker's rule did not produce the anarchical disorder found in Rhode

          Island, largely because his congregation preferred the town (or plantation) over the

          individual, although it gave preference to local governmental units over the larger

          colonial ones.  On 3 March 1636 a commission began to meet, forming the colony's

          first government.  Consisting of eight men, this commission exercised full

          executive, legislative and judicial authority for regulating all matters including

          military discipline.  Commission government lasted only a year, meeting from 26

          April 1636 through 28 March 1637.  The first officers of the Connecticut were

          John Mason and Roger Clap.

               The General Court governed Connecticut in 1637 and 1638.  On 24

          January 1639 the three plantations of Hartford, Wethersfield and Windsor adopted

          the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut.  Springfield under William Pynchon

          refused to federate and by 1649 was sending delegates to the General Court of

          Massachusetts.  By 1662 some 15 towns had associated.  Franchise was essentially

          open to all male free Trinitarians.  Between 1637 and 1643 Reverend John

          Davenport and others purchased land from the Amerindians and founded New

          Haven, Stamford, Guilford and Milford, establishing Mosiac law as the basis of the

          governance of the General Court.  Since the colony still had no charter, the

          Restoration in England left the colony without legal status until Governor John

          Winthrop, Jr., obtained a royal charter on 3 May 1662.  New Haven was included

          within the scope of the Connecticut Charter, but the plantation opposed its

          inclusion.  Soon faced with a choice of joining Connecticut or coming under the

          rule of the Duke of York, and thus being included in the Province of New York

          administratively, the towns of New Haven plantation, one by one, affiliated, until

          finally New Haven itself yielded to pressures on 5 January 1665.

               The commission was followed by a general court whose meeting was

          required by the impending Pequot Indian war.  In their language Pequot translated

          to "destroyers of men" and they were opposed to the colonization of their land. 

          Initial skirmishes occurred at Saybrook and extended as far upriver as

          Wethersfield.  Three murders, including two massacres on Wethersfield Plantation,

          prompted the Court to consider undertaking a defensive war.  The Pequots had

          moved southward, warring against a number of other tribes, including the Niantics,

          Mohegans and Narragansetts, pausing to recoup and gather their strength on the

          banks of the Thames River near the present boundary of Rhode Island.

               The colony thought it could count upon the offended tribes, especially the

          powerful Narragansetts under Miantonomo, to become allies in the war.  In May,

          Hooker and his council decided that the militia must go on the offensive, so the

          three principal towns were required to supply 90 men, which required a commit-

          

          ment of about half of the able-bodied men in the colony.  Springfield Plantation

          and a few other tiny settlements were exempted from the general requirement that

          all federated towns contribute men toward the expedition.  All the plantations were

          vulnerable to attack, but these towns were so exposed to dangers that the Court

          feared for the safety of the men's families should they be called to war.  By the end

          of June an additional 40 men had been added.  Supplementing this tiny force were

          the traditional enemies of the Pequots, the Mohicans under Uncas.

               Captain Mason's mixed force of militia and Amerindians followed the

          Pequots to a location near Nehantic Fort.  The surprise attack on the Pequot

          encampment about two miles from present-day Mystic was an overwhelming

          success, although the expected alliance yielded few warriors from the other

          Amerindian tribes.  Pursuing the Pequots with a vengeance, the Connecticut militia

          trapped them near Southport and in a bloody fight in a swamp destroyed Pequot

          power.  The surviving Pequots turned on their chief Sassacus and chose a new war

          leader.  Mason pursued the Pequots and killed most of the survivors at what is now

          Fairfield.

               In preparation for the Pequot War of 1636, the General Court at Hartford

          ordered that "every Plantation shall train once in every month and if upon

          complaint of their military officer it appears that there bee divers very unskillful"

          the commander may order that additional exercises be held, either for the whole

          company or only for those who were deficient.  Further,

          

          It is ordered that every plantacon shall traine once in every moneth, & if vppon complainte

          of their military officer it appr that there bee divers very vnskilfull the sayde plantacon may

          appointe the officer to traine oftener the saide vnskillfull.  And that the saide military officer

          take veiwe of their seurall Armes whether they be seruiceable or noe.  And for default of

          every souldiers absent the absent to paye 5s. for every tyme without lawfull excuse within

          2 dayes after tendered to the Comrs or one of them in the saide plantacon.  And for any

          default in Armes vppon warnings to them by the saide officer to amend the same & a tyme

          sett & if not then amended by the tyme appointed, 1 shilling [fine] every tyme.  And where

          Armes are wholly wantinge to be bounde over to answere it at the next Corte.

          

               Consideration of the increasing threat from the Pequots constituted the

          only important business of the first session of the Connecticut General Court. 

          Following the victory of the Pequots, Mason was named "publique military officer

          of the plantacions of Connecticut."  The Court established powder magazines in the

          four towns.  Public supplies of gunpowder were designed to augment the smaller

          supplues each man was required to keep at his home, and to supply men who

          practiced shooting on training days.  Most of the towns began with a supply of two

          small [half] barrels of gunpowder.  The Court also ordered that an enumeration be

          made of the male inhabitants with an eye to requiring universal military training of

          all able-bodied males between 16 and 60.

               Possession of firearms, of course, gave the settlers an enormous advantage

          over the natives who were armed only with stone age weapons.  As elsewhere. just

          the sound of the discharge of a firelock was sufficient to strike terror in the hearts

          of the savages.  Gun control was advanced, with the General Court assigning

          severe penalties for the sale to the Indians of arms, gunpowder and lead. The law

          proved easier to pass than to enforce, and other European powers, notably France,

          supplied arms and munitions to the Amerindians.

               The Court invested in some military equipment for its militia.  "It is

          ordered that there shalbe fiftie Costlets provided in the plantacons viz., Harteford

          21 Costlets, Windsor 12, Weathersfield 10, Agawam 7, which are to bee provided

          within 6 monthes at farthrest."  A corslet was light half-armor worn by heavy

          infantry, consisting of a collar, breast-plate, tassets, vambraces, gauntlets and an

          open helmet, but no leg-harness.  The officers were to make a list of those

          militiamen to whom the armor had been issued, and the men were required to

          maintain the corsalets once issued.  "And the saide Costlets are to be viewed by the

          military officer that is provided for that purpose, and if he disallowe them as

          insufficient they are to pruide better.  And alsoe that the saide Townes are to giue

          in the names of such as are to finde the saide Cosletts, att the next generall Courte,

          and then such as shall faile to provide by the day aforsaide shall forthwith pay 10

          shillings and five shillings a moneth vntill he hath supplied them;  and it shall alsoe

          be lawful for the saide military officer to call for the saide corsteletts to viewe

          whether they [be] in repaire or noe."  The penalty for missing a meeting was 5

          shillings.  The law provided that the Connecticut militia might offer fraternal aid

          to any of the other colonies. 

               Next, the General Court granted John Mason the permanent rank and pay

          of captain with an annual salary of œ40, making him the colony's first paid military

          officer.  It instructed him to train the militiamen.  "It is alsoe ordered that the saide

          Captaine Mason shall have liberty to traine the saide military men in every

          plantacon. . . ."  He was to assemble the men and drill then at least "tenn dayes in

          every yeere, soe as it be not in June or July, giving a weekes warning before hand.

          . . ."  All able-bodied men above the age of sixteen years were to muster.  Each man

          was to supply himself with a good match-lock or fire-lock and accoutrements suited

          to his arm, a half-pound of gunpowder and two pounds of lead ball.  In the same

          act, the commissioners ordered that specific training days be established.  "It is

          ordered that Captaine Mason shalbe a publique military officer of the plantacons

          of Conecticot, and shall traine the military men thereof in each plantatons

          according to the dayes appointed . . . ."  Those officers assigned to training the

          milita "shall have 40 livres pr annum, to be paid oute of the Treasury quarterly, the

          pay to begine from the day of the date hereof."

               Having made at least some preparations for defense, the colony appointed

          additional paid officers.  Captain John Underhill, having left the confining religious

          atmosphere of Massachusetts, was placed in charge of military planning, assisted

          by Captain John Mason and Lieutenant Robert Seely.  The colony had few

          problems with the Amerindians for another forty years.  When war came between

          the Mohegans and the Narragansett, the whole New England Confederation took

          the side of Uncas over the Narragansett's Miantonomo whom the Mohegans

          treacherously murdered.

               During the Pequot War, the Connecticut militia demanded that it have its

          own choice of chaplain as well as officers.  Reverend Samuel Stone had initially

          served as chaplain, but the popular choice was Reverend John Wilson.  The civil

          authorities had suspended Wilson because they had thought him guilty of heresy. 

          Wilson was suspected of accepting and disseminating the teachings of Anne

          Hutchinson.  Until Wilson was released for service the militia simply refused to

          march.

               Following the Pequot War there was a colonial expansion into the interior,

          especially into areas once owned by the Pequots.  Here the militia performed

          another kind of service.  Some interior towns began life as forts, manned only by

          militia.  Saybrook, for example, was little more than a pallisaded safety haven

          established by Lion Gardiner in 1635, but by 1641 it had lost its military character. 

          Other areas attracted militia to guard trading interests and these fortified areas grew

          into towns.

               Shortly after the Pequot War the General Court ordered that some militia

          companies be enrolled as minutemen.  This specially prepared, trained, and

          equipped organization was to be a ready force to engage any enemy, foreign or

          domestic, at a moment's notice.

               The obligation to bear arms was universal, although exemptions could be

          made for those with physical handicaps.  "Item, it is ordered that all persons shall

          beare Armes that are above the age of sixteene yeeres except they doe tender a

          sufficient excuse [to] the Corte & the Cort allowe the same.  The Comrs & Church

          officers for the present to bee exempted, as alsoe for the tyme to come after they

          have beene a Comissioner or Comrs or Church officer. . . ."  Those excused from

          militia duty were "to bee likewise for all tymes afterward exempted for bearing

          Armes, Watchinges & Wardinges."

               The new order placed the towns and plantations under obligation to keep

          supplies for the militia.  "It is ordered that there shalbe a magace of powder and

          shott in every plantaton that the supply of Or[dinary] military men if occasion

          serve, videlicet; Harteford twoe barrels, Windsor 1 barrell of powder, 300 weighte

          of leade, Weathersfeild 1 barrell of powder, 300 of leade, Aggawam halfe a barrell

          of powder, 150 of leade. . . .  The presence of such supplies did not excuse the

          militiamen from the individual obligation to own arms and supplies.  "Every

          military man is to have continually in his house in a readines halfe a pounde of

          goode powder, 2 1b of bullets. . . ."

               On 18 February 1638 the Connecticut General Council took up the issue

          of equipping the militia.  Inspectors had failed in their assignment of "surveying the

          armour and other military provisions" of each able bodied male inhabitant and in

          each town four times a year.  Council ordered the inspectors to take their charge

          seriously and to make the required surveys.  Those failing to do so would be fined

          œ0/20/0.  The militia was to meet for instruction, inspection and training at least six

          days a year.

               In 1643 the militia of Hartford made a report of the arms it possessed.  It

          had in the magazine 2 great guns, 35 pounds of fine powder, 2 kegs of gunpowder,

          one-half pig of lead, 12 half-pikes, 680 flints and various "dogs and staples of

          uiron."  In 1706 it possessed 1326 pounds of lead, 2 kegs plus another 600 pounds

          of gunpowder, 10 great guns, 33 half-pikes and various worms, bullets, chargers

          and flints.

               In 1637 Connecticut had proposed that the Puritan colonies form a mutual

          aid military alliance against the Amerindians and the Dutch.  Two major obstacles

          precluded an early decision to form this league.  Springfield had chosen to enter the

          New England Confederation in 1643 as a part of Massachusetts, seceding from

          Connecticut, a decision to which Massachusetts did not acquiesce for ten years. 

          In the interim this small plantation which laid on the east side of the Connecticut

          River was essentially devoid of outside help.  William Pynchon governed until his

          death and was succeeded by his son John ( -1703), ruling under Massachusetts

          commissions as judge and magistrate dating from 1641.  The second controversy

          centered around the division of Pequot land ceded after the war.  In 1643 the treaty

          was signed but the antipathy had not ended.  The confederation was essentially

          unnecessary after Connecticut in 1665 annexed New Haven although it continued

          to exist on paper for some time after that.

               In 1644 the Connecticut Code of Law required that, the cities were to arm

          their inhabitants, as were needed for the militia.  The law defined the militia as

          "every male person within this Jurisdiction that is above the age of sixteen years." 

          Magistrates and ministers were exempted from training with the remainder of the

          militia, but were considered to be a part of the militia.  Each citizen-soldier had to

          provide his own powder, shot, cartridge box and accoutrements.  "Each

          inhabitant in this corporation [Hartford] . . . is to provide and keep Armes. . .  [and]

          shall provide four pounds of bullets and one pound of powder; and that this shall

          be in readiness at all times . . . . "  Militia units are as old in America as the

          foundation of each colony.  Each group of pioneering Europeans brought with it

          an armorer who also served to organize and discipline the colonists in the citizen-

          soldier militia system.  The early militia law passed in Connecticut in 1644

          provided that,

          

          Each towne allso shall provide so many good firelocke muskets and good backswords or

          Cutlases. . . . That every male person within this Jurissdiction that is above the age of 16

          years . . . shall bee allwayes provided with and have in readiness by them halfe a pound of

          Powder two serviceable Bullitts or shott, and two fathoms of Match to every Matchlock,

          upon the penalty of 5 shillings per month.

          

               In 1650 the legislature allowed each man 12 pence per year to maintain

          his own firearm.  In 1653 the legislature ordered the militia be organized along

          county lines, following the model created by Massachusetts in 1643.  By 1658 the

          Connecticut militia had established a standard of three days local militia muster and

          two days general muster.  On 23 August 1658 the General Court ordered that there

          be "three particular training days that are by order and custom be attended . . . the

          General Muster is to be attended for two days space."  The Court further ordered

          that"noe soldier that attendeds the service aforesaid shal dimish any of that

          proportion of powder that ye Order of the Country imposeth on him."

               Connecticut adopted its first code of laws in 1650, and agitated for

          separation from Massachusetts.  In 1662 John Winthrop succeeded in obtaining a

          crown charter, thus guaranteeing full independence from the parent colony.  The

          Connecticut Charter of 1662 provided authority for the colonial authorities to

          create and arm a militia.  The charter assigned several tasks to the militia, including

          seacoast watch, posse comitas, containment of rebellion and insurrection and

          resistance to the Amerindians.  The charter read in part,

          

          it shall and may be lawful . . . for the Chief Commanders, Governors and Officers . . . by

          their Leave, Admittance, Appointment or Direction from Time to Time, and at all Times

          hereafter, for their special Defence and Safety, to assemble, Martial Array, and put in warlike

          Posture the Inhabitants of the said Colony, and to Commissionate, Impower and Authorize

          such Person or Persons, as they shall think fit, to lead and conduct the said Inhabitants and

          to encounter, repulse, repel and resist by Force of Arms as well as by Sea or Land, and also

          to kill, slay and destroy by all fitting Ways, Enterprises and Means whatsoever, all and every

          such Person or Persons as shall at any time hereafter attempt or enterprize the Destruction,

          Invasion, Detriment or Annoyance of the said Inhabitants or Plantations, and to use and

          exercise Martial Law in such Cases only as Occasion shall require. . . .

          

               In 1663 the General Court appointed a muster master, an officer whose

          primary responsibility was to see that the men enrolled in the militia actually

          attended musters and drilled properly.  The colony created a committee of overseers

          to inspect the militia, its arms and training.

               Prior to 1672 each town in the colony had one militia company, with 64

          men being considered a full complement, although most companies were

          undersubscribed.  On 26 June 1672 the regimental system was created, with the

          first companies to be integrated being drawn from the counties of Hartford, New

          Haven and Fairfield.  In October 1672 the colony created a new militia act.  It

          required that all able-bodied males between ages 16 and 60 serve except

          magistrates, church officers, physicians and surgeons, school masters, herdsmen

          and mariners.  The remainder was placed on active call "to bear arms unless they

          upon just occasions have exemptions granted them by the Court."

               On 11 August 1673 the Grand Committee of Connecticut ordered that

          another specialized branch of the citizen soldiers be formed to operate as dragoons. 

          The Committee ordered that, "each dragoone be provided with a good sword and

          belt and serviceable muskett or kirbine, with a shott pouch and powder and bullitts,

          vizt., 1 pound of powder made into cartridges fitt for his gunne and 3 pounds of

          bulletts. . . ."  The Colony would pay for the hardware and individual was to keep

          his gun and accoutrements in his home ready for use at a moment's notice.  "[I]n

          the county of Hartford there shall be raysed 100 dragoones, to be in readiness upon

          an howr's warning for a march; whoe are to have their armes well fixed and fitted

          for service."  In 1660 blacks, whether free or enslaved, and Amerindians were

          specifically exempted from standing watch or serving in the militia.

               Early in the history of Connecticut edged weapons, not firearms,

          predominated as militia weapons.  On 31 July 1666 the colony ordered that "such

          persons as bear Pikes in ye Train Bands . . . shall forthwith procure their pikes to

          be sufficiently headed and [the] pike to be no less that 1`4 foot in length."  Those

          who failed to properly maintain their pikes "shall sell their poles to the Overseer

          of the Town where they live."

               On 14 October 1675 the legislature ordered an inspection of all mounted

          troops and the dismissal of such of them as had failed to provide himself with a

          good horse and appropriate arms and equipment.  Those so dismissed had to rejoin

          their old foot regiments.  Following reports of massacres perpetrated by the

          Pequot Amerindian nation, the colonial legislature ordered that all persons "be duly

          prepared and provided with arms and ammunition."  It also ordered,

          

          that none should go to work, nor travel, no, not so much as to Church, without arms. A corps

          of guard of 14 or 15 soldiers was appointed to watch every night and sentinels were set in

          convenient places about the Plantations, the drum beating when they went to watch, and

          every man commanded to be in readiness upon an alarm, upon pain of a [fine of] œ5.  A day

          of fast and prayers was also kept.

          

               In 1675 the last major Amerindian war broke out.  Known as King Philip's

          War, led by a chief known among his own people as Metacom, leader of the

          Wampamoags, this bitter and brutal struggle had multiple roots.  Metacom had run

          up considerable debts that he could satisfy only by selling land to the colonists. 

          The colonists hung several warriors for murdering Metacom's secretary.  Clashes

          occurred as early as June 1675 at Swansea, Rhode Island, and spread quickly. 

          Metacom was able to enlist other tribes, including the Nipmucks.  Connecticut sent

          some of the newly formed dragoons to New London and Stonington.  The New

          England Confederation called for 1000 men, of which 315 were to come from

          Connecticut.  It actually delivered five companies commanded by Major Robert

          Treat and 150 warriors from its allies the Mohicans.

               On 19 December 1675 the allied force confronted some 3000 Amerindians

          under Metacom at a fortified blockhouse surrounded by a triple pallisade.  At the

          Great Swamp Fight, near Narragansett Bay, about two-thirds of the Amerindians

          were killed.  Connecticut lost forty dead and the same number wounded.  Among

          the dead was Captain John Mason, Jr.

               The war continued, with the Amerindians raiding into Connecticut, first

          at Pine Meadow [Windsor Locks] and then burning the settlement at Simsbury,

          although most of the action occurred in Massachusetts.  The war ended only when

          Metacom was betrayed by another Indian, and trapped, then killed, by

          Massachusetts militiamen.

               In 1680 the colony could boast that it had 2507 trained militiamen.  There

          were about 60 mounted troops, militia dragoons, and another three troops of

          mounted militia were being trained.  Each county had its own train band which

          elected its own officers.  All militia were nominally under the command of the

          colony's governor.  The train bands were apportioned as follows: Hartford County,

          where there are 835 trained soldiers;  New Haven, where there are about 623

          trained soldiers;  New London, where there are about 509 trained soldiers; 

          Fairfield, where there are about 540 trained soldiers  In May 1680 the legislature

          placed a fine of three shillings on those neglecting to attend militia training

          sessions.

               A new Militia Act, passed on 24 March 1687, required that each

          militiaman provide himself with a musket, cartridge box, sword, a dozen bullets

          and gunpowder in measure.  The fine for missing militia muster was reduced from

          30 to six shillings.

               When James II came to the British throne, he appointed Edmond Andros

          as Viceroy over territory including Connecticut.  Andros had had a long standing

          dispute with Connecticut dating to his term as governor of New York when he had

          tried to please then Duke of York by extending York's governance over all territory

          west of the Connecticut River.  In October 1687, Andros came to Hartford and

          assumed the power to appoint all civil officers, including those of the provincial

          militia.  On 28 October 1687 Andros demanded the surrender of the colony's

          treasured charter.  As the legislature debated the issue into the night, the candles

          were suddenly extinguished.  A militia captain named Wadsworth is credited with

          seizing the charter and hiding it in the Charter Oak.  Despite his failure to

          confiscate the charter, Andros' "despotic rule" continued through February 1689

          when the people of Boston, "as their contribution to the Glorious Revolution,"

          removed him from authority.  The new king, William of Orange, in 1689, allowed

          to people of Connecticut to reassume the charter and govern themselves.  

               By an Act of 1689, the Connecticut legislature ordered that militia officers

          formerly commissioned by the governor retain their offices, but "in case of want

          of officers in any Trayned Bands, or they be dissatisfied with their officers, they

          may nominate others to the next Session of the Court."

               King William's War followed.  In 1689, the French, operating out of

          Canada, raided into New York, burning Schenectady.  The General Court, fear a

          French invasion of Connecticut, mobilized the minutemen.  The Crown issued a

          call for 1000 men, of which 315 were to be militia volunteers from Connecticut. 

          Nothing came of the war as far as Connecticut was concerned, although the war

          dragged on inconclusively until 1697.

               On 14 May 1692 William Phips arrived at Boston carrying a commission

          as Captain-general, Governor and Commander-in-chief of the militia for Rhode

          Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, the King's Province,

          Massachusetts and New Hampshire estates.  Connecticut opposed one portion of

          this appointment with great vigor because it controlled its own militia completely

          by terms of its colonial charter.  There was no provision for subordinating its

          provincial militia to any exterior authority.  Its council and legislature vowed to

          retain control over the militia and not submit to Sir William or anyone else not

          approved by the provincial authorities.

               Militia days, as the required days of training of the great militia were

          called, underwent several changes during the colonial history of Connecticut. 

          During most of the Seventeenth Century the militia drilled on most Sabbaths. 

          Failure to attend militia training continued to be a problem in the colony so in

          October 1696 the legislature again took action.  It reenacted the law to "prevent and

          suppress the disorder of Soldiers in not coming . . . in their Arms Compleat and

          well fixed upon the days of training. . . to exercise in the use of his arms and

          military discipline."  This time it lowered the fine for each infraction to two

          shillings.

               By 1698 the training days were dropped to six times a year.   In October

          1708 the legislature lowered the upper age bracket for militia training to 55.  They

          were ordered to maintain their weapons as before so that they constituted a final

          reserve; and they were permitted, as veterans, to continue to participate in elections

          of militia officers.  The government also ordered that artillery companies be created

          within the militia system.  The next year the legislature moved to require

          additional training of militia officers and instruct them in the use of training

          manuals.  In August 1710 the government ordered that annual returns of the

          militia be made, giving certain basic information.  The report had to show the

          numbers enrolled in each company;  the extent of arms and training among the

          men;  and the numbers of eligibles in each militia district.

               The age span for required militia service likewise underwent several

          changes.  Most of the time Connecticut, like most other colonies, set sixteen as the

          minimum age for service.  Initially men served only until they were age 30.  In

          1708 the age bracket was extended to fifty-five.  The age was then lowered to

          fifty  and finally, in 1764, to age 45.    A census of the militia taken in

          September 1730 showed that there were 8500 freemen enrolled.  For some

          unknown reason attorneys were exempted from militia duty.

               King William III was succeeded by Queen Anne, who entered the War of

          Spanish Succession, as it was known in Europe, and Queen Anne's War, as the

          colonists called it.  In 1703 the French burned Deerfield, Massachusetts.  The

          Connecticut General Court debated and finally decided that it would not deploy

          militia in the wilderness areas of the colony because "French and Indians lurked"

          all along the frontier.  The elected body also resisted the Crown's call to dispatch

          militia volunteers to accompany the ill-fated expedition against Port Royal in 1707.

               In 1708 Queen Anne ordered Colonel Samuel Vetch to contact the

          colonial governors of Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and

          order them to provide 1500 of their best militiamen to serve as volunteers in her

          army.  She assigned Connecticut to provide 350 men to fight in Canada. 

          Additionally, the queen ordered Vetch to try to enlist as many Connecticut

          volunteers as possible to join the expedition.  This time, the Court was unable to

          shield its militia, so 300 volunteers form part of the 1500 man colonial force,

          which, with 400 British regulars, captured Port Royal, but only at a very

          considerable cost in men, money and materials of war.

               On 14 October 1708 the legislature amended the fundamental militia act. 

          In addition to the occupational exemptions, the law now exempted "Indians,

          Negroes and Mulattoes."  It also created a watch system for the "time of war and

          danger" that required service of all militiamen.  The disposition of men on watch

          was left to the military authorities.  The act was almost immediately amended to

          require attendance at militia musters and exercises, again allowing the military

          officers to set time, place and frequency of training days.

               In September 1730 the governor was asked to report to the Lords of Trade

          on the state of the colony and its militia.  The colony had about 12,000 inhabitants

          in 1640.  In 1730 there were an estimated 38,000 inhabitants of all ages, races and

          both sexes, among which were 700 Indian and black slaves.  Without giving

          specific numbers, the governor reported that "the number of inhabitants [has] much

          increased this ten years past."  Membership in the train bands, as the colony

          continued to call its militia, was an estimated 8500, including most males, ages 16

          to 55.  The minutemen constituted about one-third of this number, and the dragoons

          filled one regiment, although both were undertrained.

               The colony, as with its sister colonies, generally imported all the militia

          arms, whether swords, pikes, muskets or fowling pieces, from the mother country. 

          By 1700 local arms makers had begun to make some weapons.  One of the first

          identifiable arms contractors was a militia captain, Theophilus Munson, born 1

          September 1675.  On 6 March 1697 he purchased a property on the southeast

          corner of Elm and High streets, New Haven, where he built a gunshop and smithy. 

          A musket with a hand-made dog-lock dated 1700 bears his mark.  He also made

          various edged weapons, including pikes.  A list of the colony's debts for August

          1711 shows a bill from Munson for repairing and marking the colony's arms. 

          Another invoice dated 8 December 1728 shows that he worked on the colony's

          "great guns" or cannon.  His business prospered and his shop grew in size.  He

          presumably trained quite a few apprentices and journeymen gunsmiths and

          supervised their work until his death on 28 November 1747.

               Because the government believed that far too many men were being

          declared invalids who were sufficiently able-bodied to perform militia duty, in

          October 1714 the law was altered so that a certificate of two physicians or surgeons

          were required to obtain even a temporary exemption.  Other minor changes were

          made to the militia act in October 1722.  With reports of impending attacks along

          the frontier by Amerindians linked with the French in Canada, on 26 April 1725

          the legislature moved to increase militia training, equipage and practice.

               In the autumn of 1733 Governor Talcott appointed Captain John Mason

          to study the reasons why the Amerindians raided the frontier.  On 8 October 1733

          Mason reported to Governor Talcott that, after completing his study of, he had

          concluded that the availability of intoxicating liquors was the major factor.  He

          recommended that the governor appoint several men to act as agents to control the

          trade in spirits and to "prosecute to effect such persons as should be known as to

          sell [liquor] unto them."  Mason thought that the costs of controlling the liquor

          trade would be more than offset by the reduction in uses and deployment of the

          militia.  "Your Honour is not insensible," he wrote, "of the great damage that strong

          liquors have been to these people."

               In 1740 Connecticut revised its militia law.  Those between 16 and 60

          years of age were liable for service either in the army or the militia.  The purpose

          of the new act was simply stated in its preamble.  "Whereas for the honour and

          service of his Majesty, and for the security of this his Majesty's Colony against any

          violence or invasion whatsoever, it is necessary that due care be taken that the

          inhabitants thereof he armed, trained, and in a suitable posture and readiness for the

          ends aforesaid: And that every person may know his duty, and be obliged to

          perform the same."  The act provided universal manhood training.  "Be it enacted

          by the Gouvenour Council and Representatives, in General Court assembled, and

          by the authority of the same, That all male persons, from sixteen years of age to

          fifty, shall bear arms and duly attend all musters and military exercises of the

          respective troops and companies where they are inlisted or do belong."  

               The exceptions to universal service were relatively few and were the

          common exceptions found in most contemporary provincial militia acts.  It

          exempted "assistants, justices of the peace, the Secretary, church officers, time

          rector, tutors and students at the collegiate school, masters of art, allowed

          physicians and surgeons, representatives or deputies for the time being school

          masters, attorneys at law, one miller to each grist-mill, constant herdsmen, amid

          mariners  who make it their constant business to go to sea, sheriffs, constables,

          [and] constant ferrymen,."   Those physically unable to serve had to provide

          physicians' certificates.  "Lame persons or otherwise disabled in body, producing

          certificate thereof from two able physicians or surgeons s to the acceptance of the

          two chief officers of the company whereto seeking dismission appertain, or of the

          chief officer of the regiment to which such company belongs. . . ."  

               The law provided exemptions for the disabled, members of certain

          professions, and all non-Caucasians.  The law also exempted "Indians and

          negroes."  All other persons "listed in any troop or company shall so continue and

          attend all duty in such troop or company, or otherwise suffer the penalty by law

          provided, until orderly dismissed, or removed out of the town or precinct; and in

          case of removal into the precinct of aim other company in the same town, to

          produce a certificate under the hand of the chief officer of time company in the

          precinct where he is removed, that he is listed theresaid, and to lead or cause such

          troops, so formed or filled up, to impelled to be choice of officers proper and

          necessary and make return thereof to the General Assembly."

               The law allowed the men latitude in the selection of their uniforms.  "And

          the respective troops in this Colony are hereby impowered, two-thirds at least of

          such troops agreeing to pass votes for the regulating said troops with  respect to the

          colour of their cloathing. . . ."  The troops were also permitted "to impose fines, not

          exceeding twenty shillings per day, on such as neglect or refuse to comply with

          such votes; and such fines shall be leveyed in the same manner, and disposed of

          and improved for the same uses, as other fines and penalties in said troops by law

          are."

               The legislature retained the power to appoint senior officers.  "That there

          shall be in each regiment, from time to time, appointed by the General Assembly

          a colonel, lieutenant-colonel amid major, who shall be commissioned by the

          Governor for the time being."  The legislature gave certain specific powers to these

          senior officers.  "That the colonel or chief officer of each regiment, as often as he

          shall see cause, shall require the captain or chief officer of each company in his

          regiment to meet, at such time and place as he shall appoint, to confer with them

          and give in charge such orders as shall by them, or the major part of them, be

          judged meet, for the better ordering military affairs and promoting military disci-

          

          pline in said regiment."

               Each unit elected its own minor officers.  The act charged the senior

          officers with seeing that musters and drills were held.  The senior officers were to

          check on the elected minor officers to ascertain if they were performing their duties

          properly.  Training and equipment inspection were the most important functions of

          the minor officers in peacetime. There were to be four training days per year, with

          no less than three days advance notice of musters.

          

          That the colonel or chief military officer of each regiment is hereby authorized and required

          to muster together the several companies in his regiment, or such a number of them as he

          shall judge proper, [at least] once in four years, for regimental exercise; which musters the

          several captains or chief officers of said companies are required to attend with their

          companies, on penalty of œ5, which said penalties shall be distrained by warrant from the

          chief officer of said regiment, directed to either of the constables of the town in which said

          captain dwells, and be paid into the treasury of said town. . . .  That the colonel or chief

          officer of each regiment shall be, and is hereby impowered and authorized, upon any alarm,

          invasion, or notice of the appearance of an enemy, either by sea or land, to assemble in

          martial array and put in war-like posture the whole militia of time regiment under his

          command, or such part of them as he shall think needful, and being so armed, to lead,

          conduct and imploy them, as well within the regiment whereto they belong as in any other

          adjacent place in this Colony, for the assisting, succumbing and relieving any of his

          Majesty's subjects, forts, towns or places that shall be assaulted by as an enemy, or in danger

          thereof, and with them by force of arms to encounter, repel, pursue, kill and destroy such

          enemy, or any of them, by any fitting ways, enterprizes or means whatsoever.  And the

          colonel or chief officer of any regiment, so taking to arms or leading forth any party of men,

          shall forthwith post away the intelligence and occasion thereof to the captain-general or

          commander in chief for the time being, and shall attend and observe such directions and

          orders as he shall receive from him. . . .  That when any town or place in this Colony shall

          be assaulted by Indians, or any other enemy, it shall be lawful for and within the power of

          the chief commission officer or officers of the company or companies in such place so

          assaulted, to call forth all the souldiers under his or their command, and to martial order and

          dispose them in time best manner to defend the place assaulted, and to encounter, repel,

          pursue and destroy time enemy, and, if need so require, to assist a neighbour town when

          assaulted as aforesaid.  And that such officer or officers so taking to arms shall forthwith

          dispatch notice to his or their superior officer of his or their motion and time occasion

          thereof, and observe such commands and orders as he or they shall receive from him.

          

               The law gave officers considerable latitude in handling minor offenses

          that might occur within their units.  "That the chief officers of each regiment shall

          order the correcting and punishing disorders and contempt on days of regimental

          exercises, and the two chief officers of any company or troop shall order the

          correcting and punishing disorders and contempt on training days or on a military

          watch."  Their authority was limited to levying fines and the imposition of what

          was then considered relatively easy physical punishment, that is,  "the punishment

          not being greater than laying neck amid heels, riding time wooden horse, or twenty

          shillings fine."  The fine for insubordination was œ10.

               The penalty for missing drills was increased to 10 shillings for enlisted

          men and 12 shillings for officers.  Adults were, of course, responsible for their own

          berhavior and compliance with the law.  Parents and guardians were responsible

          for their wards.  "That all fines, penalties and forfeitures, arising by virtue of this

          act or any breach thereof, shall be levyed on the goods or chattels of the respective

          delinquents, if upwards of twenty-one years of age, and on the goods or chattels of

          tine parents, masters or guardians of such delinquents as have not arrived at the age

          of twenty-one years. . . ."  The law also specified the use of fines.  The militia fines

          "shall be for the use of the respective companies or troops to which the persons

          fined do belong, (except such fines as are otherwise disposed of in this act:) that

          is to say, for tine procuring and maintaining trumpets, colours, banners amid

          halberts, and for paying drummers and trumpeters, or other charge of said

          company, by direction of tine commission officers of such company". 

               The act assumed that militia fines would be sufficient to provide some

          basic equipment and accoutrements.  However, "where there are not fines sufficient

          to provide halberts amid colours amid to pay drummers, what is wanting shall be

          had out of the town treasury."  The towns and cities also had to provide, out of their

          own resources, for military stores, such as ammunition, lead and gunpowder.  "The

          providing a sufficient stock of ammunition or military stores for the Colony, as also

          for the several towns within the same, is necessary for the defence thereof . . . ."  

          

          And it is further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That the selectmen of the several towns

          in this Colony, and they are hereby ordered and directed to provide, keep, and to renew from

          time to time as occasion shall require, a sufficient stock of ammunition or military stores inn

          the several towns in this Colony to which they do respectively belong, which shall not be

          less than fifty pounds of good powder, two hundred weight of bullets and three hundred

          flints, for every sixty listed souldiers, and after that proportion for all the listed souldiers in

          each town, whether they be more or less.  And the selectmen of any town that are not able

          (upon information made to the colonel or chief officer of tine regiment to which such town

          doth belong) to make it appear to said colonel or chief officer of such regiment, that they are

          provided with such stock of ammunition as aforesaid, within three months after the

          publication hereof, shall pay a fine of œ5 lawful money, one-third part of which fine shall be

          to him that shall inform against them, the remainder shall be laid out and improved towards

          the procuring such stores which said penalty shall be distrained by warrant signed by said

          colonel or chief officer of said regiment, directed to the sheriff of the county in which such

          town is, his deputy, or either of the constables of said town, and shall be accordingly

          collected and paid into the hands of said colonel or chief officer aforesaid, for the purposes

          aforesaid . . . . And it is further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that the selectmen of any

          town, as aforesaid, shall incur the same penalty for every three months that they shall remain

          unprovided as aforesaid, to be levyed and improved as aforesaid. . . . And if any person or

          persons, being warned as aforesaid, or in any other manner which the authority and

          selectmen shall agree and conclude upon, shall neglect or refuse to attend at time and place,

          armed and furnished as aforesaid, or to observe the orders to them given by the constable or

          any other person appointed by the authority and selectmen as aforesaid, shall for every such

          neglect or offence pay a fine of ten shillings, which by warrant from an assistant or justice

          of the peace shall be levyed by the constable, and disposed of for the use of said watch.

          

               The colony had to provide some basic stocks of war materials.  "The

          Treasurer of this Colony for the time being shall, at all times hereafter, at the

          publick charge of this Colony, procure, keep and maintain, a magazine of powder

          and shot, to be ready for the use of the Colony as occasion may call for the same;

          and the said Treasurer is hereby ordered and directed to take direction from time

          to time for the Governor and Council, respecting the quantity and proportion of

          said stores of ammunition."

               Men had to provide their own equipment and firearms.  The law provided,

          "That every listed souldier and other house-holder (except troopers) shall always

          be provided with, and have in continual readiness, a well-fixed firelock, the barrel

          not less than three feet and an half long, or other good fire-arms to the satisfaction

          of the commission officers of the company to which he doth belong, or in the limits

          of which he dwells, a good sword or cutlass, a worm primer, and priming wire, fit

          for his gun, a cartridge-box, one pound of good powder, four pounds of bullets fit

          for his gun, and twelve flints, on penalty of ten shillings for want of such arms and

          ammunition as is hereby required, and three shillings for each defect; and the like

          sum or sums for every four weeks he shall remain unprovided."  Those who had

          extra duties also had to provide what they needed.  "And every person chosen by

          any company for their drummer, upon his accepting said service shall provide

          himself a good drum, and constantly attend service when required, on penalty of

          ten shillings fine for each day's neglect, to be levyed by warrant from the two chief

          officers of time company to which such drummer belongs; and shall be paid for

          each day's service six shillings."

               The law created a militia class for cavalry.  Members of the mounted units

          had to keep a horse and weapons appropriate for use on horseback.  "That every

          trooper shall be always provided with a good serviceable horse, not less than 14

          hands high, to the acceptance of the two chief commission officers of the troop to

          which he belongs, covered with a good saddle with housing and other proper

          furniture thereto, bitt, bridle and holsters, and furnished with a carbine, the barrel

          not less than two feet and half long, with a belt and swivel, a case of good pistols,

          a sword or cutlass, a flask or cartridge-box, one pound of good powder, three

          pounds of sizeable bullets, twenty flints, a good pair of boots and spurs, on penalty

          of 15 shillings for want of such horse, as is hereby ordered, and three shillings for

          each other defect, and the like sum for every six weeks he shall remain unprovided;

          and that each trooper list his horse, and shall not dispose thereof without the

          consent of the chief officer, on the penalty of five pounds.  And for non-appearance

          at the time and place appointed for exercise, every listed trooper shall pay a fine of

          twelve shillings for each days neglect."

               The law provided that towns set up watches wherever needed.  "And, for

          as much as it may be necessary for the better defence of the Colony, or any parts

          thereof exposed to invasion &c., that watches and wards be kept up at times and

          places within the same, Be it therefore further enacted by the authority aforesaid,

          That when and so often as the authority and selectmen in any town in this Colony,

          or the major part of them, shall judge it necessary or highly convenient for the

          safety of such town, to have watches and wards therein, they are hereby authorized

          and impowered, by warrant to command the constable, or some other meet person

          by them appointed, to warn such a number of men to appear at such time and place

          in said town as they shall think necessary; and all and every such person or persons

          that shall be notified to watch or ward as aforesaid. . . ."  Those chosen for watch

          duty "shall appear at the time and place with a good fire-lock and sword, a quarter

          of a pound of powder, and one pound of bullets fit for his gun, and observe such

          directions as shall be given by order of said authority and selectmen, who are

          hereby impowered to give such orders and directions relating to the regulating such

          watching and warding, and the continuance thereof, as they shall judge needful." 

               In early 1740 Great Britain asked Connecticut to supply volunteers from

          the militia to serve in an expedition against the Spanish West Indies under Major-

          general Gooch.  The militia supplied 600 volunteers, and Governor Talcott wrote

          to Captain John Monson, informing him that the British were overwhelmed by the

          response.  Still, the colony had a quota of only 200 volunteers and it was to be

          Monson's job to choose which of the 600 men would be enrolled.  The remainder

          of the volunteers would be retained to protect the colony from French and Indian

          attack.

               In March 1755 the General Assembly raised 1000 men, placed in two

          regiments.  Shortly thereafter the colony enlisted another 7500 militiamen who

          were ordered to form in two additional regiments.  On 23 January 1755 Privy

          Council Secretary Robinson notified the governor of Connecticut that Parliament

          had inserted a clause in the Mutiny Bill "enacting that all [militia] troops in

          America whilst in conjunction with the British forces under the command of an

          Officer bearing His Majesty's immediate commission shall be liable to the same

          Martial Law and Discipline as the British Forces are."  The same act reduced all

          colonial militia officers to a subordinate position to all but the lowest rank of

          British commissioned officers.  Thus, even a general in the Connecticut militia was

          required to take orders from a British army captain.

               The legislature chose in the same year to make certain revisions in the

          colony's militia law primarily aimed at preventing men to escape their militia duty

          through one of several clever ruses.  It also made all militiamen, including special

          and mounted troops, subject to impressment into the king's service outside the

          province.  Still, the lawmakers lamented, it was to be hoped that the militia "in this

          Colony are not likely to be serviceable abroad" and that they "will be excused from

          a proportionable part of his Majesty's service against the enemy" because taking the

          militia out of the province might weaken it "to the prejudice of the public

          service."

               In 1755, as the crown prepared to attack the French at Crown Point and

          elsewhere, Governor Thomas Fitch reported to the Lords of Trade and the Privy

          Council that the colony was in a poor state of readiness to undertake an expedition

          against the French.  The greatest problem was a deficiency in arms of military type

          and quality.  "What adds to our difficulties in these services is the want of a supply

          of good arms, there being no Public Store of that kind in the Colony."  The

          militiamen's arms were wholly inadequate.  "Those which belong to private persons

          [are] mostly poor and undersized and unfit for an expedition."  Many militiamen

          were too poor to buy sufficient arms, with the result being that the "able-bodied

          effective men are unprovided and unable to provide for themselves."  Still, if the

          crown were to provide arms, the colony "though small, being warmed with zeal for

          your Majesty's service" was able to "raise 1000 men . . . to be augmented by 1500

          if there be necessity of it" to join in the attack on the French at Crown Point.

               The Lords of Trade wrote to Governor Fitch, asking "the present actual

          state and quantity of cannon, small arms, ammunition and other ordnance and

          military stores belonging to the said Colony" whether publicly held or in private

          hands.  It also asked for the "real number of persons, whites and blacks, how many

          of the former are able to bear arms" in the colony and the state of the colony's

          militia law.  Having already reported on the state of armaments, in a letter that

          doubtless was in transit when the Lords wrote to Fitch, the governor had only to

          supplement his previous report.  His response came in several parts, spread out

          over more than a full year in time.

               Meanwhile, Fitch was able to tell the king of a major success on Lake

          George.  The French and their Amerindian allies had been raiding the New England

          colonies from Fort St. Frederick at Crown Point.  The provincial forces routed

          Baron Dieskau's "troops, consisting of Regulars from France, Canadians and

          Indians of diverse Nations."  The 3000 militia and volunteers had inflicted many

          casualties "wherein many of the officers and a great number of the enemies were

          slain, their general taken and a happy victory obtained."  The king responded to

          the good news by noting the arms deficiency Fitch had reported on 1 August and

          taking cognizance of his report that the militia could be of greater use to the crown

          "if a proper supply of good arms could be furnished them."  The king notified Fitch

          that, as a reward for faithful service, and as an inducement to act even more boldly

          against his enemies, he was shipping 10,000 stands of arms, sufficient ammunition

          and other accoutrements for the use of all the New England colonies.

               Lord Loudoun, having succeeded William Shirley (1694-1771) as

          supreme British commander in North America, decided to bring his regular army

          units in the colonies up to full strength.  To do that he needed to recruit Americans

          and chose to seek volunteers from among the militia.  Three regiments in Nova

          Scotia and those in New York were all under the full compliment of 1000 men

          each.  Loudoun also sought rangers to supplement his regular troops on the frontier. 

          Governor Fitch was authorized to offer land bounties of 200 acres to each

          volunteer.  Loudoun required that the provinces grant the rangers "their pay, arms

          and cloathing."  The king would assist by granting New England, New York and

          New Jersey the subsidy of œ115,00, of which Connecticut received œ26,000. 

          Meanwhile, Loudoun, along with his second in command, Major-general

          Abercrombie, were trying to piece together a total force of 10,000 men, regular

          army and militia, to assault Crown Point.  Fitch pledged a force of 2500 militia,

          which was exactly double his assigned quota.  By the end of June 1756 he had

          raised the full compliment of men.

               On 30 March 1756 Governor Fitch replied to the inquiry made by the

          Lords of Trade on the composition and organization and legal standing of the

          militia.  He reported that not only "every enlisted soldier but all others exempted

          from duty are to keep . . . one gun and sword or cutlass, one pound of powder, 4

          pounds of bullets and 12 flints . . ."  All militia eligibles "are obliged on the first

          Monday of May annually to produce throughout the Colony, to be viewed by

          respective officers" the arms required by law.  The governor complained that "these

          arms being all of private property are very various in their sorts and sizes,

          according to the different occasions and humors of their owners and accordingly

          not at all adapted to the business of a Campaign."  He later reported that between

          the end of 1749 and the beginning of 1756 the iron furnaces of the colony had

          sustained an annual production of 120 tons of bar iron, some of which was used for

          military purposes.

               In 1757 the British government assigned Connecticut a quota of 5000 men

          out of a total assessment of 30,000 men to be recruited from among the colonial

          militias, to fight with the British army in Canada.  When the word reached

          Governor Fitch of the surrender of the British army at Fort William Henry, Fitch

          was alarmed.  Adding to his apprehension were reports of illness, death and

          desertion among the provincial militias in service in the northeast.  He informed the

          Earl of Holderness that he expected the worst.  "The militia was put under standing

          orders to march in whole or in part, as there should be occasion."

               In 1764 the legislature provided that no member of the unenrolled militia

          would have to train more often than four times a year.  In May 1746 Connecticut

          suspended the purchase of Indian scalps, an incentive to militiamen of long

          standing.  In May 1747 the fine for missing militia drills was raised to three

          shillings, the initial amount of the fine.

               In 1762 the governor reported to the Board of Trade the increases in

          population since 1756.  In 1756 there were 128,212 white and 3587 black

          inhabitants; and in 1762, there were 141,000 whites and 4590 blacks.  In 1762 the

          militia numbered 20,264.  The governor noted that "the Militia spend their own

          time, supply themselves with arms and are of no expence to the Colony." 

          However, there was a small expense associated with the artillery.  "We have," the

          governor said, "a small batterey at New London, expence of which to the Colony

          is small."

               In October 1774 Governor John Trumbull (1710-1785) reported to the

          King's Secretary of State that there were 191,392 caucasian inhabitants and 6464

          blacks, mostly freemen.  The Connecticut militia rosters contained the names of

          26,260 men.  The militia had been incorporated under an Act for the

          Encouragement of Military Skill for the Better Defense of the Colony.  The militia

          still embodied all able-bodied men, ages 16 to 45, excepting primarily clergymen

          and civil and eccleastical officers.  The militia was divided into eighteen regiments,

          with a mounted troop attached to each.  Each town had a "train band" company

          which drilled four times a year.  There were also 18 regiments with at least one

          company of mounted militia within each regiment.  Both foot soldiers and cavalry

          were required, under penalty of fines, to provide themselves with adequate and

          appropriate arms.  Fines were imposed if arms were not in good working order. 

          Trumbull noted that the militia was not "of any expense to the colony."  A general

          muster was held every four years.  By March 1775 there were 22 militia regiments

          of foot and additional artillery and mounted companies.  Regiments with less than

          six men had two drummers and two fifers;  when a regiment exceeded 100 men

          three of each musician were appointed.

               The subject of an adequate militia occupied the thoughts of many of the

          colony's leaders as war approached.  All agreed that the militia as then constituted

          was inadequate to protect Connecticut should the colony be engaged in a war with

          the mother country.  On 22 August 1774 Christopher Leffingwell wrote to Silas

          Deane (1731-1789) that, 

          

          At present we are in a miserable, defenceless situation; our Militia is under a bad regulation,

          (at least it appears to me to be so).  I want the Militia throughout the Continent on a better

          footing.  I have thought much but have said but little on the subject.  But as our whole

          dependence is in the wisdom, prudence and determination of the Congress, the highest and

          most respectable Council that ever was (and perhaps that ever will be) in America, who will

          give laws to this whole Continent, laws like unto those of the Medes and Persians, which

          must not be altered, but must and I believe will be strictly and most religiously observ'd ,--

          I could wish among other things it might be recommended by the Congress to have eighty

          or am' hundred thousand men on the Continent under regular Discipline, on the following

          plan or somewhat similar to it, vizt., The superior or commissioned Officers to be appointed

          by the General Assemblys, and to be such as are possessed of Real Estate worth contending

          for: The Adjutants and Serjeants to be under constant pay; to be well acquainted with

          discipline ; the former to instruct the Officers in what relates to the Evolution and

          Manouvres of an Army, the better to teach the manual Exercise: and that they be always

          ready to receive and discipline such men as shall be presented to fill up Vacancies.  The

          Arms and Clothing to be purchas'd by the respective Governments, and deposited under the

          care of proper Officers at the place of Rendezvous in each County.

          

          Leffingwell then described the militia system recently adopted.

          

          The Select-Men of each Town to make a return of the number of males from 18 to 45 years

          of age, excepting Clergy of all denominations, Magistrates, &c.  The proportionable number

          being flx'd that each Town shall raise.  The Select-Men, with the consent of the Inhabitants,

          either proceed to balloting or laying a tax to pay a premium sufficient to induce men to enter

          [as] Volunteers.  The men so chosen (on pain of Imprisonment or other penalty) be oblig'd

          to appear at the place of rendezvous, at time appointed, to learn the Exercise for one month

          at least, during which time they shall be subjected to military law, and all Offences

          punishable by Court-Martial.  But if any person shall be under necessity of leaving the

          County in which he serves, he shall be oblig'd to shew his reasons before two Magistrates

          in the Town in which he belongs, who shall be impowered (if they see cause) to grant him

          a Dismission, and appoint another in his stead, who must immediately attend the Serjeant

          to learn the Exercise; to receive the same pay (or more) that the regulars do during the time

          they are embodied; the money to be paid out of the Colony Treasury; and after attending one

          month in every year for three years, they shall be finally discharg'd.  But if during the above

          term they are call'd to actual service, they may not lay down their arms till they obtain a legal

          discharge, on pain of being treated as deserters.  Some such regulation as this appears to me

          absolutely necessary for our defence against both foreign and domestic Enemies.

          

          On 10 October he thought that "our militia [is] the best I have ever seen."

               The initial militia law of the state, after the Declaration of Independence

          was little more than a re-enactment of the 1740 law.   On 8 September 1774

          many prominent politicians in the colony petitioned the legislature to enact a new

          and stronger militia act in anticipation of war.  In May 1775 the Connecticut

          legislature offered modest payments to those of the citizenry who complied with

          the militia law.  "One shilling and six pence shall be paid to each of said men who

          shall supply themselves with three pounds of ball, also three shillings for a pound

          of powder, and three pence and a half for half a dozen flints."  If the citizen did not

          have his supplies or arm in readiness "such defect [is] to be supplied by the

          selectmen of each town, respectively, out of the town stock."

               As the militia took stock of its arms it was in for a bitter surprise. 

          Jedediah Huntingdon reported on 1 July 1775 that, "I got the arms repaired.  They

          were in the worst order when in took them in hand.  Some of them had nothing left

          but the barrel and part of the lock."  The legislature moved to contract with

          various local gunsmiths to repair and manufacture arms.  Among those who were

          contractors were Amasa Palmer, Edward Williams, William Williams, Hezekiah

          Huntington, David Trumbull of Lebanon and John Page of Preston.  They and

          other contractors were directed to mark the arms they made or refurbished with S.

          C. for the State of Connecticut and with their own names, initials or marks. 

          Edward Williams supplied the state with new musket locks to replace inoperable

          locks on older guns and around which to build new ones.  On 16 February 1776 the

          legislature hired Trumbull to oversee the refurbishing of arms found at Crown

          Point left over from the Seven Years War so that the state militia could be armed. 

          He and those whom he hired evidently performed this task well for on 14 July 1777

          the legislature appointed Trumbull to gather armourers and repair arms found at

          Albany.  Finally, on 29 July of the same year it ordered Trumbull to refit, appraise

          and issue various arms received from abroad and 500 muskets received from

          Springfield.  On 15 February 1777 the Council of Safety commissioned William

          Williams to repair a chest full of "broken firearms" from the ship Oliver Cromwell

          for the use of the state militia.  Europe was cleaning out its arsenals, shipping arms

          that, in many cases, were long out of repair or obsolete.  Most of these, even after

          repair, were deemed suitable only for militia use.

               The basic militia organization remained the 64 man company, although,

          as we have seen, the regiment had been introduced as an organizational unit by

          1672 and reconstituted in 1739.  In 1775 there were 24 regiments existing on paper. 

          In December 1775 the colonial leaders adopted a manual of exercise for militia

          training.

               Like the militia from other states, those from Connecticut were not well

          disposed to accept discipline.  They especially disliked siege and garrison duty and

          other times of inactivity between battles.  About 40% of the state's troops in the

          Revolution were militia, and nearly all Connecticut troops in the Continental Line

          had served in the militia.  In 1776 Washington complained to Connecticut

          Governor Nicholas Cooke that the Connecticut militia "are not to be depended

          upon for more than a few days; as they soon get tired, grow inpatient, become

          ungovernable, and of course leave the service."  

               In the winter of 1775-76 Connecticut militia were deployed in

          Massachusetts, while the colony raised 19 regiments of 900 men each.  In the

          summer of 1776 Washington put out a call for men to come to his aid in the New

          York city area.  The New York Mercury described the Connecticut volunteers and

          militia as "hearty fellows" who could stand against either the king's troops or

          German mercenaries.  The paper described the militia as wearing brown or blue

          regular coats and trousers, while some backwoodsmen arrived in white hunting

          shirts.

               On 8 June the Continental Congress order that Connecticut furnish two

          battalions of militia to reinforce the army in Canada.  Shortly thereafter it ordered

          5500 Connecticut militia to reinforce the army under siege in New York.  On 13

          June 1776 Jedediah Huntingdon wrote to his brother Jabez, lamenting the shortage

          of arms, "you see . . . how far short of the demands of Congress this Colony has

          come in furnishing their Militia at the present crisis."  Further, the militia itself was

          in deplorable state of readiness.  The legislature "have only ordered them reviewed

          and to stand ready."  However, the state was meeting its obligation to Congress to

          provide men to the Continental Line.  "I now inform you that this Colony are

          drafting the Militia agreeable to Resolve of Congress."

               The Connecticut Committee of Safety, like committees in other colonies,

          contracted with various gunsmiths, armorers, blacksmiths and assorted other

          tradesmen, to manufacture muskets for the colonial militia and the state's members

          of the Continental Line.  One such contractor was Samuel Hall of East Hadden,

          who offered to make 400 muskets at œ3/10/0 each.  Within a year Hall wrote to the

          legislature, in response to its complaints that he had failed to deliver the muskets

          in a timely fashion.  He pointed out that he had delivered 143, and was "pursuing

          his business faithfully" but the militia had drafted him and his apprentices and

          journeymen into the militia "so that he was hindered and delayed."  Hall pointed

          out that he and his men were supposed to have deferments because of the important

          nature of their work to the militia.  In May 1778 the legislature informed him that

          no more muskets would be purchased, but Hall responded that he had 44 almost

          completed and 25 more in various stages of completion.  The legislature debated

          and finally decided to accept the remainder.

               In the summer of 1777, urged on by Alexander Hamilton, Connecticut

          turned to the black community as a source of manpower.  Blacks could voluntarily

          enlist or be enlisted as a paid substitute of another.

          

                                            The Maine Militia

          

               Maine, also known as Cornwall, was the subject of early conflicting

          claims.  In November 1603 the French king granted Sieur de Monts a patent which

          included Maine.  In 1604-05 Champlain explored much of the province.  The

          territory also fell within the English grant issued in 1606 to the Plymouth

          Company.  It was noted again in the English Council for New England in 1620. 

          In 1622 the English king granted to Captain John Mason and Sir Fernando Gorges

          all lands between the rivers Kennebac and Merrimac, to a distance of 60 miles

          inland.  The name Maine was first noted in this charter and thus antedates all

          provincial names except Massachusetts and Virginia.  Charles I renewed the charter

          ten years later, stipulating that the grant must, henceforth, be called Maine

          exclusively.  In 1664 the king granted Maine to "our dearest brother James Duke

          of York" for an annual rent of four beaver skins.  It then reverted to Massachusetts

          and remained part of that state until it received statehood in 1820.

               The 1639 Grant of the Province of Maine to Gorges made him captain-

          general of the militia and stipulated that he was to provide his inhabitants with

          "Ordynances, Powder, Shott, Armour and all other Weapons, Munition and

          Habilliments of Warr both for defence and offence."  The militia was to contain the

          French and their Amerindian allies as well as all other hostile savages and to

          restrain "Rebells, Traytors, Mutyners and Seditious Persons."  In 1664, when the

          province came under the rule of the Duke of York, the king issued much the same

          command in the charter.  The militia was charged with the containment of

          "rebellion, insurreccon and mutinie" as its primary, but not exclusive,

          responsibility.  It was also to "repel and resist by force of arms" by "all wayes and

          means" all "warlike" savages and foreign troops as might threaten.

               On 17 October 1691, the king issued a royal charter which formally

          incorporated both Maine and Plymouth colonies into Massachusetts.

                              The New Hampshire Militia

          

               The royal Commission of New Hampshire of 1680 required that the

          president and council create and maintain a militia.  They were to "give

          commissions from time to time to such persons and persons whom they shall judge

          best qualified for regulating and discipline of ye militia."  The officers were to

          instruct their peers "how to bear and use their arms."  They were to make certain

          that "care be taken that such good discipline shall be observed as by ye said

          Council shall prescribe."  The commission made no mention of suppression of

          rebellion or other assistance to the civil authorities as was the case in other early

          charters, but commanded only that the militia provide for "ye better defence and

          security of all our loving subjects within ye Province of New Hampshire."

               Militia development in New Hampshire basically followed the standard

          New England pattern.  The militia law had required each male inhabitant between

          ages 16 and 60 to serve in the militia.  Each man had to provide himself with a

          musket, bayonet, knapsack, cartridge box, a pound of gunpowder, 20 lead bullets,

          and 12 flints.  Each town was required to maintain for each militia company of 60

          men 1 barrel of gunpowder, 200 pounds of lead and 300 flints.  All able-bodied

          males being eligible for draft into the regular military units.  The militias rarely

          drilled except in wartime.  When they did drill, on the sole authority of towns in

          which they were organized, it was frequently for the "greater glory of the King,"

          and not to increase the knowledge of the military arts.  The crown was always a bit

          suspicious of colonial military organization.  The militia was exercised to the

          taps of at least two drummers and various other musicians.

               In 1684 the Crown sent Edward Canfield to suppress radical Puritan

          practices, including much of the local self-government and religious and political

          discrimination against other religions.  As a career military man Canfield was naive

          about the institutions of self-government and localism.  Resistance took the form

          of rebellion, with a trained band led by a religious fanatic named Edward Gove. 

          Canfield organized a militia of his own supporters, many of whom were greedy

          land speculators.  Nathaniel Ware, a justice of the peace from Hampton, organized

          yet a third militia.  Ware was successful in disarming Gove before Canfield's militia

          arrived.  Canfield accused Gove of high treason, and Gove was found guilty, but

          was eventually pardoned.

               In 1693 Massachusetts asked New Hampshire to pay its share of costs for

          defense of the north and western frontiers.  Pleading inability to pay, New

          Hampshire did not pay.  Massachusetts then withdrew its men and the Indians fell

          upon the open frontier with a vengeance.  Even Portsmouth came under attack. 

          The governor was obliged to impress men of his own guard to man the outposts on

          the frontier because the militia was disheartened and their arms were in poor shape. 

          The militia had seen, or at least heard of, their comrades-in-arms being tortured

          after they were captured by the Amerindians.  Many merely wished to remain at

          home to defend and protect their own families.  New Hampshire was forced to beg

          assistance from the Massachusetts militia, which in a few months it did send.  The

          situation did have one small benefit.  It moved New Hampshire toward greater

          independence from Massachusetts.  The two would, for the time, have one

          governor, Lord Bellomont, but would otherwise be separate.  As originally

          constituted the governorship of New Hampshire had enormous powers.  He could

          dismiss local councillors, call the legislature into session or dismiss it, veto

          legislation and control the militia

               Fortunately for the settlers there was an epidemic of small pox among the

          Amerindians.  Their strength depleted, the Indian leaders sued for peace at Fort

          Pemaquid, pledging allegiance with the English and abandoning their French

          allies.

               The peace proved to be short lived.  Recruited during the summer of 1694

          by a Frenchman, Villieu, 250 warriors gathering from among the tribes of St. John,

          Penobscot and Noridgwock.  On the night of 17 July 1694, they attacked Durham,

          where there were 12 houses garrisoned by militia.  Over 100 settlers were captured

          and five of the fortified houses were burned.  In 1696 a group of Amerindians

          attacked Portsmouth and took 19 prisoners, but the militia commanded by Captain

          Shackford mustered, followed and overtook them, rescuing all prisoners.  The

          political situation had deteriorated because Governor Usher had engaged in land

          and commodity speculation during the terrible Indian wars.  He thereby lost both

          the respect of the people and the militias. 

               By 1703 the provincial executive power of Massachusetts Bay and New

          Hampshire were combined under Joseph Dudley, Anglicized American.  He loved

          power and was a sophisticated man of the world.  The Canadian governor,

          Callieres, died in May, 1703, and was succeeded by the Marquis de Vaudreuil, a

          veteran of the last war who had taken Callieres' place as governor of Montreal.  He

          was a French aristocrat, a capable leader who held his office until his death in

          1725.  Governor Dudley called the Abenaki chiefs to council in June, 1703, and

          they swore to keep the peace.  But within a month Governor had assembled some

          five hundred of the tribe and sent them against Maine under the Sieur de

          Beaubassin.

               Queen Anne's War, also called the War of Spanish Succession, raged

          between 1702 and 1713.  On 10 August 1703 the Abenakis raided settlements in

          Maine.  They divided into half a dozen war parties to strike simultaneously on

          August 10 from Wells to Saco to Casco Bay.  At Wells thirty-nine inhabitants were

          killed or captured.  At Saco and other places, a hundred were taken or killed.  Chief

          Moxus led the attack on the fort at Casco, which was under the command of Major

          John March.  Three militiamen, drawn from the fort by trickery, were killed. 

          Beaubassin brought up his other parties, substantially increasing the strength of his

          force.   The fort held out until relieved ny additional militia companies.  Two

          months. later another raid in the area cost eighteen killed or captured at Black

          Point, and six killed at York.  The French were successful in so committing the

          Abenakis that the English were unlikely to make peace with them.

               In August 1704 a large body of French and their Amerindian allies began

          a campaign of terrorism from Deerfield west, killing and capturing 130 settlers. 

          They destroyed Deerfield on 28 August 1704.  The government spurred the militia

          to action by offering a bounty of œ40 for each Indian scalp.  To eliminate the

          Abenakis' supplied, and to gain control of Acadian fisheries, 500 New England

          militiamen under Colonel Benjamin Church attacked and destroyed the French

          villages of Minas and Beaubassin  in July 1704.  In 1706, as the militia was

          pursuing one group of hostiles, another band fell upon Durham.  Disguising

          themselves as male militiamen, the local women repelled the aborigine.

               In late May 1706 the New Hampshire militia carried the war into New

          France, attacking Port Royal, seat of the French Indian agents.  Initially they fought

          bravely and well, but soon after the first victory the lack of a unified command and

          petty jealousies among militia commanders subverted the campaign.  On 21

          September 1707, in retaliation, the Amerindians attacked winter Harbor, Maine. 

          In October 1710 a joint punitive expedition of New England militia and British

          troops reduced the French stronghold at Port Royal.

               Under the Treaty of Utrecht of 11 April 1713 France ceded New-

          

          foundland, Acadia and Hudson's Bay.  The treaty effectively ended the long war

          between the eastern New England tribes, but the quarrel between the whites and the

          Abenakis was still simmering.  The French set a Jesuit priest, Father Sebastian

          Rasle to offer arms to the Abenaki if they would rise against the New England

          colonists.  In 1724 the New England joint militia attacked the largest Abenaki

          village in  Maine and killed over 80 warriors and Father Rasle.  Determined to end

          the threat from the Abenakis once and for all the governor authorized bounties of

          up to œ100 for scalps taken by the militiamen.  Spurred on by the bounty, Captain

          John Lovewell raised a militia company and surprised the last, large group of

          Abenakis on the border between Maine and New Hampshire and, in a bloody

          engagement, broke their power forever.  By 1730 they were no longer a threat and

          most migrated elsewhere.

               The New Hampshire legislature on 13 May 1718 passed an Act for the

          regulating of the Militia, which read in part,

          

          Whereas for the honor and service of his Majesty, and for the security of this his province,

          against any violence or invasion whatever, it is necessary that due care be taken that the

          inhabitants thereof be armed, trained, and in a suitable posture and readiness for the ends

          aforesaid, and that every person may know his duty, and be obliged to perform the same. 

          Be it therefore Enacted by His Excellency the Governor, Council and Representatives, 

          convened in General Assembly, and by the Authority of the same,  That all male persons

          from sixteen years of age to sixty (other than such as are hereinafter excepted), shall bear

          arms and duly attend all musters, and military exercises, of the respective troops and

          companies where they are listed or belong, That there be military watches appointed, and

          kept in every town, at such times, in such places, and in such numbers, and under such

          regulations, as the chief military officers in every town shall appoint, or as they may receive

          orders from the chief officer of the regiment;  and that all persons able of body, or that are

          of estate and not exempted by law, shall by themselves, or some meet persons in their stead,

          to the acceptance of the Commander of the watch, attend the same, on penalty of five

          shillings for each defect, there having been due warning given. . . . That the persons hereafter

          named be exempted from all trainings, viz. . . . Indians and Negroes. . . . That the persons

          hereafter named be and hereby are exempted from military watchings, and warnings, viz. 

          The members of the Council, secretary, representative for the time being, ministers and 

          elders  of churches, allowed physicians, and chyrurgeons, constables, constant ferrymen, and

          one miller to each grist mill. . . . All males from sixteen to sixty are required to bear arms and

          train with the companies in their regions.  All able-bodied persons are to help in keeping

          military watches.  Indians and negroes are exempted from trainings, but are not listed among

          those exempted from the watches.

          

               In 1724 the Connecticut militia serving on the northern frontier enlisted

          over 40 Amerindians in its service.  It also advised against permitting its

          Amerindian allies to migrate northward and mix with the Amerindian tribes which

          were friendly with the French.  Captain John Mason justified this prohibition.  "I

          can't think it any benefit to our Indians or to the Colony that they should associate

          themselves with the Indians that live remote."

               In 1745 a joint New England militia operation was successful in its siege

          of Louisbourg, the French fortress on Cape Creton Island.  The superior military

          prowess of the New Hampshire and other New England militiamen in this

          operation boosted the general morale as well as raised the English estimate of value

          of the New England militia.  The French and Indian reaction to the destruction of

          Louisbourg took the form of reprisal attacks on the New Hampshire frontier

          patrols.  He also authorized payments against for the taking of scalps by volunteer

          and militia companies.  The militia was quite effective in guarding the frontier.  In

          one of the few engagements worth mentioning, at Charlestown 30 militia repelled

          a reported 300 French and Indian attackers.

               During the French and Indian War, the New Hampshire militia was

          effective in holding and protecting the frontier.  Its militia served mainly as a

          deterrent against French and Indian encroachment into New England, and as a

          reservoir of manpower for the English effort.  Several hundred of the select militia

          fought in New York and in Canada.  Benning Wentworth, Governor of New

          Hampshire, in 1756 reported that "hardly a regiment of the Militia in the Province

          is fully provided with a pound of powder to each Man, which is the Quantity with

          which the Law requires each Soldier to be furnished . . . . The Militia both horse

          and foot are esteemed more useful for Home Service than those of the Southern

          Colonies, and that they are at most provided with Arms but in general of the

          meanest Sort."

               The origin of the well-organized New Hampshire militia of the

          Revolutionary War era can be traced to the efforts of Governor John Wentworth

          in the decade before the Revolution.  Wentworth thought to use the militia as a tool

          of control over seditious activities of groups which became the leaders of the

          patriot cause within his state.  He reorganized the militia into twelve regiments,

          which organization remained after revolution came.  He drilled and disciplined

          these regiments and appointed the most prominent men of the regions as their

          officers.  He instituted an inspection program which insured that the enlisted men

          had the required arms and accoutrements.  By the spring of 1775 Wentworth could

          report that the town militias were prepared to defend the colony against invasion

          "by His Majesty's enemies."  He also reported to Lord Darmouth that "The people

          here . . . are arming and exercising men, as if for immediate War."   Much of

          what Wentworth accomplished in militia reform was laudatory, but some of his

          appointments were purely political.  When he could think of no other civil rewards

          to dispense, he chose to make his favorites into officers in the militia.  Some of

          these appointments angered even his colonial supporters and certainly served to

          lower morale in the militia.

               On 13 December 1774 Paul Revere arrived in Portsmouth to relate that the

          Massachusetts Committee of Safety had learned that Wentworth was taking

          possession of Castle William and Mary, the stronghold that guarded Portsmouth

          harbor.  Henceforth, regular British troops would garrison that fortress instead of

          colonial militia.  Revere also related that England had embargoed further exports

          of military stores that might be used by the various colonial militias.  The local

          militia then began to remove supplies from all magazines that might fall under

          English control, or which might be seized by the British army.  On the night of 14-

          15 December militiamen raided Castle William and Mary and took control of 100

          barrels of gunpowder, several cannon and 60 stands of arms.  More munitions and

          arms might have been obtained except for the arrival of two English men-of-war

          from Boston.  Wentworth decided to test the loyalty of the militia, while

          suppressing insurrection, if possible, by ordering the militia to muster under his

          direction.  The militia ignored him.  Several magistrates then called upon him to

          inform him that matters were now beyond his power to control and that he could

          not expect the militia to control the people.

               Wentworth attempted to regain his control over the militia by making new

          appointments among the militia.  He dismissed John Sullivan, charging him with

          having led or organized the seizure of military supplies from Castle William and

          Mary, and for having ignored his orders to quell insurrection.  But it was Sullivan

          and his companions who now controlled the militia, not Wentworth.  When one

          loyalist militia captain attempted to follow the royal governor's orders, and to resist

          the patriots, the citizen-soldiers simply ignored him, elected a new captain and

          followed Sullivan's orders.

               The first reorganized militia company was created in Portsmouth on 20

          December 1774, followed rapidly by Dartmouth.  While most able-bodied men did

          join the militia, and many who were unable to bear arms were otherwise employed,

          one group of older men, most German veterans of the French and Indian War,

          formed the Old Men's Company of militia.  On 6 April 1775 the Hillsborough

          Congress resolved that,

          

          Whereas it is Necessary for the Defense of any People that they Perfect themselves in the

          military art, and whereas it is said that from the good discipline of regular Troops that one

          Regiment would put to flight ten that are not Disciplined, we earnestly recommend . . . to

          form themselves in to companies and make choice of such men as they shall think Best

          Qualified for teaching the military art to meet once a week.

          

               The third provincial congress met at Exeter, New Hampshire, on 21 April

          1775, to debate what action the province ought to take following the clash between

          minutemen and British troops at Lexington and Concord.  Four days later a

          delegate well-known to the members of the congress, James Sullivan, arrived from

          Boston, requesting that New Hampshire form a regular body of troops.  The

          congress took no action on that request, but it did resolve on 26 April that each

          town should lay in all necessary military supplies and raise companies of

          minutemen.  

               The war presented the New Hampshire militia with at least five problems. 

          First, it had a seacoast and a harbor at Portsmouth to defend from raids from the

          British navy, but the militia figured little in this unless the English landed troops,

          in which case the militia would be the first line of defense.  Second, the frontier,

          especially through the Connecticut Valley, was open to raids from the English and

          their Amerindian allies from Canada.  The defense of the frontier was the primary

          responsibility of ranging companies of militia.  Third, the same routes invited the

          relay of information from Tory spies to English authorities in Canada.  Rangers and

          frontier scouts would have to try to intercept spies and their messengers.  Fourth,

          the militia would have to act as a reservoir, to supply the army with men to help to

          fill the quota set by the national Congress.  Fifth, it would have to spread good

          news, quash rumors, refute bad news and generally keep morale high on the home

          front.  Most of the province was remote and rumors, more than accurate infor-

          

          mation, was the case on many days.

               When news reached New Hampshire that hostilities had commenced in

          Massachusetts many minutemen rushed to aid their brethren without waiting for

          orders to march.  They went to Massachusetts as individual volunteers, not as

          organized companies.  Moreover, the minutemen and organized militia were

          augmented by hundreds of the unorganized militia or irregulars.  They had no clear

          chain of command and were under no discipline.  Without any clear battle lines or

          engagements at hand the majority returned home as quickly as they had assembled. 

          General John Stark (1728-1822) was able, by force his personality, to retain many

          men whom he then enlisted into more formal units and placed them under his

          command.

               Immediately after the Revolution began New Hampshire reformed its

          militia.  One company of Rangers was stationed on the Connecticut River, and two

          additional militia companies were enlisted for support of the Rangers if need be. 

          The twelve regiments of militia which were recruited by Royal Governor

          Wentworth were retained and four regiments were formed as Minutemen.  The

          minutemen were treated as a select militia and trained monthly, with the intention

          of deploying them anywhere they were needed on short notice.

               On 20 May 1775 the New Hampshire Provincial Congress authorized the

          recruitment of 2000 men from the militia into the regular army.  When recruitment

          was complete the militia reservoir of trained manpower had produced sufficient

          men to form three regiments of state troops.  On 1 December 1775 Generals

          George Washington and John Sullivan were forced to recruit militia from New

          Hampshire and Massachusetts to take the place of the Connecticut militia because

          the latter had taken offense at some real or imagined injury from the commanders

          and had marched away, alleging that their enlistment was up.  New Hampshire

          provided thirty-one companies, containing 1800 militiamen; and Massachusetts

          contributed 3200 militiamen, all to serve six weeks.  Volunteers and militia filled

          the nation's needs through the end of the year 1775.  There was, as yet, no thought

          of a draft.

               When the Continental Congress created a national army the state

          regiments became the New Hampshire Continental Line.  Continental Congress

          allowed the continuation of election of subordinate officers and largely confirmed

          the state appointment of superior officers.  These three regiments were deployed

          throughout the nation until 1781 when the number was reduced to two line

          regiments, or 1152 men, although the greatest number raised in that time frame was

          744.  Throughout the war the town and state governments paid bounties of up to

          œ10 for volunteers who were willing to leave the militia and join the Continental

          Line.  In 1779 the state added the interesting inducement of exempting regulars

          from paying state taxes.  When these inducements failed to fill the ranks the state

          passed its first draft law on 18 January 1777.  The colonels of each regiment were

          assigned quotas for volunteers.  If an insufficient number volunteered from the

          various militia districts, the militia commanders were authorized to draft men from

          their units to fill the quotas.  Men could avoid being drafted by hiring substitutes

          and by simply refusing to march as ordered and paying rather nominal fines.  By

          1779 so many militiamen paid the fine rather than responding to the draft that the

          fines were raised substantially so that only a few rich draftees could afford to avoid

          service in that way.

               In addition three militia regiments were formed into a reserve brigade to

          protect the inhabitants.  The Militia Act provided that all general and field officers

          be appointed by the two houses of the state legislature.  Election had been

          commonplace, except under Royal Governor Wentworth, for all officers up to and

          including full colonel.  All subordinate militia officers were to be elected by the

          citizen soldiers.  The militia was a town-based organization and had long been

          controlled by the ruling oligarchy in each town.  After the events of Lexington and

          Concord nearly all militia officers resigned their commissions and invited the men

          in their old companies to elect new officers.  Most officers had gained sufficient

          respect from their men to be reelected by them.  Only those with loyalist

          sympathies were removed and replaced by patriots.

               The Continental Congress feared the establishment of a permanent

          military machine as a result of the war effort.  On 18 July 1775 Congress

          recommended that New Hampshire reorganize its militia by maintaining its quota

          by establishing a system of temporary enlistments from the state militia.  After

          an unsuccessful attempt to reorganize in August 1775, the provincial congress

          provided a new militia law on 9 September 1776.  The state legislature now

          appointed all superior officers, including colonels, and all commanding officers of

          the local militia organizations.  The state militia was placed under the command of

          a major-general, also a political appointee.  The militia comprised all able-bodied

          males between ages 16 and 50, although there was a long list of exemptions, mostly

          of clergy and those engaged in some aspect of military production.  The local

          militias were called "training bands" with 68 men comprising a fundamental unit. 

          All members of the training bands had to provide themselves with arms and

          specified accoutrements at their own expense.  If a man claimed to be too poor to

          equip himself he had to apply to the town council.  If they agreed that he was

          impoverished, and that equipping himself would be an undue 

          hardship, the town was obliged to equip him.  A poor man so equipped might be

          charged with performance of some civic duty as recompense.  Officers other than

          local commanders were popularly elected.  These training bands were to be

          exercised and drilled on a regular basis, eight times a year, and thus constituted a

          select militia.  The law was enforced, unlike earlier militia laws, and officers who

          failed to enforce the law were subject to fines and loss of position.  This group

          constituted the reservoir from which the vacancies in the Continental Line were

          filled.  There was also a great, or unenrolled, militia called the alarm list.  To this

          list there were few exceptions, except for those with religious scruples against

          military service and clergy.  The alarm list also had some organization and

          occasional training.  The members elected their own officers and drilled only twice

          a year.

               The militia organization was more than sufficiently strong to survive the

          change of political order.  It formed the basis of military and political order in the

          towns and gave enormous support to the Provincial Congress.  That congress

          recommended increased military training for all communities.

               The militia took charge of arms and gunpowder and distributed these

          according to needs.  The militia laws had long required each town to maintain

          stocks of gunpowder, flints and muskets, but, as elsewhere, enforcement of the law

          had been lax.  Towns began to scout for supplies, some of which they purchased. 

          With all military supplies becoming scarce the New Hampshire militia looked for

          other possible sources.

               When the enlistment of the Connecticut militia expired in March 1776

          sixteen companies of New Hampshire militia were sent to Boston and remained

          until the English withdrew.  Overall one authority estimated that "the percentage

          of adult males who left their homes for any length of time remained smaller than

          in each of the colonial wars.  After 1776 the total never exceeded one-tenth of

          those eligible for military service."  Terms of enlistment for New Hampshire

          soldiers were short as with the soldiers from all the states.  In 1777 and 1778 some

          enlistments were for only eight or nine months.  Desertions were not uncommon,

          with men leaving for a variety of reasons, including tending to their farms and

          protecting their families.  The militia continued to serve as a reservoir for continual

          recruitment of replacements.  On 23 January 1777 General Washington wrote the

          New Hampshire Committee of Safety that "We have a full army one day and scarce

          any the next."  On 31 January Washington reported that  "our new army will

          scarcely be raised, before it will dwindle and waste away".  Finally, in October

          1778 Washington wrote to the New Hampshire Committee of Safety that, "I am

          religiously persuaded, that the duration of the war and the greatest part of the

          misfortunes and perplexities we have hitherto experienced are chiefly attributed to

          the system of temporary enlistments."

               In 1790 General Henry Knox reported to Congress that, although

          Massachusetts and New Hampshire had been assigned a quota of 88 battalions,

          New Hampshire had never supplied more than 1282 men at a time, and that by

          war's end, had only 700 men in continental service.

               Politics entered into the appointment of all superior officers.  Some

          appointed officers resented political intrusion into what they considered their

          prerogative.  General John Sullivan wrote the Provincial Congress, "Surely by my

          having the Choice of 31 set the Officers who have been under My Immediate

          Inspection, I could have had a much Better Opportunity of Selecting 8 good ones

          that You who were not here and Could not know how they behaved."  Others

          argued that appointment of officers lessened the possibility of social revolution

          from below, while increasing discipline.  They feared, "electing officers by the

          voice of tumult, dissention and party spirit" would create a truly revolutionary

          militia.

               Ill feeling among several ranking militia officers resulted in the

          resignation of Colonel John Stark of Dunbarton from his regular army appointment. 

          Stark believed that he had been passed over for promotion to general both in terms

          of experience and seniority.  He had served with distinction in the Seven Years

          War as a captain in Rogers' Rangers and, at the beginning of the war, was probably

          the most able commander available to the province.  He was opinionated and direct

          in manner and was not a politician and often offended those who were.  Stark

          returned to militia duty and campaigned bravely and wisely.  The army's loss

          became the militia's gain.  He was given command at Bennington and deployed his

          militia brilliantly.  For this leadership he was rewarded with an appointment as a

          brigadier-general in the Continental Line.

               John Sullivan (1740-1795) was a lawyer from Durham with essentially no

          military experience.  He had been a major in the local militia.  After much political

          intrigue and backbiting Sullivan was given command over New Hampshire's three

          regiments of the Continental Line.  Most of his contributions to the patriot effort

          were consequently as an officer in the regular army.  He did have an opportunity

          to use his militia experience in a punitive expedition against the Amerindians and

          tories in New York.  After a number of especially bloody and ruinous raids

          throughout New York and south in the Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania, General

          Washington bent to political pressures and diverted as part of his small force to a

          campaign on the frontier.  On 29 August 1779 Sullivan's force, consisting of about

          equal numbers of militia and regulars, defeated a tory-Iroquois force led by Sir

          William Johnson's son John and Joseph Brant at Elmira, New York.  Sullivan

          pressed on, destroying 40 Seneca and Cayuga villages and 160,000 bushels of corn

          and other foodstuff and supplies.  The cost was very small to the patriots, in large

          because Sullivan managed his force wisely and in part because Sullivan managed

          his force wisely and in part because the Amerindians avoided direct confrontation. 

          The expedition effectively reduced the Iroquois threat to occasional small raids.

               General John Sullivan hero to the American Revolution and commander

          of the punitive expedition in New York among the Six Nations in 1778, was the

          post-war governor in New Hampshire.  A strong supporter of the state militia

          system, Sullivan supported the enactment of a strong militia act, based on his

          wartime experiences.  "The citizens of every community, however desirous of

          peace, should always be prepared for war, and this can never be the case without

          a well-regulated militia, or a standing army."  He rejected the notion of a standing

          army in the free republic.  "The latter, I am fully persuaded, is more dangerous to

          the liberties of any country than a foreign force, and I most ardently pray may never

          be established in the American states."  He knew that as a general in the late war

          "I could do but little towards forming a well-regulating militia, without the

          countenance and aid of the people at large."  He believed that militia duty was a

          responsibility of all citizens, and was critical of the post-war militia act because

          "With us, at this day, a slender escape, a defect in the militia law, or, at a word, a

          small fine, amy exempt a person during life from appearing in the field."  Tyrants

          are under no such disability because "the despot issues his orders and punishes the

          breech, according to his caprice."  The only way to avoid having a standing army

          was to establish a militia with a universal obligation to militia service.  "If we

          approve not of a standing army, our militia must be taught the use of arms; or our

          safety will defend on the peaceful dispositions of our neighbors, and not upon any

          precautions of preparations of our own."  He recommended the merit appointment

          of superior militia officers and the popular election of the minor officers. 

          "Formerly, the man of wealth and family was sought after, without the least

          attention to capacity."  This was not the democratic way, for in a democracy talent

          and ability are more important than family connections or wealth.  Sullivan

          suggested that officers be instructed in military science for "it is really surprising

          that . . . the most important science should be so lightly esteemed as to entrust the

          teaching of it to persons totally uninstructed and who have not even the capacity

          to acquire a knowledge of it themselves."  He noted that the law of his own state

          "enacts that every soldiers shall be provided with a gun, bayonet, cartouch-box" but

          lamented that there was no requirement that there be "a uniformity of arms." 

               The first constitution of the state of New Hampshire was not created until

          after the war was over, in 1784.  Reflecting the experiences of the colonial

          experience and war, the document provided for a militia, popular election of minor

          militia officers, legislative appointment of superior officers and subordination of

          the military to the civil authorities.  It also contained a strong statement outlining

          the individual's responsibility to offer his services in defense of his state.  It also

          provided exemptions from military service for those who, by reasons of conscience

          and religion, were opposed to bearing arms.  The president of the state was named

          commander of all military forces, including the militia.  The constitution outlined

          the duties, functions and control of the militia.

          

          The president of this state for the time being, shall be commander in chief of the army and

          navy, and all the military forces of the state, by sea and land; and shall have full power by

          himself; or by any chief commander, or other officer, or officers, from time to time, to train,

          instruct, exercise and govern the militia and navy; and for the special defence and safety of

          this state to assemble in martial array, and put in warlike posture, the inhabitants thereof, and

          to lead and conduct them, and with them to encounter, expulse, repel, resist and pursue by

          force of arms, as well by sea as by land, within and without the limits of this state; and also

          to kill slay, destroy, if necessary, and conquer by all fitting ways, enterprize and means, all

          and every such person and persons as shall, at any time hereafter, in a hostile manner,

          attempt or enterprize the destruction, invasion, detriment, or annoyance of this state; and to

          use and exercise over the army and navy, and over the militia in actual service, the law-

          martial in time of war, invasion, and also in rebellion, declared by the legislature to exist, as

          occasion shall necessarily require: and surprize by all ways and means whatsoever, all and

          every such person or persons, with their ships, arms, ammunition, and other goods, as shall

          in a hostile manner invade or attempt the invading, conquering, or annoying this state: and

          in fine, the president hereby is entrusted with all other powers incident to the office of

          captain-general and commander in chief, and admiral, to be exercised agreeably to the rules

          and regulations of the constitution, and the laws of the land; provided that the president shall

          not at any time hereafter, by virtue of any power by this constitution granted, or hereafter to

          be granted to him by the legislature, transport any of the inhabitants of this state, or oblige

          them to march out of the limits of the same, without their free and voluntary consent, or the

          consent of the general court, nor grant commissions for exercising the law-martial in any

          case, without the advice and consent of the council.

          

          Conscientious objectors, however, had to bear the costs of hiring replacements. 

          The bill of rights attached to the constitution contained the following provisions.

          

          XXIV.  A well regulated militia is the proper, natural and sure defence of a state.

          

          XXV.  Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up

          without the consent of the legislature.

          

          XXVI.  In all cases, and at all times, the military ought to be under strict subordination to,

          and governed by the civil power.

          

                                   Vermont Militia

          

               In 1749 New Hampshire Governor Benning Wentworth began issuing

          land grants to unexplored territories west of the Connecticut River.  New York also

          had claims on the area and in 1764 King George III decided in favor of that colony. 

          In 1770 the highest court of New York held the New Hampshire claims to be

          invalid, forcing those who had purchased lands from New Hampshire to buy them

          anew from New York.  Settlers who had what they believed to be valid grants from

          New Hampshire fought a minor, but effective, guerilla war.  They elected Ethan

          Allen (1741-1801) colonel of their "militia" known as the Green Mountain Boys. 

          Initially known as the Grants, Vermont was comprised of the eastern counties of

          New York, especially Charlotte, Cumberland and Gloucester.  British authorities

          refused to intervene with military force and attempted to mediate a peaceful

          settlement to the dispute.  Of course, a force of regular British army would have

          been worthless in the hilly wilderness.  British authorities also refused to allow

          New York to issue more land warrants until the dispute was settled.  In this matter

          Britain acted wisely and had it so acted in other matters might have precluded the

          American Revolution.

               Early in the war for independence the Green Mountain Boys espoused the

          patriot cause.  Massachusetts had authorized a regiment to capture Fort

          Ticonderoga and sent Benedict Arnold on that mission.  On 6 May 1775 Arnold

          learned that Ethan Allen was raising a force of Green Mountain Boys to

          accomplish the same mission.  Arnold joined Allen and attempted unsuccessfully

          to claim command.  Nonetheless, Arnold joined the force of 83 Green Mountain

          Boys and on 9 May crossed Lake Champlain and early in the morning of 10 May

          captured the 42 man British garrison, as Allen is alleged to have said, "in the name

          of the great Jehovah and the Continental Congress."  On 12 May the force occupied

          Crown Point and on 16 May it seized St. John's across the Canadian border.  The

          force suffered no casualties, but captured some valuable supplies, including

          cannon, which were later of great use to Washington's army.  Ethan Allen reported

          to the Massachusetts Congress that, "by order of the General assembly of the

          Colony of Connecticut, [I] took the fortress of Ticonderoga by storm."  He

          described his force.  "The soldiery was composed of about 100 Green Mountain

          Boys and nearly 50 veteran soldiers from the Province of Massachusetts Bay . . .

          under the command of Colonel James Easton."

               Allen continued his partisan activities, capturing Skenesborough on 12

          May.  He also captured a schooner and was delighted to find some medium bore

          cannon in good order on board.  He communicated his good fortune to Connecticut

          Governor Jonathan Trumbull, sending along with the message "a major, a captain

          and two lieutenants in the regular establishment of George the Third."  He

          indicated that he intended to march on other British fortifications, and to capture

          other boats, along Lake Champlain.  "The enterprise," he bragged, had been

          achieved by the "Green Mountain boys, nor do I hesitate as to [reporting] the

          success."

               Led by Ira Allen (1751-1814), brother of Ethan; and Thomas Chittendon

          and Jonas Fay, Vermont declared itself to be an independent republic during the

          Revolution and is thus unique among the New England states.  The Continental

          Congress never recognized Vermont's claim to nationhood, did not grant it

          statehood and left its legal status undecided during the entirety of the war.  Still, it

          treated Vermont as though it was a state in terms of military action, recruitment and

          mutual assistance.  On 1 January 1777, a letter sent to General Washington

          reported on the Vermont independence movement.  The state of New York

          

          formerly consisted of 14 counties of which five and a part of a sixth are in possession of the

          enemy and a considerable part of the inhabitants of the Counties of Gloucester, Cumberland

          and Charlotte appear determined to shake off their dependence upon us so that above one-

          half is already lost; and of the remainder a considerable portion is disaffected and ready upon

          a favorable opportunity to join the enemy.

          

               In early 1777, having declared itself an independent and sovereign state,

          Vermont sought admission to the American confederation.  New York Governor

          Clinton opposed the secession, but realized that practically he was powerless to

          stop it.  Had he attempted to employ force, it would have diverted badly needed

          troops of both New York and Vermont from the northern department of the

          fledgling army.  The authorities of Vermont were prepared to use the newly formed

          state militia to guarantee its independence against New York and England alike. 

          Its separate existence as a republic lasted for 14 years until it was admitted to the

          union as a state in 1791.

               While still a part of New York, on 7 June 1776, Vermont was ordered to

          raise 250 militia to be inducted into Continental Line.  Just three days later, on 9

          June, the four counties of New York which became Vermont were asked to provide

          men, with a bounty of $4 as an incentive, to assist in the invasion of Canada.  On

          23 July 1776 the counties were asked to muster 250 militia to serve on the frontier. 

          The pay per day was based on the allowance given to soldiers of equal rank in

          continental service.  Each man was required to provide himself with a "good

          Musket or Fire-lock, Powder Horn, Bullet Pouch, Tomahawk, Blanket and

          Knapsack."  Further, a company of rangers was to be formed whose duties

          extended not only to the protection of the frontier, but to assisting neighboring

          counties with Amerindian invasions.

               The most famous action of the Vermont militia, the seizure of Fort

          Ticonderoga,  occurred just prior to the Vermont independence movement came to

          fruition.  Ethan Allen was captured on 25 September 1775 during Arnold's ill-fated

          campaign against Canada, but exchanged on 6 May 1778.  He then retired from

          military life, although granted the rank of colonel in the Continental Line.  Most of

          what is heard of Vermont's military contributions during the war came from a

          second Vermont regiment raised under Colonel Seth Warner (1743-1784).  Allen

          became a major general and commander of the state militia.

               The Vermont Constitution of 1777 provided "that the people have a right

          to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State."  It also prohibited the

          maintenance of armies in peacetime and subordination of military to civil power.

               On 29 August 1777 the government raised 375 militia for its own defense. 

          On 18 June it offered a bounty of œ4/4/0 for militiamen who would enlist in the

          Continental Line.  Later, the bounty was raised to $10.  The men also received 50

          shillings a month pay.  Because of the constant threat of invasion from Canada,

          one-sixth of the militia was stationed for six months duty on a rotational basis on

          the frontier.  On 20 February 1779 the legislature authorized an allowance of $5

          for each gun lost by either Vermont soldiers or militiamen in actual combat or

          when they were captured in an engagement.  On 11 March 1779 100 militia were

          sent to guard the frontier against an anticipated Tory and Amerindian attack.  On

          5 June 1779 150 militia were mustered to serve as guards for prisoners and supplies

          in Rutland.

               In the spring of 1779 many citizens of Cumberland County denied the

          power of the government to draft militiamen into the Continental Line.  They

          threatened violence and formed a rag-tag non-uniformed militia to resist the draft. 

          Ethan Allen drew a second non-uniformed militia force, rode through Cumberland

          County and suppressed the draft riots.  No one was killed or injured in this

          incident.

               Ethan and Ira Allen entered into negotiations with British authorities as

          early as 1779, in a desperate attempt to guarantee Vermont independence.  The

          primary role of Vermont's militia during the Revolution was the maintenance of

          peace on its border with Canada, especially against the northern, formerly pro-

          French, Indian tribes.  Ethan Allen loved to brag that he had 7000 militia under his

          command, but in the spring of 1780 it could barely field 19 men to defend along

          the western flank of its defensive line.  It seems unlikely that Allen ever mustered

          more than 500 men at one time during the war, out of a population of about

          40,000.

               The Treaty of Paris of 1783 did nothing to clarify Vermont's status,

          although New York continued to deny its separation until Vermont was finally

          admitted to statehood in 1791.                     The Rhode Island Militia

          

               Rhode Island was created by pioneers who possessed virtually nothing but

          their simple household goods, tools and arms and a strong determination to

          succeed.  Most did not possess even simple ploughs.  In the seventeenth century the

          colony was known only for its agricultural products, notably tobacco, sheep, swine,

          cattle, corn, tobacco and goats.  The population grew very slowly and prosperity

          came but slowly.  Founder Roger Williams drew up a simple social contract to

          which young men, upon achieving majority, added their names to those of their

          forbearers.

               Williams believed fully in the universal brotherhood of all humankind and

          labored hard at achieving a lasting peace not only between Europeans and the

          Amerindians, but also among the various Amerindian tribes.  His mission of peace

          caused him to travel throughout all of New England.  Already unpopular among the

          Puritans for his religious views, Williams argued that the various Indian wars had

          been caused directly by the bellicose policies the other New England colonies had

          followed regarding their aboriginal neighbors.  He especially wished to prevent the

          formation of an alliance between the Pequots and Narragansett tribes because he

          regarded it as an ant-colonial military arrangement.  If peace could be achieved,

          then the militia would have few duties and responsibilities, even though militia duty

          was among the most fundamental responsibilities accepted by all signing the

          contract.

               The Rhode Island militia was formed prior to 1640.  Before the colony

          created a formal militia organization it created a watch system.  On 5 September

          1638 the legislature "ordered that on the twelfth day of this ninth month there shall

          be a general training and exercising of those who are to bear arms in the art of

          military discipline and that [includes] all that are 16 and upwards of 50."  At the

          same time the legislature created public militia inspection officers and ordered them

          to "go into every house and [see] what arms are defective and that the men whose

          arms" are defective are "ordered to have the same repaired."  The inspectors were

          to make certain as well that each man had four pounds of gunpowder for his

          weapon.  From 1639 onward the men of the militia companies elected their own

          officers."

               By 1640 the Rhode Island militia was training eight days a year, with a

          general muster being held twice a year.  The law required that by "the second beat

          of the drum all men allowed and assigned to bear arms are to make their personal

          appearance, completely armed, to attend their colours by eight o'clock in the

          forenoon."  The legislature completely revised the colony's law in 1640.  The

          portion which covered the militia reads,

          

          20.  It is agreed and ordered, that all Men allowed and assigned to beare armes, shall make

          their personall appearance completely armed with Muskett and all its furniture ; or pike with

          its furniture, to attend their Coulers by Eight of the clock in the morning, at the second beat

          of the Drum, on such dayes as they are appointed to Traine.  And further it is ordered, that

          eight severall times in the yeare the Bands of each Plantation shall openlie in the field be

          exercised and disciplined by their Commanders and Officers.  And further it is ordered, that

          there shall be two Generall Musters in the yeare, the one to be disciplined at Nieuport, the

          other at Portsmouth; and that if any shall faile to make their personal appearance as

          aforesaid, according to time and place aforesaid, he shall forfeit and pay the sum of five

          shillings into the hands of the Clark of the Band.  And further it is ordered, and by this

          present authority established, that if any person shall come to the said Training or Generall

          Muster, defective in his armes or furniture equivalent, he shall pay forthwith the sum of

          twelve pence ; and further it is ordered, that when the Generall Muster shall be held at the

          one Towne, there shall be a sufficient Guard sett and left at the other Towne with the

          Constable or his deputy.  And further, it is ordered, that the Commanders Vidg't, Chieftaine

          and Lieutenant, shall appoint the dayes and times of their s'd meetings; And further it is

          ordered that all men who shall come and remaine the space of twentie days on the Island, he

          shall be liable to the injunctions of this order; provided, that if eyther heardsmen or Lighter

          men be other ways detained upon their necessary employments, they shall be exempted,

          paying only two shillings and six pence for that day, into the hands of the Clarke : And

          further be it established, that the two Chiefe Officers of each Towne, to witt: the one of the

          Commonweal, the other of the Band; and these two officers upon the exhibition of the

          Complaint by ye Clark (which shall be within three dayes after the faults committed), shall

          Judge and determine of the reasons of their excuses, who upon the hearing thereof, shall

          determine whether such person shall pay five shillings and six pence, or nothing.  And

          further it is ordered, that Libertie be granted to Farmer or Farmer,' to leave one man at the

          s'd Farme, he paying the sum of two shillings and six pence into the hands of the Clarke. 

          And further it is ordered, that the Clarke of each Band shall receive the monies off any Man

          to provide and make supply of such things as he shall stand in need, of; during which time,

          after the deliverie of the s'd money, he shall be excused for his defects in his Armes ; but if

          the money be not delivered, then to be liable to the injunction herein contained ; provided,

          also that the Clark of each Band shall hereby be authorized to ask, receive or destraine for

          all such fines or forfeitures As by any are made, and that the said sum of monies so levied

          shall be employed to the use and service of the said Band.

          

               21.  It is ordered, that the Treasury shall provide and fitt up on Drum Collers and

          halberts for the Band of Portsmouth.

          

               On 1 March 1643 the legislature ordered "every man to come armed unto

          meeting every sixth day."  Just a few weeks later, on 10 April, the legislature

          reiterated its position "that every man carry arms with them unto the meeting [on]

          the sixth day."

               In 1647 the assembly ordered that,

          

          the Towne Councils shall have power to cause those which are defective in armes, to he

          supplied in an equal way according to Estate and strength.  And if any of ye Traine Band

          after his appearance shall refuse or neglect the command of his Captain, to be exercised and

          disciplined, he shall forfeit as much as if he had not appeared:  And that the Town Council

          shall order the power of the Military Officers within the Towne, and in all cases that

          concerne ye whole, the President and ye foure assistants, and ye Captains of every Band

          shall be the Councill of Warr; that if any of the Officers of ye Band be at any time left out,

          they shall beare Armes again, for ye Constitution of our place will not beare the contrary :

          that every Inhabitant of the Island above sixteen or under sixty yeares of age, shall alwayes

          be provided of a Musket, one pound of powder, twenty bullets, and two fathom of Match,

          with sword, rest, bandaleers all completely furnished.

          

               In 1647, in another legislative action, the council moved to prevent the

          sale of arms and gunpowder to the enemy.

          

          It is ordered and agreed, that if any person or persons, shall sell, give, deliver, or any

          otherwayes convey any powder, shott, lead, gunn, pistoll, sword, dagger, halberd or pike to

          the Indians that are or may prove offensive to this Colonie, or any member thereof, he or

          they, for the first offence, shall forfeit ye sum of five pounds; and for his second offence,

          offending in the same kind, and being lawfully convicted, shall forfeit ten pounds; half to

          the State, and half to him that will sew for it, and no wager of Law by any means to be

          allowed to the offender.  And, it is further ordered, that if any person shall mend or repaire

          their Guns, he or they shall forfeit the same penaltie.

          

               In 1650, the legislature acted to repair certain deficiencies in the colony's

          militia.  First, the law had not specifically required that the citizens own firelocks

          that were in working order so the legislature ordered that all the colony's arms be

          brought into proper working order.  "All excuses sett aparte," it decreed, the

          gunsmiths authorized by the colony  "shall mende and make all lockes, stockes and

          pieces that by order from the warden of each Towne shall be from any of the

          inhabitants thearof presented to them."  The legislature did offer to stand the cost

          of such repairs, giving "just and suitable satisfaction in hand payed, without delay." 

          Those who failed to bring their arms forth were placed "under the penaltie of ten

          pounds, to be levied by distraint from the head officer to the use of the sayd

          Towne's Militia."  Next, it offered to pay for the repairs to private arms used in

          militia service.  "It is ordered, that all men that have gunns and pieces to mend, and

          have need to have them mended for their present defence, shall forthwith,

          according to order, Carrie those pieces to mende, upon paine of forfeiting ten

          shillings a piece, which shall be levied by distraint from the head officer of the

          Towne to the use of the sayed Towne's militia."

               Next, in the same year, it decided to create adequate gunpowder

          magazines along with supplies of flint or match as needed by establishing

          repositories of these vital militia supplies.  The assembly "ordered that the

          proportions allotted to the Towne for a magazine for the present, and constant

          supply, be equally layed upon the inhabitants of each Towne by the councill

          thereof."  The inhabitants were taxed "according to each man's strength and estate;

          which being made known to every man by theare Sarjeants."  Failure to contribute

          was punishable by fine.  "Each man in particular shall be liable to the penaltie

          above sayed."  The legislature specified what must be kept constantly on hand

          in the magazines.

          

          It is ordered by the authoritie of this present Assemblie, that each Towne shall have in it a

          magazine for its present and constant defence.  The Towne of providence shall have in its

          magazine one barrell of good powder, five hundred poundes of leade, six pikes, and six

          muskets all in good case and fit for service.  The Towne of Portsmouth shall have in its

          magazine two barrells of good powder, one thousand weight of leade, twelve pikes and

          eighteen muskets, all in good case and fit for service.  The Towne of Newport shall have in

          its magazine three barrells of good powder, one thousand weight of leade, twelve pikes and

          twentie foure muskets, all in good case, and fit for service.  The Towne of Warwick shall

          have in its magazine one barrell of good powder, five hundred weight of leade, six pikes and

          six muskets, all in good case and fitt for service; and all thease magazines shall be thus

          compleately furnished by the last day of the month called August next ensuinge, under the

          penaltie of ten pounds sterling for each default therein, upon sufficient information of the

          default, by virtue of a warrant from under the Presidents hande, the Generall Sarjeant shall

          take it by distraint and forthwith returne it into the publicke Treasurie.

          

               In 1650, the legislature again laid on all inhabitants the heavy burden of

          providing an arm suitable for militia use.  "It is ordered that . . . one was posest of

          a gunn, &c., as his owne proper goods, and upon demand of the Solicitor cannot

          produce, or will not give a good account what is become of it, before one or two

          persons or the Atturney, he shall be judged guiltie of breach of the lawe." 

          Moreover, the law extended "to enquirie especially of gunnes and other

          prohibitions, as powder, shott, leade, wine or liquors that hath been marchandized

          or convayed away to the Indians since the lawe made in that respect."

               In 1651 the colony experienced a time of grave civil disorder and

          insurrection.  William Coddington, president of the General Court, attempted to

          effect a coup d'etat, claiming that he had the support of the vast majority of the

          population.  When the court threatened to remove him from office if he "deserted"

          the colony, Coddington sailed for England.  There he brought his case before the

          Council of State which received him favorably and offered him a lifetime

          appointment as governor of the islands of Aquidneck and Conanicut.  Dr John

          Clarke and Roger Williams were able to convince the Council to rescind

          Coddington's commission, largely because they convinced it that Coddington had

          formed a conspiracy with the Dutch at New Amsterdam.  On 7 April 1652 the

          Council of State revoked Coddington's commission and confirmed Williams' patent

          of 1644.  The government had been able to hold its own and to restore some

          semblance order in some part because it controlled the militia.

               The collapse of Coddington's scheme did not restore a full and lasting

          peace for the centrifugal forces of excess liberty and liberty bordering on license

          were far too strong.  Especially in Providence the populace was dissatisfied with

          any sort of governmental restraints on what was virtual anarchy.  Adding to the

          discord was the split between the islands and the mainland so great in intensity that

          between 1651 and 1654 the court met with only delegates from Providence and

          Warwick, while all other areas boycotted the legislative meetings.  Finally, in 1654,

          Williams returned and threw all his energies into building a cohesive and integrated

          society.  Bolstered by a letter of support from Cromwell, Williams did succeed in

          overcoming the disunity and regional antagonisms so that by March 1656 even

          Coddington agreed to accept the authority of the General Court and charter. 

          Introduction of the common American punishments of the time, including the

          whipping post, pillory and stocks;  and the appointment of constables and militia

          sergeants to assist in maintaining the peace also helped restore order.

               In the Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations of 18 July

          1663 the crown granted the authority to the governor and company to appoint

          militia officers and to prepare "for the defence and safeguard of the sayd

          Plantations."  More specifically, the governor was "to assemble, exercise in arms,

          martiall array, and put in warlyke posture, the inhabitants of sayd collonie for theire

          special defence and safety."  Should the militia be called out to defend the colony

          or to go on offense against its enemies, the militia was permitted to "encounter,

          expulse, expell and resist by force of armes . . . and alsoe to kill, slay and destroy"

          the king's enemies.  In implementing this charter in March 1664 the General

          Court repealed the earlier provision that all laws had to be approved by the towns

          before becoming effective.

               In 1665 the Assembly of Rhode Island, "taking into consideration the

          great defect in training, occasioned by the remissness of some vnder the pretence

          of the burden in training soe often as eight dayes in the yeare,  . . . enacted and

          declared, that the sixe dayes only in the yeare be ordered, and are hearby ordered

          for the milletary exercise in training, which shall be dilligently attended to in each

          respective towne . . . ."  The Assembly was most concerned about the burden that

          the militia law placed on the poor by requiring them to purchase arms from their

          own meager resources and by forcing them to miss many days' work.  It noted "the

          great inequality, in that the poorest being vnable to spare wherewith to maintaine

          armes and amunition, as powder, &c., yett are forced by the law to beare armes as

          well as the most able . . . ."  The act specified the times for militia muster.  "The

          dayes prefixed for the exercise of training, are yearly to be the last Monday in May;

          the first Monday in September; the first Monday in November; the last Monday in

          March, and the last Monday in Aprill."  

               The act made the officers responsible for gathering the militia for training

          "vpon penalty that each Captain, or in his absence, the Leftenant of each towne,

          shall be fined in case he call not the listed soulders together by warrant. . . ."  It also

          specified the penalties for failures.  "The summe of ten pound starling to the

          Gennerall Treasury, to be by law recovered by the said Treasurer, for the Collony;

          as alsoe fortye shillings for each defect of calling the said company together to

          traine on each the training dayes hereafter appointed, or refusing then to exercise

          them in training . . . "  The act specified fines "for every defecte in not duely

          attending the trainings, each one listed, soe deficient, shall for every dayes defect,

          pay three shillings fine, to be levied by distraint on the partyes goods, or on the

          goods of the master, or mistress, or parents of such sones or sarvants as are

          defective; and to the end the fines may be levied more certainly, the same . . . . "

               Some militia fine money was to be used to maintain and repair, even

          purchase if absolutely necessary, arms for the poorer men.  "And for the

          incorradgement of the meaner sort, there shall be alowed yearly nine shillings in

          currant pay to, or for, each soldiare listed in the traine band, to be duely payed and

          discounted yearly by the Clarke or Treasurer of the traine band, at the Captain's

          discretion for the repaireing of armes, &c.; and the said nine shillings yearly to be

          payed and cleared by or before the last Monday in March. . . ."

               The law required that parents be responsible for their sons and masters for

          their servants.  Specifically, it required that, "parents and masters as find armes and

          amunition (as they must doe) for their sones and sarvants that are listable, which

          are to be listed, and to traine. . . ."  Further, the law required that householders or

          other men that find themselves armes and traine in their owne persones; which all

          men from sixteene years of age to sixtye yeares old are hearby required to doe, both

          masters, parents, sones, sarvants and others. . . ."

               Following law passed previously on 4 May 1664, the 1665 act retained

          provision for the men to elect their own officers.  The Assembly ordered the

          militiamen to assembly immediately "to make choyce of Captaine and other officers

          milletary . . . ."

               Exemptions from militia duty in early Rhode Island were rare.  The law

          principally allowed exceptions for "such as are in publicke office."  Earlier laws

          had exempted a few others from military service, such as ministers, and the 1665

          Act recognized those that "are by former lawes exempted."

               By an act of the General Assembly passed at a session held on 1 May

          1667, it was provided that "noe person or persons within this Colony from the age

          of sixteen years unto the age of sixty years, shall be released from traininge or other

          duties in military affairs, excepting only the civil officers in this Colony &c, the

          exceptions not including negroes or persons of color."

               Dr John Clarke who had worked with Roger Williams in frustrating the

          Coddington cabal had remained in England, acting as an informal agent of the

          provincial government.  Knowing of the colony's deficiencies in gunpowder, shot,

          match, flints and other martial supplies, Clarke was able to secure supplies for

          distribution to the towns from various friends and supporters.  Supposedly the

          money advanced for the supplies was a loan, but it does not appear that it was ever

          repaid in full.

               In 1676 the colony ordered that free blacks "shall be lyable to that

          service."  In that year the legislature enacted a law providing for a fine of 5

          shillings for those eligible for militia service and who failed to respond to a call to

          muster.  Militiamen were required to have "a musquet, cartouche box, 12 bullitts,

          a half pound of [gun]powder and 6 flints."  Each man also had to provide his own

          accoutrements.  A man who reported for training days with unsuitable or defective

          equipment was liable for a fine of 3 shillings.  If a soldier neglected to pay, or

          could not pay, his militia fine he was jailed.  Some men were assigned to picket

          or warding (watching) duty.  This additional militia duty could be avoided by

          paying for a substitute.  Militia duty was required of all able-bodied males

          between the ages of 16 and 60.  The men elected their own officers.  If they elected

          an officer with less than five years of militia service, that officer had to receive

          special training.  Officers could use corporeal punishments, including "riding the

          wooden horse" and "hog tying" in addition to the levying of fines.  An act of the

          General Assembly of the Colony of Rhode Island, and Providence Plantations, at

          its session begun May 2, 1676, read in part,

          

          June the 30th . . . Voted, that whenever there is a clause made at an Assembly held May the

          7th, 1673, wherein is specified that persons declaring that it is against their conscience or

          judgements to bear arms in martial or military manner, that such shall not be liable to the

          military authority, nor any ways liable to pay the fine by law afore ordained and set; and

          finding that several, under pretense decline their duty, whereby great disturbance is in the

          several Train Bands; therefore for the encouragement of the Militia in this Colony, the said

          clause in the said law is made void, null and repealed. . . . And all persons in this Colony are

          to be observant actively or passively, as the former laws have provided in Military affairs,

          and this to stand in force, any law or laws, clause or clauses  therein  to the contrary notwith-

          

          standinge.

          

               In 1677 the Rhode Island Assembly found it necessary to strengthen the

          militia law.  The Assembly prefaced the act with the comment that "His Royall

          Majesty . . . granted unto his people and subjects the inhabitants thereof, free

          liberty of conscience for the real worship of God, as they arc perswaded by the

          several dispensations thereof: yet therein alsoe strictly requiring and commandinge

          that all due obedience shall be give unto the laws of his realme, which as is well

          knowne, are upheld and mainetained under God, both from forreign invasion and

          domestick rebellion by the millitary power alsoe strictly requireinge. . . ."

               Not all inhabitants were willing to perform their militia duties, for reasons

          varying from conscience to contempt for all civil authority.  "Some under pretence

          of conscience, hath taken liberty act contrary, and make voyde the power, strength

          a authority of the millitary soe necessary to be upheld and maintained, that the civill

          power (in which the whole free dome and priviledges of his Majesty's subjects are

          kept and preserved), cannot without it be executed. . . ."  The overall effect was

          such "that this his Majesty's Collony this time is in effect wholly destitute of the

          millitary forces for the preservation thereof."  The Assembly warned that the

          "inhabitants therein . . . may thereby be made a prey unto the weakest meanest of

          his Majesty's enemys."  There was no question as to the obligation to bear arms in

          defense of the colony.  The authorities took "into their most serarious consideration

          and findinge that his Majesty in his Pattent hath required that the inhabitants of his

          Collony are to be led, conducted and trained up in martiall affaires."  Therefore, the

          civil power ordered that "by the power and authority thereof, [we] order, enact and

          declare that the inhabitants of every respective towne within the Collony" shall

          register and serve in the militia.      The men "shall in each towne respectively have

          their free choyce or election of their millitary commanders and officers; and that

          yearly, upon the last Monday in the month of May."  The men were free "to make

          choyce and elect their commander and millitary officers."  On election day and five

          other days a year that "there shall be . . . traininge days."

               The authorities further ordered "that the Governor, Deputy Governor, or

          any one Assistant, in each respective towne shall give forth warrant unto the Towne

          Sergeant warne the inhabitants to assemble in armes on the day abovesaid. . . ." 

          The authorities decreed that "for the future it is enacted, that the Captaine, or in his

          absence the next chief commander of the respective Trained Bands, shall give forth

          warrant from time to time unto their respective Corporalls, or some other person,

          whoever they thinke convenient, to warne and require the inhabitants yearely, on

          the said last Monday of May, to assemble in armes."  At such time the men were

          to "elect their respective commanders and millitary officers for the exercisinge of

          the people in martiall affaires in each respective towne."

               The 1677 Act made the cities and towns responsible for funding the major

          portion of militia costs.  Some costs were borne by militia fines, but shortfalls were

          to be made up by local taxes.

                    Rhode Island required some native Americans to enroll in the

          colony's militia.  In 1678 the Rhode Island assembly ordered that, 

          

          several Indian servants upon New Shoreham, and other Indians there, . . . may be serviceable

          to her Majesty . . . . [They are] to be entered and trained up in martial discipline . . . . That

          all Indian men servants, and others of said island, shall be under the command and discipline

          of such Captain and other officers . . . for training up and instructing in martial discipline .

          . . and that they be by the inhabitants and authority of said Island carefully provided for with

          arms and ammunition . . . .

          

               In the 1690s the Rhode Island legislature became embroiled in a dispute

          with their governor, Sir William Phipps over the command of the colonial militia. 

          In a petition of 2 August 1692, the colony claimed that Phipps had no authority to

          assume command of its militia.  The colony appealed to the crown:  "his

          Excellency, Sir William Phipps . . . writ a letter directed to your Majesties'

          Governor and Councill here, a copy whereof is herein enclosed, declaring himself

          to be empowered with the militia of this your Majesties' Collony."  He wanted the

          colony to "send some persons to him, and to propose men, faithfull to their

          Majesties, to be commisionated, &c."  The "Governor and Councill being

          convened, and perusing the letter, found that the grant was with respect to a statute

          made in the thirteenth year of the reign of King Charles the Second."  According

          to the colony, Charles "gave the Governor and Company of his said Collony . . . the

          sole power of the militia therein from him and successors, to them and their

          successors."  Therefore, under charter rights, Phipps had no power to issue order. 

          The colony was willing to cooperate, but found Phipps in no mood to compromise

          his supposed authority.

          

          That nevertheless, we your Majesties' Governor and Councill, taking notice of your

          Majesties' good intentions towards us in the time of war for our better defence against the

          enemies, were willing to submit to your Majesties' commands when made to appear, and

          thereupon chose and commissionated Major John Greene, Deputy Governor, and Mr. Henry

          Britemen, Assistant, to treat with his Excellency, concerning his commission, who carried

          with them a list of the commissioned officers of the trained bands, chosen by the order of the

          Collony, which they delivered; as also gave in a list of some of the principal persons. who

          together with some other their adherents were disobedient and disclaimed this your

          Majesties' government, the copy of the return whereof is also herewith sent.  But his

          Excellency, instead of sending an answer to the Governor, which he promised to do, he sent

          up Commissions to Major Peleg Sanford, endeavoring thereby to commissionate the most

          of them objected against, and thereby endeavoring to depose those severall of them that have

          stood up hitherto to support your Majesties' government hero; but the most of either of them

          do refuse to take such commissions, so that your Majesties' good intentions towards this your

          poor distressed Collony, in this time of war, is like to be subverted, and that which was

          proposed for better defence against the enemy, is hike to make way for an inlet to the enemy

          if not timely prevented.  Whereupon, your Majesties Governor and Councill saw cause to

          order the Generall Assembly to be convened for the resettling the militia, and to make

          application to your Majesties for redress herein, and thie rather because our Commissioners,

          aforesaid, obtained not a sight of his Excellency's commission, nor of an attested copy.

          

               On 7 December 1693 the Attorney General, Edward Ward, offered his

          opinion on the significance and power of the Rhode Island colonial charter.

          

          I find by a copy of the commission granted by their Majesties the 12th of December, 1691,

          unto Sir William Phipps, reciting the Act of Parliament made in the thirteenth year of the

          reign of King Charles the Second, for the militia, and that thereby the sole and supreme

          power, government, command and disposition of the militia and of all forces by sea and

          land, forts and places of strength belong to their Majesties;  their Majesties for the better

          protection and security of the inhabitants in those parts, did constitute and appoint the said

          Sir William Phipps their Majesties' Lieutenant and Commander in Chief of the militia, and

          of all forces by sea and land, forts and places of strength in the said Collony (amongst other

          places there mentioned), during pleasure.  The petitioners, by their annexed address, and by

          Mr. Christopher Almy, their Agent here, do humbly represent that their Charter being

          granted since the making of the Act for the Militia, they thereby humbly conceive they have

          the power [for the] training and government of the militia in that Collony, and that the

          subsequent commission of Sir William Phipps, which was never so much as published, or

          made known by him amongst them, may be an occasion of great inconvenience and

          prejudice to their Collony, which is but small, and a frontier to the sea, and open to the

          enemy if he should command (as he already hath), severall men out of it, the whole number

          of the inhabitants being but sufficient for its defence, and humbly praying their Majesties'

          confirmation of their Charter and all the priviledges thereby granted . . . . The power given

          by the Charter to the government of the Collony to trayn and exercise the inhabitants of the

          Collony in martial affairs, as also the rest of the Charter, is still in force. . . . I see nothing

          in point of law but that their Majesties may . . . gratify the Petitioners and confirm their

          Charter. . . . Edward Ward, Attorney General.

          

               On 2 August 1694 the Queen's Council responded to both the colonial

          petition and Attorney General Ward's opinion on command of the Rhode Island

          militia.  Despite charter rights, the queen was sovereign and, as final and complete

          political power, had the absolute right to order the disposition of all troops, colonial

          militia or any others.  The council offered one compromise:  Rhode Island would

          not be required to furnish more troops in proportion to its population in any draft

          of militiamen or volunteers than any other colony.

          

          Her Majesty having received the humble Address and Petition of the Governor and Company

          or their Majesties' Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantation, in New England,

          humbly representing that the petitioners had received advice from Sir William Phipps,

          Governor in Chief of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, that he was empowered with

          the militia of the Colony of Rhode Island, the grant of which power to Sir William Phipps,

          the petitioners find to be with respect to the statute made the 13th year of King Charles the

          Second . . . whereby the role power or the militia is granted to the Company.  And therefore

          humbly praying their Majesties' confirmation of their government, according to the

          boundaries of their Charter; which Address having been referred to the Right Honorable, the

          Lords of the Committee of Trade and Plantations, for their Lordships' consideration, and to

          report their opinion what is fit to be done therein; and the Lords of the Committee having

          received the report of Mr. Attorney and Mr. Solicitor Generall upon the said Address, and

          a petition in behalf of the Colony of Connecticut, in relation to the militia of those Colonies,

          and uniting their strength against the French . . . . we do hereby require and command our

          Governor [of Rhode Island] . . . to provide and send to be under his [Phipps'] command and

          direction for the defence of our Province of New York . . . . We [have] given especial

          directions to our Governor . . . not to demand or require at any time a greater part of the

          quota of our Militia of our Collony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantation than he shall

          in proportion demand or require of the quotas of the rest of the adjacent Colonies . . . .

          

               On 21 August 1694 Queen Mary reaffirmed the appointment, power and

          full authority of Phipps to command all her forces, militia and volunteers included,

          irrespective of charter or other provincial rights.

          

          It having been represented unto us by your humble address and petition, that our

          Commission to our trusty and well beloved Sir Wm. Phipps, Knight, Governor in Chief of

          our Province of the Massachusetts Bay, in New England, whereby he is ewpowered to

          command the militia of our Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantation, being with

          respect to the statute made in the 13th year of the reign of our Royal uncle, King Charles the

          Second, of blessed memory; by the Charter to the Governor and Company of our said

          Colony . . . the sole power of the militia is granted to the said Company, you having

          therefore humbly prayed our confirmation of the government of our said Colony according

          to the boundaries of the said Charter; and whereas, out of our great care and tenderness for

          the preservation of all our loving subjects as well in their rights and priviledges as for the

          security of their persons and estates. . . . the uniting the strength of our said Colony of Rhode

          Island and Providence Plantation, and the adjacent Colonies, for the defence of our subjects

          in those parts against the French [is of utmost importance] . . . . We have thereupon further

          signified our pleasure to our said Governor of our Province of the Massachusetts Bay, that

          in the execution of the powers granted to him by our said Commission, he do not take upon

          him any more than during war to command such quota or part of the militia of our said

          Colony, as we shall at any time direct as occasion may require the same, except in case of

          imminent danger of an actual invasion of the enemy; in which case we have directed him,

          that with the advice of the Governor of our said Colony, he conduct and command the rest

          of the forces of our said Colony, for the preservation of our said Colony, or of such other of

          our adjacent Colonies as shall most stand in need thereof; he taking care that he do not leave

          our said Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantation unprovided of a competent force

          for the defence and safety thereof. . . . of our pleasure to our several Colonies and Provinces

          in the northern parts of America, the 11th day of October, 1692, to be aiding and assisting

          to our Governor and Commander in Chief of our Province of New York, for the defence and

          security of our said Province against the attempts of our enemies, and to agree upon a quota

          of men or other assistance to be given by each of our said Colonies or Provinces, for the

          defence and security of our said Province of New York, some of our said Colonies or

          Provinces having omitted to send Commissioners to adjust the quotas to be furnished by

          them respectively, nothing hath been done therein; we have thereupon thought fit to appoint

          the several quotas of men or other assistance to be furnished by our said Colonies and

          Provinces respectively, for the defence and security of our said Province of New York.  And

          accordingly we do hereby signify our will and pleasure unto you, that a quota or part of our

          militia of our Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantation, not exceeding forty-eight

          men, be the measure of the assistance to be given by our said Colony for the defence and

          security of our said Province of New York . . . .

          

               In February 1708 Queen Anne appointed Colonel Samuel Vetch to

          represent her among the various colonial governors and to order them to provide

          her with militia to supplement her army in the campaign planned against French

          Canada.  She assigned "the governor of  New England and... the governor of Rhode

          Island" a quota of "1200 of thier best men" from among the militia and also to

          encourage as many militiamen as possible "to go as Volunteers in the Expedi-

          

          tion."

               On 7 May 1718, the "General Assembly of His Majesties Colony of

          Rhode Island and Providence Plantations in New England begun and Held at

          Newport . . . And Continued by Adjournment to the Ninth Day of September

          following," passed legislation concerning the militia.  

          

          Be it therefore enacted by the General Assembly of this Colony and by the Authority for the

          same, and it is hereby Enacted.  That all Acts heretofore made Relating to the Militia or

          appointing Officers of the same, Be hereby and Absolutely Repealed and Declared Null and

          Void, and that for the future the following Order, Regulation, and Rules Relating to the

          same, be Kept and Observed by all Persons in this Colony. . . . First it is Enacted and

          appointed, that all Male Persons Residing for the space of Three Months within this Colony,

          from the Age of Sixteen to the Age of Sixty Years, shall bear Arms in their Respective Train

          Bands, or Companies whereto by Law they shall belong Excepting only . . . . And be it

          further Enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That upon any Alarm in time of War, or other

          emminent danger of any Assault or Invasion, all Male Persons, both Listed Soldiers and

          others in this Colony of and between the Age of Sixteen and Sixty, shall upon notice of the

          same, forthwith Repair to the Colours and Ensigns of such Company, within whose Province

          they Inhabit or dwell.

          

               In 1730 the legislature repealed the militia act of 14 June 1726.

               In 1740-41 Rhode Island provided 2300 volunteers to the British attack

          on Cartagena, West Indies, during King George's War.  The order for recruitment

          of volunteer militia in Rhode Island is similar to that which the legislatures in all

          the colonies were required to promulgate.

          

          An Act for raising and enlisting a number of soldiers, to be transported to the West Indies

          for His Majesty's service.  Whereas, His Majesty hath been graciously pleased to make a

          declaration of war against the King of Spain, and being determined in the most effectual

          manner to distress and annoy the Spaniards; and more particularly by making an attempt

          upon some of their most considerable settlements in the West Indies; and for that purpose

          having recommended to this government the necessity of raising a number of soldiers to be

          there transported; -- In obedience therefore, to His Majesty's orders, and for the

          encouragement of those who shall enlist in His Majesty's service, be it enacted by the

          General Assembly of this colony and by the authority thereof it is enacted, that there be a

          commanding officer in each regiment in this colony appointed by the Governor and so many

          of the council as are upon Rhode Island, to enlist so many men as shall be willing to serve

          His Majesty in the intended expedition against the Spaniards, which officer so appointed,

          shall be obliged to enlist himself.  And be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, that each

          soldier (so enlisted by said officer) being an able bodied effective man, shall have the sum

          of œ3 allowed him by the colony, at the time of his enlisting; and shall be exempted from all

          military service for the space of three years after his return, except in cases of great

          extremity; and that the money hereby allowed, be deposited in the hands of each colonel in

          the colony, for the purpose aforesaid.  And in order to facilitate the raising and enlisting such

          soldiers, the field officers in each county be hereby empowered to call each captain's

          company together, in order for the aforesaid commanding officer to enlist soldiers, as

          aforesaid; and that each of the said officers attend on said companies.  And it is also further

          enacted by the authority aforesaid, that there be at the charge of the colony, provided proper

          transports for the transporting such and so many men as may be enlisted, at such time as His

          Honor, the Governor, upon further advice, shall judge proper, to embark them, in order to

          go to the place of the general rendezvous.

          

               The Massachusetts legislature offered a bounty for enlistments, but still

          had trouble filling even half Governor Belcher's quota.  Colonials were to be

          allowed to elect their inferior officers, and officers and men would have rank and

          pay, and be armed and clothed, equal to the British troops.  They were to "have

          their just share and proportion of all plunder or booty gained from the enemy,

          according to their services."  After the war they would be permitted to retain their

          arms and uniforms for military duty.  Along with 500 volunteers from

          Massachusetts, the Rhode Islanders filled five ships when they left Boston harbor

          and, after the bloody defeat, barely filled one ship on return.  They lost 153 officers

          and 30 transport commanders and untold numbers of enlisted men both to enemy

          fire and fever.  Approximately ten percent of the volunteers had survived.

               In the early fall of 1741 the British army proposed moving against Cuba. 

          The New England governors and the English authorities agreed on an enlistment

          bounty of œ4 sterling.  Massachusetts Governor Belcher appealed to patriotism,

          indicating how important the West Indian and Cuban trade were to all of New

          England.  Rhode Island again led the New England colonies with recruits which

          may speak more of the economic conditions than their patriotism or foolhardiness. 

          Massachusetts did recruit more men than it had for the ill-fated Cartagena

          expedition.  The Duke of New Castle had hoped to raise 3000 provincial

          volunteers for his West Indian expedition.  In proportion to its size, Rhode Island

          supplied the largest number of recruits.  Two companies were drawn largely from

          its militia.  It had a large financial stake in the West Indian trade.

               On 24 December 1754, Isaac Norris rose in the legislature and spoke in

          favor of "establishing a regular Militia within the Province, and providing Arms

          and Stores of War and building proper Magazines at the most convenient places. 

          All these things they desire may be done in such Manner as to be the least

          burdensome to the Inhabitants . . . ."  A new militia act appeared in February

          1755.

               In 1755 Rhode Island again was assigned a quota of militia volunteers to

          supplement the British army with men to join the regular British army in a joint

          punitive expedition against Crown Point.  The text of the legislative act reads as

          follows.

          

          Whereas, the defeat of the English army at, or near the Monaungahela, may not only

          inspirit the French and their Indian allies, but give them an opportunity and the advantage

          of detaching such a part of their forces to the northward, as may render the success of the

          expedition under Major General Shirley against Niagara precarious, but frustrate that which

          this colony, in conjunction with some other of His Majesty's governments in North America

          are engaged in, against Crown Point, and thereby bring the English empire in those parts,

          into considerable danger; for preventing whereof, as far as lieth in the power of this colony, 

          Be it enacted by this General Assembly . . . that three companies, of fifty men, each,

          including officers, be forthwith raised and supported at the expense of this colony, under the

          command of such officers as shall be chosen and appointed for that purpose, and sent by

          land unto Albany, as fast as the companies can be filled up . . .  and from thence, to march

          with the utmost expedition . . . against Crown Point . . . . the officers to be chosen, shall have

          and receive the same wages, and enjoy equal immunities and advantages with those already

          sent; and every soldier to be raised, the same wages bounties and immunities in every respect

          . . . . And as a further encouragement, and for the more speedy raising men to form the three

          new companies, each soldier shall have and be allowed, upon his enlisting, a bounty of œ25,

          old tenor . . . . And to the end that there may be a sufficiency in the general treasury, for

          raising men, paying bounties, supporting the troops, and other incident charges,  Be it further

          enacted, that the sum of œ20,000 be forthwith made and struck . . . . within the space or term

          of two years from the passing this act, by a tax to be assessed and levied upon the inhabitants

          of this colony, in the same manner as the tax for sinking the œ60,000 . . . . This Assembly do

          vote and resolve, and it is voted and resolved, that the sum of œ5,000, be allowed and paid

          out of the general treasury, towards carrying on the building of Fort George. . . . 

          

               The British attempted to recruit volunteers, out of the militia units or

          elsewhere, with advertisements in newspapers and elsewhere.  Broadsides, or

          posters hung in public places, were among the more popular devices used for

          recruitment.  One Broadside, dated 8 August 1757, called the militia to duty during

          a critical phase of the French and Indian War. 

          

          Advertisement!  This is to command and require all, and every one, of His Majesty's well

          affected subjects who are able to bear arms, to repair with all expedition, to Fort Edward on

          Hudson's River, to march with General Webb, to the relief of Fort William Henry, which still

          stands out fighting against a large and numerous enemy; which if not speedily relieved must

          fall the sacrifice and the whole Province of course; some of the colonels of the militia have

          been so remiss in their duty on this occasion.  This method is taken to warn all His Majesty's

          subjects of the danger . . . .

          

               The legislature acquired arms and distributed these among the citizen-

          soldiers of the colony.  The militia men were required to care for the arms and to

          be prepared to account for them at any time.  After the militia trained each company

          commander was to account for all arms in his command.

               In 1774 the assembly created a frontier ranging company of militia, to be

          called the North Providence Rangers.  Immediately after, the legislature created

          the permanent rank and position of major-general of the militia, the occupant of

          this office to be appointed by the governor.  Finally, it passed the last major

          revisions of the basic militia act enacted prior to independence.  

          

          it is enacted, that for the future, each enlisted soldier, who shall not be provided with a

          sufficient gun, or fuzee, as directed in the said act, shall be fined two shillings, lawful

          money, for each deficiency; and also, that every soldier be provided with a good bayonet

          fixed on his gun, upon the penalty of four pence, lawful money, for each default.  And be it

          further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that the captain, or, in his absence, the next

          superior officer of each respective company, shall warn and call together the company under

          his command, one day in every month, and exercise the same in martial discipline, according

          to the mode established by His present Majesty in 1764 . . . .  That the first warning be by

          warrant under the hand and seal of such officer, issued within ten days before such training

          or exercising; and that all succeeding warnings be given verbally by the commanding officer

          for the day, at the head of the company, while under arms.  Provided, nevertheless, that in

          the towns of Providence and Bristol, the captain, or other commanding officer, may warn

          their companies by beat of drum, as in the said act is permitted in the town of Newport. . .

          . within ten days after each penalty shall be incurred, the captain, or other superior officer,

          shall issue his warrant therefor, returnable to himself, within twenty days ; and that twelve-

          and-an-half per cent. only, be allowed for collecting such fines. . . . the fines of all those

          who, being exempted from appearing on the days of training, are notwithstanding, obliged

          to be provided with arms and other accoutrements, shall be the same for every deficiency,

          as the fines of the enlisted soldiers ; and that the examination and survey, appointed by the

          said act, shall be made by the sergeants of the company in whose district they live, by

          warrant from the captain, on the first Monday in February, and on the last Monday in April.

          . . . no town officer shall be exempted from doing military duty, as an enlisted soldier,

          excepting the members of the town council, the town treasurer, the town clerk and the town

          sergeant. . . . that there be a general muster and review of each regiment or battalion, twice

          in every year, to wit : on the first Monday in April, and on the first Monday in October; and

          that there be a general muster and review of brigade, once in two years. . . . that the captain

          general, lieutenant general and major general, or any two of them, be, and they are hereby,

          fully authorized and empowered to direct and order when, and in what manner, the forces

          within this colony shall march to the assistance of any of our sister colonies, when invaded

          or attacked; and also in what manner the said forces shall be provided and supplied; and also

          to direct and make use of the cannon belonging to the colony, either in or out of the colony,

          as they may deem expedient. . . . that the said forces, whenever they shall be called out of

          the colony, shall be under the immediate command and direction of the major general. 

          

               In June 1776 the new state government ordered the publication and

          distribution of a set of regulations for army and militia drill and discipline.  In the

          late winter of 1775-76 the Rhode Island legislature passed laws implementing the

          orders of Congress to revitalize the colony's militia.  It ordered that, 

          

          all such persons as are by law obliged to equip themselves with a good fire-arm, bayonet and

          cartouch box, and who shall not, by the report of a town council, be declared incapable of

          providing themselves, . . . do provide themselves by the 20th day of April, agreeably to the

          law, under the penalty of œ5 . . . .

          

               In the urban areas of colonial America, the militia thrived only as long as

          there was an immediate threat from the native aborigine.  The governor of Rhode

          Island, Nicholas Cooke, wrote to General George Washington, on 25 January

          1776:

          

          For many years past, the inhabitants of this colony, surrounded on the land side by

          Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay thought themselves in a perfect state of security, and

          entirely neglected military discipline, and disposed of their arms so generally, that at the

          breaking out of the present war, the colony was in a manner disarmed.  We have taken every

          method in our power, by purchasing, by employing manufacturers, and by importation, to

          procure a sufficient quantity, but are still so deficient . . . [that] we shall scarcely be able to

          find arms for the troops we have ordered to be raised for our immediate defence.  Besides

          which, the peculiar situation of the colony requires that every man in it should be provided.

          

               In April 1777 Rhode Island ordered that militia be allowed the same

          monthly wages to militia as were received by soldiers enlisted in the continental

          service.  Soon after, Rhode Island conducted its second draft of militia, to relieve

          those called a year earlier.  The law read,

          

          . . . . resolved, that the first division of the second draft of the militia, and alarm and

          independent companies, heretofore drafted agreeably to the resolves of the Assembly, passed

          at their session in December and March last, be formed into companies, as are by said

          resolves directed; and that they march to such part of the shores within their respective

          counties, as shall be directed by the commanding officer, on or before the 24th day of this

          current April, properly equipped, to relieve those that are now upon duty, and there to

          remain and do duty for fifteen days from the time they shall actually take the field. . . . to

          exert themselves in the defence of their country, that a bounty of ten shillings, lawful money,

          be allowed to each non-commissioned officer and soldier of the said first division of the

          second draft of the militia, and alarm and independent companies, who shall do his duty; and

          that all fines which shall be incurred for delinquency, after deducting the cost and fees for

          collecting the same, shall be equally divided among the non-commissioned officers and

          soldiers doing duty, who belong to the same town with the delinquents who shall neglect to

          do duty. . . . in case of sickness and inability to do duty (which alone shall excuse any

          person), it shall be in the power of either of the field officers of the regiment of the district,

          to permit such a person to hire a man to do his tour of duty; and if such sick and unable

          person shall be extremely poor in the judgement of such field officer, as to be unable to hire

          a person in his stead, that such field officer be empowered to remit such poor person's fine.

          . . . the other divisions of the independent companies, alarm companies and militia, so

          drafted, as aforesaid, relieve said division, agreeably to said resolves; and that they be

          entitled to the same wages and encouragement as are allowed said division, and be subject

          to the same penalties. . . . the lists of the male inhabitants within this state, from sixteen years

          of age, and up wards, that have been taken and returned . . . be bound together, and lodged

          in the secretary's office.

          

          . . . resolved, that the commanding officer of the Continental troops within this state, for the

          time being, have liberty to call into service all such field officers as he shall deem necessary

          for the public service. . . . the several independent companies within this state, when called

          out to service in the pay of this state, or of the United States, shall be allowed pay for the

          same number of officers in proportion to the number of privates, as are in the foregoing re-

          

          solve allowed to militia and alarm men. . . . that five hundred effective men be raised by the

          several towns within this state (excepting the towns of Newport, Portsmouth, New Shoreham

          and Middletown) for filling the Continental battalions raising by this state, on or before the

          10th day of May next; that they be proportioned to the several towns, according to the

          number of polls; and that [several men] . . . be a committee to proportion the same, to the

          respective towns . . . that each town be empowered to give such a sum, over and above the

          bounties already allowed, as they can agree for, with the men enlisting, not exceeding the

          sum of œ22, lawful money.

          

               In February 1778, the Rhode Island legislature authorized the recruitment

          and enlistment of black, whether free or enslaved, into both the militia and the

          state's Continental Line.  A few free blacks responded to the offer of a bounty for

          enlistment, but the response was greater among the slaves to whom "freedom with

          their swords" was tendered, provided only that they serve with bravery and fidelity. 

          Black recruits into both the militia and the Continental Line provided the state with

          integrated forces, among the very first in America.  Only commissions as officers

          were beyond the reach of blacks; but the ranks of non-commissioned officers were

          open to persons of color.

               In May 1778 the Rhode Island assembly passed legislation to strengthen

          its militia.  The legislation failed to achieve its aims.  In September 1779 the

          legislature directed Major General James Varnum "to cause strict examination to

          be made of the state of arms &c. of the militia, alarm and independent companies

          within this state on the third Monday of October next."  Varnum was to report on

          deficiencies and the legislature would attempt to correct any and all problems with

          the militia.

               The universal practice of drafting militiamen into the Continental Line had

          proved to be as noxious to men in Rhode Island as elsewhere.  In May 1781 the

          state passed a new militia act which provided that militiamen who were deployed

          along the frontiers were "to serve within this State for [a period not exceeding] one

          month . . . and no longer; and not to be marched out of the same."  The law proved

          to be popular and was renewed in August 1781.                             Endnotes