UNITED STATES v. MORRISON (99-5)
169 F.3d 820, affirmed.
Supreme Court of the United States
United States v. Morrison et al.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-5. Argued January 11, 2000 — Decided May 15, 2000
Petitioner Brzonkala filed suit, alleging, inter alia, that she was
raped by respondents while the three were students at the Virginia Polytechnic
Institute, and that this attack violated 42 U.S.C. § 13981 which provides
a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence.
Respondents moved to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint failed to state
a claim and that §13981’s civil remedy is unconstitutional.
Petitioner United States intervened to defend the section’s
constitutionality. In dismissing the complaint, the District Court held that it
stated a claim against respondents, but that Congress lacked authority to enact
§13981 under either §8 of the Commerce Clause or §5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had
explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for §13981. The
en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Section 13981 cannot be sustained under the Commerce
Clause or §5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Pp. 7-28.
(a) The Commerce Clause does not provide Congress
with authority to enact §13981’s federal civil remedy. A
congressional enactment will be invalidated only upon a plain showing that
Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds. See United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568, 577-578.
Petitioners assert that §13981 can be sustained under Congress’
commerce power as a regulation of activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce. The proper framework for analyzing such a claim is
provided by the principles the Court set out in Lopez. First, in
Lopez, the noneconomic, criminal nature of possessing a firearm in a
school zone was central to the Court’s conclusion that Congress lacks
authority to regulate such possession. Similarly, gender-motivated crimes of
violence are not, in any sense, economic activity. Second, like the statute at
issue in Lopez, §13981 contains no jurisdictional element
establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress’
regulation of interstate commerce. Although Lopez makes clear that such
a jurisdictional element would lend support to the argument that §13981 is
sufficiently tied to interstate commerce to come within Congress’
authority, Congress elected to cast §13981’s remedy over a wider, and
more purely intrastate, body of violent crime. Third, although §13981,
unlike the Lopez statute, is supported by numerous findings
regarding the serious impact of gender-motivated violence on victims and their
families, these findings are substantially weakened by the fact that they rely
on reasoning that this Court has rejected, namely a but-for causal chain from
the initial occurrence of violent crime to every attenuated effect upon
interstate commerce. If accepted, this reasoning would allow Congress to
regulate any crime whose nationwide, aggregated impact has substantial effects
on employment, production, transit, or consumption. Moreover, such reasoning
will not limit Congress to regulating violence, but may be applied equally as
well to family law and other areas of state regulation since the aggregate
effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is
undoubtedly significant. The Constitution requires a distinction between what
is truly national and what is truly local, and there is no better example of
the police power, which the Founders undeniably left reposed in the States and
denied the central government, than the suppression of violent crime and
vindication of its victims. Congress therefore may not regulate noneconomic,
violent criminal conduct based solely on the conduct’s aggregate effect on
interstate commerce. Pp. 7-19.
(b) Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which permits
Congress to enforce by appropriate legislation the constitutional guarantee
that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process or deny any person equal protection of the laws, City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517, also does not give Congress the
authority to enact §13981. Petitioners’ assertion that there is
pervasive bias in various state justice systems against victims of
gender-motivated violence is supported by a voluminous congressional record.
However, the Fourteenth Amendment places
limitations on the manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct.
Foremost among them is the principle that the Amendment prohibits only state
action, not private conduct. This was the conclusion reached in United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, and the Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, which were both decided shortly after the Amendment’s
adoption. The force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these
decisions stems not only from the length of time they have been on the books,
but also from the insight attributable to the Members of the Court at that
time, who all had intimate knowledge and familiarity with the events
surrounding the Amendment’s adoption. Neither United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, nor District of Columbia v. Carter,
409 U.S. 418, casts any doubt on the enduring vitality of the Civil Rights
Cases and Harris. Assuming that there has been gender-based
disparate treatment by state authorities in this case, it would not be enough
to save §13981’s civil remedy, which is directed not at a State or
state actor but at individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated by
gender bias. Section 13981 visits no consequence on any Virginia public
official involved in investigating or prosecuting Brzonkala’s assault, and
it is thus unlike any of the §5 remedies this Court has previously upheld.
See e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301. Section
13981 is also different from previously upheld remedies in that it applies
uniformly throughout the Nation, even though Congress’ findings indicate
that the problem addressed does not exist in all, or even most, States. In
contrast, the §5 remedy in Katzenbach was directed only to those
States in which Congress found that there had been discrimination. Pp. 19-27.
169 F.3d 820, affirmed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined.
Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, and in which Souter and
Ginsburg, JJ., joined as to Part I-A.
1. Together with No. 99-29, Brzonkala v.
Morrison et al., also on certiorari to the same court.