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Law of Nature,

According to the

Principles and Method laid down in the Reverend Dr. Cumberland's (now Lord Bishop of Peterborough's) Latin Treatise on that Subject.


His Confutations of Mr. Hobb's

Principles, put into another Method.

The Second Edition Corrected, and somewhat Enlarged.


WITH THE Right Reverend Author's Approbation.


Printed for W. Rogers in Fleet-street, R. Knaplock in St. Paul's Church-yard, A. Bell in Cornhil, and T. Cockeril in the Poultry. 1701.


TO THE Right Reverend Father in GOD,




Having, many years ago, when your Learned and Judicious Treatise of the Law of Nature was first published, carefully perused it to my great satisfaction, I also thought it

iv The Epiftle Dedicatory.

necefjary to make an Epitomy or Abridgment of it, as mil for my own better (Remembrance, at tbat I believed it might be alfo ujeful, a* an Introduction to Etbicks, for Jome near Delations of mine, for whom! then dejigned it. Tbefe Papers, after they bad lain by me federal Years, 1 happened to fiew to Jprne Worthy Friends of mine, and In particular to the Learned and Honourable Mr. Boyle, who fo mil approved of the Undertaking, that they incou-raged me to make it publick, as that which might give great /atufattion to thofe of.the Nobility and Gentry oj our own Nation (<uwelltu others of a lower rank) who either do not under-ft and Latin, or elfe had rather read Epitomies of greater Works, than take the pains to ptruje the Originals. Ffbicb Task, tho not Very grateful to me, yet I was prevailed with to undertake, and to look over thoje Papers again, and add feVcral confiderable Vajjages out^ of the Jreatife it Jelf^ and this not for Fame's fake, or the honour of being thought an Author, Jince 1 was fatisfied that nothing of that nature could be due to one, who does not pretend t6 more than toTfanfltteorAbridg another Moris Labours :

Yet 1 am willing, in purfuance of your Lord* flrips Principle, to facrifice all thefe little private Confederations to the Publick Good, as being fenfible, that in the Jrade of Learning (as in o-tber Trofef/ions) diVers, who cannot be Inventors or chief Merchants, may yet do the Publickgood ferVice by venting other Mens potions in a new drefs; effectally (ince 1 haVe alfo obferVedj that things of this kind, if well done (and with due acknowledgment to the Authors from whence tley are borrowed) as they haVe proved bene* ficial to thofe whofe Education, or cohftant 1m-floyments in their own Trofeffeons, will not give them leave to peru/e many Jfolumes, written perhaps in a Language they are no great JMa~ Jlersof; fo alfo theyhaVe not failed of fome Commendation from all candid Readers. Thus Monpeur Rohault'i Abridgment o/Des Cartes^ (Philofopby, and Monfeeur Bernier^ of Gaflendps^ (to mention no more) have been received Tbitb general Afflaufe^ not only by all Ingenious Men of the French, but alfo of our own Nation? who underftand that Language.

And the Learned and Inquifoi'Ve Dr. Burn?t haththught an Undertaking of this kind Jo ufe-ful for our Nobility and Gentry, a$ to give MS his own elegant Translations, or rather Abridgments in Englifli, of bis two Elaborate Tre<* ttfes of the-Theory of the Earth. And I doubt not, but your Lord/hip would haVe donefow-whatin this kind with this admirable Work of yours, had not the conflant Jmployments of your Sacred ffunftion, as well as your other feVere mdufeful Studies hindered you from it.

<But ferhafs itntay bethought by fome, that this Task hath been Very well performed already by the Ingenious and Learned IV. Parker, late Jtijhopof^Oxford, inhisTreatife, entituled, A Dcmonfttation of the Laws of Na-tute, and therefore needs not be done oVer a-gain* *But to this J (hall only fay, that as he owns he hath been beholden in that Work to your Lordfhi^s 'Book, fo hath he fallen fhort of the Original from whence he cofy'd, both in, theclearnefs, as well as choice of the ArgU" ments or TtemonftrationS) and in the particular

fetting forth of tbofe Rewards and 9wlfhments derived (by God's Appointment) from the Nrf-ture of Ment and the Frame of "things; which can only be done according to that exacl Method yourLordfhlp hath there laid down. Tbo, 1 confefsy there is one thing that Is particular in that Authors Undertaking, viz. That excel~ lent Account he there gives utof the great Differences and Uncertainties among the moftfamout of the Heathen iPbilofopbers, concerning Man's Sovereign Cjood or Happinefs, mainly for want of the cert am belief of a Future State, and that clear convlcllon we now baVe, that Mens chief eft Good or Happintfs confifts in God'sLoVe and FaVour towards them: As alfo his obferVationy That notwithstanding all that can be Jaid of the Natural Rewards of Virtue, and Tunijlments of ftce, nothing but the realbnable hope and expectation of Happinefs in a Life to come, can in all Cafes bear us up under all the Miferies, Sorrows and Calamities of this. 4nd herein I muflown I agree With bintj and therefore hope your Lord/trip will pardon me, if 1 have in the enjuing Difcourfe inllftt'd fomeTbhat more particularly upon thefe

future Rewards and (Punijhmmts, which 1 doubt not may Very well be proved from ${eafon, and the necejftty of Juppofing them, in order to the ajjerting and vindicating God's Juftice and Providence: Jho 1 grant, that the tyfpel, or 'Divine Revelation, hath given u* more firm grounds for this our Belief, than Tfre had before by the mere light of Nature.

But fuppofing thisWork of Si/hop Parker never fo well performed ; as 1 do not deny but it hath all the advantages of a Popular and Genteel Stile, and that neat Turn of Wit he gives to all his Writings; and therefore IhaVe notfcrupledtotranfcribeoutof his Difcourfe one or two Taflaves* where 1 thought either his Way

t JJ O 7 O �/

cf urging your Lordfiip 5 Arguments, or the clofe Jumming them up, was not to be mended ly any other fen: Yet fwceifs too concife in fome parts, and full of Digre/fions in others; and lefides wants your folid (Confutations of Mr. H'$ Principlest it feems necejfary that another Treatife more exatl in the kind, fbould be publijhed as more agreeable to your Lordfhip*s Original; Whether this which 1 now prefentyott

with, be fuck, I muft fubmit to jour Lord' /hip's and the Reader's Judgment.

But fince I have undertaken this difficult Province with your Lord/hip's approbation, it is ft that I give you, as mil as the Deader, fome Account of the Method 1 have followed in this Treatife, and wlxrein it differs from yours.

Fir ft then, to begin with the Preface; The Subftance of it is "toholly yours, except the Introdu&ion concerning the ufefulnefs of the Ifyowledg of the true Grounds if the Law of Nature, in order to a right underftanding of MoralThilofophy, nay Qyrijlianityh fdf.

But for 'a Condu/ton to the Preface, I haVe alfo made fome Additions, wherein 1 baVt fhewn your Principle of endeavouring the Common Good is not a new Invention, but that which feVeral Great Men had before delivered^ as the only firm 1(ule, by which to try not only all our Moral dftions, but all Civil Laws, whether they are right and juft t that is, agreeable

to right Q(eafon, or not. And I haVe alfo cow-eluded it with a fet of Principles Very necejfary to be underflood for the proving the Truth of all Natural tyligion, and the Law of Nature, tho the two lajt alone are the Subje ft of your Lard/hip's feook, as well as of my Abridgment efit.

But to /peak more particularly of the 1)1 f-courfe it felfy fince I here defign no more than an Epitome, I hope your Lord/hip will not take it H19 tf 1 haVe omitted moft of your rare Inflates and Parallels drawn from the Mathe-matichj many of which are above the capacity of common Deader sy (tho therein your Lord-fhip Iwth fhewn your jelf a (jreat Mafter ) and have confined my filf only to fuch plain and eafie Proofs and natural Ob/erVations as Men of all Capacities may under/land. So aljo if in the Chapter of Humane Nature, I have left out divers curious Anatomical ObferVations> wherein the Strufture of Mens Bodies differs from that of fteafts, if 1 thought they were at all queftionable or doubtful, or fuch as did not direttly tend to the [roving, that

JMens Sadies are fitted and ordained by God for the Profecution of the Common Good of others of their own jfijnd, above all other Creatures.

1 have alfo made bold to contraft the hap* ters in your Work, into a lejfer number, having difpofed the fubftance of them into other places, or elfe quite omitted fome, as not fo necejjary to our purpofe: As for example^ I baVe placed moft of the Matter of the third Chapter, De bono naturali, partly in ike explanation of the Word Good, in the &e-fcription of the Law of Nature ~+mn~ contained in the third Chapter, referring what remained of it to the fecond fart for the (Confutation of that Principle of Mr. H's, That no Aftion is Good or Evil in the State of Nature. So likewife for the fourth Chapter, De Diftaminibus Pradticis, 1 have fet down the Subftance of it (omitting the Mathematical Illuftrations) in onr fecond (Chapter of Humane Nature. So alfo the Jixtb Chapter, entituled, De iis quae in Lege Naturali continentur. And the fevtntb and eighth,

De Origine Dominii, & Virtucum Mora-lium. IhaVe partly difpofed the fubftance of them into the fir ft Chapter of the Nature of Tilings, but chiefly into your fourth Chapter, reducing all the Laws of Nature, and Moral Virtues therein contained, into this one Principle, of Endeavouring the Common Good of Rational 'Beings. But as for your laft Chapter, viz. that part of it which contains the Confedaria, or Conferences, deducible from the foregoing Chapters, in relation to the Law of Mofes, and all Civil Laws j 1 have made bold to omit it, fince It Is plain enough, that all the Precepts of the Decalogue do tend either (in the fir ft Table) to the Honour and Glory of God, in his commanding himfelf to be the fole Object of our Wbrjhip, and that without any Images of himfelf' or dje f in the fecond Table ) to our Duties towards others, wherein the higheft Virtue and Innocence are prefcribed. And Jo likewife, that all the Laws of the Supreme Qvil Powers have no Authority, but as they purfue this Qreat ^ule, or Law of Nature, of procuring the Common Good of $(atio-nal 'Beings j that lsy the Honour and Worjhip

of God, and the Peace and Happinefs of their Subjetls, and of Mankind in general* And whereas your Lordflnp hath here alfo folidly and briefly confuted many grofs Errors in Mr. FTs JMorais, as well as Politicks, fome of thofe Confutations 1 haVe made ufe of in tie fe-cond Party viz. thofe that relate to that Author's Moral Principles, which, if they are falfe^ his Politick ones will fall of them-felves.

To conclude; 1 mufl beg your Lord/hip's Pardon, if I have made bold to alter your Method, as to your Confutation of Mr. Hs Principles. For whereas you haVe thought fit to do it in the Body of your Work, and as they occurred under the JeVeral Heads you treat of; pnce I perceiVd the placing your Anfwers after that manner, did difturb the Connexion, and Perfpicuity of the Difcourfe, 1 thought it better to caft tho/e Anfwers into a dtfiinft faff, digefted under fo many Heads, or Proportions, in the order in "tohicb they (land in Mr. H's IBooks. De Give, and Leviathan, where the deader, if he pleafes, may winpart what 1 laVe quoted out of him.

JndHope your Lordfhip will not take it d-miI"s in me, if (to render the Work more plea-fant and grateful to common fyaders, and that it may not look like a bare tranflation ) IhaVe added feVeralbfytionSy Jnjlancesand ObferVati-onsy Jome of my owny and others out of Hifto-ry, and the Delations of Modern Travellers, concerning the Cuftoms of thofe Weft-Indiart Nations commonly counted barbarous, who yet by their amicable living together, without either Qvil Magiftrates, or written Laws, ferVe fufficiently to confute Mr. H's extravagant Opinion, That all Men by J^ature are in a State of Wr, which he endeavours to prove, from Jome evil Cuftoms among thofe People.

1 have likewife made bold to add thofe A-phorifms containing the grounds of moral Qood and Evil contained in Sifrop Wilkins** Trea-iife of Natural fyligion, and Dr. Moor's Enchiridion Ethicutn, that the Deader may fee them all at once; tho I confefs they are mojt tf them to be found (tho difper/edly) in

your Ltrdftep't Work. I haVe alfo inferted form thingsy in anfwer to the Objections at the end of the fir ft Part, out of that noble con-templative <Pbilofopher, Mr.Lockinhis EJfay of Humane Underftanding; fince be froceeds upon tbe fame (Principles with your Lordfhipy and bath divers Very new and ufefut Notions concerning ibt Manner of Attaining tbe Jfyowledg of all Truths, as wtt T^atural as Divine, and tbe Certainty we haVe of them.

fBut 1 fear, Have trefpafs'd too much upon your Lordjbip's Patience, by [o long an Epiftle^ and therefore fball conclude y>itb my Prayers for your Lord/hip's Maffinefs and Health^ fince 1 am confident you cannot but froVe more ufeful for tbe common good of our Church and State, in this high and publicK Station to which their Majefties haVe thought fit to call you, than you could baVe been in a morepri* Vate Condition : And I hope your Lordfbip will look upon this Dedication as a fmall 7H-tute of gratitude, which all the FPorldmuft owe you for your Learned and not Common

UndertaKng, of which Ott&tion none nigh to be (or indeed is) more fenfible than,


Your Lordflhip's moft faithful

and humble Servant,






By way of


ISuppofe you are not Ignorant, that the Study of Moral Philofophy, or the Laws of Nature, was preferred (by Plato, Ariftotle^ Socrates^ and Tully, the wifeft of the Heathen Philofo-phers ) above all other Knowledg, whether Natural or Civil, and that defervedly, as well in refped of its ufefulnefs, as certainty, fince it was to that alone ( as molt agreeable to the Natural Faculties of Mankind ) that Men, before they were aflifted by Divine Revelation, owed the Difcovery of their Natural Duties, to God, themfelves, and all others: as Cicero hath fhewn us at large in thofe three excellent Trea-tifes, De Officiis, Ve Finibus* and De Legibus. And tho I grant we Chriftians have now clearer and higher Difcoveries of all Moral Duties, by the Light of the

Gofpel, yet is the Knowledg of Natural Religion, or the Laws of Nature, itill of great ufe to us, as well for the confirmation as illuftracion of all thofe Duties, lince by the knowledg of them, and the true Principles on which they are founded, we may be convinced, thai God requires nothing from us in all the pradical Duties of revealed Religion, but our reafo-nable Service \ that is, what is really our own inte-reft, and concerns our good and happinefs to obferve, as the beft and molt perfed Rule of Life, whether God had evef farther enforced it or not by any revealed Law. And tho I do not deny, that our Saviour Jefus Chrift hath highly advanced and improved thefe Natural Laws, by more excellent and refined Precepts of HuraJlity, Charity, Self-denial, &c. than were difcovered before by the wifefl of the Heathen Philo-fbphers, efpecially as to the greater aflurance we have of that grand Motive to Religion and Virtue, the Immortality of the Soul, or a life either eternally happy or miferable, when this is ended: Yet certainly it was this Law of Nature, or Reafon alone, by which Mankind was not only to live, but alfo to be judged, before the Law given to Mofes; and it muft be for not living up to this Natural Light, that the Heathens fhall be condemned, who never yet heard of Chri/l, or of a revealed Religion, and fo cannot ( as St. Paul exprefly declares to the Romans) believe on bim of whom they have notbeard, Rom. 10.14. Therefore it is that the fame Apoflle,in the fidl Chapter of that Epiitle, appeals to the knowledgof God, from the things that are feen, that is, the Creation of the World, as che foundation of all Natural Religion, and tells the Romans, that their falling Cnot-withftanding this Knowledg 3 into that grofs I-dolatry they profeflcd, was the only reafon, why God gave tbem up to their own hearts tufts, betaufe that when they knew Godj they glorified him not as God, neither were

thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, ttndihefr

foolijhheart was darkned, v. 21. And fo likewife in the

fecond Chapter,he farther tells themjbat when the Gen*

tiles, who have not the Law, do by Mdture the things con

tained in the Law, tbefe having not the Law, are a Lam

unto themfelves, /hewing the work of the Law written in

their hearts -, that is, the Law of Mature or Reafon,

as the main fubftance or effecl of the Mofaical Law.

And that it is by this Law alone, that they (hall be

judged, is plain from what immediately follows, Their

confciences bearing witnefs, and their own thoughts ( or rea-

fonings, as it is rather to be rendred ) in the mean while

accuftng or excuftng each other. And indeed the Apoftle

fuppofes the Knowledg of God as a Rewarder of Good

Works, to be the foundation of all Natural, as well

as Revealed Religion, and the firlt Principle of faving

Faith, as appears in his Epiftle to the Hebrews, Chap.

11. v. 6. But without faith it is impojfible to pleafe him ;

for he that comes unto God muft firft believe that he is9

and that he is a Rewarder of all them that diligently feek^

him. But I need fpeak no more of Natural Religion^

and how neceflary it is to the true Knowledg of that

which is revealed, fince the Reverend and Learned

Dr. Wi\\ms, late Bifhop of Chefter, hath fo well per-

form'd that Noble Undertaking, in his excellent Poft-

humous Treatife, publifhed by the Reverend Dr.

Tittotfon, late Lord Archbifhop of Canterbury, to

which nothing needs to be added by fo mean a Pen as


But fince the Laws of Nature, as derived from God the Legiflator, are the foundation of all Moral Philo-fophy and true Politicks, as being thofe which are appealed to in all Controverfies between Civil Sovereigns, and alfo are the main Rules of the mutual Duties between Sovereigns and their Subjects: It is worth while to enquire how thefe Laws may be dif-covered to proceed from God as a Legiflator, Now,

this can only be done by one of thefe two ways^ (viz,) Either from the certain and manifeft Effects and Confequences that are obferved to proceed from them ', or from the Caufes from which they are derived. The former of thefe hath been already largely treated of by others, efpecially by the nioft learned Hugo Grotius, in his admirable Work, De Jure Belli & Pacvs �, By his Brother WiU'uim^ in that fmall Poft-humous Treatife of his, De Princifiis Juris ftaturalis $ And by the Judicious Monfieur Puffendorf, in his learned Treatife, De Jure Nature & Gentium : As alfo by our own Countryman, Dr. Sharrock. Who have all undertaken to prove the certainty of the Laws of Nature, from the general belief and reception of them by the wifeft and molt civilized Nations in all Ages. To which we may alfo add the moft learned Mr. Seldcn, in that mcft elaborate Work, De Jure Gentium juxta flacita Hcbrtforum. And as I do acknowledg, thatthofe Great Men have all deferved very well in their way, fo 1 think none deferves greater Commendation, than that excellent Work of GYO-tius the Elder, which as it was the firft in its kind, fo it is worthy to laft as long as Vertne and Juftice fliall be in efteem among Mankind. And tho the Obje&i-ons which are wont to be brought againft this Method of proving the Laws of Nature, are not of fo great moment, as to render it altogether fallacious or ufe-lefs, as fome would have it to be \ yet I freely acknowledg they chiefly ferve to convince Men of fin-cere and honeft minds, and who are naturally difpofed to Venue and right Reafon: So that I conceive it were more ufeful, as well as more certain, to feek for a firmer and clearer Demonfh ation of thefe Laws, from a ftrift fearchand inquifition into the nature of things, and alfo of our own felves, by which I doubt not but we may attain not only to a true Know ledg of the Laws of Nature, but alfo of that true Principle on which they

are founded, and from whence they are all derived.

But it will not confift with the narrow bounds of a Preface, to propofe and anfwer all the Obje&ions that maybe brought againfl their Method of proving the Law of Nature, from the Confentof Nations; neither perhaps can it be done at all to the univerfal fatisfa&ion even of indifferent perfons: fince it may beltill urged, that altho fome Diftates of Right Rea-ibn may be indeed approved of by our Underftand-ings, and are commonly received and praftifed by? molt Nations by reafon of their general ufefulnefs and conveniency, yet it muft be acknowledged, that there; 'is ft ill wanting the Knowledg of God as a Legiflatpr, by whofe Authority alone they can obtain the force of Laws. The Proof of which (tho the moft material part of the Queftion ) hath been hitherto omitted, or but flightly touch'd, by former Writers on this Subject.

Befides the Objections of fome of the Antients, Mr. Selden. and Mr. Hobbes have alfo argued againft this Method, tho upon different Principles, and from different Defigns} the latter aflerting that no body ought to receive thefe Dictates of Reafon,as obligatory to outward A&ions, before a Supreme Civil Power be instituted, who fliall ordain them to be obferved as Laws. And tho he fometimes vouchfafes them that Title, yet in his De Cive^ cap. 14. he tells us plainly, " That in the ftate of Nature they are but improperly called fo^ and tho the Laws of Nature may be found largely defcribed in the Writings of Philofophers, yet are they not for this caufe to be called Laws, any more than the Writings or Opinions of Lawyers are Laws, till confirmed ancj made fo by the Supreme Powers. But, on the other fide, Mr. Selden more fairly finds fault with the want of Authority in thefe Di&ates of Reafon, ( confidered only as fuch ) that fce may from hence flicw us a necelfity of recurring to the Legiflativc

Power of God, and that he may thereby make out, that thofe Di&ates of Reafondo only acquire the force of Laws, becaufe all our knowledg of them is to be derived from God alone, who when he makes thefe Rules known to us, does then ( and not before ) pro-mulgate them to us as Laws. And fo far I think he is in the right, and hath well enough corrected our common Moralifts, who are wont to confider thefe Dictates of Reafon as Laws, without any fuffident proof, that'they have all the Conditions requifite to make them fo, viz.. That tbey are eftabli/hed and declared to us by God as a Legiflatorj wbo bath annexed to them fuffident Rewards and Punifhmtnts. But I think it is evident, that if thefe Rational Di&ates can by any means be proved to proceed from the Will ofGod~+mn~ the Author of Nature, as Rules for all our Moral Adions, they- will not need any Humane Authority, much lefs the Confent or Tradition of any one, or many Nations, to make them fo : And therefore, tho I grant;this learned Author hath taken a great deal of pains to prove from (livers general Traditions of the %wi{h Rabbins, that God gave certain Commands to ^Ldam^di afterwards to Afod^contained in thofe feven Precepts, called by his Name \ and that thofe various Quotations this learned Author hath there produced, do clearly prove, that the Jews believe that all Nations whatever, even thofe which do not receive the Laws of Mofts^ are obliged to obferve the fame Moral Laws, which they conceive to be all contained under the Precepts above mentioned. And tho this Work of Mr. Selden is indeed moft learnedly and judi-cioufly performed, and may prove of great ufe in Chriftian Theology, yet I muft confefs it ftill feems to me, that he hath not fufficiently anfwered his own Objection concerning Mens Ignorance, or want of difcovering the Lawgiver*, for admit it fliould be granted,that thofe Traditions which they call thePre-

cepts of Noah, mould be never fo generally or firmly believed by the whole Jewifh Nation, yet were they not therefore made known to the reft of Mankind j and one of them, viz.. That of not eating any Part or Member of a living Creature, is juftly derided and received withfcorn by all other Nations. So that it feems evident to me, that the unwritten Traditions of the learned Men of any one Nation, cannot be looked upon as a fufficient promulgation made by God as a Law-giver, of thofe Laws or Precepts therein contained j and that all thofe Nations, which have never heard of Adam or Noah, mould be condemned for not living according to them, efpecially when we confider, that it was but in the latter Ages of the World, that the Jewifh Rabbins began to commit thefe Traditions to Writing, which 'tis very probable the antient Jews knew nothing of, fince neither Jofepbas, nor Pbih Judteus, take any notice of thefe Precepts in their Writings.

Therefore that the Divine Authority of thofe Dictates of Right Reafon, or Rules of Life, called the Laws of Nature, might more evidently be de-monftrated to all con fide ring Men, it feemed to me the belt and fitteft Method to inquire into their Natural Caufes, as well internal as external, remote as near: for in tracing this Series of Caufes and EfFedts, we fliall af laft be more eafily brought to the know-ledg of the Will of God, their firft Caufe, from whofe intrinfick Perfections and extrinfick Sanctions, by fit Rewards and due Punimments, we have endeavoured to fhew, that as well their Authority as Promulgation is derived.

I grant the greatefi part of former Writers have been content, to fuppofe that thefe Dictates of Reafon, and all Ads conformable thereunto, are taught us by Nature j or affirm in general, that they proceed from God, without ihewing us which way, or the

wanner how : But it feemed highly neceflary to mef to enquire more exadly how the force of Objeds from without, and that of our own Notions or Idea's from within us, do both concur towards the imprinting, and fixing thefe Principles in our Minds, as Laws derivedfrom the Will of God himfelf. Which Work if it be well performed, I hope may prove of great life, not only to our own Nation, but to all Mankind ^ becaufe from hence it will appear, both by what means Mens Underftandings may attain to a true and natural Knowledg of the Divine Will, or Laws of God; fo that if they praftife them not, they may be left without excufe. And this Principle will like-wife ferve for a general Rule, by which the Municipal Laws of every Common-wealth may be tried, whether they are Juft, and Right, or not ^ that is, agreeable with the Laws of Nature, and fo may be corrected, and amended by the fupreme Powers, whenever they have deviated from the great End of the Common Good. And from hence may alfo be demonftrated, that there is fomewhat, in the Nature of God, as alfo in our own, and all other Mens Natures, which ad-minifters prefent Comfort and Satisfaction to our Minds, from good Actions, as alfo firm Hopes, or Prefages of a future Happinefs, as a Reward for them when this Life is ended -, whereas on the other fide the greateft Mifery, and moft difmal Fears, do proceed from wicked, or evil Actions, from whence the Confcience feems furniflied, as it were with- Whips and Scorpions, to corred and punim all Vice, and Improbity : So that it may from hence appear, that Men are not deluded in their moral Notions, either by Clergy-men, or Politicians.

I grant, the Platonics undertake to difpatch all thefe Difficulties a much eafier way, and that is, only by fuppoflng certain innate Idea's of moral Good and EviJ> impreft by God upon the Souls of Men. But

I muft indeed confefs ray felf not yet fo happy, as to be able thus eafily to attain to fo great a Perfection, as the Knowledg of the Laws of Nature by this natural Inftinft, or Impreflion : And it doth not at prefent feem to me either fafe, or convenient, to lay the whole Strefs of Natural Religion, and Morality upon an Hy-potbefc which hath been exploded by all Philofophers, except themfelves, and which can never alone ferve to convince thofe of Epicurean Principles, for whom we chiefly defign this Work : But whofoever will take the Pains to perufe, what hath been written againft thefe innate Idea's by the inquiOtive, and fagacious

* Author of the late ElTay of humane * Mf,. . f , , _. .. ... ,. '-. i J * mx.JonnLoclr.

Vnderftandmg, will find them very J

hard, if not impoffible to be proved to have ever been innate in the Souls of Men before they came into the World. Therefore as I fliall not take upon me, abfolutely to deny the Being, or Impoflibility of fuch Idea\ fo I fliall not make ufe of any Arguments drawn from thence in this Difcourfe; tho I heartily wifh that any Reafons, or Motives, which may ferve to ipromote true Vertue and Piety, may prevail as far as they defer ve, with all fincere and honeft Men.

And the fame Reafons, which deterred me from fuppofing any natural Laws innate in our Minds, have alfo made me not prefently fuppofe, as many do ( without any due proof) That fuch Idea's have ex-ifted in the Divine Intellect from all Eternity. And therefore I looked upon it as more proper, and nc-ceflary to begin from thofe things, which are molt known, and familiar to us by our Senfes, and from thence to prove that certain Propofitions of immutable Truth prefcribing our Care of the Happinefs, or common Good of all rational Agents confidered together, are necefiarily imprinted upon our Minds from the Nature of things, and which the firft Caufe perpe-

tually determines fo to a& upon them: And that in the Terms of thefe Propofitions are intrinfecally included an evident Declaration of their Truth and Certainty, as proceeding from God the firft Caufe in the very intrinfick Conftitution of things: From whence it will be alfo manifeft, that fuch practical Propofitions are truly and properly Laws, as being declared, and eftablilhed by due Rewards, and Pu-mfhments annexed to them by him, as the fupremc Legiflator.

But when it (hall appear, that the Knowledg of thefe Laws, and a Practice conformable to them, are the higheft Perfection, or moft happy State of our Rational Natures, it will likewife follow, that a Perfection analogous to this Knowledg, and a Practice conformable to thefe Laws, mull neceftarily be in the firft Caufe �, from whence proceeds, not only our own Natural Perfections, but alib the moft wife Ordination of all Effeds without us, for the common Confer-vation, and Perfection of the whole Natural Syftem, or Univerfe, and of all thofe things our Eyes daily behold. For that is look'd '"pon by me as moft certainly prov'd, that it muft be firft known what Juftice is, and what thofe Laws enjoin, in whofe Obfervation all Juftice confifts, before we can diftin&ly know, that Juftice is to be attributed to God, and that his Jufticq is to be confidered by us as a Pattern, or Example for us to imitate. Since we do not know God by an immediate Intuition of his Eflence, or Perfections, but only from the outward Effe&s of his Providence, firft known by our Senfes, and Experience: Neither is it fafe to affix Attributes to him, which we cannot fufficiently underftand, or make out from things with* out us.

Having now {hewn you in general, the difference between our Method, and that which others have hitherto followed, it is fit we here declare, in as few

words as we can, the chief Heads of thofe things which we have delivered in this Treatife. Suppofing therefore thofe natural Principles concerning the Laws of Motion, and Reft, fufficiently demonftrated by Naturalifts ( efpecially fuch as depend upon Mathematical Principles) fince we have only here undertaken to demonftrate the true Grounds of Moral Philofophy, and to deduce them from fome fuppofed Knowledg of Nature, and as they refer to our Moral Pradice} I have here therefore fuppofed all the Effects of corporeal Motions, which are natural and neceflary, and performed without any Intervention of humane Liberty, to be derived from the Will of the firftCaufe. And, zdly. ( which Mr. Hobbes himfelf likewife in his Leviathan admits) that from the Con* lideration, and Inquifition into thefe Caufes, and from the Powers and Operations of natural Bodies, may be difcovered the Exiftence of one Eternal, Infinite, Omnipotent &eing?which we call God.

So that every Motion imprefs'd upon the Organs of our Senfes, whereby the Mind is carried on to apprehend things without us, and to give a right Judgment upon them, is a natural Effed j which by the Mediation of other inferiour Caufes owes its Original to the firft Caufe. From whence it follows, that God, by thefe natural Motions of Caufes and Effeds, delineates the ldea\ or Images of all natural and moral Adions on our Minds �, and that the fame God, after he hath thus made us draw various Notions from the fame Objed?, does then excite us to compare them with each other, and then join them together, and fo determines us to form true Propofitions of thethings^ thus fingly received and underltood. So that fome-times a thing is expofed whole, and all at once to our View, and fometimes it is more naturally confidered fucceflively, or according to its feveral parts : And the Mifid thereby perceives that the Notion of a whole,

(ignifies the fame with that of all the feveral Ideas of the particular parts put together, and fo is thence carried on to make a Propofition of the Identity of the whole, with all its parts i and can truly affirm, that the fame Caufes which preferve the whole, muftalfo conferve all its conftituent parts; and then from a diligent Contemplation of all thefe Propofitions (which juftly challenge the title of the more general Laws of Nature) we may obferve, that they are all reduce-able to one Propofition, from whofe fit and jult Explication, all the Limits or Exceptions, under which the particular Propofitions are propofed, may be fought for, and difcovered, as from the Evidence of this one Propofition (which may be reduced into this, or one of the like fenfe) viz. Tm Endeavour, as much as we are ab/e, of the common Good of the whole Syftem of Rational Beings conducesi as far as lies in our Power, to the Gooa of all its feveral Parts or Members, in which our own Felicity is alfo contained, as part thereof-, where" as the dfts ofpofite to this Endeavour, do bring along with them Effetts quite oppofite thereunto, and witt certainly frocure our own Ruin or Mi fay at laft. Therefore the whole Sum of this Propofition may be reduced to thefe three things: i. That which concerns the Matter of it, to wit, the Knowledg of its Terms drawn from the Nature of Things. Or, 2. Its Form, viz.. the Connexion of thofe Terms contained in this pra^ dHcal Propofition �, and particularly fuch, which be-caufe of theRewards and Punifhments annexed to them, may make it deferve to be called a Divine, Natural Law, as proceeding from God, the Author of Nature. Or elfe, 3. The Deduction of all other natural Laws from this, as their Foundation and Original, according to that refpeft or proportion they bear to the common Good, or happieft State of the whole aggregate Body of rational Beings,

But as to the Explication of the Terms of this Propofition, I hope the Reader will not be fcanda-liz'd, that we attribute Reafon to God, and have reckoned him as the Head of rational Beings, fince. we do not thereby mean that fort of Reafon which confifts in deducingConclufions from.priorPropo-fitions, but rather that abfolute Omnifcience and perfect Wifdom, which we underftand to be in God, which Cicero himfelf could not better defcribe, than by the Name of adult a Ratio, or the mofi pfrfeft Reafon. And if we Mortals can know, or apprehend any thing of him aright, it is as we do partake of fome part, tho in an infinitely lower degree, of that only true Knowledg and Underftanding. So that if we can once rightly judg that the common Good of Rational Beings is the greateft of all others, it is no doubt true, and no otherwife true, than as it is fo apprehended by the Divine Intelledt} as when it is de-monftrated to tis. that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones} no doubt but the Deity it felf had before the fame Idea of it. So likewifc if we have affirmed, that we can contribute any thing to the good and happinefs of rational Beings, by our Benevolence towards them, and fo may fup-pofe, that there is a certain Good common to us and the Deity, and which we may fome way ferve to promote �, we delire fo to be underftood, not as if we imagined, that by our teftifying our Love and Honour towards God, in any internal or external Afts of Worfhip, we could add or contribute any thing to his infinite Happinefs and Perfections; but only as judging it more grateful and agreeable to his Divine Nature, if by our Deeds we exprefs our Gratitude and Obedience to him, by imitating him in our care of the common Good of Mankind, than if we deny his Being, or blafpheme his Attributes, and violate or contemn his Laws: So like wife, if in our Thoughts,

Words and Aaions, we exprefs our Love towards him we doubt not but it is more pleafing and agreeable to his Divine Nature, than if by the contrary Actions we fhould fignify our negled or hatred of him: for if we abftradively compare any two rational Natures together, wemuft acknowledga greater Similitude when one of them agrees and co-operates with the other, than if we fhould fuppofe-aDifagree-jnent or Difcord between them, or that the End or Defisn intended by the one fhould be crofted or op-pofed by the other. Neither do I fee what can hinder but that the fame may be affirmed, it one ot thefe rational Natures be fuppofed to be God, and the other only Man. Therefore, as it is known by our common fenfe, that it is more grateful to any Man to be beloved and honoured, than to be hated and contemned ^ fo it may be found by a mamfeft Analogy of Reafon, that it is more grateful to God, the Head of rational Beings, to be belovd and honoured by the Service and Worfhip of us Men than to be hated and contemned. For as the defire of be-inebeloved areueth nolu^erfedhon inus^ fohkewife in God, it is fo far from giving the leaft fufpicion thereof, that on the contrary it rather argues his Goodnefs, fmce our Natures are perfefted to the hieheft degree they are capable of by our Love to him, and Obedience to his Commands. So .that when we fpeak of any Good common to us with the Divine Nature, it is only to be underftood analogically; for thofe things which we perceive to conferve or perfect our own Nature, wecall grateful to us, that is as they rendeTthe Min'd pleafed and full of Joy, Pleafure, and Satisfaction : And tho we confefs we cannot con-tribute any thing to the infinite Perfeftion of the Deity vet fmce this Joy or Complacency proceeding from our Love and Service towards him, may be con-feived without any Imperfection, they, I think, may

fee fafely attributed to his Divine Nature, and look'd upon as a fort of Good endeavoured by us for him, fince God efteems our Love and Service as the only Tribute we can pay him j and therefore he hath infe-parably annexed the highefl Rewards to this Love of himfelf (as (hall be proved in this following Difcourfe) which certainly he would never have done, unlefs it had been his Will that we mould thus love and wor-ftip him. Therefore, if I fliould grant, that the Divine Good orHappinefs is not any ways advanced by our Worfhip of him ; yet will not this at all derogate from our definition of endeavouring the common Good of rational Beings, which may be made out by thefe following Confiderations.

1. That all Rational Beings or Agents are, and muft be confidered together, as naturally and ne-ceflarily conftituting one intellectual Syftem or Society, becaufe they agree together to profecute one chief End, viz.. The Good of the Univerfe or World, efpecially of that intelle&ual Syftem, by thefitteft Means applicable to that end j fince, whilfl they are truly rational they cannot differ in judging what is that beft End, nor avoid chufing the fame neceflary Means leading thereunto.

2. That altho God, the Head of this intellectual Syftem, be indeed incapable of any Addition to his infinite Happinefs and Perfection, yet the whole Syftem (in as much as it includes all finite rational Beings) is capable of improvement in thefe its finite parts, which Improvement God cannot only defire, but ever did and will promote, both by his own Power, as alfo by that of all fubordinate voluntary Agents, whereby God's elfential Goodnefs becomes manifeft to us: a<i the Good of the whole Syftem may reafonably be judged as grateful or pleaiing to God the head thereof, altho it can add nothing to himfelf. Thus in Erabrions all the other Members

daily grow and improve, after the Head or Brain is fuppoled to have attained its full bignefs.

Thefe voluntary or free Aftions of the fubordU nate Agents, when they concur with God's Wifdom and Goodnefs, are naturally and evidently known to be more pleafmg (as being rewarded by him) than malevolent A&ions oppolite to this chief End, which fight both againlt God and Men ; nor docs the con-(ideration of God's rewarding fuch good A&ions, imply any addition to his Divine perfections. So that our Benevolence towards God, and confequently our Worfhip of him, is but our free acknowledgment, that he naturally and efientially is (what he ever was and will be) the fame infinite, good and wife Difpo-fer and Governour of the whole Syftem of rational Beings �, and this our Benevolence, by giving him Glory, Love, Reverence and Obedience, thereby fulfils all the Duties of Humanity towards thofe of our own kind, which anfwers both the Tables of the moral, and natural Law 9 and in this confent of our minds with the Divine Intellect, confifts that com-pleat Harmony of the Univerfeof intellectual Beings.

The great influence of thefe Principles upon all the parts of Natural Religion, may be more fully ex-prefs'd and made out by thefe following Confidera-tions.

i. The voluntary acknowledgment and confent of our Minds to the Perfections of the Divine Nature and Actions, include the agreement and concurrence of our chief Faculties, viz.. the tlnderftanding and Will, therewith j and moreover, naturally excite all our Affedions to comply with them, and fo ftrong-ly difpofe us in our future Life and A&ions, to conform our felves to the imitation thereof, to the ut-moftof our Abilities, Particularly thefe Principles naturally produce in us, Firft, Praifes and Thankf* givings to God, private and publick, for Goods ai-

fready done toourfelves or others, wherein one efi iential part of Prayer is contained.

i. Hence alfo arife Hope, Affiance or Truft iri God, all which I acknowledg fullelt of affii-rance, when founded not only on Obfervations, or paft Experience of Providences} but hath alfo revealed Promifes annex'd relating to a future Good.

3. To conclude, when our Acknowledgment and high efteem of the Divine Attributes move us to the imitation thereof, we muft needs thereby arife to thole high degrees of Charity^ or the endeavour of the greatest publick Good which weobferved God td profecute �-, and fuch Charity imports not only exacl: Jultice to all, but that ovet flowing Bounty, Tender* heft and Sympathy with others, beyond which Human Nature cannot arrive; becaufe thefe not only harmonioufly confent with tlie like Perfections in God^ but alfo co-operate with him, to the improvement of the finite parts of the rational Syftem, whereof he is the infinite, yet fympathiting Head, who declares he takes all that is done to the Members of thi$ intelleftual Society, as done to himfelf;

Neverthelefs, I profefs to underftand this.Symp4* thy or Compafllon in God in fuch a ferife only as ic is underftood in Holy Writ, for that infinite concerii for the good of his beft Creatures, which is contained in his infinite Goodnefs, and is a real Perfection of his. Nature, .not iniplying any Miftake, nor capacity of being lelTened or hurt by the power of any man's Malice, but yet fully artfwers (nay infinitely exceeds) that fblicicous careaiid concern for the good of otheisf which Charity and Compafnon work in the bell of


jri ftiort, if the Reader will take thepa;inst6.per^ tife the three firft Chapters of this Difcourfe, he will find that we have, in explaining the terms of this. Pftfpc'jfalafriy not only given a bare interpretation of

Words, but alfo have propofed the true Notions and Natures of thofe things from whence they are taken, as far as is neceflary for our purpofe; and may obferve that by dne and the fame labour we have dire&ly and immediately explained the Power and Neceflity of thofe human A&ions which are required to the-common Happinefs of all men, and alfo to the private good and neceifity of particular Perfons. Altho it feemed moft convenient to ufe fuch general words, which might in fome fenfe be attributed to the Divine Ma jefty ^ and I have done it with that defign> that by the help of this A-nalogy thus fuppofed, not only our obligation to Piety and Vertue, but alfo the Nature of Divine Juftice and Dominion may be from hence better under-ftood.

But as for what concerns the form of this Propo-fition, it is evident that it is wholly practical, as that which determines concerning the certain effects of human Actions. But it is alfo to be noted, thatal-tho the words conduces or renders, in either of thefe Propofitions, are put in the prefent Tenfe } yet it is not limited to any time prefent, but abftracls from it: And becaufe its truth doth chiefly depend upon the Identity of the whole with all the parts, it is as plainly true of all future time, and is as often ufed by us in this Difcourfe with refpect to future, as well as to prefent Actions. And therefore this Propofl-tion is more fit for our purpofe, becaufe built upon, no particular Hypothefis j for it doth not fuppofe men born in a Civil State, nor yet out of it, neither confiders any Kindred or Relations among men, as derived from the fame common Parents, as we are taught by the Holy Scriptures, lince the Obligation of the Laws of Nature is to be demonftrated to thofe who do not yet acknowledg them. Neither on the other fide, doth it fuppofe (as Mr. Hobbs doth in his

deCiw) a great many men already groWnand fprung up out of the Earth like Mufhrooms. But our Pf opofi-tion, and all thofe things we have deduced fV6mit might have been underftood and acknowledged by the firlt Parents of Mankind, Jif they had only confidered themfelves together with God, and their Posterity which was to come into the World. Neither may it lefs eafily be underftood and admitted by thofe Nations which have not yet heard of Mam and Eve.

Betides, it may not be amifs to obferve concerning thefenfeof this Propofition, that in the fame words in which the Caufe of the greateft and belt Effect is laid down, there is alfo delivered in ftiort the means conducing to the chiefeft end; becaufe the effed of 21 rational Agent, after it is conceived in its mind, and hath determined to bellow its endeavours in producing it, is called the End, and the Ads or Caufes by which it endeavours to effed it, are called the Means f And from this Obfervation may be ftiewn a true Me* thod of reducing all thofe things virhich Moral Phito-fophers havefpoken about the means leading to the bell end, into natural Theorems concerning the Pow* erof human Actions in producing fuchEffeds ^ and inthis^form they may more eafily be examined whether they are true, or not, and may be more evidently demonstrated fo to be. And alfb we may hence learn by the like Reafon how eafily all true know-ledg of the force of thofe natural Caufes, which we may any way apply to our ufe,does fuggeft fit Medium for the attaining of the end defigned, and fo may be applied to Praftice according to occalion. Laftly, from thence it appears, that either of thefe Propofi-tions, which we have now laid down, do fo far approach to the nature of a Law, as they refped an end truly worthy of it?viz. The common good of all rational Beings; or elfe (if you pleafe to word it o-therwife) the Honour or Worlhip of God conjoint

with the coramen pood and Happinefs of Mankind. And tho it,doth not yet appear that this Fropofiti-on is a Law,, :be.caufe the Law-giver is not yet mentioned, neverthelefs I doubt not but you will find in the Body,of this;1pifcourfe,v =that it hath all things ne-ceifary toret^er'ikfo, [<vk God, confidered as a Le-giflator, and his Will or Commands fufficiently declared: to us, as ail^aw from the very conftitution of our Natures^ as alfq of other things without us, and likewjfe ejlabliftied by, fufficient Rewards and Punifh-ments, bpdigin this,Life and ,the next -, neither do we fuppofe itcaji, be more evidently proved, that God is the Author ofallthings,; than that be is alfo the Author of this Propofition concerning the common good of ratiojaal Beings, or concerning his own Honour andA^orihip, conjoined with the common Good of Mankind. And tho I confefs we have been more exad, and have dwelt longer upon the Rewards that vts may expe& from the obfervation of this Law, than upon the Punifhments which are appointed for the;breach of it, and- tho I know the Civilians have placed the xSan&ion of r^vil Laws rather inPunifh-mentsthan'Rewards; yet I hope we have not offend. cdj tho we a little deviate from their Senfe, and make it part of the Sanction of this Law, that it iselta-bliQied by Rewards as well as Punifhments, fince it feemsmore agreeable to the Nature of things, whofe Footffceps are ftri&ly to be followed, to confider the pofitive Ideas of Caufes and Effeds in our Minds, and which do not receive either Negations or Privations by our outward Senfes j and our Affe&ions ought rather to be moved by the Love or Hopes of a prefent or future Good, than by the Fear or Hatred of the contrary Evil: For as no man is faid to love Life, Health, and thofe grateful Motions of the Nerves or Spirits, which are called corporeal Pleafures,4>ecaufe he may avoid Death, Sicknefs or Pain -, but rather

from their own jntrinfick Goodnefs ofcAgreeableneft with^ our human Natures} fo likewife no rational Man defires the Perfections of the Mind, to wit, the more ample and diftind knowledg of the moft noble Obje&s, the happieft State of rational Beings can only give him 5 and this, .not only that he may avoid the Mifchiefs of Ignorance, Envy, and Malevolence; bue becaufe of that great Happinefs which he finds by experience to fpring from fuch vertuous Aft ons and Habits, and which render it moft ungrateful to him to be deprived of them �, and fo the Caufes alfo of luch Privations are judged highly grievous and troublefbnu From whence it appears, that even Civil Laws themfelves, when they are eftabliflied by Punifliments, e. g. by the fear of Death, or lofs of Goods (if we confider the thing truly) do indeed force men to yield obedience to them from the love of Life or Riches, which they find can only be preferved by their obfervation. So that the avoiding of Death and Poverty, is but in other words, love of Life and Riches * as he who by two Negatives would fay he would not want Life, means no more, but that be defires to enjoy it. To which we may likewife add, that Civil Laws themfelves ought to be confidered from the end which the Law-makers regard in making them, as alfo which all good Subjects defign in obferving them j to wit, the publick Good of the Commonwealth (part of which is communicated to all of them in particular, and fo brings with it a natural Reward of their Obedience) rather than from the Pu-nifliments they threaten, by whofefear fome are deterred from violating them ^ and thofe of the worlt, and moft wicked fort of Men.

But tho we have fliewn, that the Sum of all the Precepts or Laws of Nature, as alfo of the Sanctions annexed to them, are briefly contained in this Propo-fition^ yetitsSubjeft is ftill but an endeavour, to the

titmoft of our Power, after the common Good of the whole Syftem of rational Beings: this limitation of, the utinoft of our Power implies, that we do not think our felves capable of adding any thing to the Divine Perfections which we willingly acknowledg to be beyond our Power. So that here is at once ex-preft both our Love towards God, and Good-will to Mankind, who are the conftituent parts of this Syftem. But the Predicate of this Propofition is, that which conduces to the good of all its Angular Parts, or Members, and in which our own Happinefs is contained as one part thereof; fmce all thofegood things, which we can do for others, are but the Effects of this endeavour: So that the Sum of all thofe Goods (of which alfo our own Felicity confifts) can never be mift either in this Life, or a better, as the Reward of our obedience thereunto. So like-wifetothe contrary A&ions^ Mifery in this Life, or in that to come, are the Pummments naturally due* But the Connexipn of the Predicate with the Subjeft, is both the Foundation of the truth of this Propofition, and alfo a Demonftration of the natural Connexion between this obedience and the Reward, as alfb between the Tranfgreffion and the Punilhment.

From whence the Readers will eafily obferve, the true Reafon for which this practical Propofition, and aH others that may be drawn from thence, do oblige all rational Creatures to know, and underftand it �, whilft other Propofitions (fuppofe Geometrical ones) tho found out by right Reafon, and fo are Truths proceeding from God himfelf, yet do not oblige men to any A&, or Pradice purfuantto them 5 but may be fafely negleclcd by moft Men, to whom the Science of Geometry may not be neceflary: whereas the effects of the endeavour of the common Good,do intimately concern the Happinefs of all mankind, (upon whofe joint or concurrent Wills, and

Endeavours, every fingle man's Happinefs doth after fome fort depend ) fo that this Endeavour can by no means be negle&ed, without endangering the lofing all thofe hopes of Happinefs, which God hath made known to us, from our own Nature, and the Nature of things; and fo hath fufficiently declared the Connexion of Rewards and Punilhments, with all our Moral Actions; from whofe Authority, as well this general Propofition, as all others which are contained in it, muft be underftood to become Laws.

It is therefore evident from the terms of this Pro-pofition, that the adequate, and immediate effect of our thus acting, concerning which this Law is efta-blifhed, is whatever is grateful to God, and beneficial to Men, that is, the natural Good of all the parts of the whole Syftem of rational Beings: Nay further, it is the greateft of all Goods, which we can imagine, or perform for them ; fince it is greater than the like good of any particular part, or Member of the fame Syftem. And farther, it is thereby fufficiently declared, that the Felicity of particular Perfons, is derived from this happy State of the whole Syftem ^ as the Nutrition of any one Member of an Animal is produced by a due Diftribution of the whole Mafs of Blood diffufed through all the parts of the Body. From whence it appears, that this Effeft muft needs be the beft, fince it mews us, that not the private Felicity of any fingle Man is the principal end of God the Legiflator, or ought to be fo of any one, who will truly obey his Will} and by a Parity of reafon it alfo appears, that thofe humane Aftions, which from their own natural force and efficacy are apt to promote the common Good, are certainly better than thofe which do only ferve the private Good of any one Man j and that by the fame proportion, as a common Good is greater than a private: So likewife thofe A&ions, which take the neareft way to attain

this effect as an End, are called Right, becaufe of their natural Similitude with a right or ftreight line, fvhich is always the fhortelt between the two Terms, But the fame A&ions, when compared with a Natural, or pofitive Law, as a rule of Life, or Manners, and are found conformable to it, are called morally good, and alfo right �, that is, agreeable to the Rule: but the Rule it felf is called right, or ftreight, as it fhewsthe neareft way to the End. But I fnall refer you for the clearer Explication of thefe things, to what we have farther faid concerning them in the Difcourfe it felf, efpecially in the Second part, wherein we prove againft Mr. Hobbes his Principle, that there is a true Natural, and Moral Good antecedent to Civil Laws.

But however, it may not be amifs to give you in fliortthe Method which we take to prove, that this Law of endeavouring the common Good, is really and indeed, and not metaphorically a Law. i. This general Suppofition being premifed, That all particular Perfons, who can either promote or oppofe this con> inon Good, are parts of that whole Body of mankind, which is either prefervcd, or prejudiced by their endeavours. We mall not now defcend to the particular Proofs as they are drawn from the Caufes of fuch Actions, of which we have partly treated in the Chapter of humane Nature*, and partly from their natural Effects and Confequences, of which we have largely difcourfed, in the Chapter of the Obligation of the Law of Nature} as alfo in the Second part in our Obfervation on Mr. Hobbes's Principles: all which play neverthelefs be reduced to thefe plain Propofiti-ons. i. As I have obferved, it is manifeft, that our Felicity, or highefl Reward, is eflentially connected by God the Legiflator, with the moft full, and con* ftant exercife of our natural Powers employed about the nobleft Objects, and greateft Effe&s they can be

capable of as proportioned to them: From whence it may be gathered, that all men endued with thcfe Faculties are naturally obliged under the penalty of lofing, or miffing of this their Happinefs, to exer-cife thofe Powers about the worthidt Objects, (viz..} God, and Mankind. Nor can it be long doubted, whether our Faculties may be more happily exerdied in maintaining Friendihip, or Enmity with them} for I think it is certain, there can be no Neutral State in which God and Men can neither be beloved, nor hated j or in which we can ftancl fo far Neuters, as neither to do things grateful, or ungrateful to them. But if it be granted, that there is a manifeft Neceility ( if we will be truly happy ) of prefervirtg Amity both with God and Men, here is thereby prefently declared the San&ion of this general Law pf Nature, which we are now enquiring into; for this alone eftablifhes all Natural Religion, and alfo all thofe things, which are neceflary to the Happinefs and prefer vation of Mankind, which are, befides Piety towards God, (i.) A peaceable Commerce and Agreement between the People of divers Nations, as treated of by the Law of Nations, which is but a Branch or fubordinate Member of this great Law of Nature. (2.) The Conftitution, and Confervation of a Civil Society, or Commonwealth, which is the Scope of all Civil Laws. And (3.) The Con* jinuance of Domeflick Relations, and private Friend/hips, concerning which the general Rules of Ethicks, as alfo the'more particular ones of Oe-conomics, do prefcribe. And therefore, we have put together many things in the Chapter of humane Nature, by which all particular Perfons of found Minds are fbme way rendred capable of fo large a Society, and are either more nearly, or remotely difpofed to it. And we do here jntreaf the Pleader, that he will not confider thofe things, each of them

fingly, or apart, but all together; fince from all of them conjoined, he may raife a fufficient Argument to prove the Exiftence, and evince the Sanction of this moft general Law of Nature v and that Men will neceflarily fail of their Happinefs, which chiefly confifts in the adequate, or proper Exercife of their rational Faculties, unlefs they will exercife them in cultivating this Amity, or Love both with God, and Men \ to which Ends they are before all other Animals particularly adapted.

But from the Effects of fuch Actions conducing to the Common good of Rational Beings, we have alfo further (hewn, in the Chapter of the Obligation of the Laws of Nature, that this Sanction by fufficieat Rewards and Punilhments, is moft commonly connected with fuch A&ions. And it is manifeft, that in the firft place God, as the beft and wifefl of Rational Beings, is to be loved and honoured by fuch Actions or Endeavours, as that the Goods, and Fortunes of all innocent Perfons of what Nation foever, are thereby fecured as far as lies in our Power, and all things profitable for patucular Perfons, procured according to the Proportion they bear to the good of the whole Body of Mankind �, fo that this Law will not permit any thing to be done, which the Care of the whole doth not allow: Nor can any thing be fuppofed more worthy a rational Creature, and from whence greater effects can proceed, than a Will always propenfe towards the good of this wholeBody governed by the Conduct of a Right Underftanding.

Therefore, fince it can certainly be foreknown, that fuch Effe&s will follow from this Endeavour, no Man can be ignorant that all the Joys, and prefent Comforts of true Piety and Vertue are therein contained, together with the hopes of a blefTed Immortality, befides thofe many Conveniences of Peace, and Commerce with thofe of other Nations, and all thofe

Emoluments both of Civil, and Domeftick Government, and private Friendfhips, which are connected with this Endeavour, as the common Rewards thereof, and which cannot by any Means within" our Power be otherwife obtained. So that, he who neg-le&s the Care of the Common good, doth alfo rejeft the true Caufes of his own Felicity, and embraces thofe of his Mifery, as a Puniftiment due to his Folly. In ihort, fince it is manifeft from the Nature of things, that the higheft Happinefs which we can. procure for our felves, proceeds from our Care both of Piety to God, and Love and Peace with Men; and that the Endeavour of thefe can only be found in his Soul, who truly ftudieth the common Good of all Rational Beings �, it is alfo evident, that the great-eft Rewards, that any one can acquire, are necefTa-rily connected with this Endeavour, and that the Lois, or Deprivation of this Felicity, doth neceflarily adhere as a Puniftiment to the oppolite Actions. The former of thefe, which declares the true Caufes of all that Felicity, which particular Perfons can thereby obtain, we have proved from Natural Effe&s found by Experience. The latter, (viz.) Piety to God, and Charity or Benevolence towards all Men, are contained in the Endeavour of the common Good ; and we have alfo proved in the fourth Chapter, that allVertues, both private and publick, are contained in this Endeavour.

But becaufe the Connexion of Rewards and Pu-niftiments, that follow thofe Ads which are for the common Good, or oppolite to it, is fbmething obfcu-red by thofe Evils which often befal good Men, and thofe. good things which too frequently happen to Evil ones, it will be enough for us to (hew, thatnotwith-ftanding all thefe, the Connexion between them is fo fufficiently conftant, and manifeft in the Nature of things, that from thence may be certainly gathered

the Sanftion of the Law of Nature, commanding the former, and prohibiting the latter Actions. And we may fuppofe thofe Punifhments to fuffice for its San&ion, which (all things rightly weighed ) much exceed the Gain that may arife from any Aft done contrary to this Law. But in comparing of the Effe&s which do follow good Adions on one hand, and Evil ones on the other, thofe good, or evil Things ought not to be reckoned in to the Account, which either cannot be acquired, or avoided by any humane Prudence, or Induftry} fuch as thofe which proceeding from the natural Neceffity of External caufes, may happen to any one by mere Chance, and fuch as are wont to fall out alike, both to good and bad. Therefore we fhall only take thofe in to our Account, which may be forefeen and prevented by humane Forefight, as fome way depending upon our own Wills or Afts.

But I muft acknowledg, that thefe Effects do not all depend upon our own particular Powers, but many of them do alfo proceed from the good Will and Endeavours of other Rationals; yet fince it may be known from their Natures, as they are agreeable to our own, that the common Good is the beft, and greateft End which they can propofe to themfelves, and that their Natural Reafon requires that they fliould a& for an End, and rather for this than any other lefs good, or lefs perfeft: And that it is moreover known by Experience, that fuch Effedts of Uni-verfal Benevolence, may be for the moft part obtained from others, by our own benevolent Actions j it is juft that thole Effeds fliould be numbred or efteemed among thqfe Confequences, which do for the moft part fo fall out, became every Man is efteemed able to do whatever he can perform, or obtain by the Affiftance of others. So that the whole Reward which is connected to good Aftions, by the natural

Conftitution of Things, is fomewhat like thofe Tributes of which the publick Revenues confift, which do not only arife out of conftant Rents, but alfo out of divers contingent Payments, fuck as Cuftoms or Excife upon Commodities, whofe Value, altho it be very great, yet is not always certain, albeit they are often farmed out at ascertain Rate. Therefore in the reckoning up of thefe Rewards, not only thole parts thereof ought to come into Account, which immutably adhere to good Actions, fuch as are that Happinefs which coniifts in the Knowledg and Love of God, and good Men, the? abfolute Government of our Paffiohs, the fweet Har- mony and Agreement betwixt the true Principles of our Actions, and all the parts of ourLivesv the Favour of the Deity, and the Hopes of a blefledJm-mortality proceeding from all thefe: But there oughfc alfo to be taken into the Account,- all thofe5 Goods, which do (tho contingently ) adhere to them, ani' which may either happen to us from the good ' WiH<o$ others, or flow from that Concord, and Societyy which is either maintained between divers Nations,-or thofe of the fame Commonwealth ; and which we do, as far as we a re able, procure for* dUr felves by fuch benevolent A&ioiis. And by the like Reafon, we may alfo underftand of what particulars all that Mifery, or thofe Punifhments may confifl, which is connected with thofe Ads that are hurtful to the common Good.

So that all of us may learn, from the Neceflityof the Condition in which we are born and live^ to efteem contingent Goods, and to be drawn to aft by the Hopes of them v for the Airit felf, which is^fo necefTary for our fubfiftence and prefervatibn, dotf* not always benefit our Blood, or Spirits; but is fometiraes infected with deadly Steams, and Vapours* Nor can our Meat, Drink or Exercife always pre^

ferve our Lives, but do often generate Difeafes. And Agriculture it felf doth not always pay the Huf* band-man's Toil with the expefted Gain, but fome-times he even lofes by it. And fure we are not Icfs naturally drawn to the Endeavour of the common Good, than we are tofuch natural Aftions from the Hope of a Good, that may but probably proceed from them. But how juftly we may hope for a con-fiderable Return from all others, jointly confidered, for all our Labours beftoWed upon the common Good j we fhall be able to make the beft Account of, when weconfider what our own Experience, and the Hifto-ry of all Nations for the time part, may teach us to have befallen thofe who have either regarded, or de-fpifcd this great End.

Butbecaufe the whole Endeavour of this common Good, contains no more but the Worfhip of the Deity, the Care of Fidelity, Peace, and Commerce betwixt Nations, and the inftituting, and maintaining Government both Civil and Domeftick, as alfo particular Friendfhips, as the parts thereof taken together j it is manifeft, that the Endeavour of all thefe expreft by a mutual Love and Afliftance, mult in ibme degree be found among all Nations, as necefla-ry to their own Happinefs and Prefervation: Nay, it feems farther manifeft to me, that thofe who attain but to the Age of Manhood do, owe all thofe paft Years much more to the Endeavour of others beftow-ed upon the common Good, than to their own Care, which in their tender Age was almoft none at all. For we then do altogether depend upon, and owe our Prefervation to that Obedience, which others yield as well to Oeconomical Precepts, as to all thofe Laws both Civil and Religious, which do wholly proceed from this Care of the common Good. So that it is certain, that if afterwards we expofe our Lives to danger, yea, if we lofethem for the publickGood,

we Ihould lofe much lefs for its fake, than we did before receive from it \ for we do then only lofe the uncertain Hopes of future Enjoyments, whereas it is evident that fcarce fo much as the Hope of them can remain to particular Perfons where the common Good isdeftroyed; for we have thence received the real Poflfeflion of all thofe Contentments of Life, with which we are bleft: And therefore we are bound in Gratitude, as well as Intereft, to return thofe again whenever they are lawfully required of us 5 tho I grant ( for the Honour of the Gofpel) that the firm-eft Encouragements, and greateft Reward we Men can have for expofing, nay, lofing our Lives for the Benefit, or Service of the Common-wealth, is that Happinefs we may juftly expeft in another Life after this.

Thefe things feem evident to us, as refembling that Method whereby we are naturally taught, that the Health, and Strength of our whole Body is preferred by the good Eftate of its particular Members, in its receiving Food, and Breath: Altho fpmetimes Difeafes may breed within the Body, or divers outward Accidents (as Wounds, Bruifes, and the like) do happen to it from without, which may hinder the particular Members from receiving thatNourifli-ment that is neceflary for them: And we are taught after the fame manner by the Ads immediately promoting the common good, that the Happinefs of particular Men (which are the Members of this natural Syftem ) may no lefs certainly be expected, nor are lefs naturally derived from thence, than the Strength of our Hands doth proceed from the due State of the whole Mafs of Blood, and nervous Juice : Tho we confefs that many things may happen, which may caufe this general Care of the whole Body of Mankind, not always to meet with the good Effed we de-fire j fo that particular Perfons may for certain in-

fallibly enjoy all the Felicity they can hope for, 6f expedt: Yet this is no Argument againft it, any more than that the taking in of Aif^ and Aliments, ( however neceflary for the whole Body ) (hould prevent all thofe Accidents, and Diftempers it is fubjed to$ fince it may happen as well by the violent, and unjuft Actions of our fellow Subjects, (like the difeafed Conftitution of fome inward part) or by the Invafi-eh of a foreign Enemy (like a Blow, or Other outward Violence ) that good Men may be deprived in* this Life of fome Rewards of their good Deeds, and may alfb fuffer divers outward Evils*, Yetiince thefe are more often repelled by the Force of Concord,, and Civil Government, or are often fhook offafter fome (hort Disturbances, either by our own private Power, or elfe by that of the Civil Sword, as Difeafes are thrown ofFby a healthful Crifis,or Effort of Nature. So that notwithstanding all thefe Evils, Men are more often recompenfed with greater Goods, partly from the Afiiftance of others, but chiefly from that of Civil Government, or elfe of Leagues made with Neighbouring States : From whence it is that Mankind hath never been yet dcitroyed, notwithstanding all the Tyranny and Wars, that Mens unteafonable Paflions have exercifed, and raifed in the World 5 and that Civil Governments, or Empires, have been more lafting than the moll long-lived Animals. From all which it is apparent, that the depraved Appetites of divers Men, or thofe Paifions which do often produce Motions fo oppofite to the common Good, ought no; more to hinder us from acknowledging the Natural Propenfities of all the reft of Mankind ( confidered together) to be more powerfully carried towards that which we every Day fee may be procured thereby, (vim.) The Confervation and farther l?erfe&ioi? of the whole Body of Mankind, than that divers Difeafes breeding in the parts of Animals^ orariyotfc

ward Violence (hould hinder us from acknowledging, that the Frame of their Bodies, and the Natural Fun&ion of their parts are fitted, and intended by God, fortheConfervationof Life, and the Propagation of their Species.

But that we may carry on this Similitude, (between a living Body and its particular Members, with the whole Body of Mankind, and all the individuals contained under it) a little farther, I will here give you Monfieur pafcat's Excellent Notion concerning this common Good, as it is published in thofe Fragments, Entituled, LtsPenfeesde Alon-fimr Pafcxl, llncc it both explains and confirms our Method. He thet-e fippofes, That God having made the Heavens, and the Earth, and divers other Creatures, not at all feniible of their common Happinefs, would alfb make fome rational Beings which might know him, and might make up one Body confiding of rational Members �, and that all Men are Members of this Body: fo that it is neceflary to their happinefs, that all particular Men, as Members of this Body, conform their particular Wills to the Univerfal Will of God, that governs the whole Body, as the Head or Soul thereof. And tho it often happens, that one Man falfly fuppofes himfelf an independent. Being, and fo will make himfelf the only Centre of all his Adtions} yet he will at laft find himfelf whillt in this State, ( feparated from the Body of rational Beings, and who not having any true Principle of Life, or Motion, doth nothing but wander a-bout) diftradted in the uncertainty of his own Being �, but if ever he comes to a true knowledg of himfelf, he will find, that he is not that whole Body, but only a fmall Member of it, and hath no proper Life, and Motion, but as he is a part thereof: So that to regulate our Self-love, every Man

Vide Chap; des Penfees Morales*

ought to imagine himfclf, but one ftnall part of this Body of Mankind, compofed of fo many intelligent Members ^ and to know what Proportion of Love every Man oweth himfelf, let him conlider what Degree of Love the Body bears to any one fmall Tingle part, and fo much Love that part (if it had fenfe ) ought to beftow upon it felf, and no more : All Self-love that exceeds this is unjufl. So far this fagacious contemplative Gentleman thought Jong fince, tho I confefs he doth not proceed to fhew in what manner the Good of every individual Perfon depends upon the Happinefs of the whole Body of Mankind, as our Author hath here done ^ tho no doubt, he was admirably well fitted to do it, if he had lived to reduce thofe excellent Thoughts into a fet Difcourfe.

We have delivered in this Epitomy the Sum of that Method, by which we have enquired into the San&ion of the Laws of Nature, in which we have confidered all the Felicity naturally flowing from good Actions, as a Reward annexed to them by God the Author of Nature; and their Lofs, or contrary Evils that follow them, as a PunUhment naturally flowing from their Tranfgreflion : And indeed, our Method feems very much confirmed from the common Confent of Mankind, finee all .Men, of however different Opinions concerning Moral Principles, do yet agree in this, that good Aftions ought Hill to be encouraged by Rewards, and evil ones to be reftrained by Punim-ments; in this all Se&s of Philofophers, however quarrelling among themfelves, do agree, as alfo the Founders of all Religions, and the Makers of all Civil Laws, have made this their main Foundation \ Nay, thofe, who would feem molt to negled all Rewards, and would deduce all Vertues from Gratitude alone, yet find it neceflary to acknowledg this Gratitude to proceed from the Memory of Benefits re-

ceiv'd. But fure it Hill argues as much Love toward8 our felves, when we are perfwaded to do bur Duty bY a Confideration of Benefits already received, as when, we do it for the fame things to be received hereafter 5 yea, he feems to a& more generoufly, who is moved toad for a Good only in expectation, than he who doth as much for the like good things which he already eh joys.

But this Method which we have here taken to reduce all the Laws of Nature to this fingle Proportion, of endeavouring the common Good, feems the more convenient, becaufe its proof is more eaiie, and expedite than that of fo ir any Rules,, which are wont to be propofed by Philofophers, and the Memory will be lefs burthened by the daily Remembrance of this one Propofirion, than of many �, efpecially when we are directed to it from the Nature of this common Good, as a Meafure whereby the Judgment of any confidering Man, may put Bounds to his own Aftions and Paffions, in the doing of which all Moral Vertue con (ills. And this Work Ariftoile hath recommended to the Judgment of every rational Man in his Definition of Vertue, tho he hath not indeed (hewn us the Rule of making this Judgmentj whereas our Propo-fition teacheth us, that the Rule is to be taken from the Nature of the beft, and greateft End; that is, Refpeft being had to all the parts of the whole Syftem of rational Beings, or of that Common-wealth of which God is the Head, and all the Members are his Subjefts.

And from this Principle alfo to be derived that Order, or Preference among all the particular Laws of Nature, according to which, the former doth Hill reftrain, or limit the latter, which Dr. Sburrock hath, prudently, and folidly obferved in his Book De Officiis^ Chap. 10. As for Example, that there is a prior Reafon for abftaining from invading that which isano-

thers, than of obferving Promifes; and likewifc there is a greater Account to be made of Faith once given, than of returning Benefits, &c. But the true Ground of all thefe Rules is only to be found in our Principle, becaufe it more conduces to the common Good, that a prior Law of Nature concerning making and preferving Properties mould not be violated by the Invaflon of anothers Right, than that any one Ihould obferve a Compad, or Promife, when it cannot be done without fuch an Invafion; and there is the like Reafon in obfervingthofe other Laws, which we have reckoned up in the following Difcourfe, according to their due Order and Dignity: fo that indeed no Man ought to wonder, that we have fo pofi-tively afierted, that no Vertue can be explained with-out a Refpeclto the State of all rational Beings, or of the whole intellectual World �, for we fee in Natural Philofophy, that the Accidents of Bodies daily obvious to our Senfes, fuch as are the communication of Motion, Gravitation, and the Adion of Light and Heat, Firmnefs and Fluidity, Rarefaction and Condenfation, can new be explained, without a "Refpeft to the whole Syftem of the corporeal World, and the Motion therein to be preferved. Laftly, from this order among the Laws of Nature, whereby all the fpecial ones are ftill made fubordinate to this general one of the common Good, andthelowefb of them to the higheft, it may eafily be fhewn, that God never difpenfes with them, unlefs in thofe Cafes, in which the Obligation of a lower, or lefs Law, may feem to be taken away, and the nature of the Adion fo changed, as that there may be only place left for the Obfervation of the higher.

To conclude, we have here likewife fliewn, that the Generation of all Commonwealths is to be deduced from thefe two Principles, tending to this great End of the common Good of Rationals, w. firfty

irom that which commands the ConiHtution of a di-ftindt Property in things, and in the labours or endeavours of Perfons, where no fuch Property is yet inftituted, and where it is found to be fo., to prefer ve it inviolate, as the chief and neceflary. Medium to this common Good. 2. From that Law which commands a peculiar Love, or Benevolence of Parents towards their Children �, for this could never have exerted it felf, unlefs our firft Parents had permitted their Children when grown up, to enjoy a part of thofe neceflaries of Life, which were needfal for their future Subfiftence ; and fo from many fuch Fathers of Families joining together by mutual Compacb for common Defence, might arife the firft Governments in the World, of whatfoever kind you pleafe to fup-pofe.

But in the following Difcourfe, we have thought it belt to confine our felves within the bounds of Piiilofo-phy, and have wholly abftained from Theological Queftions: And therefore we have not faid any thing concerning Good, or Evil Spirits, or Angels, or ta* ken in their Good or Happinefs, into our Hypotbefi} $ for tho I doubt not of the Exiftence of fuch intelligent Beings, yet it is certain, all we can underftand of them proceeds wholly from Divine Revelation, or humane Tradition, neither of which are true means of obtaining Philofophical, or natural Know* ledg.

As for the Second part of this Treatife, in which is contained the Confutations of fome of Mr. ffobbes's Principles, or Arguments \ fince the Firft part is entire without it, and that the truth is a fufficient Proof to it felf, I leave it to thedifcretion of the Reader, whether he will trouble himfelf to perufe it, or nor, fince all Mens tempers do not alike fute with the ftudy of Controverfies > but it was neceflary not only pp lay a Foundation of better Moral Principles, but

alfo to (hew the Falihood, and Vanity of tliofc he hath laid down �, fince otherwife it might have been thought by foffl.e, that they were altogether unanfwe-rable: Yet I hope we have performed this unplea-fant Task, without receding upon the Memory of the Dead, and difturbing the Ames of a Perfon, who yvhilft he lived, was (as mult be acknowledged even by his Enemies) confiderably famous, both for Wit and Learning.

I have little more to add, but that I doubt not but onr learned Author ( whofe Work I have nowr abridged ) hath hit upon that true Method of proving the Law of Nature, which the Lord Bacon in his Advancement of Learning, tells the Reader he dellred to fee well performed, arid pjiat his Defign was to make enquiry into the true Fountains of Juftice, and publick Utility; and fo in every part of the Law, to represent a kind of Real Charatfcr, or Idea of that which is truly juft; by which general Mark, he that will bend his ftudy that way, and examine the Grounds, or endeavour the Amendment of the Laws of particular Kingdoms, or States, may be truly guided in this noble Undertaking. And he there proceeds to give fome general Aphorifms, which he calls the Idea's of Uni-verfal Jufticq, and his Fifth Aphorifm is very home to bur purpofe i for he there tells us, that the main End to wick all Laws fhould tend^ and ^hereunto they fhould 'dire ft fair Decrees and SancJions^ is only the common "Good, or Felicity of the People. And Cure this could liave no Foundation, but as the Felicity of any particular People, or Nation is contained in the general, or common Good an4 Happinefs of rational Beings,

And tho I grant that our Faculties are not fitted to pierce into the internal Fabrick, and real Eflences of Bodies, as th aboveraea^ioned Author of the EiTay

&<% 8. Chap. 3.

rable Connexion, and Agreement one with another j fo far as we can find their Habitudes and Relations, fo far we (hall be pofTefled of certain, real, and general Truths : And I doubt not, but if a right method were taken, a great part of Morality might be made out with that clearnefs, that could leave to a confidering Man no more reafon to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the Truth of anv Propofitions in Mathematicks which have been demonftrated to him. And I am confident our Author hath found out this only right method, and made ufe of the fitteft De-jnonftrations for the Proof of this Principle of the common Gopd of rational Beings, as the Sum of all natural Laws; fo that I hope you will have no caufe to doubt, but that he hath as fully proved it to befo, as if he had given us fo many Mathematical Demon-ftrationsof it.

But fince, as in the Mathematicks, there are required certain Principles, or Poftulata, which muft be taken for granted, before its Profeilbrs are able tode-rnonftrate any thing from them > fo we fliall reduce all we nave to fay on this Subject, into Six plain Poftulata 5 the Three firft of which having been already made out by others both in Latin and Engliih, I mall wave the Proof of them, and confine my felf wholly to the .Three laft : The. Propofitions are thefe.

T. That there is one Infinite, moll powerful, intelligent Being which we call God, who is the Author, and G.eator of the Univerfe, or World.

2.. TnatGod, as he hath created, fo he likewife g \'erns, and preferves this World, confiftingof Bo-dis and Spirits, by certain corporeal Motions, and the Dictates of Reafon, by which they aft as the chief Inftrumentsof his Providence.

3. That God thereby maintains, and preferves all bis Creatures, and farther defigns the Happinefs, and

of humane Under/landing hath very well obfcrved: Yet in the fame place he alfo grants, l 1 hat the Knowledgwe have of them, is fufficient to (Mover to us the Being of a God, and of a Divine Providence * andthattheKnowledgof our felves, and the Nature of other things is fufficient to lead us into a full, and clear Difcovery of our Duty towards Him, as being the great Concernment of our Lives-, and that it becomes us as rational Creatures to employ our Faculties about what they are moft a-dapted to, and follow the direction of Nature, where it fecms to point us out the way. So that it is highly reafonable to conclude, that our proper Employment lies in moral, rather than natural Truths. And therefore the fame Author in his Fourth Book, and Third Chapter, pag. 274. hath this Pailage: ' The Idea ofaSupream Being, infinite in Power and Wifdom, whofe Workmanfhip we are and on. whom we depend, and the Idea of our felves as underftanding, rational Creatures, being fuch as are clear to us, thefe would, I fuppofe, if duly confidered, and rnrfued, afford fuch Foundations of our Duty, and rules of Aftion, as might place Morality amongft the Sciences capable of De-monflration �, wherein I doubt not, but from Principles as inconteftable as thofe of the Mathematicks, by necefTary Confequences, the meafures of Right and Wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himfelf with the fame indifferency and attention to the one, as he doth to the other of thefe Sciences. And in the Twelfth Chapter of the fame Book, he faith, p. 3*1- cT!"s Savemethe Confidence to advance that Conjefture, which I fuggeft-ed, Chap. 3. w. That Morality is capable of Demonftration as well as Mathematicks j For the Idea's that Etbicks are converfant about, being all realEffences. and fuch as I imagine have a difcove-

Prefervation of fuch of them as are fenfible, as far as their frail and mortal Natures will admit, and that Power which God hath given to Mankind over them.

4. That of all animate, or fenfible Creatures, God hath made Man alone to be confcious of his own Exiftence j and alfo that it is more particularly his Duty, to aft as his fubfervient Inftrument ^ not only for his own private Good, and Happinefs, but alfo for the common Good of all rational Beings.

5. That this knowledg of God's Will, as our Duty, is plainly difcovered to us, from the Being and Nature of God, as alib of our felves, and of thofe things without us, which he hath made neceflary for our ufe, and prefervation.

6. That thefe Di&ates, or Condufions of right reafbn, all tending to one great End wa the com-mon Good of rational Beings, (in which our own is contained ) being given us by God as a Legillator, for the well governing, or right ordering of our Adions to.this End, ccnftitnte the Law of Nature �, as being eftablifhed by fufficient Rewards and Puniflunents, both in this Life, and in that to come.



THE Learned Author of tbis Treatife fent it to me (then being in a Private Station) above a year ago , but then concealed bis Name from mey either though bis great Modefty, or becaufe in bis Prudence he thought that if I knew him, I might be biaffed in my Judgment, by the Honour which I am obliged to have to his Family-, and efpeciatty to bis Grandfather by his Mother's fide, the moft Learned f Primate of Ireland. Wherefore I read the Book without any refpett to the unknown Writer, and conftdered only the Merits of the Performance. Thus I found that he had not only well translated and epitomized in fome places what I had written in Latin, but had fully digefted the chief things of my De/ign in a well chofen Method of his own, with g* cat Perfpicuity, and had added fome llluftrations of bit own, or from other Learned Authors, with a Philosophical Liberty, which I mu(l needs allow. For this Reafon I judged that the then unknown Author had given too low a Title to his Book, and that I was to efleem him a good Hyperafpiftes, or able Second, in this Combat for Truth and Ju/lice, rather than a Tranfla-tor or EpitomiMr of what I had written. This obliged me to enquire diligently after the Author's Name and Quality, and then I foon obtained the Favor and Honour of a more intimate Converfation with him. Hereby I quickly found that I might fafely leave the Maintenance of that good

f Archbifhop Vjher*

Caufein which I was engaged, to his great Abilities and Diligence. And, I hope that fince tins Learned Gentleman hath conquered the Difficulties of the Search into the Rife of the Laws of Nature, now many of our younger (Sentry witt be encouraged to follow him in the may which this bis Treatife makes flain before them. For from thence they may receive affiance, not only to difcern the Reafonable-npfs of (M Vertue and Morality<, which is their Duty and [Ornament as they are Men, but alfo they may here fee the true Foundations of Civil Government and Property, which they are tnofl obliged to underfand, becaufe, as Gen" tlemen, they are bom to the greateft Interefl in them both. 1 need add no more to give you Durance that I freely sonfent to your Printing of this Book, and am

Tour affeffiotuite Friend,

Ric. Peterborough.



of the Firft Chapter.

A Brief Repetition of the Preface; That the Law of Nature can only be learnt from the Knowledg of a God, and from the Nature of Things, and of Mankind in general, $ i.

A ft ate of the Queflion between us and the Epicureans and Scepticks, 2.

'The Method propofed, in what manner we are to enquire into the Nature of things, and of Mankind, in order to frove certain general Pr^ofetions, that /hall cany with them the Obligation of Natural Laws, 3.

The Soul fuppofed to be rafa Tabula, without any innate IdeaV. Our method propofed of con/fdcring God a* the Caufe of the World ; and all Things $nd humane jftfions, as fubordinate caufes and effe^st either bin-dring, cr promoting our common Happmefs and Prefer-nation, 4.

All the Laws of Nature deducible from hencs^ as /o many prattled Proportions, and all our obfrrvations or Iwowledg of it reducible to one Propofition, of the higheft Benevolence of rational Beings towards each other, as the fum of all the Laws of Nature ^ and what is meant by this Benevolence, $5.

What things are neceffary to be known or fuppofed, in order to the knowledg of this univerfal Benevolence^ 6.

Tfje Connexion of the Terms of this Proportion proved^ and what vs to be cottetfed from thence \ The true happi-nefs of /ingle Perfons inseparable from that of Mankind; The general Caufes of its Happinefs to be con/idered in the fir ft place, $7.

Therefore no Man's particular Happing/scan be oppofed~+mn~ or preferred to the Happinefs of all other rational Beings ; The contrary Brattice unreasonable and unjuft, $8.

Tet that this Propo/ition cannot be of fufficient efficacy, titt we have propofed the Common Good of Nationals for the great End of all our j4ftions, 9.

The Effefts of this Proportion not prejudiced by the itt life of Mens Free-wills, 10, ii.

By wkatfteps and degrees the Knowledg of this Common Good comes to be conveyed into our minds from the nature of things, $12. ���''<

Firft Natural Obfervation, ttat in our free ufe and enjoyment of all the outward Nece/Jaries of Life, and in our mutual adminiftring them to each other, conjifts all mcns happinefs and prefervation, from whence alfo proceeds a Notion of the Common Good of Nationals, 13.

That Afen are able to contribute more to the good and happinefs of thofe of their own kind, than any other Creatures, 14.

Nothing a furer help and defence to Mankind, than the moft fincere and diffufive Benevolence, $15.

Nor any thing more deftrutfive to it, than their conftant Malice and Ill-will, $ \6.

That tbefe Principles are as certain as any in Arithme-tick and Geometry, notwithftanding the fuppofttion of Mens free-will, fy 17.

Tet that they are only Laws as proceeding from God the prSt Caufe, and as ejlablifh'd with fit Rewards and Pu-nijlmenis, $ 18.

That from tbefe natural and general Obferuations we attain to a true knewledg of tbe Caufes of all Mem bappi-nefs and that by tbe Lavs of Matter and Motion tbefe Caufes aa to certainly as any other, $ 19, 20.

Hence ari/es a true notion of things naturally and un-alterably good or evil, $21. ~

7bat Mens natural Powers, and tbe things neceffary for life, can neither be exerted nor made ufe of contrary to the known rules of Matter and Motion, * 22.

Some Concluftons deducible from hence -, at that we chiefly concern our felves about tbofe things and attiom that are in our Powers, 6 23.

No man felf-fufficient to procure all thtngs neceflary for fct5 own prefervation and happinefs, and therefore needs the ood-will and affiance of others, $24.

None of tbefe neceffaries for Life can produce the Ends defarfd but a* they are appropriated to Man's particular ufefand necejfities for the time they make ufe of them,

2fr'om whence arifes the Right of Occupancy or Poffeffion, vbichmaybe exercifed even during a natural Community

of mott things, 26. .....

That M this natural Diwjton and Propriety in things w neceiTarytotheprefervation of particular Perfons, fo it w alfo of Mankind conftdered M an aggregate Body,

* Zrhat thefe Principles dejlroy Mr. HobbesV Hypothecs of the Right of all Men to aU things in the ft ate of Nature,

*2The necejjity of a farther Divifion and Appropriation of things, now Mankind is multiplied on the Earth,

* 2No Man bath a Right to any thing farther than a* it conduces to, or at leajt conffls with tbe common Good of rational Beings^ 30.

Theknowledg of thefe natural Caufes and Effe ft s alike certain as well in a natural as civil State, with a brief Recapitulation of the Grounds and Arguments infiftedon in this Chapter, 31.

The Contents of the Second Chapter.

MA N to be con/idered as a natural Body, a$ an Animal, and alfo at a rational Creature. Some Obfervations from the firft of thefe Conjtderations -, as that humane Bodies and Actions are fubjeft to the fame Laws of Matter and Motion with other things

t i, i. *�'

No Afliow or Motions more conducive to Man's happinefs, than what proceeds from the moft diffufive Benevolence, $3.

Mankind considered as a Syflem of natural Bodies, doth not make any confiderable difference between them, when confidered as voluntary Agents endued with fenfe, but that they rather aft more powerfully thereby, $4.

Mens greateft fecurity from Evils, And hopes of obtaining Good, depends upon the good-will and voluntary A/Jiftance of others, 5.

Several natural Conclu/ions drawn from thefe Obferuct-tions, $6,7.

The like being found true in animate as well as inanimate Bodies, will make us more fotticitous towards the general good of thofe of our own kind, 8.

T'hat loving or benevolent Attions towards each other conftitute the bappieft fate we can enjoy �, and alfo it ordained by aconcourfe of Caufes, that all rational Beings Jbould be fen/ible of thefe Indications, $ p.

This proved from feveral natural Obfervations.


i. That the bulk of the Bodies of Animals being but nar-

ron>, the things nectjfary fa* tk V prefirvition can be but few, and moft of them communicable to many at once, and fe requires a limited feif-love conjiftcnt with the fafe-ty and'bappinefs of others, 10.

2. That Creatures of the fame kind cannot but be movedtothe likeajfettions towards others, a& towards them-felves, from the jlnfe of the fimilitude of their natures, $11.

Animals do never deviate from this natural ft ate, but when they are feized with fome preter-natural Difeafe or Pajjion, which, as oft a* it happens, is abfolutely de-ftruftiveto their Natures, $12.

Aft Creatures ex^refs a delight in the fociety of others of the fame kind ; fome cafes or intervals wherein Nature feems to aft otherwife, no contradicJion to this general Rule, $ 13.

All Animals impelled by the natural Conftitution of their farts to a Love of thofe of a different Sex, and to a natural Affettion to their Offspring, 14.

All Animals take delight in the fleeter Pajfions of Love, Joy, Defire, &c. 45 helpful to their natural Covfli-tution', whereat the contrary Pajftbns, when inordinate^ tire highly deftruftive to it, 15.

Mr. H. cannot deny thefe natural Propenfions, and therefore ts forced to fuppofe fomewhat in Mans nature that renders him more wfociable than Brutes, 16.

Other peculiar Obfervations relating to MJ.n, whereby be w made more capable of promoting the common good -, a* firfl, from the greater quantity of Brains in Men, than in Mrutes, 17.

2. From the natural Conftitution of their Blood, and Spermatick fejfels, from whence arifes a Necejjity of Marriage, and of a more conflant and lafling Love to fair Offspring, ^18.

3. From the wonderful ftrufture of Mem hands it w f roved, that this Injlrument wot given us, for fome more noble uje than bare fdf-prefervation^ $ 19.

Laflly, From the upright pojlure of Mcns bodies^ and way of motion, $20.

Toe next Set of Obfervations tending to prove Men more fitted for the promoting of this common Good, taken from the natural and peculiar faculties of Men's Souls a-hove thofe of Brutes, Andyi. from that of deducing EffecJs from their Caufes, and vice versa ; especially in that of diftinguifhing of real or natural, from apparent Goods, $21.

What is under/tood by us, by a natural or moral Good or Evil. Certain Axioms for the plainer underftanding their Nature and Degrees^ 22.

Horn we arrive to an Idea of a fpecies or kind of Creatures, and alfo to a notion of the general or common good of Mankind, $ 23.

Speech and the Invention of Letters, peculiar faculties of Man's nature : And the great Benefits art/ing from thence in order to the common good, $ 24.

Men do infinitely exceed Beafls in their difcur/tve Faculties, as alfo in the knorvledg and ufs of Numbers,


Andlikewifeinthe Power of undemanding the different

Quantities and Proportions between Bodies, which we call Geometry, $ 26.

The two great remaining Prerogatives of humane Souls, Freedom of Will as to moral Attions, and theKnowledg of aGod) $27,28.

tfrhat knowledg we can have of his Attributes, which can never be truly underjlood, but with refpett to their great End, the Profecution of the common good of the Vniverfe, 29.

The Contents of the Third Chapter.

A Brief recapitulation of the former Chapters, and a fumming up all thofe Observations into a general Propo/ition of God's Willing and Commanding the Common Good of Rational Beings, as the main End of all our Aftions, $ i.

A brief Explanation of the Terms of our^Dcfcription of the Law of Nature, and that Words are not always cffential to Laws, 2.

That att moral Truths or Duties as declared by God, arc contained in this one Propo/ition of Endeavouring the common good j certain Principles laid down for the proving it,

$3v4, 5,6-

That this being once difcovered to ttf, we lie under a fufficient Obligation to obfervc this Propo/ition, as a natural. Law, with the Explanation of the Term, Obligation, and who hath Authority to oblige us, 7, 8, 9.

Tet that this Obligation may well confift with the freedom of our wills. The difference between a mere animal and a rational or natural Good, the ncglett of which diftinftion is the Caufe of Epicurus and Mr. H's Errors, $ 10.

The laft part of the Obligation to this Law, viz. its SanCiion by Rewards and Punifbments. Certain Axioms neceffary to be known in order to the right underftanding the true nature of a moral Good or Evil j and of Marts true happinefs and perfecJion^with its difference from that of other Beings, i i.

That tho all moral Obligation docs not confijl in Rewards or Tuniflwicnis \ yet that by rcafon of the wcakmfs of humane Nature, it is infignificant without them } with a Scale of Nature, /hewing the difference between Vegetables and inanimate Bodies, and between Men and Brutes,

$ I 2.

Theftrifteft Sanction, and confequentlj Obligation to all Laws,conftfts in Rewards and Puni/hments duly diftributed -9 Qoo?s right of Dominion not to be refolded into his irrefifti-bis Power? $13.

The internal Rewards ordained by God in Nature, are9 firft, the inward fatisfaftion of the Soul> and alfo the pleafure all men take in the excrcife of the fwcetcr pajfions of Love, &c. 14,15.

The external Rewards are all the like returns of this Be-neyolence from others, w,ith the praife or commendation of all good men, together with the peace and protection of the civil Government, $ 15, 17.

Laftly, from God, Soundnefs of mind and body, with all thofe outward blejjings he ufually bejlows on the peaceable and vertuous ; with a Solution to the difficulty ^ Way God of ten afflicts Good men, $ 18.

The internal Puni/hments ordained by God for the tranf-grejjion of this Law, are, the abfence or privation of the former good things, which is, an Evil and a Punijhment^ 19.

Error, and being governed by the Pajfions, arealEvil9 and an internal Puni/hment, 20.

3. That fuch> evil Actions cannot but be often difpleafing tp the Perfon that doth them, ir. ,

4. "that Pices and Crimes feldom come alone, but let in a train of others of the fame kind, or worfe, along with them, ^ 22.

5. That fuch an Offender cannot get out of this ft ate when he will, at leaft not without the trouble of Repentance^

$23. - ".'" ' " ""' ''"

6. The fear of Puni/hment botfy from G,od andMan9 24. ' ,.' "' " ' ; "c;v'

The external Puni/bmcnts are, i. The Evils that bqp* fen to the body from violent and unfociable Pajjionfy 925. ' ' "" . ' ' ' ' �'""-.;

2d. Thofe returns of hatred or contempt wbicb tf# fuck men muft expeft from others, 2.6,

3d, Returns of ' revenge from thofe they have injured, $27.

Laflly, Thofe Punifhments which are often inflifted by the civil Powers-, all which natural Puni/hments Mr. H. bimfelf acknowledges to be ordained by God, $28.

That where thefe Punifhments fail in this Life, they will be fupplied by others infinitely more grievous and durable in that to come, $29.

A brief recapitulation of this Chapter, That this Propo/t-ttonof our Endeavouring the common good, &c. is truly a Law, as containing all the Conditions requi/tte thereunto, $ 30.

The Contents of the Fourth Chapter.

A Brief repetition of what hath been faid in the firft Chapter, That no Man can Rave a right to preferve his own Life, but as it conduces to the common good, &c. That in att Societies the good of the leffer part muft give place and be fubordinat* to that of the greater, i, 2.

That a due con/lderation of this Law will lead us to a Inowleag of the reafon and grounds of all the particular Laws of Nature, $ 3.

And alfo that all moral fertues are contained under this one Law of endeavouring the Common Good. That Prudence is nothing but the knowlcdg of our duty, in order to the great End, the Common Good \ as Constancy in the frofecution of it, is therefore true Fortitude, 4.

That Temperance,or Moderation,*'?* att corporeal Plea-fures is no otherwife a fertue than as it conduces to the hap-pinefs and prefervation of Mankind', That under Love and Benevolence are contained the V'trtms of Innocence, Meeknefs, &c. $ 5,6.

Equity a Vertue at it poMotes the common good of Mankind, $7.

The fame proved likewife of Juftice, fince nothing can be called Ours, either by natural or civil Laws, but as it conduces to this great End, and a natural and civil Property neceffary thereunto; the one in a natural ft ate, the other in a civil fociety, $ 8.

From Property arifes the neceflity of Contraffs, Pro-mifes, Gifts, &c. all which are ft ill to be governed by this great Law, $9.

From this natural Property arifes the Fertue of Moderation, fetting bounds to inordinate felf-kve in order to the common good; Frugality, no otherwife afertue9 than as it renders us not burthenfom, not injurious to others, 10.

The natural Love of Parents to their Children to be ex-ertifed and limited with refpecJ to the common good, $ ii.

All the reft of the moral Vertues, fetch as Temperance^ Frugality, &c. more particularly explained to proceed from the fame Original, and not to be under food without it, $ 12.

The fame more particularly applyed, and made out in every particular Pertue, which conftitutes Juftice, $

13- � .'

AH the homiletical Pertues, i. e. fitch as refpe&Con-verfation, cr the due ufe of Speech, explained after the fame manner, with a like refpett to the Common $od, $ 14,15,16.

Self-love and Self prefervation only lawful in order to this End, $ 17.

Some farther explanations of the nature of Temperance, and wherein it confifts, 18.

That part of it called Chaflity, a Vertueonly as it tends to the good and propagation of mankind, 19.

Another part of it, viz. Modefty in feeking of Riches, Honour, &c. t'ertues only as thty limit our felf-love from pretending to more than we have need of, or �deferve^ in order to the Common Good, $ 20.

That a regard to this gnat Rule runs through all the Moral fertucs, which are all of them contained under the moft diffufive Benevolence towards Rational Beings, $21.

Right Reafon explained to be only # due confederation of thvs End in all Moral Actions towards God or Men ��> and that the knowledg oftbcfe moral Rules is as certain, as that of the knowledg of any other natural caufcs and effecJs concerning the prefervation of Animals, 22.

And that from their true underftandirig proceeds all the certainty we can have of natural Laws, notwithstanding there may be a fufficient latitude left us for indifferent afti-ons, $ 23.

The Common Good as it is a collection of all other goods; fo it w a true ftandard, or meafure of them, 05 /hewing what goods are to be fought for or dcfired before others^


It w only to be learned from hence, what degrees of pajfi-ons or affeftions are lawful, that it, confident with the Common Good, and confequently thereby to judg of the feveral degrees and proportions of goodnefs and happinefs^ $25.

Piety towards God a frvrtue, as it conduces to the com-won good and happinefs of Rational Beings, 26.

Nothing a Good-, but as it contributes to this great End, $ 27.

The reafon of tbvs Difyti/ition into the true grounds of Good and Evil, as being that which makes all moral Pbilo-fophy a practical Science, and not merely fpeculative, like that of the Stoicks, $ 28.

A brief Conclu/ton out of Dr. Parker'* Demonftratior, of the Laws of Nature, $ 29.

The Contents of the Fifth Chapter.

THE Obje&ionso/ two forts of Men, Platonifts and Epicureans, againfl this Notion of the Common Good; the Objections of the former to be firft confidered; their firft Objedion, Tkat it is more fuitable to God's good-wfs to imprint certain Innate Idea'* of good and evil on our minds, i.

Anfwer thereunto out of Mr. Lock'* Effay, &c. $ 2.

A farther Anfwer from St. Paul, That the vifible things of the Creation are a fujjicient proof of the Being of a God, and of the Laws of Nature, $ 3.

fhe labor ioufncCs of our Method no material Objection,


An explicit Idea of this Common Good, not always nc-ccffary to itsobfewation, 5.

Another Objection againft our Method, That it makes e-very man's Obligation to cndea-vour this Common Good, to wife from its being chiefly good to himfelf. Anfwer That this, if it be confidered, will prove a miftake -, tho I grant our'Obligation to it as a Law cannot extend farther, than 06 it concerns our happinefs or mifery, 6,7.

A Reply to the Objections of the Epicureans �, Thefirft Objection, That it feems not futtable to God's goddnefs., &c. to permit thit great End of the Common Good to de-psndupon the unreafonable Pajfions and Lusts of Mankind. Anfvv. That God intended Man for a voluntary Creature? to be moved by Moral Evil, as well as Good ; and that God not with flan ding all this reftrains his Aftions byh'vs infinite Power and Providence, 8,9.

Second Objection, If this Law of Nature is fo cafie to be known, how comes it to pafs, that fo many Nations feem wholly ignorant of it, many living without any know-ledg of a God, or of a Moral Good or Evil ? 10.

Anfwer. This Objection is of no more weight againft the Certainty of this Law, than it it again/I that of^rithme-tick and Geometry; but that if they are guilty of this Ignorance, it proceeds either from the Lofs of the Tradition of the Creation, or elfe from want of time or opportunities to conjider thefe things, $ 11.

Mem not making a due ufe of their faculties in difco-vering thefe Truths, no Objection againft their certainty,

$ 12.

The laft Obje&ion, That this Notion of the Common Good, is a mere Platonick Idea, without any reality in Nature, $13.

This Objedion it vain, if it be conjtdercd, That this Notion of the Common Good is made up of particulars, and that from thence arifes an Idea of a common or general Good, which tho a complex one, is as true and real as any other, and as agreeable to the Nature of things, farther proved from Mr. Lock'* Effay; and thai Mr, H. himjelf cannot deny the Truth of this Notion, 14.

Mr. H'* great Rule of doing as you would be done by, Signifies nothing without refpecJ to the Common Good of Mankind, 15.

So neither that of prefi, ving a Man's felf, or any other innocent perfon, unlefs as it conduces to the Common Good of Mankind, 16.

Not only the whole Law of Nature, but the revealed Law of Mofes, and the Gofpel of Jefus Chrift reducible to t\m one Proposition, of Endeavouring the Common Good, and that this was the great de/ign of Chrift'* coming into theWorld,ii,i8.

A Condufion of the whole, $ i p.


Law of NATURE,


Ofthefirft Means of diJcoVering the Law* of Nature 3 ( viz.) the Nature of 'Things.

$. i. TT

Have in the Iritrodu&ibn to this Difcourfe , fliewn you thote feveral Methods, by which divers Authors have endeavoured to prove a Law 6f Nature; and have alB given myRealbns, (^tho* very briefly) why I cannot acquiefce in any of them, as laying too weak Foundations whereon to raife fb great and weighty a Building. I have likewife giveri you the bnly true Grounds, by which it can^ as I fuppofe, be made out, (i>/Js.) from the

Exigence of a G O D declaring his Will to us; from the Frame of the World, or from the' Nature of all Things without us; as al(b from our own Natures, or that of Mankind in general, we, by the Power of our natural Faculties, orReafons, drawing true Conclufions from all thefe. This being pre-inifed, I fhall now proceed particularly to declare, in the firft place, what I underftand by the Frame of the World, or Nature of Things, in order to the proving the Exi-ftence and Obligation of the Law of Nature and that it is really and truly a Law obliging all Perfons of Years of Difcretion and found Minds, to its Obfervation: Which being performed, I fhall theo proceed to our own Nature, as included in that of all Mankind.

-$. %. But though the antient, as well as modern Sceptrcks and Epicureans, have formerly, and do {till at this day, deny the Exigence ol any Law of Nature, properly fo called; yet, I fappofe, that we are both funV nently agreed what we underftand by this Term, fmee we both thereby mean certain Principles of immutable Truth and Certain-rv winch cUreic cur voluntary Actions concerning the eledfcion oi'Good,andtheavoi-cUna o? Evil Things,and (o lay an Obligation as to our external Ad-ions, even in the

{Fate of Nature, and out of a Civil Society, or Common-weal. That fuch eternal Truths are neceflarilyand unavoidably prefented to, and perceived by Men's Minds, and retained in their Memories, for the due ordering or governing of their Actions, is, what is here by us affirmed, and by them as confidently denied. And I farther conceive, That the Actions fo directed and chofen, are firfl: known to be naturally good, as productive of the greatefl publick benefits; and afterwards are called morally Good,becau(e they agree with thofe dictates of Reafbn, which are here proved to be the Laws, or Rules,of our Manners, or voluntary Actions: So alfo the Evil to be avoided, is firfl: the greatefl: natural Evil, which afterwards for the like Rea(bn is called Moral.

ff. 3. Therefore that the Exiflence of fuch Proportions may more plainly appear, and be demonftrated to the Underftandings of all indifferent Readers, it is neceflary that we firfl: carefully confider the Nature of divers Things without us, as alfb that of Mankind ,* and what we mean by Good and Evil, whether Natural or Moral. Laflly, we (hall {hew what thofe general Propofiti* ons are, which we affirm carry with them the force or Obligation of Natural Laws, as declaring their Exercile or Performance

neceflary to the comparing of an End* that ought to be endeavoured or (ought after, in order to our true and greateft Happinefs.

jr. 4. Nor let it feem ftrange, that I fup-pofe the Nature of divers Things, about which we are daily converfant, ought firft to be lobked into, and confidered: For I will here fuppofe the Soul, or Mind of Man, to be at firft, raft Tabula, like fair Paper$ that hath no connate Character or Idea's imprinted upon it (as that Learned Theorift Mr. Lock hath, I fuppofe^ fully proved) and that it is not fenftble of any thing at its com ing into the World$ but its own Exiftcnce and Adion ; but receives all its Idea's aftcrwards,from fuchOb* je&s as it hath received in by the Senfes: So that our Underftandings being naturally de-ftitute of all Notions or Idea's, we cannot comprehend how they can operate, unlefs they be iirft excited by outward Object And indeed how can ,\ve underftand what may be helpful and agreeable, or elfc hurtful and deftrudive to Men's Minds and Bcu dies, unlefs we firft coafider (as far as we are able)all theCauies both, near and remote^ which have made, conftituted, and doftili prcicrve Mankind, or eilc may rend to its

Vld. his Eflay concerning HUmane ttn~ derftanding, Book. i. Chap. ii.

deftru&ion, either for the time prefent, 01? to come > Nor indeed can it be underftoocl what is the fitted and bed Thing, or A&i-on, any Perfon can perform in a Cafe pro-pofed, unlefe firfl all thofe Effe&s which may proceed from it, in all its various Cir-cumftances, be duly confidered and compared together. So that the Contemplation both of the Ca,u(es on which Men's Safety and Happdaeft do depend, asalfbof the EfFedh which may be produced by their joint or concurring Forces and Endear vours, muft neceflarily lead our Minds, firft to the Confidesation of all other Men-, and then of our felves, as a very (mall part of Mankid.

Ap$ in the next place, that we proceed to-, contemplate this Syftera of Things, called the Vifilk World$\& more efpecially GO D, as its Creator; and Governour, according to ihe Method laid down in the Introduction so this Dilcourfe; the Idea's of which being duly confidered and digefled in our Minds, we may dra\y fpom thence certain- Conchi-fions, by which we may judge or determine what Humane Things,snd Actions are certainly and neceflarily conducing to the Common Good and Happinefs of all Rational Beings, and in which every particu* lar Ferfon's Felicity or Well-being is cpt>-

tained, as a part thereof; and in which Rational Dictates, or Conclufions, I (hall hereafter prove this Law of Nature to con-fifl

$. 5, Nobody, I fuppofe, will think it neceflary to the matter in hand, that I iliould here make Phyfical Difquifitions into the Natures of all Things that are the Objeds of our Senfes, that being the Bufmels of prpfefs'd Natural ifts: It is iufficient for us to ihew, That all the Rules of Moral Philofo-phy, and the Laws of Nature, may be at laft refblved into certain natural and eafie Obfervations, gathered from common Experience ; or elle into certain Conclufions, eftabliflied upon the known Principles of Mathematicks and Phyficks; by which, I do not only mean all thofe natural Laws of Matter and Motion in Bodies, but alfo the Operations of our own Souls, as far as we Iwe able to know or enquire into them. From all which, by the Order of Natural Caufes, we may be led to the Knowledge of GOD their Creator and Or-dainer , and (b may acknowledge Him <as the only Cairfe of nil tbe(e excellent Ef-fedh, ficce this Nature of Things doth as well fugged to oar Minds the idea of a Creator, as cf the Tilings created ,� and fb fupply us with fufncicnt matter frcmwlnch

we may deduce all the Laws of Nature, as fb many true Practical Propositions; though it is only the Knowledge of the Firfl Caufe, or Creator, that can {lamp any, Authority or Obligation upon them.

Now although there may be many Things collected from our Knowledge of federal Beings in the Wcrld> that may ierve for our Moral Inftrudion, and the cultivating of our Manners; yet I {hall, for Brevity's feke, only feled: Tome of the moft material of them, and (uch as may ferve to explain our fhort account of the Law of Nature,which (notwithftanding {everal Authors have Co much enlarged upon it) I think may very well be reduced to this flngle Propofition, viz. The moft umverfal Love, or moft diffufve Benevolence ofatl Rational Beings towards each other*) conftitutes the happieft State they catt le capable of: So that their Endeavouring the Common Good ly this Benevolence, is the fum of att the Laws of Nature, and in which they are all vertuatly contained. Note, That by this Love or Benevolence^ I do not mean only a fruitlefs Defire, or Well-wi(h-ing, but an active Affection, exerting it felf in all the Ad:s of Piety towards God, Duty towards Parents, Kindnefs and Gratitude towards our Country, Friends, and Relations, and of Charity and Humanity

towards all the reft of Mankind, as often as any opportunity offers it felf.

$. 6. In the making out of which De fcription of the Law of Nature, it is here needlefs to enquire into the Nature of our Souls, and the manner of our Knowledge and Underftanding;; fince the former hath keen fo Learnedly performed by the Reverend Dr. War,k late Bifhop of Sal!s6uryyznd the latter fo exadfcly done already mEngliJh 6y theabovementioned Author of the Effay of Humane Underflanding. I {hall only briefly fuppole upon his Principles, that our Souls dp, i. From the very birth,bydje. grees, receive Idea's drawn from outward Objeds by our Senfes. x. That it is: their faculty from divers fingle Notions, or Idea's yut together, to come to make complex ones; that is, t;o make divers Pfoptofitions or Conclufions; not only concerning their own inward Actings, but al(p about afl thofe outward Objedts, with which they are daily converfant,and which may tend to the finding out the readied means of attaining to,and preserving themfelves in the happieft State and Condition they are able to ac-<ju.ire. Thefe things being fuppos'd, it were neediefs to. trouble you'with any farther defcriptionjs of this Love, or Benevolence, fince every Perfbn cannot but be Efficiently

(enfible of its Nature, Degrees, and various Operations, that will but make any Self-refle&ion upon his own Inward Affe&ions.

$. 7. But as for the due Connexion of the Terms of this Proportion, in which its Truth does chiefly confift, it (eems to me plain enough: It being no more than to affirm, That our endeavour of procuring all the good things in our Power, and which are mod conducing to our own prefervati-on and Happinefs,and that of all other Rational Beings, is the beft,or chiefefl thing that all Perfbhs can xlo, to render both them* (elves, and all others^ as happy as their Natures will permit, or can require ,� and that there is no furer, or more powerful- means to be difcovered by us, whereby we may obtain a full enjoyment of all the good things of this Life, and the hopes of that to come^ than by endeavouring our own Felicity in Conjunction with that of othejs. So thai from what I have already advanced,the Reader may Colled: thefe two Proportions.

i. That the Foundation of all our inward Natural Happinefs confifts in an habitual determination of the Will to the utmoft of its Ability and Perfection, whereby we may be always ready and prepared to endeavour this Common good of Rationals.

, That; the true Bappiaefs of each Indi-

vidual Perfon, cannot be feparated from that of other Rationals, fince the whole doth not differ from all its parts taken together; fo that this Propofition, concerning this general or diffufive Benevolence, is thus to be underftood, viz. Not to mean, or only intend, what any One, or more Perfons may perform towards the procuring of their own private Happinefs, or that of their own Party or Faction, diftincl: from that of the reft of Mankind ; but what all particular Perfons may jointly contribute to render themfelves and others happy; that is, what each of them may rationally perform towards the obtaining this Common Felicity. For it ought firft to be known in general what all Men are able to do, or not to do, towards any common end, (fuch as is the common happinefs of Rationals) and then what it is poffible for any particular Pcrlon in this or that Cafe to perform , for example, towards his own private hap-pineis, as feparate from that of all others; though fuch cafes being Indefinite, cannot be certainly or diftincStly known.

$. 8. But indeed the care of any parti* cular Perfbns, or a few Men's happinefs is rend red ufelefs for the prefent nor can be hoped for the future, if it is fought by op-polinc;, oV poftnomna the happinefs of all

other Rationals; becaufe die mind being thus affeclred, a main, and eflential part of its own felicity mud needs be ftill wanting? Ci;/2.) That inward Peace of Conference proceeding from a folid Reafon, and true Prudence, always conflant and agreeable to it felf. For whilft fuch a Perfon refolves to adl by one rule towards himfelf, and by a-nother towards all others, who are of the fame Nature, and therefore need and require the fame things with himfelf, he muft needs contradict his own Reafbn, and fb wants that true Joy and Satisfaction con-flantly fpringing in the mind of a Jufl Benevolent, and Good-natur'd Perfon,from the fenfe of another's good and happinefs when promoted, or procured by himfelf: So that it is importable for any Man to be truly happy, who not only neglects the neceflary caufes thereof, God, and all other Men, (on whofe Help and Affiftance his true Happinefs, and Well-being wholly depends) but alfb provokes them to his certain Ruin and Definition; fb that there is no furer way, which can bring any Man to the attaining his own particular Happinefs, but that which leads him alfb to endeavour the Common Good of all other men, as well as his own.

jT. 9. But I here acknowledge, that this

Proposition concerning Univerfal Betievo knee, cannot be of fufficient efficacy for the due ordering our Actions, and correcting our Manners, until we have firft proposed to our (elves this Common Good of Rational Beings j (viz.*) Our- own Felicity (in conjunction with that of others) as our main end, and that we are convinced that the various A&s contained under this general Love, or Benevolence, are the only true means to procure it: The truth of which Propofition, is, in the firft place, to be made manifeft to us 5 in the next all thofe other Proportions that can be deduced from thence ; fuch as are thofe left general Ones, which determine concerning the Natural Power of Fidelity, Gratitude, Paternal and Filial AfFeftion, as alfo of all other particular Vertues, neceffary for the obtaining any part of this humane Felicity 5 for as well the whole truth of this Propofition, as of ell thofe which follow from thence, depend upon the Natural, and, NeceflTary Power of fuch Actions,,, as real Caufes ^reducing fuch Effects.

J*. i o. And though perhaps it may at firft light feem to detract from their certainty, that they depend upon (uch an.uncertain Caufe as Man's Will; Yet however? it fuk ices, tor their truth. and> ce#ainty, fiat

whenever fach voluntary Caufes fliall exert themfelves, fuch Effedh will certainly be produced. Thus in Arithmetick we freely Add and Subftraft; that is, we can choofe whether we will perform thofe Operations or not; but if we reckon truly, we ftiall always find the Total, equal to all the par* ticulars either Added or Subftra&ed. And there is a like certain, and true Connexion between all the Caufes and Effects, which can be known in any other Science. And this I have likewhe imitated in this Treatife of Moral Philofophy, by reducing all the parts, of which it confifts, to this one Head or Summ, (wz.) Love or Benevolence; which Idea I (hall improve by enquiring into its feveral Kinds, and (hewing the ne-ceflary Connexion of this, or that particular A&ion, with the Common Good of Rationals, which ought to be the great end fought for by us.

. ii. But fince our voluntary Actions alone can be govern'd by Reafon, and thofe only which concern intelligent Agents,are to be confider'd in Morals j it is evident, that from none of all thefe Actions we can frame a higher, or more comprehenfive Idea, than this of Univerfal Benevolence, which comprehends the willing, and endeavouring of all good things, and the re-

moval, or hindring of all evil ones, from thofe Obje&s about which it is converfant: And this Benevolence extends its felf to all Moral A&ions, as well thofe of confidering, and comparing divers goods with each o-ther, as thofe of enquiring into the means by which they may be produced; nor is it more certainly true, that the Addition of feveral numbers makes a SummTotal,than that this Benevolence produces a general good effect to all thofe towards whom we exert it. Thus it is as certain, that Piety, Fidelity,Gratitude,Friendfhip, Paternal and Conjugal Affedtion,together with filial Duty, make up the chief and conftituent parts of' this Bcnevo!ence,as that Addition,Subftra&* ion, Multiplication and Divifion, are feveral parts oi? Arithmetick; therefore it is no material Objection to fay, that this Universal Benevolence may be prejudiced or lef-(encd by the wickednefs or ill nature of Men y So that the great end,or Summ of the Law of Nature., cannot be thereby generally obtain'd as it ought, any more than it is an Obje&icn againitthe certainty orufefulnefs of Arithmetiei:, or Geometry, that fbme Men fhould through Lazynefs and Inadvertency, altogether negled: their Rules, or make falfe Conclufions from their Sciences, or ihould through Ignorance or prejudice,

deny their certainty. So likewife it is in the Science of Morality, as contained in the Law of Nature, which is chiefly imploy'd in weighing, and tsking a true account of thofe humane Powers, that contribute to the Common Good of Rational Beings; which fince they may vary fbmewhat in fb great a variety of poflible Cafes, he may be faid, ( and that defervedly ) to have well performed this task, who firft affirms in general, that all thofe Powers are comprehended under the moft general and diffii-five Benevolence; though he may be able afterwards more particularly to demon-ftrate; that a juft divifion of things. Fidelity, Gratitude, and all the other Vertues are contained under it, and alfo (hew in what Cafes they become ufeful to this end; by which means Religion, and humane Society, with all other things which may render Men's lives happy and fale, will be certainly improved and advanced. And herein confifts the Solution of that moH" uleful Problem concerning the Common good of Rationals, procured by the molt diffufive Benevolence, which Moral Philo-fbphy teaches us to fearch after. Nor is the truth or authority of fuch Precepts at all prejudiced or diminilhed, though very many Perfbos will not- obey themj or willTet

tfiemfelves to oppofe them; fmce this only can be the contequence of it, That they wilt thereby loofe their own happineis, and perhaps may draw others by their falle reafons into the fame miCery: And fo I doubt not on the other fide, but that Men would think themfelves oblig'd to perform all the A&s that conflituie this Benevolence, i( they were but once convinced that fo great and noble an end, as the Common good of Rational Beings, (and in which their own happinefs is likewife contained *) will be certainly procured thereby, and cannot be had by any other, or contrary means.

$. i -L. \ come now to confider, that together with the knowledge of this vifible World, (of which our {elves make but a fmall part) there is likewife convey'd into our minds by our Senfes a certain knowledge, i. Of divei a natural outward goods. ^. And thoi� not only peculiar to our felves alone, but common to all thofe of our own kind. 3. Of which goods fome are greater than others, and that good which hath none that we know excels it, we may call the greateft or higheft. 4. Alfo of thofe, (bme are commonly in our Power, others we underliand to exceed the narrow limits of our humane forces; but fmce the Nature of theft- tilings is by two feveral ways

difcovered to us, either more confufedly by common experience and dailyObfervation, or elfe more diftindbly from experimental Philofophy , and the Mathematicks ; the former of thefe methods being eafy, and obvious to every one , I (hall rather niake ufe of that; whereas the other would be only proper for Philofophers and Mathematicians , fince the Grounds or Principles of the Law of Nature, ought to be a-like evident to the Illiterate as Well as to the Learned, for all are under the Jik& obligation to obferve them ,� and therefore I ihall only put you in mind of fuch vulgar and eafy Obfervations, which no Rational Man can difpute, or deny : and fuch, as from which I undertake to prove, that the Knowledg" and Coherence of the Terms of the propofmon may evidently be de* duced.

JT. 13. Our firft Natural Obfervatiort therefore is , that by our free ufe, and enjoyment of thofe produces of the Earth, that come under the general Titles of Food* Cloathing, Houfes, @c. and alib by that help or aliiftance, which one or more Per-fons can afford each other ; Men may be preferved, and live as happily and content* tedly for feveral years, as their frail Nature will permit,

And in the next place, that thefe effe&s being not only agreeable, but neceflary to our Natures, are naturally good, as tending to their Prefervation, or Perfe&ion ; and therefore by the fame reafon, Men's affe&ions , from whence thefe outward things and a&s do proceed, and which produce all thele good effects, are con-ceiv'd under the notion of good Will, or Benevolence, which muft be alfb good; fmce whatever goodnefs is contained in the effe&s,muft be likewife in the caufe.And we are alfo fenfible, that by this Benevolence, we are not only able to help our (elves, or fome few perfons, but many others, as well by our advice, as by our ftrength and in-duftry; especially when we fee divers others of our own kind who are able, and feem alfo willing to requite us in the like manner. So that each of us in particular, may be provided with a fufficient ftock of all the neceilaries of Life, by our mutual help and affiftance, all which would not only be wanting to us, but we fhould be expos'd to innumerable mifchiefs and hazards, as alfo to a great want even of necelTaries, if all Perfons looking onely to themfelves, Ihould always (hew themfelves ill-natur'd, malevolent, and enemies towards other Rational Beings; whereas the

contrary endeavours being thus helpful^ and neceflary to fo many others, may eafily and naturally produce in our minds a notion of this common good ofRationals, which from the obvious Similitude of Rational Beings to each other, muft equally re-ipe<3: all thofe, whom we have opportunity or occaTion of knowing, or cbnver-fing with, as alfb thofe with whom we have noti

JT. 14. And I may add farther from cbri-flant experience, that we are able to contribute more to the good, arid afliftance of thofe of our own land, than any other Creatures, becaufe their Nature (and con* fequently what is good, or definitive td it) is more evident to us from the know-ledg we have of bur felves, than of other Creatures. For ds our Nature is capable of more, and greater goods than they, and In the attaining of which we can better affift each other ,� fb we muft alfb confefs it to be liable tb greater Dangers and Calamities ; for the declining and removing of which, God hath appointed our natural Benevolence exprefled by our endeavours^ and afliftance of each other, as the mofi foitable and neceffary means thereunto.

tf. 15. And we may alfo obferve, that by our Advice and Counfel,communicated by apt Signs or Words, we are able to contribute many helps and conveniences of Life to thofe of our own kind, of which other Animals are altogether incapable either of ading or receiving. And farther, becaufe of the Similitude of thofe of our own kind with our felves, we cannot but think it agreeable to our Rational Nature to do, or to procure the like things for them, as for our felves, and can alfo be {en-fible of greater Motives to benefit Men, than other Creatures; fmce we have all the reafon to hope, that thofe we have thus done good to, or obliged, being moved by our benefits, will make us a fuitable return whenever it lies in their power, and that they may one time or other,in the like, or fome other way oblige us. So that it is evident from common Experience, that there can be no larger Pofleflion, nor any (urer defence for Mankind, than the moft fincere Piety towards God, the Head of Rational Beings, and the moft diffufive Love and (incere Benevolence of all Per-ibns towards each other; fmce if they prove malevolent,or ill-natur'd they wouldbereave one another ot all things they enjoy, together with Life it (elf: nor can the Love or

Good-will of others, be obtained by any more certain or powerfiill means than every one's (hewing himfelf fo affe&ed in his Aliens towards others, as he defires they (hould be towards himfelf; That is, Loving and Benevolent upon all occafions, though more particularly to thofe to whom we are obliged by Friendfhip or Relation.

JT. 16. Laftofall, the fame Experience that demoftrates the natural Benevolence of particular Perfbns to be the mod powerful Cauie of their Felicity, does as neceflarily teach us from a like parity of Reafon, that the Love, or Good-will of any greater number of Men, towards any the like number, hath a like proportionable effect; fo on the other fide, the conftant Malice or Ill-will of all Men towards all,exprefs'd by datable Adions, would bring a quick definition on the whole Race of Mankind,fmce it would foon deflroy all the Caufes re-quifite to their Happinefs, and well-being, and introduce perpetual Enmity and War, which are the certain Caufes of the greateft Miferies and Calamities, that can befall Mankind : all which, though Mr. H. him-felf acknowledges , yet he will not own the neceflity of Men's mutual Love and Concord, to be alfb as rieceffary to their

Prefervation. But why the Caufes of Men's Prefervation and Happinefs, as being Prior in Nature, (hould not be more evident than thofe of their Definition , fince the one is altogether as evident and neceflary, and may be as eafiiy forefeen and prevented as the other, I can fee no reafbn 5 and I fhould be glad if any of Mr. Hys Difciples could Ihew us any fufficient Reafon for that Opinion.

JT. 17. So that thefe things which I have now laid down concerning the Natural means of Men's happinefs , appear fq evident from our common Reafon, and daily Experience, that they are of like certainty with the Principles of Arithmetick and Geometry, in all whole Operations, there areflill fuppofed certain Ads depend^ ing upon our free, humane Faculties ,� and yet neither of thefe Sciences are render'd the more uncertain, from the fuppofition of Men's Free-will, whether they will draw-Lines, or cad up Sums, or notj'fmce it fnfikes for their truth end certainty, that there is an infeparableConnexion between fach A&s, which are fuppofed to be in our Power to exert, and all the effects fought for .; To the finding of which, both the pleafure annexed to their contemplation, and the various ufes of Humane Life do at

once invite us. And in the like manner, the truth of all Moral Knowledg is founded in the ImmutableCoherence between thehigh-eft Felicity, which Humane Power can attain to,with thofe Ac1:s of univerfal Benevolence, that is of Love towards God and Men , and which exerts it (elf in all the particular Moral Vertues; But in the mean time thefe two things areftill fuppofed, That Men defire, and feek the higheft Felicity they are capable of 5 and alfo, That they are able to exercife this Benevolence, not only towards themfelves, but God and Men, as partakers with them of the fame Rational, or Intelligent Nature. This I have thought fit to add, to prevent all thofe Cavils which Mr. Pfs Difciples are ufed to make againft Morality, from the neceflity of our wills.

jT. 18. But before I proceed farther to enquire into the Nature of things,! defirc you to remember what I have already hinted in the Introduction to this difcourCe, that this Truth concerning the efficacy of Univerfal Benevolence, for the preferva-tjon and happinefs of Rational Beings, as alfo all other Propofitions alike evident, and contained under it, do all proceed from God, as the firft Caufe, and ordainer of all things; and confequently of our hu-

mane Underftanding , and of all Truths therein contained. And fmcc thefe Rules drawn from the Nature of things, tend to the procuring God's End and De-fign , viz. The prefervation, and Happi-nefs of Mankind ; and alfo that it hath pleated Him to annex certain natural Rewards to the oblervation of thefe Dictates of Rea{bn,and Punifliments to their TranC-greffion; (b that they thereby becoming apt, and fufficient for the due ordering of our Thoughts, and governing our Actions towards Qod, our (elves, and all others, (as I (hall farther make out in this Di courfe) I fee nothing wanting to give it the Efience, and Vigour of a Law. And ! (hall farther (hew before I have done, that under this general Rule of endeavouring the common Good of Rational Beings, or Univerfal Benevolence, is contained Piety towards God, and the higheft Goodwill or Charity towards Men , and is the Summ both of the Moral Law otMofes, and of the Gofpel of our Saviqur Jefus CkriJ!.

$. 19. Thefe Things being thuspropo-fed in general, I come now more particularly to (hew, that a due Obfervation and jKnowledg of thefe natural Things without us, will truly and clearly teach us what

Operations or Motions of them are good, or evtt> for all other Men, as well as our felves; and alfo (hew us how neceflarily and unalterably all thefe Things are produced ; for Natural Knowledg fearches into the true Caufes of that Generation and Corruption which daily happens to all Natural Bodies, and efpecially to Men, and fo can demonftrate the necefiary coherence of thefe Efleds, with their Caufes j and therefore thofe Caufes that help to generate or preferve Men, and that make them live happily in this Life, are Natural Goods, as the Caufes of their Mifery and Diflblution are Natural Evils: And it then as plainly follows,That by this knowledge we can a$ certainly demonftrate and foretel what Things are Naturally Good,or Evil, for all Mankind, as for any fingle Perfbn.

$. 10. Therefore we may truly conclude, That the knowledg of all thefe Effed-ts, which either Nature or Humane Induftry can produce for Men's Food, Cloathing, Habitation, and Medicine, is part of this Natural Knowledg : to which we may alfo add the undemanding of all other Human eOperationsaandoftheEffecl:sproceed-ing from thence, for the Ufes of Humane Life. For although the voluntary Adions of men, as they exert themfelves towards

Things without them, do not work exactly afterthe fame manner as mere Mechanick Motions, -Z//Z. from the Pulfion or Motion of other Bodies, but either from their Rea-fons, or Wills ; yet fince all the outward Motions we exert, receive their Meafare and Force from the Natural Powers of Humane Bodies, which are 'of the fame Nature with others, and fo muft perform their Natural Fun&ions, as they are re-gulated by the neceflary Laws of matter and motion , much after the fame manner as other Natural Motions, it is evident,that thefe voluntary Actions, whenever they are thus exerted , are regulated by the fame Natural Laws : And it is commonly known how much men's Induftry, by the various motions of their Bodies (which a Philofo-pher can eafily refblve into mechanic ones,) does contribute to their own and other Men's Prefervation, by providing and ad-miniflring Victuals, Cloths, Phyfick,Hoti-fesj^c.ln performing which Effects, Men's Strength^nd Skill in Husbandry,Building, Navigation,and other manual Trades, are chiefly employed.Norare the Liberal Arts abfolutely free from thefe Laws of Motion, fince by the help of certain fenfible Signs, and articulate Notes, or marks, as Words, Letters,or Cyphers,the minds of Men come

to be endued with Knowledg, and directed in mofl of their Civil and Moral Duties. I have only thought fit to hint thus much concerning Humane Actions confidered as meer Natural Things exifting without us; but I (hall treat more fully of them in the next Chapter, when I come to treat of the Nature of Man, confidered as a voluntary Agent.

. ^I. Hence it plainly appears,That all thefe Natural Things, and the mutual Helps by which they are procured, may be certainly known, and forefeen by us , to be naturally and unalterably Good ,� that is, tending to the Prefervation and Happinefs of Mankind. And for the fame Reafon all thofe contrary Caufes,or Motions,by which men's Bodies are weakned or deftroyed,by JefTeningor taking away the Neceflariesand Conveniences of Life, fuch as Food, Ray-ment, Liberty, Quiet, &c. And alfb thole Actions by which Vertue and knowledge may be rooted out of men's minds ,� and Errors, and unbridled Paflions,deftrudive to the Common Good of Mankind, introduced in their Rooms, are neceflarily and in their own Nature Evil. Therefore when we determine of Natural Goods, or Evils, according to the Law of Nature, we are not only to confider the Preferyati-

on of a few particular Perfons, fines the Puniihment, nay, Death of thofe, may often conduce to the common Good; but rather that of the aggregate Body of Man-kind, fubordinate to GOD, as the Head of Rational Beings, in the Natural Syftem or Commonweal,eftabliuYd by Natural Laws: For the Good of an Aggregate Body,is nothing elfe but the Chiefeft Good that can accrue to all its Parts, or Individuals.

JT. ^^. Having now found out from the Nature of Things, by what means our Minds can receive the Idea's of a Common Natural Good, and Evil, and thefe no lefs certain and ftable, than thofe by which the Caufes of Generation and Corruption are exhibited to them ; I come next to con-fider, That the Matter and Motion, in Which the Powers of Humane Bodies (as well as other Parts of this VifiUe World) confift, and exert themfelves after a limited manner, and have a finite Quantity , and certain Bounds, beyond which they cannot acT: ; from which Principles flow thoie known Laws of Natural Bodies, as that they cannot be at once in divers Places , and therefore cannot be moved toward contrary Points, at the fame time; or Ib as to be fubferyient to the contrary Wills

of divers Perfons, at once; but are fb bounded and determined in their Natures, as to be only ordered or difpofed of, according to the Will of one Perfon alone, or elfe of divers confenting or confpiring to the fame End, or Defign. For if Men fhould think thus to make ufe of them, they would be fb far from conducing to their Benefit, or Prefervation, that they would only tend to their Hurt, and De-ftrudHon ; fince if the ftronger had a Right to take from the Weaker by ftrength, and the Weaker from the Stronger by Cunning and Surprize , any of thefe Neceflaries of Life, which he was once pofleffed of; yet when he had them, he could not be more aflured that he mould keep them, than he was that laft poflefled them, fmce one Stronger, or more Cunning than himfelf, may yet come , and ferve him as he had done the other before; and fb on, 'till all Men that enjoy'd them fhould be de-flroy'd, and the Things contended for, pe-rifh without ufe : So that their could remain neither any Owner, nor Thing to be owned.

tf. 23. From all which that hath been now laid down, I (hall draw fbme Con-c'uhons oi great moment to our fubjecl:; as, i.) From this knowledge of the Na-

ture of Things, (and efpecially of our own Humane Nature) we may learn that fo-tnuch celebrated Diftin&ion of the Stoicks, between the TO Itf vfiJj. <?.) thofe Things which are in our own Power and Difpo-(al, fuch as are the voluntary Motions and Inclinations of our Bodies and Minds; and ** & ty' /"> 0- O the Things out of our Power, fuch as are thofe Corporeal Mo-tions, To violent and irrefiflible, which we daily'obferve to proceed from the Nature and Frame of the World, and we weak Creatures are not able to refifl, and from whofe irrefiflible Force, all things here below are in a perpetual flux; whence alfo there happens to us Men, a perpetual vicif-fitude of Things, as well Adverfe as Pro--fperous, as allb of Maturation, Decay, and DhTolution : So that this Diftin&ion (if duly obferved) will be of fmgular ufe, as well in forming our Manners, as governing our AfFecHons: For from hence we are taught not to expecl: any other or greater Happinefs, as a Reward of all our Labours and Endeavours, than what may proceed from a prudent Management of our Rational Faculties, and from thofe External Helps which we may expecl: Divine Providence will afford us, in governing the world ; by which means we may be

freed from thofe fruitlefs Labors and En-deavours, to which Men's vain Fears, and groundlefs Hopes* fo often tranfport them: Nor fhall we too much afflict our (elves for thofe Evils, which either do now, or may hereafter, without our own Faults, inevitably befal us, whence the greateft part of thofe Troubles and Moleftations, which are wont to proceed from Grief, Anger, and Difcontent at our prefent fortunes, or Conditions, may, by our Prudence, or Patience, be prevented. Neither are \ve hereby only directed to the avoiding of Evils but here is alfb chalked out to us, a more fhort and compendious method, by which we may, by degrees , attain to thofe two greateft Bleflings which can be enjoyed by us in this Life ; the Culture of our own Minds, and the Goverment of our Paf-fions.

JT. 14. I need not profecute this Subject any farther, but fliall proceed to take notice of fome obvious Obfervations to our Purpofe, viz. That it is evident from common Experience, That the natural Forces or Powers, of any one Perfbn, are too weak, (canty, and inconfiderable, towards the obtaining all that Happinefs he defires and is capable of; to procure which,heftill wants the Help and Afliftance of many

other Perfons and Things, to render his Lifefafe,pleafant, or contented. And,fur-ther, that it is in the Power of any one of us to contribute many Things towards the ufe of others of our own kind, which we do not need our (elves; and which though of no ufe to us, yet may be of fmgular u(e to their Happinefs, or Prefervation. But fmce we are certain, from thofe known Bounds of our Power, that we are not able to compel all thofe by force, whofe Afliftanceweftandinneed of, to co-operate with us, towards this our main End andDefign, viz. Happineft; there can be no furer Means, or fafer Defence left us* than that by a conftant offering and affording thofe Neceflaries of Life , together with our Afliftance toothers, as often as it lies in our Power, we may thereby probably render them like wife Benevolent and Helpful to us inthelikeNeceffities, or Oc* cafions: So that this Benevolence, or Charity is only a conftant Will and Endea-vour'to Ad thus fmcereiy and diffusely, whenever any Opportunity offers it felf; and that even in thofe Cafes, in which it may oftentimes be probably forefeen, that noReturncanbeimmediatelyexpectedfrom the Perfon to whom the Benefit is done j fmce, however, it ftill contributes to the

general Good-of Mankind, of which thai Perfbn we fb benefit is a Member : which general Benevolence doth not yet hinder, but that we may beftow and exercife a larger fhare , and higher degrees thereof, cowards thofe from whom our own long Acquaintance, and nearer Relation, may perfiiade us to hope for larger Returns of Friend/hip*

tf. ^5< Whence we may,in the next place,1 obferve, That if our Afliilance, and other Things in our Power, certainly contribute to the ufe, or Benefit of others, they can only perform this, as they are Aflign'd, or appropriated, to the particular Perfons that are to make ule of them, according to (bme certain time and place. So that if Right Reafon prefcribe a Ufe of Things,and Humane Helps, as neceflary for the Happinefs and Prefervation of Mankind, it, as nece farily, prefcribes, that this Ufe of thefe Things, fhould be appropriated to them that are thus to ufe them, for the time they (land in need of them, and according to the place in which they are to be ufed. The ConCequence is evident,becau(e RightRea-* fon can only prefcribe that to be done,which will confift with the nature of the Things that are to be uied, and the Perfons that are to uft them. So it being evident, that a Di-

vifiou*or Appropriation ofThings,and Humane Affiftances and Labours,is abfolutely neceflary for theSubfiflancc and Happinefe of all Men ; it alfo follows, That this neceffary Limitation, or Appropriation of any of thefe Things to particular Perfons, for the time they uand in need of them, is a natural Separation of them, from the ufe of all others, during the time they are fo made ufe of. By Things, I mean fuch (ingle Things as are uncapable of divifion ; and to make ufe of which, it is abfolutely neceffary that it be poflefled whole and entire fiich as are Food,Cloths, and the like; but there are other Things, as an Ifland, a Field, and the like , which may very well ferve for the Ufe of divers Perfons at once, and whofe Divifion arifing from the pofitive Confent of Men Already entered into Civil Societies, or commonweals, I need not

now treat of,

$. 16. But from this natural Divifion, or Appropriation of Things, and its Neceflity for the Prefervation of Mankind , arifes that Natural and Primitive right proceeding from Occupa ncy,which both Philofophers and Civilians grant to haveplace in the (late of Nature, fuppofmg a Community of moft Things: For Right is but a certain Faculty,

ot Power of AcVmg,or enjoying arty thing granted us by a Law ; but in this flate,there is no other Law but that of Right Reafon* given by GOD, concerning fuch AdHons as are neceflary for the common Good of Rational beings. Therefore fince Right Reafbn requires! a (eparate ufe,of particular Things, and Humane afliflances, as nece iary and conducing to this End, theremufl needs follow from thence, a Right to the Ufe and Enjoyment of any particulafThing during the time the pbfleflbr fo makes life of it; for a Man hath the fame Right to live to morf ow,as he hath to day | and cori-fequently hath the fame Right to all the Means which are neceflary for his preferva-tion. Therefore if this Houfe, Servant, or% any thing elfe that I am now poflefled of,be rieceflary for my Happinefs or Prefcrvation to day, I (hall have alfo a like Right to it for tlie future as long as it coritinues thus#ece (ary: Arid in this ftate,there being no other Judg of the Means of my own Prefervitiort but my felf, I ihali have a Right to it as loug as I live, for the fame Reaibrt for which I had a Right to it at fir ft. So that unlefs,the Ufe or Neceffity ceafing, I alteir my Mind concerning it, or afiign my InteJ reft in it to another, I have a perpetual Right ink,excluding that of any other,du-

ring the time that I am thus poflefled of it : Not that I hereby grant every Man a Right, in the flate of Nature, to all Things which his unreafonable Paflions, or Appetites (hall fanfie to be neceflary for his own Prefervation, or Happinefs, but only to fo much of theMeans conducing thereunto,as any Man, whilfthe judges according to Right Reafbn, or Equity, and the natural Neceflities of himfelf and Family, ihall rightly fo determine , without arrogating, or afluming to himfelf more than is really neceflary for the Ends, and without robbing others of what is alfo neceflary for them,which is down-right Violence and In-Juftice.

tf. xy. Whence it plainly appears, That this natural Divifion,or property in Things, firft proceeding from Occupancy and Po feflion, as it is neceflary for the Prefervation of all particular Perlons, (b it mufl be like^ wife for that of Mankind, confidered as an aggregate Body, confiding of divers Individuals, the feme Means being neceflary for the prefervation of the whole, as are re-quifite to all its conftituent Parts or Members, though this kind of Property may very well confift with Community, as at Ordinaries and Theatres, every one that

pays his Mony hath a Right to his Dinner, or Place : yet none can tell what it is, or where it (hall be, till he hath it on his Plate, or is actually (eated in it.

ff. z8. It alfo further appears Thatthefe Principles, being truly drawn from the Nature of Things, do entirely deftroy Mr ffs wild Hypothecs, concerning the Natural Right of all men to all Things, that he may thereby prove a Right, in the ftate of Nature, in all Men, of doing whatfb-ever they pleafe towards others, Neceflary to their prefervation,- fb that thence may arifea natural flate of War of all Men againft all. And hence it likewile appears upon what grounds every Man hath a Right to his own Life, Limbs, and Liberty, viz. becaufe they are the natural Means by which we are enabled to ferve GOD, and aflift Mankind ,� in doing which, we profe-cute the Common Good of Rational Beings. And from thefe Principles here laid down, it clearly appears, thatMr. Ffs Do-drines concerning the Law of Nature, and Dominion , are not only precarious , but manifeftly falfe; which, firft, fuppofe (^without any fufficient Proof) an unlimited Right of all Men to all Things,to be necef-fary to their Prefervation, as the Foundation of all Natural Laws,and Civil Societies

For the proving of which, he only makes tife offome falfe and fpecious Arguments, as I hope I have diffidently made appear in the (econd Part of this Trea-tife.

$. 19. Having now eflabliflied a Natural Property in fuch Things , Humane Helps, or Affiftances, as are neeeflary for Men's Happinefs and Prefervation, in order to the Common Good, I (hall not concern my felf to prove the Convenience of Civil Property, as now eflablifhed in moft Com-monwealsjnor fhall I now trouble you with thofe Mifchiefs, which Artflotle, in his Politicks, hath very well proved, would fol-Jow from a Community of Things, by rea-fbri of thofe unavoidable Strifes and Contentions, which would daily arife from our lifing the Fruits of the Earth in commpn: Only I think T may fay thus much, That (jnce Mankind is fo {multiplied in well-inhabited Countries, that there is not land fuf-ficient to be divided amongft all the inha-fcitantSjfoas to fervefor eachPerfon'scomfor-table Subfiftance without foreign Trades, or mechanick Employments,there muft nece(I jarily follow a more full and exad Divifioq ^nd Appropriation of the neceflaries of Life, fbch as are land,or the ufe & produces there* i>f,as CDrn,Cattel,and thelike,in order tothe

Prefervation and Happinefs of that Nation, or Civil Society, by whofe Content fuch a Divifion and Appropriation of thefeThings were at firft introduced ,� which being once fetled by Civil Laws, there is the like Reafon for its continuance; and Men have as much Right to thofe Things they thus enjoy,by the particular Laws of the Countries where they live, as they had before in the ftate of Nature, to whatever they, could poflefs by the Right of Occupancy, or Pofleflion; fince it is evident, That this more exad: Property, or Dominion, con* fitting in a finder and more limited ufe of thefe Things, hath a greater efficacy in order to the Happinefs and Prefervation of that Nation, or part of Mankind, which have thus agreed to it, than the bare Occupancy, or Pofleflion of thefe Things had, before fuch, a Divifion made, or a-greed upon; nor can it now be altered; however, perhaps, hard and unequal it may prove to fome particular Perfons , fince it will always conduce to the Happi* nets and Tranquil ity of each particular Civil Society , or Commonweal, that it mould continue as it doth,that it fhould be ftill altered,according to every Man's parti* cular Fancy,or Intereft,fince fuch a Change can never be made, without inconceivable

Difcontents, and Civil Diflentions, which would quickly end in open Violence and Hoftility.

^.30. So that from thefe Principles here laid down,that there is no Right conferred upon any Man, of doing whatever his own wild Fancy, or unbounded Appetite may prompt him to, but only, what he (ball, according to right Reafon, truly judge ne-ceffary to his own, or Family's Happinefs and Prefervation,in order to the Common Good of Mankind. Therefore I here de-fire you to take notice, that whatever Right we enjoy, even to the things mod peceflary for our Prefervation, it is found-ed, if not in the Precept, yet at leaft per-miflion of this great Law of Nature, of endeavouring the Common Good of Rational Beings, whr.: we truly judge according to the Nature of things, concerning the means neceflary, and conducing to this great End ; (b that it can never be proved, that any one hath a right of Preferving himfelf, unlefs it be firft made out, how this Right of Self-prefervation conduces to, ,or at leaft confifts with this Common Good. Since no Rational Man can ever believe, thnr God intended the Prefervation, much lets the Senfual Pleafures of Siny one Man, as the Sole End of His Cre-

ation. Which Principle being once efla-bliflied, as the Foundation and Original of all the Natural, or Civil Rights we en-joy;, our own natural Powers and Rights will appear (b limited thereby, that we cannot without Injury and Injuftice, violate or invade the Right of others, much lefs break out into Open War againft them without juft Caufe; nay, all thofe Arguments by which any one Man can aflume a Right to preferve himfelf by the Law of Nature, will likewife be of the fame force to prove, that he ought to preferve others alfo; and that it can never become lawful for us in any State, to rob innocent Per-fonsofwhat is neceflary for their'Well-being and Prefervation ,� but rather on the contrary, that all Men's natural Rights, fliould be (ecured from the muchieis of unreafonable Violence,? War, and Contention, which natural Security in a Civil State or Common weal, is highly improved and encreafed by the Affiftance of Human Skill and Induftry, according to the efla-blifhed Laws of Property or Dominion.

JT. 31. I have fpoken thus much concerning the neceflary Connexion between the particular Actions above mentioned, and the Common Good of Mankind, that by confidering their relation to this Great

End, the Nature of all Humane Adions may more certainly be known and predetermined. Since the Dependance of natural Effe&s on their Caufes, is abfolutely neceflary and immutable ; for as well in the ftate of Nature or Community, as of Civil Society, or feparate Property, thofe Human Actions which caufe, or procure, thatPeople's minds ftiould not be prejudiced by Errors, Lyes, or Perfidioufhefs ,� nor their Bodies hurt, nor their Lives, Goods, Fames and Chaftities violated, or taken a-way, 'and alfo by which a grateful return is rendred'to thofe that have done us good; cr in (hort, all thofe Actions by which the true happinefs of any one Man, or more is procured, without Injury to others, as they always were* fo they ever will be the certain caufes of the Common Good, and Happinefs of Mankind, and are therefore diftinguithed by the Titles of Moral Ver-tues, as I lhall more at large demonftrate in this Difcourfe, when I come to fhew how all Moral Vertues are derived from, and at laft refolved into this Principle of the Common Good of Rational Beings.

But lead the varioufhefs of the Obfer-vations treated of in this Chapter, and their Independance upon each other,(hould render them perplex'd, and confequently

unconvincing to common Readers, who may not be able to carry fo long a train of confluences in their minds ,* I fcall contract of what hath been now faid into thefe few plain Proportions.

i. That though all particular Men are mortal, and but of a fhort duration, yet God hath ftill preferved Mankind without any fenfiHe failure or decay.

a. That in Order to this,God hath made Man to be propagated by Generation, and alfb to be preferved by divers outward means, which we call neceflaries of Life.

3. That thefe natural means can no way ianfwer this end, but as they are allowed, or appropriated to the ufes and occafions of particular Perfbns, during the time they ftand in need of them, and fo cannot at the fame time anfwer the different or contrary defires, and neceflities of divers men,endea-vouring to ufe thefe things in a manner wholly different and contradictory to each other.