Law of Nature,

According to the

Principles and Method laid down in the Reverend Dr. Cumberland's (now Lord Bishop of Peterborough's) Latin Treatise on that Subject.


His Confutations of Mr. Hobb's

Principles, put into another Method.

The Second Edition Corrected, and somewhat Enlarged.


WITH THE Right Reverend Author's Approbation.


Printed for W. Rogers in Fleet-street, R. Knaplock in St. Paul's Church-yard, A. Bell in Cornhil, and T. Cockeril in the Poultry. 1701.


TO THE Right Reverend Father in GOD,




Having, many years ago, when your Learned and Judicious Treatise of the Law of Nature was first published, carefully perused it to my great satisfaction, I also thought it

iv The Epiftle Dedicatory.

necefjary to make an Epitomy or Abridgment of it, as mil for my own better (Remembrance, at tbat I believed it might be alfo ujeful, a* an Introduction to Etbicks, for Jome near Delations of mine, for whom! then dejigned it. Tbefe Papers, after they bad lain by me federal Years, 1 happened to fiew to Jprne Worthy Friends of mine, and In particular to the Learned and Honourable Mr. Boyle, who fo mil approved of the Undertaking, that they incou-raged me to make it publick, as that which might give great /atufattion to thofe of.the Nobility and Gentry oj our own Nation (<uwelltu others of a lower rank) who either do not under-ft and Latin, or elfe had rather read Epitomies of greater Works, than take the pains to ptruje the Originals. Ffbicb Task, tho not Very grateful to me, yet I was prevailed with to undertake, and to look over thoje Papers again, and add feVcral confiderable Vajjages out^ of the Jreatife it Jelf^ and this not for Fame's fake, or the honour of being thought an Author, Jince 1 was fatisfied that nothing of that nature could be due to one, who does not pretend t6 more than toTfanfltteorAbridg another Moris Labours :

Yet 1 am willing, in purfuance of your Lord* flrips Principle, to facrifice all thefe little private Confederations to the Publick Good, as being fenfible, that in the Jrade of Learning (as in o-tber Trofef/ions) diVers, who cannot be Inventors or chief Merchants, may yet do the Publickgood ferVice by venting other Mens potions in a new drefs; effectally (ince 1 haVe alfo obferVedj that things of this kind, if well done (and with due acknowledgment to the Authors from whence tley are borrowed) as they haVe proved bene* ficial to thofe whofe Education, or cohftant 1m-floyments in their own Trofeffeons, will not give them leave to peru/e many Jfolumes, written perhaps in a Language they are no great JMa~ Jlersof; fo alfo theyhaVe not failed of fome Commendation from all candid Readers. Thus Monpeur Rohault'i Abridgment o/Des Cartes^ (Philofopby, and Monfeeur Bernier^ of Gaflendps^ (to mention no more) have been received Tbitb general Afflaufe^ not only by all Ingenious Men of the French, but alfo of our own Nation? who underftand that Language.

And the Learned and Inquifoi'Ve Dr. Burn?t haththught an Undertaking of this kind Jo ufe-ful for our Nobility and Gentry, a$ to give MS his own elegant Translations, or rather Abridgments in Englifli, of bis two Elaborate Tre<*« ttfes of the-Theory of the Earth. And I doubt not, but your Lord/hip would haVe donefow-whatin this kind with this admirable Work of yours, had not the conflant Jmployments of your Sacred ffunftion, as well as your other feVere mdufeful Studies hindered you from it.

<But ferhafs itntay bethought by fome, that this Task hath been Very well performed already by the Ingenious and Learned IV. Parker, late Jtijhopof^Oxford, inhisTreatife, entituled, A Dcmonfttation of the Laws of Na-tute, and therefore needs not be done oVer a-gain* *But to this J (hall only fay, that as he owns he hath been beholden in that Work to your Lordfhi^s 'Book, fo hath he fallen fhort of the Original from whence he cofy'd, both in, theclearnefs, as well as choice of the ArgU" ments or TtemonftrationS) and in the particular

fetting forth of tbofe Rewards and 9wlfhments derived (by God's Appointment) from the Nrf-ture of Ment and the Frame of "things; which can only be done according to that exacl Method yourLordfhlp hath there laid down. Tbo, 1 confefsy there is one thing that Is particular in that Authors Undertaking, viz. That excel~ lent Account he there gives utof the great Differences and Uncertainties among the moftfamout of the Heathen iPbilofopbers, concerning Man's Sovereign Cjood or Happinefs, mainly for want of the cert am belief of a Future State, and that clear convlcllon we now baVe, that Mens chief eft Good or Happintfs confifts in God'sLoVe and FaVour towards them: As alfo his obferVationy That notwithstanding all that can be Jaid of the Natural Rewards of Virtue, and Tunijlments of ftce, nothing but the realbnable hope and expectation of Happinefs in a Life to come, can in all Cafes bear us up under all the Miferies, Sorrows and Calamities of this. 4nd herein I muflown I agree With bintj and therefore hope your Lord/trip will pardon me, if 1 have in the enjuing Difcourfe inllftt'd fomeTbhat more particularly upon thefe

future Rewards and (Punijhmmts, which 1 doubt not may Very well be proved from ${eafon, and the necejftty of Juppofing them, in order to the ajjerting and vindicating God's Juftice and Providence: Jho 1 grant, that the tyfpel, or 'Divine Revelation, hath given u* more firm grounds for this our Belief, than Tfre had before by the mere light of Nature.

But fuppofing thisWork of Si/hop Parker never fo well performed ; as 1 do not deny but it hath all the advantages of a Popular and Genteel Stile, and that neat Turn of Wit he gives to all his Writings; and therefore IhaVe notfcrupledtotranfcribeoutof his Difcourfe one or two Taflaves* where 1 thought either his Way

t JJ O 7 O �/

cf urging your Lordfiip 5 Arguments, or the clofe Jumming them up, was not to be mended ly any other fen: Yet fwceifs too concife in fome parts, and full of Digre/fions in others; and lefides wants your folid (Confutations of Mr. H'$ Principlest it feems necejfary that another Treatife more exatl in the kind, fbould be publijhed as more agreeable to your Lordfhip*s Original; Whether this which 1 now prefentyott

with, be fuck, I muft fubmit to jour Lord' /hip's and the Reader's Judgment.

But fince I have undertaken this difficult Province with your Lord/hip's approbation, it is ft that I give you, as mil as the Deader, fome Account of the Method 1 have followed in this Treatife, and wlxrein it differs from yours.

Fir ft then, to begin with the Preface; The Subftance of it is "toholly yours, except the Introdu&ion concerning the ufefulnefs of the Ifyowledg of the true Grounds if the Law of Nature, in order to a right underftanding of MoralThilofophy, nay Qyrijlianityh fdf.

But for 'a Condu/ton to the Preface, I haVe alfo made fome Additions, wherein 1 baVt fhewn your Principle of endeavouring the Common Good is not a new Invention, but that which feVeral Great Men had before delivered^ as the only firm 1(ule, by which to try not only all our Moral dftions, but all Civil Laws, whether they are right and juft t that is, agreeable

to right Q(eafon, or not. And I haVe alfo cow-eluded it with a fet of Principles Very necejfary to be underflood for the proving the Truth of all Natural tyligion, and the Law of Nature, tho the two lajt alone are the Subje ft of your Lard/hip's feook, as well as of my Abridgment efit.

But to /peak more particularly of the 1)1 f-courfe it felfy fince I here defign no more than an Epitome, I hope your Lord/hip will not take it H19 tf 1 haVe omitted moft of your rare Inflates and Parallels drawn from the Mathe-matichj many of which are above the capacity of common Deader sy (tho therein your Lord-fhip Iwth fhewn your jelf a (jreat Mafter ) and have confined my filf only to fuch plain and eafie Proofs and natural Ob/erVations as Men of all Capacities may under/land. So aljo if in the Chapter of Humane Nature, I have left out divers curious Anatomical ObferVations> wherein the Strufture of Mens Bodies differs from that of fteafts, if 1 thought they were at all queftionable or doubtful, or fuch as did not direttly tend to the [roving, that

JMens Sadies are fitted and ordained by God for the Profecution of the Common Good of others of their own jfijnd, above all other Creatures.

1 have alfo made bold to contraft the £hap* ters in your Work, into a lejfer number, having difpofed the fubftance of them into other places, or elfe quite omitted fome, as not fo necejjary to our purpofe: As for example^ I baVe placed moft of the Matter of the third Chapter, De bono naturali, partly in ike explanation of the Word Good, in the &e-fcription of the Law of Nature ± contained in the third Chapter, referring what remained of it to the fecond fart for the (Confutation of that Principle of Mr. H's, That no Aftion is Good or Evil in the State of Nature. So likewife for the fourth Chapter, De Diftaminibus Pradticis, 1 have fet down the Subftance of it (omitting the Mathematical Illuftrations) in onr fecond (Chapter of Humane Nature. So alfo the Jixtb Chapter, entituled, De iis quae in Lege Naturali continentur. And the fevtntb and eighth,

De Origine Dominii, & Virtucum Mora-lium. IhaVe partly difpofed the fubftance of them into the fir ft Chapter of the Nature of Tilings, but chiefly into your fourth Chapter, reducing all the Laws of Nature, and Moral Virtues therein contained, into this one Principle, of Endeavouring the Common Good of Rational 'Beings. But as for your laft Chapter, viz. that part of it which contains the Confedaria, or Conferences, deducible from the foregoing Chapters, in relation to the Law of Mofes, and all Civil Laws j 1 have made bold to omit it, fince It Is plain enough, that all the Precepts of the Decalogue do tend either (in the fir ft Table) to the Honour and Glory of God, in his commanding himfelf to be the fole Object of our Wbrjhip, and that without any Images of himfelf' or dje f in the fecond Table ) to our Duties towards others, wherein the higheft Virtue and Innocence are prefcribed. And Jo likewife, that all the Laws of the Supreme Qvil Powers have no Authority, but as they purfue this Qreat ^ule, or Law of Nature, of procuring the Common Good of $(atio-nal 'Beings j that lsy the Honour and Worjhip

of God, and the Peace and Happinefs of their Subjetls, and of Mankind in general* And whereas your Lordflnp hath here alfo folidly and briefly confuted many grofs Errors in Mr. FTs JMorais, as well as Politicks, fome of thofe Confutations 1 haVe made ufe of in tie fe-cond Party viz. thofe that relate to that Author's Moral Principles, which, if they are falfe^ his Politick ones will fall of them-felves.

To conclude; 1 mufl beg your Lord/hip's Pardon, if I have made bold to alter your Method, as to your Confutation of Mr. Hs Principles. For whereas you haVe thought fit to do it in the Body of your Work, and as they occurred under the JeVeral Heads you treat of; pnce I perceiVd the placing your Anfwers after that manner, did difturb the Connexion, and Perfpicuity of the Difcourfe, 1 thought it better to caft tho/e Anfwers into a dtfiinft faff, digefted under fo many Heads, or Proportions, in the order in "tohicb they (land in Mr. H's IBooks. De Give, and Leviathan, where the deader, if he pleafes, may winpart what 1 laVe quoted out of him.

JndHope your Lordfhip will not take it d-miI"s in me, if (to render the Work more plea-fant and grateful to common fyaders, and that it may not look like a bare tranflation ) IhaVe added feVeralbfytionSy Jnjlancesand ObferVati-onsy Jome of my owny and others out of Hifto-ry, and the Delations of Modern Travellers, concerning the Cuftoms of thofe Weft-Indiart Nations commonly counted barbarous, who yet by their amicable living together, without either Qvil Magiftrates, or written Laws, ferVe fufficiently to confute Mr. H's extravagant Opinion, That all Men by J^ature are in a State of W«r, which he endeavours to prove, from Jome evil Cuftoms among thofe People.

1 have likewife made bold to add thofe A-phorifms containing the grounds of moral Qood and Evil contained in Sifrop Wilkins** Trea-iife of Natural fyligion, and Dr. Moor's Enchiridion Ethicutn, that the Deader may fee them all at once; tho I confefs they are mojt tf them to be found (tho difper/edly) in

your Ltrdftep't Work. I haVe alfo inferted form thingsy in anfwer to the Objections at the end of the fir ft Part, out of that noble con-templative <Pbilofopher, Mr.Lockinhis EJfay of Humane Underftanding; fince be froceeds upon tbe fame (Principles with your Lordfhipy and bath divers Very new and ufefut Notions concerning ibt Manner of Attaining tbe Jfyowledg of all Truths, as wtt T^atural as Divine, and tbe Certainty we haVe of them.

fBut 1 fear, Have trefpafs'd too much upon your Lordjbip's Patience, by [o long an Epiftle^ and therefore fball conclude y>itb my Prayers for your Lord/hip's Maffinefs and Health^ fince 1 am confident you cannot but froVe more ufeful for tbe common good of our Church and State, in this high and publicK Station to which their Majefties haVe thought fit to call you, than you could baVe been in a morepri* Vate Condition : And I hope your Lordfbip will look upon this Dedication as a fmall 7H-tute of gratitude, which all the FPorldmuft owe you for your Learned and not Common

UndertaKng, of which Ott&tion none nigh to be (or indeed is) more fenfible than,


Your Lordflhip's moft faithful

and humble Servant,






By way of


ISuppofe you are not Ignorant, that the Study of Moral Philofophy, or the Laws of Nature, was preferred (by Plato, Ariftotle^ Socrates^ and Tully, the wifeft of the Heathen Philofo-phers ) above all other Knowledg, whether Natural or Civil, and that defervedly, as well in refped of its ufefulnefs, as certainty, fince it was to that alone ( as molt agreeable to the Natural Faculties of Mankind ) that Men, before they were aflifted by Divine Revelation, owed the Difcovery of their Natural Duties, to God, themfelves, and all others: as Cicero hath fhewn us at large in thofe three excellent Trea-tifes, De Officiis, Ve Finibus* and De Legibus. And tho I grant we Chriftians have now clearer and higher Difcoveries of all Moral Duties, by the Light of the

Gofpel, yet is the Knowledg of Natural Religion, or the Laws of Nature, itill of great ufe to us, as well for the confirmation as illuftracion of all thofe Duties, lince by the knowledg of them, and the true Principles on which they are founded, we may be convinced, thai God requires nothing from us in all the pradical Duties of revealed Religion, but our reafo-nable Service \ that is, what is really our own inte-reft, and concerns our good and happinefs to obferve, as the beft and molt perfed Rule of Life, whether God had evef farther enforced it or not by any revealed Law. And tho I do not deny, that our Saviour Jefus Chrift hath highly advanced and improved thefe Natural Laws, by more excellent and refined Precepts of HuraJlity, Charity, Self-denial, &c. than were difcovered before by the wifefl of the Heathen Philo-fbphers, efpecially as to the greater aflurance we have of that grand Motive to Religion and Virtue, the Immortality of the Soul, or a life either eternally happy or miferable, when this is ended: Yet certainly it was this Law of Nature, or Reafon alone, by which Mankind was not only to live, but alfo to be judged, before the Law given to Mofes; and it muft be for not living up to this Natural Light, that the Heathens fhall be condemned, who never yet heard of Chri/l, or of a revealed Religion, and fo cannot ( as St. Paul exprefly declares to the Romans) believe on bim of whom they have notbeard, Rom. 10.14. Therefore it is that the fame Apoflle,in the fidl Chapter of that Epiitle, appeals to the knowledgof God, from the things that are feen, that is, the Creation of the World, as che foundation of all Natural Religion, and tells the Romans, that their falling Cnot-withftanding this Knowledg 3 into that grofs I-dolatry they profeflcd, was the only reafon, why God gave tbem up to their own hearts tufts, betaufe that when they knew Godj they glorified him not as God, neither were

thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, ttndihefr

foolijhheart was darkned, v. 21. And fo likewife in the

fecond Chapter,he farther tells themjbat when the Gen*

tiles, who have not the Law, do by Mdture the things con«

tained in the Law, tbefe having not the Law, are a Lam

unto themfelves, /hewing the work of the Law written in

their hearts -, that is, the Law of Mature or Reafon,

as the main fubftance or effecl of the Mofaical Law.

And that it is by this Law alone, that they (hall be

judged, is plain from what immediately follows, Their

confciences bearing witnefs, and their own thoughts ( or rea-

fonings, as it is rather to be rendred ) in the mean while

accuftng or excuftng each other. And indeed the Apoftle

fuppofes the Knowledg of God as a Rewarder of Good

Works, to be the foundation of all Natural, as well

as Revealed Religion, and the firlt Principle of faving

Faith, as appears in his Epiftle to the Hebrews, Chap.

11. v. 6. But without faith it is impojfible to pleafe him ;

for he that comes unto God muft firft believe that he is9

and that he is a Rewarder of all them that diligently feek^

him. But I need fpeak no more of Natural Religion^

and how neceflary it is to the true Knowledg of that

which is revealed, fince the Reverend and Learned

Dr. Wi\\ms, late Bifhop of Chefter, hath fo well per-

form'd that Noble Undertaking, in his excellent Poft-

humous Treatife, publifhed by the Reverend Dr.

Tittotfon, late Lord Archbifhop of Canterbury, to

which nothing needs to be added by fo mean a Pen as


But fince the Laws of Nature, as derived from God the Legiflator, are the foundation of all Moral Philo-fophy and true Politicks, as being thofe which are appealed to in all Controverfies between Civil Sovereigns, and alfo are the main Rules of the mutual Duties between Sovereigns and their Subjects: It is worth while to enquire how thefe Laws may be dif-covered to proceed from God as a Legiflator, Now,

this can only be done by one of thefe two ways^ (viz,) Either from the certain and manifeft Effects and Confequences that are obferved to proceed from them ', or from the Caufes from which they are derived. The former of thefe hath been already largely treated of by others, efpecially by the nioft learned Hugo Grotius, in his admirable Work, De Jure Belli & Pacvs �, By his Brother WiU'uim^ in that fmall Poft-humous Treatife of his, De Princifiis Juris ftaturalis $ And by the Judicious Monfieur Puffendorf, in his learned Treatife, De Jure Nature & Gentium : As alfo by our own Countryman, Dr. Sharrock. Who have all undertaken to prove the certainty of the Laws of Nature, from the general belief and reception of them by the wifeft and molt civilized Nations in all Ages. To which we may alfo add the moft learned Mr. Seldcn, in that mcft elaborate Work, De Jure Gentium juxta flacita Hcbrtforum. And as I do acknowledg, thatthofe Great Men have all deferved very well in their way, fo 1 think none deferves greater Commendation, than that excellent Work of GYO-tius the Elder, which as it was the firft in its kind, fo it is worthy to laft as long as Vertne and Juftice fliall be in efteem among Mankind. And tho the Obje&i-ons which are wont to be brought againft this Method of proving the Laws of Nature, are not of fo great moment, as to render it altogether fallacious or ufe-lefs, as fome would have it to be \ yet I freely acknowledg they chiefly ferve to convince Men of fin-cere and honeft minds, and who are naturally difpofed to Venue and right Reafon: So that I conceive it were more ufeful, as well as more certain, to feek for a firmer and clearer Demonfh ation of thefe Laws, from a ftrift fearchand inquifition into the nature of things, and alfo of our own felves, by which I doubt not but we may attain not only to a true Know ledg of the Laws of Nature, but alfo of that true Principle on which they

are founded, and from whence they are all derived.

But it will not confift with the narrow bounds of a Preface, to propofe and anfwer all the Obje&ions that maybe brought againfl their Method of proving the Law of Nature, from the Confentof Nations; neither perhaps can it be done at all to the univerfal fatisfa&ion even of indifferent perfons: fince it may beltill urged, that altho fome Diftates of Right Rea-ibn may be indeed approved of by our Underftand-ings, and are commonly received and praftifed by? molt Nations by reafon of their general ufefulnefs and conveniency, yet it muft be acknowledged, that there; 'is ft ill wanting the Knowledg of God as a Legiflatpr, by whofe Authority alone they can obtain the force of Laws. The Proof of which (tho the moft material part of the Queftion ) hath been hitherto omitted, or but flightly touch'd, by former Writers on this Subject.

Befides the Objections of fome of the Antients, Mr. Selden. and Mr. Hobbes have alfo argued againft this Method, tho upon different Principles, and from different Defigns} the latter aflerting that no body ought to receive thefe Dictates of Reafon,as obligatory to outward A&ions, before a Supreme Civil Power be instituted, who fliall ordain them to be obferved as Laws. And tho he fometimes vouchfafes them that Title, yet in his De Cive^ cap. 14. he tells us plainly, " That in the ftate of Nature they are but improperly called fo^ and tho the Laws of Nature may be found largely defcribed in the Writings of Philofophers, yet are they not for this caufe to be called Laws, any more than the Writings or Opinions of Lawyers are Laws, till confirmed ancj made fo by the Supreme Powers. But, on the other fide, Mr. Selden more fairly finds fault with the want of Authority in thefe Di&ates of Reafon, ( confidered only as fuch ) that fce may from hence flicw us a necelfity of recurring to the Legiflativc

Power of God, and that he may thereby make out, that thofe Di&ates of Reafondo only acquire the force of Laws, becaufe all our knowledg of them is to be derived from God alone, who when he makes thefe Rules known to us, does then ( and not before ) pro-mulgate them to us as Laws. And fo far I think he is in the right, and hath well enough corrected our common Moralifts, who are wont to confider thefe Dictates of Reafon as Laws, without any fuffident proof, that'they have all the Conditions requifite to make them fo, viz.. That tbey are eftabli/hed and declared to us by God as a Legiflatorj wbo bath annexed to them fuffident Rewards and Punifhmtnts. But I think it is evident, that if thefe Rational Di&ates can by any means be proved to proceed from the Will ofGod± the Author of Nature, as Rules for all our Moral Adions, they- will not need any Humane Authority, much lefs the Confent or Tradition of any one, or many Nations, to make them fo : And therefore, tho I grant;this learned Author hath taken a great deal of pains to prove from (livers general Traditions of the %wi{h Rabbins, that God gave certain Commands to ^Ldam^di afterwards to Afod^contained in thofe feven Precepts, called by his Name \ and that thofe various Quotations this learned Author hath there produced, do clearly prove, that the Jews believe that all Nations whatever, even thofe which do not receive the Laws of Mofts^ are obliged to obferve the fame Moral Laws, which they conceive to be all contained under the Precepts above mentioned. And tho this Work of Mr. Selden is indeed moft learnedly and judi-cioufly performed, and may prove of great ufe in Chriftian Theology, yet I muft confefs it ftill feems to me, that he hath not fufficiently anfwered his own Objection concerning Mens Ignorance, or want of difcovering the Lawgiver*, for admit it fliould be granted,that thofe Traditions which they call thePre-

cepts of Noah, mould be never fo generally or firmly believed by the whole Jewifh Nation, yet were they not therefore made known to the reft of Mankind j and one of them, viz.. That of not eating any Part or Member of a living Creature, is juftly derided and received withfcorn by all other Nations. So that it feems evident to me, that the unwritten Traditions of the learned Men of any one Nation, cannot be looked upon as a fufficient promulgation made by God as a Law-giver, of thofe Laws or Precepts therein contained j and that all thofe Nations, which have never heard of Adam or Noah, mould be condemned for not living according to them, efpecially when we confider, that it was but in the latter Ages of the World, that the Jewifh Rabbins began to commit thefe Traditions to Writing, which 'tis very probable the antient Jews knew nothing of, fince neither Jofepbas, nor Pbih Judteus, take any notice of thefe Precepts in their Writings.

Therefore that the Divine Authority of thofe Dictates of Right Reafon, or Rules of Life, called the Laws of Nature, might more evidently be de-monftrated to all con fide ring Men, it feemed to me the belt and fitteft Method to inquire into their Natural Caufes, as well internal as external, remote as near: for in tracing this Series of Caufes and EfFedts, we fliall af laft be more eafily brought to the know-ledg of the Will of God, their firft Caufe, from whofe intrinfick Perfections and extrinfick Sanctions, by fit Rewards and due Punimments, we have endeavoured to fhew, that as well their Authority as Promulgation is derived.

I grant the greatefi part of former Writers have been content, to fuppofe that thefe Dictates of Reafon, and all Ads conformable thereunto, are taught us by Nature j or affirm in general, that they proceed from God, without ihewing us which way, or the

wanner how : But it feemed highly neceflary to mef to enquire more exadly how the force of Objeds from without, and that of our own Notions or Idea's from within us, do both concur towards the imprinting, and fixing thefe Principles in our Minds, as Laws derivedfrom the Will of God himfelf. Which Work if it be well performed, I hope may prove of great life, not only to our own Nation, but to all Mankind ^ becaufe from hence it will appear, both by what means Mens Underftandings may attain to a true and natural Knowledg of the Divine Will, or Laws of God; fo that if they praftife them not, they may be left without excufe. And this Principle will like-wife ferve for a general Rule, by which the Municipal Laws of every Common-wealth may be tried, whether they are Juft, and Right, or not ^ that is, agreeable with the Laws of Nature, and fo may be corrected, and amended by the fupreme Powers, whenever they have deviated from the great End of the Common Good. And from hence may alfo be demonftrated, that there is fomewhat, in the Nature of God, as alfo in our own, and all other Mens Natures, which ad-minifters prefent Comfort and Satisfaction to our Minds, from good Actions, as alfo firm Hopes, or Prefages of a future Happinefs, as a Reward for them when this Life is ended -, whereas on the other fide the greateft Mifery, and moft difmal Fears, do proceed from wicked, or evil Actions, from whence the Confcience feems furniflied, as it were with- Whips and Scorpions, to corred and punim all Vice, and Improbity : So that it may from hence appear, that Men are not deluded in their moral Notions, either by Clergy-men, or Politicians.

I grant, the Platonics undertake to difpatch all thefe Difficulties a much eafier way, and that is, only by fuppoflng certain innate Idea's of moral Good and EviJ> impreft by God upon the Souls of Men. But

I muft indeed confefs ray felf not yet fo happy, as to be able thus eafily to attain to fo great a Perfection, as the Knowledg of the Laws of Nature by this natural Inftinft, or Impreflion : And it doth not at prefent feem to me either fafe, or convenient, to lay the whole Strefs of Natural Religion, and Morality upon an Hy-potbefc which hath been exploded by all Philofophers, except themfelves, and which can never alone ferve to convince thofe of Epicurean Principles, for whom we chiefly defign this Work : But whofoever will take the Pains to perufe, what hath been written againft thefe innate Idea's by the inquiOtive, and fagacious

* Author of the late ElTay of humane * Mf ,. . f , , _. .. ... ,. '-. i J * mx.JonnLoclr.

Vnderftandmg, will find them very J

hard, if not impoffible to be proved to have ever been innate in the Souls of Men before they came into the World. Therefore as I fliall not take upon me, abfolutely to deny the Being, or Impoflibility of fuch Idea\ fo I fliall not make ufe of any Arguments drawn from thence in this Difcourfe; tho I heartily wifh that any Reafons, or Motives, which may ferve to ipromote true Vertue and Piety, may prevail as far as they defer ve, with all fincere and honeft Men.

And the fame Reafons, which deterred me from fuppofing any natural Laws innate in our Minds, have alfo made me not prefently fuppofe, as many do ( without any due proof) That fuch Idea's have ex-ifted in the Divine Intellect from all Eternity. And therefore I looked upon it as more proper, and nc-ceflary to begin from thofe things, which are molt known, and familiar to us by our Senfes, and from thence to prove that certain Propofitions of immutable Truth prefcribing our Care of the Happinefs, or common Good of all rational Agents confidered together, are necefiarily imprinted upon our Minds from the Nature of things, and which the firft Caufe perpe-

tually determines fo to a& upon them: And that in the Terms of thefe Propofitions are intrinfecally included an evident Declaration of their Truth and Certainty, as proceeding from God the firft Caufe in the very intrinfick Conftitution of things: From whence it will be alfo manifeft, that fuch practical Propofitions are truly and properly Laws, as being declared, and eftablilhed by due Rewards, and Pu-mfhments annexed to them by him, as the fupremc Legiflator.

But when it (hall appear, that the Knowledg of thefe Laws, and a Practice conformable to them, are the higheft Perfection, or moft happy State of our Rational Natures, it will likewife follow, that a Perfection analogous to this Knowledg, and a Practice conformable to thefe Laws, mull neceftarily be in the firft Caufe �, from whence proceeds, not only our own Natural Perfections, but alib the moft wife Ordination of all Effeds without us, for the common Confer-vation, and Perfection of the whole Natural Syftem, or Univerfe, and of all thofe things our Eyes daily behold. For that is look'd '"pon by me as moft certainly prov'd, that it muft be firft known what Juftice is, and what thofe Laws enjoin, in whofe Obfervation all Juftice confifts, before we can diftin&ly know, that Juftice is to be attributed to God, and that his Jufticq is to be confidered by us as a Pattern, or Example for us to imitate. Since we do not know God by an immediate Intuition of his Eflence, or Perfections, but only from the outward Effe&s of his Providence, firft known by our Senfes, and Experience: Neither is it fafe to affix Attributes to him, which we cannot fufficiently underftand, or make out from things with* out us.

Having now {hewn you in general, the difference between our Method, and that which others have hitherto followed, it is fit we here declare, in as few

words as we can, the chief Heads of thofe things which we have delivered in this Treatife. Suppofing therefore thofe natural Principles concerning the Laws of Motion, and Reft, fufficiently demonftrated by Naturalifts ( efpecially fuch as depend upon Mathematical Principles) fince we have only here undertaken to demonftrate the true Grounds of Moral Philofophy, and to deduce them from fome fuppofed Knowledg of Nature, and as they refer to our Moral Pradice} I have here therefore fuppofed all the Effects of corporeal Motions, which are natural and neceflary, and performed without any Intervention of humane Liberty, to be derived from the Will of the firftCaufe. And, zdly. ( which Mr. Hobbes himfelf likewife in his Leviathan admits) that from the Con* lideration, and Inquifition into thefe Caufes, and from the Powers and Operations of natural Bodies, may be difcovered the Exiftence of one Eternal, Infinite, Omnipotent &eing? which we call God.

So that every Motion imprefs'd upon the Organs of our Senfes, whereby the Mind is carried on to apprehend things without us, and to give a right Judgment upon them, is a natural Effed j which by the Mediation of other inferiour Caufes owes its Original to the firft Caufe. From whence it follows, that God, by thefe natural Motions of Caufes and Effeds, delineates the ldea\ or Images of all natural and moral Adions on our Minds �, and that the fame God, after he hath thus made us draw various Notions from the fame Objed?, does then excite us to compare them with each other, and then join them together, and fo determines us to form true Propofitions of thethings^ thus fingly received and underltood. So that fome-times a thing is expofed whole, and all at once to our View, and fometimes it is more naturally confidered fucceflively, or according to its feveral parts : And the Mifid thereby perceives that the Notion of a whole,

(ignifies the fame with that of all the feveral Ideas of the particular parts put together, and fo is thence carried on to make a Propofition of the Identity of the whole, with all its parts i and can truly affirm, that the fame Caufes which preferve the whole, muftalfo conferve all its conftituent parts; and then from a diligent Contemplation of all thefe Propofitions (which juftly challenge the title of the more general Laws of Nature) we may obferve, that they are all reduce-able to one Propofition, from whofe fit and jult Explication, all the Limits or Exceptions, under which the particular Propofitions are propofed, may be fought for, and difcovered, as from the Evidence of this one Propofition (which may be reduced into this, or one of the like fenfe) viz. Tm Endeavour, as much as we are ab/e, of the common Good of the whole Syftem of Rational Beings conducesi as far as lies in our Power, to the Gooa of all its feveral Parts or Members, in which our own Felicity is alfo contained, as part thereof-, where" as the dfts ofpofite to this Endeavour, do bring along with them Effetts quite oppofite thereunto, and witt certainly frocure our own Ruin or Mi fay at laft. Therefore the whole Sum of this Propofition may be reduced to thefe three things: i. That which concerns the Matter of it, to wit, the Knowledg of its Terms drawn from the Nature of Things. Or, 2. Its Form, viz.. the Connexion of thofe Terms contained in this pra^ dHcal Propofition �, and particularly fuch, which be-caufe of theRewards and Punifhments annexed to them, may make it deferve to be called a Divine, Natural Law, as proceeding from God, the Author of Nature. Or elfe, 3. The Deduction of all other natural Laws from this, as their Foundation and Original, according to that refpeft or proportion they bear to the common Good, or happieft State of the whole aggregate Body of rational Beings,

But as to the Explication of the Terms of this Propofition, I hope the Reader will not be fcanda-liz'd, that we attribute Reafon to God, and have reckoned him as the Head of rational Beings, fince. we do not thereby mean that fort of Reafon which confifts in deducingConclufions from.priorPropo-fitions, but rather that abfolute Omnifcience and perfect Wifdom, which we underftand to be in God, which Cicero himfelf could not better defcribe, than by the Name of adult a Ratio, or the mofi pfrfeft Reafon. And if we Mortals can know, or apprehend any thing of him aright, it is as we do partake of fome part, tho in an infinitely lower degree, of that only true Knowledg and Underftanding. So that if we can once rightly judg that the common Good of Rational Beings is the greateft of all others, it is no doubt true, and no otherwife true, than as it is fo apprehended by the Divine Intelledt} as when it is de-monftrated to tis. that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones} no doubt but the Deity it felf had before the fame Idea of it. So likewifc if we have affirmed, that we can contribute any thing to the good and happinefs of rational Beings, by our Benevolence towards them, and fo may fup-pofe, that there is a certain Good common to us and the Deity, and which we may fome way ferve to promote �, we delire fo to be underftood, not as if we imagined, that by our teftifying our Love and Honour towards God, in any internal or external Afts of Worfhip, we could add or contribute any thing to his infinite Happinefs and Perfections; but only as judging it more grateful and agreeable to his Divine Nature, if by our Deeds we exprefs our Gratitude and Obedience to him, by imitating him in our care of the common Good of Mankind, than if we deny his Being, or blafpheme his Attributes, and violate or contemn his Laws: So like wife, if in our Thoughts,

Words and Aaions, we exprefs our Love towards him we doubt not but it is more pleafing and agreeable to his Divine Nature, than if by the contrary Actions we fhould fignify our negled or hatred of him: for if we abftradively compare any two rational Natures together, wemuft acknowledga greater Similitude when one of them agrees and co-operates with the other, than if we fhould fuppofe-aDifagree-jnent or Difcord between them, or that the End or Defisn intended by the one fhould be crofted or op-pofed by the other. Neither do I fee what can hinder but that the fame may be affirmed, it one ot thefe rational Natures be fuppofed to be God, and the other only Man. Therefore, as it is known by our common fenfe, that it is more grateful to any Man to be beloved and honoured, than to be hated and contemned ^ fo it may be found by a mamfeft Analogy of Reafon, that it is more grateful to God, the Head of rational Beings, to be belovd and honoured by the Service and Worfhip of us Men than to be hated and contemned. For as the defire of be-inebeloved areueth nolu^erfedhon inus^ fohkewife in God, it is fo far from giving the leaft fufpicion thereof, that on the contrary it rather argues his Goodnefs, fmce our Natures are perfefted to the hieheft degree they are capable of by our Love to him, and Obedience to his Commands. So .that when we fpeak of any Good common to us with the Divine Nature, it is only to be underftood analogically; for thofe things which we perceive to conferve or perfect our own Nature, wecall grateful to us, that is as they rendeTthe Min'd pleafed and full of Joy, Pleafure, and Satisfaction : And tho we confefs we cannot con-tribute any thing to the infinite Perfeftion of the Deity vet fmce this Joy or Complacency proceeding from our Love and Service towards him, may be con-feived without any Imperfection, they, I think, may

fee fafely attributed to his Divine Nature, and look'd upon as a fort of Good endeavoured by us for him, fince God efteems our Love and Service as the only Tribute we can pay him j and therefore he hath infe-parably annexed the highefl Rewards to this Love of himfelf (as (hall be proved in this following Difcourfe) which certainly he would never have done, unlefs it had been his Will that we mould thus love and wor-ftip him. Therefore, if I fliould grant, that the Divine Good orHappinefs is not any ways advanced by our Worfhip of him ; yet will not this at all derogate from our definition of endeavouring the common Good of rational Beings, which may be made out by thefe following Confiderations.

1. That all Rational Beings or Agents are, and muft be confidered together, as naturally and ne-ceflarily conftituting one intellectual Syftem or Society, becaufe they agree together to profecute one chief End, viz.. The Good of the Univerfe or World, efpecially of that intelle&ual Syftem, by thefitteft Means applicable to that end j fince, whilfl they are truly rational they cannot differ in judging what is that beft End, nor avoid chufing the fame neceflary Means leading thereunto.

2. That altho God, the Head of this intellectual Syftem, be indeed incapable of any Addition to his infinite Happinefs and Perfection, yet the whole Syftem (in as much as it includes all finite rational Beings) is capable of improvement in thefe its finite parts, which Improvement God cannot only defire, but ever did and will promote, both by his own Power, as alfo by that of all fubordinate voluntary Agents, whereby God's elfential Goodnefs becomes manifeft to us: a»<i the Good of the whole Syftem may reafonably be judged as grateful or pleaiing to God the head thereof, altho it can add nothing to himfelf. Thus in Erabrions all the other Members

daily grow and improve, after the Head or Brain is fuppoled to have attained its full bignefs.

Thefe voluntary or free Aftions of the fubordU nate Agents, when they concur with God's Wifdom and Goodnefs, are naturally and evidently known to be more pleafmg (as being rewarded by him) than malevolent A&ions oppolite to this chief End, which fight both againlt God and Men ; nor docs the con-(ideration of God's rewarding fuch good A&ions, imply any addition to his Divine perfections. So that our Benevolence towards God, and confequently our Worfhip of him, is but our free acknowledgment, that he naturally and efientially is (what he ever was and will be) the fame infinite, good and wife Difpo-fer and Governour of the whole Syftem of rational Beings �, and this our Benevolence, by giving him Glory, Love, Reverence and Obedience, thereby fulfils all the Duties of Humanity towards thofe of our own kind, which anfwers both the Tables of the moral, and natural Law 9 and in this confent of our minds with the Divine Intellect, confifts that com-pleat Harmony of the Univerfeof intellectual Beings.

The great influence of thefe Principles upon all the parts of Natural Religion, may be more fully ex-prefs'd and made out by thefe following Confidera-tions.

i. The voluntary acknowledgment and confent of our Minds to the Perfections of the Divine Nature and Actions, include the agreement and concurrence of our chief Faculties, viz.. the tlnderftanding and Will, therewith j and moreover, naturally excite all our Affedions to comply with them, and fo ftrong-ly difpofe us in our future Life and A&ions, to conform our felves to the imitation thereof, to the ut-moftof our Abilities, Particularly thefe Principles naturally produce in us, Firft, Praifes and Thankf* givings to God, private and publick, for Goods ai-

fready done toourfelves or others, wherein one efi iential part of Prayer is contained.

i. Hence alfo arife Hope, Affiance or Truft iri God, all which I acknowledg fullelt of affii-rance, when founded not only on Obfervations, or paft Experience of Providences} but hath alfo revealed Promifes annex'd relating to a future Good.

3. To conclude, when our Acknowledgment and high efteem of the Divine Attributes move us to the imitation thereof, we muft needs thereby arife to thole high degrees of Charity^ or the endeavour of the greatest publick Good which weobferved God td profecute �-, and fuch Charity imports not only exacl: Jultice to all, but that ovet flowing Bounty, Tender* heft and Sympathy with others, beyond which Human Nature cannot arrive; becaufe thefe not only harmonioufly confent with tlie like Perfections in God^ but alfo co-operate with him, to the improvement of the finite parts of the rational Syftem, whereof he is the infinite, yet fympathiting Head, who declares he takes all that is done to the Members of thi$ intelleftual Society, as done to himfelf;

Neverthelefs, I profefs to underftand this.Symp4* thy or Compafllon in God in fuch a ferife only as ic is underftood in Holy Writ, for that infinite concerii for the good of his beft Creatures, which is contained in his infinite Goodnefs, and is a real Perfection of his. Nature, .not iniplying any Miftake, nor capacity of being lelTened or hurt by the power of any man's Malice, but yet fully artfwers (nay infinitely exceeds) that fblicicous careaiid concern for the good of otheisf which Charity and Compafnon work in the bell of


jri ftiort, if the Reader will take thepa;inst6.per^ tife the three firft Chapters of this Difcourfe, he will find that we have, in explaining the terms of this. Pftfpc'jfalafriy not only given a bare interpretation of

Words, but alfo have propofed the true Notions and Natures of thofe things from whence they are taken, as far as is neceflary for our purpofe; and may obferve that by dne and the fame labour we have dire&ly and immediately explained the Power and Neceflity of thofe human A&ions which are required to the-common Happinefs of all men, and alfo to the private good and neceifity of particular Perfons. Altho it feemed moft convenient to ufe fuch general words, which might in fome fenfe be attributed to the Divine Ma jefty ^ and I have done it with that defign> that by the help of this A-nalogy thus fuppofed, not only our obligation to Piety and Vertue, but alfo the Nature of Divine Juftice and Dominion may be from hence better under-ftood.

But as for what concerns the form of this Propo-fition, it is evident that it is wholly practical, as that which determines concerning the certain effects of human Actions. But it is alfo to be noted, thatal-tho the words conduces or renders, in either of thefe Propofitions, are put in the prefent Tenfe } yet it is not limited to any time prefent, but abftracls from it: And becaufe its truth doth chiefly depend upon the Identity of the whole with all the parts, it is as plainly true of all future time, and is as often ufed by us in this Difcourfe with refpect to future, as well as to prefent Actions. And therefore this Propofl-tion is more fit for our purpofe, becaufe built upon, no particular Hypothefis j for it doth not fuppofe men born in a Civil State, nor yet out of it, neither confiders any Kindred or Relations among men, as derived from the fame common Parents, as we are taught by the Holy Scriptures, lince the Obligation of the Laws of Nature is to be demonftrated to thofe who do not yet acknowledg them. Neither on the other fide, doth it fuppofe (as Mr. Hobbs doth in his

deCiw) a great many men already groWnand fprung up out of the Earth like Mufhrooms. But our Pf opofi-tion, and all thofe things we have deduced fV6mit£ might have been underftood and acknowledged by the firlt Parents of Mankind, Jif they had only confidered themfelves together with God, and their Posterity which was to come into the World. Neither may it lefs eafily be underftood and admitted by thofe Nations which have not yet heard of Mam and Eve.

Betides, it may not be amifs to obferve concerning thefenfeof this Propofition, that in the fame words in which the Caufe of the greateft and belt Effect is laid down, there is alfo delivered in ftiort the means conducing to the chiefeft end; becaufe the effed of 21 rational Agent, after it is conceived in its mind, and hath determined to bellow its endeavours in producing it, is called the End, and the Ads or Caufes by which it endeavours to effed it, are called the Means f And from this Obfervation may be ftiewn a true Me* thod of reducing all thofe things virhich Moral Phito-fophers havefpoken about the means leading to the bell end, into natural Theorems concerning the Pow* erof human Actions in producing fuchEffeds ^ and inthis^form they may more eafily be examined whether they are true, or not, and may be more evidently demonstrated fo to be. And alfb we may hence learn by the like Reafon how eafily all true know-ledg of the force of thofe natural Caufes, which we may any way apply to our ufe,does fuggeft fit Medium for the attaining of the end defigned, and fo may be applied to Praftice according to occalion. Laftly, from thence it appears, that either of thefe Propofi-tions, which we have now laid down, do fo far approach to the nature of a Law, as they refped an end truly worthy of it? viz. The common good of all rational Beings; or elfe (if you pleafe to word it o-therwife) the Honour or Worlhip of God conjoint

with the coramen pood and Happinefs of Mankind. And tho it,doth not yet appear that this Fropofiti-on is a Law,, :be.caufe the Law-giver is not yet mentioned, neverthelefs I doubt not but you will find in the Body,of this;1pifcourfe,v =that it hath all things ne-ceifary toret^er'ikfo, [<vk« God, confidered as a Le-giflator, and his Will or Commands fufficiently declared: to us, as ail^aw from the very conftitution of our Natures^ as alfq of other things without us, and likewjfe ejlabliftied by, fufficient Rewards and Punifh-ments, bpdigin this,Life and ,the next -, neither do we fuppofe itcaji, be more evidently proved, that God is the Author of»allthings,; than that be is alfo the Author of this Propofition concerning the common good of ratiojaal Beings, or concerning his own Honour andA^orihip, conjoined with the common Good of Mankind. And tho I confefs we have been more exad, and have dwelt longer upon the Rewards that vts may expe& from the obfervation of this Law, than upon the Punifhments which are appointed for the;breach of it, and- tho I know the Civilians have placed the xSan&ion of r^vil Laws rather inPunifh-mentsthan'Rewards; yet I hope we have not offend. cdj tho we a little deviate from their Senfe, and make it part of the Sanction of this Law, that it iselta-bliQied by Rewards as well as Punifhments, fince it feemsmore agreeable to the Nature of things, whofe Footffceps are ftri&ly to be followed, to confider the pofitive Ideas of Caufes and Effeds in our Minds, and which do not receive either Negations or Privations by our outward Senfes j and our Affe&ions ought rather to be moved by the Love or Hopes of a prefent or future Good, than by the Fear or Hatred of the contrary Evil: For as no man is faid to love Life, Health, and thofe grateful Motions of the Nerves or Spirits, which are called corporeal Pleafures,4>ecaufe he may avoid Death, Sicknefs or Pain -, but rather

from their own jntrinfick Goodnefs ofcAgreeableneft with^ our human Natures} fo likewife no rational Man defires the Perfections of the Mind, to wit, the more ample and diftind knowledg of the moft noble Obje&s, the happieft State of rational Beings can only give him 5 and this, .not only that he may avoid the Mifchiefs of Ignorance, Envy, and Malevolence; bue becaufe of that great Happinefs which he finds by experience to fpring from fuch vertuous Aft ons and Habits, and which render it moft ungrateful to him to be deprived of them �, and fo the Caufes alfo of luch Privations are judged highly grievous and troublefbnu From whence it appears, that even Civil Laws themfelves, when they are eftabliflied by Punifliments, e. g. by the fear of Death, or lofs of Goods (if we confider the thing truly) do indeed force men to yield obedience to them from the love of Life or Riches, which they find can only be preferved by their obfervation. So that the avoiding of Death and Poverty, is but in other words, love of Life and Riches * as he who by two Negatives would fay he would not want Life, means no more, but that be defires to enjoy it. To which we may likewife add, that Civil Laws themfelves ought to be confidered from the end which the Law-makers regard in making them, as alfo which all good Subjects defign in obferving them j to wit, the publick Good of the Commonwealth (part of which is communicated to all of them in particular, and fo brings with it a natural Reward of their Obedience) rather than from the Pu-nifliments they threaten, by whofefear fome are deterred from violating them ^ and thofe of the worlt, and moft wicked fort of Men.

But tho we have fliewn, that the Sum of all the Precepts or Laws of Nature, as alfo of the Sanctions annexed to them, are briefly contained in this Propo-fition^ yetitsSubjeft is ftill but an endeavour, to the

titmoft of our Power, after the common Good of the whole Syftem of rational Beings: this limitation of, the utinoft of our Power implies, that we do not think our felves capable of adding any thing to the Divine Perfections which we willingly acknowledg to be beyond our Power. So that here is at once ex-preft both our Love towards God, and Good-will to Mankind, who are the conftituent parts of this Syftem. But the Predicate of this Propofition is, that which conduces to the good of all its Angular Parts, or Members, and in which our own Happinefs is contained as one part thereof; fmce all thofegood things, which we can do for others, are but the Effects of this endeavour: So that the Sum of all thofe Goods (of which alfo our own Felicity confifts) can never be mift either in this Life, or a better, as the Reward of our obedience thereunto. So like-wifetothe contrary A&ions^ Mifery in this Life, or in that to come, are the Pummments naturally due* But the Connexipn of the Predicate with the Subjeft, is both the Foundation of the truth of this Propofition, and alfo a Demonftration of the natural Connexion between this obedience and the Reward, as alfb between the Tranfgreffion and the Punilhment.

From whence the Readers will eafily obferve, the true Reafon for which this practical Propofition, and aH others that may be drawn from thence, do oblige all rational Creatures to know, and underftand it �, whilft other Propofitions (fuppofe Geometrical ones) tho found out by right Reafon, and fo are Truths proceeding from God himfelf, yet do not oblige men to any A&, or Pradice purfuantto them 5 but may be fafely negleclcd by moft Men, to whom the Science of Geometry may not be neceflary: whereas the effects of the endeavour of the common Good,do intimately concern the Happinefs of all mankind, (upon whofe joint or concurrent Wills, and

Endeavours, every fingle man's Happinefs doth after fome fort depend ) fo that this Endeavour can by no means be negle&ed, without endangering the lofing all thofe hopes of Happinefs, which God hath made known to us, from our own Nature, and the Nature of things; and fo hath fufficiently declared the Connexion of Rewards and Punilhments, with all our Moral Actions; from whofe Authority, as well this general Propofition, as all others which are contained in it, muft be underftood to become Laws.

It is therefore evident from the terms of this Pro-pofition, that the adequate, and immediate effect of our thus acting, concerning which this Law is efta-blifhed, is whatever is grateful to God, and beneficial to Men, that is, the natural Good of all the parts of the whole Syftem of rational Beings: Nay further, it is the greateft of all Goods, which we can imagine, or perform for them ; fince it is greater than the like good of any particular part, or Member of the fame Syftem. And farther, it is thereby fufficiently declared, that the Felicity of particular Perfons, is derived from this happy State of the whole Syftem ^ as the Nutrition of any one Member of an Animal is produced by a due Diftribution of the whole Mafs of Blood diffufed through all the parts of the Body. From whence it appears, that this Effeft muft needs be the beft, fince it mews us, that not the private Felicity of any fingle Man is the principal end of God the Legiflator, or ought to be fo of any one, who will truly obey his Will} and by a Parity of reafon it alfo appears, that thofe humane Aftions, which from their own natural force and efficacy are apt to promote the common Good, are certainly better than thofe which do only ferve the private Good of any one Man j and that by the fame proportion, as a common Good is greater than a private: So likewife thofe A&ions, which take the neareft way to attain

this effect as an End, are called Right, becaufe of their natural Similitude with a right or ftreight line, fvhich is always the fhortelt between the two Terms, But the fame A&ions, when compared with a Natural, or pofitive Law, as a rule of Life, or Manners, and are found conformable to it, are called morally good, and alfo right �, that is, agreeable to the Rule: but the Rule it felf is called right, or ftreight, as it fhewsthe neareft way to the End. But I fnall refer you for the clearer Explication of thefe things, to what we have farther faid concerning them in the Difcourfe it felf, efpecially in the Second part, wherein we prove againft Mr. Hobbes his Principle, that there is a true Natural, and Moral Good antecedent to Civil Laws.

But however, it may not be amifs to give you in fliortthe Method which we take to prove, that this Law of endeavouring the common Good, is really and indeed, and not metaphorically a Law. i. This general Suppofition being premifed, That all particular Perfons, who can either promote or oppofe this con> inon Good, are parts of that whole Body of mankind, which is either prefervcd, or prejudiced by their endeavours. We mall not now defcend to the particular Proofs as they are drawn from the Caufes of fuch Actions, of which we have partly treated in the Chapter of humane Nature*, and partly from their natural Effects and Confequences, of which we have largely difcourfed, in the Chapter of the Obligation of the Law of Nature} as alfo in the Second part in our Obfervation on Mr. Hobbes's Principles: all which play neverthelefs be reduced to thefe plain Propofiti-ons. i. As I have obferved, it is manifeft, that our Felicity, or highefl Reward, is eflentially connected by God the Legiflator, with the moft full, and con* ftant exercife of our natural Powers employed about the nobleft Objects, and greateft Effe&s they can be

capable of as proportioned to them: From whence it may be gathered, that all men endued with thcfe Faculties are naturally obliged under the penalty of lofing, or miffing of this their Happinefs, to exer-cife thofe Powers about the worthidt Objects, (viz..} God, and Mankind. Nor can it be long doubted, whether our Faculties may be more happily exerdied in maintaining Friendihip, or Enmity with them} for I think it is certain, there can be no Neutral State in which God and Men can neither be beloved, nor hated j or in which we can ftancl fo far Neuters, as neither to do things grateful, or ungrateful to them. But if it be granted, that there is a manifeft Neceility ( if we will be truly happy ) of prefervirtg Amity both with God and Men, here is thereby prefently declared the San&ion of this general Law pf Nature, which we are now enquiring into; for this alone eftablifhes all Natural Religion, and alfo all thofe things, which are neceflary to the Happinefs and prefer vation of Mankind, which are, befides Piety towards God, (i.) A peaceable Commerce and Agreement between the People of divers Nations, as treated of by the Law of Nations, which is but a Branch or fubordinate Member of this great Law of Nature. (2.) The Conftitution, and Confervation of a Civil Society, or Commonwealth, which is the Scope of all Civil Laws. And (3.) The Con* jinuance of Domeflick Relations, and private Friend/hips, concerning which the general Rules of Ethicks, as alfo the'more particular ones of Oe-conomics, do prefcribe. And therefore, we have put together many things in the Chapter of humane Nature, by which all particular Perfons of found Minds are fbme way rendred capable of fo large a Society, and are either more nearly, or remotely difpofed to it. And we do here jntreaf the Pleader, that he will not confider thofe things, each of them

fingly, or apart, but all together; fince from all of them conjoined, he may raife a fufficient Argument to prove the Exiftence, and evince the Sanction of this moft general Law of Nature v and that Men will neceflarily fail of their Happinefs, which chiefly confifts in the adequate, or proper Exercife of their rational Faculties, unlefs they will exercife them in cultivating this Amity, or Love both with God, and Men \ to which Ends they are before all other Animals particularly adapted.

But from the Effects of fuch Actions conducing to the Common good of Rational Beings, we have alfo further (hewn, in the Chapter of the Obligation of the Laws of Nature, that this Sanction by fufficieat Rewards and Punilhments, is moft commonly connected with fuch A&ions. And it is manifeft, that in the firft place God, as the beft and wifefl of Rational Beings, is to be loved and honoured by fuch Actions or Endeavours, as that the Goods, and Fortunes of all innocent Perfons of what Nation foever, are thereby fecured as far as lies in our Power, and all things profitable for patucular Perfons, procured according to the Proportion they bear to the good of the whole Body of Mankind �, fo that this Law will not permit any thing to be done, which the Care of the whole doth not allow: Nor can any thing be fuppofed more worthy a rational Creature, and from whence greater effects can proceed, than a Will always propenfe towards the good of this wholeBody governed by the Conduct of a Right Underftanding.

Therefore, fince it can certainly be foreknown, that fuch Effe&s will follow from this Endeavour, no Man can be ignorant that all the Joys, and prefent Comforts of true Piety and Vertue are therein contained, together with the hopes of a blefTed Immortality, befides thofe many Conveniences of Peace, and Commerce with thofe of other Nations, and all thofe

Emoluments both of Civil, and Domeftick Government, and private Friendfhips, which are connected with this Endeavour, as the common Rewards thereof, and which cannot by any Means within" our Power be otherwife obtained. So that, he who neg-le&s the Care of the Common good, doth alfo rejeft the true Caufes of his own Felicity, and embraces thofe of his Mifery, as a Puniftiment due to his Folly. In ihort, fince it is manifeft from the Nature of things, that the higheft Happinefs which we can. procure for our felves, proceeds from our Care both of Piety to God, and Love and Peace with Men; and that the Endeavour of thefe can only be found in his Soul, who truly ftudieth the common Good of all Rational Beings �, it is alfo evident, that the great-eft Rewards, that any one can acquire, are necefTa-rily connected with this Endeavour, and that the Lois, or Deprivation of this Felicity, doth neceflarily adhere as a Puniftiment to the oppolite Actions. The former of thefe, which declares the true Caufes of all that Felicity, which particular Perfons can thereby obtain, we have proved from Natural Effe&s found by Experience. The latter, (viz.) Piety to God, and Charity or Benevolence towards all Men, are contained in the Endeavour of the common Good ; and we have alfo proved in the fourth Chapter, that allVertues, both private and publick, are contained in this Endeavour.

But becaufe the Connexion of Rewards and Pu-niftiments, that follow thofe Ads which are for the common Good, or oppolite to it, is fbmething obfcu-red by thofe Evils which often befal good Men, and thofe. good things which too frequently happen to Evil ones, it will be enough for us to (hew, thatnotwith-ftanding all thefe, the Connexion between them is fo fufficiently conftant, and manifeft in the Nature of things, that from thence may be certainly gathered

the Sanftion of the Law of Nature, commanding the former, and prohibiting the latter Actions. And we may fuppofe thofe Punifhments to fuffice for its San&ion, which (all things rightly weighed ) much exceed the Gain that may arife from any Aft done contrary to this Law. But in comparing of the Effe&s which do follow good Adions on one hand, and Evil ones on the other, thofe good, or evil Things ought not to be reckoned in to the Account, which either cannot be acquired, or avoided by any humane Prudence, or Induftry} fuch as thofe which proceeding from the natural Neceffity of External caufes, may happen to any one by mere Chance, and fuch as are wont to fall out alike, both to good and bad. Therefore we fhall only take thofe in to our Account, which may be forefeen and prevented by humane Forefight, as fome way depending upon our own Wills or Afts.

But I muft acknowledg, that thefe Effects do not all depend upon our own particular Powers, but many of them do alfo proceed from the good Will and Endeavours of other Rationals; yet fince it may be known from their Natures, as they are agreeable to our own, that the common Good is the beft, and greateft End which they can propofe to themfelves, and that their Natural Reafon requires that they fliould a& for an End, and rather for this than any other lefs good, or lefs perfeft: And that it is moreover known by Experience, that fuch Effedts of Uni-verfal Benevolence, may be for the moft part obtained from others, by our own benevolent Actions j it is juft that thole Effeds fliould be numbred or efteemed among thqfe Confequences, which do for the moft part fo fall out, became every Man is efteemed able to do whatever he can perform, or obtain by the Affiftance of others. So that the whole Reward which is connected to good Aftions, by the natural

Conftitution of Things, is fomewhat like thofe Tributes of which the publick Revenues confift, which do not only arife out of conftant Rents, but alfo out of divers contingent Payments, fuck as Cuftoms or Excife upon Commodities, whofe Value, altho it be very great, yet is not always certain, albeit they are often farmed out at ascertain Rate. Therefore in the reckoning up of thefe Rewards, not only thole parts thereof ought to come into Account, which immutably adhere to good Actions, fuch as are that Happinefs which coniifts in the Knowledg and Love of God, and good Men, the? abfolute Government of our Paffiohs, the fweet Har-» mony and Agreement betwixt the true Principles of our Actions, and all the parts of ourLivesv the Favour of the Deity, and the Hopes of a blefledJm-mortality proceeding from all thefe: But there oughfc alfo to be taken into the Account,- all thofe5 Goods, which do (tho contingently ) adhere to them, ani' which may either happen to us from the good ' WiH<o$ others, or flow from that Concord, and Societyy which is either maintained between divers Nations,-or thofe of the fame Commonwealth ; and which we do, as far as we a re able, procure for* dUr felves by fuch benevolent A&ioiis. And by the like Reafon, we may alfo underftand of what particulars all that Mifery, or thofe Punifhments may confifl, which is connected with thofe Ads that are hurtful to the common Good.

So that all of us may learn, from the Neceflityof the Condition in which we are born and live^ to efteem contingent Goods, and to be drawn to aft by the Hopes of them v for the Airit felf, which is^fo necefTary for our fubfiftence and prefervatibn, dotf* not always benefit our Blood, or Spirits; but is fometiraes infected with deadly Steams, and Vapours* Nor can our Meat, Drink or Exercife always pre^

ferve our Lives, but do often generate Difeafes. And Agriculture it felf doth not always pay the Huf* band-man's Toil with the expefted Gain, but fome-times he even lofes by it. And fure we are not Icfs naturally drawn to the Endeavour of the common Good, than we are tofuch natural Aftions from the Hope of a Good, that may but probably proceed from them. But how juftly we may hope for a con-fiderable Return from all others, jointly confidered, for all our Labours beftoWed upon the common Good j we fhall be able to make the beft Account of, when weconfider what our own Experience, and the Hifto-ry of all Nations for the time part, may teach us to have befallen thofe who have either regarded, or de-fpifcd this great End.

Butbecaufe the whole Endeavour of this common Good, contains no more but the Worfhip of the Deity, the Care of Fidelity, Peace, and Commerce betwixt Nations, and the inftituting, and maintaining Government both Civil and Domeftick, as alfo particular Friendfhips, as the parts thereof taken together j it is manifeft, that the Endeavour of all thefe expreft by a mutual Love and Afliftance, mult in ibme degree be found among all Nations, as necefla-ry to their own Happinefs and Prefervation: Nay, it feems farther manifeft to me, that thofe who attain but to the Age of Manhood do, owe all thofe paft Years much more to the Endeavour of others beftow-ed upon the common Good, than to their own Care, which in their tender Age was almoft none at all. For we then do altogether depend upon, and owe our Prefervation to that Obedience, which others yield as well to Oeconomical Precepts, as to all thofe Laws both Civil and Religious, which do wholly proceed from this Care of the common Good. So that it is certain, that if afterwards we expofe our Lives to danger, yea, if we lofethem for the publickGood,

we Ihould lofe much lefs for its fake, than we did before receive from it \ for we do then only lofe the uncertain Hopes of future Enjoyments, whereas it is evident that fcarce fo much as the Hope of them can remain to particular Perfons where the common Good isdeftroyed; for we have thence received the real Poflfeflion of all thofe Contentments of Life, with which we are bleft: And therefore we are bound in Gratitude, as well as Intereft, to return thofe again whenever they are lawfully required of us 5 tho I grant ( for the Honour of the Gofpel) that the firm-eft Encouragements, and greateft Reward we Men can have for expofing, nay, lofing our Lives for the Benefit, or Service of the Common-wealth, is that Happinefs we may juftly expeft in another Life after this.

Thefe things feem evident to us, as refembling that Method whereby we are naturally taught, that the Health, and Strength of our whole Body is preferred by the good Eftate of its particular Members, in its receiving Food, and Breath: Altho fpmetimes Difeafes may breed within the Body, or divers outward Accidents (as Wounds, Bruifes, and the like) do happen to it from without, which may hinder the particular Members from receiving thatNourifli-ment that is neceflary for them: And we are taught after the fame manner by the Ads immediately promoting the common good, that the Happinefs of particular Men (which are the Members of this natural Syftem ) may no lefs certainly be expected, nor are lefs naturally derived from thence, than the Strength of our Hands doth proceed from the due State of the whole Mafs of Blood, and nervous Juice : Tho we confefs that many things may happen, which may caufe this general Care of the whole Body of Mankind, not always to meet with the good Effed we de-fire j fo that particular Perfons may for certain in-

fallibly enjoy all the Felicity they can hope for, 6f expedt: Yet this is no Argument againft it, any more than that the taking in of Aif^ and Aliments, ( however neceflary for the whole Body ) (hould prevent all thofe Accidents, and Diftempers it is fubjed to$ fince it may happen as well by the violent, and unjuft Actions of our fellow Subjects, (like the difeafed Conftitution of fome inward part) or by the Invafi-eh of a foreign Enemy (like a Blow, or Other outward Violence ) that good Men may be deprived in* this Life of fome Rewards of their good Deeds, and may alfb fuffer divers outward Evils*, Yetiince thefe are more often repelled by the Force of Concord,, and Civil Government, or are often fhook offafter fome (hort Disturbances, either by our own private Power, or elfe by that of the Civil Sword, as Difeafes are thrown ofFby a healthful Crifis,or Effort of Nature. So that notwithstanding all thefe Evils, Men are more often recompenfed with greater Goods, partly from the Afiiftance of others, but chiefly from that of Civil Government, or elfe of Leagues made with Neighbouring States : From whence it is that Mankind hath never been yet dcitroyed, notwithstanding all the Tyranny and Wars, that Mens unteafonable Paflions have exercifed, and raifed in the World 5 and that Civil Governments, or Empires, have been more lafting than the moll long-lived Animals. From all which it is apparent, that the depraved Appetites of divers Men, or thofe Paifions which do often produce Motions fo oppofite to the common Good, ought no; more to hinder us from acknowledging the Natural Propenfities of all the reft of Mankind ( confidered together) to be more powerfully carried towards that which we every Day fee may be procured thereby, (vim.) The Confervation and farther l?erfe&ioi? of the whole Body of Mankind, than that divers Difeafes breeding in the parts of Animals^ orariyotfc

ward Violence (hould hinder us from acknowledging, that the Frame of their Bodies, and the Natural Fun&ion of their parts are fitted, and intended by God, fortheConfervationof Life, and the Propagation of their Species.

But that we may carry on this Similitude, (between a living Body and its particular Members, with the whole Body of Mankind, and all the individuals contained under it) a little farther, I will here give you Monfieur pafcat's Excellent Notion concerning this common Good, as it is published in thofe Fragments, Entituled, LtsPenfeesde Alon-fimr Pafcxl, llncc it both explains and confirms our Method. He thet-e fippofes, That God having made the Heavens, and the Earth, and divers other Creatures, not at all feniible of their common Happinefs, would alfb make fome rational Beings which might know him, and might make up one Body confiding of rational Members �, and that all Men are Members of this Body: fo that it is neceflary to their happinefs, that all particular Men, as Members of this Body, conform their particular Wills to the Univerfal Will of God, that governs the whole Body, as the Head or Soul thereof. And tho it often happens, that one Man falfly fuppofes himfelf an independent. Being, and fo will make himfelf the only Centre of all his Adtions} yet he will at laft find himfelf whillt in this State, ( feparated from the Body of rational Beings, and who not having any true Principle of Life, or Motion, doth nothing but wander a-bout) diftradted in the uncertainty of his own Being �, but if ever he comes to a true knowledg of himfelf, he will find, that he is not that whole Body, but only a fmall Member of it, and hath no proper Life, and Motion, but as he is a part thereof: So that to regulate our Self-love, every Man

Vide Chap; des Penfees Morales*

ought to imagine himfclf, but one ftnall part of this Body of Mankind, compofed of fo many intelligent Members ^ and to know what Proportion of Love every Man oweth himfelf, let him conlider what Degree of Love the Body bears to any one fmall Tingle part, and fo much Love that part (if it had fenfe ) ought to beftow upon it felf, and no more : All Self-love that exceeds this is unjufl. So far this fagacious contemplative Gentleman thought Jong fince, tho I confefs he doth not proceed to fhew in what manner the Good of every individual Perfon depends upon the Happinefs of the whole Body of Mankind, as our Author hath here done ^ tho no doubt, he was admirably well fitted to do it, if he had lived to reduce thofe excellent Thoughts into a fet Difcourfe.

We have delivered in this Epitomy the Sum of that Method, by which we have enquired into the San&ion of the Laws of Nature, in which we have confidered all the Felicity naturally flowing from good Actions, as a Reward annexed to them by God the Author of Nature; and their Lofs, or contrary Evils that follow them, as a PunUhment naturally flowing from their Tranfgreflion : And indeed, our Method feems very much confirmed from the common Confent of Mankind, finee all .Men, of however different Opinions concerning Moral Principles, do yet agree in this, that good Aftions ought Hill to be encouraged by Rewards, and evil ones to be reftrained by Punim-ments; in this all Se&s of Philofophers, however quarrelling among themfelves, do agree, as alfo the Founders of all Religions, and the Makers of all Civil Laws, have made this their main Foundation \ Nay, thofe, who would feem molt to negled all Rewards, and would deduce all Vertues from Gratitude alone, yet find it neceflary to acknowledg this Gratitude to proceed from the Memory of Benefits re-

ceiv'd. But fure it Hill argues as much Love toward8 our felves, when we are perfwaded to do bur Duty bY a Confideration of Benefits already received, as when, we do it for the fame things to be received hereafter 5 yea, he feems to a& more generoufly, who is moved toad for a Good only in expectation, than he who doth as much for the like good things which he already eh joys.

But this Method which we have here taken to reduce all the Laws of Nature to this fingle Proportion, of endeavouring the common Good, feems the more convenient, becaufe its proof is more eaiie, and expedite than that of fo ir any Rules,, which are wont to be propofed by Philofophers, and the Memory will be lefs burthened by the daily Remembrance of this one Propofirion, than of many �, efpecially when we are directed to it from the Nature of this common Good, as a Meafure whereby the Judgment of any confidering Man, may put Bounds to his own Aftions and Paffions, in the doing of which all Moral Vertue con (ills. And this Work Ariftoile hath recommended to the Judgment of every rational Man in his Definition of Vertue, tho he hath not indeed (hewn us the Rule of making this Judgmentj whereas our Propo-fition teacheth us, that the Rule is to be taken from the Nature of the beft, and greateft End; that is, Refpeft being had to all the parts of the whole Syftem of rational Beings, or of that Common-wealth of which God is the Head, and all the Members are his Subjefts.

And from this Principle « alfo to be derived that Order, or Preference among all the particular Laws of Nature, according to which, the former doth Hill reftrain, or limit the latter, which Dr. Sburrock hath, prudently, and folidly obferved in his Book De Officiis^ Chap. 10. As for Example, that there is a prior Reafon for abftaining from invading that which isano-

thers, than of obferving Promifes; and likewifc there is a greater Account to be made of Faith once given, than of returning Benefits, &c. But the true Ground of all thefe Rules is only to be found in our Principle, becaufe it more conduces to the common Good, that a prior Law of Nature concerning making and preferving Properties mould not be violated by the Invaflon of anothers Right, than that any one Ihould obferve a Compad, or Promife, when it cannot be done without fuch an Invafion; and there is the like Reafon in obfervingthofe other Laws, which we have reckoned up in the following Difcourfe, according to their due Order and Dignity: fo that indeed no Man ought to wonder, that we have fo pofi-tively afierted, that no Vertue can be explained with-out a Refpeclto the State of all rational Beings, or of the whole intellectual World �, for we fee in Natural Philofophy, that the Accidents of Bodies daily obvious to our Senfes, fuch as are the communication of Motion, Gravitation, and the Adion of Light and Heat, Firmnefs and Fluidity, Rarefaction and Condenfation, can new be explained, without a "Refpeft to the whole Syftem of the corporeal World, and the Motion therein to be preferved. Laftly, from this order among the Laws of Nature, whereby all the fpecial ones are ftill made fubordinate to this general one of the common Good, andthelowefb of them to the higheft, it may eafily be fhewn, that God never difpenfes with them, unlefs in thofe Cafes, in which the Obligation of a lower, or lefs Law, may feem to be taken away, and the nature of the Adion fo changed, as that there may be only place left for the Obfervation of the higher.

To conclude, we have here likewife fliewn, that the Generation of all Commonwealths is to be deduced from thefe two Principles, tending to this great End of the common Good of Rationals, w. firfty

irom that which commands the ConiHtution of a di-ftindt Property in things, and in the labours or endeavours of Perfons, where no fuch Property is yet inftituted, and where it is found to be fo., to prefer ve it inviolate, as the chief and neceflary. Medium to this common Good. 2. From that Law which commands a peculiar Love, or Benevolence of Parents towards their Children �, for this could never have exerted it felf, unlefs our firft Parents had permitted their Children when grown up, to enjoy a part of thofe neceflaries of Life, which were needfal for their future Subfiftence ; and fo from many fuch Fathers of Families joining together by mutual Compacb for common Defence, might arife the firft Governments in the World, of whatfoever kind you pleafe to fup-pofe.

But in the following Difcourfe, we have thought it belt to confine our felves within the bounds of Piiilofo-phy, and have wholly abftained from Theological Queftions: And therefore we have not faid any thing concerning Good, or Evil Spirits, or Angels, or ta* ken in their Good or Happinefs, into our Hypotbefi} $ for tho I doubt not of the Exiftence of fuch intelligent Beings, yet it is certain, all we can underftand of them proceeds wholly from Divine Revelation, or humane Tradition, neither of which are true means of obtaining Philofophical, or natural Know* ledg.

As for the Second part of this Treatife, in which is contained the Confutations of fome of Mr. ffobbes's Principles, or Arguments \ fince the Firft part is entire without it, and that the truth is a fufficient Proof to it felf, I leave it to thedifcretion of the Reader, whether he will trouble himfelf to perufe it, or nor, fince all Mens tempers do not alike fute with the ftudy of Controverfies > but it was neceflary not only pp lay a Foundation of better Moral Principles, but

alfo to (hew the Falihood, and Vanity of tliofc he hath laid down �, fince otherwife it might have been thought by foffl.e, that they were altogether unanfwe-rable: Yet I hope we have performed this unplea-fant Task, without receding upon the Memory of the Dead, and difturbing the Ames of a Perfon, who yvhilft he lived, was (as mult be acknowledged even by his Enemies) confiderably famous, both for Wit and Learning.

I have little more to add, but that I doubt not but onr learned Author ( whofe Work I have nowr abridged ) hath hit upon that true Method of proving the Law of Nature, which the Lord Bacon in his Advancement of Learning, tells the Reader he dellred to fee well performed, arid pjiat his Defign was to make enquiry into the true Fountains of Juftice, and publick Utility; and fo in every part of the Law, to represent a kind of Real Charatfcr, or Idea of that which is truly juft; by which general Mark, he that will bend his ftudy that way, and examine the Grounds, or endeavour the Amendment of the Laws of particular Kingdoms, or States, may be truly guided in this noble Undertaking. And he there proceeds to give fome general Aphorifms, which he calls the Idea's of Uni-verfal Jufticq, and his Fifth Aphorifm is very home to bur purpofe i for he there tells us, that the main End to wick all Laws fhould tend^ and ^hereunto they fhould 'dire ft fair Decrees and SancJions^ is only the common "Good, or Felicity of the People. And Cure this could liave no Foundation, but as the Felicity of any particular People, or Nation is contained in the general, or common Good an4 Happinefs of rational Beings,

And tho I grant that our Faculties are not fitted to pierce into the internal Fabrick, and real Eflences of Bodies, as th£ aboveraea^ioned Author of the EiTay

&<% 8. Chap. 3.

rable Connexion, and Agreement one with another j fo far as we can find their Habitudes and Relations, fo far we (hall be pofTefled of certain, real, and general Truths : And I doubt not, but if a right method were taken, a great part of Morality might be made out with that clearnefs, that could leave to a confidering Man no more reafon to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the Truth of anv Propofitions in Mathematicks which have been demonftrated to him. And I am confident our Author hath found out this only right method, and made ufe of the fitteft De-jnonftrations for the Proof of this Principle of the common Gopd of rational Beings, as the Sum of all natural Laws; fo that I hope you will have no caufe to doubt, but that he hath as fully proved it to befo, as if he had given us fo many Mathematical Demon-ftrationsof it.

But fince, as in the Mathematicks, there are required certain Principles, or Poftulata, which muft be taken for granted, before its Profeilbrs are able tode-rnonftrate any thing from them > fo we fliall reduce all we nave to fay on this Subject, into Six plain Poftulata 5 the Three firft of which having been already made out by others both in Latin and Engliih, I mall wave the Proof of them, and confine my felf wholly to the .Three laft : The. Propofitions are thefe.

T. That there is one Infinite, moll powerful, intelligent Being which we call God, who is the Author, and G.eator of the Univerfe, or World.

2.. TnatGod, as he hath created, fo he likewife g \'erns, and preferves this World, confiftingof Bo-dis and Spirits, by certain corporeal Motions, and the Dictates of Reafon, by which they aft as the chief Inftrumentsof his Providence.

3. That God thereby maintains, and preferves all bis Creatures, and farther defigns the Happinefs, and

of humane Under/landing hath very well obfcrved: Yet in the fame place he alfo grants, l 1 hat the Knowledgwe have of them, is fufficient to (Mover to us the Being of a God, and of a Divine Providence * andthattheKnowledgof our felves, and the Nature of other things is fufficient to lead us into a full, and clear Difcovery of our Duty towards Him, as being the great Concernment of our Lives-, and that it becomes us as rational Creatures to employ our Faculties about what they are moft a-dapted to, and follow the direction of Nature, where it fecms to point us out the way. So that it is highly reafonable to conclude, that our proper Employment lies in moral, rather than natural Truths. And therefore the fame Author in his Fourth Book, and Third Chapter, pag. 274. hath this Pailage: ' The Idea ofaSupream Being, infinite in Power and Wifdom, whofe Workmanfhip we are and on. whom we depend, and the Idea of our felves as underftanding, rational Creatures, being fuch as are clear to us, thefe would, I fuppofe, if duly confidered, and rnrfued, afford fuch Foundations of our Duty, and rules of Aftion, as might place Morality amongft the Sciences capable of De-monflration �, wherein I doubt not, but from Principles as inconteftable as thofe of the Mathematicks, by necefTary Confequences, the meafures of Right and Wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himfelf with the fame indifferency and attention to the one, as he doth to the other of thefe Sciences. And in the Twelfth Chapter of the fame Book, he faith, p. 3*1- c T!"s Save me the Confidence to advance that Conjefture, which I fuggeft-ed, Chap. 3. w. That Morality is capable of Demonftration as well as Mathematicks j For the Idea's that Etbicks are converfant about, being all realEffences. and fuch as I imagine have a difcove-

Prefervation of fuch of them as are fenfible, as far as their frail and mortal Natures will admit, and that Power which God hath given to Mankind over them.

4. That of all animate, or fenfible Creatures, God hath made Man alone to be confcious of his own Exiftence j and alfo that it is more particularly his Duty, to aft as his fubfervient Inftrument ^ not only for his own private Good, and Happinefs, but alfo for the common Good of all rational Beings.

5. That this knowledg of God's Will, as our Duty, is plainly difcovered to us, from the Being and Nature of God, as alib of our felves, and of thofe things without us, which he hath made neceflary for our ufe, and prefervation.

6. That thefe Di&ates, or Condufions of right reafbn, all tending to one great End» wa» the com-mon Good of rational Beings, (in which our own is contained ) being given us by God as a Legillator, for the well governing, or right ordering of our Adions to.this End, ccnftitnte the Law of Nature �, as being eftablifhed by fufficient Rewards and Puniflunents, both in this Life, and in that to come.



THE Learned Author of tbis Treatife fent it to me (then being in a Private Station) above a year ago , but then concealed bis Name from mey either though bis great Modefty, or becaufe in bis Prudence he thought that if I knew him, I might be biaffed in my Judgment, by the Honour which I am obliged to have to his Family-, and efpeciatty to bis Grandfather by his Mother's fide, the moft Learned f Primate of Ireland. Wherefore I read the Book without any refpett to the unknown Writer, and conftdered only the Merits of the Performance. Thus I found that he had not only well translated and epitomized in fome places what I had written in Latin, but had fully digefted the chief things of my De/ign in a well chofen Method of his own, with g* cat Perfpicuity, and had added fome llluftrations of bit own, or from other Learned Authors, with a Philosophical Liberty, which I mu(l needs allow. For this Reafon I judged that the then unknown Author had given too low a Title to his Book, and that I was to efleem him a good Hyperafpiftes, or able Second, in this Combat for Truth and Ju/lice, rather than a Tranfla-tor or EpitomiMr of what I had written. This obliged me to enquire diligently after the Author's Name and Quality, and then I foon obtained the Favor and Honour of a more intimate Converfation with him. Hereby I quickly found that I might fafely leave the Maintenance of that good

f Archbifhop Vjher*

Caufein which I was engaged, to his great Abilities and Diligence. And, I hope that fince tins Learned Gentleman hath conquered the Difficulties of the Search into the Rife of the Laws of Nature, now many of our younger (Sentry witt be encouraged to follow him in the may which this bis Treatife makes flain before them. For from thence they may receive affiance, not only to difcern the Reafonable-npfs of (M Vertue and Morality<, which is their Duty and [Ornament as they are Men, but alfo they may here fee the true Foundations of Civil Government and Property, which they are tnofl obliged to underfand, becaufe, as Gen" tlemen, they are bom to the greateft Interefl in them both. 1 need add no more to give you Durance that I freely sonfent to your Printing of this Book, and am

Tour affeffiotuite Friend,

Ric. Peterborough.



of the Firft Chapter.

A Brief Repetition of the Preface; That the Law of Nature can only be learnt from the Knowledg of a God, and from the Nature of Things, and of Mankind in general, $ i.

A ft ate of the Queflion between us and the Epicureans and Scepticks, § 2.

'The Method propofed, in what manner we are to enquire into the Nature of things, and of Mankind, in order to frove certain general Pr^ofetions, that /hall cany with them the Obligation of Natural Laws, § 3.

The Soul fuppofed to be rafa Tabula, without any innate IdeaV. Our method propofed of con/fdcring God a* the Caufe of the World ; and all Things $nd humane jftfions, as fubordinate caufes and effe^st either bin-dring, cr promoting our common Happmefs and Prefer-nation, § 4.

All the Laws of Nature deducible from hencs^ as /o many prattled Proportions, and all our obfrrvations or Iwowledg of it reducible to one Propofition, of the higheft Benevolence of rational Beings towards each other, as the fum of all the Laws of Nature ^ and what is meant by this Benevolence, $5.

What things are neceffary to be known or fuppofed, in order to the knowledg of this univerfal Benevolence^ §6.

Tfje Connexion of the Terms of this Proportion proved^ and what vs to be cottetfed from thence \ The true happi-nefs of /ingle Perfons inseparable from that of Mankind; The general Caufes of its Happinefs to be con/idered in the fir ft place, $7.

Therefore no Man's particular Happing/scan be oppofed± or preferred to the Happinefs of all other rational Beings ; The contrary Brattice unreasonable and unjuft, $8.

Tet that this Propo/ition cannot be of fufficient efficacy, titt we have propofed the Common Good of Nationals for the great End of all our j4ftions, § 9.

The Effefts of this Proportion not prejudiced by the itt life of Mens Free-wills, £10, ii.

By wkatfteps and degrees the Knowledg of this Common Good comes to be conveyed into our minds from the nature of things, $12. ���''<

Firft Natural Obfervation, ttat in our free ufe and enjoyment of all the outward Nece/Jaries of Life, and in our mutual adminiftring them to each other, conjifts all mcns happinefs and prefervation, from whence alfo proceeds a Notion of the Common Good of Nationals, £ 13.

That Afen are able to contribute more to the good and happinefs of thofe of their own kind, than any other Creatures, § 14.

Nothing a furer help and defence to Mankind, than the moft fincere and diffufive Benevolence, $15.

Nor any thing more deftrutfive to it, than their conftant Malice and Ill-will, $ \6.

That tbefe Principles are as certain as any in Arithme-tick and Geometry, notwithftanding the fuppofttion of Mens free-will, fy 17.

Tet that they are only Laws as proceeding from God the prSt Caufe, and as ejlablifh'd with fit Rewards and Pu-nijlmenis, $ 18.

That from tbefe natural and general Obferuations we attain to a true knewledg of tbe Caufes of all Mem bappi-nefs and that by tbe Lavs of Matter and Motion tbefe Caufes aa to certainly as any other, $ 19, 20.

Hence ari/es a true notion of things naturally and un-alterably good or evil, $21. ~

7bat Mens natural Powers, and tbe things neceffary for life, can neither be exerted nor made ufe of contrary to the known rules of Matter and Motion, * 22.

Some Concluftons deducible from hence -, at that we chiefly concern our felves about tbofe things and attiom that are in our Powers, 6 23.

No man felf-fufficient to procure all thtngs neceflary for fct5 own prefervation and happinefs, and therefore needs the £ood-will and affiance of others, $24.

None of tbefe neceffaries for Life can produce the Ends defarfd but a* they are appropriated to Man's particular ufefand necejfities for the time they make ufe of them,

2fr'om whence arifes the Right of Occupancy or Poffeffion, vbichmaybe exercifed even during a natural Community

of mott things, §26. .....

That M this natural Diwjton and Propriety in things w neceiTarytotheprefervation of particular Perfons, fo it w alfo of Mankind conftdered M an aggregate Body,

* Zrhat thefe Principles dejlroy Mr. HobbesV Hypothecs of the Right of all Men to aU things in the ft ate of Nature,

*2The necejjity of a farther Divifion and Appropriation of things, now Mankind is multiplied on the Earth,

* 2No Man bath a Right to any thing farther than a* it conduces to, or at leajt conffls with tbe common Good of rational Beings^ §30.

Theknowledg of thefe natural Caufes and Effe ft s alike certain as well in a natural as civil State, with a brief Recapitulation of the Grounds and Arguments infiftedon in this Chapter, §31.

The Contents of the Second Chapter.

MA N to be con/idered as a natural Body, a$ an Animal, and alfo at a rational Creature. Some Obfervations from the firft of thefe Conjtderations -, as that humane Bodies and Actions are fubjeft to the fame Laws of Matter and Motion with other things

t i, i. *�'

No Afliow or Motions more conducive to Man's happinefs, than what proceeds from the moft diffufive Benevolence, $3.

Mankind considered as a Syflem of natural Bodies, doth not make any confiderable difference between them, when confidered as voluntary Agents endued with fenfe, but that they rather aft more powerfully thereby, $4.

Mens greateft fecurity from Evils, And hopes of obtaining Good, depends upon the good-will and voluntary A/Jiftance of others, § 5.

Several natural Conclu/ions drawn from thefe Obferuct-tions, $6,7.

The like being found true in animate as well as inanimate Bodies, will make us more fotticitous towards the general good of thofe of our own kind, § 8.

T'hat loving or benevolent Attions towards each other conftitute the bappieft fate we can enjoy �, and alfo it » ordained by aconcourfe of Caufes, that all rational Beings Jbould be fen/ible of thefe Indications, $ p.

This proved from feveral natural Obfervations.


i. That the bulk of the Bodies of Animals being but nar-

ron>, the things nectjfary fa* tk V prefirvition can be but few, and moft of them communicable to many at once, and fe requires a limited feif-love conjiftcnt with the fafe-ty and'bappinefs of others, § 10.

2. That Creatures of the fame kind cannot but be movedtothe likeajfettions towards others, a& towards them-felves, from the jlnfe of the fimilitude of their natures, $11.

Animals do never deviate from this natural ft ate, but when they are feized with fome preter-natural Difeafe or Pajjion, which, as oft a* it happens, is abfolutely de-ftruftiveto their Natures, $12.

Aft Creatures ex^refs a delight in the fociety of others of the fame kind ; fome cafes or intervals wherein Nature feems to aft otherwife, no contradicJion to this general Rule, $ 13.

All Animals impelled by the natural Conftitution of their farts to a Love of thofe of a different Sex, and to a natural Affettion to their Offspring, § 14.

All Animals take delight in the fleeter Pajfions of Love, Joy, Defire, &c. 45 helpful to their natural Covfli-tution', whereat the contrary Pajftbns, when inordinate^ tire highly deftruftive to it, £ 15.

Mr. H. cannot deny thefe natural Propenfions, and therefore ts forced to fuppofe fomewhat in Mans nature that renders him more wfociable than Brutes, § 16.

Other peculiar Obfervations relating to MJ.n, whereby be w made more capable of promoting the common good -, a* firfl, from the greater quantity of Brains in Men, than in Mrutes, § 17.

2. From the natural Conftitution of their Blood, and Spermatick fejfels, from whence arifes a Necejjity of Marriage, and of a more conflant and lafling Love to fair Offspring, ^18.

3. From the wonderful ftrufture of Mem hands it w f roved, that this Injlrument wot given us, for fome more noble uje than bare fdf-prefervation^ $ 19.

Laflly, From the upright pojlure of Mcns bodies^ and way of motion, $20.

Toe next Set of Obfervations tending to prove Men more fitted for the promoting of this common Good, taken from the natural and peculiar faculties of Men's Souls a-hove thofe of Brutes, Andy i. from that of deducing EffecJs from their Caufes, and vice versa ; especially in that of diftinguifhing of real or natural, from apparent Goods, $21.

What is under/tood by us, by a natural or moral Good or Evil. Certain Axioms for the plainer underftanding their Nature and Degrees^ §22.

Horn we arrive to an Idea of a fpecies or kind of Creatures, and alfo to a notion of the general or common good of Mankind, $ 23.

Speech and the Invention of Letters, peculiar faculties of Man's nature : And the great Benefits art/ing from thence in order to the common good, $ 24.

Men do infinitely exceed Beafls in their difcur/tve Faculties, as alfo in the knorvledg and ufs of Numbers,


Andlikewifeinthe Power of undemanding the different

Quantities and Proportions between Bodies, which we call Geometry, $ 26.

The two great remaining Prerogatives of humane Souls, Freedom of Will as to moral Attions, and theKnowledg of aGod) $27,28.

tfrhat knowledg we can have of his Attributes, which can never be truly underjlood, but with refpett to their great End, the Profecution of the common good of the Vniverfe, §29.

The Contents of the Third Chapter.

A Brief recapitulation of the former Chapters, and a fumming up all thofe Observations into a general Propo/ition of God's Willing and Commanding the Common Good of Rational Beings, as the main End of all our Aftions, $ i.

A brief Explanation of the Terms of our^Dcfcription of the Law of Nature, and that Words are not always cffential to Laws, §2.

That att moral Truths or Duties as declared by God, arc contained in this one Propo/ition of Endeavouring the common good j certain Principles laid down for the proving it,

$3v4, 5,6-

That this being once difcovered to ttf, we lie under a fufficient Obligation to obfervc this Propo/ition, as a natural. Law, with the Explanation of the Term, Obligation, and who hath Authority to oblige us, § 7, 8, 9.

Tet that this Obligation may well confift with the freedom of our wills. The difference between a mere animal and a rational or natural Good, the ncglett of which diftinftion is the Caufe of Epicurus and Mr. H's Errors, $ 10.

The laft part of the Obligation to this Law, viz. its SanCiion by Rewards and Punifbments. Certain Axioms neceffary to be known in order to the right underftanding the true nature of a moral Good or Evil j and of Marts true happinefs and perfecJion^with its difference from that of other Beings, § i i.

That tho all moral Obligation docs not confijl in Rewards or Tuniflwicnis \ yet that by rcafon of the wcakmfs of humane Nature, it is infignificant without them } with a Scale of Nature, /hewing the difference between Vegetables and inanimate Bodies, and between Men and Brutes,

$ I 2.

Theftrifteft Sanction, and confequentlj Obligation to all Laws,conftfts in Rewards and Puni/hments duly diftributed -9 Qoo?s right of Dominion not to be refolded into his irrefifti-bis Power? $13.

The internal Rewards ordained by God in Nature, are9 firft, the inward fatisfaftion of the Soul> and alfo the pleafure all men take in the excrcife of the fwcetcr pajfions of Love, &c. § 14,15.

The external Rewards are all the like returns of this Be-neyolence from others, w,ith the praife or commendation of all good men, together with the peace and protection of the civil Government, $ 15, 17.

Laftly, from God, Soundnefs of mind and body, with all thofe outward blejjings he ufually bejlows on the peaceable and vertuous ; with a Solution to the difficulty ^ Way God of ten afflicts Good men, $ 18.

The internal Puni/hments ordained by God for the tranf-grejjion of this Law, are, the abfence or privation of the former good things, which is, an Evil and a Punijhment^ § 19.

Error, and being governed by the Pajfions, arealEvil9 and an internal Puni/hment, § 20.

3. That fuch> evil Actions cannot but be often difpleafing tp the Perfon that doth them, §ir. ,

4. "that Pices and Crimes feldom come alone, but let in a train of others of the fame kind, or worfe, along with them, ^ 22.

5. That fuch an Offender cannot get out of this ft ate when he will, at leaft not without the trouble of Repentance^

$23. - ".'" ' " ""' ''"

6. The fear of Puni/hment botfy from G,od andMan9 24. ' ,.' "' " ' ; "c;v'

The external Puni/bmcnts are, i. The Evils that bqp* fen to the body from violent and unfociable Pajjionfy 925. ' ' "" . ' ' ' ' �'""-.;

2d. Thofe returns of hatred or contempt wbicb tf# fuck men muft expeft from others, § 2.6,

3d, Returns of ' revenge from thofe they have injured, $27.

Laflly, Thofe Punifhments which are often inflifted by the civil Powers-, all which natural Puni/hments Mr. H. bimfelf acknowledges to be ordained by God, $28.

That where thefe Punifhments fail in this Life, they will be fupplied by others infinitely more grievous and durable in that to come, $29.

A brief recapitulation of this Chapter, That this Propo/t-ttonof our Endeavouring the common good, &c. is truly a Law, as containing all the Conditions requi/tte thereunto, $ 30.

The Contents of the Fourth Chapter.

A Brief repetition of what hath been faid in the firft Chapter, That no Man can Rave a right to preferve his own Life, but as it conduces to the common good, &c. That in att Societies the good of the leffer part muft give place and be fubordinat* to that of the greater, £ i, 2.

That a due con/lderation of this Law will lead us to a Inowleag of the reafon and grounds of all the particular Laws of Nature, $ 3.

And alfo that all moral fertues are contained under this one Law of endeavouring the Common Good. That Prudence is nothing but the knowlcdg of our duty, in order to the great End, the Common Good \ as Constancy in the frofecution of it, is therefore true Fortitude, § 4.

That Temperance,or Moderation,*'?* att corporeal Plea-fures is no otherwife a fertue than as it conduces to the hap-pinefs and prefervation of Mankind', That under Love and Benevolence are contained the V'trtms of Innocence, Meeknefs, &c. $ 5,6.

Equity a Vertue at it poMotes the common good of Mankind, $7.

The fame proved likewife of Juftice, fince nothing can be called Ours, either by natural or civil Laws, but as it conduces to this great End, and a natural and civil Property neceffary thereunto; the one in a natural ft ate, the other in a civil fociety, $ 8.

From Property arifes the neceflity of Contraffs, Pro-mifes, Gifts, &c. all which are ft ill to be governed by this great Law, $9.

From this natural Property arifes the Fertue of Moderation, fetting bounds to inordinate felf-kve in order to the common good; Frugality, no otherwife afertue9 than as it renders us not burthenfom, not injurious to others, § 10.

The natural Love of Parents to their Children to be ex-ertifed and limited with refpecJ to the common good, $ ii.

All the reft of the moral Vertues, fetch as Temperance^ Frugality, &c. more particularly explained to proceed from the fame Original, and not to be under food without it, $ 12.

The fame more particularly applyed, and made out in every particular Pertue, which conftitutes Juftice, $

13- � .'

AH the homiletical Pertues, i. e. fitch as refpe&Con-verfation, cr the due ufe of Speech, explained after the fame manner, with a like refpett to the Common $o»d, $ 14,15,16.

Self-love and Self prefervation only lawful in order to this End, $ 17.

Some farther explanations of the nature of Temperance, and wherein it confifts, § 18.

That part of it called Chaflity, a Vertueonly as it tends to the good and propagation of mankind, § 19.

Another part of it, viz. Modefty in feeking of Riches, Honour, &c. t'ertues only as thty limit our felf-love from pretending to more than we have need of, or �deferve^ in order to the Common Good, $ 20.

That a regard to this gnat Rule runs through all the Moral fertucs, which are all of them contained under the moft diffufive Benevolence towards Rational Beings, $21.

Right Reafon explained to be only # due confederation of thvs End in all Moral Actions towards God or Men ��> and that the knowledg oftbcfe moral Rules is as certain, as that of the knowledg of any other natural caufcs and effecJs concerning the prefervation of Animals, §22.

And that from their true underftandirig proceeds all the certainty we can have of natural Laws, notwithstanding there may be a fufficient latitude left us for indifferent afti-ons, $ 23.

The Common Good as it is a collection of all other goods; fo it w a true ftandard, or meafure of them, 05 /hewing what goods are to be fought for or dcfired before others^


It w only to be learned from hence, what degrees of pajfi-ons or affeftions are lawful, that it, confident with the Common Good, and confequently thereby to judg of the feveral degrees and proportions of goodnefs and happinefs^ $25.

Piety towards God a frvrtue, as it conduces to the com-won good and happinefs of Rational Beings, § 26.

Nothing a Good-, but as it contributes to this great End, $ 27.

The reafon of tbvs Difyti/ition into the true grounds of Good and Evil, as being that which makes all moral Pbilo-fophy a practical Science, and not merely fpeculative, like that of the Stoicks, $ 28.

A brief Conclu/ton out of Dr. Parker'* Demonftratior, of the Laws of Nature, $ 29.

The Contents of the Fifth Chapter.

THE Obje&ionso/ two forts of Men, Platonifts and Epicureans, againfl this Notion of the Common Good; the Objections of the former to be firft confidered; their firft Objedion, Tkat it is more fuitable to God's good-wfs to imprint certain Innate Idea'* of good and evil on our minds, § i.

Anfwer thereunto out of Mr. Lock'* Effay, &c. $ 2.

A farther Anfwer from St. Paul, That the vifible things of the Creation are a fujjicient proof of the Being of a God, and of the Laws of Nature, $ 3.

fhe labor ioufncCs of our Method no material Objection,


An explicit Idea of this Common Good, not always nc-ccffary to itsobfewation, § 5.

Another Objection againft our Method, That it makes e-very man's Obligation to cndea-vour this Common Good, to wife from its being chiefly good to himfelf. Anfwer That this, if it be confidered, will prove a miftake -, tho I grant our'Obligation to it as a Law cannot extend farther, than 06 it concerns our happinefs or mifery, § 6,7.

A Reply to the Objections of the Epicureans �, Thefirft Objection, That it feems not futtable to God's goddnefs., &c. to permit thit great End of the Common Good to de-psndupon the unreafonable Pajfions and Lusts of Mankind. Anfvv. That God intended Man for a voluntary Creature? to be moved by Moral Evil, as well as Good ; and that God not with flan ding all this reftrains his Aftions byh'vs infinite Power and Providence, § 8,9.

Second Objection, If this Law of Nature is fo cafie to be known, how comes it to pafs, that fo many Nations feem wholly ignorant of it, many living without any know-ledg of a God, or of a Moral Good or Evil ? § 10.

Anfwer. This Objection is of no more weight againft the Certainty of this Law, than it it again/I that of^rithme-tick and Geometry; but that if they are guilty of this Ignorance, it proceeds either from the Lofs of the Tradition of the Creation, or elfe from want of time or opportunities to conjider thefe things, $ 11.

Mem not making a due ufe of their faculties in difco-vering thefe Truths, no Objection againft their certainty,

$ 12.

The laft Obje&ion, That this Notion of the Common Good, is a mere Platonick Idea, without any reality in Nature, $13.

This Objedion it vain, if it be conjtdercd, That this Notion of the Common Good is made up of particulars, and that from thence arifes an Idea of a common or general Good, which tho a complex one, is as true and real as any other, and as agreeable to the Nature of things, farther proved from Mr. Lock'* Effay; and thai Mr, H. himjelf cannot deny the Truth of this Notion, § 14.

Mr. H'* great Rule of doing as you would be done by, Signifies nothing without refpecJ to the Common Good of Mankind, §15.

So neither that of prefi, ving a Man's felf, or any other innocent perfon, unlefs as it conduces to the Common Good of Mankind, § 16.

Not only the whole Law of Nature, but the revealed Law of Mofes, and the Gofpel of Jefus Chrift reducible to t\m one Proposition, of Endeavouring the Common Good, and that this was the great de/ign of Chrift'* coming into theWorld,§ii,i8.

A Condufion of the whole, $ i p.


Law of NATURE,


Ofthefirft Means of diJcoVering the Law* of Nature 3 ( viz.) the Nature of 'Things.

$. i. TT

Have in the Iritrodu&ibn to this Difcourfe , fliewn you thote feveral Methods, by which divers Authors have endeavoured to prove a Law 6f Nature; and have alB given myRealbns, (^tho* very briefly) why I cannot acquiefce in any of them, as laying too weak Foundations whereon to raife fb great and weighty a Building. I have likewife giveri you the bnly true Grounds, by which it can^ as I fuppofe, be made out, (i>/Js.) from the

Exigence of a G O D declaring his Will to us; from the Frame of the World, or from the' Nature of all Things without us; as al(b from our own Natures, or that of Mankind in general, we, by the Power of our natural Faculties, orReafons, drawing true Conclufions from all thefe. This being pre-inifed, I fhall now proceed particularly to declare, in the firft place, what I underftand by the Frame of the World, or Nature of Things, in order to the proving the Exi-ftence and Obligation of the Law of Nature and that it is really and truly a Law obliging all Perfons of Years of Difcretion and found Minds, to its Obfervation: Which being performed, I fhall theo proceed to our own Nature, as included in that of all Mankind.

-$. %. But though the antient, as well as modern Sceptrcks and Epicureans, have formerly, and do {till at this day, deny the Exigence ol any Law of Nature, properly fo called; yet, I fappofe, that we are both funV nently agreed what we underftand by this Term, fmee we both thereby mean certain Principles of immutable Truth and Certain-rv winch cUreic cur voluntary Actions concerning the eledfcion oi'Good,andtheavoi-cUna o? Evil Things,and (o lay an Obligation as to our external Ad-ions, even in the

{Fate of Nature, and out of a Civil Society, or Common-weal. That fuch eternal Truths are neceflarilyand unavoidably prefented to, and perceived by Men's Minds, and retained in their Memories, for the due ordering or governing of their Actions, is, what is here by us affirmed, and by them as confidently denied. And I farther conceive, That the Actions fo directed and chofen, are firfl: known to be naturally good, as productive of the greatefl publick benefits; and afterwards are called morally Good,becau(e they agree with thofe dictates of Reafbn, which are here proved to be the Laws, or Rules,of our Manners, or voluntary Actions: So alfo the Evil to be avoided, is firfl: the greatefl: natural Evil, which afterwards for the like Rea(bn is called Moral.

ff. 3. Therefore that the Exiflence of fuch Proportions may more plainly appear, and be demonftrated to the Underftandings of all indifferent Readers, it is neceflary that we firfl: carefully confider the Nature of divers Things without us, as alfb that of Mankind ,* and what we mean by Good and Evil, whether Natural or Moral. Laflly, we (hall {hew what thofe general Propofiti* ons are, which we affirm carry with them the force or Obligation of Natural Laws, as declaring their Exercile or Performance

neceflary to the comparing of an End* that ought to be endeavoured or (ought after, in order to our true and greateft Happinefs.

jr. 4. Nor let it feem ftrange, that I fup-pofe the Nature of divers Things, about which we are daily converfant, ought firft to be lobked into, and confidered: For I will here fuppofe the Soul, or Mind of Man, to be at firft, raft Tabula, like fair Paper$ that hath no connate Character or Idea's imprinted upon it (as that Learned Theorift Mr. Lock hath, I fuppofe^ fully proved) and that it is not fenftble of any thing at its com ing into the World$ but its own Exiftcnce and Adion ; but receives all its Idea's aftcrwards,from fuchOb* je&s as it hath received in by the Senfes: So that our Underftandings being naturally de-ftitute of all Notions or Idea's, we cannot comprehend how they can operate, unlefs they be iirft excited by outward Object And indeed how can ,\ve underftand what may be helpful and agreeable, or elfc hurtful and deftrudive to Men's Minds and Bcu dies, unlefs we firft coafider (as far as we are able)all theCauies both, near and remote^ which have made, conftituted, and doftili prcicrve Mankind, or eilc may rend to its

Vld. his Eflay concerning HUmane ttn~ derftanding, Book. i. Chap. ii.

deftru&ion, either for the time prefent, 01? to come > Nor indeed can it be underftoocl what is the fitted and bed Thing, or A&i-on, any Perfon can perform in a Cafe pro-pofed, unlefe firfl all thofe Effe&s which may proceed from it, in all its various Cir-cumftances, be duly confidered and compared together. So that the Contemplation both of the Ca,u(es on which Men's Safety and Happdaeft do depend, asalfbof the EfFedh which may be produced by their joint or concurring Forces and Endear vours, muft neceflarily lead our Minds, firft to the Confidesation of all other Men-, and then of our felves, as a very (mall part of Manki»d.

Ap$ in the next place, that we proceed to-, contemplate this Syftera of Things, called the Vifilk World$\& more efpecially GO D, as its Creator; and Governour, according to ihe Method laid down in the Introduction so this Dilcourfe; the Idea's of which being duly confidered and digefled in our Minds, we may dra\y fpom thence certain- Conchi-fions, by which we may judge or determine what Humane Things,snd Actions are certainly and neceflarily conducing to the Common Good and Happinefs of all Rational Beings, and in which every particu* lar Ferfon's Felicity or Well-being is cpt>-

tained, as a part thereof; and in which Rational Dictates, or Conclufions, I (hall hereafter prove this Law of Nature to con-fifl

$. 5, Nobody, I fuppofe, will think it neceflary to the matter in hand, that I iliould here make Phyfical Difquifitions into the Natures of all Things that are the Objeds of our Senfes, that being the Bufmels of prpfefs'd Natural ifts: It is iufficient for us to ihew, That all the Rules of Moral Philofo-phy, and the Laws of Nature, may be at laft refblved into certain natural and eafie Obfervations, gathered from common Experience ; or elle into certain Conclufions, eftabliflied upon the known Principles of Mathematicks and Phyficks; by which, I do not only mean all thofe natural Laws of Matter and Motion in Bodies, but alfo the Operations of our own Souls, as far as we Iwe able to know or enquire into them. From all which, by the Order of Natural Caufes, we may be led to the Knowledge of GOD their Creator and Or-dainer , and (b may acknowledge Him <as the only Cairfe of nil tbe(e excellent Ef-fedh, ficce this Nature of Things doth as well fugged to oar Minds the idea of a Creator, as cf the Tilings created ,� and fb fupply us with fufncicnt matter frcmwlnch

we may deduce all the Laws of Nature, as fb many true Practical Propositions; though it is only the Knowledge of the Firfl Caufe, or Creator, that can {lamp any, Authority or Obligation upon them.

Now although there may be many Things collected from our Knowledge of federal Beings in the Wcrld> that may ierve for our Moral Inftrudion, and the cultivating of our Manners; yet I {hall, for Brevity's feke, only feled: Tome of the moft material of them, and (uch as may ferve to explain our fhort account of the Law of Nature,which (notwithftanding {everal Authors have Co much enlarged upon it) I think may very well be reduced to this flngle Propofition, viz. The moft umverfal Love, or moft diffufve Benevolence ofatl Rational Beings towards each other*) conftitutes the happieft State they catt le capable of: So that their Endeavouring the Common Good ly this Benevolence, is the fum of att the Laws of Nature, and in which they are all vertuatly contained. Note, That by this Love or Benevolence^ I do not mean only a fruitlefs Defire, or Well-wi(h-ing, but an active Affection, exerting it felf in all the Ad:s of Piety towards God, Duty towards Parents, Kindnefs and Gratitude towards our Country, Friends, and Relations, and of Charity and Humanity

towards all the reft of Mankind, as often as any opportunity offers it felf.

$. 6. In the making out of which De« fcription of the Law of Nature, it is here needlefs to enquire into the Nature of our Souls, and the manner of our Knowledge and Underftanding;; fince the former hath keen fo Learnedly performed by the Reverend Dr. War,k late Bifhop of Sal!s6uryyznd the latter fo exadfcly done already mEngliJh 6y theabovementioned Author of the Effay of Humane Underflanding. I {hall only briefly fuppole upon his Principles, that our Souls dp, i. From the very birth,bydje. grees, receive Idea's drawn from outward Objeds by our Senfes. x. That it is: their faculty from divers fingle Notions, or Idea's yut together, to come to make complex ones; that is, t;o make divers Pfoptofitions or Conclufions; not only concerning their own inward Actings, but al(p about afl thofe outward Objedts, with which they are daily converfant,and which may tend to the finding out the readied means of attaining to,and preserving themfelves in the happieft State and Condition they are able to ac-<ju.ire. Thefe things being fuppos'd, it were neediefs to. trouble you'with any farther defcriptionjs of this Love, or Benevolence, fince every Perfbn cannot but be Efficiently

(enfible of its Nature, Degrees, and various Operations, that will but make any Self-refle&ion upon his own Inward Affe&ions.

$. 7. But as for the due Connexion of the Terms of this Proportion, in which its Truth does chiefly confift, it (eems to me plain enough: It being no more than to affirm, That our endeavour of procuring all the good things in our Power, and which are mod conducing to our own prefervati-on and Happinefs,and that of all other Rational Beings, is the beft,or chiefefl thing that all Perfbhs can xlo, to render both them* (elves, and all others^ as happy as their Natures will permit, or can require ,� and that there is no furer, or more powerful- means to be difcovered by us, whereby we may obtain a full enjoyment of all the good things of this Life, and the hopes of that to come^ than by endeavouring our own Felicity in Conjunction with that of othejs. So thai from what I have already advanced,the Reader may Colled: thefe two Proportions.

i. That the Foundation of all our inward Natural Happinefs confifts in an habitual determination of the Will to the utmoft of its Ability and Perfection, whereby we may be always ready and prepared to endeavour this Common good of Rationals.

£, That; the true Bappiaefs of each Indi-

vidual Perfon, cannot be feparated from that of other Rationals, fince the whole doth not differ from all its parts taken together; fo that this Propofition, concerning this general or diffufive Benevolence, is thus to be underftood, viz. Not to mean, or only intend, what any One, or more Perfons may perform towards the procuring of their own private Happinefs, or that of their own Party or Faction, diftincl: from that of the reft of Mankind ; but what all particular Perfons may jointly contribute to render themfelves and others happy; that is, what each of them may rationally perform towards the obtaining this Common Felicity. For it ought firft to be known in general what all Men are able to do, or not to do, towards any common end, (fuch as is the common happinefs of Rationals) and then what it is poffible for any particular Pcrlon in this or that Cafe to perform , for example, towards his own private hap-pineis, as feparate from that of all others; though fuch cafes being Indefinite, cannot be certainly or diftincStly known.

$. 8. But indeed the care of any parti* cular Perfbns, or a few Men's happinefs is rend red ufelefs for the prefent nor can be hoped for the future, if it is fought by op-polinc;, oV poftnomna the happinefs of all

other Rationals; becaufe die mind being thus affeclred, a main, and eflential part of its own felicity mud needs be ftill wanting? Ci;/2.) That inward Peace of Conference proceeding from a folid Reafon, and true Prudence, always conflant and agreeable to it felf. For whilft fuch a Perfon refolves to adl by one rule towards himfelf, and by a-nother towards all others, who are of the fame Nature, and therefore need and require the fame things with himfelf, he muft needs contradict his own Reafbn, and fb wants that true Joy and Satisfaction con-flantly fpringing in the mind of a Jufl Benevolent, and Good-natur'd Perfon,from the fenfe of another's good and happinefs when promoted, or procured by himfelf: So that it is importable for any Man to be truly happy, who not only neglects the neceflary caufes thereof, God, and all other Men, (on whofe Help and Affiftance his true Happinefs, and Well-being wholly depends) but alfb provokes them to his certain Ruin and Definition; fb that there is no furer way, which can bring any Man to the attaining his own particular Happinefs, but that which leads him alfb to endeavour the Common Good of all other men, as well as his own.

jT. 9. But I here acknowledge, that this

Proposition concerning Univerfal Betievo knee, cannot be of fufficient efficacy for the due ordering our Actions, and correcting our Manners, until we have firft proposed to our (elves this Common Good of Rational Beings j (viz.*) Our- own Felicity (in conjunction with that of others) as our main end, and that we are convinced that the various A&s contained under this general Love, or Benevolence, are the only true means to procure it: The truth of which Propofition, is, in the firft place, to be made manifeft to us 5 in the next all thofe other Proportions that can be deduced from thence ; fuch as are thofe left general Ones, which determine concerning the Natural Power of Fidelity, Gratitude, Paternal and Filial AfFeftion, as alfo of all other particular Vertues, neceffary for the obtaining any part of this humane Felicity 5 for as well the whole truth of this Propofition, as of ell thofe which follow from thence, depend upon the Natural, and, NeceflTary Power of fuch Actions,,, as real Caufes ^reducing fuch Effects.

J*. i o. And though perhaps it may at firft light feem to detract from their certainty, that they depend upon (uch an.uncertain Caufe as Man's Will; Yet however? it fuk ices, tor their truth. and> ce#ainty, fiat

whenever fach voluntary Caufes fliall exert themfelves, fuch Effedh will certainly be produced. Thus in Arithmetick we freely Add and Subftraft; that is, we can choofe whether we will perform thofe Operations or not; but if we reckon truly, we ftiall always find the Total, equal to all the par* ticulars either Added or Subftra&ed. And there is a like certain, and true Connexion between all the Caufes and Effects, which can be known in any other Science. And this I have likewhe imitated in this Treatife of Moral Philofophy, by reducing all the parts, of which it confifts, to this one Head or Summ, (wz.) Love or Benevolence; which Idea I (hall improve by enquiring into its feveral Kinds, and (hewing the ne-ceflary Connexion of this, or that particular A&ion, with the Common Good of Rationals, which ought to be the great end fought for by us.

§. ii. But fince our voluntary Actions alone can be govern'd by Reafon, and thofe only which concern intelligent Agents,are to be confider'd in Morals j it is evident, that from none of all thefe Actions we can frame a higher, or more comprehenfive Idea, than this of Univerfal Benevolence, which comprehends the willing, and endeavouring of all good things, and the re-

moval, or hindring of all evil ones, from thofe Obje&s about which it is converfant: And this Benevolence extends its felf to all Moral A&ions, as well thofe of confidering, and comparing divers goods with each o-ther, as thofe of enquiring into the means by which they may be produced; nor is it more certainly true, that the Addition of feveral numbers makes a SummTotal,than that this Benevolence produces a general good effect to all thofe towards whom we exert it. Thus it is as certain, that Piety, Fidelity,Gratitude,Friendfhip, Paternal and Conjugal Affedtion,together with filial Duty, make up the chief and conftituent parts of' this Bcnevo!ence,as that Addition,Subftra&* ion, Multiplication and Divifion, are feveral parts oi? Arithmetick; therefore it is no material Objection to fay, that this Universal Benevolence may be prejudiced or lef-(encd by the wickednefs or ill nature of Men y So that the great end,or Summ of the Law of Nature., cannot be thereby generally obtain'd as it ought, any more than it is an Obje&icn againitthe certainty orufefulnefs of Arithmetiei:, or Geometry, that fbme Men fhould through Lazynefs and Inadvertency, altogether negled: their Rules, or make falfe Conclufions from their Sciences, or ihould through Ignorance or prejudice,

deny their certainty. So likewife it is in the Science of Morality, as contained in the Law of Nature, which is chiefly imploy'd in weighing, and tsking a true account of thofe humane Powers, that contribute to the Common Good of Rational Beings; which fince they may vary fbmewhat in fb great a variety of poflible Cafes, he may be faid, ( and that defervedly ) to have well performed this task, who firft affirms in general, that all thofe Powers are comprehended under the moft general and diffii-five Benevolence; though he may be able afterwards more particularly to demon-ftrate; that a juft divifion of things. Fidelity, Gratitude, and all the other Vertues are contained under it, and alfo (hew in what Cafes they become ufeful to this end; by which means Religion, and humane Society, with all other things which may render Men's lives happy and fale, will be certainly improved and advanced. And herein confifts the Solution of that moH" uleful Problem concerning the Common good of Rationals, procured by the molt diffufive Benevolence, which Moral Philo-fbphy teaches us to fearch after. Nor is the truth or authority of fuch Precepts at all prejudiced or diminilhed, though very many Perfbos will not- obey themj or willTet

tfiemfelves to oppofe them; fmce this only can be the contequence of it, That they wilt thereby loofe their own happineis, and perhaps may draw others by their falle reafons into the fame miCery: And fo I doubt not on the other fide, but that Men would think themfelves oblig'd to perform all the A&s that conflituie this Benevolence, i( they were but once convinced that fo great and noble an end, as the Common good of Rational Beings, (and in which their own happinefs is likewife contained *) will be certainly procured thereby, and cannot be had by any other, or contrary means.

$. i -L. \ come now to confider, that together with the knowledge of this vifible World, (of which our {elves make but a fmall part) there is likewife convey'd into our minds by our Senfes a certain knowledge, i. Of divei a natural outward goods. ^. And thoi� not only peculiar to our felves alone, but common to all thofe of our own kind. 3. Of which goods fome are greater than others, and that good which hath none that we know excels it, we may call the greateft or higheft. 4. Alfo of thofe, (bme are commonly in our Power, others we underliand to exceed the narrow limits of our humane forces; but fmce the Nature of theft- tilings is by two feveral ways

difcovered to us, either more confufedly by common experience and dailyObfervation, or elfe more diftindbly from experimental Philofophy , and the Mathematicks ; the former of thefe methods being eafy, and obvious to every one , I (hall rather niake ufe of that; whereas the other would be only proper for Philofophers and Mathematicians , fince the Grounds or Principles of the Law of Nature, ought to be a-like evident to the Illiterate as Well as to the Learned, for all are under the Jik& obligation to obferve them ,� and therefore I ihall only put you in mind of fuch vulgar and eafy Obfervations, which no Rational Man can difpute, or deny : and fuch, as from which I undertake to prove, that the Knowledg" and Coherence of the Terms of the propofmon may evidently be de* duced.

JT. 13. Our firft Natural Obfervatiort therefore is , that by our free ufe, and enjoyment of thofe produces of the Earth, that come under the general Titles of Food* Cloathing, Houfes, @c. and alib by that help or aliiftance, which one or more Per-fons can afford each other ; Men may be preferved, and live as happily and content* tedly for feveral years, as their frail Nature will permit,

And in the next place, that thefe effe&s being not only agreeable, but neceflary to our Natures, are naturally good, as tending to their Prefervation, or Perfe&ion ; and therefore by the fame reafon, Men's affe&ions , from whence thefe outward things and a&s do proceed, and which produce all thele good effects, are con-ceiv'd under the notion of good Will, or Benevolence, which muft be alfb good; fmce whatever goodnefs is contained in the effe&s,muft be likewife in the caufe.And we are alfo fenfible, that by this Benevolence, we are not only able to help our (elves, or fome few perfons, but many others, as well by our advice, as by our ftrength and in-duftry; especially when we fee divers others of our own kind who are able, and feem alfo willing to requite us in the like manner. So that each of us in particular, may be provided with a fufficient ftock of all the neceilaries of Life, by our mutual help and affiftance, all which would not only be wanting to us, but we fhould be expos'd to innumerable mifchiefs and hazards, as alfo to a great want even of necelTaries, if all Perfons looking onely to themfelves, Ihould always (hew themfelves ill-natur'd, malevolent, and enemies towards other Rational Beings; whereas the

contrary endeavours being thus helpful^ and neceflary to fo many others, may eafily and naturally produce in our minds a notion of this common good ofRationals, which from the obvious Similitude of Rational Beings to each other, muft equally re-ipe<3: all thofe, whom we have opportunity or occaTion of knowing, or cbnver-fing with, as alfb thofe with whom we have noti

JT. 14. And I may add farther from cbri-flant experience, that we are able to contribute more to the good, arid afliftance of thofe of our own land, than any other Creatures, becaufe their Nature (and con* fequently what is good, or definitive td it) is more evident to us from the know-ledg we have of bur felves, than of other Creatures. For ds our Nature is capable of more, and greater goods than they, and In the attaining of which we can better affift each other ,� fb we muft alfb confefs it to be liable tb greater Dangers and Calamities ; for the declining and removing of which, God hath appointed our natural Benevolence exprefled by our endeavours^ and afliftance of each other, as the mofi foitable and neceffary means thereunto.

tf. 15. And we may alfo obferve, that by our Advice and Counfel,communicated by apt Signs or Words, we are able to contribute many helps and conveniences of Life to thofe of our own kind, of which other Animals are altogether incapable either of ading or receiving. And farther, becaufe of the Similitude of thofe of our own kind with our felves, we cannot but think it agreeable to our Rational Nature to do, or to procure the like things for them, as for our felves, and can alfo be {en-fible of greater Motives to benefit Men, than other Creatures; fmce we have all the reafon to hope, that thofe we have thus done good to, or obliged, being moved by our benefits, will make us a fuitable return whenever it lies in their power, and that they may one time or other,in the like, or fome other way oblige us. So that it is evident from common Experience, that there can be no larger Pofleflion, nor any (urer defence for Mankind, than the moft fincere Piety towards God, the Head of Rational Beings, and the moft diffufive Love and (incere Benevolence of all Per-ibns towards each other; fmce if they prove malevolent,or ill-natur'd they wouldbereave one another ot all things they enjoy, together with Life it (elf: nor can the Love or

Good-will of others, be obtained by any more certain or powerfiill means than every one's (hewing himfelf fo affe&ed in his Aliens towards others, as he defires they (hould be towards himfelf; That is, Loving and Benevolent upon all occafions, though more particularly to thofe to whom we are obliged by Friendfhip or Relation.

JT. 16. Laftofall, the fame Experience that demoftrates the natural Benevolence of particular Perfbns to be the mod powerful Cauie of their Felicity, does as neceflarily teach us from a like parity of Reafon, that the Love, or Good-will of any greater number of Men, towards any the like number, hath a like proportionable effect; fo on the other fide, the conftant Malice or Ill-will of all Men towards all,exprefs'd by datable Adions, would bring a quick definition on the whole Race of Mankind,fmce it would foon deflroy all the Caufes re-quifite to their Happinefs, and well-being, and introduce perpetual Enmity and War, which are the certain Caufes of the greateft Miferies and Calamities, that can befall Mankind : all which, though Mr. H. him-felf acknowledges , yet he will not own the neceflity of Men's mutual Love and Concord, to be alfb as rieceffary to their

Prefervation. But why the Caufes of Men's Prefervation and Happinefs, as being Prior in Nature, (hould not be more evident than thofe of their Definition , fince the one is altogether as evident and neceflary, and may be as eafiiy forefeen and prevented as the other, I can fee no reafbn 5 and I fhould be glad if any of Mr. Hys Difciples could Ihew us any fufficient Reafon for that Opinion.

JT. 17. So that thefe things which I have now laid down concerning the Natural means of Men's happinefs , appear fq evident from our common Reafon, and daily Experience, that they are of like certainty with the Principles of Arithmetick and Geometry, in all whole Operations, there areflill fuppofed certain Ads depend^ ing upon our free, humane Faculties ,� and yet neither of thefe Sciences are render'd the more uncertain, from the fuppofition of Men's Free-will, whether they will draw-Lines, or cad up Sums, or notj'fmce it fnfikes for their truth end certainty, that there is an infeparableConnexion between fach A&s, which are fuppofed to be in our Power to exert, and all the effects fought for .; To the finding of which, both the pleafure annexed to their contemplation, and the various ufes of Humane Life do at

once invite us. And in the like manner, the truth of all Moral Knowledg is founded in the ImmutableCoherence between thehigh-eft Felicity, which Humane Power can attain to,with thofe Ac1:s of univerfal Benevolence, that is of Love towards God and Men , and which exerts it (elf in all the particular Moral Vertues; But in the mean time thefe two things areftill fuppofed, That Men defire, and feek the higheft Felicity they are capable of 5 and alfo, That they are able to exercife this Benevolence, not only towards themfelves, but God and Men, as partakers with them of the fame Rational, or Intelligent Nature. This I have thought fit to add, to prevent all thofe Cavils which Mr. Pfs Difciples are ufed to make againft Morality, from the neceflity of our wills.

jT. 18. But before I proceed farther to enquire into the Nature of things,! defirc you to remember what I have already hinted in the Introduction to this difcourCe, that this Truth concerning the efficacy of Univerfal Benevolence, for the preferva-tjon and happinefs of Rational Beings, as alfo all other Propofitions alike evident, and contained under it, do all proceed from God, as the firft Caufe, and ordainer of all things; and confequently of our hu-

mane Underftanding , and of all Truths therein contained. And fmcc thefe Rules drawn from the Nature of things, tend to the procuring God's End and De-fign , viz. The prefervation, and Happi-nefs of Mankind ; and alfo that it hath pleated Him to annex certain natural Rewards to the oblervation of thefe Dictates of Rea{bn,and Punifliments to their TranC-greffion; (b that they thereby becoming apt, and fufficient for the due ordering of our Thoughts, and governing our Actions towards Qod, our (elves, and all others, (as I (hall farther make out in this Di£ courfe) I fee nothing wanting to give it the Efience, and Vigour of a Law. And ! (hall farther (hew before I have done, that under this general Rule of endeavouring the common Good of Rational Beings, or Univerfal Benevolence, is contained Piety towards God, and the higheft Goodwill or Charity towards Men , and is the Summ both of the Moral Law otMofes, and of the Gofpel of our Saviqur Jefus CkriJ!.

$. 19. Thefe Things being thuspropo-fed in general, I come now more particularly to (hew, that a due Obfervation and jKnowledg of thefe natural Things without us, will truly and clearly teach us what

Operations or Motions of them are good, or evtt> for all other Men, as well as our felves; and alfo (hew us how neceflarily and unalterably all thefe Things are produced ; for Natural Knowledg fearches into the true Caufes of that Generation and Corruption which daily happens to all Natural Bodies, and efpecially to Men, and fo can demonftrate the necefiary coherence of thefe Efleds, with their Caufes j and therefore thofe Caufes that help to generate or preferve Men, and that make them live happily in this Life, are Natural Goods, as the Caufes of their Mifery and Diflblution are Natural Evils: And it then as plainly follows,That by this knowledge we can a$ certainly demonftrate and foretel what Things are Naturally Good,or Evil, for all Mankind, as for any fingle Perfbn.

$. 10. Therefore we may truly conclude, That the knowledg of all thefe Effed-ts, which either Nature or Humane Induftry can produce for Men's Food, Cloathing, Habitation, and Medicine, is part of this Natural Knowledg : to which we may alfo add the undemanding of all other Human eOperationsaandoftheEffecl:sproceed-ing from thence, for the Ufes of Humane Life. For although the voluntary Adions of men, as they exert themfelves towards

Things without them, do not work exactly afterthe fame manner as mere Mechanick Motions, -Z//Z. from the Pulfion or Motion of other Bodies, but either from their Rea-fons, or Wills ; yet fince all the outward Motions we exert, receive their Meafare and Force from the Natural Powers of Humane Bodies, which are 'of the fame Nature with others, and fo muft perform their Natural Fun&ions, as they are re-gulated by the neceflary Laws of matter and motion , much after the fame manner as other Natural Motions, it is evident,that thefe voluntary Actions, whenever they are thus exerted , are regulated by the fame Natural Laws : And it is commonly known how much men's Induftry, by the various motions of their Bodies (which a Philofo-pher can eafily refblve into mechanic ones,) does contribute to their own and other Men's Prefervation, by providing and ad-miniflring Victuals, Cloths, Phyfick,Hoti-fesj^c.ln performing which Effects, Men's Strength^nd Skill in Husbandry,Building, Navigation,and other manual Trades, are chiefly employed.Norare the Liberal Arts abfolutely free from thefe Laws of Motion, fince by the help of certain fenfible Signs, and articulate Notes, or marks, as Words, Letters,or Cyphers,the minds of Men come

to be endued with Knowledg, and directed in mofl of their Civil and Moral Duties. I have only thought fit to hint thus much concerning Humane Actions confidered as meer Natural Things exifting without us; but I (hall treat more fully of them in the next Chapter, when I come to treat of the Nature of Man, confidered as a voluntary Agent.

£. ^I. Hence it plainly appears,That all thefe Natural Things, and the mutual Helps by which they are procured, may be certainly known, and forefeen by us , to be naturally and unalterably Good ,� that is, tending to the Prefervation and Happinefs of Mankind. And for the fame Reafon all thofe contrary Caufes,or Motions,by which men's Bodies are weakned or deftroyed,by JefTeningor taking away the Neceflariesand Conveniences of Life, fuch as Food, Ray-ment, Liberty, Quiet, &c. And alfb thole Actions by which Vertue and knowledge may be rooted out of men's minds ,� and Errors, and unbridled Paflions,deftrudive to the Common Good of Mankind, introduced in their Rooms, are neceflarily and in their own Nature Evil. Therefore when we determine of Natural Goods, or Evils, according to the Law of Nature, we are not only to confider the Preferyati-

on of a few particular Perfons, fines the Puniihment, nay, Death of thofe, may often conduce to the common Good; but rather that of the aggregate Body of Man-kind, fubordinate to GOD, as the Head of Rational Beings, in the Natural Syftem or Commonweal,eftabliuYd by Natural Laws: For the Good of an Aggregate Body,is nothing elfe but the Chiefeft Good that can accrue to all its Parts, or Individuals.

JT. ^^. Having now found out from the Nature of Things, by what means our Minds can receive the Idea's of a Common Natural Good, and Evil, and thefe no lefs certain and ftable, than thofe by which the Caufes of Generation and Corruption are exhibited to them ; I come next to con-fider, That the Matter and Motion, in Which the Powers of Humane Bodies (as well as other Parts of this VifiUe World) confift, and exert themfelves after a limited manner, and have a finite Quantity , and certain Bounds, beyond which they cannot acT: ; from which Principles flow thoie known Laws of Natural Bodies, as that they cannot be at once in divers Places , and therefore cannot be moved toward contrary Points, at the fame time; or Ib as to be fubferyient to the contrary Wills

of divers Perfons, at once; but are fb bounded and determined in their Natures, as to be only ordered or difpofed of, according to the Will of one Perfon alone, or elfe of divers confenting or confpiring to the fame End, or Defign. For if Men fhould think thus to make ufe of them, they would be fb far from conducing to their Benefit, or Prefervation, that they would only tend to their Hurt, and De-ftrudHon ; fince if the ftronger had a Right to take from the Weaker by ftrength, and the Weaker from the Stronger by Cunning and Surprize , any of thefe Neceflaries of Life, which he was once pofleffed of; yet when he had them, he could not be more aflured that he mould keep them, than he was that laft poflefled them, fmce one Stronger, or more Cunning than himfelf, may yet come , and ferve him as he had done the other before; and fb on, 'till all Men that enjoy'd them fhould be de-flroy'd, and the Things contended for, pe-rifh without ufe : So that their could remain neither any Owner, nor Thing to be owned.

tf. 23. From all which that hath been now laid down, I (hall draw fbme Con-c'uhons oi great moment to our fubjecl:; as, £i.) From this knowledge of the Na-

ture of Things, (and efpecially of our own Humane Nature) we may learn that fo-tnuch celebrated Diftin&ion of the Stoicks, between the TO Itf vfiJj. <?.) thofe Things which are in our own Power and Difpo-(al, fuch as are the voluntary Motions and Inclinations of our Bodies and Minds; and ** & ty' »/"> 0- O the Things out of our Power, fuch as are thofe Corporeal Mo-tions, To violent and irrefiflible, which we daily'obferve to proceed from the Nature and Frame of the World, and we weak Creatures are not able to refifl, and from whofe irrefiflible Force, all things here below are in a perpetual flux; whence alfo there happens to us Men, a perpetual vicif-fitude of Things, as well Adverfe as Pro--fperous, as allb of Maturation, Decay, and DhTolution : So that this Diftin&ion (if duly obferved) will be of fmgular ufe, as well in forming our Manners, as governing our AfFecHons: For from hence we are taught not to expecl: any other or greater Happinefs, as a Reward of all our Labours and Endeavours, than what may proceed from a prudent Management of our Rational Faculties, and from thofe External Helps which we may expecl: Divine Providence will afford us, in governing the world ; by which means we may be

freed from thofe fruitlefs Labors and En-deavours, to which Men's vain Fears, and groundlefs Hopes* fo often tranfport them: Nor fhall we too much afflict our (elves for thofe Evils, which either do now, or may hereafter, without our own Faults, inevitably befal us, whence the greateft part of thofe Troubles and Moleftations, which are wont to proceed from Grief, Anger, and Difcontent at our prefent fortunes, or Conditions, may, by our Prudence, or Patience, be prevented. Neither are \ve hereby only directed to the avoiding of Evils but here is alfb chalked out to us, a more fhort and compendious method, by which we may, by degrees , attain to thofe two greateft Bleflings which can be enjoyed by us in this Life ; the Culture of our own Minds, and the Goverment of our Paf-fions.

JT. 14. I need not profecute this Subject any farther, but fliall proceed to take notice of fome obvious Obfervations to our Purpofe, viz. That it is evident from common Experience, That the natural Forces or Powers, of any one Perfbn, are too weak, (canty, and inconfiderable, towards the obtaining all that Happinefs he defires and is capable of; to procure which,heftill wants the Help and Afliftance of many

other Perfons and Things, to render his Lifefafe,pleafant, or contented. And,fur-ther, that it is in the Power of any one of us to contribute many Things towards the ufe of others of our own kind, which we do not need our (elves; and which though of no ufe to us, yet may be of fmgular u(e to their Happinefs, or Prefervation. But fmce we are certain, from thofe known Bounds of our Power, that we are not able to compel all thofe by force, whofe Afliftanceweftandinneed of, to co-operate with us, towards this our main End andDefign, viz. Happineft; there can be no furer Means, or fafer Defence left us* than that by a conftant offering and affording thofe Neceflaries of Life , together with our Afliftance toothers, as often as it lies in our Power, we may thereby probably render them like wife Benevolent and Helpful to us inthelikeNeceffities, or Oc* cafions: So that this Benevolence, or Charity is only a conftant Will and Endea-vour'to Ad thus fmcereiy and diffusely, whenever any Opportunity offers it felf; and that even in thofe Cafes, in which it may oftentimes be probably forefeen, that noReturncanbeimmediatelyexpectedfrom the Perfon to whom the Benefit is done j fmce, however, it ftill contributes to the

general Good-of Mankind, of which thai Perfbn we fb benefit is a Member : which general Benevolence doth not yet hinder, but that we may beftow and exercife a larger fhare , and higher degrees thereof, cowards thofe from whom our own long Acquaintance, and nearer Relation, may perfiiade us to hope for larger Returns of Friend/hip*

tf. ^5< Whence we may,in the next place,1 obferve, That if our Afliilance, and other Things in our Power, certainly contribute to the ufe, or Benefit of others, they can only perform this, as they are Aflign'd, or appropriated, to the particular Perfons that are to make ule of them, according to (bme certain time and place. So that if Right Reafon prefcribe a Ufe of Things,and Humane Helps, as neceflary for the Happinefs and Prefervation of Mankind, it, as nece£ farily, prefcribes, that this Ufe of thefe Things, fhould be appropriated to them that are thus to ufe them, for the time they (land in need of them, and according to the place in which they are to be ufed. The ConCequence is evident,becau(e RightRea-* fon can only prefcribe that to be done,which will confift with the nature of the Things that are to be uied, and the Perfons that are to uft them. So it being evident, that a Di-

vifiou*or Appropriation ofThings,and Humane Affiftances and Labours,is abfolutely neceflary for theSubfiflancc and Happinefe of all Men ; it alfo follows, That this neceffary Limitation, or Appropriation of any of thefe Things to particular Perfons, for the time they uand in need of them, is a natural Separation of them, from the ufe of all others, during the time they are fo made ufe of. By Things, I mean fuch (ingle Things as are uncapable of divifion ; and to make ufe of which, it is abfolutely neceffary that it be poflefled whole and entire fiich as are Food,Cloths, and the like; but there are other Things, as an Ifland, a Field, and the like , which may very well ferve for the Ufe of divers Perfons at once, and whofe Divifion arifing from the pofitive Confent of Men Already entered into Civil Societies, or commonweals, I need not

now treat of,

$. 16. But from this natural Divifion, or Appropriation of Things, and its Neceflity for the Prefervation of Mankind , arifes that Natural and Primitive right proceeding from Occupa ncy,which both Philofophers and Civilians grant to haveplace in the (late of Nature, fuppofmg a Community of moft Things: For Right is but a certain Faculty,

ot Power of AcVmg,or enjoying arty thing granted us by a Law ; but in this flate,there is no other Law but that of Right Reafon* given by GOD, concerning fuch AdHons as are neceflary for the common Good of Rational beings. Therefore fince Right Reafbn requires! a (eparate ufe,of particular Things, and Humane afliflances, as nece£ iary and conducing to this End, theremufl needs follow from thence, a Right to the Ufe and Enjoyment of any particulafThing during the time the pbfleflbr fo makes life of it; for a Man hath the fame Right to live to morf ow,as he hath to day | and cori-fequently hath the fame Right to all the Means which are neceflary for his preferva-tion. Therefore if this Houfe, Servant, or% any thing elfe that I am now poflefled of,be rieceflary for my Happinefs or Prefcrvation to day, I (hall have alfo a like Right to it for tlie future as long as it coritinues thus#ece£ (ary: Arid in this ftate,there being no other Judg of the Means of my own Prefervitiort but my felf, I ihali have a Right to it as loug as I live, for the fame Reaibrt for which I had a Right to it at fir ft. So that unlefs,the Ufe or Neceffity ceafing, I alteir my Mind concerning it, or afiign my InteJ reft in it to another, I have a perpetual Right ink,excluding that of any other,du-

ring the time that I am thus poflefled of it : Not that I hereby grant every Man a Right, in the flate of Nature, to all Things which his unreafonable Paflions, or Appetites (hall fanfie to be neceflary for his own Prefervation, or Happinefs, but only to fo much of theMeans conducing thereunto,as any Man, whilfthe judges according to Right Reafbn, or Equity, and the natural Neceflities of himfelf and Family, ihall rightly fo determine , without arrogating, or afluming to himfelf more than is really neceflary for the Ends, and without robbing others of what is alfo neceflary for them,which is down-right Violence and In-Juftice.

tf. xy. Whence it plainly appears, That this natural Divifion,or property in Things, firft proceeding from Occupancy and Po£ feflion, as it is neceflary for the Prefervation of all particular Perlons, (b it mufl be like^ wife for that of Mankind, confidered as an aggregate Body, confiding of divers Individuals, the feme Means being neceflary for the prefervation of the whole, as are re-quifite to all its conftituent Parts or Members, though this kind of Property may very well confift with Community, as at Ordinaries and Theatres, every one that

pays his Mony hath a Right to his Dinner, or Place : yet none can tell what it is, or where it (hall be, till he hath it on his Plate, or is actually (eated in it.

ff. z8. It alfo further appears Thatthefe Principles, being truly drawn from the Nature of Things, do entirely deftroy Mr ffs wild Hypothecs, concerning the Natural Right of all men to all Things, that he may thereby prove a Right, in the ftate of Nature, in all Men, of doing whatfb-ever they pleafe towards others, Neceflary to their prefervation,- fb that thence may arifea natural flate of War of all Men againft all. And hence it likewile appears upon what grounds every Man hath a Right to his own Life, Limbs, and Liberty, viz. becaufe they are the natural Means by which we are enabled to ferve GOD, and aflift Mankind ,� in doing which, we profe-cute the Common Good of Rational Beings. And from thefe Principles here laid down, it clearly appears, thatMr. Ffs Do-drines concerning the Law of Nature, and Dominion , are not only precarious , but manifeftly falfe; which, firft, fuppofe (^without any fufficient Proof) an unlimited Right of all Men to all Things,to be necef-fary to their Prefervation, as the Foundation of all Natural Laws,and Civil Societies

For the proving of which, he only makes tife offome falfe and fpecious Arguments, as I hope I have diffidently made appear in the (econd Part of this Trea-tife.

$. 19. Having now eflabliflied a Natural Property in fuch Things , Humane Helps, or Affiftances, as are neeeflary for Men's Happinefs and Prefervation, in order to the Common Good, I (hall not concern my felf to prove the Convenience of Civil Property, as now eflablifhed in moft Com-monwealsjnor fhall I now trouble you with thofe Mifchiefs, which Artflotle, in his Politicks, hath very well proved, would fol-Jow from a Community of Things, by rea-fbri of thofe unavoidable Strifes and Contentions, which would daily arife from our lifing the Fruits of the Earth in commpn: Only I think T may fay thus much, That (jnce Mankind is fo {multiplied in well-inhabited Countries, that there is not land fuf-ficient to be divided amongft all the inha-fcitantSjfoas to fervefor eachPerfon'scomfor-table Subfiftance without foreign Trades, or mechanick Employments,there muft nece(I jarily follow a more full and exad Divifioq ^nd Appropriation of the neceflaries of Life, fbch as are land,or the ufe & produces there* i>f,as CDrn,Cattel,and thelike,in order tothe

Prefervation and Happinefs of that Nation, or Civil Society, by whofe Content fuch a Divifion and Appropriation of thefeThings were at firft introduced ,� which being once fetled by Civil Laws, there is the like Reafon for its continuance; and Men have as much Right to thofe Things they thus enjoy,by the particular Laws of the Countries where they live, as they had before in the ftate of Nature, to whatever they, could poflefs by the Right of Occupancy, or Pofleflion; fince it is evident, That this more exad: Property, or Dominion, con* fitting in a finder and more limited ufe of thefe Things, hath a greater efficacy in order to the Happinefs and Prefervation of that Nation, or part of Mankind, which have thus agreed to it, than the bare Occupancy, or Pofleflion of thefe Things had, before fuch, a Divifion made, or a-greed upon; nor can it now be altered; however, perhaps, hard and unequal it may prove to fome particular Perfons , fince it will always conduce to the Happi* nets and Tranquil ity of each particular Civil Society , or Commonweal, that it mould continue as it doth,that it fhould be ftill altered,according to every Man's parti* cular Fancy,or Intereft,fince fuch a Change can never be made, without inconceivable

Difcontents, and Civil Diflentions, which would quickly end in open Violence and Hoftility.

^.30. So that from thefe Principles here laid down,that there is no Right conferred upon any Man, of doing whatever his own wild Fancy, or unbounded Appetite may prompt him to, but only, what he (ball, according to right Reafon, truly judge ne-ceffary to his own, or Family's Happinefs and Prefervation,in order to the Common Good of Mankind. Therefore I here de-fire you to take notice, that whatever Right we enjoy, even to the things mod peceflary for our Prefervation, it is found-ed, if not in the Precept, yet at leaft per-miflion of this great Law of Nature, of endeavouring the Common Good of Rational Beings, whr.: we truly judge according to the Nature of things, concerning the means neceflary, and conducing to this great End ; (b that it can never be proved, that any one hath a right of Preferving himfelf, unlefs it be firft made out, how this Right of Self-prefervation conduces to, ,or at leaft confifts with this Common Good. Since no Rational Man can ever believe, thnr God intended the Prefervation, much lets the Senfual Pleafures of Siny one Man, as the Sole End of His Cre-

ation. Which Principle being once efla-bliflied, as the Foundation and Original of all the Natural, or Civil Rights we en-joy;, our own natural Powers and Rights will appear (b limited thereby, that we cannot without Injury and Injuftice, violate or invade the Right of others, much lefs break out into Open War againft them without juft Caufe; nay, all thofe Arguments by which any one Man can aflume a Right to preferve himfelf by the Law of Nature, will likewife be of the fame force to prove, that he ought to preferve others alfo; and that it can never become lawful for us in any State, to rob innocent Per-fonsofwhat is neceflary for their'Well-being and Prefervation ,� but rather on the contrary, that all Men's natural Rights, fliould be (ecured from the muchieis of unreafonable Violence,? War, and Contention, which natural Security in a Civil State or Common weal, is highly improved and encreafed by the Affiftance of Human Skill and Induftry, according to the efla-blifhed Laws of Property or Dominion.

JT. 31. I have fpoken thus much concerning the neceflary Connexion between the particular Actions above mentioned, and the Common Good of Mankind, that by confidering their relation to this Great

End, the Nature of all Humane Adions may more certainly be known and predetermined. Since the Dependance of natural Effe&s on their Caufes, is abfolutely neceflary and immutable ; for as well in the ftate of Nature or Community, as of Civil Society, or feparate Property, thofe Human Actions which caufe, or procure, thatPeople's minds ftiould not be prejudiced by Errors, Lyes, or Perfidioufhefs ,� nor their Bodies hurt, nor their Lives, Goods, Fames and Chaftities violated, or taken a-way, 'and alfo by which a grateful return is rendred'to thofe that have done us good; cr in (hort, all thofe Actions by which the true happinefs of any one Man, or more is procured, without Injury to others, as they always were* fo they ever will be the certain caufes of the Common Good, and Happinefs of Mankind, and are therefore diftinguithed by the Titles of Moral Ver-tues, as I lhall more at large demonftrate in this Difcourfe, when I come to fhew how all Moral Vertues are derived from, and at laft refolved into this Principle of the Common Good of Rational Beings.

But lead the varioufhefs of the Obfer-vations treated of in this Chapter, and their Independance upon each other,(hould render them perplex'd, and confequently

unconvincing to common Readers, who may not be able to carry fo long a train of confluences in their minds ,* I fcall contract of what hath been now faid into thefe few plain Proportions.

i. That though all particular Men are mortal, and but of a fhort duration, yet God hath ftill preferved Mankind without any fenfiHe failure or decay.

a. That in Order to this,God hath made Man to be propagated by Generation, and alfb to be preferved by divers outward means, which we call neceflaries of Life.

3. That thefe natural means can no way ianfwer this end, but as they are allowed, or appropriated to the ufes and occafions of particular Perfbns, during the time they ftand in need of them, and fo cannot at the fame time anfwer the different or contrary defires, and neceflities of divers men,endea-vouring to ufe thefe things in a manner wholly different and contradictory to each other.

4. That the taking away thofe nece/feries of Life, which another is rightly poflefled of, doth not only caufe the ruine and de-ftrudion of that Perfbn and his Family, who were thus poflefled of them; but by caufing a perpetual flrife among mankind, will render thefe things uncapable of being

made ufe of at all for their Common Good and Prefervation.

5. That fuch a Strife, if profecuted to the utmoft, will certainly end in the de-ftrudfcion, not only of particular Perfbns and Nations, but of all Mankind contrary to God's defign.

6. From all which we may Rationally colled;, that God defigns the Prefervation and Happinefs of Mankind,as alfb of all In* dividual Perfons as parts of it, fb far as their frail and mortal Natures will permit, and in (iibordination to the good of the whole body thereof.

y.That therefore there are no (urer means to procure this great End of the Common Good of Mankind, than an Univerfal Benevolence towards Rational Beings; confiding, Firft, in Divine Love or Piety towards God j and in refpecT: of Men, not only in permitting/each other quietly to enjoy all the neceuaries of Life, but alfo in making a (etled divifion of them to others, fbas to be appropriated to feveral men's u-fes or occafions; which dictates being given us by God as a Rule of all our moral Adions, (in the exercife of which is contained our trueft Happinefs, as in its viola-lation, our greateft Mifery) are therefore truly and properly a Law, and indeed the Sum of all the Laws of Nature.


ObferVatiorts and ConcluKons, drawn from the Confederation of Human Nature and Gfybt (fieafon, as alfo from the Nature of God.

JT. i. TTTTAving in the former Chapter I 'I drawn fiich eafie and obvious ^ -*� Obfervations, from the Nature of thofe things without us, which we daily (land in need, and make ufe of,as may ferve to prove,after what manner we ought to make ufe of them, and > whence that Right arifes we have to them> I come now to make the like Obfervations from the Nature of Mankind, in order to the pro-ving,that we are defigned by God for the Good arid Prefervation of others befides our (elves, and that in the doing of this, we procure (as far as lies in our Power,) the Good and Happinefs of all Rational Beings, in which our own is like wife included. To perform this Task, I fliall firft take notice

ofthofe Qualities or Properties that belong to man (i) as a meer natural Body,(x){uch as belong to him as an Animal, (3) fiich as are peculiar to him as a Rational Creature, endued with a higher and nobler Principle than Brutes,'v/z.an immortal SouL $. -L. To begin with the firft of thefe, it is evident, that as a Natural Body, he is endued with thefe Properties common to all other Natural Bodies, (i.) That all his Motions, in which his Life, Strength, and Health confift, do proceed from God, the firft Original, or Caufe, of them, and are neceflarily complicated with, and depend upon the motions of innumerable other Bodies,among which thdfe Corporeal motions of Men (.which do often limit and reftrain our own) are firft and chiefly to be confidered. CO That from them, as from other Bodies, Motion may be propagated Indefinitely, and which does not pe* rifh, but concur with other motions to perpetuate the Succeflion of things, that isj contribute to the confervation of the Uni-verfe; and as the former of thefe Obferva-tions teaches us, that a particular end,i>/s. our own Prefervation, depends upon our common or joynt Forces, or Natural Powers ; fb this latter inftru&s us, that fuch Powers and Motions of particular Pcrfbns,

are often mtift Beneficial,and conducing to the common good of all Men. The firft of thefe Concltifions forbids us to hope for or endeavour our own private Good or Happi-nefs, as feparate and diflind from that of all others,and fo excites us tb feek the common good of Rationals, as the Original of our own particular Happinefs. The other (hews, that this endeavour of the Common Good can never prove in vain, or to no purpofe, fmce it concurs with the Will of God, and conduces to the Prefervadon of the Univerfe, and of all Humane Creatures therein contained; and farther,that in each complicated motion,as well in that,towards which divers Caufes concur for the Pre-fervation of any Body for a certain time, as alfo in that,,whereby each particular Body concurs to the confervation of the whote Syflem; there is a certain order flill ob-ferved, whereby fome motions are necef-farily determined by others in a continual Series, or Succeflion, all which are yet governed or over-ruled,by the motion of the whole Syflem of Natural Bodies. And although this fort of Contemplation, may feem remote from common ufe,yetis it not to be contemned as altogether unprofitable in Human Affairs; for it makes us more diftin&ly perceive from fome certain gene-

ral Principles, how neceflarya conftant and certain Orderis amongft thofe Caufes, that A& from Corporeal Powers ; fo that many of them, may each in their order Succeffively concur to an effed forefeen,or defigned by us; and farther (hews us a Rule how we may certainly judge, what Caufe does more or lefs contribute to the Effect (ought for, or defired; fo that from the Natural Efficacy of thefe Caufes, their Or* der,Force,and Dignity, in refpedt to each Effe6t,,are to be determined and judged of; and we are taught from the Nature of things, as well what Caufes are to be moft efleemed for thofe good EfFeds they have, or may producers alfo which are moft diligently to be (ought after,for the obtaining thofe ends which we defire, and by which means it may be alfo known; that thofe Caufes which Philoiophers calls Univerfal, viz. God the firft caufe, and the motion of the Celeftial Bodies as proceeding from Him, are the Original Caufes of the Common Good or Happinels of Mankind, a part of which we either always do adual-ly, or can hope to enjoy.

tf. 3. But omitting thofe Motions which are not in our Power to influence or alter, it is certain, that among the things which are in either our Power to do or forbear;

thofe voluntary Humane motions proceeding from an Universal Benevolence of all Men towards all others, are_the principal Caufes of their Common Happinefs, and iii which every one's privateGoodis included. Since from this fource proceed all thofe Actions, by which Men's Innocence and Fidelity towards each other are preierved i as alfoby which Humanity, Gratitude, and aimoft all the other Vertues are exerted and performed, after as certain a manner as thg Natural motions of the Spirits, Bowels, Nerves and Joynts in an Animal,do wholly proceed from the motion of the Heart,and Circulation of the Blood ,� which judgment or determination, being taken from the Nature of things duly conftdered, fliould, without doubt, caufe us to yield Obediencd to all the Laws of Nature, as contributing to this Common Good of Rational Agents, and Ihould make us alfo diligently take care^ that the fame be obferved by others,fb that there may be nothing wanting on bur fide to render us as happy, as our frail Nature will allow; fince right reafbn can pro* pofe no higher or nobler End, than this, of all our moral Adhons.

JT. 4. Yet whilft we compare the Aggr£* gate Body of mankind, ^as far as we eafi

A& by Corporeal force) with the Natural Syftems of other Bodies,! am not unmindful of the manifeft difference there is between them, v/z. That all the Effects of meer Corporeal Syftems, are produced by the Contiguity, and immediate Operation of feodies,moving upon others that are capable pf Being moved by them; without that Senfe, Deliberation, or Liberty, which are only to be found in human Adions,in whole Motions and Operations on each other, though a great difference often intervenes, yet for all that,it is evident,that the Corpo-i:eal Powers of Men when exerted, are fuk je&to the fame Laws of motion with other Bodies, and that divers Men may often co-operate to one certain Effect, relating to the dood or Hurt of others, fo that there is the fame neceff.:y of a Subordination between Human motions,as there is between thofe of other Bodies. And I mufl here farther take notice, that Men have frequent .ppportunities of meeting together, and alfb many other means by which they may hurt or help each other,by (peaking,writing, or other Adiions. And therefore if we confider theNature of Mankind,in the whole courfe of their Lives, it ought to be confidered as one entire Syftem ot Bodies, confiding of (everal particular parts; fo that nothing al-

mod can be done in Relation to any Man's Life, Family, or Fortune, which doth not fome way or other, either benefit or pre-judice,tho(e things which are moft dear to others alfo : as the motion of any one Body in the Syftem of the world, Communicates it felf to many others. For that great prerogative of Knowledge andUnderftand-ing, with which Man is endued,(upplies the Contiguity required for motion in other Bodies,* Men being often excited toA&ions, by certain Arbitrary figns or words, by which they understand, what hath been done by others in places far diftant. So alfo our intellect apprehending a likencfs of Defires and Averfibns, between thofe of the fame Species with it (elf, as to things necef-iary or hurtful to Life, as al(b being able to remember other Men's Actions towards thenifelves, or thofe they love, are from thence excited to hope for, or expect the likethings from them,and arealfb provoked to a requital when occafion is offered. Such Properties being plainly Natural, and con-ftant in Humane Nature^ are no left efficacious to excite Men to (uch Actions or mo-i tions, than a natural contract between Bo-dieSjis to Communicate motion between all the parts of any Corporeal Syftem;

JF. $. From which Natural Obfervations it is plainly manifeft, that particular Men may Learn, that both their greateft Security from Evil, and all their hopes of obtaining any Good or Afliftance from others, towards making themfelves Happy, do truly and neceflarily depend upon voluntary Adlons, proceeding from the Benevolence of others, who at the fame time do them-felves (land in need of the like means for their Happinefs and Safety. From whence we eafily perceive,that thefe mutualHelps and Afliftances of Men towards each other, are highly beneficial to all of them, and anfwer that Concourfe of natural Bodies, and that Ceflion or giving place to each other, which is fo neceflary for the performance of their motions. So that from this neceflity of thefe mutual helps, it follows, that he who would confult his own Happinefs and Prefervation, ftiould procure (as far as he is able) the Good will and affift-ance of others, fince he cannot but be fen-fible, that he is able to afford and perform to others , divers like Offices of kindnefs, .andTo is able to confpire with the whole Syftem of Rational Beings, towards the fame End, (viz.) the Common Good of Rational Beings : and that, on the contrary, the weak and inconfiderable forces

of any one Man, are not fiifficientto compel fb many others, each of them equal (if not fuperiour)to him(elf,both in Wit and Power, to yield him their help and afli-ftance,to their own prejudice} whetherthey will or no; which would prove as impof-fible,as that a hundred pound weightplaced in one Scale of a Balance, ihould bear down feveral other hundred weights, put in the oppofite Scale: So likewifethe force and cunning of any fingle perfbn, is ofnofuf-ficient Power or Force, againft the (everal Neceflkies, Counfels, and Endeavours, of innumerable others towards their own, and the Common Good,' without any confide-ration of his particular Happinefs alone. Therefore it is manifeft from this natural Balance of Humane Powers, that men may be more certainly induced by our Benevolence, or Endeavour of the Common Good, to yield us thofe things and afliftances we ftand in need of, than by ufmg force or deceit,which Mr. Holls * (up-poles, even the Good and Ver-tuous may lawfully exercifein the State of Nature, as the only natural means of felf.prefervation, in his Imaginary State of Nature.

JT. 6. So that from thefe Natural Obfer-vatioHS, concerning all the means neceflary

*"/rfe, The Preface to He Che.

to the Confection of the Corporeal Univerfe, and of the feveral forts of Beings therein coqtained,we may draw thefe Con-clufions. i. That all things are Co diipofed, that not the leafl quantity of matter and motion, pan ever be loft,- but the fame Species of Animals are {till continued, and are rather encreafed than leflened, not with-ftanding all the oppofition of the cruel Paf-fions, and unruly Appetites of Come other Animals, Co that in this perpetuity of matter and motion, by a continual fucceflion of things, the Natural Good, orConfer-vation of (he Corporeal Univerfe confifts, and towards which it is carried according to the immutable Laws of motion : nor can there be any fufficient reafbn given, why the Confervation of Mankind may not be looked upon as ^ftablifhed by as certain and natural a chain of Caufes, as the Succeflive Generations of any other Creatures, fmce they depend alike upon the jading Nature of the Corporeal Univerfe, and agree in all the Eflentials of Animals. And certainly the Addition of a Rational Soul to our Bodies, does very often put us in a better Condition than that of Brutes, but can never make us in a worfe; This will be evident to any Man that confiders the benefits, which accrew to our Bodies

from the Government of our Reafbn, and which do abundantly recompenfe (bme in-conveniencies wh.ich may happen to them; from the errours; of our minds. Nay, it is moft certain, that its errours touching Food, Pleafure, and other things which concern the Prefervation of our Bodies, proceed from the Soul's yielding, agairift the Admonitions of Reafbn, to Carnal Aj> petites, and Corporeal or Animal Paflions, x. That the matter and motion of all Bodies, as alfo of Men (confidered only as fiich) do Mechanically, or whether they will or no, promote the motion of that of the Corporeal UniverCe, fmce the motion of all particular Bodies is determined, by the general motion of the whole Syflem.

JT. 7. In fliort, our Judgments concerning the neceflary means of the Happinefs of Mankind,may be convinced from thefe Natural caufes operating after the fame man* ner, and by the fame Natural Lawsj by which the Corporeal Univerfe is preferved, fince they confift in thefe two Rules:

i. That the endeavours of particular Perfbns towards their own prefervation, are as plainly neceflary for the Conferva-tion of the whole Species of Mankind, as the Mechanick motions of particular Bo-dies,are to the general motion of the whole Corporeal Syftem.

x. That the Powers of particular Perfons, by which they defend themfelves agamft the force of others, fhould be fo equally Baj lanced, as that (like the motion of other Bodies} none of them (hould be deftroyed or loft, to the Prejudice or Detriment of the whole. Somewhat like which is feen in all the motions of the Corporeal Syftem of the World, which proceed from its Plenitude, and the mutual Contract of Bodies, and fo extend themfelves through the whole mafs of matter ; but it is the proper Talent of Humane Reafon and Underftanding, to obferve that each Man's particular Happi-ne(s, does depend upon the voluntary Actions of other Rationals, after a much nobler manner, even when they are far jdiftant, and can therefore take care that all Humane Actions may in like manner con-duceto the Common Good of Rational Agents,as the motions of all Bodies,do tothe Conservation of the whole Corporeal Sy-ftem ; which will be truly performed, if jn all voluntary A&ions which refpedo-thers, thofe two Rules aforegoing be oh-ferved. So that we are taught from the real Nature of Bodie^ as well thofe that are animate as thofe that are not, after what planner, and to what Degree we ought to perfue our own particular Happmefs ?

which muft neceflarily conduce to, and is included in that of other Rational agents. And we are hence alfo Inftru&ed , what A&ions are prefcribed, or forbid by the Laws of Nature; fince fuch Actions only are thereby commended, as promote this great End, and the contrary Actions forbidden, which difturb or hinder it; which is alfo ftppofed by all Princes and States in their Deliberations and Treaties of Peace, it being that, in which they all agree, as contributing to their common Safety and Prefervation,CwzJ That the Powers of all the feveral States concerned, fhould be fa juflly moderated and equally balanced,that none may deftroy or opprefs each other. Thus between neighbouring Nations, not Subject to the fame common Power, it is chiefly provided in alltheirLeaguesandXrea-ties,that the Forces of each particular Commonwealth, fhould be fb equally balanced by the Afliflance,and Support of their Confederates and Allies,that it fhould be impofii-ble for any one of them to fwallow up,or deftroy another; but that there fliouid be flill left to each of them Power and means fufficient to preferve themfelves, and their Subjects in Peace and Safety, as being the main ends, for which they were at firil ordained by God; and inilituted by Men.

JT. 8. And it is proper to all Natural Bodies, whilft they perfeyere in their own motion, to be under fome kind of neceffity alfo to contribute,and be fubfervient to the motions of innumerable other Bodies,from the general Laws of motion, for the Confervation of the Univerfe. And This Rule being found true in Animals,it feems to admoniih us,not only as meer Animals, but rational Agents, that we fhould contribute our particular endeavours towards the general Good, or Prefervation of all thole of our own kind, fmce it is not only a poffible effed:, but alfo fuch a one as depending upon Caufes fb perfect and certain, we may with reafon believe, that it will endure to the end of the World. But if we farther add to thefe Obfervati-ons thofe things that diftinguifli Animate from Inanimate Bodies, they will yet more flrongly convince us, and make us to obferve fufficient reafons wherefore (not fo much concerning our felves witho-ther Corporeal Beings) we ftiould be chiefly follicitous in giving our affiflance to thofe of our own kind: Firft, then the Nature of Animate is diftinguifhed from that of Inanimate Bodies, by fuch a fit difpofition of parts, and an apt conformation of their Natural Organs, as (unices for their Gene-

ration, Senfation, Imagination, Affections, Nourifhment, and alfo all fpontaneous Mo! tions. And it is by thefe adions, that all forts of Animals endeavour their Confer-vation and Happinefs for the time that is appointed them, and thereby procure the Prefervation of the whole Species.

JT. 9. But I mall not dwell too long upon thefe common obvious things, which are fo evident in themfelves, but (hall from hence deduce fomething more material to my purpofe, (viz.) that from the fame in-trinfick Conftru&ion of all Animals, whereby they are determined to this Endea-vour of Preferving themfelves, there are befidesgivenmanifeft Declarations, that Loving and Benevolent Adions towards thofe of their own Kind, are alfo neceflary for their own defence, and conftitute the happieft State of Life they can enjoy. And likewife that it is farther ordained from the fame concourfe of External and In-ternalCaufes, that all Rational Agents cannot but be fenfible, or mindful of thefe Indications. Thefirftof thofe Conclufions contains the Senfe,and Sanction of the Law pf Nature, as the latter regards its Pro~ mulgation,or the manner whereby it comes to be made known to us. I (hall explain each of them in their order.

,5*. io. It is therefore firft to be obferved, That the corporeal Bulk, even of the lar-geft Animals, is contained within afmall and narrow cbmpafs; as alfo that the Space of Time wherein they can live, or be prefer-ved, is not long: From whence it follows, That but a few Things, and afmall quantity of them, are really neceflary for their Nourifbment and Prefervation ; or where there is need of a Concurrence of more of them, they are only fuch as maybe free-ly communicated to many at once,-whence they are naturally led to defire but a few particular Things, yet daily (land in need of divers others in cornmon, whofeufe may notwithftanding be well communicated to many at once,withoutexhaufting theirftore; fiich as are the free Enjoyment of Air,Light, Fire, W&er,&c. And farther,if we confider the Structure of their Bodies, we may ob-(erve, that the fame fuperficies of the Skin which hinders theEffufion}governs alfo the Circulation of the Blood, and does at the iarne time fix bounds tothofe Appetites and NecelTities by which they are urged to feek their own Prefervation : So that thofe few Things that fuffice to repair the vital Flame which daily confumes, are likewife fuffici-ent not only for the Conlervation of their lifcyindnaturalftrengtl^but alfo for inabling

them to contribute their help and afliflance to others of the fame kind. And, Jaftly, the Structure and Capacity of the Veflels, in which their Aliment is digefled, and of thofethat convey the Chyle, asalfo of the Veins and Arteries that receive it,being but narrow,require but a fmall quantity to fill them. So that I think no Brute can be guilty of Mr. fTs Errour, of judging or de-firing all Things whatever, as neceflary fqr its own Prefervatipn ,� fince from the intrin-fick and conftituent Parts of all Animals, it plainly appears, That very few Things fuffice to allay their Hunger and Thirft,and to prevent the Injuries of the Weather. And if fb few Things are neceflary for their Happinefs and prefervation, they may very well leave the reft of thofe Produces which the Earth fb plentifully brings forth, to be enjoyed by others of their own kind, fince the finite quantity of their Bodies limiting their Appetites to the defiring, and their Powers only to be ufing a few neceflary Things,'from this limitedUfeandNeceflky, there arifes a natural Divifion or Appropriation of Things, amongft divers Animals of the fame kind (as I fliewed before in the laft Chapter.) The allowance or permiffion of which Diftribution , is the foundation of all the mutual Concord and Benevolence

amongft them, and which their Nature re-quires for their Prefervation: So that if this innate Love, or Defire of Self-prefervatton in Animals, be limited after the manner we have nowde(cribed,this oncefatisfied,there can be no Reafon why they fhould with-ftand, or obftrud: the Confervation of o* thers of the fame kind, either by hindring their Enjoyment ofthofe Things which they Jthetnfelves do not need, or in refufing to lend them their Help and Afliftance, when there is occafion,and that they do not want it themfelves.

$.11. The next Obfervationwe make, is from the Effefts of the Senfes, as alfb the Imagination and Memory in Animals when they are taken up, and employed about o-thers of the fame kind : For fmce from the Impreffions made on their Organs of Senfe, they cannot but perceive, that fuch Creatures are of the fameNaturewith themfelves, luch Notions muft,from the Conftitution of their Nature, move them to fbmewhat alike affe&ion towards them as towards them-(elves. But I (hall here avoid all Controversies concerning the Knowledg of Brutes^ of which way their Affections are moved by their Imaginations; and (hall only fuppofe, Thattheirlmagination excites theirpaflions and that thefePaiiions do like wife often pro.

duce the like Motions, or Inclinations in their fellow Animals: From whence I colled:, That this Similitude of Nature does highly conduce to the procuring of Bene-Volence, or Concord, amongft thofe of the lame kind,unlefs there be fbme unaccountable Antipathy, or Diffimilitude of Difpofi-tion,which may happen to excite Enmity, orDifcord between them, which yet not of-ten happens : whence it follows, That A-nimals, fb long as they are in their Right Senfes, and are mindful of themfelves, cannot forget others of the fame kind, fince under the fame Idea's by which they conceive their own Nature and the Neccffities thereof, they cannot but have an Idea of that of others of the fame Species with them-(elves; and muft alfo be (enfible, thatfuch Animals being urged by the like Appetites of Hunger and Third as themfelves, are thereby moved to feek Food when hungry or thirfty; and cannot but be al(b fenfible, that it is highly grateful to them, when the* uie of thefe Neceflaries is left free and un-difturbed, or elfe is adminftred to them by others,or that they are any ways afiifted by them in the obtaining them.

tf. ix.ButfmceIdea'sof this fort do con-fiantlyfpringupin the minds of Animals, and produce perpetual motives to love or

Good-will arifmg neceflarily from this ft-militude of Nature jit alfo follows,that they never {b far deviate from the natural date, as when,through Madnefs,or any other violent Appetite,or paflion, they a& contrary to thefe firft and mod natural Dictates. As allMen grant it to be a preternatural Dileale in a Dog,when feized with Madnefs to bite all other Dogs he meets with; or when a Sow, through a depraved Appetite eats her own Pigs. Nor indeed can I fee any Rea-fon why all other kinds of inordinate Pa£ (ions, which difturb the natural Difpofition of an Animal, (b as to make it do extravagant A&ions, and hurtful to its own Species, without any juft Caufe, (fuch as Anger, and vehement Envy oftentimes produce) may not be juftly efteemed as preternatural Diftempprs oftheBlood,or Brain, very like to that of a mad Dog ; for there often appears in thofe that are tranfported with thefe paflions, all the Symptoms of thole Difeafes that proceed from an overflowing of Choler , or a violent efFerve-(cenceoftheBloodjfuch as an i&erial black-nefs of the Face,paraly tick Trcmblings,and other Signs well enough known to Phyfici-ans. Nor is an immoderate needlefs Fear of Animals of the fame kind,to be lefsreckon-ed amongluch Difeafes, fince it is not only

preternatural, or be/ides their Conftitutiori when in Health, but doth likewifc, as Well as other Difeafes, deftroy the Body, by driving them into animmoderateSad-nefs, unfeafbnable Solitude and watchings, with otherSymptoms of predominant Melancholy, whence an untimely Death is often accelerated. Neither can there be any Mean, or End, put to this unreafbnable Fear, when once the Mind is touched and infected with a falfe Imagination , that aJl other Men defign to kill and deftroy them > which Madnefs is very like that of thofe, who being bitten by a mad Dog, are afraid of Water, and all Liquids, though they cannot live without them,-of which I have met with a famous Example. In the French Chronicles of KingCharlesVI. who being feized with a violent apprehenfion, that all his fervarits were bribed, by his Son the Dauphin, to poifon him, did quite obflairi from all Food, till at lafl he died, as truly of Hunger , as Fear.

JT. 13. And it is evident (and Mr H. him-felf confefles it) that, Men as well as other" fbciable Animals, do more or Jefs delight in the fociety of each other of the fame kincf^ as may be oblerved from thofe figns of joy and Satisfaction which they exprefs wheft

vid. Meyeray'f Hift. in the Life of this Prince.

they meet after any long abfence: But fince it is as plain, that the Caufes of this Aflb-ciation and Agreement, proceed from the iritrinfick Nature of the Creatures, and are no other than thole by which the Blood, Spirits, and Nerves are continued and preferred, in a due and healthy (late; it as evidently follows, That the Safety and Pre-(ervation of each of them, cannot be fepa-rated from a Propenfion,at leaft,to a friendly Aflbciation with thofe of their own kind; fo that though they fbmetimes quarrrel a-bout the fame Meat, or Female, yet this does not any way cro(s or contradict this great End of Nature, of procuring the Common Good of theUniverfe; but is rather in order to it, viz. when the Defire of Food, for their own Prefervation,or Luft,to propagate their Spenes, prompts them to fight, and fbmcdmes to deftroy each other; the time of which Contention, is yet but ftnall in comparifon of the greater part of their Lives, in which they are obferved to live in peace.

And that all Animals are determined by Mature , to profecute and endeavour the Common Good of their own Species, by the fame Caulesthat preferve the Lives of each of them in particular, appears from the great Love and Kindneis, which Crea-

tures of the fame Species^ but of different Sexes, expreis towards each other, and by virtue of which,they perform the ad of Ge-neration,fo highly grateful and pleafing to each other,and thereby propagate their off-Ipring; which when brought forth,they love jand defend ,as part of themfeJves,unlefs fome iinufiial Diftempef intervene, which may fometimes difturb or change thefe natural Propenfiorisjas when Sows or Rabbets eat or deftroy their young ones ; which happening but feldom, is rather to be accounted a-mong theDifeafes of the Brain,or diflempers of the Appetite, than to be afcribed to' their naturalState,or Conftitutioii;and does no more contradidfc this general Law of Nature, than the afcerit ©f Water iri a Pump, does oppofe thatgeneralRuleof theconf!ant defcent of heavy Bodies. So that we may, for all that, affirm, That the Procreation; of their young, and that sop^ or natural Affection they Iiave for them, and defire of breeding them up , 'till they are able to fhift for themfelves , are feldom or never feparated ,� for prefervation is but, as it were, the Generation of the fame Crea» tureftill continued.

So that the fame natural Caufes excite A-nimalstothe one,as as well as other.Bujt it is evident, Thsit their off-fpring can neither

be generated nor preferved, unlefs thofe of different Sexes do, for fome time, maintain Peace,and a Co-habitation with each other, which in many others of them, continues much longer than the bare time of Generation, Quiz.') for the whole feafon of Coupling and Breeding up of their young ones ;and in divers others, as Doves, Pigeons, &c. This AfFedion continues (like marriage)as long as their Lives. And that Creatures are excited to generate their like , from the fame Natural Caufes for which their own Prefervation is procured, appears from this anatomical obfervation , that part of the fame nutritious Juice pafTes into the Nou-rimment of the Body, and the reft to the Propagation of Seed ; and the whole Circulation of the Blood, with the Caufes that produce and promote it, as the mu-fcular force ol'the Heart, and that flrange and wonderful Artifice of the Valves in the Veins , do by one and the fame Action, (erve for the particular Nutrition of the Animal, and alfo perform the more pub-lick Duty of propagation of the Species, whilft it does, at the fame time, fend down part of that matter to the Spermatick Ve£ fels out of which the Seed is produced.

$. 14, But leaving the nicer Difquifition of thefe anatomical Obfervations to Na-turalifis and Phyficians , I fliall only add this one Observation, That it is evident that ail Animals are, by thefe means, impelled to the Love of thofe of a different Sex, and alfb of their own ofFfpring, and' fo are brought to impart feme of that Self-love, with which they are at firft endued , to others of their own kind, from an irrefiftable inflincl: of Nature j and hence it is truly oblerved of Men, That after they are married, and have got Children, they are more prone to , and folicitous after Peace than before ,� but that this defire of Propagation , difpofes Men to a greater Affection towards thofe of the Female Sex, is fo evident, that it needs no proof. But fince Mr. //.and others of his Opinion, do grant thefe Obfervations, concerning the natural propenfions of Creatures to be true , but are wont to evade them , by affirming, that they only proceed from the Tele Love of their own Pleafure and Satisfaction ,� and that all the actions proceeding from thence, tend to no higher end than the Love and Prefervation of themfelves; as I do not in this part of the Difcourfe, intend to difpute, fb have I not omitted to anfwer this Obieftion in ; he lafl

.Chapter, which is defigned on purpofe fop anfwering all thofe Objections that can well be made againfl our Definition of the Law of Nature.

JT. i ?. The laft general Obfervaition to be drawn from tne Nature pf Living Creatures, may be taken from that Stveet-nefs and Pleasure they take and enjoy in jthofe Actions and Paflions that tend to the .Common Good of their owp Kind, fmce i£ is very well known to Naturalifls, that m thofe fweejer Paflions of Love, Defire, JBope, Joy, (efpecially when employed a-bout any great Good towards others) the vital Motions of the Blood and Heart are then highly helped and promoted. $p that the Veins and Arteries are filled with a milder and nobler Juice, whilft brisket and more active Spir'ts are thereby generated, and the Circulation of tlie Blood, and confequently all the other animal Functions, are more eafily and nimbly performed. So that by thofe very affections by which they do good to Animals of their own Kind, they themfelyes are alfo fatisfied and delighted, and as far as they feel this naturally rooted in their very Natures, they mud needs incline to thefeAffe&ions fo highly conduce* Ing p their own Happinefs and Preferva* tion | whereas, on the contrary, in Hatred,

Envy, Fear, and that Sadnefs and ill-lift* mour which neceflarily fprings from thofe four and immoderate Pafiions; the Circulation of the Blood is obftru&ed, and the Heart rendred more heavy, and unapt to motion. So that it thereby expels the Blood with greater difficulty in its Syftole, from whence proceeds meagernefs and palenels of the Countenance, with innumerable In-conveniencies to the whole Oeconomy of the Body, but chiefly in the Functions of the Brain and Nerves, fuch as are thofe Difeafes which are attributed to the Spleen, deep Melancholy , and Difcontent. But thefe things being rather of a medicinal Confideration, Ifhall but onlyjuft mention them, tho the Writings of Phyflcians may yield divers Examples of fuch who have haftened their own Fate, through immoderate Envy and Regret, that they could not fatisfie their Malice or Revenge; of which I may chance to give you a tafte when I come to confider the Sanction of the Law of Nature by Punifhments, proceeding from the undue and immoderate cxercife of thofe pafiions.

JT. 16. But as Mr. H. and his Difciples cannot deny thefe Natural Propenfions in Brute Creatures towards mutual Concord, (b they have no other way to evade thefe

Inftances, bqt by fuppofing fome things in Man's Nature , that render him worfe Natur'd , and more unmanageable than Bears, Wolves, &c. That fo being naturally in a perpetual (late of War, they can no way be kept from deftroying each other, but by fome Common Supreme Power (et over them to keep them all in awe ; which Arguments, and the Anfwers to them, fince by their length they would too much perplex the Connexion of this Difcourfe, I mail refer you to the fecond part, wherein I hope I have made it appear, that there is nothing in Man's Nature considered as an Animal, that ought to be governed by right Reafon, (}and in which alone he excels other Creatures) that can lay any ne-cetfity upon him of being more fierce, and nnfociable than Brutes.

$. 17. Having now Difpatchedthefe common and eafie Obfervations concerning Man, confidered as a meer Body, and alfo. {uch as concern his Nature as an Animal, tending to prove, that the, endeavour of the Common Good of his, own Species, was one great end and Defign of God in His Creation. I come in the next place to confider thofe particulars, in which the Nature of Man excels that of Brutes, and whereby he is rendred much more capable

than they of promoting,and performing this great End, viz. the Common Good of Rational Agents : which I (hall divide into two Heads, either thofe belonging to the Body, or elfeto the Sou I or Mind 5 as to the former, though there are divers Anatomical Obfervations, made by curious A-natomifls and Learned Phyficians concerning the differences between the Conftitu-tion of the inward parts, or VefTels in Men and Brutes ; yet I fhall take notice of no more, than what are.abfblutely neceflary p our purpofe, and which may ferve to (hew, what are the natural Caufes of that Excellency and Superiority, that is commonly found in Humane intellects, above thofe of Brutes. The firft of which Obfervations may be drawn from the large quantity of brains which is found in Hu^ mane Bodies, and which bears a much greater proportion in refpecl: of their bulk, than in any other Creatures; for though the weight of an ordinary Humane Body, dees feldom exceed above a fourth part of that of a Horfe or Bull ,� yet for the motion and government of fo much a fmaller Body, Nature hath allowed him near double the quantity of Brains, viz. about the weight ofiour or five pounds, fo that there is eight times as much brains, appointed for

the goverment of the like bulk in a Man, as in an Ox or Horle. And though the Carcafes of the largefl Sheep and Hogs, do often weigh near as much as a Humane Body : yet their brain is not above an eighth part of the weight in proportion to ours; which teems to be thus ordain'd by Nature,that by reafbn of the greater large-nefsof the Veflels,the Animal Spirits fliould be prepared in greater plenty, and al(b have more room to work, and {b fliould become more lively and vigorous in Man, than in other Creatures; dnce all the Nerves do either fpring from the Brain, or elfe from the Spinal Marrow which is continuous,and of the fame fubftance with it; whence it may follow that this larger quantity, and conlequently greater flrength of brain in a Man above othe«- Creatures, was intended to ferve him to dired, and govern that greater variety of Motions and Actions depending thereupon,with a more exa& care and deliberation.

tf. 18. Afecond Obfervation to prove that Man is a Creature ordained by God for a fuller and more conftant Aflbciation with thole of his own kind, (which alfb tends to the promoting of the Common Good of his Species) than other Creatures, may be taken from the Natural Cpnftitu-

.tion of the Blood, and Spermatick VefTels, by which hi? Appetite to Copulation is not confined (as in mod other Creatures) to fome certain times, but are equally the lame atallteafons of the Year,- from whence proceeds a defire pf Marriage, or a con-flant Cohabitation with one, or more wo men, from whence mud like wife follow a more conftant generation of their ofF-fpring,and a more lading care of them when generated and brought forth. For whereas Brutes, quit the care of their Young, and iiriye them away from them as foon as e-ver they are able to ihift for themfelves; Man alone loves and cherilbes his off-fpring, and continues his love and care of them fo long as they live, and ftill loves jhem the more the longer they have continued with them, and the more care and pains they have beftowed on their Education : and fb like wife Man is the only Creature we know of, that makes any returns for this care, by a<9:s of Duty and Gratitude tpwards his Parents; for as for the Gratitude pf Storks to their Sires or Dams when aged, I look upon it as a meer old Wive's Fable.

tf. 19. Laftly, I (hall confider the wonderful Frame and Structure pf the Hand in Man, which though I grant it not peculiar

to him alone ; all Creatures of the Ape or Monky kind, having their fore paws very like it, and in many Actions ufmg them to the fame ends, both in feeding themfelves and carrying their Young ones ; yet fince we fee our Hands were not given us in-ilead of Feet to go upon, (as in them} we may juftly conclude,that they were Fram'd for fbme Higher and Nobler Ufe, than, our bare Prefervation , or the hurting or deftroying of others; becaufe if God had ordained them only for this end, fliarp Teeth, Claws and Horns, would have done much better, and would have faved us the trouble of making Swords, Spears, and fucji like Inftruments, not only defendve but offenfive; whereas we find thai: by the help of our hands, directed by our reafbn, we are able to do much more than any of thofe weak filly Animals can do with their Paws j for they cannot employ them to make any of thofe ordinary Inftruments, or Utenfils of Life, which even the mod Barbarous Nations cannot be without: or fb much as to ad-minifter to each other, many of thofe ordinary helps and ajTidances, which Men by means of their Hands do daily afford each other. So that if we confider the Ordinary Ufe of thefe Members, efpecially

in labouring Men and Mechanicks, we (hall find, that they do not only ferve for their own Suftenance and Prefervation, but alfo for the. benefit and maintenance of many others of their own kind, who cannot well Subfift without the manual Labour of o-thers. And though I grant this noble In-ftrument, the Hand, is often abufed by wicked and violent Men, to make unjuft Wars, and commit Murthersand Robberies, and by left Thieves to pick Pockets, Pilfer, (SV, and that without this they could never commit (uch Villanies; yet doth it not follow, that their Hands were beflowed upon them by God for that end* Since if he intended the Common Good and Happinefs of Mankind, as His great end, He never could intend that thefe In-flruments Ihould be made ufe of to a quite contrary defign,i//z,their Ruine and Definition. So that whoever will but flri&ly confider all this,cannot but confefs,that we are made and ordained to depend upon each other's affiftance, and that Man was Created for a higher purpofe than his own (ingle Self-prefervation.

JT. 10 This too may be farther made out from the natural Conftitution of Humane Nature, as that no Man is born Self-fuffi-cient, or able to procure all things necef*

fary for his bate fubfiftance, much lefs for a quiet or pleafant Life, but needs the Ailiflance of others to breed him up whilft an Infant, or to tend him when he is Tick, old, or unable to help himfelf; or if it be fometirnes poflible for a time, yet it muft be with great hardftiip and fcantinefs, that any Man's own (ingle Labour unafiifted by the help of others, can provide hirri-felf with alt the neceflaries of Life. Whence firft arifes another neceflky of 'Marriage" in the ftate of Nature , which is the Contract of a Man and a Woman to live together, for the propagation of their Species, and breeding up of their Off-fprings, and alfo for mutual Help, and a joint Provifioit of the Neceflaries of Life for themfelves' and them. And, fecondly, a neceflity of a Man's livi ng in cc^cord, or fbciety, with all other Men, efpecialSy thofeof his own Nation, or Commonwealth. So that it is evidentjthe chief Happineft and well-being of Mankind , depends upon their mutual adminiftration of thefe Things, as often as need lhall require; that is, upon Ads of the higheft Love and Benevolence, in order to the Common Good.

To all which may be added another OEs fervation, of the great difference in the Frame of Men's Bodies from thole of Brutes,

in the upright pofture of their progreffivc motion $ Man alone going upon two Legs, whereas moft other terreftrial Animals go upon all four, whereby Men have the con-ftant ufe of their Hands, both to help and aiTiftthemfelves and others, to a much greater degree, and in a much more powerful manner, than what Brutes are able to perform. But whereas fbme Atheiftshave alledged, that this pofture proceeds rathe* from Cuftom and Example than Nature; I defire them to mew me any Nation in the World fo barbarous, where men do not go upon two Legs as well as we: and though Children, 'tis true, before they can go, mud crawl; yet it is not upon their Hands and Feet, but knees : For a Man's Legs (as is notorious to AnatomiftsJ are fo much longer than his arms, and are likewife fo fet on, that they cannot be brought to move in Right-Angles with the Arms, or Fore-legs, as in Brutes.- and though I grant that fbme Beafts, as Apes, Monkeys, and Bears,, can fometimes go upon their Hind-feet, yet is not this conftant; but as fbon as the pcefent Neceflity is over, they flrait return to their natural pofture. To conclude, I think I may leave it to any indifferent Reader to judge, whether from all thefe natural Obfervations from the

Frame of Humane Bodies»and the Nature of their Paflions, it doth not evidently appear* ThatMan'sHappinefs andSubfutence in this Life, was not defigned by GOD to depend upon his ownparticular fenfual pleafure,or the meer fatisfadion of his prefent Appetites and Paflions, retrained to himfelf, without any Confideration of others of his own kind, but was rather intended for the Common Good and Prefervati-on of the whole Species of Mankind.

JF. xi. Having now difpatched thofe natural Obfervations that may be drawn from the Conftitution or Frame of Man's Body, in order to the rendering him capable of (erving the Common Good in the propagation of his Species, I (hall proceed to the next Head before laid down, (viz) thofe Excellencies, or Prerogatives, of the Humane Soul, or Mind ; and in which he excels all other Creatures.And,inthe firfl place Mr. H. very well obferves, " That it is peculiar to the Nature of Man, to be inquifitive into the Caufes of the Events they fee ; and that upon the fight of any thing that hath a beginning, to judge alfb that it had a Caufe which determined the fame to begin when it did: And alfo whereas there is no other Felicity amongft Beads, but

laviath Parti-Chap. 12.

the enjoying their daily Food, Eafe, and Luft, as having little or no forefight of the time to come for want of Qbfervati-on and Memory of the Order, conle-quence, and Dependance of Things they fee. Man alone obferves how one Event hath been produced by another; and therein remembers the Antecedence and Conference. Whence he certain'y mud be endued with a larger Capacity, for ob-ferving the natures of Things without hira-feif, and is al(b able to make more curious and exad: Searches into their Caufes and Effedfcjthan the mod faglciousBrutesj who though they are endued with Ibms few Appetites, or Inclinations, towards thofe Things thaj are neceflary for their Preiervation, and an averiion. for others that are hurtful to them, yet this feems to proceed from fome natural indindl, or; impreffion, ilampt by GOD on their very Natures, and not from Realbn or Deli* beration. As, young Wild-Ducks (they fay} will run away irom a Man, as (bon as they are batch'd. and Chickens know the Kite, though they never (aw her before ; and this nqt from any experience or Rational Dedu&ion. But as for Man , it is his Faculty alone, to proceed from ibme known Principles , to draw Rational De-

du&ions, or Conclufions, which were not known before : The exercife of which Faculty we call Right Reafon , or Ratiocination; which I grant is not born with him, and fo is not a property belonging to him as ameer Animal(fmce we fee Children till they come to fome Years, and Fools,and mad Folks,a<a without it as long as they live) However, it is not therefore Artificial, (as fome would have it ) fmce all Perfons of Years of Difcretion, who will give themfelves leifure to think, may attain to a fufficient degree of it for the well Government of their Adi-ens in order to their own prefervation, and the difcovering that Duty they owe to GOD and the reft of Mankind: which Notions being peculiar to Man, and alfo common to the greater part of Mankind, either from Men's own particular Obfer-vations, or Rational Deductions, or elfe from the Inftrudions of others, who them, felves firft found out fucli Rational Conclufions, and taught them to their Children, or Scholars, with their firft Elements of Speech, come, in procefs of time (having forgot when thofe early Notions were firft inftill'd into them) to be taken for connate Idea's : So that I doubt they have been, by too many, (who have not well

coiifidered their Original ) miftaken for Idea's, or Notions imprefled by GOD upon their Souls.

But leaving this , of which others have faid enough, it cannot be denied, but that from this Faculty of deducing effects from tyheir Caufes, Man hath been always able to find out diffident Remedies for his own natural Weaknefs, by the Invention of fe-treral Arts, fuch as Phyfick and Chyrur-gery for his Prefervation and Cure, when fick or hurt: And alfb thofe of a more publick Nature, fuch are the Knowledg of Polities, or the well-Goverment of Common-weals, of Navigation, Warfare, or the Art Military,for his Happinefs and Defence, as a Sociable Creature. So that, though Man is born naked, and without thofe natural Defences and Weapons,with which divers Brutes are fumiflied by Nature; yet by the power of this Faculty, he is able, not only much better to fecure him-felf from the violence and injury of the Weather,by providinghimfclf with Cloths, Houfes,and Victuals before-hand,fmce Nature hath not made him to live like Beads uponthofeFruits of the£arth,which itfpon* taneoufly produces, but they can alfo tame, (bbdu£, and kilt the flrongeft, fierceft, and cunningeft Brutes, and make them (iibfej:-

vient to thole Ends and Dcdgns for which lie pleafes to imploy them: So likewife from this Faculty of Judging of Confcquences from their Antecedents, andforefeeingthe Probability or improbability of future E-vents, he thereby diftinguiihes between reel! and apparent Goods; that is, between iiicli Things that may pleafe for the prefent, ami do afterwards hurt him; and thofe which however they may feem difpleafing for a time, may after do him a greater Benefit ,� which Principles, fince they contain Foundations of all Morality, and the Laws of Nature , that we now treat of, it will not be amifs here particularly to fet down, as the Grounds of what I have to fay on this Subject.

jT. ^^. Firli, It hath been already proved, That every Animal is endued with aNatural Principle, whereby it is necefiarily inclined to promote his own prelervation and Well-being ( not excluding that of others of their own Kind)That therefore which molt con^ua.'S to this end, is called a natural (load; and on the contrary,That which is apt to obfLruft and hinder it,a natural evil. Among which Goods and Evils, there are leverai kinds of degrees,accorciiugas Things arc endued with more or ids iitnefs or power to promote or hinder this End. All

which , may be reduced to thcfe plain Maxim, or Proportions, as I have taken* them out of ^.Wilkinss Treatife of natural Religion^ and Dr. Moors Enchiridion Ethi» cttm. I have colbfted thefe Axioms, and put them together in this method , as they are layd down by thofe excellent Authors, that you may fee them all at one view,-though I own there are many other natural Truths, which are alfb ufeful to prove what actions are productive of the Common Good, divers of which we have given you difperfedly in thefe twoChapters.

Principle I.

THe le/ening or efcapi»z of an Evilr is to le reckoned undtr the Nttion of Good.

Principle II.

The leffeitit:g or lofs of Good^ is to le reckoned under the Notion of EviL

Principle III.

fhat which i$ Good, is to le ch&fen ; that which is Evilyto It avoided.

Principle IV.

The greater Good r j- to be preferred before the lejs ; and a left Evil to le endured, rather than a greater.

Principle V.

Such Things or Eventsy whether Good or Evil) as will certainly come to pafs, way fall under Computation, and le eflimated according to their feveral Degrees, as well as Things prefent: And the fame likewife way be faid of fitch Things as may probably come to pafs, though this probability befomewhat remote; it may alfo be counted valuable, and eft mated at a certain rate^ as when a Matt is one amongft four or fve equal Compe* t it or s for an Office , or the fourth wr fftk Expeftant of an Inheritance 5 and though in fuch Cafes there may be the odds of three or four to one.yet the Price that isfet upon this, Dtay be fo proportioned, as either to reduce the purcbafe fo an Equality , or make it at leajt a ^ery advantageous Bargain.

Principle VI?

A prefect Good may reafonably le parted mth, upon a probable Expectation, of a fu-

turc Good, which is much greater, and more excellent.

Principle VH.

Aprefent Evil is to be endured , for the avoiding of a probable future Eviljvhich is far greater*

Principle VIII.

The greater the Evil, the wore reafon there is to venture the lofs of a greater Good, or t&efafferifig of a iefs Evil, for the efcaping it.

Principle IX.

// is letter to be without any GooJ, than by the enjoy went of it to endure an Evil, as great or greater than that Good comes to.

Thefe laft Priticiples refpe&ing our (elves, may fervc to produce Prudence, Temperance, and Fortitude in our Minds; the reft that follow, refped our Dury towards others,and are the Foundation of all Right and Wrong among Men.

Principle X.

We ought to perfue the Chief eft , or COM-wcn Good, with the higheft $ and all lefs orftilordinate Goods, with a lefs affettion, or Defire: Neither ought we to make the ffigheH^ or Common Good julordinate to any Meaner, or middle Goody or the middle Good to the leaf.

Principle XL

Whatsoever Good you would have done to your felf^ in fuch attdfuch Circuwft[aaces, you ought to do the fame to another', in the fame or like Circuwftances, as far as may le^ without prejudicing the Community.

Principle XII.

IVljatforucr Evil you would not have done loyourfelf, you ought to alftain from doing to another.

Principle XIIL

Good is to Is recommenced with Goody and

yot with Evil.

Principle XIV.

// is good for a wan to enjcy all the Means wherewith he in ay live happily.

Principle XV.

It is letter for the Pullick , or Common Good, that one Man fhould not live voluptu-oujly, than that another Jhould thereby live mi-ferable.

Principle XVI.

If it is 4 Publick, as well as a Private Good> for anyone to have enough wherewith to live happy; it follows from the fame Rule,That it is doubly better > when there is fefficient for two Men ; and by the fame Rule of Proportion, a thoufavd times letter if there lefujjicient for a thoufatidto live happy: So that at lafl^ from the fame Principle^ it mpfl be confeffed^ That if all the Men in the World^ or all Man-kittdy cottid live happily , // were the greatejt Good we coitldfuppofe them capable of.

Principle XVII.

// is neceffary to the PMck Good> That every Mans Right and Property be allowed

/;//», and its free Ufe or Pojfeffion be likewise permitted him, without any Injury or Molefla-tion from others; though it mufl be granted^ that a Man way fa behave himfelf^ as what-foever is his, whether by Pojfeffion , Gift, or Put-chafe, nay lawfully ceafe to le /0, as a Funijhment for his Crimes , in tranfgrejfing this great Law of Mature, of endeavouring the Cowmen Good.

Principle XVIII.

// is letter to Obey Gody declaring his Will to us by the true Principles of Natural ReaJ on, than our own unreafonabk Lufls and Pajfions, or the wicked defires or Commands vfMen.

Theft and the like Principles may fitly be called Natural* as well as Moral Axioms* they being the true refiilts of Natural Reafon, and are fo clear and manifeft of themfelves, that if any one will confider them without prejudice, or being byafs'd by Paflion, or too much Self-love, they will not need a long train of Arguments to prove them; fince they appear true and evident at the firft Pppofal. So alfo thefe Moral Principles, confidered as Propofi-ttons declaring the Connexion of all Humane Aliens, with the natural effects that

depend upon them; as for example, when they fliew us any Action which will mod certainly conduce to our own, and all o-ther's happinefs, and that it appears to be not only our Duty but Interefl to perform them. Thefe Principles thus confidered, with relation to our future Actions, may be called Pradical Dictates, fince they do not only (hew us the higheft End we can propofe to our felves, in order to our pre-(ent and future happineft; but do alfb direct us to the choice of the fitted means to attain it.

JT. 13. But I think it doth (ufficiently appear, that weare not only able to form a com -plex Idea of this Common Good of Rational beings,but alfofrom t)ie faculty of con> paring the likeneft of our own Nature with that of all other Men,can alfb frame an uni-verfal or complex Idea of a Species , or kind of Creatures agreeing in the fame natural Properties, and requiring the fame things for their Happinefs and Subfiftence ashimfelf. Note, that I do not mean by this, any adequate Idea of the true Phy-flcal Nature of Mankind, fince of this Cas of all other (ubftances ) we have no ether knowledge but by their fenfible qualities, therefore I mean only here an Idea fori, or fuch a common and inadequate Idea of th«

Nature of Man, as ferves us for all the mo-ral Rules of Life, which Idea he can give a name to,and call Mankind ,-and fo conies toconfider, and underlhnd all theCaufes ami means, not only of his own Preferva-tion and Happintfs," but that of all other men's, confidcred as an aggregate Body. And from thence is able to draw divers Conclufions concerning the proportion and degrees of men's natural Good or Happi-nefs, according to the Principles before laid down ; till he at lad arrive at this Uni-verfal Idea of the Common Good of Ra* tional Beings, as the higheft and noblefl; that he can attain unto, and which is moft infeparably conjoyned with his own particular Confervation and Happinefs. But whereas God hath Created other Creatures to ail for their own prefent Satisfaction and Prelervation, without any con-fideraticn of that of others ,� He hath made man alone, not only able to contribute to the good and Prefervation of his own kind, but'hath alto made him fenfible of this Ability: and I (hali farther ihew in this bilcourfc, that he hath laid a fufficient Obligation on him to exert it.

§. ^4. Another faculty of the Rational Soul, and only proper to Man as a fociable Creature.,1s, that of Speech, or exprefling

our Notfons by fignificantWords or Sounds,-which though it be not born with us, yet however may be reckoned amongft the Natural faculties of Mankind, as well as going with two legs; ilnce we find no Brute Creatures capable of it, though dj-vers of them are endued with Tongues like ours, and that divers Birds can pronounce whole Sentences, yet have they no notion of what they fay : whereas there is no Nation, though never (b Barbarous, but hath the uie of .Speech. And to ihewyou farther, how natural Come fort of Speech is to Mankind, I have heard of two young Gentlemen that were Brothers, (and I knew one of them my felf 3 who were born deaf, and confequently dumb, but by often and long Entercourfe with each other, came to irame a certain Language between themlelves ; And though it teemed perfect Gibberifh to the flanders by , yet , by the fble motion of their Lips and other (igns, they perfectly underflood each o-ther ,� which was likewife evident from this, that in the dark they were not able to convcrfe at all. So that this faculty feems to have been bellowed by God on Mankind , not for his Prefervation as a rneor Animal, fince divers Brutes are able to ftbfift for more years without it; and

therefore feems to be intended to render Man a Sociable Creature, and who was by this Faculty to benefit others of his own kind, as well as himfelf. For we are not only hereby able to impofe certain Arbitrary names to particular things ; but ha-ving firft framed Univerfal Idea's, can 1 ike-wile give names to them, as to this general Idea applicable to all particular Men in the World, we can give the name of Man;. and herein confifts the main difference between Men and Brutes, and not in Ratiocination alone. Since. I fuppofe even Brutes haye right Idea's of thofe Objects they have received by their Senfesj and can likewife infer, or reafon right about them. As when a Dog, by often feeing his Mailer take down his Stick beiore he goes abroad, docs thence argue whenever he does fo, that his go ing abroad will follow, cxpreiTmg his Joy by barking and leaping; yet we cannot find that Brutes have any general or complex Idea's,rnuch iefs names tor them, having no more but a few Ordinary figns , whereby to exprefk their pre-ient Appetites and Paflions; but the main benefit of Speech teems to refped others more than our felves, fmce we are hereby able to inftrud them in many Arts andSci-encts, neceflary for their Happinefsand

Prefervation, and alfo to tfdvife and ad-monifh them in all Civil and Moral Duties, and there is fcarce any one fo Brutifh, who is not fenfible that in the exercife of this Faculty, confifts one of the greateft plea~ fures of Humane Ufe,fv/s/) Conversion. And fuppofmg Men in a. (late of War, I do not fee how they could ever well get out of it again, were it not for Treaties and Articles of Peace; butmuft (likeGame Cocks and Bulls) fight it out, till one fide were either quite deftroyed, or forced tp run away, and quit that Territory or Country where they Liv'd.

Nor can we omit another great benefit we receive from Speech, O/z.J the Invention of Letters, by which we are not only able to Regifter our prefent Thoughts for our own remembrance; butcanlike-wHe Profit and Inftru#, not only the prefent, but alfo all future Generations, by Books or Writings, as we do now mak<j ufe of the Knowledge and Experience of thofe who dyed fame Thoufands of Years before we were born. But fince Mr. Hobh and others, have made fome Objections againft the benefit of Speech and Letters, as that they often tend to promote falfe

Opinions, and War amongft Mankind : Yet granting it to be fo, it is no more anObje-

&ion againft the benefits we receive by them, than it were to fay, that the Air, Water, or Food, (the only means of Lifej are hurtful to Mankind; becaufe by the ne* ceflary courfe of Nature, or elfe our own Intemperance,they often become the caufes of Plagues, Surfeits, and divers other di£ eafes, whereby Mankind is deftroyed. Yet fmce that Author hath made the ufe of Speech one great Reafbn why Men can-not live fb peaceably as Brutes, and therefore fancies they muft be in a natural ftate of War : I (hall therefore refer the Anfwer-ing it to the Second Part, becaufe my Intention 45 not here to Difpute, but In-ftru<2.

$. 1*5. Men do alfo far exceed Brutes in their Rational or difcourfive Faculty, as appears in the Knowledge of Numbers, or Collecting divers (ingle things into one Total Sumrm, which we call Arithmetick; fo ncceflary for all Affairs of a Civil Life, and the Duties of diftributive Juilice. And though I grant it is an Art, and that divers Barbarious Nations want that cxad: knowledge of it which we have; yet by reckoning upon their fingers they have a fuificient ufe of it, as much as is neceflary for their purpofe or buftnefs 5 and if they did but apply their Minds to it, I

doubt not but that they would arrive to the fame perfection in Arithmetick as we are. But I look upon this Faculty as peculiar to Mankind, fincewe cannot perceive Brutes to have any knowledg of it. Thus if from Bitches or Swine, you take away never fo many of their Young ones , yet if you leave them but one or two, they do not mifs the reft; which (hews that they have no Ideas of Numbers, whatever they they may have of Quantity;

$.±6. TothisObfervationmay likewife be added as a Confequence thereof, that Faculty fo proper to Mankind,of meafiiring the quantities of Bodies, the diftances between them, and the Proportions they bear to each other, which Science we call Geometry or Mathematicks; which Arts were certainly invented by Man, as a Creature intended for a Sociable Life; fince on fome of thefe depend moft Trades, all Com-merce, Architecture, Navigation, and moft of the Rules of diftributive Juftice, with other Arts needlefs here to be fet down. So that whoever will but ferioufly reflect upon the excellency of thefe Sciences, as well in the certainty of their Demonftra-tions, as in the vaft Stupendious effedts they produce, cannot but acknowledge

that our Rational Faculty exceeds that of Brutes by many degrees.

JT. 17. But there yet remain behind two of the greateft Prerogatives of Man's Soul, and in refped of which alone he is made a fit Subject of the Law of Nature. The firft is freedom in actions, or the power of doing or forbearing any action; which does not only confift in indifferent things, as when a Man of two different Objects, chufes which of them he pleafes; bwt is alfoable tochufe a greater Good before a lefs, and does likewife often prefer ( though unjuftly ) a prefent lefs Good grateful to his Senfes, before a greater Good approved of by his Reafbn : yet however it cannot be denyed, but that Man by the power of his Reafon, is able to move and excite his Paflions of Love and Pity , when he fees Objects that require his help and afliflance,� Nay , can alfb by deliberation , command and overrule thofe domineering Pafiions of Luft , Anger, and Revenge, &c. when they happen to prompt him to actions that are Contrary to his own true Good, and that of the reft of Mankind. And laflly, Man being capable of comprehending all particular goods,and of adding them together into one Sum, v/z, the Common and

General Good of Rationals, as the bed and mod noble End he can impJoy himfelf a-bout, is alfo able to divert his thoughts from his own private pleafure and profit alone ; and fix them upon the care of his Relations and Friends, or the more pub-lick Good of his Country. And though I grant it is difficult, exactly to explain after what manner we exert this Faculty, fmce the Nature and Actings of the Rational Soul, are very abflrufe; yet I appeal to every Man's own Heart, whethef he does not find in himfelf, not only a Liberty to do or forbear indifferent actions, fuch as going abroad or flaying at home ; but likewife fuch as are certainly better by a Rational eftimate, if he will but give himfelf time to confider, and weigh the Nature and Confequence of them * or elfe to what purpofe is he fbrry > Or why does he repent the having done any toolifli, wicked, or ralh adion ? fmce if all Adi-ons were abfolutly neceflary, it were as idle and infignificant as if he (hould be forry, that he was not made a Prince, rather than a private Perfon ; or inftead of a Prince, that he was not anAngeL So that certainly, God would not then have endued Man with thefe two Prd-perties peculiar to him, viz. That of Con*

fclence, or a PvefiedHon upon the Good or Evil of his own adions, and that of Repentance or Sorrow, for having done amifs, altogether in vain, fince both were needlefs, if all Actions were alike ne-ce/Titated.

$. z8. But the laft and higheft Faculty, and whereby Man's Nature is chiefly di-fiinguiihed from that of Brutes, is, when by the force of his Reafbn, fading by the method and means here defcrib'd) he becomes feniible of the Exi(lence,Providence, and other Perfections of the Deity ; from whence we may infer, that it is highly improbable, if not impollible , that this mofl Wife and Powerful Being, which we call God,ihould have Ordained any Power or Faculty of Man's Soul to no purpofe. If therefore He hath,of allhisCreatures,En-dued Man alone with the knowledg of his own Exiflence and Attributes, as far as is neceflary for us Finite Creatures to conceive of them, forlmuft acknowledg we are not able throughly to comprehend Infinite Perfections; it is not likely,that God fhould endue Man only with fo excellent a Know-Jedg as thisr for fb ufele(s an End as bare Speculation ; which alone is of no great Ufe or Benefit, either to himfelf, or the r?ft of Mankind, whofe Good and Hap-

pinefs God chiefly intended in their Creation : So that indeed we cannot apprehend any end more worthy his Divine Wifdom and Goodnefs, in Creating us capable of thefe Idea's, than what is Practical, that is, as may fomeway ferve to dired our A&i-ons, as free and voluntary Agents towards the obtaining our own Good and Happi-nefs,Conjoyn'd with that of other Rational Beings. Nor can any Adions render us more Happy, than thofe that teflifie our high Veneration of God's Infinite Perfe-dions , and a deep Senfe of his Goodnefs towards us, and whereby we may be dif-pofed to one entire Obedience to his Laws, whether Natural orReveal'd, whenever they are made known to us; fo that if it can be prov'd, that thefe Didates of right Reafon, called the Laws of Nature, derive their Authority from God as a Law-giver, and were intended by Him for the Hap-pinefs and Prefervation of Mankind, and as Rules whereby he would have us dired all our Actions to this great End; there can be no doubt but we lie under a fuf-ficicnt Obligation to obferve them; and to prove this, will be the next and greatefl part of our task.

$. X9. But before I undertake this, it will not be amifs to Treat a little, concerning thofe Attributes of the Deity, as far as we can have any Idea's of them ,� fmce from the confederation of the Nature of things, and alfb of our own Humane Nature, we can* not but be carry'd on to confider the Nature of God himfelf,' and if from the Creation of the Univerfe, we cannot but conceive Him of Infinite Power ; fo from His Acting and Ordaining all things, for the beft and Worthieft End, we may likewife affirm Him to be alfo Infinitely Wife and Good : fo that His Infinite Power always Acting for the bed and wifeft Ends, is {till fo limited by His Infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs, that it cannot A& any thing de-ftruftive to this Common Good of Rational Beings, of which Himfelf is the chief; and from hence proceeds the certainty of the Law of Nature,as alfb, of our perpetual Obligation to it. For as I will not affirm that God could not have made the World, and the Things therein, after another manner than he hath done; fo fince He hatlx made it in the Order we now find it, this great Law of Nature, of endeavouring and procuring the Common Good of Rational Beings, is of the fame Duration with that

of the Univerfe it £elf; and (b confequently of conftant and perpetual Obligation in re(pe<3: of HimCelf, and all thofe whom He hath Ordained to be His Subordinate Means, or Inftruments to procure it, efpecially Men, whom he hath made Confcious of their Duty, and able to Cooperate with Him for this Great and Excellent End.


Of tie Law of N A T u R E, and that it is reducible to one jingle (propofition, which is truly, and froferly a Law, as containing all things neceffary thereunto.

A S I have in the Two former Chapters /~jL from the Great Book of Nature, (j:har is, as well that of things without us, as of our {elves in particular, and of Mankind in general) made feveral Obfervations for the proving of this Proportion, That Man was Ordain'd by God tor a Sociable Creature, whofe Being, Prefervation and Happinefs, was to depend upon the Af-fiftance and Good will of God his Creator, as alfb thofe of his own kind ; So I come in the next place to fhevv, That every one is oblig'd to a return of the like Benevolence to others ,� for we can by no means be better afliired of the like Good-will from them, than by doing them the fame good Offices, as often as it lies in our Power, which we defire they ihould do for us, and that this conftitutes the happieft ftate Men are capable of in this Life, viz. Peace -and Concord, not only among par-

ticular Men,but alfo between all Commonwealths and Nations, of which the whole body of Mankind confifts ; fo that it evi* dently appears, that the true and Natural flate.of Mankind, is, That of Peace, Love, or mutual Benevolence, and which indeed would require no other Rewards,than what proceeds from it (elf, (was Man a Creature always governed by right Reafon and his pwn true Good) Rewards and Punifhments being Ordained for Men, as too often go-vern'd by their Paflions and Senfual Appetites, and not according to the perfedion of their Rational Nature. Yet fince it pleated God, to Create Man a mixt Creature, confiding of a Body and a Soul, and being too oft'n drawn afide byPaffions,not dire&ed by right Rea(bn,andtoftand inneedofPunifh-ments as well as Rewards, to keep him to his duty; thence antes a necefllty of his dealing with Man as a Legiflator,and of giving him certain natural Laws or Rules, whereby to govern his Adions,with certain Penalties and Rewards annex'd to them ; which -Laws may be very well contracted into one finglePropofition.or practical Con-clufion drawn froai the Nature of God, our own Nature, and that of things without us, by the Cbfervations already laid dovvn,z;/z. That God will sot commands jhat all reafc&akk

Perfons fhould endeavour the Common Good of RationalBeings,a$ the great End for which they \»ere Created^and inpttrfuance of whichjon/ifls their own true Good or Happinefs; as in its xegleft or violation, their greatefl Mifery*

$. i. Having given you this fummary defer iption of the Laws of Nature, as coming from its firftCaufe,God, I (hall now explaia the terms therein contain'd,to avoid all Am. biguity andException.(i)By God'sWills and Commands^ do not mean any Commands by Words, that being the method of God's Revealed, and not Natural Will, and fo is not the Subject of this DiCcourfe; but I here only underftand that Will or Command of God, which is to be learned from the Con-fideration of his Divine Nature, our own, and that of all other things, confiding not in Words, but in Idea's; that is, true Con-clufions drawn from right Reafon $ but that words are not always Eflential to a Law,or that it cannot be made known to the Sub, je&s, without fome fetform of Speech,may appear by Perfons born Deaf and Dumb, whom we often.find to have Notions of a God, and a Law of Nature, though they were not conveyed in their Minds by Words or Writing: for it is fufficient if the Will of the Legiflator may be difcovered by any other fit means or figns, efpecially when

(as in this Law we now treat of ~) there are fuch certain Rewards and Punifhments, annexed to theirObfervation orTranfgreflion, as may make it their Intereft, rather to ob-ferve than tranfgrefs them ,� which is not only vifible in Men,but Brutes. Since we fee, that by certain Signs imprinted in their Minds,by the means of fit Rewards andCor-redions; Elephants, Horfes, Dogs, &c. are made Sufceptible of Humane Commands, and (as far as their Natures permit) are governable by Laws of our Prefcribing; For we can fhew them by fuch figns, what Actions are to be done or omitted by them; and certainly God hath not left us lefs plain demonftrations of his Will, in reference to our Duty towards him, from that Knowledge he hath given us of his Ex-iftence, as alfo of our own Nature, as I (hall farther prove in this Difcourfe.

By Reafoaalle Perfons, I mean, all thofe, £ though of never fb mean a Capacity,) who are able to make fuch eafie and natural Obfervations and Conclufions, as I have already laid down: And therefore Children, under the Years of Difcretion, Idiots and Mad-folks, are dill to be except ted from this Law, who not having the actual ufe of right Reafbn, are not able to draw thofe Obfervations and Conlequences

from the Nature of things, as are already laid down, and which are necetfary for the right undcrftanding thereof.

By Endeavour * I mean all fuch voluntary A&tons, which Perfons oi"found Minds can knowingly, and deliberately perform towards the good of others,without deftroy-ing or hurting their own true Happinefs -, And tlio' tiiefe endeavours, ( by many un-forefeen accidents in the Courfe of Nature) may be often fruftrated, and ib fail of their intended clcfign : yet when we have done the utmoft we are able, we have fuffici-ently perform'd our Duty, fince no Laws require the performance of more, than is in our Power to pertorm.

By the Cownon Good of Rational Beings, I mulerfhnd the whole collective Happinefs of the Deity, as the head of them,together with that of all the individual Perlons of Mankind, exifting with us, as the con-ilituent parts or" Members; and in which each Man's particular Good and Happinefs is included; fince it is impoflible to endeavour the Happinefs of others, as voluntary Agents, unlefs each particular perfon whofe duty it is fo to do,have firft a Right to pre-fcrve, and make himfelf happy, jointly wit'a others in his Proportion, to the whole BQ:!V o" Mankind.

By true Good or Happinefs, I mean, all thofe Goods, whether of Body or Mind, by which Men may be rendred truly Happy, and contented in this Life, and in that to come ,� but in which, whenever the former fland in Competition with the latter , the Goods of the Soul are to be preferred; that is, the good of our better or Eternal part, before that of our Body, which is lefs valuable, as being only temporal. But I need add nothing here to prove, That God is the Head of all Rational Beings,and in what Sence we may be (aid to procure or endeavour his Good and Happinefs, fince I have fpoken fo largely of that in the Preface to this Difcourie ; and as for the difference between Natural and Moral good, I have fatd fo much concerning it in the Second Part, in the Confutation of Mr. H's Sixth Principle, that ly Nature nothing is Good or Evil; that it would be impertinent to repeat it here.

I (hall now prove, that this Propofition, containing this Defcription of the Law of Nature is true, that is, agreeable to the Will of God, as far as it is declared to us; by what we are able to know of His Divine Nature, or can colled: from our own, and the Natures of all things without us, and that all the Moral Duties we owe, either to

God, our fclves, or others, are contained in, or may be reduced to this one Propo-fition, That we endeavour to procure the Common Good of Rationals; in order to which, I (hall lay down thefe Proportions.

tf. 3. i. That God in the firft place Wills and intends his own Glory and Service, and in the next, the Good and Prefervation of all Mankind, and of all particular Perfbns therein contain'd,as far as confifts with that frail and Mortal (late wherein He hath Created them. This Propofition hath already been made out in the Firft Part of this Dif-courfe; wherein I have proved,that the Prefervation and continuance of all theSpecies ofCreatures,£and confequently of Mankind as one of them) does wholly depend upon God's Providence. And as for the Individu-als,or particularPerfonSjfince God's Knowledge is Infinite, and extends even to the leaft things,- and alfothat of thefe Particulars, each Species of Creatures is made up, and confifls; It is likewife as evident,that God defigns their Good and Prefervation, as well as that of the whole kind; though I grant He prefers the Good of the whole Species, before that of the Individuals.

a. It is the Will of God that all Men of found Minds, fliouid be made confcious of this His intention of the Good and Prefer-

vatioa of Mankind, and that they ftould operate as his Subordinate Means, or In-ftruments towards this great End. Which I (hall prove thus.

i. " It is evident that ajl Men of (bund Minds,have a notion of the good and hap-pinefc of others, as well as of themfelves. idly. ** That this Notion or Idea, when truly purfued, will at laft extend it (elf to all Mankind ,� for it can never (lop ihort of it, fo long as it may £lili proceed farther, and find new and fitObje&s to work on; every Individual Member of Mankind making a part of this Univerfal Idea.

3. That this notion of endeavouring the CommonGood of RationalBe ingfjs notonly poffible to be performed, butis al(b highly Rational, and the greateft and nobleft End we can imagine, or propofe to our (elves, as comprehending the Good and Happinefc of the whole Syftem of Rational Beings, and is alfo true, /. e. agreeable with the Divine Intellect: which f thus make out, the foregoing Principles being fuppofed.

tf. 4. Firft, It is certain, that all the truths our Minds are endued with, or capable of, are from God, fmce whatever perfe&ion is found in the efFeft, muft needs have been ftrft more eminently in its Caufe.Therefore if the Knowledge of Truth be a, perfection,

(as doubtlefs it is) it muft be much more fo in God, the Original Caufe thereof j fo that if this Idea of the Common Good of Rational Beings, is the higheft Good we Men are capable of knowing, [Forit is a clear and perfect (tho com-plext)Idea,drawn from the Nature ofGod and all other things, and a Collection of the Good and Happinefs of the Deity,and dfall other Rational Agents; ] it muft be true, and consequently from God. And the Divine Intellect,doth as certainly agree with our Idea concerning it, as it doth when we judge, that the Bate of an Equilateral Triangle, is equal to either of the Crura or Legs. Therefore if this Idea of the Common Good be true,and that it is alfo certairi,that all Truth is from God, as likewife that He hath made us truly to underftand, that He Wills the Good and Happinefs of Mankind; it is likewife as certain, that He would have us act as Rational Agents, confcious of this His great defign.

JT. 5. The Second Part of this Propofition (wz.) That God would have us Operate as his Inftruments to this End ; will appear likewife more clear1 when you confider what I have already faid, That God who hath made nothing in vain, would not have endued us with an Idea of this Common Good, as the greateft

End we can propofe to our felves, for mere Speculation, but rather for feme practical End, in order to our own Good and Hap-pinefs, with that of others; efpccially finc'e God hath placed it fomuch in our Power to promote and procure this Common Good. For fo far as we endeavour the Good add Happinefsof particular Perfons, fo far we do contribute our (hare to that of Mankind, considered as one Aggregate Body. Thus whatfoever does good to any one Member, does fo far benefit the whole Body; and the Good and Happinefs of an Aggregate Body confiding of divers diflinft Members, con-fifts in that of each of its part?. Thus then, if God intends the End, (viz ) the Common Good of Mankind, (as I have already proved) he de(igns likewife the Means to produce it: Nor can there be any better means, or fitter Infiruments for this End, than the joint Endeavours cf all Men, exprefledly all the A#s of Benevolence and Kindneis towards each other; fmce it is certain (a> Ifaid before} that Men can contribute more to the Hurt, or Benefit, cf each other, than all other Creatures put rcgaher. Therefore as God hath citTigncd tie End, and ordained fu/ficicnt Means to produce it, (wz ) Men's kind and benevolent ^clions; fo it is as evident, That he will male vie of

Men,as the neceflary means for this End.Tho* I grant he hath ordained us to operate, not only as Mechanick Caules, but rather as free and voluntary Agents to produce it; that is, as true Subjects to this Law of Nature. * Thus by the fame fteps that we arrive at the knowledge of God, rhe Supreme Being, we are hkewife brought to an acknowledgment of this his great Defign of the Common Good of Rational Beings. And if from all the wonderful Ob-fervations, and curious Contrivances (taken notice of in this lad Chapter) drawn from the Nature of Things, and Mankind, we cannot but conclude, That they were fo difpo-fed by a mod Wife, Intelligent Being, towards this greatEnd: The very fame appearances that difcover thefe Things , muftlike-wife declare his Intention of making ufe of Us Men, as neceiTary means thereunto.

* nd. Dr Parker's Demonftrarion of the L*» of Nature* page 24

§, 7. The bft Proportion for the proving this Defcription of the Law of Nature to be true, is this: That GOD having made this Difcovery of his Will unto us, we thereupon he under a fufTicient Obligation, to ob-fetve this great Law of endeavouring this Common Good: To prove which, I firft fuppofe that Obligation to an Action enjoy-ned by the natural Law, is the neceflary and

conftint effed; thereof* upon every Perfon fubjed: to it; and that this immediately re» fults from its own Nature, this Law being always juft and right, as the Will of GOO, the Legiflator,is,from whence it proceeds: So that tho' I underftand an Obligation to A-diveObedience to be the immediate effed: of this Law , yet that it primarily flows from that Will of GOD, which ordained this Law^ and made Man a Creature fubjedt to it $ as Heat in us is the immediate Effcd: or A&ion of Fire upon us, but originally both the Fire and Heat is from the firft Caufe. Now, there is no legal Liberty left us in the cafe of natural Laws, to chufe whether we will be obliged to the Actions therein commanded* or rather will fubmit to the Pun./h-ment attending the Violation thereof. And although our natural Liberty of Will be not deftroyed thereby, yet we have no Right left us to determine our felves otherwile than natural Law direds, becaufe ail Moral Truth, or Rectitude, is comprehended within that Law. But in Human Laws, becaufe they may enjoyn fomething amifs, there a Right is often left to us to chufe rather to bear the Penalty, than to obey them, ( becaufe we are obliged rather to obey GOD thafc Man ) in cafe they command any Adi-

on contrary to the Divine Law, whether Natural or Revealed.

§. 8. For the further clearing of this, I dial! premlfe fomewhat to explain this Word Obligation, which the Civilians thus define: Olligatio eft viftculttm Juris, quo quis aftrin-gitur delitum perfolvcre. That is, an Obligation is that Bond of Law, whereby every one is obliged to fay his Debt, cr Due : Which Definition doth well include all icrts of Obligations if by the Word Jus, or Law, we underftand that Law whole Obligation we propofe to define. So that by vimulum Juris in this Definition, we underftand that Bond, or Tye, of tht Law of Nature, ty which every one is obliged to pay this natural Debt, /. e. to perform that Duty which he ows to GOD his Creator, by reafon of his own Rational Nature, or cffe to undergo thofe Punifhments which are ordained for his Difobedience or Ntgledh So that there is a twofold Tye, or Obligation, in all Laws ; the one adive in the Debt, or Duty; the other pafiive, in a patient fob-mifiion to the Puniihment, in cafe of any wilful negleft, or omiflion thereof! Of both which, we ihall fpeak in their Order.

$. 9. But you are firft to take notice, That none can oblige us to do, or forbear any Adioo, bm 1'uch who have a Right to Com-

tmnd us: So that this Obligation proceeds from that juft Right of Dominion, which a fuperiour Power hath over us and our AcTi-ons; and as far as we are fubjed: to others, we are fo far under an Obligation to their lawful Commands, which obliges us to a dif-chargeof that Debt, or Duty, we owe them; that is, when we are obliged to do, or forbear any Action from the Will or Command of a Supreme Power, or Lcgiflator, to whom, when fufficiently made known to us, we are bound to yield Obedience to the utmoft of our Power: And herein confifts the Obligation, or Duty, (viz.) in the Conformity of our Actions to a Rule, fiich as is declared by the Will of the Lcgifhtor. So that all our Obligation to the Laws of Nature, is at laft refolved into that abfolute Dominion, which GOD, as he is the Great Creator and Preferver of Mankind, hath over us: For I cannot undrrftand 3 Right (efpe-cially ot Dominion ) to be in veiled cr leated in any Suprrme Pc.wer, but by virtue of fomtthing which may be called (at leaft analogically) a Law. 2.. That every Dictate of the Divine Wiiciom, concerning Matter fit to be established by a Law, is fuch' a Law: And (o Cicero fdic beft M'iler of Language) /peaks, towards the end of i>h Hrfl: Book de Legilus. 3. That the Eternal Wiiciom of

GOD, contains eminently, or analogically, in it, all that we can know to be Natural Law. 4. But to know that it is Natural l^w or the Dictate cf Right Reafon, concerning the fit left Means to the bed End, or greateft Good, it is neccfFiry to (his pyrpofe, ThurheSjo"emeG^ernnrRntof all Things (an i efpeoiaiiy of Rarional Creatures) (hould be in Him, who is mod able and willing to purfuf and attain that greateft End; that is it mud be fetled in GOD. 5. So that by this JX& - .e of Eternal Wifdom, or of performing all Things for the beft End, the Sovereignty bt comes bis Right; and our Knowledge that this Didate of Eternal Wifdom is in Him, "(lures us That this Right isimmuta-b-y 6x'd and vefted in Him. 6. Although in the method of inveftigating the Laws of Nature, as they fubfift in our Minds, the firft Law refpeds the End, and this concerning the Means, comes in the fecond place: Yet in our Thoughts concerning GOD, we Know that infinite Wifdom comprehends all thefe Dilates together; and therefore that the Didate, or La\v, fetling Univerfal Dominion in GOD, is co-eternal with Him; and f) is as early in his Nature, as the firft JsJ '.rural Lw � the O'^ligJttion of which, we are f.dabliih'.ng in this Chapter. And here aiifes the difference between a Moral Obit-

garion (which is that we now treat of) and a Civil one, or that by which we are obliged to Laws in Civil Governments ; the former being in refped to G O D's immediate Will, as the Supreme Legifhtor 5 whereas all the Duty we owe to our Civil Magiftrates, Parents, and Matter*, &c. is only in fubordi-nation to G O D's Will fo declared unto us, and who hath ordained this Obedience for his own Worftiip and Glory, and in order to the Common Good of all Humane Socie* ties and Commonwealths, that is, of Mankind in general.

§. 10. Yet I think, nctwithftanding all we have faid of the Force andNature of this Obligation , it may well enough confift with the natural Freedom of Man's Will, fmceall thefe Confiderations do ftill but excite, not necefluate Him to A&one way or other: For it is ftill left in his Power either to chufe that which is abfolutely the bed in obeying this Will of God, or elfe to prefer a lefs, but pre-fent good before it, in the fatisfaction of his Appetites, or Paffions. And herein likewife confifts the difference between an Animal Good, or Evil, and a Moral one; the former being thole natural Means conducing to each Man's prefervation, or deftru&ion, con* fidered as a mere Animal, without any re-fpe6t to God as their Author, or the Com-

raon G^or] of nationals as their Rule- The latter, that is of all Humane Moral Adions, or i-iahits, considered as agreeable, or di(-agreeableunio the LAWS of Nature, ordained by God a;> a Lcgiflator, and made known to Man, m order to t!uj common good of national Beings ; fo that tiiey are thus morally Good, or E'v'i.I, only in refpedt of their Conformity or D^ne,.m?nt with the Will of God; and as their Obfervance, or Ncg-Ld", brings eivher Good, or Evil, (that is, Happinefs or Msfery) upon us in this Life, or in that to come. From whence you may obferve the neceflity of putting God, in all cur defcriptiorii, or definitions ot the Law of Nature, as the Author thereof: For were it not for hi? exidenc", in whofe divine In-telicd I he Idea's of Moral Good and Evil, art eternally eflabliilied, and into whofe will fo ordaining them, they arc ultimately to be refolved,Mr. Hols$ (or rother Epicurms A(-fertion)would certainly be true, That there is nothing morally Good, or Evil, in its own Nature. And it m A v he here silo obfervtd, That the great omiflion of divers Writers on this Su! jcdl, in not placing God as theCaufe, or Author of the Law of Nature, in their de-rirmions, hat!> been perhaps the main, if not only Keafon, of that fa lie Atlcrtion, That the Laws of Nature are not properly to,

'till they are eftabliihed by the Authority of the Supreme Civil Power. So on the other fide, if it be made evident, That God Wills, or Commands, all Men fhould endeavour the Common Good of Rationals, as the greateft they are capable of; it'inuft necef-iarily follow, that we lie under a fufficient Obligation, by all the Tyes of Duty and Gratitude, to concur with God's Will and Defign, in purfuing and endeavouring this great End.

£.11. But fince God hath thought fit to make Man a Creature confiding i f two different and diftind: Parts, or Principles, a Soul and a Body, both capable of' Gocd and Evil, /. e. of Rewards and Pumirmunrs; I come to the other part of this Law, i>/z>. the Obligation by which we arc bound, by all the Rational Motives, or Rewards,'thit Man's Nature is capable of, to obfcrve this great Law,and are deterred by all the contrary Evils, or Puniiliments, from neglecting or tranfgrefling it: In order to which, I Ihall lay down thefe plain Axioms, drawn from the Nature of Moral Good and Evil, which you may find ia the Learned Biihop Wilkins Ills excellent DiiCourfc of Natural Religion.

'Axiom I. Thai which is morally good,

( i, e,) A£resal?l? to the Will of God9 is to

le defired and profecuted; and that which is evil, i. e, contrary to his Will^ is to le a-vrided.

* Ax. i. The greater Congruity there is in any thing to the Reafon of Mankind, and the greater tendency it hath to promote or hinder the Perfection of Mans Nature, in the endeavour of the Common Good; fa much greater degrees it hath of Moral Good% or Evil; and according to which9 we ought to proportion our Inclinations, or Awrfions thereunto.

< Ax. 3. So that it is fuitalle loth to the Reafon and Intereft of Mankind^ that all Perfons jbould fulmit themfehes to God's Willy upon whom thev depend for their Hap pinefs and Well'being^ ly doing fuch Things as vnay render them acceptable to Him^ and avoiding thofe contrary Actions &hich may provoke his Difplaafure^ that //, in (hort, in profecuting the Common Good of Rational Beings.

' Ax. 4. Hence the Rational Nature, and the Perfections belonging to //, being more Nolle than the Senjftive, a Moral Good is tn be preferred before &n Animil Pleafure ; and that which is morally evil, is more to le aviidecit than that which is merely animal.

fc Ax. 5. A prefent Animal Good may le parted with , upw a prolalle Expectation of a greater future Moral Good.

4 Ax. $. A prefect p.vil is to le endured, for the profalle avoiding of a greater, though future Evil.

But fince all the Rewards which God can beftow upon us, for our obferving this fundamental Law, of endeavouring the Common Good of Rationals, does only amount to the trued and bighefl Happiriefs that Man's Nature is capable of; it is fit that we fufficiemly (late that Happinefs, and wherein it coniifts: For the clearing of which, I (hall lay down thefe two plain Proportions.

$. \i. Prop. i. That which gives, orcon-flirutes the Eflence of any thing, and diftin-guiflieth it from all other things, is called the Effential form of that thing.

Prop. 2. That State, or Condition, by which the Nature of any thing is advanced to the utmoft perfection which it is capable of, according to its kind, is called the Chief End, Good, or Happinefs of fuch a BHng.

Thus, for Example, (to give you a Scale, drawn from the Nature of thole Beings we know to be endued \* ith Life or Motion) i. The Nuure of Plants confifts in having a vegetative Life, by which they receive Nourifliment ami-Growth, and are enabled to multiplytheir kind. The utmoflr Perfe&ion which this kind of Being is ca-

pable of, is to grow up to a Hate of Maturity , to continue unto its natural P riod, and to propagate its Kind. z. The Nature of Brutes ( beficScs what is common to them with Plants) contifts in their being endue d with Faculties, whereby they are capable of apprehending external Objt&s, and of receiving Pain or Pleaiure from them, in order to their own Preservation, and the propagation of their Species. The utmoft Perfection of thefer confjfts in nitre fin-iitive Plcafures; /. e. of doing and enjoying fuch Things as are grateful to their Appetites and Senfes. 3 But the Nature of Man, f befides what is common to him with Plants and Brutes, both in the vegetative and fenfirive Life 3 confifts in the Faculty of Right Reafon, whereby he is made capable of under (landing the Law of Nature , and its Rewards and Puniihments, either in this Life, or that to come, to induce him to their ObitTvation, and deter him from the tranf-greflion of them : Which fentiments as no Creature in this vifible World, except Man, does partake of; fo his Chief Good , or Happinefs, conftfts in the improvement and perfection of this Faculty j that is, in fuch Actions as ^re mod agreeable to Right Rea-lon , and as may bell entitle him to t! e Divine Favour, and afford him the Create it

Affurance of a lading Happinefs, both in this Life, and after it is ended. So that all the Athens of Man, confidcred as voluntary snd fubject to the Law of Natme, and thereby capable of Rewards and Punilhmtnts, are called Moral, as being diaclxd by God, the Supreme Legifhtor, to the greatefl and rood excellent End, viz. the Common Good of Rational Beings*

§. 13. Having laid down thefe Principles of Moral Good and Evi!, in order to the fet-ling and clearing the Nature of this Obligation, and wherein it confifts; I fhali, in the next place, particularly declare the Sanction of this Law, -(wz.) thofe Rewards which God hath ordained for the Obfervation of this Law of Nature, of endeavouring the Common Good; and thofe Punishments he haih appointed for its Breach, or Tranf-greflion. I have already laid down, That all Obligations upon the Soul of Man , a-rife properly from the Commands of fome Rightful Superior Power; that is, fuch a one who hath not only force fufficient to in-fiicl: what Evils he plcafcs upon the Difobe-dient; but, who hath, allo given us juft Grounds, or .Rcafons, wherefore he requires us to determine the natural Liberties ot our Wills,according to his Pleafure ; both which, whenever they meet in any Supreme Power ,

and that he hath once fig-iified Ms Will to usi ought to produce in our Minds not only fear to offendjbut alfo a love of, and obedience to his Commands. The former, from the Confederation of his irrefiftible Power; The latter, from their own intrinfick Goocnefs, as alfo from all thofe Motives w ich ought to perfuade us to perform M? Will. F) as one who hath no other Re?f.m than downright Force, why he will hav? me perform and fubmit to his Commands, whether i \irill or no, may indeed fo far terrify me, thar^ to avoid a Beater Evil, 1 may think it bid to obey him; yet that Fearonce reir :>ved. there will then remain nothing that cm hinder me from acting according to my own, rather than his Will, or Humour. So on the other fide, he who can give me never fo good Reafons why I ought to obey him ; yet if deftitute of Power to inflid any Puniih-ment upon me for my Difobedienccj fueh his Commands may, without any outward inconvenience, be negle&ed by fne, if I think fit, unlels he is endued with fufficient Power to vindicate the Negleftj or Contempt, of his Authority, Therefore £he ftrideft San&ion which any Sovereign Power can give unto its Laws, is, when it is not only able, but hath alfo fufficiemly declared^ That it will confer a fufficient fhate of good

Things, or Rewards, for fo doing ; and of Evils, orPunifhmentSj upon any breach, or negleft of its Commands. So though I grant the whole force of this Obligation is properly refolved into the Will of the Legislator* or chofe to whom the Cuflody of thefe Laws are committed ; all which are included in this Law of Nature, fince we find God commanding it, to whom we ought to yield abfolure Obedience; though not in Right of H;s irrefiftible Power alone, but rather as He hath, by his Eternal Wifdorii and Goodnefs in his Creation and Prefer vat ion of us, an abfolute Dominion over, and an undoubted Right to Command us; and confequently we are obliged to yield Obe. die nee to His Laws, as they are not only highly reafonable, (being ordained for the Common Good of Rationale) but are alfo eftabliihed by fufficient Rewards and Puniih-ments. But fince the former feem more plainly declared to Mankind, and are like* wife more agreeable to our Rational Natures, which ihould rather delight to be allured by Rewards, than terrified by Punifh-ments; I (hall firft begin with the natural Rewards annexed to the Obfervation of this great Law of Nature, of endeavouring the Common Good ; Which may be divided into Internal* or External; that is. cither in

relation to the Soul alone, or to the Body and the S'uil jointly conficiered.

§. 14. The fir.'t internal Reward, ordained uy viod for our Qbfervauon of the Law of Nature, is, That inward Satisfaction the Soul enjoys, when reflecting upon thofe Adions, which, by the means'of the Body it hath performed, it finds they are agreeable to the Rule; of Right Reafon, that is, confo-nanr to the Nature of Things, and confe-qtscmly to thofe true Idea's contained in the Divine Intellect; from whence arifes that un-exprtfiibSe Pleafure, called, Peace of Co»fci-ence. proceeding from a felf-Reflection, That it hath sdrtd agreeable to God's Will, and may thereby expect his Favour, as a Reward for its Obedience; and This, alone, were a fufrtcieiu Obligation, if there were no Other , for any Rational Man to obferve this Law of Nature, as the declared Will of God,fceirg his true Happinefs, or the higheft Good he is capable of, confifls in his fenfe of God's Favour; who hath thought fit to propofe to us the Common Good of Ratio* nals, as the nobleft Object, and higheft End we can be ordained for, as being the funi of all his natural Laws; and that we do not herein ad: only as fenfleis,fubordinate Inftru* ments to thisEnd,bjtHe hath alfo allowed us to be herein voluntary Imitators of bis Divine Beneficence.

£. I £. To which I ihallalfo add, that inward Pleafure and Satisfaction, which all Rational and Gcod-natured Perfons in eft neceflarily take in the due exercife of thofe fweeter Paffions of Love, Joy, and De-fire, &c. exprcfled in the wiihing and endea-vouring the lil'e good Things to a!! \* orthy and innocent Pcrions, as for thtnvfelve? t crd alfo in the performing all kind end chari-table Actions towards them, as far PS lies in their Power, whenever their prefTt Ccca-fions, or Neccffrics require it ; which S^rk-fadion will flill be greater, the krg*-> rnd more difTufed this Charit)% cr Bcnevcltnce, is, and the more Objecls it fire's to cyerr it felf upon; whereas the Plcafure which ary ielfilh, ill-natured Man can take, in doing goodto,and pleafing himfelf alone.nv..:ft- vr.eri.« be very fcanty and narrow, as being co^fi? td within fo fmall a compals as one iingir ptrlbn*

Thus if we examine all«he faculties of t?ur Souls, we (hall find them rn».ich larger, and more ample than can only be well excrrni tov^ards our ftlves ; and our Minds are often carried on, whether they will or no, to ?be confideration of thofe Things that may pr.'; ve more beneficial to the n-(l oi Mankind, than to our felvts alone : ^nd ro this, ?T5^il Arrs and Sciences found ouc by Men's induftry and Invention, and mads known for the

Common Good of Mankind.chiefly owe their Original. So that if natural Inftindt teaches us to endeavour our own Prefervation; our Reafons will like wife inform us, That we ought to exert all the Faculties of our Souls towards the profecution of this great End, The Common Good of Ratwnals ; fincc whilft we promote that, we do at the fame time obtain our own particular Good and Happinefs befides,

$ i6. In the next place, as for the external Rewards that refpeft both our Bodies and Souls together, and which God hath ordained for the Obfervation of this Law, they proceed either from Man, or from God: Of the former fort are all thofe To-kens of Benevolence, either by Words, or Actions, from thofe Perfons whom we have never injured, and who are fenfible of our Concurrence with them towards this great End, and alfo of Gratitude from thofe whom we have any ways obliged by a&s of kindnefs and charity $ the very Hope and Expedition of which, though perhaps it may not be a Good which we iLall always actually enjoy; yet fince it is fuch a Return as we do moft commonly meet with, and may reafo-nably expect from the Nature of Man, may very well be reckoned amongft the natural Rewards of vertuous Actions r fioce the

Hope, or Expectation, of a probable future Good,isan ufual and juft Motive to perfbade men to do kind and beneficial Adticns towards others: Under which is alfo coroprl* fed all that due Praife and Commendation, which all good and vertuous Perfons beftoiv upon kind, charitable, and generous Acli-ons, which is the trueft Honour, and mod: (olid Glory that a man can attain to in this Life; and. which, though it ought not to be the principal End and Motive of any Man's doing fuch Actions, yet fmce it commonly follows them, it feems to be ordained by God, as a natural Reward for our performance of fuch Things, or A&ions, ssare mod agreeable to his Will.

§ ly.The laft external Reward we may pro-pofe to our felves, for our endeavouring 'bis Common Good of Mankind, is, all that Peace and Tranquility, with other Tempers! enjoyments? which we may hope to enjoy from the Protection and Encouragement of the Commonweal, whilft we faithfully purfue the great End thereof, the Common Good. All Civil Government tving the Compacts or Agreements of a colltcU .? ^ciy t,± M--n, for the procuring the Gocd and hq-pinds of the whole Coirm:unity, againfl all fuch wicked and unrenfon^ble Perfons as lhall go about to difturb it.

$ 18. Laftly, in refpeft of God,confidered as the immediate Author and bcftower of thefe Rewards, They are thefe, Health, or Soundnefs both of Soul and Body; the former, from that Temperance, Moderation , and Sedatenefsof its Paflions, uhich it thereby enjoys; the latter from that Security,proceed-ingfrom Concord, maintain'd with, and Benevolence exercifed towards the reft of Mankind, which is alfo generally attended with a Competency cf all the necefTaries of Life, which are uluaily bedowed by God on thofe that are Frugal, Temperate, Peaceable, and Charitable j all which Bldlings may be rationally hoped for by us, ss the Natural Rewards ordained by God, for thofe that do their utmoft to obferv* this great Law of the Common Good. But fince we muft confefs, that many of thefe Rewards foretimes, either altogether tail, or fall ihorc cf this Life, and that divers Evils or AfHl&ioas do often happen Co thofe that nre truly good, pious and vertucus; and alfo that all thofe outward good things that conftitute this external Felicity, do often attend thofe that art* Wicked, Unjuil, and Violent 5 we may from thence with higheftReafon conclude,thatGod will recompence thofe Lciks and Afflictions with a far larger Sure o; H^ppincC to be enjoyed by the Good and Venuou^, in

a Life after this; fince other wife the Wif-dom and Providence of God would prove Inefficient for the ends it defigned. For if (as I have already laid down) God really intends Man's Happinefs, and that Happi-nefs is the great end which Man's Nature fo earneftly defires: If then He is not happy in this Life ( no Man that ever lived having been perfectly fo )God would befruftrated of this great defign, and would alfo have given us this defire of Happinefs altogether in vain, unlefs he fatisfy it in a Life after this is ended. And moreover, thefe Laws of Nature would (ignify but little, (as I have already prov'd) without a due Administration of Rewards and Paniflments, which fmce they fo often fail in this Life, ought to be made up in that to come. And trom hence it was, that mod of the wifeft Heathen Phiiofophers did without any D*vine Revelation, conclude a neceilky of a future Srate, in which Men were to enjoy that Hippincfs, or erd«re that Mifery, which they had either mili'd pf, or defervtd in this Life; otherwife the Providence of Gad would not only have appeared very lame and imperfecT:, hu His Liws would often-times loof'f. the m.r,^ part o*->heir Sandion, if not their Obligacior 100^72- v?-e Rewards appointed for tneir OSic-rv-iti'Tr, and the Puniihments due to their Tran:j.!;-t-f-

fion, which being not always diftributed in Hiis Life, it is highly reafonable, nay necef-fary they fhould be Conferred or Infilled in another, or clfe God would not be (wbac without doubt He is} a Juft and true Le-gifhtcr.

$. 19. But fince it mud be confdled, that the Nature of the greateft part of Mankind, is fo mean and fervile> as rather to be terrified by Punifhments, than allur'd by Rewards, or governed by the Dictates of right Keafon, from purfuing their own unreafo-nable Appetites and Pafiionf, fo deftru&ive to their own real good and happineis, as alfo to that Common Good of Rational Beings $ I come ro the other part of theSan-£hon of this Law of Nature, viz. thofe Natural Punishments which God hath Ordained for thofe that wilfully negled: or violate it: which I (hall likewife divide (as I did the Rewards) either into Internal, as proceeding from the Nature of the evil Actions themfelves ; or elfe External, from the Nature of God and other Men, and which would moll of them be the fame, were there no Civil Laws or Government in the World. Firft then, He that but negleds ihe endeavour of this great Law of Nature, though perhaps he does not abfolutely violate it, deprives hunk if of all thofe good

things which Conftitute the true H^ppinefs of a Rational Man, and which (as I have already proved) are Ordained by God as Natural Rewards for thofethat obferve this Law, and as much as they mifs of, or loofe thisHappinefs, they do fo far puniili them-felves; fmce the very abfence, or miffing of a good thing, through our own folly or wilful negle&,is really an Evil,and when con-fidered as fo pre-ordain'd by God, is like-wife a Punifliment.

£. ^Q. And 2dly. The wilful Tranfgreflbr of this Law, whilft he thereby contradi&s his own Reafon, (which, if he confiders rightly, will tell himhe ought to Aft other-wife) not onely debauches his own under-Handing, but deprives himfdf of the Natural Liberty of his Will; fince one error in practice once admitted as true and rea-fonable, introduces innumerable other, not onely Errors but Vices, and fo at lad delivers the Man wholly up to the Government of his unruly Appetites and Pa(lions, which is abfolutely contrary to the Rational Nature of Man, fincehe thenpurpofesto him-felf certain Principles and Rules of Life and Converfation, contrary to the Dictates of right Reafon ; which being a fort of folly or madnefs, muft needs be a great evil, and inconfutent with true Felicity, though per-

fops the Perfon that a&s thus madly is not

-fenfibi.: c if.

£. L ;. 3<:lly. Such actions, when ever they com to Lv dcHy receded on, and confi-<i» R-G hv the Doer, mull needs through rhc:r own iurpinid" and unreafonablenefs, oi:en n-ike hini <iig::ly diipkaled, and angry with- him''elf, whereby he loofes the greateft Hippinciaof Lire, Quiz.} Thac Se!t fatisfa-eft on which (prings from the reflection of the Mind, upon us own Adions when a-gree'ible to the Rules of Reafon, ss the 8 uyrifi handibraely expreffes it. � Exemplo (jusAiiwq'is milo commitiittif) ipfi Difplicet Author:. �-�� Juven. Sir. 13.

^.£x. 4th!y. Neither do thefe Moral E-vils (when once any of them enter and take pofl;ii;oo of the Soul) come Tingle t and wirhcut a Train of Followers of the fime NitufC: for l:eing, as it were, linked together, they commonly introduce one nno-thcrr j H.i t.oat he who commits one a£t of WjcJeedneis, and intends to iiop there, finds him^'if Piiilai^n ^\ his Accompt. Thus the .Man t!-3t hat'i io jar injured snd provoked ar'o:i;ef; »hit he itands in fear of his Re-vcr,fe,, oftc'j:i.'iit. - is not to be Satisfied, 'till.

w^ ' 7 ^

to kv:i>:t; if.jr»W:;.i^ he huh inurthe/ed or rui-r>c:> hitTi, by JVeacuery, Forgery, or Subornation i a*id theu, if he be accufed of this,

will not fail to forfwear it, and (if occafion be) hire others to perjure themfelves, to clear himfelf or his Complices.

§. 23. ^thly. But if ever fuch an Offender againft the Laws of Nature, fhalrgrow fenfibleof his Crimes, and defirous to leave them, he will then find his Soul fo fullied and difturbed, by thofe Vices and PaiOons which have fo long domineered over it, and alfoail the natural Powers of his Intelled/o weakened by a long and conflant habit of Sin 9"d Wickednefs, that he can fcarce ever (or at leaft not without much difficulty) overcome them, or be able to reduce his Mind to a ftri& obfervation of the Laws of Reaibn andVertue, whereby he wholly loofes, or at leaft highly impairs the great Prerogative of Humane Nature, Freedom of Will; which if ever he be able again to exert, it cannot be without a great itrugling, and a ftrict watch over himielr, attended with that moft painful and difpleaftng Remedy, Repentance 9 for having thus tranfgrcfled this Divine Law,

§. 14. 6thly, and laflly, whilfl: the Offender continues in this lamentable ftate of wilful Rebellion againft God, he cannot but be almofi conlb.ntly tormented with a dreadful Remorfe of Conference, proceeding from a fear of puniihment both from God and Man,

which feldom fails to torment the Souls of wicked Men , and which the fame Poet fo well fets forth, in the place afore-cited:

--------Trimaeft katcVltio, quod fe

Judice nemo nocens alfohitur.1 � �

Which Punifliments though future, yet fince they are fuch as he may well expeft from his own wicked ^dions, do fall under the notion of a prefent Evil, feeing no Offenders againft this Liw can ever be morally aflured that they (hall pafs undifcovered, and unpu-nifhed for their Crimes, either in this Life, or in that to come. And Epicurus himfelf (though he takes away all the grounds of Moral Good and Evil, in denying God to have any Concern tor Humane Actions ) ad-vifes no wife man to commit any unjuft or wicked A&, becaufe he can never be a flu red he ftiall efcapedifcovery and puniihment for them, and fo mud always live in perpetual Fear and Anxiety.

§ 25-. But, in the fecond place, as for thofe external Puniflmems which concern the Body, they are either fuch as proceed from the Nature of thofe Paflions them-ftlves, whereby a wicked man is moft commonly governed, or elfe from outward Cau-fes, (-wsjGod, or Man. As for the former

of thefe, the violent and unfatiable Paflions themfelves, it is commonly obferved, That Envy, Fear, immoderate Anger, and excef-five Self-love, accompanied with Hatred and Contempt of others, are fo oppofite to the natural Tranquility, or Health of the Af*W, that they prove their own Punifhment, not only to the Soul, but Body alfo. Thus Envy and Hatred, whilft they produce fadnefs and unquietnefs of the mind, do hinder that brisk and active motion of the heart, which is fo neceflary for a due Circulation of the Blood, as is evident from that palenefs and meagernefs in the Face, leannefs of the Body, and general diftemper in the whole Condi-tution, which may be commonly obfer-ved in envious, fpiteful, and angry People; and that an immoderate Defire of Revenge, may fometimes procure death it felf, Dr.Harvey proves by an odd inftance, in his Treatife of the CirculAtion of the Bloody of a Gentleman (a Patient of his) who p* 9' languifhed long under unufual Symptoms, but at la(l died out of pure melancholy and difcontent, that he could not have his Revenge upon a Perfon above him, for a great Injury he had formerly received from him. And to let you fee how fatally this Paflion affects the Vitals, it was obfei-yed in this Gentleman, that his Heart, when

he was opened, was fwelled as big as that of an Ox. And I have already given you, in the former Chapter,an inftance of Charles VT. King of France, how certainly an unneceffa-ry fear of others,will procure a Man's Deftru-dion. And as for fudden immoderate Fits of Paflion, or Anger, there are infinite Examples of thofe, whom fuch violent Fits have bereaved of their Lives.

£. x6. But as for the external Punilhments proceeding from Men, there is, in the firft place, a general Hitred and Contempt, which ill-natured, violent, and unjuft men, muft always exped: from all the reft of the World, though perhaps they may be fo powerful, that men dare not exprefs it to their Faces; and this even from thofe who are of a like humour with themfelves. For you (hall ft-ldom or never fee ill-natured men love or fpeak well of one another; which certainly muft needs be an Evil, or Puniihment to thole that lye under it, becaufe they cannot but at one time or other be fenfible of ir: For if the Love and Commendation of others be a Good, and defirable, as they render a man capable of the Efteem of thofe he converfes with, and often proves very ferviceable to the comparing his De-fires,or D^figns; then certainly the contrary to thefe mail be an Evil, as that which com-

monly hinders men from attaining thofe Ends they propofe to themfelves, by the help and afliftance of others. And therefore it is always feen, that men of violent, unjuft, and domineering Natures, are always forced to hide and difiemble this Humor towards thofe from whom they expecl: any Benefit, or Preferment; well knowing, that if their natural Inclinations were once di(covered, they muft never look to obtain any thing from their Patrons, fmce no wife man can expect any other return from fuch men but Ingratitude and Injuftice.

§.27. In the next place, we may account all thole returns of Evil, or Revenge, whether by ill Offices, Force, or Death it felf, which fuch wicked men muftexped^as a juft Retaliation of the like Actions from thofe they have injured, or deftroyed ; or if not from them, at leaft from their Friends and Relations, and which is as natural and lawful a Punifhment in the ftate of Nature, where there is no Law to the contrary, as that inflicted by Civil Magiilrates in Com-monwe,3lths,becaufe he is only intruded with that natural Right, in order to the good and prefervation ot Mankind, which every particular Perfon in the ilate of Nature was before endued with.

§. i8. Amongft thefe we may alfo reckon thole external Punifhments which the Civil Powers have ordained againft thofe that pre-fume to tranfgrefs this great Law of Nature, by Blafphemy againft God, or by injurious Language,or by violent and unjuft Adions towards others; which Punifhments, though they may fometimes fail to be inflided, for want of difcovery, or elfe by falfe Information , Bribery, or Injuftice in the Judges or Witnefles, or elfe by Pardon from the Supreme Powers; yet fince thefe Punifhments are oftner inflicted, than not; and whenever this happens, they infinitely exceed all the Good, or Pleafure, which the Offender hath, or can ever receive by the doing them: It is evident, That no prudent man will venture to do fuch Actions, which are fo full of hazard, and which will mod probably bring upon him Ignominy, lofs of Life and Eitate ; and befides (if not repented of) more lading Puniihments in the World to corre. And therefore we are not over-hs(lily to cenfure the fevere Punifhrnents ordained by Civil Laws, againft Thieves, Coiners of falfe Money, &c. as over-rigorous, for it is but reafonable that they ihould re-compence, orfupply the difficulty and rare-nelsof their difcovery, and the frequent re-

petition of their Crimes, with fo great a pu-nifhment as the lofs of Life, even with Torments, when they are taken, becaufe perhaps they have offended an hundred times, without any punifhments at all. So that if the Supreme Powers are ordained by God for the good and prefervation of Mankind, it will I ike wife follow, That fuch Punifhments (as are already mentioned) are alfo intended by him, as the firreft means to procure this great End.- Which natural Punifliments, Mr. Hols himfelf owns in his Engli/h Leviathan£ap.$. whofe fence is here fo good and pat to this purpofe, that I (hall give it you at large .-

" Having thus briefly fpoken (fays he ) of the natural Kingdom of God, and his natural Laws; I will add only a ihort Declaration of his natural Punifhments.There is no A&ion in this Life, that is not the beginning of (o long a Chain ofConfequen-ces,as no humaneProvidence is high enough to give a man a profpeft to the End : and in this Chain,there are linked together both pleating and unpleafing Evenis.in fuch manner, as he that will do any thing for his Pleafure, muft engage himfelf to differ all the Pains annexed to it .� And thefe Pains are the natural Punifhoients of rhole ^#i-ons, which are often the beginning of more

harm than good: And thereby it comes to pafs, that Intemperance is naturally puni-flied with Difeafes; Rafhnefs with Mifchan-ces j Injuftice with the violence of Enemies ; Pride with Ruine; Cowardice with Oppreflion; negligent Government of Princes with Rebellion; and Rebellion with Slaughter, Thus far Mr. Hobs. If therefore Punifhments are Confequent on the breach of Laws, and natural Punifli-ments are ordained by God, as Confequent on the breach of the Laws of Nature, it therefore follows them as their natural, not arbitrary EfFecls. So that after what he hath here declared, it may feem ilrange, That this Author fliould (in his Book deCi�, Chap. V.) maintain, That the Laws of Nature do not actually oblige us to their Ob-fervation in the (late of Nature, but only to a Will to oblerve them, when we may with fafety doit; that is, not 'till we are Members of a Civil State, or Commonwealth; fince no Man, according to his own Concef-fion, can in either ftate vioJate them, without incurring fome of thefe natural Punifhments (already mentioned) ordained by God to deter them from committing them.

§. 19. Laflly, As for thofe extrinfick Pu-nifnments in this Life, immediately inflicted by God, they are all thofe temporal Evils,

which we commonly call Judgments, with which God fo often puniflies the Tranfgref-fors of this Law of Nature, cipher in their Minds, Bodies, Fortune?, or Relations: And for the truth of this, I need but refer you to the Hiftoriescf all Ages paft, beftdes what you may have gathered from your own Obfervation.

To conclude; Where-ever thefe natural Puniihments fail, or fall (hort in this Life, they will certainly be fupplyed by Puniihments infinitely more durable and grievous, in a Life after this, than what our narrow Apprehenfions are able to conceive ; or eife that great Attribute of God, (-w^.) hkju-flice, would fall fhort of its Efted:, and con-fequently the Sanction due to his Laws; which powerful and unreafonable Men would believe to be none at all, if they were fure they could efcape unpunifhed, both in this Life, and the next too*

£. 30. Having now proved this Di&ace of Right Reafon, That we ought to endeavour the common Good of Rational Beings'+ to be truly, and not metaphorically a Law, as containing all thofe Conditions* which are neccflary to conftitute it fo, viz- (i.) God* confidered as the Legiflator. (^.') That he hath fufficiently declared this Law to Mankind , as his Subjeds, who he intends (hould

obey it; arid that by all thole plain Evidences, and De.Tionlirations, as may be collected from our own Nature, and that of Things; and altoeftablifhed it by gll thefe Rewards and Punifbments here laid down and that are ntceflary to that End, I fup. pofe it plainly appears, That the Defoini-on we have here made of this Law, is true ; and that then we are obliged to obfcrve it, can as little be doubted of, if we do but re* col!e<5t whu hath been already faid upon this Sui jed:, (viz^) That if fo many Things in Nature are ordained by God, to inform every particular Perlon of found Underftanding, that his own true Intereft and Happinefs,con« fills in his endeavouring the Common Good of Ratio-nsls, by pious, innocent, and benevolent Adtions; It muft be a clear and fatisfadory Djmoo'lrationtoali Men, That as this is the chief End God hath prcpofed to us, fo it is his Intention to oblige all his Subjects to a& in pursuance of the fame : And what could he have done-more to engage them thereunto, than to make them know not only that it is his Will and Pleafure, by that excellent Method and Order he hath e-ftabliflied in the World, but alfo that he ex-pe&s they Ihould yield a full Obedience to it, as they hope to enjoy all the Comforts,

Vii. Or- Parker's Trearife on this Subjaft,^. 25.

and avoid the greateft Miferiesof this Life* ano alfoofthat toveome? And this he hath fiifficiemly performed, whilft he makes the True Good and Hippineis of every parricm lar Perfon, (b manifeftly depend upon their (incere Endeavours to promote the good of the reft ot Mankind, and that with the fame neceffary connexion, as other natural Effedts do upon their Caufesi And 'here(ore fmce we havefo clear demonftrations of our Buty^ and fuch powerful motives 10 perform if"; we have all the Conditions requisite to render us truly Subj*#"ib this Law, and to put us under a perM: Obligation to obfcrve it; Becaufe the Wi^le rnio of m;ucal liffed:^ are iilti^m£el^reiblved into God's W^II and Providence, as'the' firP sndi only Ganffs cf all Things, and .of.Nall the Qualities and Pro perties that refult from thence : Therefore if the ufrfulnefs end '' p< 23\ neceflity of this Law, b:; fo evident frt»m the whole Contrivance of Nature ; it was rnly. the Author of Nature that bath fo ordained it 5 and then there will be no avoiding this Conclufion, (i//z.) That he intended that all thole rational Creatures that were able to make Obfervations from his Works, fhoulcf lay down the common Good of Mankind,-as the Rule of all their moral Adions; for5 Rules can but dire# us how to ad towards

ccmpafing an End propofed; and fo do thefe natural Obfe? vations, by their own in-trinfick Fores and Vertue. And there ^re fuch Rules proceeding from the Will of God, the Supreme Legiflator, do, upon their difccvery to us, become natural Laws, and we are confequently under all the Obligations in Nature, to do our utmoft Endeavours to obferve them.


Demonftrating tie Ufefulnefs of Under-ftanding this fum of the Laws of NATURE, all Moral Vertms and 'Duties bein? therein contained.


§. i. "T Come now to the lad part of my in-A tended Defign, which is to prove, That in our due Obfervation of this great Law of endeavouring the Common Good of Rational Beings ; all our Civil Duties , as alfo all thofe Habits of the Mind, and outward Ad ions called Moral Vertues, are therein contained, and are to be from thence deduced. I have already, in the firft Chapter, {hewn, That all the Right and Pro-

priety which particular Perfons can have in any thing they enjoy, is derived frompod's Will, that Mankind mould be preferred and propagated, and all the particular Members thereof, be rendred as happy as the frail Condition of their Nature is capable of; fo that no Man can have a Right 16 much as to preferve his own Life, but as he isa Member of that Common Body of Mankind, and that his Prefervation conduces to this end, as the confcrvation of a parr, contributes to that of the whole ; which aggregate Body of Mankind, being by God divided into thofe greater, or integral pam, as Nations, or People, fpeaking different Languages $nd governed by different Cuftoms: And thefe Nations being often fubdivided into feveral didinft Governments, or Commonweals, confiding of divers Families, as thefe Families of particular Perfons, as the firft and fmalled condiment parts; whence there dill neceflarily arifes a fubordination of the leder of thefe, to the greater, (viz.) That the good and happineis of particular Perfonr, ihouU give place to that of the whole Family ; and the Inrerell of particular Families to that of the Supreme Civil Power; fo (in like manner) that is to be Regulated by the good of the who! Nation, or People, join <i together, and confederate by Com-

pad1;, for the good and prefervation of the whole politick Body: And Ia(l!y? That the Rights and Inrtr-fts of all particular Kingdoms, and Commonweals, ought ft ill to give place, and be fubordin&ie to the good an J prefervaiion of the rt-it of Mankind ; an^i from this great Law alone it is evident bow ufijuft it is for any Monarch, or Com-Bionweahh, though never fo powerful, to nuke unneceiFiry Wars upon their Neigh* bours, becaufe it cannot commonly be done, without a vaft Efflifnn of Blood, and a wicked and unnatural Oppreflkn, and en-(living of peaceable and innocent Nation?, who by Nature, and the Laws of their own Country, were born free; .all .which are highly dedrucrive to the good and hsppi-DfTfsof the whole Body of Mankind.

^ i. Therefore upon the fame grounds, and for the fame reafons that divers natural things ire good for, and promote, the Happinefsof particular Perfons and Families, they are like-wife from the fame Principles beneficial to wholeNatfons,QrComm0nwea!s; fuch as are thofe moral Ad ions, which the Law of Na* tare and Nations do prefcribe; fome of which re/peeling the general good of mankind, Ethicks, or Moral Philofophy,do particularly teach us,others regarding the Happinefs only pf private Families, are diredled by the Rules

of O economics, whilftother's are taught by the Rules of Politics, or the Art of Well-governing Kingdoms, or Commonweals ; which (liew us by what means a whole Kingdom, or Nation may, (both Prince and People) be rend red happy, and fecured from in-teftine Rebellions and Tumults, as well as foreign Invafions; whilft the fame general Law of Nature, regarding the good of the whole Body of Rational Beings, ought to be the main end and icope of all kinds of Governments, as alfo of r he Governours that adminifter them : So that as all leffer Societies ought to have all their Rights and Actions Ikmted by a refpecl: to the general good of the Common weal in which they ire contained ; fo like wife mould all Kingdoms, or Commonweals themfelves, dill act with a like refpe& to the good and preservation of a greater and nobler Body, [viz.) that of rational Agents; and ought to do, or command, nothing contrary to the Laws of Nature, that is, thofe natural Rules by which the Actions of Commonweals, as well as private Perfons, are to be directed towards this great End ,� fuch as are thofe Laws of Nature, which prefcribe Divine Wor/bip, and the not hurting, or making War upon the Innocent; Fidelity in Compacts; Gratitude for Benefits received, and fuch like;

and like wife from the fame Principle, fuch pofitive Laws of our Country (in Obedience to which the fafety of the Commonweal confjfts) arc not to be violated, for procuring the prefent advantage ot any partcu-lar Perfons, or Families.

§. 3. But fince I have already proved, That the Neceflaries of Life, iuch as Health, and Strength of Body and Mind, joined withPtjace> Liberty, or Freedom of A&.on, as alfb thofe Habits of the Mind, called Moral Fertues) are thofe natural and unalterable good Things, that conftitute the Happinels of dl particular Perfons : It will Jikewife fo!!ow, That if all thefe could, by a general Innocence, Fidelity, Gratitude, and Bene-vc^ence, be conferred upon all Men alike,they would be aifo general goods, as conftituting the common Felicity of all Mankind : And though, as I have already proved, we ft ill contribute fomewhat towards this general Felicity, when we do good but to one fmgle Perion; yet can we not perform this great End of all our Actions knowingly, and as we ought, without a due care and regard to ihc Rights of all other Men; which cannot be fecured, without a diffufive Love and Benevolence towards all Mankind. And therefp' , in the firft place, it is neceflary, That if we will do gcccj to others, as we

ought, we fhould dill have a refped to this End, by a due fubordination of all Duties to each other, according to the Rules already laid down: Nor can we, without making this Law of Nature the main rule and guide of ail our Moral Actions, ever be able to diftinguifh, not only Moral Evil from Good, but a lib when two Duties are pro-poltd to us, and which cannnot both be performed at once, which of them ought rather to be preferred and take place, whereof there are various Inftances in Echicks. So likewife a due confederation of this general Law, will lead us into the knowledge of the Reafon, and Grounds of all the particular Laws of Nature, as well as thofeof our own Country; bccaufe it is certain, that all the wholefome Laws of Commonweals, and the moral Dictates and InftrudHons of our Parents and Matter?, either do, or ought Hill to refpeft this main End. So that it is a great Error to fuppofe f as fome have done) that Ethicks were intended to inftrudfr us, like Hermits in a Defart, without any re-lpe& to others: Whereas Juflice, the chiefeft of all the Moral Vertues, does wholly regard the good of others ; and (ince a great part thereof confi(Is in Innocence, or the forbearing thofe Actions we call Murther, Theft, Injury, and the like, there could be no reafon

to prohibit them, were they not in their own nature (antecedent to any Liu) evil, that i?> deftrudtive to the common good snd happinefsof Mankind.

§ 4. I (hall now proceed to iliew you, That all the particular Moral Venues, are contained under this one Law of endeavouring this common good or" rational Beings, and are to be deduced from it, as their only true Ground and Original: For the proving of which,! firft fuppofe, That all our volunta* ry Ad ions, as far as they can be governed by Reafon and Confederation, are either the cliche Ads of the Uoderftanding, cr elfe of the Will and Aff-clions; and therefore it is firft prescribed by this general Law of Nature, thai: we fiiould extrt rhe natural Faculties of our Intellects on all Perfons and Things, about which they can be conversant; and by the due exercift of which, we may arrive to that excellent Hibit of Mind, called, Prudence, and which, above all ethers, conduces to that great End of the common good above-mentioned. Sa that the ftrft ground of this Prudence, is a true knowledge of the Nature of Things, and efpeci-aliy Mankind: but its efiential parts, are the practical knowledge of the cuief Fnds of all our Moral A&ions, (viz.) our Duty or Service to Gad, as the Head of rational

Beings, and our endeavouring the common good, as commanded and enjoyncd by Him ; for Prudence ccnfiils in a firm Pcrfua-fijn and Aflent to true praclical Dida:cs : But the immediate, and rr?oft general Ef-fe&s of this Prudence, are, (n) Conilancy of Mind, by which we firmly adhere, without any wavering, to the Dictates of right Reafon, Prudence being only a right appre-henfion, and unchangeable re/oluticn of tha practical Judgment, as alfo of the Will pur-fuant thereunto, concerning the be/1 and greateft End of ail our Moral Actions, (vzz.^) the common good: WhichConftancy. proceeds from the immutable Certainty of the Truih, made known to us by fuch practical Propofitions, and by which the Will is determined to this great End, by the fitted means neceflary thereunto. This Conftan-cy, when, in the profecution thereof, it is attended with any great danger to our felves, is called Fortitude ; and whilft we contentedly fuffer any Evils, or AfHi&icns for the fame, Patience.

£. 5*. The next et&dfc of Prudence, is Tens* per&nce, or Moderation, which is the retraining our Affe&ions, and limiting our Actions, within fuch bounds as are confo-nant to this End : But fiace Prudence doth always dired the Mind thereunto, as alfo

tofuch means as are neceflary to obtain it > therefore as this Moderation cannot be fe-parated from Sincerity, era real defire and endeavour to profeoute this End, fo neither from Diligence and Induftry to find out and purlue the fkteil means leading thereunto: But this Moderation being chiefly confpi-cucus in reftraining tliofe motions of our fcnfual Appetites and Affections, which may any way difturb, or hinder us in our profecution of this End, is then called Tern* fsrance^ or a reftraining of our immoderate Appetites towards Meat, and Drink, orelfe of otu- carnal Lufts or Defires towards Women. The former of which is a Crime, when our Eataigand Drinking beyond what Nature requires, does both injure our Health, and bring upon us Difeafes, or untimely Death, or elfe fo cloud and difturb the Fa-culvies of the Mtnd, as to render them unfit to do that good and fervice they owe eirher to God, Themfelves, their Families* or theCommonwealth: So likewife as to carnal Luft, it is alfo unlawful, fo long as it continues wandnng and unfixed towards one Objr&, and hinders God's main Defign, (viz ) the propigation of Mankind: Or elie, U'hilft it invades the Rights of others, in violating either the Chaftity of their Wives, Daughters, &c. bcfides the Injury it does

to Others, it often produces Quarrels Fightings, and Murthers amongft Men ; all which Effects, are evidently definitive to the Peace and Prefervation of Mankind ; not to mention the horrid Sat of Sodomy, whofe formal fevil feems to co'nlYL in cfcifione femi-*is in vaje non del ito, and thereby hindring the propagation of Mankind. Since therefore thefe three great Vertues of Prudence, Fortitude^ and Temperance, which feem fo particularly to concern a Man's private Converfation, have yet fo great an influence upon the common good of mankind ; we (hall now fee of how much greater force they will be, when confidered more particularly in relation to others: (ince if we feri-oufly confider them, we (hall find this Prudence and Moderation, to extend themfelves to all thofe voluntary Actions commanded by this Law of Nature; and when fo confidered, may be comprehended under the general name of the moft diffuled Love, and efficacious Benevolence towards our (elves and others 5 by which I mean not only a bare ufekfs wilhina and defuing, but fuch a powerful Love, or Charity, as exprcfics it fetf in thofe Endeavours, by which all Things good and beneficial to mankind, may be procured for thole who (land in freed of them; and whatloever are evil, or hurtfu!,

may be prevented, or removed. So tha* this Vertue of Benevolence, or Charity, as far as it retrains and corrects all the volurr tary motions and a#ions in us, contrary to this common good, contains ill thofe fubor-dinate Venues, of Innocence, Meeknejit Repentance^ and Self-denial ; which may be thus maJe out.

§ 6 (i ) !nnocence,indeed,isbut a negative Vertue, and implies no more than our ab-fhining frnm wronging others; yet cannot the ground of this Vcr*ue be truly under* fiood, without a refptd: to the common good of mankind, which it fo particularly tends to promote. (2.) Meeknefs, orGen-tlenefs, is but our patient bearing with the Importunities and Irnpertinencies of o-thers, out of love towards them, and confi-deration of the Frailty and Infirmities of Humane Nature. (3.) Repentance, or Sorrow, when we have done others any Injury, with an acknowledgement of the fame, if there be cccaiion, exprefled by our Refti-tution, making Amends, or begging Pardon for what Wrongs foever we have done them, X4«) Self-denial, that iy, a Will rather to forego fomewhar, that we may pretend to, than hinder another, who may deferve it better than our felves. And as this Benevo* lence implies a conflant and fetkd purpofe

of well-dnng, fo it causes us to judge charitably oi other men's Word* and Addons, which is true Candour, or I gt^uity : So likewifr whrn it moves us to Dronni'e, and al-fo to perform * har!oever we 'hereby r>we to otners, , it «* Fidelity .� & ad as this Benevolence en .ffly. confides thofe who by the Ii ke go« >d A £t kO is, co- op' ' te v it h us towards this comm ' g »od, .o ir renders us likewifc grateful; Gratitude being nothing elie but an exprcflion, or return oi cur kind Refentmenr, or good-will towards thofe who have been kind or beneficial to us, or thofe we have a kindnefs for: though the fame, general Benevolence, of intending to do good to the whole Body of Mankind, may yet more particular!? regard thofe before others, to whom we are more nearly related, or have grester Obligations, or are more likely, or able to contribute to the good of the Commonweal.

§. 7. But becsufe it is the main bufinefs of this Benevolence, to take care that no Action be done contrary to this great End ; or when it happens to be done othervvife than it ought, it is then its Duty prefently to correct and amend it: Therefore 'Equity is one great part of this general Benevolence, which denotes a Will always ready to cor red" fuch Actions by the Rules of Prudence, or Right

Reafon, which have been already determi* ned by any particular Law, or Judgment, otherwife than a due Conftderation ot the common good of Mankind may require $ fince it often frppens, That through the Ambiguity of the Laws, or through fome Error, Weaknefs, or Incogitancy of the Judges, or Law-makers themfelves, not being able to forefee all the particular Cafes that may happen within thofe general Rules, they may often deviate from this great End of the common good, though by them never fo really intended: Therefore the fin-eere Endeavour thereof requires, That, as often as we are employed as Judges, Mediators, or Arbitrators, after having weighed all due Circumilances of the Cafe, we ihould, upon a more perfed: underftanding thereof* correct fuch Judgments as were erroneoufly, or unjuftly made or decreed at firft: So that from this general Laiv of endeavouring the common good of Mankind, all Sentences pronounced, ex aquo, & low, derive their Authority as the only Fountain of natural Juftice, as I fliali in the next place make out.

£. 8. The Vertue called Juftice, (as defined by Civilians) is a conflant and perpetual Will of yielding every Pe^fon their Own; and what is meant by Their Ow;, I have already,

in jthe Firft Chapter of this Difccurfe, fufn-ciently made cut; (T/*Z.) That in the (late of Nature, and out of Civil Government, or CommonweaI9 it is the yielding and allowing fuch a diilin& and fepcrate Uf., or Propriety, in all Things neceflary for Lite, and in the Helps or Ser vices of Perfons. which any one, by Occupancy or -Poflefiion, or elfe by the Grant, or Ceffion of others, hath* by reducing it into his Ufe and Pcfleffion, made his own, and which I Lave there proved to be commanded by this Law of Nature, as being abfolutcly necefiary lor the Prefervation of Mankind. (2.) In a Civil State, or Commonweal, is is the allowing and maintaining fuch a Property in tl.oSe Things, arifing from a more full and abu-lute divifion of them (according to the po-fitive Laws cf every Kingdom, or Commonweal) ss conduces to this great � tnd : And therefore we have laid down this Definition, in the moft general Terms we could, thac the fame Rules may direct Men, us well in that natural State, which may be tup^o-fed to precede an abfolute Divifion of TtiinijA, as in that Civil, or Politick Society. tiuic ordained fuch a Divifion.

Under the former (late, this Rule obliges Men only to iiich a general Propriety,and XJfe of Things, and Humane Afiilhr.cts, as might

beil con fill with our own, and others,naturai Necefluies; and fince in this State many Accidents may be fappoied to have happened, which might make it appear to all Par-ties concerned, That it would be more fcr their Common Benefit and Advantage, to agree to a full and abfolute Divifion of Lsnds, and all Things neceflary for Life, fuch as were the Quarrels and Contentions of divers Men, when it was not plainly evident what proportion of thefe Things were reqmfite for every Man's particular Occa-fions: to which msy be added the Care-lefsnefs and Idlenefs of many others, in neglecting to contribute their due proportion of Labour for the Tilling of the Ground, when lying in common, together with divers other Inconveniences, needlefs here to be related. In all which Cafes, the general Law concerning the common good of Mankind, and the means neceflary thereunto, being confidered, and applied to the prefent Circumftances, by all the Perfons concerned, might oblige them to make a more abfclute Divifion of all forts of Property. And the fame Law doth now likewife oblige us, and all others, fuccef-iively to maintain this Divifion thus made, as being neceflary to the Quiet and Happi-nefs of that Kingdom , or Commonwealth,

wherein we live, as the Happinefs of thefe conduces to the good and prefervation of mankind, whereof they are a part j nor need I fpeak more concerning this divi-fion, fince we find it already made, and fo well and exa&ly done, that it is fufficient to render all men as happy ( unlefs they will be wanting to themfelves) as the frailty of their own Natures* and of thofe Things they make ufe of, will permit, or require j and therefore I (hall only add, That where-ever .any thing remains dill undivided, and that a farther diviiion thereof is ne~ ceflary, that luch a diftribution of them be made, among all thofe that have any Jntereft therein, as may bed conduce to the Peace and Happinefs of the Commonweal, and the Good of all the particular Perfons therein contained.

§. 9 Property being thus fetk j and e-ftablifli'd from this general Law of Na-turej there now accrues fomethin'g to par-ticular Perfons, concerning which they may promife, grant, or covenant with o-thers, and which mull be fuppofed before any Promife, or Contrad: ( which is one of the firft grounds of Civil Jadice) can be kept; for if any Gift, or Alignment of any Thing be valid, it is upon the fame fcore upon which Property was firft

conflituted, (viz) in order to the Common j*ood oi Mankind^ therefore ic is evident, That God, and all fubordinate Ordainers of Property, always intended that Men Ihould be mindful of this great End, in conferring, or receiving any Gifts, or Benefits ; for whofoever receives fuch a Benefit, he is fuppofed by his acceptance tacitly to agrecj That this gift fliould operate for the good of the whole Community; that is, as well of that Perfon who beftow-ed it, as of himfelf that received it: And fo Jikewife of all others who have a Right to aflign, cr bellow any thing. Which tacite Confent, includes alfo that of the Receiver's making a grateful Return for the Benefit fo received, when any Occafion fhall offer it felf.- So that Gtatt-tude is but a part of univerfal Juftice, that being only a fmcere Endeavour of performing this great Law of the Common Good of Mankind ; whence I fuppofe it is as clearly evident, That Gratitude is commanded by this Law, to be obfcrved and prsdlifed as a chief part of that primary Moral Vertue, Juftice.

§. 10. Moreover, from the due proportion of thofe Things which by any pofidve Law becomes ours, (and are thus limited by a due regard to the good of others)

arifes that part of Juftice called Modern tiont or MoJefly^ which fets bounds to in-ordinate Self-love, or too great Care of our own Concerns; (ince u-hilft we ccn-fult our own good and happinefs, we ought flill to abftain from any invafion of the particular Rights of others, and ought much more to take care that we do no injury to that Common wealth of which we are Members. This limited Self love does chiefly exert it felf in the Vertues of Mtdefiy and Frugality ; the former being only our abftaining from pretending to thofe Things, (fuch as Offices and Employments) which perhaps we might obtain, it we would put in for them, out of a true ienfe of the frmlnefs of our own Merits, in companion with others who better defervethem ; which is but a fort of Jit/tice, in refpect of our felves and others. And as for Frugality, it is a prudent management of uhat is our own, fo that we may not live above thofe means, or that Eitate we have, and thereby become burthenfome, or injurious to others, which is a fore of gencrrfty, or greatnefs of mind.

§. n. The fame great L?w of Njcnre, of endeavouring this Common good, does likcwife direcT: and limit even the natural Care and Affection of Parents towards

*heir Children, fo as may b?ft conduce *o the publick Happinefs of th<; Commonweal Whence anfes that exact Care of Pcfterity, ordained by Civil Laws concern-ing Succeilion to the Goods and Eftates of deceafed Relations. From all whsch it appears, rhat all ths Branches of diftrilutme Janice conhfling in Bexejicsnce towards o-rhers; ss, Observation of Pa&s, Gratitude^ tiwpcravze, fcruga/ifv , Modefty, and Af* fechw to cur Poiierity, cannot be well unr derftood, or pradtied as they ought, unlefs there b^ fisli fuppofed luch a ieparate di-vifion of men's Rights and Properties, as that what is our own, may be fome way known and diftinguiOied from anothers; and the fame general Law by which this Divifion is made and prderved, does like-U'ife oblige men to the exerciie of all thofe Venues already mentioned, and of all others which are contained under, or which may be derived from them.

Laftiy, How abiblutely neceflary that part of Juihee, which may be called Poll-hV'.?/f and which confifts in an equal retribution of Rewards and Punilhments, to thofe v/ho in a Civil State do ad any thing that is highly conducing, or elfe dedru&ive to the good and happinefs of the Commonweal, (that is, to the general good of mankind)

needs no farther proof, fince it is evident, that without this Juftice, not only all pofi-tive Laws, but alfo even thofe of Nature, would be either quite negle&ed, or at lead highly violated.

£. ix. I fliall now proceed to fhew how all the reft of the Moral fortues, may ea» fily be deduced from thefe two general ones, ( W& ) 3*P'ce anc! C^r/(y, or general Benevolence towards Mankind. If therefore (as I have already proved) the Rights of all particular men are only conftituted for the Common good of mankind, it will alfo follow, That all men are obliged in making ufe of thofe Rights , to obferve thefe great Rules in order to this main End : 11.) To allow,or grant to others fuch a (hare of thefe Neceflaries of Life, as is requifite for their real Subfiftence. (x.) Yet (till with a Right of referving to themfelyes fuch a fhare of thofe Things, as that they may always be left in a capacity to provide for themlelves and Families; but fo as it may ftill confift with the good and happinefs of others.

The former Rule commands us to confider others, in order to this Common good ; and prefcribes Charity and Lilerality, with all the homiletical Venues. The latter prefcribes Temperance, and Fw&alHi, in thoie ihings which are fo relerved srd left to us, that we

may thereby be ftili rcndrcd more fubfervicnt to this Common good. So that in each of tliefc Rules, the whole Body of Mankind ( of \vhich we are but a (mail part) (lill prefents it Self to our Confederation ; and each par-ticuhr Vcrtue does always refpcd: this pub-lick,before any private good. From whence we may alfo underfUnd for what Reafon this great End ought to be always pnefent to our mind?, even whilft we are seeing according to the ftn&eft Rales of Vertue; tor though we immediately endeavour, or profecute fome part of this End, yet cannot we know whether the practice of fuch a Vertue be conformant to the reft, unlefs by comparing it with this general Law of the Common good of Mankind. So that in vertuous Addons, the care of this End ought never to be omitted, or ncgledted by us; for as by this it is lull prescribed, That each particu-lar man fhould contain himfelf within the bounds of his own Bights, and that he do not invade thofe of others: So likewife thefe limired Rights cannot well be confidtrid, or under flood, without a due refpeft to this Common good, f>r which End alone the Properties of parricuhr men were at firfl (ct out, and ,-ppoi.irc(j. Therefore al! Commonweals ought to rrgard this more general Di-viilon of Property, or Do ruin ion, whereby

fome things become facred to God, andlike-wife divers Rights and Territories are left to be enjoyed by other Nations, or Commonweals ; and all fuch Politick Bodies muft ftill acknowledge fome bounds of their own Propriety, or Dominion.

§.13. The true ground and meafure of the moft general Moral Vereues being thus laid down, and explained, it is eafie to define and deduce all the other more particular fuboidinate Venues, becaufe their very Ef-fence confiOs in a readinefs of the Will to yield Obedience to all the Laws of Nature, as fubordinate to this general one. of endeavouring the Common good. Let us therefore confider and apply the two Rules laid down in the laft Section, and which we have already derived from thisOiclate of Reafon,of ordaining Property in order to thi>End: And we fhali Tee that though the former of thefc Rules prefer ib:s to us to communicate our Goods toothers for this purpofe; yet fo as that we may alfo referve to our felves fuch a (hare as isfufBcient for our ownHappinefs sndWell-being : And it is plain that this mud be fo pre-fcribed,beciufe i: is dill neeeflarvfor thisCc-m-mon good; for unlefsevery man's own Hippi-nefs be confidered in the 6rfi p'accjt would be altogether in vain to perfuade men to endeavour that of others :So that tho Liberalityis to

be reduced to ibis head, as being a kind of Juftice, that confifts in the weli-beftowing cur Goods on others gratis; yet its true rneafure is to be taken From this great Law above-mentioned ; for every part of Juftice is to be tried by fome Law; and in every Law to which any Perfon can be obliged, there are to be confidered as well the natural, ss pofitive Laws of God, as alfo the particular Laws of Nations, or Commonweals, before any Action can be determined to be juft or vertuous: And this Liberality \s known by divers Names, according to the variety of Obje&s which may require it, and on which we ought to exercife it. Thus if it exert it felf on things that do fignally ferve for publick Benefit, it is called Generofity, or a publick Spirit; to which is oppoied on one fide, the vain Profufion of the Ambitious ; and on the other fide, the bafe Pe*u-rioufnefs of the mean-fpirited: Towards the Poor and Miferable it is termed Charity and Goodnefs of Nature $ towards Strangers well received and entertained in our Hcufes, Hofpitality. Whilft in all thefe the true mea» fure of Liberality is ftiii to be confidered, as it conduces to thofe various parts of it, that conftitute this Common Good of Mankind ; that is, the procuring and rraintaiaing mutual Amity, AfliHance. Fidelity, and Commerce

between divers Commonweals; or elfc to the well-being of all leffer Societies and Families ; or, laftly, to the Concord and Hap-pinefsof the particular Members of the fame Community ; the Good of the lefler being flill made fubordinate to that of the greater Body, according to the Rules before laid down, I have been the more particular in determining the true Standard of this firft and moft general Vertue/w'z. Juftice, becaufe all the reft of the homiletical Vertues depending upon it, and being to be explained according to the fame meafure, there will be no need particularly to repeat it.

$. 14. But we (hall now pafs to the homiletical Vertues themfelves; that is, thofe which particularly regard Humane Conver-fation 5 which fort of Vcrtue I thus define: (i//z.) A Juflice exprefled towards others ly the ufe of 'voluntary Signs, conducing to the Common Good of Mankind: And though by Voluntary Signs I chiefly mean Speech,yet I here alfo take in all thofe motions of the Countenance, and outward Geftures of the Body, which ufually fignify the voluntary Declarations of the Mind, fmce in all thefe. Affability and Gravity ought to be dill confpicuous; whilft in Difcourfe, moderate Silence and Veracity ferve to keep us within the true bounds of Convention:

Nor can I better explain the grounds of A** fability sn:l Gravity, than by putting you in mind of what we have already proved, That in all Ads of Juflice towards others, true Prudence, and the largefl Benevolence are required. Thus when all the due Signs of Prudence, or Difcretion, are exprefs'd in a Man's Behaviour and Converfation , it is then called Gravity; but when in thofe A-dions there appears alfo all tokens of Goodwill, or Benevolence, it is called A§'ability, from whence the oppofite Vices are better underflood; that is, on the one fide, too great Severity and Morofenefs of Manners 5 and on the other, all Levity, and Vanity in Converfation, are repugnant to true Gravity : And fo likewife to AffMity on the one fide, Flattery, and on the other, Mo-rofity, are diredly oppofite.

§. i f.But becaufe Speech is the true Interpreter of the Mind, and only proper to Mankind, therefore this great Law of Nature prefcribes a Mean in expelling this natural Juftice and Benevolence in our Difcourfe^ and which is moft confpicucus in divers Vertues relating to Converfation; for, in the firft place, we are enjoyned Silence, whenever that Reverence we owe to God, or our Superiours, require it, or that the Secrets of the Com* monweah our Friends, Families, or thofe re-

lating to our own private Concerns, fhculd not be difcovered 5 which yet is only a Ver-tue, as it is fubfervient to the Common Good; to which is oppofed on the one fide, all un-neceflary refervednefs, or fparingnefs of Speech ; which is not only an Enemy to .all pleafant Converfation, but alfo extreamly prejudicial to all Knowledge, the chief Benefits cf Humane Society. But fince all thefe ways of exprdling our Minds by Words, do either regard things pad, or pre-fent 5 This Law of the Common Good, pre-fcribt s to us fo to fpeak concerning things pad or prelenr, as we really know,or believe them to be, which is Veracity 5 or elfe if it only refpeft future things to be performed by us, it prefcribes, That we only promife fuch things to others, which may tend to, or at lead confift with the Common Good, whether our Promifes are made without any Condition, or elfe with fuch Couditionsas the nature of this great end may require: And as from thefe Promifes, which are but Agreements, or Contracts, between fevcral Perfons, fprings mod of that Trade, or Commerce , which is ulcd amongft Men ; and this Vertue which maintains and fulfills thefe Promifes, or Agreerr^nts, is known by the Name of Faith, or Fidelity, iojufily eftttori-ed amongd all Nations; yet mil it pro-

ceeds from the fame Intention, and is directed to the fame Ends that made Men defirous to enter into Compa&s, and then to obferve them when they were made; it being neither lawful to make, or keep any, but fuch as may well be performed without the leaft violation of this great Law of endeavouring the Common Good: So that Juftice, which properly confifts in the Obfcrvation of fome Law, it is fo far from being refolved (as (brae! would have it ) into the bare Obfervation of Compacts, that on the contrary it cannot be well underftood, whether any Promile does oblige, until we are firft fatisfied, that fuch a Bargain, or Compact, does confift either with the exprefs Command, or at leaft Per-miffion of this great Law of Nature.

£. 16. Laftly> as for thofe Vertues which more immediately depend upon our Benevolence towards others, fince thefe cannot be exprefled in our Difcourfe, unlefs fomething pleaiant be mingled with it, for their fakes with whom weconverfe; This when performed as it ought, is called Civility, or good Breeding. But this Vertue is ftill to be cir-cumfcdbed by the fame bounds as the reft $ for by this Law it is provided, That nothing be ever fpcke, fo much as in jeft, which may intrench upon that Veneration we owe to God, or that may diminifh the Haopinefs, or

good Name,of any honed and innocent Per-fon} and this Rule will be belt obferved, if neith-r the Laws of Nature, nor the revealed Will, of God, nor thofe of our own Commonweal, nor the private Concerns ot Families, uor yet of particular Perfons, be ren-drcd ridiculous by our fooViih and unieafo-nable Raillery. And as thofe who offend a-gainft th£fe Ru%, are guilty of Scurrility and Prophanenefs; fo, orj the other fide, fuch as do abiolutely avoid all innocent Mirth and Pleafantnefs in Converfacion, do fall into the other extream of Crabbednefs and Morofity.

$. 17. This may fuffice concerning the firft fpecial Rule laid down, about our granting to others fuch a (hare of the Comfortable Conveniences of Life, ss their Neceflitks require, which is derived from the general Vertue of Juftice, to which all thofe Vertues we have now fpoken of, are to be referred; As is likewife the feccnd Rule ( derived from this Juftice ) viz. of referring fuch a fhare of thofe things, as that we may be in a Condition to provide for cur (elves and Families; yet (hasmay itiliconiid uith the Good and Happinefs of ethers. This Rule alfoccnflitutesand prefcrves thcRiglus of particular Perfons, in order to the promoting the Common good cl Mankind; erd

therefore we have only fo far a Right to all the Necsflaries of Life, and are like wife obliged fo 10 make ufe of them, as may be ft conduce to this End, (or at lead not to do any thing to prejudice it) fo that even Self-love ojght to give place to this Law, and contain it felf within tLofe due toandsjwhich the former general Rule, of yielding to o-thers their juft Rights, does prefcribe; tho* a limited Self-love is always lawful, as being commanded by the Law of Nature, in Order to this great End. And I have already ihewn, That there is a neceffity of a Right and Propriety ro particular Perfons in divers things, as neceifary for their own Happinefs and Preservation, yet fubordinate to that of the Common Good, which confifts in that of all its particular Members: Therefore the endeavour of this being once enjoynedj the care of the former muil necefTarily follow, becaufc the H ippinefs and Good of others,can-not be procured by us, if we absolutely neg-kfl: our own. But as the Body and Soul are ihstwoe&ntia! Parts of our Nature, fo a cue Care of both isilill fuppo&d^to be pre-icribed by all due means, in order to this lino,

$. 18. But it is not to my purpofetolay dovvn any Rules concerning the Culture of the Mind, That being the Bufmefs vtEtb/ckst

or Moral Philofopby, which it is not my Intention here particularly to treat of; only I ihall add fomething farther concerning fewperaitcey and the fubordinate Vertues therein contained, that I thought to fpeal* of, when I laft mentioned that Vertue. i ihall therefore thus define Temperance^ to be a Juflice to\x>arth our fehes9 in the due Care of, our Bodies, and Fortunes^ for cur own Prefervation^ in order to the Ccmmon Good: For though this Vertue prefcribes divers moral Rules of Health, concerning Sleep, Diet, Continence, Sfc. yet they differ much from the natural Rules of Phyfi-cians concerning the fame things , who think they have fufficiently done their parr, in giving their Rules, or Advice, concerning the Health of their Patients; whereas the fame Rules, morally confidered, and confti-tuting this Temperance as a Vertue, are di-reded to a far nobler End, (wa.) the pre-iervation of Health, both of Body and Soy], in order to the Common Good; for furely no Body can look on a Man to be endued with this Venue,who fhonld never ib carefully oblerve all the Diredlonsof bis Phyficisn only for the prefervation of his own Health, without any corifidcration of the Laws of Nature, relating to this great End, And fur-ther, If any M'.n, though without any pre«

judice to his Health, do fo much indulge his Geniust as to keep a Table above his Ellate, and thereby become unable ro p-ovide ior his Family,or ro con rihur^tothe publickcharges of the Corrmor-Weal, he i; highly guilty of Internet A ce, thr-jfth peihsp* he may do it withtiK any prfjiuiict 10 hi- Health.

§. 19. And a& tor tbsf other fort oi Temperance, called Cka/ltfy, cr Continence, I need nor f rrhtr to dr-cbre how much the Common Good and H-ppinefs of Mmkind depend tp^n ir, having already ihtwn divers of thofe Evils, and inconveniences, which do necedarily follow the contrary Vices : ! lhall onety add, That it is fbfSjicnt that the conmidion of this Offence oi Ir-continence makes a Mao g^iUy or snoihei's Sin, as well as his own : Therefore I define Cfaflitj to be the aljlain'mg from all Inordinate, or forlidden I ujhf i* order to the Common Goed, or for the propaga'Ln of Mankind*, and therefore is not only confined to the bare forbidding of Fornication, butallb extends itklf to chat moral Obligation, or Contract, Vi'hich \vc call Marriage $ So that out of a confiJention of this great End, thofe prormfcucub Copciaiions betu een Brothers and Siilers, and elvers other near Relations, which upon the firft Peopling of the World were lawful, becaufe then necef

fary for the propagation of Mankind, are now, for the fame Reafon , become un-lawful; fince without an abhorrence of this Copulation between Brothers and Sillers, ie were hard, if not impcflible, that the Cba-flity of fuch young Perfcas, converging fo con dandy and intimately together from their youth, fhould be otherwife preferved, without an early prepofleflion of the hor-rour of fuch promiscuous Copulations. And hence alfo I fuppofe, That Natural Reafon taught moft Nations, after Mankind began to be multiplied upon the Earth; and the memory of the firft original Relation they had to each other, wss forgotten, to prohibit Marriage between near Relations, that by this means new Friendfhips, and ftrider Bonds of Amity, fhould be contracted between Families and Perfons not nearly related in Blood; from whence a larger diffu-fion of Friendfhlp and Kindnefs, proceeding from this Relation, might be fpread amongft Perfons not only of the fame Com mon-VYea!, but alfo of divers Nations; and that thofs Factions and Enmities, which would often happen between pattkular Men and' Fa-milies, were they only to marry in:o their own Clan or Tribe, may be prevented £ or if begun, may, by frcfh Alliances, be re«-conciled and taken away, So that it is cvi-

dent, Th*t the Reafon of this Vertue of Chaflity, or Continence, can no way be truly explained,or under Hood, without a true knowledge of the great End for which it was ordained, T/Z. the Common Peice, Hap-finefS) and Preservation of Mwkir.cl.

$. xo. I frail onely add iomewhat more concerning that other -fort of Temperance, relating 10 our fceking after, and acquiring thofe outward Goods often conducing, though not abfohitely neceilary, to our Well-being, (u/z.) Riches and Honour ; and therefore the fame general Law which limits our Love towards our felves, in order to the Common Good,ought alfo, from the fame Confutation, to limit and regulate our Defires, both in acquiring and keeping thefe Advantages; and therefore thc> arc to be fought for to no other fc'nd, than as they may render as more capable of promoting the great End above-mentioned, and to which they ought always to be Subordinate. The former of thefe Vcrcats relating to Riches, is called Mcderathx, which is r* limited Care in acquiring and keeping Riches; of which I need fpsak no farther, having fufficiently Hiewn the Meafurc and Reafon of it, when I defined Liberality and Fruga* Iity9 with their oppofce Vices: The other fort of Temperance relating to Honour?, is

called Modefti, and may be define^ a Ju» ft ice towards cur (elves in a reafinMe De* Jire of Honours^ tit order to the fpmrnsn GW; and therefore it cenfifls in a du«. Ms-dircritj) as well in deiirirg Honours, as a-voiding Infamy ;and this Vertue, as ir curbs the Defirefrcm feeking higher Things dun the Perfon really liikrvts, or may wt M pretend to, in order to this great Fod, is r |!ed Huwi-ity ; tthicb is^ tc& or true ejfeem vf a Mans feIf or ptrfonal Merits. But ?stius Defire of the Common G,>od^ often cU vates the Mind to the perforirirg of grf.iit t-nd noble Actions, whereby he may acquite rhe higheft Honours, it is then called Mttnani* tnity; and therefore the Magnamnv us is flill fuppofed to be endued wiin perfect Vertue, and a moft large Delne of the C^mmoa Good of Mankind, as believing he hath rra-fon to judge himfelf worthy of any Honour that he can julliy pretend to: And I fu^poie every Man is fenfible, That it is a part of the fame Vertue, not only to feek tor true Honour, but alfo to take care to preferve it when it is obtained: And from theConfide-raticn of thefe Vertues, the contrary Vices are more eafily undcrftood; for Pride is direAly oppofue both to MAgnaximityt a^d ^/«w////y,fIiawiRg it felf in a prepofte/ous Am-bition,fooliili Arrogance,or vain-glory j and fo

like wife PujHIammityy or meannefs of Spirit, is diredtly contrary to Magnanimity*

§. n. Thus we have run through al-moft all the particurar Vcrtues, and do ft ill find io each of them a conftant Re-iped, or Tendency, to the Common Good of Mankind: So that whether they regard our frlves or others, the fame great End is 1-iH intended by God, the moft Wife Lfgiflator: And this Law being thus e-ihbHllied ; there is therein contained the largeft and moft diffufwe Society between divers Nations, or Common-Weals, and the trueft Love or Benevolence between all the Members of the fame Common-Weal, ss aifo between particular Families: So that there may be hence demonilrated and determined the certain Rules and Meafures of true Piety towards God. asdiftinguifli'd from Impiety and Superftiticn; and aifo of all other Venues towards Men, which inuft be ftrft truly known, and applied to their right Objects, that the Names of thefe Vmues, uvisn falfly imposed on Adiions eor,ii;aryfo the Laws cf God and Nature, may not deceive us: For it is hence evi-tknr, T<;;.u all ihc parts of tmiverial Ja-.fiice and tknevckr.ce, (viz.) all the particular Vcrtues contained under them, are

only commanded in order to this Common Good ; bfcaufeitismanifeft by Experience, That Inch Juft and B n vo'enr Adtons, are always endued with a n tural Power of procu'l g *nd prorcotirg tW Common Peace and H-ppinefs of divers Nations and Common-Wea!s4a$ alfo of Itfler SocietiVs ?nd particular Pt-rfons; of all which, confidered in their due order and fubordir.ation to each other, this Common Good of Mankind is made up, and confifts.

£. z2. And, farther, it mav b? htnce clearly ihcwn what is that Right Reafw, by which every prudent Man rughr to pre-fcribe to himfeif a juft Mediocrity in all his moral Actions; for it only confifts in practical Proportions, propofing or declaring unto us this great End ; and alfo (hewing us all the means in our Power whereby we may attain it ; which are thofe that* (i.) Prefcribe^the Rules of" Piety, and Divine Worlhip,. both private and pubiick. C1*) Thofe that concern the Society and Commerce of divers Nations and Common'Weals. (3.) All pofuive Laws, whether Civil or Oomtfln-k, tending to the Good of the Civil S citty wherein we iwe. (4.) True and rational Conclufions , draw-n 'hom Knowledge , or Experience, either of our iclvts, or oihers,

concerning the natural Efficacy of Things ami Actions,'all which are at laft refol-ved into the natural Power of fuch Humane'Ac! bns, as may either benefit, or hurt Mankind, considered apart, or in an aggregate Body, as in a Family, or Nation ; fines Experience doth not with lefs certsinty teach us, what kind of Actions are h;;n?:fk'h!, or hurtful to Mankind , than it lh>;vvs whst (brt of Diet vuli either nourilh, or deftroy us: Nor is it more difficult to tinderftand the Truth of this Propofition, That a right, or equal Difiribution of ail Things ficcrflary for Life, is requisite to the Common Good and Happinefs of Mankind ; than it is to know in Phyfick, That It is neceflary for the Life and Health of an Animal, that a due proportion of NouriOi* rnent be equally diftributed to all its Parts, or Members; both which Truths, are grounded'on the lame natural Principles, [viz.) That the fame Things which preferve the ' whoie,doHkewife preierve all irs parts ; and �vice verfa, the &£B6 Things which preferve all the Parts, or Members , do alio ferve to the Confervarion of the whole; which being evident from true Principles, is a Science taught by Experience, drawn from the Nature of Things.

§. ^£. And thus from the immutable Efficacy of Corporeal Caufes of this fort, for the production of their Effects on all Humane Bodies, depends all the Certainty and Knowledge of Natural Philofophy and Phy-fick : So like wife from their immutable Influence, or Powers on Humane Adlons, for the Confervation of Particular Perfons, Families, and Common Weals,prcceeds all the Certainty of thofe practical Proportions, called Natural Laws, which conftitute Moral Philofophy,fliewing and determining the Nature of all Vertues and Vices: Nor is that variety of Actions, which may be prefcribed to Perfons in difti n<3:Farmlies,orComrnon weals, and under various Circumfiances of Life, more repugnant to the conftant Care of pre-ferving ail the Parts, or Members, which contribute to this great End, than the di-verfity of Diet, and wnys of living, peculiar to the divers Climates, Ages, or Conftitutions of Men's Bodies, are to the conftant Care that all Men ought to have of preferving their own Lives snd Healths, according to thefe-versl Neceflkies of their Natures: For in thefe we cannot, by doiog whatever we will, promote this End ; but Nature hath put feme limits thereunto, although our weak Underdandings cannot attain to a nice, or Mathematical exadnefs in sfligning then), as

we may live long arH Iv-aUh'u'ly <nv>ug')f without weighing our M.- r an 1 D ,<, I KS Leffius; fo we miy like wife procure ilis Common Good, as far as lies in om Power, although we dj not always pfrrtoim th?t which tsabloluttly or (imply bell m al! C\ics; it is as much as God the Legiflitor mjuires, if we truly endeavour it, and contribute as far .as we are able unto this g-eat EnJ.

£ 14. la the lift plare, I ihall here repeat what I have before hii down, T!vat this Common Good of Ruion;l, as it is a Col-lc(3:io,T of all naturi! Goods (and the grea-teft of allot h-?^ ((bit is the true Standard of all other Goods either natural, or moral: Infomuch thar by our comparing them with this, we may truly determine whether they are greater, or lefs than each other; and lo whether they are principally to bedefired and fought after, or to be poftponed to other greater Goods. Like wife the fame meafure whence the proportion of thefe Goods is taken, gives us a trueeftimate of all the con. trary Evils, and fo (hews us what is more or lefs to be avoided or repeated of.

§. 15. We may alfo hence learn what degrees of Paflions or AfFe&ions are lawful ; for it is certain, That only fuch a proportion of AfFedUons are required, as are congruous to our Rational Nature, and

exactly anfwering the true Eftimate of thofe good or evil Things by which they are excited ; but fmce the Government of our Appetites and Paflions is a thing of fo great moment, as that on which all our Vertue and Happinefs (as far as it is in our Power) depends; which Government proceeds from our knowledge of a-truemeafureof all Goods, and Evils, according to which they are to be judged; therefore I (hall be the larger in explaining what I have a little before laid down, (viz.) That the Common Good ougfyt to be the Standard of all our Affections and Paflions, as being fo ordained by God , and determined by the Nature of Things; which is evident, in that we have dcmon-flrated this Common Good to be that great End, to whofe profecution all Men are naturally obliged by the Will of God as a Legifhtor, who muft have given us the knowledge of any thing as Good, or Evil, to Jittle purpofr, uskfs he had alfo given us a Rule by which we might judge of the feveral meafures or degrees of this Goodnefs: So that this Common Good being once eflablifhed as a certain Meafure or Standard for this End, the Good of each particular Perfon will bear fuch a proportion to that of the whole Body of

Rationals, as the foundnefs of any one Member does to the Health of the whole Body. So from the knowledge of this Order of divers fubordinate Guods, and the proportion which any one of them bears to the Common or Created Good, may eafily be deduced how much the Well-being or Happinefs of every Tingle Per-fon may contribute to that of the whole Familv; the Felicity of a Family to that of a Common-Wealth; that of aCommon-ueil , to rlv? Happinefs of all Nations ; and o^ ail th fe confidered together, what proportion they may bear to the Common Felicity of Mankind. So that hence you may be eafi-y fatisfied how much the knowledge of this one Truth , conduces to our right prosecution of this great End, and, indeed, Sum of ail the Laws of Nature,

§. 16. Ladly, (which yet ought rather to have been put in the firft place of all ) let us coafidcr the chief and principal of all the Moral Vertues, Lwe, or Piety towards G<?tl, expreffed in all the A<5rs of Divine Worihip, as Prayer, Praife, Thankf-giving, &c. This muft needs be a Ver-tue, fines it does that which is highly grateful and pleafing to God the Head of all Rational Being% and fpeaking after the man-

ner of us Men, performing fomewhat Good, and agreeable to his Divine Nature ; and which alfo in refped of our felves, makes us mod happy, not cnly by rcndring the Deity propitious to us, but alfo by a nearer fpi-ritual approach and converfation with it, in thofe holy Exercifes, it puts us in the happieft ftate we can be capable of in this mortal Life, and fo makes us more able to perform the great End of our Creation, viz. } Our contributing to the Common Good of Rational Beings.

£.27. I have been the larger in laying down and explaining this Law, as a Mea-fure or Standard of all good Actions , to the end that we fhould efteem all Good, or Evil, nor, as it more or lefs profits or hurts our own particular Perfons alone, but as it may more or lefs add to, or detract from this Common Good: So that in comparing of all Goods together, whether Natural or Moral, we ought ftill to look upon that as the greateft Good which confers moft ; and rhatto be the lead, which contributes lead to this great End, which is therefore to be defired, or profecuted by us with pro-portionableArTtchons and Endeavours: From whence alfo may be drawn a general and powerful Remedy sga.nli a!! thofe inordinate Paffions proceeding from exctiBve Self-

Love, by which Men are moft commonly drawn to hurt or injure others. For a Man who thus governs himfelf, will not extravagantly defire any of theie outward Things, nor fuffer his Soul to be difturbed by the con-fcioufnefs of any Crime, who judges nothing truly Good, but what really conduces to the common Good of Rationals.

§. 18. Thus I hope I have demonftrated the true Reafons and Grounds of Moral Good and Evil, or of Vertueand Vice ; and have endeavoured to render Moral Philo-fophy ( or the true knowledge of the Laws of Nature,) a practical Science, and not merely fpeculative, or Notional, like that of the Stoicks; who whilft they allowed nothing to be really good, but Vertue ; or Evil, except Vice; and kept fuch a pother to extol the real Good of. the former, and declaim again!! the certain Evil of the latter; yet by not giving us the true Reafons, or Grounds, why Venue (hould be embraced, and Vice avoided, they rendred their Philofophy merely fpeculative, and only fit for thofe idle Porches in which they declaimed, fcarce having any farther influence upon the Actions of Life, when either their own ArTedions, or any po-.ver-ful outward Temptation, did at a/vy li'ise prompt them to a& contrary tiiCmii--.:o:

For Vertue is only to be efteemed as the hjgHeft or mod perfect Good; not becaufe it is a wrlI-foundingWcrd,or that fills ourMinds uithfome vainemptyNotions;bur becaufe it determines our Actions to their utrnoft influence upon the Common Good of Rational Beings, which is the only true Piety, as eon-fitting in the Performance of the Commands and Will of God, by the imitation of his Divine Good nefs and Beneficence.

$. 19. Sc that I fh?!l conclude this Chapter with Dr. Parkefs excellent Conftdera-tion on this Subj-& ; and which being better than any thing that I can now think of, I (hall give it you almoft Demolition of in his own Words, with but the Law, 6*. t»g, a very little alteration. So a3' that it is now demon ft rarively certain (fays he) by induction of Particulars (according to the method we have now taken ) that every Vertue hath fome natural Efficacy to promote the Common Good of Rationals; and is no otherwife a Vertue, than as it contributes to this great End ; and that each Man's true private Intereft and Happinefs is therein contained, and infeparably con-ncdh-d with it, by the neceflary order ef Nature, /. e. by the Contrivance and VVi;domof Divine Providence: So that nothing can be more evident, than that its Au-

thor commands all his Rational Creatures, that are capable of any knowledge of his Will, and fence of their Doty, to ad fui-tably to that Order of Things whchhe hath tftabliflied in the World, and to that Declaration of his Will, which he hath made by that Eftabliihment, in order to the bringing about this great end of the Common Good of Rational Beings.


Containing an Anfioer tofucb Objections as,may le made againft the Law of Nature, thus explained and reduced into this Propofiticn, Of Endeavouring the Common Good of Rational Beings; with a Conclujion^ provingthis to le thefum of all Laws, whether Natural or Revealed.

§. i. Q Ince there are two forts of men, who O according to their fevera! Principles, and Inclinations, may make different Obje-drions againft this our Method of proving and deducing the Law of Nature, and con-tracing it into this Angle eafie Proportion, of our endeavouring the common good of Rational Beings 5 I (hall therefore divide them into Platonifts, or Epicureans. Thofe who put the whole ftrefs of their belief of the Lairs of Nature upon innate Ideas or Principles of Moral Good and Evil irnpreft. by God upon men's Souls; and whoj doubt not, may .^avs a true zea! (though without knowledge) for this Common Good; v.'hich is more than I can promife for thoie, who filling into the other extrcsm, will not acknowledge that wo can !nve any true cr certainNo:ion,orIdca, rf this Common Good, io ss to make it'tl;c


main end of all our Adions. I (hall therefore in the firft place confider thcfeObjediorts that may be made by the former fort of Men ; whofe firft Objection may be this, That it is mbft fuitable to the goodnefs of God to ie> print upon the minds of men certain Characters and Notions of himfeff, andalfoof thofe Moral Duties which he requires of them ; and not to leave them in the dark, and in doubt about things of fo great aConcernment to them ; fince by that means he would not only have fecurcd himfelf of that Worfhip and Veneration which is due from fo Intelligent a Creature as Man, but would alfb with great cafe and certainty have taught him his duty towards hirnfelf, and others, without putting him to the trouble and pains of difco-verirg his Exigence, and all thofa More!"Duties that depend upon ir, by fo tedious a Method as 1 have here propoied; ivhich every man hath not tin?^ ro enquire ifito, nor pcr-hc-psFiscckies-.^h-on,?, coou^h to ni^ke fucli rational Co^ch;flsn:-4 or Da~uct:ons from the-Nature of God, sna other thin^s%f'oy the un-derdanding of ihe Laws of N:nu:e, 95 we hjve here laid clown: and there tcr;?, thr«t-God (who doth ail things I y the bcft and eafieU means) hath irnpri:fi si! theNotkms or Ideas ot Good and Evil upon tn^'s Souls.

$. ^. TP which Obje&ion I need return n° c'her Anfwerthan what is already mHe by the Author of the Effiy coocermng Human* V::d& Banding (io often cited by me) jlihall th-jT£fore give it you in his own words^ BocM. cL'ip. 4 $. 12. This Argument, if it Is vf any force) wilt prove mxcb msrc than tbofe who ufe it in this ca/e expett from it; for if we may conclude^ That God kath done for me%9 all that men jhalljudge is Is'lfcr them^ lecatifeit is fuit*blc for bis Goodnsfsjo to cio; it will prove not ottly9 that God bath imprinted en tb? minds of men an fdea ofbsmfelfi lut that fa bath plainly flamped there, in fair Char afters, all thai men oucht t;?k'""'iv $r Relieve of bim> and all that they ov-oht to do in vfadiettce t« his Will .� &rA tbat he


hath^i'vsn fbetn aWillandAffcftims cottforKia&le to it. Tim fjy doubt every cne m!l think is letter for tnctf) than tbat tkeyjbouldin the dark^rcps after Knowledge%as St.Pad tells »j,a!l Nations did after God, A$$ Vfll. 27, or than tb&t tbeir Wills fiouldclafimtb their Vtidsrfizvd-ings^ anJthssr Appetites crcfs their Duty. The Komani (h/*y, "fh left for men, axdfcfuita* Us to the Goodttcfs cf Qcdt that there /hcukf ^ 4x Lifettible Jtt^e of Contrcojtrfies w. Earti\ end therefore tbsrt is otie ; Audi ly tbc famc reajcv fey, *Ti$ fatter for wzr. flat every man uimfclf (bould Is MzVillz. I lews them to vwfjtffrt K>h�s~3S?byt*iejoK?tf this Argument

tbty (bail think that < *v. r\ man is fo. I think it a ver *qo;d Ar-ument to fay* the infinitely Wife God bath made itf\ and therefore r is le/L But it i'e-~ws to we a little ?o.? much confidence of cur WtjdcW) tfl/ay,r / thivk it left, and therefore God hat'; made itfo\ and in the matter in I* and,it mil Ic in v-iin to ar^ue from luch a 7 opick, tl\tt G >d hath di-nef", ivbe% certain Experience fieivs us tha* he hath w//, Bat the Goodwefs of Gc,dkaib not l-ccn wjxtiHg tc;mexj,vhh(tutfti;h aright! ;m prefjl'iis of Knoivlczsc, c? ldtasftamped en the wild, fince be barb jxrn?fbedffi&x with thcje Faculties which will ferine fir tl:t falfchnt flifcovs-ty of all thin?s requiftte to the cr.a ;:\,fuch a Be-iwr : A'r-if! / doult not lut /,? /J:civ9 that a m&n iy th? r)gkt u(e cf bis vatural sllilities �may9with^ttt any imiaH Prir.cii'fes, attain to tb?. knowledge f.-f a (jpf/, and other things that concern vim. God having endued Man with thofe faculties uf Kv,iv-leJgs which behath^ was vo more elliged lyhh Gtodxefs tc implant ihefe inna!? Notions in his. filind) thttt thai having given Irlm Realm, Hands a*d ftliier'iah, Ie {l.ltdf! aljo lurid him Bnd'fes, cr Houfes ; which fe^e People in ihe World, hnvever of gjwdnatural parts, do either totally wanf^or are but ill providedcf, as w<eli tfs ethers arefperhc.pi) whollywitbrut Ideas of CW, and Principles �>/ M-ratify, or &t lea/l have litt i)?.ry ill. tmss. The realm in l^fb Ca/cs Itinq^ this, That tks'i never employed their Parts, Faculties

andPmersinduftrioujl. that way tut contented themfelves with the Qptni.ns* Fa/ht--»s. and things of their Count rev, as they jcutfd //vw, wit hint looking any further. io far tins Learned Author.

£. 3. And as for u hat is farther urged, the difficulties ol the coming to the knowledge of the Being of a God, by the method wep o-pofe, if this were nor plainly to be read-fin m the great Book of'the World, St. Faulted in vain sccufcd the general corruption of the Gen'ileSf and their bfsof the knowledge of the true God, as,he doth in the id of the R>Jwaits, v. 19, io. Because that which may be known of God is manijeft in thcm9 for God bath /hewed it unto them. For the tmifj&e things of him from the Creatir-n of the wld are clearly feenfiein^unclerfto^elljtke things that are nude even his eternal power, and Godhead: fo that they are without excttfe.' Where you miy ob-fcrve, the Apofile hers appeals to che common Reaibncf Mankind, guid"d by thirgs without u>, for the proof of the Exifhrnc,- of a Deity, thit they m^y be left without ail tx-cufe for this their wilful ignorance and ne-g!ed.

§. 4. And as for the other part of the Ol> je&ior, concerning the difficulty and iabori-

oaiaefe of the Method we. have here propose!, lor ihedifcovtiynf thcL*wof Nature, ar?d the ureakncfs of men's Faculties, for the msk-io^ilidnuao^'Canclufioos from the Nature of Thimjs 5 I uiink that wJf figmfie much lefs tbaiithe jonijer.. if thofe tiut make this Obje£Hn<i will plt^'b toconfider how obvious fucJi Conclusions art1, aod how eaf?I>- made t-ut, in the Third Chapter of this Di&oirfe; where 1 particularly treat of rhu Natural Power of men's Minds, in making Obfervati» 0^3 from the N-M'ure of 1 liifjgd, and reducing thtni in.o ccrtciin pn^d;ie;:] Pn'opo^siors, so order to their own 1'utcKs happincls, in coo junction uirh inar of t>t->ers: So thai I thiiA I n^ay lafdy afltrrn, that thoil?wlie are notofN-iiural Partsiufficientta di'c? vtr the Bci-"gof a God; and a Providence ^ f-:d-b to underihoJ t&, Lsw^of Natu!p'=, which fie-* p£iid upo:> ihat llaO-wJedgn: 1C- they did but dusy apply their MLiJ-. -:o thb?.; upon their ownGagioalj ?.r?d iha^of rhe Vf^iJd, by true Principles or ilcaiGOj mi?il be either F-;oIs or MaJmen, and fb no*, capable Sabjedlsof ilia Laws cp" ^' ::.arc, ^s not being to be reckoned Bmoiigii i:uiona! Crtiiturt;s 5 or elle, \vhic.T, is-w^rie, ayoJo*'^-right Adidlls^ who, to i.idii'^-j- £hdr own uat'c&fbnable Lulls and PaiU^tf, du abfclutely der?) all thofe clear D jraoisilr^tions iroai Natural Things, which

f4re brought for the proof a Deity, and of th; ir Duty towards it.

§ 5-. And tho I grant that all men do not ordinarily reduce all the Laws of Nature into this one tingle Proportion, of endeavouring this common good of Rational Beings, or may not have an explicite Notion of it; Yet this will not hlnder,but that they may for all that really purme it, tho* they may not have fo large and Perkd a knowledge of the grounds of their Duty, as they would have if they were fenfible of this Idea : For if a man be but thoroughly convinced that he is not made for hirmeil done, but that lie ought to mind the good and preservation of others befileshimklf; and that he doch truly ob-ferye the Laws of Nature cowards himfelf, by a temperate anJ a rational Life; As di'o cowards his Neighbour, by oL&rving that ?reat Rale, of doing as he would Le done by, 10 aU cafes towards others: f lay, fuch a man EDO* oever (b llmple and i.;ncrant in c-ther things, doth really contribute lus il;are of endeavour towards procuring the common good: And tho' he may ne~ diuinclly know all the true reafons and grounds of his own A&ions; yet if he thus led his Life, and oblerve all the Rules tesiding to this End, I doubt not bot that he wili meet with

al thc& Re wauls intended by God for Vertu-O'-;, .-. :l:ior:s; provided he has never heard of, .{?�� '�.ritfiiLiitvcr wi!l-u!!y refuted ihernorepcr-fci'vl/twof ?heG<>!f:e!; delivered by our Saviour j-v^js Gin i'i, when duly propofed to him. Thus a Countrt-y Carpenter may de-i::rve (bfiicient W.iges, and Commendation, ir;. c:n I.'.;?'...: a H:v»j:e, and honeilly perform His W.v'l-'j r.cropJin^ co thofe few prsdical Ru!c> h i- = -;i-. ka.rnr, rho' he doth not un-derfc'-irr-r) ali til? P,'ii)clp!*s of Geometry, or Arcauc^br?, nccot'Uin^ to which, d! that he i;.i;.h wrou^ac m^y e-jfily be demonilrated to him, if Le % ill bur take the pains to un-de«-(tsnd thtm.

^. 6. There is another O! je&Son which this

fort of men ouy make ngainft cur M-thod of fi-ding our, and demoottrating this great L*w oj Nature, in that I make every man's oblation 10 end^vour ir, to ariic- from iis

heii-gp;ood or evil rr> himfilf alone; where-Lv it m;;y fVeoi, J?s if we fupp^fed the honour

of Gor, -.rd i-u' cominon good of mp.r.kind vver-_ '.o b-.: p--;i-pcne.i, snd tradeiubftvvk-nt

ti; :'!"�': i:;;i;;;:;:- i3 Oi cfV p2; ticul.ir p'sTioH.

-'; o f::ia:io ^lilch Sc;vp!-.? J do in the fir ft place ifH'ai, :i.v.:r V;," do nor intend any iuch thing, ti-K:e uc ha; ed! aleag endeavoured to eila-bii'h die quite contrary Dodrine; For I a(?

fert, that no man hath any Right,properly fo calkd, to his own Life or Being, but in order, (and as it conduces)to the honour and fervice of God, and the common good of mankind. I ihall therefore now more diftin&ly declare how thefe (tho* Tome may think them contrary to each other) do very well confift. In the fir ft place therefore Idefire you to take notice that our Natural Obligation to this Law is not difcovered by us in the feme order and method, as it is conftituted by God in the nature of Things; for our weak finite Under-{landings, when acting without the affiftance of Divine Revelation, do (lowly enough at firft attain to the knowledge of Individual, or Single Things; ?nd thence taking Rife from iuch common effects as are moft obvious to our Senfes, proceed to their more abftrtifc Caofes, until at length discovering one Infinite Being, called God, to be the fir (I Caufe and Creator of all thing?; We from thence colled: net only what i& his Nature, but alib what is his Wiil; whereby we do not only find that he is the btft, and moft perfect Being, bur that as iuch,be wiilethand-procurcth the good and preiervation, not of feme few Particulars alone, but of the whole Species of Mankind. And Jaftly, that he would have us menace-operate, as lubordinate, (thofrce Agents) to this End, as the ercatcft and u or-

thieft we can undertake: Which tho it be the kit thing we come to the knowledge of, yet is that which is firft and chiefly intended by God, as the principal objeft of our Knowledge, and the main End of all our Moral A&ions. So that it feems evident, this knowledge of our felves, and of things thus learnt from experience and obfer^stion, was intended byGod,oaly to ferve as ileps to raife us to that larger knowledge, and nobhr defire of puriuing the common good of Rationals, as the fum of all cur Moral Dut'cs. And that our Wills and Affections towards this end, are not to be regulated or directed in the fame order, ii>y v uch this common good cornes to be diibr vrn-d j /. e. (with a re<pe<ft to our lelves £�! ne) 5 but iVom a true judgment concern-ing the ra; Jures of that natural good and per-fefem ?:,.;rcir! contained. S> that tho1 we' are at firit indeed excited to "he procuring our ovy-j !)i.;»;)[nd>, -.s the prime and moll natu-rtl iijoiiveof ;illour Actions; yet we come at !a& u^oa beiccr contideration to difcover, th:;t vhis hr.ivjinefs of ousr^; is contained in our enucivciiii �.�>' che Common good of Rational Brings, £.:a i-:; ii'.icpariiblc from it, as the con-ierviidcnofany of cur particular Members is contiined in the health and prdervation of the whole Body.

£ 7« Arid vhis Pro^ofltioo, that every fin-gle tnsr/3 .30?i is t^ntaincd *o the cemmon-gooL?, prices indeed, that ins Sanction of this gene^S La^, is by rewards and pwnifh-mcrts to £vt>ry fiogie tn^n: But tint £wr/ is not to be remised rd my fcif, or sny one mar? alone, but expends ^ 102 to each other man, or all men.- Since it is evident, that thefe words ( Every matt) amount to all men ,� as ei^sry part colle&ively taken, fig-nifks the wbok. And tho' the main end intended b}r God, the Legiflator, from fuch Rewards aad Pumlhnieots, are obedience to his Laws, and the prefervstion of Mankind, as his Subjects (which are Indeed of much greater value to him, than the happinefs of any one (ingle perfon ); Yet will it not detract from the perfection or Sincerity of this obedi» ence,if from theconfideration of a man's cwn particular huppioefs or miftr}^, he thereby comes to confider and undcsftand, ehat God hath ccrnmanckd liim to purfue an higher and nobler end than that alone; yet to which his own happineis or mifery are inf; parably cor^ neclxd.

£. §. I come in thelaf; place to thofe Ob-js<3;ions, that may be made by men of quite contrary Principles 5 and who will not acknowledge, that we either can, or ought to

propcfe this common good, as the Sum of all the Laws of Nitur.", and the unifi end of all our Moral 'Idim*. Their_firft Obje&ion may be this; That it'learns nor luirable to Goci's Infinite Goxinefs, and Power, and Wiidom, in the. Government oi Mankind, it he did really intend its good and happinet- (is we here fuppofs ) ro perTsif ib groar a. Difign to be Jo often diCiurb'-d if run quite fruflrated, in divirs pcrrs ol'ctc World, by the various. Pafiion5, and unr* aUnable Appctiirs, cf ib many vio!enr,'viched and ur.jufl mer>; u hich, if Mankind be u'ell cor,fi'.itred,do make up the greatci> pin oUhis fur^p 1 xi Aggregate Body. In sr.iwer to this bhjtdion, I might tell thofe that make ir, that the true Original of thit deprived State of Mankind, and from which 3-1! thit difordtr vve now find in Humxre Nature is derived, was the Fall of AdtYYi, the hrit Father of Mankind ; who thrrci-vconvcye;- :i vveaknefs of Reaibn, and that prcvallinp, Power which we feel in our tcrfia! Appetites and Pjalons, to all his Po-ft«-rliV^vheri by M?^ i;' bccojne very pron^ to \LvJt an-J too C;K r-i rrr-ra'^-t'Ts the Laws of K;r.ire. Bat I ill ill aut iniiil uoon this, be-c-iu'.e tlie Gemicnun with whccn I have to do, Hiiy laugh st di Divine Revelation, nor ccccpt of any Proofs us fuiticient, but what can be brought from mere Natural Resfon.

I fhail therefore anfwer them in their own way; and (hall firft of si! grant j That God might, if he had thought fit, have created Man without any pdlibiii-y x>f finning, and have determined him only to that which is morally good. But then God had not created a Man, bat quite another Creature: For he having made Man toconfifl of two different Principles, a Body and a Soul; the one to be driven on by Scnfual Appetites and Paf-fions ; the other to be governed by Reafon: It was neceflary th,-e he fhould be carried towards Good or EvjL as one or other of thefe

" i

fhouid prtvail. So that coniidenng what fort of Creature God hath made us, he bath done all he needed to GO towards tre good and happinefs of Mankind ; Sjppofing that he hath crrrued us, and deals with us as Ire^, volu-uarv Agents, endued wnhaiaedotoef choice, either to deliberate upon the confe-qurnce and nature of all cur Mora! Actions bcibiC we do them; and to acl according to the Rules of right Reafon, or die clean contrary thereunto, that is, wholly st ran-doir1, or by chance, which is unworthy our Rational Nature.

§. 9.5^0 thatGod having thus left the great-cH; pent of man's happineis in his own power,

either to be obtained bv endeavouring this

�j t^j

common good ; orelfe mifled of, or loft by his own neglect of if;; h is not to b~- wondered, if men's usresfuiable App£tr*:s??ndP;?f-fions, looking f,o farther thun their prefect Pleafures, or outward Advantages, do often carry them away without any confideration of thofe future, bur as certain sod greater evils which may fellow them in the whole courfe of their lives. By which sb'-n; of men's natural Freedom,! grant the good and happinels cf Mankind as very ranch diilurbed sod dimin'ihcd: Therefc«e It is r=o wonder, that (?ho* God's will be iufficie-;r;y declared sgsinftfuch A�lions, ) it is not .pore often i>bf<.TVcd ant! fcllowtd \ corcouk* God have ordered things better otherwife tban they �are, unlef's he lhou:d have made M:*'i with out £-1 freedom of choice, and have ^bfermi* ned his Will on'ly to one fort of £<9tions 5 which had rendered him cai-ie ancr;-er Crea-ture^od incapable of thoie Rewsrds *no Pu-ni(hr?rents, which are abfcktc-y L'Ccflary fbrthegovernnicntcv mtP9 as he is r^.^deby God, a free, voluntary Ag-:-^.t. Sec-iidly, Tho'God hath thus oiideus k^e -le ^t?., but by the ill ufe of cur Faculties, »ve become iBorepionst.oefcil Ad^ions v?,:;? good ones; Yet it snuit be iVU acsror--!.:^,:,;, God's fr?fitrue Power ?-yJ Prov''/'.--.,�- (i:^a let fuch limits to the unruly A'^-:^.- w]

Petitions of wicked men, that though by private Violence, Wars and Perfecutions for Religion, they do more mifchief to Mankind thin all the Savage Beads, Earthquakes or Fkgues in the World ever did ; Yet this is but in feme few particular Places or Countries at a time; and God hath fo retrained thefe Patfions and Lufts, not only by Natural, Divine and Civil Laws 3 but alfo by neceflary ill confequences that follow fuch Adions; that it is not often that fuch men can accomplifli their wicked de-Cgns with that fuccefs and pleafure they pro-pofe to thernfelves. And in thole Countries where thefe Violences are A&ed, the Scene oftt'n alters: So that where Civil-Wars and Periecarion for Religion, have not only very much difturbed the Common Peace and Happinefs, but alfo diminished the number or the Inhabitants, God doth often think fit, either through men's wcarinefs of Wars, or by the fuddcn desth of a Cruel snd 4rn!;rio-js Prir:ce (who was the chief cauie of it) spiin ro reftore peace and faz^L^fs ?o rh^fe Kingdoms or Countries where Civil Wars nnd Perfecutions had be-fcro h cruelly rs^cd, and fo long prevailed. And wotwithfhnding all that caa be obje-c3:ed, sgsinft God's iDteodicg the good ajid LsnpinciS of Mankind, is is certain, that

from the beginning of the World to this day, he hath preserved it in the fame State, as he hath alfo done all ether Species of Creatures. In fo much that we may boldly affirm, the number of men in the world rather in-creafes than diminifhes; tho' it may pleafe God, for the correction or extirpation of feme extremely wicked, and incorrigible Nations, to permit them to be opprefTed, di-miniflied , or quite deftroyed by Foreign Force,Civil Wars, or Domeftick Tyranny.

£, 10. A feccnd Objection that may be brought by thole of Epicurean Principles, is, That if the being of aGod,ar?d the certainty of the La vvs of Nature are fo csfy to be found out, and difcovered by men's Natural Realons and Obfervations; how it comes co pafs that there are fome whole Nations in the World, who have (as we knew of) no Notions at all of a God, or a Moral Good or Evil; as Travellers report of thofe Negroes, who inhabit near the Bay o\ Soldamta, not Far ironi the Caps rf Good f/ope; who fell fh-nr Children for Slaves, rot hole thai will give molt for them : As alfo others in the W^//and Raft-fa* dies; that make War upon , and devour a!! Strangers they can take Prisoners. O-ther{?, as sn the Iflr? of Formfa ?er:dring a-boirive ali Cl:ilciren.that the Mothers con*

ceive, before they are thirty years Old. O-thers in the Weft-Indies, and in Africa^ dealing from Strangers whatfoever they can lay their hands on. It were tedious to relate all the particular Inftances of this kind* Whofo ever defires to fee more of them, may confulc the Learned Author of \he above-mentioned Eflay cf Humane 'Undtr (landing, Bock the T. Chap. III. £ 9. befidcs what he may himfelf colled; from hi? own reading, or obferv.ation. So that it may be u?ged, that if thefe People are pare,of Mankind, and therefore Rational Creatures, how it comrs to pafs that they ihould rot be able, as well« we, to come to the knowledge of a Gr.d, snd of thofe Natural Laws, which we iuppofe to be given to Mankind ?

§ ii. To all which ! (ball reply, frf by den}-ing, as Tome do, the matters oi Fr.£t themfelvtSj.- which is nn eafy, but too pofirive away ofconfutation j imr ;h-r" r?V? thorn- ait prcfrnt forgran?i-J, feeing thry sre dchvered tons by many A?ithors of lurTinrnt credit. And thereF- re, -firUot'a!!, I think S may fafe-ly a.flirm, Tnat tho* thefe Jnftances may be of considerable weight, againft thofe who found all our Knowledge of the Laws of Nature upon certain Innate Principles, or the common ccnfent of Mankind: Yet they will

prove nothing againft us, who have, I hope, made out the certainty and obligation of this Law from more evident Principles : So that the contrary belief or practice of divers Nations in the World, is no more an Argument againft the Being of a God, or of the Laws or' Nature, than their ignorance in A-rithmetick and Geometry, is, againft the certainty or ufefulnefs of thofe Sciences; thefe people, being moftof them not able to reckon beyond their ten fingers. Now fetting afide .Innate Ideas, and Confent of Nations, as proofs of the Laws of Nature ; what other means do there remain, but the uncertain Tradition of a God, and thefe Moral Laws delivered from their Parents , or Anceftors; or e!fe to difcover them by Reafon, and obfer-vations from the Nature of things, according to the method here laid down. The former of thefe (if they had ever any fuch thing) it is certain they have now quite loft, fo that no Footileps of it at this day remains among them. And as for the latter, thefe ignorant and barbarous Nations, being wholly taken up , through the whole courfc of their lives, either in procuring for themfelves the common neceifaries for life, or elfe in brutifh and fenfual Lufts and Pleaiures; it is no wonder that they give themfelves no time or opportunity to think of thefe things, nor yet employ

their thoughts, in confideriog the caufe of their being.or for what end they came into the World. Therefore it is not ftrange that they fhould be fo little fenfible of the Being of a God, and what Worfhip or Duties He requires of them: Nor can I give a better account of this ignorance, than what you may find in the Author laft mentioned, who thus5 concludes his Paragraph againft the necefiity of Innate principles(alreadycitedin the beginning of this Chapter.J*Had you or I been borrt ( fays he) at the Bay of SoldaniA, poflibly ctir thoughts and notions had not exceeded thefe brutiih ones of the Hotentots that inhabit there: And had the Virginian King,^0cto* cana, been educated in England^ he had per^ haps been as knowing a Divine^ and as good a Mathematician, as any in it; Thd clmercnce between him, and a more improved Englifh wan, lying barely in this, That the exercife of his Faculties was bounded within the Ways, Modes and Notions of his own Counrrey, and was never directed to any other, or farther Enquiries: And if ha had not any Idea of a God? as we have^ it was only becauie he punned not thofe Thoughts that would certainly have led him' to it.

& ii. Which account, tho* it were fum"« cient alone to take ofFthis difficulty,yet I (hall further add; That altho it is true, the Exi-(tence of a God, and tht Laws of Nature, are to be difcovered by Natural Rcaion ; yet th:s muft be exerted, and made ufe of according to a right Method, and is like the Talent in the Gofpel, either to be highly increafed, or elfe may be buried, without ever being made ufe of as it ought, So that men's not making ufe of their Reafon, and thofe Faculties which God hath given them, is no more an Argument sgainil God's not hiving given men fufEcient Means and Faculties to attain to the knowledge of thefe things, than if a man, who by perpetual fitting dill, mould lave loft the ufe of his Legs had r?afcn to find fault with God, for not giving him fuffi-ci nt means of going, and helping hin.fllf. Wherefore it fetrns evident to me, that it is Itft in moft men's power,whethtr they will by a due ufe of their Reafon, raife thcmfclvts to thehigheft perfection and happinefsth&ttht'ir humane nature is capable of; or tile by employing their minds about meer (eniu*I ol-je&s, and carnal erjoyments, debafe them-felves into the ft ate of Brute.1. For I am fa tisfied, that it is not reafoning about common and outward things that confiirutes the only difference between us and them ; fince they

fon right about thofe things that are the ob-jeds of their Senfesi but that it rather con-fids in the more excellent Faculties of framing Univerfal Ideas,and by a due enquiry into the caufes and nature of things, of coming to the knowlege of God,and of his Wiil,either naturally declared, according to the method here laid down, cr elfe fupernaturally revealed in the Holy Scripture. And indeed, I think, a DogorHorfe, to be a much better Creature than a Man who hath never had, or elfehaLh totally extinguiihed the belief of a God, and of his Duty towards him; for theOne lives according to its nature,and thofe Faculties God hath given it: But a Man, who wants the knowledge of God, and of his duty towards him, by ncgle&ing the chief end of his Creation, and by giving himfelf wholly up to the government of his Portions, and unreafonable Appetites, debafcs his nature, and fo becomes, by his own fault, like to ( if not worfe than ) a Brute.

§. 13/The lafl Objection that I can think of, and which may be alfo made by Mt.ffob&es's Difciples, is; That they look upon this endeavour of the Common Good of Mankind, as a rneer Platomck Idea , or Term of Art, without any reality in nature to iupport it. Of which opinion Mr.Hols kerns to be,when

be tells us, in his Leviath. Book I. chap. 4. That of Nantes, fome are proper andfingular to one only thing, as Peter, John, This Man, this Tree $ and fume are common to many things, as Man, Horfe, Tree ; every of which, though lut oneNamejs neverthelefs the Name of divers pw-tJe-dar thixgS) in reffeff of all which together it is called jn Oniverfal^ there being nothing in the World Vniverfa!, but Names. For the things named are every cm of thstn individual and (ttnulitr. So that on thele Principles we can

J C$ *

have no knowledge or any common good out of a Commonwealth, where it arifes merely from Compacts; every man being naturally determined to feck his own particular prefer-vation and fatisfadlioo.wichout the leaft confi-dcration of any thing elfe.

§. 14. Irs aof^/er ro which ObjccHon, I defire you to take notice, That if in cur Defer ipt ion of ths Law of Nature, or Explication of it, we had any where (uppofed, that in this endeavour of the common Good, a Man cither could,-or ought, to nrgfs-ffr his own pre-iervation, and true hsppin:^, there m.ght have been fome reaibn for this OLjtdion ; I/at iince I have proveJ, scat the true good and happinels of every particular pcrlbn ir» included in the Common Good oi Rationa's and depends inseparably upon it; though I grant

every man's own happinefs and mifery is a main motive of his a&ing to this end, and al-fo confifts in a right endeavour after it; * hh h if it be fo, this part of the Objedtfon falls of it felf; unlefsthey will affirm,! hat a Man's fclf-prefervationand happinefs only con fids in che prefent fatisfa&ion of his own fenfual Appetites and Paflions, let what will be the con-fequence; which how falfe and unresfoni-ble a thing it is, any rational Man may judge. x<//X, We have alib fufficiently made out, that there is an unalterable Common Good and Evil eftablimed by God in the nature of things, necefiary for the prcfervation, or tending to the deftrudHon, not only of this, or that particular man, but of all the men in the World, conceived under the collective Idea of Mankind, and that in the ftate of Nature, and out of a Civil State or Commonwealth; Since by Comparing our own particular Natures with thofe of all other men, and finding them to agree in the fame Wants,, general Properties, and ckfires of like things neceflary for life, and an averfion to others deftrudive to it, we can thereby certainly determine what Things or Actions will conduce not only to our own happinefs and prefervation, but to all others of our own Kind. From whence there arifesa clear Idea of the Common Good of Mankind, fince (as I have

^ready proved) one peculiar Faculty of hu* fnane Vdmre d-rjertnr from that of Beads, is, to auit/act umvsrfil 'd^s from particular thing;, and then to give giiwrA Names to thole ideas, which though iney a^e but Crea-? turesof ourcv-.vn under Handing, and not ex-iftingoutof our own Brains ; yet are for all that tru? M?3S of th- general Natures ot thofe things from whence they are taken ; and as for the guier $1 Names of them, if there were nor real notions in our minds, agreeable to thz nature of thofe things from whence they were taken, and that before any Names im-pofed upon them, they would indeed be Non-fenfe> or mecr empty Sounds, without any Ideas to lopporr rhem: But the before»cited Au! nor ofihe Effay of Huma*cZl#4lerp*ru$ingi &»/& If. Chap. -2,4. (hews, That the Mind bath a Dtwer to wake complex, collective Me is rfSttl-ji3ttcess which he jo calls, lecaufefuch Jdeas are matig up <>f many particular Sub fiance s, confider-ed together as unite ditto one Idea, and which ft jrine id are locked on as Otte'->v. g. the Idea of fetch a colleffion of men as muke an Army, thouih con* /tiling of a great vumber of diftintt Subftances, is as much on? frteJ, as the fs/?.i of a'frfjv. And tvegrfdt collcftrve Idea of all Bodies wbatfoever fi(£x?f,e'l ly the transe^ Worldjs as much one Jdea9 as the Idea of any the ieaft particle of matter in it) itjttffici»g to the unity of any Idea^ that it lc

tfnftderedas one Reprefentationt or Ptfture, tbo wade up of never fo many particulars. And be likewife farther grants, That it is not harder to conceive horn an Army of Ten thottfandmen fhould make one Idea, than how a Man fhould wake one Idea; it being as eafy to the mind to unite into one the Idea of a great number of men^ to con fader it as one^ as it is to unite into one particular all the diflintt Ideas that make up the compojition of a Man, and conftder them altogether as One.

Therefore I can fee no reafon, why any man,by confidering the nature of all the Men in the World, may not only have a true Idea of all M*nki;Kl,buta!fo of the things or means that may produce their common good, or happinefs,as well as a General of an Army of 100,000 men can have a true Idea of that collective Body of Men, and order all things ne-cef'&ry for their common fafety and preferva-tion ; And if Mr. Holbss Aflertion be true, Th$t there is nothing uviverfal but Names, his beloved Sciences of Arithmetick and Geometry would alfo be fa lie nnd uncertain ; finre they only considering Numbers, Lines and Figures in general , and collecting univerfal Ideas from thence, do raife true Rules cr Axioms in thofe Sciences from thofe univerftl IdeaSjthough there be nothing really exiting in Nature out of our own Brains, but Units

and (ingle bodies. And therefore Mr H. is miihken, when he will have nothing to have any real Exiftence in nature but (ingle things, as if our abftrsd; Ideas of Univerfals were Nothing, bccaufe they are net Bodies. But if thefe general Ideas are true, as agreeing with the things from whence they are taken, it will alfo follow, that they have a real exi-ftence, and confequemly may have Names given them, whereby tofignify and reprefent them to our own minds, and thofe of others we converfe with. So that whatfoever we find to contribute to the Prefervation, Happi-nefs and Perfection of all the men we know, or have heard of, we may as certainly conclude to be naturally good for all Mankind, and fo a much greater good than that of any one particular Per ion ; which Mr. H. him-felf acknowledges in his Treatife De hcmine^ Chap. ii. £. 14. where treating of the De-grees of ^Good, w hich of them are greater or iefs, he plainly declares, that to le a greater good (ccereris parlous") which is fo to more wetts than fhst which is fo to fewer.

So that if the Rational and free ufe of a man's Will coniifts in its confent with that true judgment rhtUnderftaoding makes, concerning thofe things that agree in one Common Nature; and if we can thereby truly judge or determine what things are neceflary, or bene-

ficial for the Natures of all other men, as well as our own ; I fee no reafon why we may not defire, that they ihould alfo enjoy the like good things with our felves, and Iikewife endeavour (as far as lies in our power) to procure it for them; fince it is alfo a Duty impofed upon us by God; and that we lie under fufficient obligations to do it, we have already proved.

In fhort, This Common Good of Rationals, being thus made known to us, may very well be propofed as the end of all our Moral Actions ; and being the greateft we can defire or imagine, the Understanding judging aright, cannot but determine, that this Knowledge and Defire will more conduce to the Happi-nefs and Perfection of our Humane Nature, than that of any lefler Good: So that if this be greater than any other Good we can come to the knowledge of, it will Iikewife prove to be the greateft and nobleft end men can pro-pofe to themfelves. And Mr. HMs. himfelf is alfo fometimes fenfible of this Common Good, when in the 31 Chap, of his Leviathan, in the laft Page, he hath made in his Latin Tranflation, this Addition.

That he doth not defpair that this Doftrine of bis being Iscome more acceptable ly Cuflom^ voill as length Is received bono publico,/0r the Common Good.

So that it feems he prefages his Doctrine will come one day to be beneficial not only to one particular State, or Commonwealrh, but for the Common Good of all men, who are with him yet in the State oi Nature: And if Mr. Holbs hath fo perfect a notion of the Common Good of all Nations* I think there will be no great difference but in Words, between that and the Common Good which we maintain.

§. f 5. But to come to a Conclufion:! hope, notwiihftanding all that hath been objected to the contrary, it hath been fufficiently made our, That not only all the Moral Ver-tues are contained in, and may be reduced to this one Principle, Of endeavouring the Common Good of Rational Being*; Bat that like-wi(e all the Laws of Nature, f which are but the Exercife or Practice"of thele particular Vertues upon their due Objects, may be alfo reduced into this (ingle Propofition; fmce they all of them refpecl: either a man's Duty towards God, by a due worihip of him, or elfe tawards himfelf, in the exercife of Temperance, &c or elie by a due obfervaticn of Juftice and Charity, or the mod diffufive Benevolence towards others of our own Kind ; according to the Order we have already laid down in the former Chapter. All which is

but our endeavouring to procure (as far as we are able) this Common Good of Rational A gents.

Tis true Mr. Halls, in his Lev. Chap. 13. comra&s all the Laws of Nature into this fliort and eafyRule which he fays is intelligible even to the meaneft capacities (z//z.) Do not that to another, thou woultlft not have done to thy felf. Which Rule, tho* very true, and the lame in effl(5t, which was given by our Blefled Saviour himfelf; yet wirhout the confiderati-on of the Common Good of Mankind, would too often fail. For if this Rule were ftriftly and literally to be underftood, no Prince, Judge, or other Magiftrate, could condemn a Malefa&or to death ;for in fo doing, he did that to another, which he would not have done to himfelf, in the like Scate: Since he himfelf, as well as the Criminal he condemns, would then defire to be pardoned if he could. But indeed the reafon why al! Judges, and other inferior Officers of Juftice, are excu-fed from the cbfer vaticn of this Rule, in their publick Capacities, is, Becaufe they do not then a& as private perfons, but as publick Representatives, or Truftees, with whom the G mmon Good and Peace of the whole Kingdom or Commonwealth is emrufted ; wh;ch (is I have already fliewn) makes but a imall pm of the Common Good of all Rational Agtnts.

§ 16. There are like wife Others who reduce all the Laws of Nature into this Tingle Rule or Precept, Prefer� or do good to thy fe Ift and any oilier innocent Perfon, as to thy felf\-Which tho* I grant to be a true Rule, as con* raining our Saviour's Epitome of the Command ments of the Second Table, Love tly Neighbour as tkyfelf; Yet doth it not exprefs the Reafon or Principle on which it is founded ; for we have no Reafon to love cur Neighbour, but as they pertake of the fame Common Rational Nature with our felves; and that our doing them good, doth conduce to the pre-fervation and happineis of the whole Body of Mankind; of which that perfon, as well as our felves, are but fmall parts, or Members: Nor have we any particular obligation to endeavour our own particular Good, but as it conduces to, and is part of the Common Good of Mankind.

§. 17. And as the whole Law of Nature* fo likewife the Revealed Law, given from God by Mofes to the Jews , and intended in due time to be made known to all Mankind; tends to no other end, than this great Law of endeavouring the Common Good of Rational Agents. For all the Precepts of the Fird Table of the Decalogue, which preferIbe our Duty towards God, and which our Sa-

viour hath fo excellently well contracted into this fingle Precept, Thoujhalt love the Lord thy Goaf with all thy heart, and with aS thy foul, and with allthj ftrength, &c. contain nothing more than this great Rule. For as God, before he thought fit to create the World, and whilft there was yet no Creature to worfhip or ferve him, was not then lefs happy or perfect ; fo neither now he hath created them, is he the happier, if we worfhip him, or the more unhappy, if we omit it. For Man being created as an Objed: for the OivineGood-nefs to exert it felf upon, it muft neceflarily follow,that all the Precepts of the FirftTable, as well as of the Second, are in fome fort intended for Man's Good and Happinefs, as well as God's Honour and Service. So that even that Great Commandment of keeping holy the Seventh day, which moft chiefly re-fpe<5h God's own Glory and Service, did al-fo promote the Good and Happinefs not only of the Jews, God's particular Subjects, buc alfo of all Mankind, whenfoever this Law ihould be discovered to them. Wherefore tho* it commands the dedicating of that day to the Wodhip and Service ot God, and is obkrved in obedience to his Commands ; Yet even in this, he docs not defign his own Glory and Honour alone; but (according to

Saint Auftin ) our Good and Happinefs alfb ; which is then moft perfect and compleat, when we beftow our time in the contemplation of his Infinite Perfections and Good-nefs towards us, and in rendring him thanks for his unfpegkable' Benefits. So that though I grant he hath made and ordained us for his Service ; yet he hath fo conftituted our Nature, as ro make our higheft happinefs infeparably connected with all the particular A&s of his Worfhip. And therefore our Saviour reproves the Jews, when they found fault with him for luffering his Difciples to pluck the Ears of Corn on the Sabbath-day, exprefly telling them, That if they had known what this means.I will have mercy and not facrifice, they would not have con" demned the guilt lefs; for the Son of Man [ /. <?. not Chrift alone, but every Chrifiian] is Lord even of the Sallatb- day : A r : in St. Mark, That the Salkitb was made for Man, and not Man fir the Sjlb.ith. Thereby teaching us,that the Sabbath it felf was alfo inftituted for Man's fake ; and that, in cafes of neceflity, he is Mafter of it. And fo likewife our Saviour himfelf, by chufirg to do his greateft Miracles of healing on the

�-Credendum eft totum quo colitur Deus, homini prodef. fe, non Deo. Dt Civit. Dei Lib X. Cap. 5.

Matt. 12 7,8.

Mat. a. 27.

Sabbath-day, hath taught us, that the perfoi> mance of Afts of Charity and Mercy on that Day, is a great and neceflary part of God's Service.

§. 18. But as for the Precepts of the Se* cond Table, I need not infift upon them; be-caufe our Saviour himfelf hath contracted them all, (even that of honouring our Parents) into this fliort Precept, Thoafbalt love thy Neighbour as thyfelf: Which is no more than to bid us endeavour the common good of Mankind, totheuttermoft of our power. So that as this Law of the mod difFufive Benevolence of Rational Agents, contains the Sum of all the Laws of Nature, asalfo of the Mora! Law,contained in the Ten Commandments; ib likewife is it the Sum of the whole Gofpel delivered by our Saviour Chrift, and his Apo-J ftles. For One great defign of our Saviour's coming into the World, was, by his irioft excellent Precepts and Examples, to fcxalt .the Law of Nature to a higher perfection', than what Men by the common ufe of Reafoity could generally attain to ; And likewife a'n-Qther main End of his coming, was, to re-ftore the Law of Mofest® its Primitive Purity and Perfection; and to free it from thofe falls Interpretations and Traditions, with which the Phfoifees ha d corrupted it.- For whtfcreas

they had confined the obferyation of that* Command of lovingour Neighbours, only to-outward A&s, or at leaft, retrained it only to tliofe of their own Nation or Religion j our Saviour Chrift commands a greater per-fe&ion, and forbids even fo much as the thoughts or defires of Murther, Adultery ,e£tf. And whereas the Jews did fuppofe, that they were not obliged to (hew Ads of Charity or Mercy to thofe of a different Religion from themfelves, our Saviour teacheth them by that excellent Parable of the Traveller that fell amongft Thieves, and was taken up and cured by the merciful Samaritan, when the ill-natured Prieftand Le~ -vile had parted him by, faying to the Lawyer who had ask'd, Who is my Neighbour, Go thy ways, and, do thou likewije. By which he plainly intimates; That we ought to do all A&s of Charity and Benevolence, to all per-fpns that ftand in need of them, let their Nation or Religion be never fo different from our own. Wherefore whofoever will but ferioufly eonfider the great end of our Saviour Chrift's ctoming into the World, and alfo the whole fcope and defign of his Doftrine; will find, that it was only to procure, as well by his Example as Precepts, the good and happi-nefs oi all Mankind. For to what end elfe did betake upon him the Form of a Servant,

Luke 10. 30.

and endured a poor and miferable life, with an ignominious Death, but to procure ever-lafting happinefs for all thofe that fhould tru« ly believe in him ? Or to what other end were all thofe excellent Precepts, fo often given by Chrift and his Apoftles, of lowing one another? And therefore St. Paul tells rhe Romans, Chap, i $. v. 8. that he that l&veth another, hath fulfilled the Law: And more fully in the laft Chapter to the Galatians, v. 14, For the Law is fulfilled in this one word, eve^ m thlsj Thou (halt love thy Neighbour, as thyj -if., A.<1 in his firft Epiftletothe Corinthians, Cap* : ?, he is very large and particular in fetting forth the neceffity, and exalting the excellency of Charity, above all the other Spiritual Graces; without which, he tells them, If he hadFaitk fo AS to remove Mountains ; yet if he had not Charity, he were nothing. Now what is this; Charity but an unfeigned love and good-will to allMankind?Ch.2.i7.And St.Jams tells us,' That faith without works isdeadybeing alone. And St. John in his firft Epiffle, makes the love of our Brethren, (that is of all Men) the great fignand demonftration of our Love to God, when he tells 'emjbat if'a Man fays, I love God, and hateth his Brother, he is a lyar \ for he that loveth not his Brother, whom he hath feeri, how tan he love God, whom he hath not feen? And thii Qommdndment we have from him, That he

who lovetk God, love bis Brother alfo. So that whoever will but confider what hath here been {aid, cannot but acknowledge, that this excellent Dechme of the Gofpel, concerning the moft intenfe love towards God, and the moft diffufive Charity towards Men, doth not only far exceed all the Precepts of Philpfo-phers, but allbthe Revealed Law of Mofes it felf. Now what can be the defign of all thefe excellent Precepts ? but by all the Commands and Perfwafions imaginable, and by all thePromifes of the moftgloriousRewards, and Threatnings of the moft terrible and laft-ing Punifhments, to advance the Glory of God, and to procure the Welfare andHap-pinefs of the whole Race of Mankind.

§. 19. To conclude ; Though I fuppofe the Law of Nature, if duly obferved, where it hath pleafed God to give Men no other knowledge or difcovery of his Will, may yet give them a rational fhare of happinefs, not only in this Life, but in that to come ; yet I hope no indifferent or rational Man, but upon due confideration of the lapfed and depraved ftate of Humane Nature, and how prone it is to be carried away by exorbitant Luftsand , Paffions, contrary to the Di&ates of right Reafon, and his own Confcience, but muft alfo acknowledge, that it was a great demon-

ftration of God's Goodnefs and Mercy, to give us the moft Glorious Light of his Go-fpel; and to fend his BlefTed Son, not only to inftruft us, but alfo to die for us. Which great Myftery, that in God's due time, and according to his Promife, may be fpeedily revealed to all Mankind, we ought daily to make it our hearty Prayers to his Divine Ma-jefty, That every Heart may know, and every Tongue confefs, That Jefus'is both Lord and Cbritt; who hath brought Life and Immortality to light, through the Gofpel.

The End'of the Firft Part






A Confutation of Mr. H's Principles.

THE Introduftion, containing the Reafons why we have put thefe An-fwers to Mr. H's Principles into this Method, H&#. i.

The Heads of the Fir ft Principle. That Man is a, Creature born unapt for Society.

His Reafons for it; That a Man is not a, Sociable Creature by Nature, but Accident; for otherwife wefhould love all Men alike. All Society proceeds from Self-inter eft ; this rejbhed into mutual Fear, or eye Afire of Glory and Do* minion over others* Se£t* 2,

i. Anfiver, That thefe words, born unAft for Society, are equivocal; fince who doth not know how unapt Children and Fools are to underftand the force of Compacts. Mr* H. takes his whole meafure of Humane Nature from thofe Paflions that precede the ufe of Heafon and Experience, which arealfb natural, as he himfelf confefTes in another Place. Sect. }.

That is natural which every Man, when of years pf Difcretion, either doth, or may attain to. Sect. 4.

Anfvcr^ tohis 2d Argument concerning Tn-tereft; Society, though defir'd for a Man% own good, or Intereft, doth not make it for all.that, lef§ natural. Setf. f.

Anfmr to his Argument from Fear; not the caufe of Natural, but of Civil Society, which we are not now tre'ati ng of. Serf. 6.

Anfver to his Inflances from the Company he had kept; which beingfome witty, ill-natured Men, no ftandard can be taken from thence of the nature of all Men. Sec}. 7.

Anfwer to his Argument concerning Dominion : No Man able by^ his own iinglc Power to force all the reft of Mankind to fub-mit to his Will. Sect. 8.

Mr. H. himfelf doth not deny, but that Men cannpt fubfift or live without Society, though to evade this, he confounds Natural

with Civil Society; the abfurdity t>f which is expofed by (hewing it to be befides the Queftion. Se&.-g*

The Heads of the Second Principle.

That all Men are by Nature equal,

His Argument proved from Men's mutual will and power of hurting each other; and chiefly fr6m the power which all Men, even the moft weak, have of taking away each other's lives. Se&.i*

Anfwet. This equality, though granted, doth not prove that all Men are by Nature equal as to all things. Sett. 2.

The Heads of the Third Principle.

That there i* a mutual witt or deftre in aU Men of hurting each other*

His Argument propofed, Thattho' feme Men according to the natural equality will allow to other Men the fame things as to them-ielves; yet that the major part of Men are not fo modeft, but will arrogate themfelves honour above others, or elfe will affault other Men's Goods, or Perforis,out of a falfe efteem of their own power; from thence arifes a ne-ceflity of others defending their Peribns and Goods againft them. This proved allb from

the great Contention arifing among Men from ftrife of wit; And laftly from many defiring the fame thing at once. Setf. i.

Atifaer. None but Fools and wicked Men can have adefireto hurt thofe that have done them no injury; fo that this does not reach all Men, nor yet that even thefe have a will to hurt all Men alike, but only thofe that ftand in their way, or whofe Goods they defire. Self-defence argues nodefire of hurting others. &#.;£.

Anfaer to his zd Argument, from Men's contention of Wit; difference Of Opinion, no real ground of Men's deftroying each other. Sett. $.

Anfwer to his Argument, from Men's de-fire to think well ofthemfelves, and to contemn others; viz. That this Obfervation doth not reach all Men, but only thofe fool-ifh and unreafonable Men he defcribes, Sett. 4.

Anfmr to his Argument, from many Men defiring the fame thing at once. This, tho* true among Brutes, and Wicked and unreafonable Men, yet doth not reach all Mankind, fiice Reafon ai&ates the contrary; God hath beftowed enough of the neceffaries of life a-mong Mankind in the ftate of Nature, fo that they need not fight for them. Setf9 5.

Heads of the Fourth Principle.

That Naturehathgivw to d( Men Bright to all


Mr. Jfs Argument propofed, That aH Men having a Right to preferve themlelves, have alfo a Right to judge of the means of their own prefervation; therefore whatever they think conduces thereunto, they have a Right to, let it be what it will; Profit being here the only meafirreof Right. Se&. i.

Anfaer* Mr. H's Argument reduced into a Syllogifm, fhews, That all Men have not a right to all things, but only fb many of them as they {hall think neceffary for their own prefervation: Yet even here that Men's faHe Judgment concerning the means, cannot give them a Right to aff things whatever, tfio7 judging never ib unreafonably. Setf. 2. > ^ Farther proved from Mr. ffs own Definition of right Reafon; Right never ufed properly, but with refpecl: to fomeLaw^c^ faiowledged by Mr. H. himfelf,in hisTrea-tife De Cive. Mr. IPs Errors and Contradl-ftions of himfelf about the ufe of the word Right Reafon. &£Vj,

Not true, that in a Commonwealth the publick Reafon, or Law thereof is always to

Retaken for Right, or that no Man can di-

ftinguifh true Reafon from falfe, but by comparing it with his own. Mr. PTs Argument reduced into a Syllogifm; whereby it ap-f>ears, That the major is falfe. Men's falfe Judgments, or Reafons, cannot alter the Nature of things, nor can give them a Right to all things. 6W7. 4.

Mr. H's Error in this matter; whence it proceeds. Sect. 5.

No Rule of deciding any doubt, or difference in the ftate of Nature, but the Nature of things, or content of the Parties concerned, Sect. 6.

Humane Nature will ever acknowledge a difference between Right and Falfe Reafon, and that according to Mr. H's own definition of it. Sect. j.

But to evade this difficulty, Mr. H. fup-pofes all Men to be neceffarily evil,or to be fo by Nature. The Argument of the Author of Tratfattts Theologico-fotiticus, to the fame effe£t �, That whatever A&ion, though never fo wicked or unreafonable, any Man doth, he hath a Right to do it, becaufe he could aft no otherwife at that time. Sett. 8.

Thofe Arguments refuted: Neceflity never called a Right, that word being never ufed, but with refped to Men capable of Reafon, and Deliberation ; Men of found Minds, and mature Age, can never plead Ig-

norance, nor to be excufed IF they voluntarily give themielves up to be governed wholly by their own Appetites and Paffions. Se&. 9, 10.

Mr. H*s Excufe; That in the Jlate of No* ture, and where there is no Legiflator, MeitsPafi jions are no fins< Anfwered, fincethereisno State either Natural, or Civil, wherein God ceafes to be a Legislator, or that the Laws of N ature are not properly Laws. Seft. i o.

Mr, H's Artifice in taking away all Freedom from Mankind, and making all A&ions neceffary,whereby he deftroys all the grounds <of Moral Good and Evil; his contradi£tingf himfelf, when he acknowledges his Right or all Men to all things to be unprofitable, fmce himfelf before makes Utility to be the meafure of all Right.

The Heads of the Fifth Principle. That in the ft ate of Nature, whatfoever any one doth to another, is no injury.

Mr. H's Arguments for this; That in the fate of Nature were are no Lam; where there is no LaWy there is no 'Injuftice; where there is no Injuftice, there is no Injury ; "Juftice and In-juftice^ no Faculties either of the Body, 'or Mind; for Injufticeftippofesfome Propriety or Dominiony which cannot be fuppofedin this State. The

fame Opinion held by Eficurus long ago. Setf. i.

Anfiver. The Dilates of right Reafon^ or the Laws of Nature, are the Laws of God$ and therefore give every Man a Right to his Life, and all means necefTary thereunto. So that whatever a Man enjoys by the Right of Nature, it muft be Injury and Tnjuftice to take it away. And Mr. H himfelf agrees, that to be Injurious, which is repugnant to right Reafbn ; that is, to any known Truth, that may be collected from thence. He like-wife acknowledges the Dictates of right Reafbn to be the Laws of Nature, and therefore muftconfera Righttoevery Mantotheir Lives^and all the necelfaries thereof. Sett. 2*

Yet Mr. H. when he is hard preft, can't deny, but that there may be injury done to another, in the ftate of Nature; as when a Son kills his Father; but He hath this Subterfuge,, that a Son cannot be underftood in the State of Nature to his Father. This Opinion confuted : That every Man owes the like gratitude to any Other who fhould maintain and educate him, as to his Father; and it would be as much injury to hurt the one, as the other. Se(i. j.

This Argument in his Lev. falfeand precarious. For if God, in the State of Nature, is truly a Legiflator, then the Laws

of Nature are truly Laws; but this is already proved. Serf. 4*

The Heads of the Sixth Principle.

That nothing is Good or Evil in the State of Nature.

Mr. fPs Reaibn for it: That every Man in the State of Nature, makes his own Judgment or Jffetite the Rule of Good and Evil; which are ever underjtoodwith re/pecf to the Party that ufes them; and that in the fate of Nature, is either every Man's ownfelf', or in a Civil, of the Perfons that refrejent the Commonwealth* Se£t. i.

This he explains Phyfically in his Human Nature, from the different Motions which thofe Objects produce in the Brain, proceeding from Men's different Temperaments. Sect. 2.

Jnfaer. Mr. H's uncertainty and loofe-nefs in his Notions of Good or Evil obfer-ved. Sect. 3.

That notwithftanding the variety of Tempers or Humours, or the different Genius of particular Nations in fome Cuftoms, &c. yet they for the moft part agree in certain Notions neceflfary for the common Good and prefervation ; and confequently that of all Mankind. Sett. 4.

A more certain Account of Good and Evil; as well Natural as Moral, than what Mr. Ji hath given us. Sect. 5.

Mr. H. notwithftanding all he hath faid to the contrary, acknowledges a Common Good in the ftate of Nature. Sect. 6.

The difference between a Natural and a Moral Good, and wherein it confifts. The confounding of thefe, the great caufe of Mn H's. Errors in this Matter. Sect. 7.

Mr. Hfometimes blames this narrow Humour in fome Men, that defire nothing but their own private advantage ; and likewife confefles, that That is a greater good which benefits more Perfons, than what doth good but to a few. Sect. 8.

That notwithftanding all that Mr. H. hath faid to the contrary, all rational and good Men muft acknowledge, that to be good, which tends to the happinefs and prefervati-on of Mankind, and which may likewife any ways contribute to effeft it: That if we do not make the common Good of Rational A-gents, the end of all our Actions; all our Notions about Moral, as well as Natural Good, will be various and uncertain. Sett.y*

The Heads of the Seventh Principle. That the ft Me of Nature is aflateofW'ar,

That all Mr. H's precedent Principles, tend only to prove this darling one: If therefore, thofe are well anfwered, this Principle muft fall. " His new Reafons in his Leviathan propofed : He deduces this ftate of War from Three Caufes in the Nature of Man.

ift. Comfetition. idly, Diffidence, jjy, Glory. Each of which do in their turns make Men fall together by the Ears. A ftate of War, not only that of a&ual Figlitirig, but all that time wherein Men's Inclination to it rtiay be certainly known; illuftrated by a Simile of Rainy Weather. Sect. i.

AnjmriQ this Argument: 'Tis firft obfer-ved, that Mr. H differs in his manner of proving the neceflity of this ftate of War ; differs in his Leviathaa, from that in his De Ci-ve: Since he here only fuppofesfuch a War to be lawful, without any other proof. Sect. 2.

2^. Obfervatiori,. That this Author in his Argument here propofed, doth ftill take the Natural ftate of Man only from his Paflions, without any confideratioriofR.eafon or Experience ; which is contrary to what he had before laid down, when he made Experience

any of the Faculties of the Mind. Yet that none of thbfe Paflionsdo neceffarily and in-inevitably hurry Men into a State of War. Sect. 3.

That none of tliefe Perfons, if governed by Reafpri, ought to incite Men to War; and that Reafon can never perfwade Men to fall together by the Ears, out of Competition. Sect. 4.

The Diffidence of others , can never, if duly confidered, be any Motive to make War with all Men ; fince fuch a War is not only deftru&ive inks own nature, butalfo im-prafticable. Sect. 5.

Mr.H's. appeal to experience of what Men do for their own fecurity, anfwered, as alfo his Simile from the Weather. Sect. 6.

He himfelf grants that there was never actually throughout the World, fuch a ftate of War, as he defcribes. His infrances from the Savage People of America make rather againft, than for him *7 proved by Authorities of Travellers. Sect. j.

His Inftance from the practice of Sovereign Powers, proved to be of no force. Sect. 8.

Anfmr to his Argument from the Paffion of Glory , which doth not inevitably hurry Men to War, fineeit is more often maftered by other greater Paflions: as Fears of Death.

ttefire of things necefTary, &c. Obfervation � That the fame Paflions which excite .Men to War, do alfo, with him, at other times per-fwade them to Peace; and that thofe Paflions are really the more ftrong, that do fa Sect. g.

Mr. H's Argument from cef tain peculiar!" ties in Humane Nature; when Men cannot live as fbciably with each other as Brutes ? The i ft. Competition for Honours, &c. An-fwer, No Argument to be drawn froni this, in the ftate of Nature. Sect. id.

His 2d Reafon anfwered j That the Common Good, among Brutes, differs not front the Private, as it does among Men. Sect. 11.

Anfmr to his $d Inftance; That Crea-tures-not having theufe of Reafon, do riot find fault with the Adminiftration of the" Commonwealth; That this can be no Argument in the fbate of Nature, before Commonwealths are inftituted, &c. Sect. 12. ; Atjfmr to the 4th Reafon; That Brutes5 have not the ufe of Speech, and fo cannot make Good feem Evil, arid Evil, Good: Men hot in a worfe condition than Brutes, by feafon of Speech, but rather in a better. Sect. 13.

Anfmr to his Jth Reafon; Tfiat Brutes do not diftingifli between Injury and Da-flsage, whereas it is otherwifc in Men. Sett. 14. ,

AnfaertQ his laft Reafon �, That the agreement of Brutes is natural; but in Men Artificial. Sect. 15.

So much granted Mr.H That Men are tormented with divers Pa(fions,which Beafts are not: and fo on the other fide, Men are endued with other Paflions, which move them more ftrongly to Concord. Sect. 16.

A farther consideration of the abfurdity and inconfiftency of this Hypothefis, of a Natural itate of War, Sect. 17.

The Heads of the Eighth Principle.

That mutual Compacts of Fidelity are 'void in the ft ate of Nature j but not fo in A Commonwealth.

His Reafon for it: Bccaufewhere Covenants are made upon a mutual truft of future Performances, either Party may chufe whether he will perform, or not; becaufe he is not fure that the other willperform his Part alfo: And of this he is the fole judge: But that it is otherwife in a Civil State, where there is a common power to compel either of them that refufe. Serf. i.

The reafon apparent why he fuppofes Civil Sovereigns always in a ftate of War. Sect. 2.

Upon thefe Principles it is altogether in vain for Princes or States, to make any Leagues or Treaties of Peace with each other. This Notion gives them alfo a Right of putting to Death or making Slaves of Am* bafTadors^and all others that come into their Dominions. Sect. 16.

That upon this Principle of Mr. H's. if Compaclsdo not bind in the ft ate of Nature: neither will they be of any force in a Civil State, if either all, or the major part of the Contractors, fliould have all at once a mind to break them, upon pretence, that either others do not perform their Parts, or that they fear they would not do it. Sect. 4.

Mr. H. far exceeds his Mafter Epicurus in this Eyil Principle. Sect. 5.

The Heads of the Ninth Principle. The Law of Nature is not truly a Law, tinlefs as it is delivered in the Hoi} Scripture.

His Reafons for it: That though they aye Dictates of Reafon, yet for want of a Legijla-tor, and offufficient fecurity for thofe that jb&lt obferve them, they are not LAWS, but as delivered in Scripture. Seel:, i.

That hath been already proved, that this Law of endeavouring the common Good, is thefumofall the Laws of Nature, and that

proceeding from God, andeftablifhed by fuf-ricient Rewards and Puniftiments; it hath all the con v: L :c s required to a Law. That the defedoi other Writers, in not taking the like Methoci, hath been the caufe pf Mr. H's. and others falling into this Error. This Law not being given in any fet form of Words, no Objection againft its certainty, or plamnefs. Sect. 2.

This Law of Nature being to be colle-ded from our own Natures,and that of things, is capable of being known even by perfons born deaf arid dumb. Mr. H. acknowledges thefe Laws to be properly fo, as proceeding from God. His allowing that thofe Laws oblige only to a defire or endeavour of the Mind, that they fhould be obferved, a meer Evafion. Anfwer to his Objection, of the want of Rewards and Punifhments, he bim-felf having 'obviated this, by confeffing in hisLrc/. that they are eftablifhed by natural Rewards and Punifhments: if the Law of Nature is not properly a Law, then there are no natural Rights properly fo called. Sect. 3.

Anfiver to his main Reafon; That we are not obliged to external Afts, for want of fuf-ficient fecurity; That if this were a fufficient Objeftion, then neither Civil Laws would oblige. Divine Punifhments, as certain as Humane, Sect. 4.

That Men's greater! Security confifts in a ftrift obfervation of all the Laws of Nature. Mr. H in fomeplaces acknowledges, That if we do not obferve the Laws of Nature, we fhallfall into other Evils, befides thofe that proceed from the violence of Men. Sett. 5.

Two Realbnspropofed; fhewing the falfe-neisof this Argument of Mr. H The one, the Declaration of all Civil Sovereigns concerning Men's Innocency till accufed; The other from Mr. H's own Conceffion of a tnuch greater infecurity that will follow from their non-obfervation ; (viz?) a War of all Men againft all, which is-the-moft mifera-ble State of all others. Sect. 6, 7.

The Heads of the Tenth Principle.

That the Laws of Nature Are alter Able at the will of the Civil Sovereign.

That this is but a confequence of his former Principle, That nothing is good or evil in the fate of Nature; his Arguments for this Principle, Becaufe it proceeds from Civil Laws, that every Manjhouldhavedijiinct Rights to himfslfy as alfojbouldnot invade thofe of others; ir follows that thefe Precepts, Thou (halt bo; our thy Parents, Thou {halt not kill, Sec. are Civil Laws, and that the Laws of Nature prefcnbe the fame things, yet implicitely; for the fame

Law commands all compacts to be obferved: and that to yield obedience, when obedience is due, was covenanted at the Inttitution of the Commonwealth; and therefore whatever Civil Sovereigns command concerning thefe things, muft be obeyed, fince they alone can appoint what fhall be yours, or anothers, or what fhall be Murther, Theft, drc. Sect, i.

Nothing written by Mr.H more wickedly orloofely, nor wherein he more contradicts himfelf, than in this Principle. The main foundations of which are already deftroyed. No Compacts made at the Inftitution of any Commonwealth, which can be of greater force than the Law of Nature. The dreadful confequences that will follow from the contrary Principle; Mr. H. allowing even Idolatry it felf to be lawful, if commanded by the Suppeam Powers.

That the Secondary Laws of Nature can never contradi£t, or alter thofe that are prior to them, as more conducing to the common good; though Civil Laws may reftrain, or enlarge feveral particular inftances. His Example of the Lacedemonian Boys aniwered. Sett. 2. .

A concluding inftance in anfwerto this, from that Law of ours, againft relieving wandring Beggars. Seft. j.

Uncertain, whether Mr. H broached this dangerous Do&rine out of ignorance, orde-fign pf flattering Civil Sovereigns; yet that by this he endeavours to deftroy all Vertue and Goodnefs in Princes, and all obligation of Obedience in Subjects, whenever they are ftrong enough to rebel. Seff. 4.

The Conclufion; containing an Apology for the length of thefe Confutations. Sect. <j.

The Second Part :

Wherein the Moral Principles of Mr. Hobtfs De Che & Leviathan, are fully Confid'red,andConfuted.

��������____ ' <


§� i � fTTlHougri perhaps it may not feem 1 unneceffary, after fo much as -*- hath been faid,to prove the certainty, and conftant obligation of the Law of Nature, of endeavouring the Common Good of all rational Beings; more particularly to confute the Principles of Epicurus, and his Follower, Mr. H. it being a true Maxim in other Sciences, as well as Geometry, Rectum eft indexfui, & obtiqui: Yet fince thofe Authors have not only poifoned the World with their pernicious Tenets, but have alfo endeavoured to fupport them with the fpecious appearances of Reafon and Argument; it may be expe&ed that weflaould fay fomewhat in

anfwer to thefe Reafons and Arguments Mr. H the Reviver of thofe Principles in this Age, hath brought in his Book DeCive& Leviathan, to maintain and fupport them. And therefore I have thought fit to add fome Confiderations, and Confutations of them, as far as they contradift the Principles we have here laid down; and rather to put them here altogether at the end, than in the Body of our Treatife of the Law of Nature-, fince there they would not only have interrupt-ted the Coherence of the Difcourfe it felf, but would have alfo difturbed, and taken off the minds of the ordinary Readers (for whom Ichiefly intended it^ from a due confideration of the truth and connexion of the things therein contained. And therefore I have thought fit rather to put them here fey them-felves; fince if you are Matter of the former part of this Difcourfe,you will eafily perceive; not only the falfhood and abfurdity ofMivfcPs Principles,but that it was from his Ignorance, or Inconfideration of this great Principle of the Common Good of rational Beings, that he firft fell into thofe Errors, and made private Self-prefervation not only the firft motive (which had been true enough) but alfo the fole end of all Moral A&ipns, which is altogether faHe,andbelowthe dignity,not only of a Philofopher, but a Man. I have there-

fofe gone through all his Moral Principles iri order; and as for liis Politick ones, if thefe are falfe, they will need no other Confutation; and I have reduced them into certain Heads or Proportions, and have truly given you this fum of Arguments, that no Man may find fault with me for mifreprefenting his Opinions.


Man is a, Creature born unapt for Society.

§. '-A/TR' H in his Philosophical Ele-IVL rnents, or Treatife De Che, Chap. i.§. 2. lays down, and maintains this Principle, and gives certain fpecious Reafons for it; which becaufe they are fomewhat tedious, and divers of them very trivial, I (hall rather chufe to contract them, than be at the trouble of tranfcribing all that he hath loofely enough laid down for the maintenance^ of this AfTertion; referring you, if you doubt whether I rightly reprefent his meaning, to the Author himfelf in the place above-cited.

He there in thefrjl place fupfofes^ that Man it not ajbciable creature by Nature, but orilybyacci-dent for %fMan lovedMan nttitrallyjhtn couldbt

no reajbngiven why every one fhouldriot love every one Alike, as being alike Man ; or why he fhould father frequent thofe in whofe Society Honour and Proft is conferred,rather on himfelj, than others. Therefore we do not by nature feek Companions, but to be either honoured, or profted by them. Thefein the firft place ;and thofe in the fecond; And this he thinks he hath diffidently proved, by fhewing m for what end men herd together, and what they do when they are wet; for if they come together for Commerce-fake, every one minds not his Companions, but his own In-ierejt. If for Publick Affairs, there arifes a certain Court-friendfhip, having more of mutual fear than love; from whence often Faction, but never Good-will is produced. If for the fake of Mirth and Pleafure, every one is wont to pleaje bimfelfin thofe things which raife laughter -from whence he may(as it is the nature of what is ridicu-lout) by the comparifon of another's weaknefs or in-frmityBecome more acceptable to himfelf: And he there proceeds to fhew from feveral Obferva-tions he had made in the Companies he had kept, fhat all men that converfe together either for the fake, or the inftrutfion of others, do only feek Company for their ownprofit,or glory, and not the good of others; that if,for the love of himfelf, mt of his Companions: And therefore pnce Man can never feek Civil Society, but out of a depre of glory j tnd although the Profts and Conveni-

ences of life may he encreafedty met?* mutual tffU ftance,\yet becaufe that may bit much better pro-cured by Dominion over others,than by their Society jto body can doubt, but that men are more vehemently carried by their Nature, when fear is removed jo Dominion jhan Society; therefore if is to be laid down for a Principle, That the original of all great and, lafting Societies did not proceed front the mutual Benevolence of Men, but their mutual Fear; And by Fear, as he tells us in the Annotation to this Paragraph, he doth not mean only to befrightned, but ilnder that word Fear,fo comprehends any profpeft of a future Evil, as to dijlruft, fufpetf, beware, and fo toprovid&4hat they may not fear, to be alfo thepartofthofewho are afraid.

§. 2. Having given you the Author's Senfe, and in great part his own words; I fliall now proceed to make fome Obfervations upon them;and in the firft place miift obfetve,That the main ftrength of his Arguments corififts in the ill, or falfe ufe of thefe wor^, unapt for Society. For if he only underftands by them, that-Men-are born actually unapt rorCi^il Society,becaufe they are Infants, or dfe unexperienced of the Evils proceeding from the Wants thereof; this is indeed a grea^diieo* very, and worthy a Philofopherj that Children, or People without experience^ are not

able to underftand the meaning or force of Gompa£b;or are unable immediatelytcenter into a Civil State; Nor is his Reaipn any better j That though Infants and Perfbns of full Age, how unexperienced foever, partake Humane Nature ; yet being thus unapt for Society, Man is not made fit for it by Na* ture, but Difcipline.

§� $� From whence I obferve, That he only takes the meafufe of Humane Nature, from thofe Eaffions which precede the ufeof Rea-fbn, Experience, and Difcipline; And as they firft and chiefly fhew tliemfelves inChil-dren and Fools; or perfons unexperienced. Whereas, according to the opinion of the beft Philofophers, we fuppofe the true Nature of Man, ought rather to be taken from his utmoft perfe&ion, viz. his Reafon, or the power of deducing Effefts from their Cau-les; by which alone he is diftinguifhed from Brutes: And fo the Will may incline us to thofe things, which Reafon mall judge moft fit and convenient for our Natures. And therefore Mr. H. doth very abfurdly, to op-pofe Experience, and Difcipline, to Nature; fince whatever Men learn by either of thefe, they muft ftill attain to it by the force of their rational Natures, and thofe Faculties of Reafon and Speech, which Brutes are not capable

of: And therefore the nature of a Creature is beft judged of from the utmoft perfection it attains to: As the nature of a Plant is not to be taken from its firft appearance, or as fbon as ever it peeps out of the Earth, but from its utmoft ftate of Perfection, when it comes to bear Flowers, Seed or Fruit. And even that Experience, to which Mr. H. attributes all our Reafon lie himfelf grants to be natural^ and not acquired Power: See his Leviathad Chap. 8. where treating of Intelleclual Virtues, he hath thefe Words ; The Intellectual Vertues are of two forts, Natural, and, Acquired. By Natural, I mea.n not that which A Ma* hath from his Birth, for that is nothing elfebut fenfe, wherein Men differ fo little from one another, and from brute Beafls, as it is not to be reckoned among s'i the Verities. But I me An that Wit,which is gotten by 1)fe only,and Experiences without Method, Culture, or Infruc^ion.

§. 4. To conclude this Head, I defirfc ttiofe Gentlemen of his Opinion, to take notice, That all Philpfcphers, and Writers of Politicks, as well as Mr. H. were not ignorant how unfit Infants, and grown Perfons, without experience, or labouring under any unruly paffion,were to enter intoLeagues,orCom-pads : or to perform any of the Duties of a Civil Society ; But yet for all that, they fup-

pofed Man to be born for thofe ends; which by the force of his rational Nature, he may at laft attain to, nnlcfs fomething preternatural (fuel1, as are thofe diforderly i'aflions, or Difeafes of the Mind) intervene: And jf«-vsntPs Saying is as true as it is old ; NtinquAm aliudNatura^aliud Sapientia dicit,k\i& fure it is a childifh Inference, and favours more of So-phiftry, than true Philoibphy, to (ay, Men are born Infants, and. therefore ua&ft for Civil Society. Since any Country Fellow could have taught him better, who thinks his Son born apt to be a Plough-man, or a Graiier, tho7 he knows he will not be able to hold thePlough, until he is twelve or thirteen years of Age: Nor yet to undcriiand Grazing, until lie is--able to Ride and go to Market.

�§. 5. But let us now more particularly examine the Reaibns this A uthor there gives us, why Man is a Creature naturally unapt for Society, which he will have to be only by accident ; Bcca»fe if one Man loved another naturally as Man J here could be no re>ifon why every man (Jjould not love every Man alike; or wherefore he jljoftld rather frequent thofe inwhofe company he is mof likely to get Honour and Profit. Therefore we do not tMturattjfeek Companions, (\. e. for their own fakes) but either to gain Honour or Proft by them: Thefe in thefrft place ; but thofe in the Second, 8rc.

In anfwer to which, I gt-ant indeed, that particular per Tons, when they joyn with o-thers, in any Society or Company, do ufual-ly confider fome peculiar end, either of Profit or Pleafure , which may thence redound to themfelves. Yet doth it not therefore follow that Man is not a Creature defighed by God for Society ; or that he is not obliged by the Laws of Nature,or right Reafon,to be friendly and fociable even to thofe from whom no prefent advantage can be expected. For thd* it be granted, that Men either from a peculiar agreement of difpofltions,or that they fup-pofe they can fooner obtain fome particular end or advantage,in fome Men's Converfati-on than others ; and do therefore prefer fuch Men's Company before others; yet does not this prove, That Man is riot naturally a Sociable Creature: Since he himfelf grants, That Men can neither live comfortably, nor befo much as bred up, or preferved, without the help and Society of others.

Therefore if he is determined to the end j Wz,.happinefs,and felf-prefervation,he is like-wife as necefTarily determined to the means, (WA.) Society. And his inclination to this or that Man's company more than others, is no more an Argument agaihil our Natures requiring Society, than if I fhould argue; That becaufe I loveMutton better tha'n VeaL

therefore it is not from my nature, but only by accident, that 1 am ordained to preferve my life by eating. And as for the inftances which he gives, to let us fee with what intent men meet together, from what men do when they are met. It is plain that Mr. H. here confounds that natural Society, which is abfolutely neceffary for man's preservation, with thefe particular Companies, which men keep for their greater pleafure or advantage. And tho' I have already granted, that fome men's particular profit or pleafure may be promoted or increafed, by frequenting fome men's Companies, rather than others ; as fuppofe there be a greater agree^ ment ofdifpofitions; or that we havebee'n more ufed to this or that man's Company by Education, or long Acquaintance, drc. And though it be likewife granted, that a man does more frequent their Company, among whom he finds moft honour and profit ;Since every man may lawfully purfue his own plea-fures and advantages (if he knows rightly how to judge of them;) Yet this doth not at all contradict man's fociable nature, provided the common bonds of Society be not thereby broken and difturbed, by any man's more particular Interefts or Inclinations; and God hath not fo defigned us to do good to others, as that we (hould neglecl all care of our felves;

Since this natural fociablenefs is fo to be ob-ferved by Mankind, that by a mutual communication of humane affiftances, and other natural goods between divers perfons, we may more conveniently promote our own pleafure or advantage jointly with that of others ; feeing that mutual love and benevolence is to be obferved among men, tho' not otherways related to each other, than by the common relation of Humanity, and with whom we may preferve a fufficient Concord, by doing them good, rather than hurt, whenever it lies in our power. A Man likewifewhen he joyns himfelf with fome particular Company,will firft to be fure confider his own pleafure or profit, before that of his Companions: Yet ought he not fo to confult his private advantage, as that the good of the Civil Society, or of Mankind in general, be thereby prejudiced, by injuring any of its particular Members: And a man as well in Natural, as Moral and Civil Actions, may propofe his own pleifure or profit, in the firft place, though he may alfo intend fome higher or nobler end of his thus afting. Therefore a man who intends to marry, may lawfully propofe to himfelf his own pleafure and fatisfaftion ; tho'the great end of Marriage, (and which he may alfo chiefly intend) be the propaga-

gation of mankind. So likewife a Matter or Tutor that inftrufts others, may lawfully propofeto himfelfhisown profit or advantage thereby; though he may alfo ultimately intend the inftrufiion of his Scholars, or Pupils (that is, the common good ofMan-Idnd)as the great end of his taking that pro-feflion. So likewife in Civil Societies or Commonwealths, a man may propofe to himfelf his own Security, Profit or Honour, as a reafon why he beftows his time and labour; or ventures his life in the iervice of the Publick : And yet he may further propofe to himfelf the love of his Country, or the good of the Commonwealth , as the great end of his Actions.

§. 6. So that is to as little purpofe, which Mr. H. ailedges, That the Original of the greateft and moil lafting Societies, to wit, Commonwealths, did not proceed from mutual good-will, but mutual Fear; (the word Fear being ufed for any forefight, or precaution of a future Evil) For we are not here ccnfidering the original of Civil Societies, but of that natural fociablenefs a-mong men, which we look upon as moft ne-ceflary and agreeable to the nature of man; though fome particular men being alfo fen-iible how obnoxious they were to the injuries of thofe who fought their own pleafure

profit, without any confideration of the intereii or good of'others, did,- to prevent them, unite themfelves together in that ftri&er League of Amity, called Civil Society. So that this common Amity or Benevolence, cannot be omitted to be fir ft fuppofcd, even in the very conftituticn of Commonwealths: Since thofe who founded them, muft have been before united, either by fome natural relation; and a mutual confidence in, or benevolence toward each otlier; akho" perhaps, others might afterwards, out or fear of their Power, or a liking of their Government, be compelled or allured, to join or afibciate themfelves with them.

§. 7. But as for the inftances Mr. H. gives us of thofe who feek Society only to cenfnrc the Lives and Actions of other men, thereby to gain glory to themfelves, from the Follies or Infirmities of thofe th-.jy converfe with; Such ibrr of Converfation, confining for rb,; moft part of fome idle ill-natured men, who count themfelves Wits, and have iirdc e!;V to do, but to {peak ill of, and cenfure others, does not concern the major pare or\V-linkind ; wlio needing each other's Society, for more neccffary occafions, have cornmodiy other Bufineis todifcourfe of, when they rnccr.

$ 8. As for the reft of thofe things he fays. That the neceflaries of life may be much better procured by dominion over, than by the Society of others, that is altogether falfe, and precarious; {ince no man by his own fingle ilrength, and without the voluntary help or Society of others, could ever yet fubclue, and make Slaver, of all other men he met with: And therefore if any man ever increafed his natural power or advantage over others, it was not by virtue of his own fole power 01 ftrength, but by men's deference to his Valour, or Vertue, when they chofe him for their Head, or Leader; or elfe that they followed him, and obeyed his Commands as their Father, or Grandfather, out of Reverence to his Wifdom, or Gratitude for his Benefits.

§. 9. To conclude, He himfelf there object that men cannot grow up, or live contentedly without theSociety and Afliftance of others: And therefore cannot deny, but men defire the Society of each other,their naturecompel-lingthem thereunto. But to come off from this Objection, he will have nothing called Society, but Commonwealths; which, fays he,are not meer Meetings, but Leagues, and Confederacies, for making of which Compacts are necefTary, And therefore ftill ar-

gues, that Infants, and thofe that are unexperienced, are uncapable of them, &c. From which I iliall only obferve, That Mr. H im-pofes upon himfelf, and others, by confounding that firft, and moft natural amity, and fbciablenefs of Perlbns of one and the fame Family, as of a Husband and Wife, Parents and Children, &c. towards each other, with that artificial Society, which proceeding wholly from Compact, we call a Commonwealth: So likewife he impofes on his Readers in the ufe of the words Nature, *nANAturd(K:> \ have partly Ihewn already) for by thefe words is commonly underftood, either fomething that is by nature infepara-bly proper to its fubjeft, as to a Fifh to fwim; and other things are natural and proper to a Creature, not as a meer Animal, but as of fuch a fpecies, and at fuch an age; as for a man to go upon two Legs, and fpeak. Laftly, It fometimes fignifies an aptnefs in a Subject to receive fome farther perfection by Culture and Difcipline, with which Nature intended it fhould be endued. So the Earth is intended by Nature forthe produftionofVegetables; however it doth not naturally bring forth all Plants in all places,?.like,without Plowing, or Setting^yet are not thefePlants fo fown,or fet, lefs natural for all that: So likewife I have already proved, that whatever perfection we

attain to by the power of our Reafon or Experience, it is not lefs natural notwith-ftanding.


All Men by Nature are equal.

§. i. TTTHichhe thus undertakes to make VV outifl the Chapter laft cited,§.^. The caufe of mutual Fear conffts partly in Men's natural equality, partly in their mutual Will of hurting ; from whence it happens, that we are neither able to expeff fecurity from others, nor yet to afford it to our felves; for if rve consider Men' grown up, and take notice how frail the Frame of a Man's Body is (which failing, all his force, flrength and wifdom fails together with if) ttnd how eafie it is for any the moft weak, to kill the ftrongeft Man ; there is no reafon, that 4ny Mantrufting in hisownftrength^fljouldfup-�pofe himfelf fuperios by Nature to others, for thofe are equal, who are able to do the like things againfteach other; but thofe who can do the greatest thing, that is, take away life, are able to do like, or equal things to each other ; therefore nil Men are by nature equal, that Inequality rvb^h now is, being introduced by Civil Laws.

§ 2. Before I anfwer This, I fliall firft make thefe Conceflions and Limitations: Fir ft 91 grant that all Civil Inequality of Per-ibns is;introduc'd by Civil Laws. 2<% That there is alfo fiich a natural equality among men, that there is nothing which one man can arrogate to himfelf as a man, but by the iame reafon which he judges it fit or neceffary for himfelf, he muft alfo judge it alike fit and neceflary for another man,who {lands in like need of it. Thus if Victuals, Cloaths, and Liberty, are things neceffary for his own being, and preservation, they are likewife equally neceffary for the well-being and prefer vation of all other men, and confequently that they have a like Right to them; from which natural equality proceeds that great Rule of the Law of Nature, To do to Others,as we would, have Others do to Vs: And in this fenfe I agree with him, that all men are equal; Ib that taken thus, it is fo far from being a cauie of War, or Dilfention among men, that it rather perfwades to amity and concord : Yet doth not this equality hinder, but that there is notwithftanding a natural Inequality of frrengthor power amongft men, both in body and mind; fince any man, that doth but obferve the great difference there is in both the ftrength and underftanding of fome per-ions above others, but will nrant, that there

is as great, or greater difference between fome men and others, than there is between fome Brutes (fuppofing Apes, or Elephants) and men in understanding:Yet does there not any natural equality follow from the R^afon Mr. H. here gives us,T£^ thofe are equaljhat are Able to do the like things to each other, to wit, take aw Ay their lives: For belides that, there are fome born maimed, and ct'ipled, or elfe fo void of under ftanding, as not to have either the will or ability to hurt or kill others; and if a Coward and a Stout man are to fight, or a very Weak man and a Strong, will any man fay that they are an equal match ? And this Mr. H. ceils us, That it is eaftc fir the Weakejt to kill the Strongest man» ha grants it wuft either be by chance^ cunnwg, or furpri&e. I grant indeed it may happen by chance, and yet this will not make the match to be equal ; any more than it is in Cockfighting, where theGamefters will lay five to one on fuch a Cock's fide againft another fet down to fight with him; and though perhaps the weaker Cock may happen to kill the ftronger by a chance-ftroke, yet no man will therefore affirm that both thefe Cocks were equal by Nature; the fame may be faid of Men. But it may be replied, That there is a great difference between Men and Beafts, fince though brutes cannot, yet a man weaker in body or

mind than another, may join, or combine with one as wife and ftrong as his Advef-fary, and then they will be an equal Match in point of ftrength. If this were a good Argument, it would prove more than,or rather contrary to, that for which it is defigned; for this weaker Man may combine with one as ftrong and wife as the other, and then the odds will be appearently on the weaker man's fide : But if I Ihould grant the utmoft that canbeask'd, that both thefe Men's wit and ftrength taken together, are ftill but an equal match to the other, may not this wifer and ftronger man as well alfo combine with others as wife and ftrong as himfelf, and, then will not the Inequality be much greater than it was before ? And as for cunning, or furprize,it fignifies as little,fince the ftronger man may be as cunning as the other, and may have alfo as good luck in fuprifing him at unawares; but it is indeed a very trivial Argument to prove this natural equality, be-, caufe thofe are equal that are able to do the like things to each other: fince this were to level Man with the moft defpicable Creatures; for there & fcarce any Beaft,nay Infect, fo weak, but may fometimeor other deftroy a man by force, or furprize; and we read of a Pope who was choaked by {wallowing of a Fly in his Drink; which if it could be

fuppbfed to be done by the Fly on purpofe., would make the Fly and the Pope to be equal by Nature;


That there is a, mutual will or defre in all Men in the flute of Nature, of hurting each other.

§. i. \ TITHichMr. H. thus endeavours to V V Prove in the fame Chapter of his


There is a will (fays he) indeed in allMen of

doing hurt in the ft ate of Nature fat not from the

fame caufe,nor alike culpable. For OneMan^accprd-

we to a, natural equality* allows to others all the

<^ j. <j / ' -

fame things as to himfilf, which ti the part of a modeft man, and of one that rightly meafures hi* own ftrength ; another efeeming himfelf fu-per tor to other s, will have things to be lawful for himfelfonly, and arrogates an honour to him-(elf above others, which is the fart of a proud difyofition; therefore the will of hurting is in this Man from a, vain glory^and afalfe efteem of his own power, as it is in the other from a neceffity of defending his own Goods and Liberty again ft the other's violence. Bepdes, fince theftrife of wit isthegreateft amongft Men, it is neceffary that very great diftordjbouldarije front that Qonten-

tion ; for it is not only odious to contradict[, but alfo not to confent, for not to confent to another in a thingj s tacitly to accufe him of error in that matter ; jo likewife to diffent in very many things9 is as much a& to count him A fool; which may appear from hence, that no W^ars are more fharply frofecuted, than between different Sects of the fame Religion, and the Factions of the fame Commonwealth, where there is a frife concern* ing Doctrine, or Civil Prudence. But fnee all pleafure and fatisfaction of mind conpfts in this, That a Man may have fomewhat, by which, comparing himfelf with others, he may think very well of himfelf; it is impojfible but that they fhould fbew their mutual hatred and contempt fometimes, either by laughter, words or veftures , or by tome outward fan,, than

1 ° 7 / � � f J&'

which there is indeed no greater vexation of mind, neither from which can a greater depre of hurting arife. "But the moft freauent tauje why Men defre to hurt each other, Jfrings from hence, that many depre the fame thing at once ; yet (ivhich very often happens) they neither may^ nor can enjoy it in common, nor will yet divide it \from whence it follows, that it muH be given to the ftronger; but who is thejlronger, can only be known by fghting.

§. 2. From which, I flball firft obferve, That it is not true,that in the ftateof Nature,

there is in all men alike will of hurting each other: "For in this State, the firft, and moft natural condition to be confidered, is, when men have not as yet at all provoked each o-ther, nor done them either good or harm; And in this condition, none but a Fool, a Wicked man, or a Mad-man, can have any defire to hurt another, who hath given him no provocation for it: Though I grant, that there are too many men (fuch as Mr. Hobbs defcribes) who will arrogate more things to themfelves, than they either deferve, or really need; yet even in thefe men, there is not a will to hurt every man alike,but only thole Xvho fraud in their way ; arid whofe Goods, or other things, they may think may be ufe-fui for themfelves. Nor yet are thefe ail Maiikind,fince he grants there are fome, and perhaps as many, or more ^ whoj according to natural equality, will allow to others all the fame things, as to themfelves, which he grants is the part of a modeft ma-o^and who makes a true eltimate of his own ftrength. And certainly, if this modeft man judges according to right reafon,who allows to others the fame things, as to himfelf; this violent or proudman(he here defcribes) cannot acquire any Right to the liberty or goods of others, from his own unreafonable judgment, and falfe eftimation of his own ftrength or merit:

Nor is this felf-defence, of the modeft or ho-nefl man, properly a defire to hurt the other* but only a neceflity to defend himfelfagainfi his aflaults, fince he had no intention to hurt him, before this violent man gave him a juft provocation.

§. 3. As for that ftrife of Wit,which (as he fays) is the greateft among men ; though there may be fome difference in Opinions,and Contentions arife from thence ; Yet doth in not therefore follow, that there mud from thence neceffarily arife a defire in all men, of hurting or deflroying others : Forthereare many of fo equal and reafonable a difpofiuon. that they can find no caufe of hating, much lefs of hurting others, though they often differ from them in opinion ; Or that they rriufr. take all others for fools, if they prefer their own Judgment before another Man's.

And as for Mr. K's Inftances, that there are no Wars more (harp than thofe between the different Sefts of the fame Religion, or the Factions of the fame Commonwealth; thefe Examples will not make out that for which he produces them : Since he grants. Wars about Religion do feldom happen, but amongft thofe of different Se£h in the fame Religion ; which (hews it doth not proceed from the Natural State of Mankindi which

ought to be governed by Reafon, not Super-ftition ; much lefs from natural Religion, but from an unreafonahle Superftition, or blind Zeal, too often inHamed by the Priefts of either Party ; making it not their own, but God's Caufe, or Glory, (as they call it) for which they would have them fight, per-fecute, anddellroy each other. And as for the Wars and Contentions between the different Factions of the fame Commonwealth, it is apparent they have no place in the meer Hate of Nature ; fince they are produced by men's entring into Civjl Society; and there~ fore they are not fairly urged by Mr. H. as an Inilance of their defiretohurt each other in the flate of Nature.

§. 4. In anfwer to his AOfertion,Tto all f&tisfaction of the mind is placed in jometh'wg^ by which* A man comparing himfeljmth others, may thereby think biohfy we/I ofniwfelf : And, therefore it u iwfoffwle but thty mujl declare their hatred find contempt of each other^fometimes either bj laugh/£r,£c. than which there can be r/o greater vexation, neither from which a greater difire o] revenge doth ufitt {ly arife.

I thus reply : Fii.1, Neither does this Ob-fervation re^ch all men, ib that they muft needs take pleafure in putting a higher value i;pon themfe! ves. than they deferve ; or that

right Reafon, or Prudence, fhoutd perfwade them to affront others, either by Words or Aftions.-Neither yet to take for Affronts,and mortal Injuries, allthofe things, which any filly,ill-bred Fellow may happen to do: Since fuch quarrels da not proceed either from Nature, or Reafon, but from fooiifh Cuftoms, and bad Education; as appears in making, giving the lie ^ an affront, which was not to, till about an Age ago; neither is among other Nations, but us Europeans, any occafion of a Ouarrei : Nor yet is there any neceffity, but that men may, and often do differ from each other, in opinion and words too, without giving one another the lie, or any juft occafion of offence : And therefore thefe are no fufficient grounds to raife a general Rule of the Natural ftate of all Mankind, from the indifcretion, or LU manners of fome, nay many men.

§.5. As for his la ft Reafon, from the de-fire of divers men at once to the fame thing, which cannot be decided without fighting.

In anfvver to this, I grant this may be true amongft Brutes ; as alfo amongft brutifti and unreafonable men: But fince God hath endued men vtfith Reafon, either to divide the thing, if it be capable &f dmfioli; or

elfe to ufe it by turns, where it is not, where divers have an equal Right in it; or elfe to leave it wholly to the firft occupant; fmcee-very man hath natural Right to what he thus acquires, as is fully proved in the precedent difcourfe. Therefore granting men's Lufts and Paflions do often encline them to War and Contention,yet are not the y thereforede-termined, or neceflitated thereunto : feeing God hath given Man Reafon to forefee, as alfb to prevent the evils of War ; and has likewife endued them with as ftrong Paflions fas Mr. //.acknowledges) to incline them to peace; as hath been more fully made out, when we fpokeof the Natural State of Mankind ; Neither in the ftate of Nature, hath God made fo niggardly a diftribution of things, that no man can defire, or. make ufe of any thing neceflary for life, but prefently another mull: frart up to be his Competitor fork: Since if men lived according to right Reafon, and the neceflities of Nature, and ftill ufed the Fruits of the whole Earth in Common,there would be yet left a fufficient ftock to fupply the Neceflities of them all, without coveting the Goods of others, or taking away that they are already poflefled of.


That Nature bath give?* to every one a. Right to all things. De Give. C. j. §. 10

§. i. ' I ^HAT is ( as he explains it) in A JL nteer natural ft ate, or before men were obliged, to each other by any Compacts, it was lawful for every one to do all things what foe-ver,Andagainjhvhomfocvcr it f leafed them fo to ' do ; and to poffefs, ufe, and enjoy all things, which he would or could ; but Since whatsoever things any one would have, either feem good for himfelf, becaufe he defires them, and do either conduce to his own prefer vat ion, or at leaji feem to conduce to it: And whether thofe things do really conduce to this end, he fuppojes he hatlr in the former Article proved the Per Jon himfelf to be fblejudg e. So that th'ofe muft be counted as neceffary mems, which he judges, as. fach : And by the ^th Article aforegoing^ tho/e things are done and enjoyed, by the right of Nature, which do neceffarily conduce to the prefervation of his own life and members : Whence it follows, to have And do all things in the ft ate of Nature, u lawful for All Mtn ; and this is what it commonly Jaid, That Nature hath given all things to all Men: From whence alfo it is, under food, that in theft ate of Nature^Proft or utility, is the meafure of Right.

Which Argument in his Annotations to this Article, hethu* explains and contr&tts.

This u jo to be underftood, that That which Any one may do, in a meer natural ft ate, is injurious to no Man: Not that infuch a ft ate it is im-foffible to fin againft God, or to violate the Laws of Nature ; but injuftice towards Men fuppofes flumane Laws,which are not in the ft ate of Nature. But the truth of the proportion fo underftood, is demonftrated to the mindful Reader, in the foregoing Paragraphs : But becaufe infome cajes, the hardnefs of the Conclufon drives out the Memory of the Premifes, he contracts the Ar-gument,and lays itthtts tobefeenatonce\ By Artie. the ith it is proved, that every one hath a Right of prefervixg himfelf; and by Artie, the 8/A. Therefore the fame perfon hath a Right to ufe all weans neceffary thereunto. But by Art. the yth. Thofe means are ncceffaryjvhich he fhall judge to be fo. Therefore the fame perfon hath a Right to have, andpoffefs all things which he fhall judge rteceffary for his own prejervation : Therefore in the judgment of the doer, that which is done, is either by Right,or by Injury. Consequently it is done by Right, bftfufe in the ft ate of Nature no-thixg is injurious.

I have made bold to add this laft Claufe from what went before, becaufe otherwife the Argument is imperfed.

'Therefore it is evdently true, That in A mere natural Stale^ every man hath a Right to all things.

§.. 2. For the dcftroying of which Principle, asalfofor theanfwering the Arguments which he brings to fupporc it, I (hall in the firft place obferve,T hat the Author's Conclu-fion which he makes from his Premiies in his Annotation?, viz,* That every man hath A Right to do,andpoffefs All things which he himfilf Jball judge mcefftry for his own f refer vat ion, is net the Cime which he draws from the fame Premiies in the Text, (viz.') That every m&n hath a, Right to have, And do all things in the ft ate of N.atttre. For indeed from his own Principles no other Conclufion can follow ,than what he hath now drawn from thence in his Annotation ; for no man in IMS right Senfes ever yet judged, that to have, and do all tilings whatever, was abfolutely neceilary for his pre-fervatibn ; only that he had a Right indefinitely to as many of them as hefhould judge iiecelTary for this End. cdf/y, Neither ought a man in the flate of Nature to propofe the bare prefervation cf his own Life, and Members, as the only end of living, fince that may be en joyed by thofe who are really very mife-rable, as may be obferved in fuch as labour under tedious and conftant Infirmities,or are

condemned to the Mines* or Gallies, or fuf> ler themfelves to be carried away by any domineering, or irrational Appetite or Paflion: And if the prefervation of man's Life and Members were the only ends of life ; then if another in the ftate of Nature fhould threaten to kill or maim him,unlefs he would deny,or blafpheme God, or murther his Father, it were upon this Principle lawful,nay neceffa-ry for him fq to do; it being the only means by which he could preferve his Life and Limbs, idly, Neither doth any man's rafhor falie judgment, that fuch a thing is necefTary for his own prefervation,confer on him a right to that thing ; for then God had given him a Right to all things he (hould in any paflion,or rafli and inconfiderate humour fanfie necefla-ryfor that end,tho' it really tended to their deft ru&ion, or that of other innocent men ; So that if a man fhould think the blood of his deareft Friend would cure him of fomeDif-temper he Jay under, he might lawfully upon this Principle murther him (if he could do it fafely); And then God fliould have given men a Right of deftroying themfelves and o-thers, whenever they thought (though falfly) that it conduced to their prefervation, the fatisfa&ion of their unreafonable Appetites or Humors ; fince fuch an unlimited Right, or rather Licenfe,can be fo far from conducing to

any man's prefervation,that if any men fhould ever have gone about to put it in pra&ice, it would have long fmce produced not only their own deftru&ion, but that of all Mankind,

§. 3. And if Mr. H his own definition of right Reafon be true. Jrt.jtliof this Chapter, That it is A liberty of u fag A man's faculties According to right Reafon; then certainly right Reafon can never judge contradictory Propo-fitions to be true, as that I fhould in the Hate of Nature have a Right to all things my Neighbour was pofTeiTed of, and his life into the bargain, if I thought it might conduce to my felf-prefervation ; and that this fhould be likewife as true, and rational a Conclufion, that he (hould have the like Right againfr. me; fince the word Right is never ufed by any Writers of this SubjeQ:, but with refpect to fome Law,either Natural,or Civil,which Mr. Hacknowledges in the next Chapter,^, i ft, in thefe words. But fince Ail do grant that to be done by Right y which is not done contrary to right Reafon, we ought to frppofe that done by Injury, which is rejtugn&nt to Right reafon ; or which contradicts fome Truth collected from true Principles by right Reafon; but that is done by Jnjuryjvhich is done againjt fome Larv^ therefore ripht Reafon is A certain Lawjvhich is called na-

tural, face it is not lefs a fart of Humane Nature than any other Faculty or Affeflion of the Mind: as Mr. Hhimfelf confeffes in this 2d Chapter of this Treatife De Cive, §. i. tho' he ftrives to avoid the force of it in his Annotations to this Article; where, by right Rea-fon in the ftate of Nature, he tells us, He does not thereby underftand ( as many do ) any infallible Faculty in Men, but the Att of Ratiocination ; that is, every Man's own Reafon concerning his own Actions, as they way redound to the profit or hurt of himfelf, or other Men ; and the reafon why he calls it a Man's own Reafon, is, that though in a Commonwealth the reafon thereof, that is, the Civil Law, is to be taken as right by all the Subjects ; yet out of a Commonwealth, where no Man can dijlinguifh right Rea-fon from falfe, but by comparing it with hi sown, every Matfs own Reafon is not only to be taken for the Rule of his own Actions, but alfo in his own Affairs for the meafure of all other Meri*sReafon: But how this will agree with what follows, I cannot tell; When he calls right Reafon that which concludes from true Principles-fief aufe that infa[fe Ratiocination, or in the folly of Men not obferving -thofe duties towards others which are neceffary to their ownprefervation, conpfts all the violation of natural Laws.

But how falfe Ratiocination,or folly,fhould give them a Right to all they have a mind to

a£ thus towards others,! cannot apprehend; but from thefe words of Mr. H. I (hall only obferve, That though I do not fuppofe Rea-fon to ^be any infallible Faculty, anymore than the cafting up of an Account into a Sum total, though falfe, to be right Arith-inetick, or true Counting ; yet by right Reafon when it is not erroneous, is to be underltood the true exercife of that Faculty, not erroneous in its judgments,and therefore doth not confiil in the bare aQ: of Ratiocination, but in its true effects ; that is, when true Proportions, or Premifes, being laid up in the memory, thofe Conclufionsare drawn from thence, which when they are practical, and contain true, moral Rules of life, are called Laws of Nature.

§. 4. And therefore it is not true, that in a Commonwealth thepublick £*4/0»,orLaw thereof, is to be always taken for Right ; for then if the Laws of the Common-wealth fhould enact Parricide, Ingratitude, and breach of Faith, to be exercifed as Vertues, and to conduce to the good and prefervation of Mankind, they muft prefently become fo; which, I fuppofe, neither this Author, n0r any rational Man would affirnu Nor is his other Proportion any truer, that out of a Commonwealth, no man can diftinguiih right Reafon from falfe. but by comparing it

with his own; and therefore that muft be the meafure of all his Aftions, from whence he deduces the Right of all men to all things ; which Argument I fhall reduce into the form ofaSyllogifm,thatyou may the better judge of its truth. It is lawful in the ft ate of Nature for every one to pojfefs all things, and do aH things towards all men, which fome Judge (hall think neceff&ry for the prefervation of his own Life And. Members : But thofe things that every manhimfelf [ball judge to be necejfary to hitpre-fervationjhofe the only Judge in this cafe judges to be necejfary for this end; (for he had proved before,that himfelf is the only Judge in the ftate of Nature,what things are neceflary for his prelervation;) therefore to have, and do all things, &c. is necejfary for A man's own prefer-nation. In which Syllogifm the Major is certainly falfe,becaufe though a man's felf be the fole Judge in the ftate of Nature,yet he may give a falfe Sentence, and fuppofe thofe things to be necefTary for his prefervation which really are not; For as in a Civil State, the bare Sentence of a Judge cannot confer a true and equitable Right on any man to an Eftate, if the Judge determines contrary to all the Rules of Law and Equity. So likewife in the ftate of Nature, a man's own judgment can confer no Right to him, when he quits the only true Rules of his

Judgment^ which in this State can only be the Laws of Nature, or right Reafon, and the nature of things, and Mankind, from whence only they are drawn. Nor can there be any State fuppofed, either Natural, or Civil, in which there is no Rule of Humane Judgment,Jb that whatfoever a man's mind (hall rafhly fuppofe things to be , they muft prefently become fuch as he hath fanfied them: becaufe the utility of things ne-ceflary for the prefervation of Humane Nature depends not upon menVafh judgments, but upon the force of their natural Caufes; and a man by thus fafly judging, that he had a Right to all things that he hath a mind to, and that they are abfolutely neceflkry for his prefervation,can no more make them become fo, than if he fhould judge that Ratsbane were Sugar-candy, it would be thereby prefently turn'd into wholfome Food : So like-wife thofe general, and univerfal Caufes, which procure the prefervation, or mifchief, of Mankind,do depend upon fuch fixt Principles in Nature,as are not to be altered by the judgment of«?ny Judge, whether he be a (ingle man in the ftace of Nature, or the Su-pream Powers in a Commonwealth.

§. $� But this Error of Mr. H concerning the force of his Sentence,which thus falf-ly pronounces anabfolute Dominion over all men, and all things, to be necefTary for his prefervation, and thereby to confer a Right thereunto ; (eems to proceed from hence, That he had obferved in a Civil State the Sentence of the Supream Magiftrate, or Judge, had that force with the Sub jefts that whether his Sentence were according to the Rules of Law, or natural Equity, or not, it was neverthelefs to be obeyed, and fubmitted to: Whereas thisSubmiffion proceeds wholly from their Confents who inftituted the Commonwealth, in order to the publick Good, and for the putting fome end to Con-troverfies; for all the Subje&s muft fubmit to the Judgment of the Supream Power, or Magiftrate, whether it be Right or Wrong; becaufe they are all fatisfied, that it conduces more to their common quiet and fafety, that fom few fhould iometimes fufifer through an tinjuft Judgment, than that Controverfies Ihould be endlefs,or at leaft not without Civil Wars, or Difturbances. Wherefore it is evident, That it is only from a greater care of the Common Good, than of the Lives or E-ftates of any particular perfon that lays a foundation for thisPrerogative, which though I grant belongs to all Stipfream'-Powersy yet if

this once come to be generally and notori-oufly abufed by a conftant cpurfe of wilful Violence, Oppreflion and Injuftice, that the Subjects cannot longer bear it, they will quickly make their appeal fbmewhere elfe, uniefs they;are hindred by fome predominant Power, or Force over them.

§. 6. But on the other fide it is certain, That men in the ftate of Nature cannot ad* mit of any final Judgment,or determination of a doubt or difference, befides an Evidence either from the things themfelves, or from that truft or credit they place in forne men's Judgment or Teftimony, whereby all manner of doubt or fcruple being clearly removed out of the minds of the Parties concerned, it appears evident to them, that they are not impofed upon ; neither can there be any end of debates amohgft divers Pretenders, uniefs one Party being convinced by the ftrength of the other's Reafons, come over to his, or their Opinion ; or elfe being fatisfied of the Knowledge and Integrity of fome Third Perfon,as an Arbitrator,do willingly lubmit to his Sentence.

§. 7. For Humane Nature will ever acknowledge a difference between right Rea-fon, and falfe ; and between a it ft, and an

unjuft Judgment; and 'tis only Truth and right Reafon that have this Prerogative, that they can confer a Right on us of doing thofe things which they prefcribe. For even Mr. H. in his definition of Right, acknowledges, that it is only a liberty of ufmg our Faculties according to right Reafon; where-

^j i_* '

as all Error, or falfe Judgment, whether k be concerning Neceifaries for the preferva-tion of Life, or in any other practical matter, can give no man a Right of doing that which he then falfly judges neceiTary for his prefer-vation. And therefore Mr.H.bythis Conclufi-on, wherein he acknowledges, That right Reafon is that which concludes from true Princi-fles; and likewife that in the falfe Reafbning^and folly of men, in not understanding their Duties towards other menjonfifts all the violation of the Laws of Nature; grants as much as I can de-fire. But how this will agree with that loofe definition of Reafon,where he fuppofes every man's reafon to be a like right, I defire any of his Difciples to (hew me. Therefore to conclude, I can only allow that to be practical right Reafon,which gives us leave to undertake things reafonable and poflible, and that forbids a man to arrogate to himfelf alone a dominion over all men, and all things, which is needlefs and impoflible,and indeed wholly pernicious to hisprefervation.

§ 8. But to avoid this difficulty, Mr. H. and his Followers fly to the Subterfuge of a natural neceflity in Men, that do judge thus fafly, and aft contrary to the Laws of Na* ture/)r Reafon: And therefore in his Preface to this Treatife, he fuppoies All Men to be evil by Nature, and makes them neceffarily determined by by their Appetites andPafflons (before they are endued with Reajon and Dtjcipliue to ait mij-thievoufly, and unreafonably; and therefore tells us, that Children, unlefs you give then: every thing they defre, cry, and are angry, and wilt Jtrike their very Fathers arid Mothers ; and it it by nature they dofo, and yet are blamelefs; ax wellbecaufe they cannot hurt,& nlfo thtt wanting the itfe of Reafon, they are yet free from all its Duties: But the fame perfons, when grown up, and having got flrength enough to hurt, tf they bold on to do the fame things, they then begin both to be, and to be called evil. So that a wicked Man is almojt the fame thing, as an overgrown Child, or a Man of a childifb dilpoption, becaufe there if the fame defetf of Reafon at that age, in which by Nature, improved by Dijcipline^ and experience of its inconveniences, it commonly happens to be amended. So like wife the Author ofTntf-tAttts Theologico-Politicw, who more openly than Mr. H. (but upon the fame Principles) endeavours to deftroy all Religion, both Natural, and Revealed, argues to this purpofe,

in the i6th Chap* of his faid Treatife. Firft, By the Law of Nature, He under/lands nothing but the Nature of every Individual', according to which, we conceive each of them naturally determined to exift after a cert am manner. Thtu Fifoes Are ordained to fwim, and the great ones to devour the left : Therefore Fifbeslivein the Water, and devour each other by the higheft Right : For Nature conpderedfmply, hath a Right to all things it can do, or its right extends it (elf, as far as its Power ; Since the power of Nature is-but the power oj God, who hath the higheft Right to all things. But becaufe the power ofVniverjal Nature, is nothing but the power of all the Individual Creatures together, it jallows that every Individual hath the higheft Right to all thittgs it can do ; that is, it extends it fslf of far as its Power. And ft'nee it is thefrft Law of Nature, that every thing fhould endeavour, as far at it is able, topreferve it felf in its Natural State: and that,without any confederation of other Creatures, but only ofitfelf:. Therefore it follows, that every Individual hath the higheft Right to exift,and operate^ as it is thus naturally determined: Nor �will he allow any difference, by Nature, between Men and other Creatures; neither between Men endued, with Reafoft, andthofethat have not yet attainedtheufe of it; neither between Fools and Mad-men, and others that are of found Under-{landing ; an<d his Reafon is this, For whatever

Any Creature doth by the force of its Nature, if doth it by the higheft Right, viz. becaufeit affs as it is by Nature determined^neither is it able to act otherwife: Therefore among Menjvhilft con* pderedas living under the meer Empire of Nature, as well he that doth not yet underjtand Rea-fony or hath not acquired a, habit of Virtu^ lives by the higheft Right, according to the Laws of his own Appetite^as well as he that directs his Life according to the Rules of Reafbn. So that as A Wife-man hath a Right to all things that Reafon-dictates, or of living according to its Rules: So likewife the ignorant andfoolijh hath a like Right to all things which their Appetites depre. So that every Man's Natural Right, is not determinedby Right Reaforijte by PoWet and Appetite. For all Men are not naturally ordained to operate according to the LAWS of Reafon, but on the contrary are born ignorant of all things ; and before they come to know the true Rules of life^or acquire a habit of Vertue, a great part of their lifejlips away, thd* they are never fo weft educated: And therefore be concludes jhat whatever any one does in order as he thinks to his own prefervation^ or thefatisfaction cfSenfual Appttites, whiltt he is in this meer ft ate of Nature, it is lawfttl^becaufe the only Rule he hath to a& by»

§. 9. Having given you all that can be laict for'this-wicked, as well as foolifh Opinion,

in their own words; I fhall now endeavour to confute it. In the firft place therefore I ob-ferve that this which they call the Right of Nature,and which Mr.H.defines to be a ftate of perfect Liberty, is in their fenfe no other than that of abfolute neceflity: And therefore I fhall leave it to the Reader to judge how properly this word Right belongs to Brutes, Infants, and Fools. For the Word Right is ufed by thofe that treat ofEthicks, only in re-fpect of reafonable men, as capable of deliberation and judgment, and endued with freedom of Action, and fo fubjecl: to Laws. For to call that neceflity,by which Fifhes devour each other, and Mad-men beat their Keepers, a Right, were as proper to talk of a Right of Stones to fall downwards: noPhilo-fophers but thefe, ever ufing the word Right for Neceifity,but a liberty left by the Law of Nature, of afting according toReafon: 2ly, The laft Author confounds the nature of Beafts, Fools and Mad-men, who have no knowledge of a God, or fenfe of a Moral Good and Evil, with that of rational Crea-tnres, who are ordained for greater ends, and to be governed by a higher Law, than that of meer Appetite or Paffion : And I defire thefe Gentlemen to fhew us,that fuch unrea-fonable Appetites and PafTions do neceflarily and inevitably carry men to ad conftantly

according to them; fo that the men had then no power left,tooppofe,refi/r.or reftrainthem : andtho' we grant that Children are not yet fenfible,and Fools and Mad-men are perhaps never capable of the Laws of Reafon or Nature,andfo cannot be fubpft to them, nor are to be efteemed amongft voluntary Agents; Yet doth it not follow, that thofe that are of Mature Age, and found Minds, and fo cannot plead invincible ignorance of the Law of Nature, but out of their own wilful Humour, or unreafonable Appetites, neglect to know or learn, or through wilful Ignorance tranfgrelsitjfhould claim the likeExemption. And admit we are not angry with Children, or natural Fools,if they cry for, or take away any thing they fee ; and we pity mad people, even while they are outragious with thofe that tend Jem : However we have not the lame forbearance and pity for men of found Minds, and mature Age, if they do the like unreafonable things, and govern themfelves by no other Law, but their own unreafonable Appetites and Pa (lions ; feeing it was in their power both to have known and acted ptherwife ; and to have deliberated and judged, whether it were not better for them to forbear fuch evil Acts, than to do them.

§. ic. Neither can invincible ignorance be any excufeasto them ; for though perhaps they may not have Brains fit for the Mathe-maticks,or may not be able to deduce all the Laws of Nature from their true Principles; yet by the Precepts of others, as well as their own Reafon,and the obfervation of their own Natures, as well as other Men's, they might eafily have learnt all the Duties of an honeft Man ; that is, their Duty towards their Neighbour, by that Golden Rule, of doing as they would be done by : And their Duty towards themfelves, by endeavouring their own true happinefs and prefervation, by the only means tending thereunto, viz. Without injuring others ; and doing their Duty towards God, in reverencing him, and obeying his ,Will,when difcovered to them; allo in endeavouring, to the utmoftof their power, the Common Good of Mankind; all which Principles have been ever fo natural to Men, that they have in all Ages acknowledged them to have ftill remained the fame. Therefore Mr, H. as alfo the Author of the Treatifelaft mentioned, are very much mi-fiaken, fo directly to oppofeour knowledge of the Laws of Nature, to the Rational Nature of Man ; as if he were fo much beholden to Art for them, that he could never have acquired them himfelf, without teaching ;

which were all one as to fay, That becaufe mod Men learn Arithmetick, therefore it is foabfolutely befides, or above Nature, that no Man ever attained it of himfelf, which is contrary both to Reafon and Experience, fince both Aritmetick and Geometry, as al-fo Ethicks, muft have been naturally acquired by thofe that firft taught them.

But I have already Efficiently prov'd by Mr. H*s own Conceflion, That Reafon and Experience a re as natural to Humane Nature, as Hunting is to Dogs, tho% in both of them there is required both Exercife and Experience to learn it.

§. ii. Nor doth Mr. H?s Excufe, which he gives us in the i }th Chapter of his Levid-thav, fignify any thing ; (viz.} 7hat men's PAJJlom in the ft ate of'Ntture are vo SIMS, nor the Attions which proceed from tbtr,?., AS long as they fee no Power which c.in vvcl;iblc them; For neither c An a, LAW be known be fere ii be )%ade, neither can it be madey till they hive tgr-.ed upon A Legifl&tor. Since it may beeaiilyan-fwered,thatMr. Hallalong proceeds upon this Falfe Suppofition, That God is not a Le-giflator without Divine Revelation : nor that the Laws of Nature are properly his Laws; both which A(Tertions,ifthey have been proved falfe in the proceeding Difcourfe, it will

certainly follow, that the Laws of Nature or Reafon proceeding from God hitnfelf, are truly Laws , and the Actions prohibited by them are Sins, although Men will not through .wilful Ignorance difcover this Legiflator, nor, will confent to his Laws. And Mr. H himfelf acknowledges in his Chapter of Laws, that theSubjeftslie under an Obligation to obey them,if it can be made appear to them that the Legiflator is endued with a Supreme Power over them, and hath both fufficiently eftablifhed, and promulgated his Laws; both which may be truly affirmed of the Laws of Nature.

§. 12.But indeed Mr. H and his Followers have done very cunningly in taking a way all freedom from Mankind,and to fuppofe an ab-fblute neceffity of all moral Aft ions; fince they could not otherwife deftroy the Laws of Nature, and equal Men with Brutes, but by pulling up all the Foundations of Moral Good and Evil.

But I need fay no more on this Subjeft to fhew the folly and unreafonablenefs of this Opinion,than to put down Mr. ffs words on this Subjeft in Art. n. of this Chapter, Where he confeffes that this Right of ail men to all things, is abfolutely unprofitable for Mankind becaufe the effetf of this Right is all one, as if

there were no fetch Right at all. For although any man might fay of every thing, This is mine; yet could he not ufe it, becaufe of his Neighbour', who might by an equal Right pretend that it was bis. Which is as good as to own, that this Right is none at all: For he himfelf in the Article before-going, makes Utility to be the meafure of all Right: but here is a Right without any Utility at all; therefore thefe words Right and VnproftablejiTZ contradictory ; for Right refers in this definition to ibme ufe or profit that a Man may make of his natural Liberty ; but to be Unprofitable, owns that there is no ufe or need of this natural Liberty in that matter.


That in theftate of Nature, whatfoever any one doth to another, cannot be injurious to any Perfon.

§. i. 1 1 Ecaufefzys he, Injuftice towards men XI) fufp°f�s Humane l^aws,none of which are yet in being in the meerflate of Nature, De Give, Cap. i.Annot.ad^. 10. which he thus likewife endeavours to prove in \\\s Leviathan, Chap. 13. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law; where there is no Law, no In-

juflice; Force and Fraud are in Way the two Car-dmalffertues;Jujtice andlnjuftice are none of the Faculties either of the Body or Mind;lfthey were, they might be in a Man that were alone in the Worldyas well as his Senfes and Pafftons:They are *U Qualities that relate to Men in Society, not in SolitudeJt is consequent alfo to the fame condition that there he no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine diftinff,but only that to be every Matfs that he can get, and for fo long as he can keep it: All which is no more than what Epicurus long ago aflerted, as Diogenes La'ertitts hath told us in the Account he gives of his Life and Opinions, To this effeft; That between thofe Animals which cannot be joined by any Compact or Bargain, that they fhould not hurt each other, there is no Right, or Injury: So it is likewife amongfl Nations,which either will not, or cannot enter into Compaft ; that they do neither hurt, nor are hurt; For Injuftice is nothing in itfelf-, al'hough infome places fuch a Bargain it made by mutual Computes that they fhould not hurt each other. So that Injury is no evil in it felf, but only confifts in a fear, orfufyicion, left it ftould not be concealed from thofe who are appointed Revengers of fuch Injuries.

§. 2. In anfwer to all which, I doubt not to prove, that thefe Principles of Epicurus, as well as of Mr. H and hisDifciples^re taken

up without any juft or folid grounds; for by the dilates of right Reafon, confidered as (they are indeed) the natural Laws of God, a perfect Right is given to every Man to his Life,and all thofe neceflary means thereunto, without which he cannot fubfift. For whatever a Man enjoys by the Right of Nature, it muft needs be in jury and injuftice to take it away: for every invafion or violation of another's Right or Property ,is Injury, by whatever Law he enjoys it : And much more if that Right be conferred upon him by the Law of Nature, given by God as a Legifla-tor,than if it proceeded from meer Humane Compa&s. And though Mr. H. here afTerts, That no injury can be done to any Man, with whom we have made no Compact; yet Chap. 2. Art. i .of his De Cive,he fays, That fince all men will grant that to be done by Right, which is not contrary to right Reafon ; we ought to believe that to be done by Injury, which is re-fugnant to right Reafon; that it, which contrar diets any Truth collected by right Reafon from true Principles : But what is done by Injury, we acknowledge to be done contrary to fome Law. So that here he grants, that an Injury may be done contrary to the Laws of Nature, before any Compact, orTranflation of our Right to another ; and fince he there acknowledges tho-e Dictates of Reafon to be Laws, I would fain fee how

thofc can give any manfuch aRight to invade, or violate the Rights of another: For Right (ashehimfelfwell defines it) being a Liberty granted by right Reafon, requires that Men, who pretend to aft or fpeak according to its Diftates,fhould not aft contradictorily to its Principles, or Conclufions. And 'twere to no purpofe for him to fay, that the Injury is done to God alone,when his Laws are broken, unlefs he can (hew that thofe Laws of God do not confer a Right on Men to their Lives, and all the necefTaries thereof; and do notlikewife prohibit others from violating this Right fo granted.

§. $. But yet this Author, when he is preft hard, does acknowledge, that there may be injury done to another out of Civil Government : For it being objefted, whether if a Son fhould kill his Father in the ftateof Nature, he (hould not do him an Injury ; he an-fwers,Tto a, Son cannot be under flood to be in A natural State in reffeft of his Parents ,he being asfoon as ever he u born, under their fower and command^ to whom he owes his being and prefer-vation.

Yet fure a Man's Parents,by begetting and breeding him up, do not thereby acquire a property or dominion over him as long as he lives j though I grant Children, when by

Marriage, or otherwife,they become lawfully difcharged from the government of their Parents, (till owe a filial piety and gratitude to them �, and'tis a great impiety and injury in Children towards them, to hurt or deftroy them, though they are no longer under their power and command. So like wife the fame Law of Nature, which prefcribes Gratitude to thefe our natural Benefactors , doth make it Injurious for any Man to hurt,or kill any other Perfon, who had educated, or maintained him, or other wile highly obliged him, tho' he be not immediately Subjeft to his Power ; fince the fame Laws of Gratitude that make it injurious to hurt, or murther his Father in the ftate of Nature, do alfo command the like duty towards any other Benefaftor.

§. 4. But his Argument in his Leviathan is much more falfe and precarious ; when he argues, That where there h no common Power ^ there is no Law; and where there u no Lawjhere ^ no Injuflice. All which he brings to prove the neceflity of his natural ftate of War. For, firft, though I grant,where there is no Common Power, (that is, no Legiflator) there is no Law. yet that is not true of the Laws of Nature ; fince if they proceed from God as a Legiflator (.as I hope we have proved in the precedent Difcourfe) they are truly Laws, before any Civil Power was instituted to

make Laws, or to fee them obferved ; and confequently that it is the higheft injury and injuttice to take away any thing from others being innocent, and doing us no hurt, that is neceflary for their Life, or prefervation, which they are alreadypoffefs'dof-and though it is true,tnat Juftice and Injuftice are no Natural Faculties of the Mind, yet right Reafon is; frdm whence all Juftice is deduced, and which a Man is always bound to exercife as foon as he becomes capable of being a Member <jf Humane Society, (I do not mean a Civil one) and if there be a natural Equity (as this Author acknowledges, De Give, cap. 14. §.14.) there is likewife a natural Juftiee,and Injuftice too: but I (hall fay more of this in the next Principle.


That in the ft Ate of Nature there is nothing Good, or Evil.

§. i.lTShall here give you Mr. tfs Opinion, ± and his Reafons for it, in his own words, as they are in his Leviathan, cap. 6. Whatfoever is the Objett of any man's j4ppetite,or Defire, that it it which he for his fart cau> Good, AndtheQbjeft ofhis Hate, and Aver (ion* Evil:

And of bis Contempt, Vile and Inconfiderable. For theft words of Goody Evil, and Contemptibley are ever ufed with relation to the Perfon that ufeth them, there being nothing pmply and abfo-lutely fo ; Nor is Any common Rule of Good and Evil to betaken from the nature of the Objects themfelves, but from the perfon of the Man (where there is no Commonwealth) or, (in a, Commonwealth) from the Perfon thatreprefents it; or from an .Arbitrator, or judge, whom Men by dijagreeing {hall by confent fet up, and make hit Sentence the Rule thereof. He fpeaks to the fame effe& in all his other Works; in De Cive, cap. 4. §.17. in his De Homine, cap. 11 .which it would be too tedious here to repeat, and therefore I (hall only refer you to places already cited.

§. 2. But this he endeavours Phyfically to explain in his little Treatife of Humane Nature, cap. 7. §. i. compared with Chap. j. where he fuppofes,Tte the Motion, in which conffls the conception of 'things, without any intervention of the judgment gaffes from the Brain to the Heart; and as it there hinders, or helps itslvital motion j& is faid to pleafe or difpleafe: "But that which fo pleafes any one, he calif Good, And that which difpleafes him, Evil; and hence from the diverfty of Conftitutions, or Temperaments, there are divers Opinions of

Good that is naturally and necejfarily fo. And in the fate of Nature unblaweally, from his Opinion that judges it.

§.$.There is nothing that Mr.Khath written more loofely, and unlike a Philofopher, than thefe unftable Opinions both of natural and moral Good and Evil. And therefore it is a matter of great moment to have a fixed and conftant notion of Good; becaufe fo long as this is fluctuating and uncertain, all knowledge of our true Felicity (which is the greateft Good of every Man) asalfo of the Laws of Nature, and of all particular Ver-tues, (which are nothing but the means and caufes of obtaining this Good) will be like-wife various, wandring and uncertain.

§. 4. Therefore, although it muft be con-fefs'd,that becaufe of fome peculiarity in the divers Temperaments of Men, it fometimes happens that one fort of Diet, or Medicines, may be hurtful to one, which may not prove fo to another; yea, which Experience hath approved,riot only to be innocent, but whol-fome for others: Something like which may be obferved in the Genius and Manners of Nations quite different from others, in fome particular Cuftoms and Conftitutions; yet this doth not any more take away the com-

mon Confent of Mankind concerning the nature of Good, and its conftituent parts and degrees, than the fmall difference of Men's Faces takes away the agreement between them in their common Natures as Men, or that general iikenefs that is between them, in the conformation and u(e of their principal Parts,orMembers.For fure there is no Nation Ib barbarous which will not own, that there are, greater hopes and fatisfa&ion in loving, and obeying God, than in biafpheming and difbbeying of him.Thereis fcarce any Nation but what is fenfible, that filial duty towards Parents, gratitude to their Benefactors, love and kindnefs to their Friends and Neighbours, fidelity in their Promifes and Agreer ments, are good and necefTary for their own welfare and prefervation, and confequently of Mankind. No difference of Teipper makes any Man in his Serjfes not pefceiveit to be good for all Men, that the Lives, Liberties, Eftates and Members of all innocent Perfons, fhould be preierved; And therefore that the killing,or robbing,or maiming of them fhould be every-where prohibited under the moft fevere Penalties. Or laftly, What peculiar humour in Men not wholly barbarous can make them not think it good and beneficial for particular Families and Nations that the Conjugal Fidelity of .the Marriage-bed.

and the Chaftity of Unmarried Virgins fhould be preferved inviolate. The fame may be faid concerning the Rrght of ufing and enjoying all thofe outward things, that are neceflary for life,or conduce to our health, as Fame, Honour, the education of our Chil-dren,and the prefervation of Friendfhip,(ince in their Judgment concerning the goodnefs of thefe things about which trie whole bufi-nefs of the Laws of Nature,and ofmoft Civil Laws is taken up,all rational Men do as equally agree in their Opinions as concerning the whitenefsof Snow, orthebrightnefsofthe Sun; Though I do not lay the main ftrefsof their obligation to thefe Actions on this general Agreement, becaufe I have laid down contrary Principles in the foregoing Dif-courfe.

§. 5. But I (hall now proceed to give you a more true and fetled Notion of Good and Evil,both at natural and moral:! therefore define a natural Good tQ be, that which preferves, encreajeSy or perfects the Faculties and Power,* of one or more things ; for by thefe effects that peculiar agreeablenefs of one thing with another declares it felf to us, and which is requifite to make any thing to be truly called good for the nature of this Being before others. Which effects likewife difcover to us the hidden powers, and intrinfick natures of things.Theleftrike upon our Senfes,and beget

a knowlege in us ofthofe things from whence they flow; which Goods I grant may be different, according to the different natures of Beings which they refpeft. Thus a fuitable Soyl, Air, and Moifture are naturally good for Plants,becaufe they are agreeable to their nature, and are necefiary for their preferva-tion, growth and perfection : So likewife convenient Food, Health and Liberty, are naturally good for an Animal; becaufe they ferve for their prefervation and happinefs as long as they continue to live. So likewife, That is alfo good for Man, which preferves and encreafes the powers of his Mind and Body, without doing hurt to, or prejudicing any others of his own kind ; nor doth the mind of Man only make thefe Rules concenw ing the nature of one, or a few Creatures of a fort, but is able from the knowledge it hath of fingulars, to make certain general Propo-fitions, or Conclufions, concerning what is good or evil, for the whole Species, or Kind, whofe nature he hath enquired into; becaufe, fince there is the fame general nature in every One of the Individuals of this or that Kind,* the true happinefs of one or more of them being once known, it is eafie likewife to know what fliare and kind of happinefs is to be defired by all of them : For it is apparent, That the improvement of the Underftancling

in knowledge, and the government of the Will by fedateand regular Affeftions;as like* wife the health and vigour of the Body, in which the true happinefs of any particular Man does chiefly confift, doth alfo comprehend generally confidered) the common happinefs of all Men, that ever have, or (hall be born, which alfomay be affirmed concerning the means to thefe natural Goods, and which are required as neceflary to all Mankindjfuch as Food, Exercife, Sleep, and the like ; And this, becaufe of the identity between the parts and the whole ; that is, between the nature of any one, or more Men, with that whole Syftem of Rational Agents, comprehended under the general Name and Idea of Mankind.From whence againft follows that whatsoever doth good to one Member, or part of this aggregate Body, (all the reft being unhurt,orunprejudicedthereby) may be truly faid to do good to the whole aggregate Body of Mankind ; which fhould may excite us to a due care of our felves, provided it be not prejudicial to othersfrom a con-fideration of the common Good of Mankind. Analogically unto this we may alfo judge, that to promote the efficacy of God's Natural Right to rule our felves,and all other rational Creatures, is to perform a thing good, or grateful to God, as Supreme Governour of

the World ; and this we do by a due care to promote obedience to his own Laws, either in our felves, or others.

And therefore, though we fo far agree with Mr. H. that That may be called good which is agreeable to any other Being, and fo muft be meant relatively ; yet doth not this always refer to the Appetite of him that defires it,nor yet to the irrational Opinions of any one or more Men, if they judge contrary to the Rules and Principles of Nature or Rea-fon. And therefore, though a Young Girl that hath the Green-Sicknefs,by reafon of her depraved Appetite, may fanfie Tobacco pipes, or Charcoal to have an excellent relifh, and fo to be good for her ; yet will not her thinking fo, make them become wholfome nourifhment. The like may be faid of any Actions or Vices, which a Vicious or Unrea-fonable Man may take pleafure in ; fuch as Drunkennefs, Whoredom, eJr.whkn how-foever they may pleafe him at the prefent, yet wiB certainly in time deftroy him in this life, or in that to come. And therefore it is not true, which Mr. H here lays down, That all Good and Evil are only to be taken in refpeft of him whom at that time it plea-fes or difpleafes:Whereas every rational Mar§ ought firft rightly to judge what things arc good, and then to defire them, becaufe they

are really fo ; that is, becaufe their natura powers or effects are really helpful, or agreeable to oar Nature; And to confider private Good, as that which profits one perfon; and a common Good, as that which profits i/iany. Not becaufe it is at that inftant de-fired, and approved out of a depraved Appetite, or wanton humour: it being only the part of Brutes, Mad-men andFools,tomea-Jure the goodnefs of Things, or Actions by their prefent Lufts,without any Government P^eafon, or Thoughts of the future.

$.6. ButMr.H.himfelf doth fometimes talk more foberly; and though he doth here, as alfo elfe where,inculcate, That every thing is either good, or evil, according to the opinion of the Perfon that fo judges it (in the jftate of Nature) or elfe (in a Civil State) of the Perfon that reprefents the Commonwealth ; yet in his Leviathan, Chap. 30. when he reckons up the Offices of the Civil Sovereign, he makes one of the chiefeft to be the making of good Laws. And he there tells us, A good Larv is that which is needful for the good of the People, and withal perjpicu-otK; and a little further he thus goes on ; And therefore A Larv that is not needful, having not the true end of a Law, is not food. A Law may be conceived to be good, when it is for the beneft of

the Sovereign, though it be not neceffaryfor the People ; but it is not Jo: where you fee, the good, of the Peofle (which is certainly that which is common to many) is here acknow-JedgM by him, and propofed as the mam end of the Legiflator's Duty: But this end being thus propofed, the true nature of it is firlt to be known, and determined, before any Law can prefcribe what is good or evil for the People. So likewife Chap. 14. §. 4- of hli> DeCive, fpeaking concerning the Rules of right Judgment in a Civil State, he tells us; Thatftnce it is imfofflble to prejcribe any Vniver-fa! Rules whereby All Controverts (which mill be infmte^ may be judged, it is founder flood in every CAfepretermitted by the written Laws, that the Law of natural Equity is to be followed. Where you fee he grants that the Laws of natural Equity may be known, and followed ; And that divers more Cafes may be deter-mined from thence, than can be by the Civil Laws themfelves. But we do only fo far con-tend with him, that fome Rules of Equity may be fo evidently and naturally known, that all honeft and fincere Men cannot at all differ about them; though in the mean time we freely grant, That there are divers things fo indifferent, that no tinman Reafon can univerfally determine, that it is more necef-iary for the common Good, that a thing be

done, or a Cafe judged this way, rather than the other.

§. 7. Having ftated what we mean by a natural Good, and Evil; I fhall now give a right notion of a moral Good,znd how it differs from the former. A moral Good coitjifts m thofe �voluntary Aftions and Habits which are conformable to the Lw of Nature, or Reafon, eonftdered as given by God, the Lawgiver', for d Rule of a four Humane, or voluntary Actions : For there are many natural Goods that conduce to a Man's happinefs, which are not morally good, nor are commanded by any Law. Such as are quicknefsof Wit, Learning, Strength of Mind and Body, &c. On the other fide, I fuppofe, that no A£Hon of the Will can be commanded by God,(and fo morally good)which doth not from it's own nature, as well as from the Will of God (the Legi/lator} conduce to the happinefs of Mankind : The not taking notice of this difference, between natural and moral Goods, hath been the occafionof another great Error in Mr. H. when he makes that which feemsgood to every Matfs orvrtfelf, to be the only objeaofhis defres, as he doth in }iis De C/^Cap. i. Art. 2. which he likewife more fully expreffes in Cap. 3. Artie. 21. Every oneuprejumed to feek that which is goed

for himfelf\ but that which isjuft only by accident-and for feace fake; viz. That which is juft,he will only have to regard another's good ; which he fuppofes no Man will feek, unlefs it were for fear of thofe Evils which proceed from a ftate of War : But all he fays only tends to prove, that Men are fo framed, that it is repugnant to their Nature, and fo abfb-lutely impoflible for them to mind, or defirc any thing, unlefs for their own particular worldly profit, and glory, as he hath laid down in thofe Principles we have already confidered.

§.8.However,I cannot but take notice,that this Gentleman in his Treatife De Homi-jtf,(publifhed after his De Cive) Cap. i2.§. i* feems not at all to approve of this ill humour in Men, by thefe words. Weconfefs that it tnayfofaH out through the iS ufe of his free rviH, that a Man of a narrow Soul may conpder nothing but himfelf, andfo may defre nothing but what he judges for his own private advantage. An4 in the fame Treatife, Cap* 11. §. 14. where he doth purpofely confider which is the greater, or leflerGood; he plainly confefles, That it is a greater good which benefits more perfons, than that which doth bene* fit but to a Few,

$.9.Wherefore giving him leave to contradict himfelf as much as he pleafes, yet not-withftanding all he hath faid to the contrary, I doubt not but all rational and good men are of a more generous Spirit; who do not only efteem that to be good, which is good for themfelves alone, but alfo whatfoever tends to the confervation, happinefs and perfection of Mankind. And whatsoever they thus efteem to be good, that they will alfo defire, wifh for, and contribute their utmoft endeavour to procure for others, as well as themfelves : Nor do I fee any reafon to hinder, but that whatfoever I find agreeable to any man's Nature, I may do my endeavour, as far as lies in my power,that he may obtain it; But this much I muft freely confefs,That if men do not propofe to themfelves one common End, or Effecl:, viz,, the common good of Rational Agents, whofe Caufes (whether efficient, or perfective) fhould be before-hand agreed on to be Good, and thofe that hinder it's production, Evil j the words Good and Evil will always be equivocal, various, and uncertain; being ftill to be taken in as many different Senfes, as there are particular Men. So that whatfoever A&ion, or thing, is called good by any One man, becaufe it ferves his turn; that Other men, if it croftes their defires?will be fure to call evil,which is incon-

gruous to Reafon,and to the Communication of knowledge among men,which is the main end of Speech ; Whereas, if the words Good and Evil are applied to thofe things which concern the nature of Rational Beings in general, they will have a certain and determinate fenfe and fignification, which will not only be conftantly true, and intelligbile, but prove moft ufeful and profitable to all Mankind ;and that we are not only capable of un-derftanding, but alfo of contributing our En-deavours for the procuring of this Common Good, and are alfo under a fufficient obligation thereunto, is, I hope, fully made out in the Fourth Chapter of the precedent Dif-courfe,where we exprefsly treat of the Law cfNature,and its Obligation.


ThattheState ofNatureisaStateofWar.

§. i. A LL the Principles that Mr. H hath j£"X hitherto laiddown,havebeen only in order to the eftablilhing this Darling Principle of the natural ftate of War. But fince we have already in our Anfwer to his former Principles, fhewn their falfliood and abfur-dity � If thofe Foundations be ill laid, the

Superftrufture muft needs be infirm, and therefore I (hall omit all that he hath in his De Che inferred from thofe faife Principles; and fliall only apply my felf to what he hath in his i Jth Chapter of his Leviathan, given us a-new for the proof of this Principle, and which doth not depend upon the former;For here he derives this natural State of War from Three Principal Caufes in the nature of Man. Firft, Competition. Secondly, Diffidence. Thirdly, Glory. The firft makes man invade for Gain. The fecond for Safety, and the third for Refutation. Thefrft uje Violence to make themfehesMafters of other Men'sperfontJVives, Children and Cattel. The fecond to defend them. The third for Trifles; of A word, a finite, A different Opinion, and any other fgn of un-dervaluing,eitherdtre£tly in their perjbns, orHy refle&ion on their Kjndred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profeffton, or their N*me. Hereby it is manifefled, That during the time Men live without a Common Power to keep them all in we, they are in that condition which is called War, as is that of every man againji every Man. For War conftfts not in Battel only, or the Aft of Fighting; but in a tratt of time wherein the v>$i to contend by Battel is fufficiently known. And therefore the notion of time is to be conpdered in thenatureofWarjOf it is in the nature of Weather. For 45 the nature of Foul-weather lies

not in afhower ortwoofRain.hutin an inclination thereto of many days together ; So the nature of War conffis not in aftnal fighting, hut in the known dijfoption thereto luring all the time there if no offurwee to the contrary. All other it Peace.

§. 2. In anfwer to which, I muft firft take notice,That Mr. H in his Leviathan deduces this Right of War of all Men againft all,from other Principles than he doth in his DeCive, Chap. i. §. 12. where from the fuppofed Right of all Men to all things, he deduces a War of all Men againft all,and which renders it both lawful and neceifary : But in his Le-viathan, in the Chapter here cited, he firft aiferts the ftate ofNature to be a ftate of War, and from thence argues all things therein to be lawful; as you may fee in the Conclufioa of that Chapter,where hetells us, That by the fameRight that one Man invatlesjhe other refits; from rvhence arifis a War on both fides jap. So that being not at all felicitous about the Right of making War, he only fuppofes this War muft needs arifefrom the nature of Men's Paflions,and Defiresjand this War beingonce fuppofed, he pofitively afTerts, That it muft follow (though without any proof) that there is in this State nothing juft, orunjuft: Indeed his way of arguing in his Leviathan

ismoreplaufible, but lefs clofe than the former in his De Civ* ; For all Perfons of fenfe muft agree, that a War ought firft to be proved juft,before it can be thence deduced what things are lawful therein, even towards Enemies : Neither doth He himfeff fuppofe that all things are lawful, even in the jufteft War; for in his De Give, Annot. adArt.tf.caf.j; be grants that Drunkenneft, and Cruelty, are not to be praftifed even in War; and therefore it isneceffarythatfome natural Principles, or Laws, be firft acknowledged, by whofe command or permiflion we may be able to judgeof any War, whether it be juft, or not, or before we can thence infer thofe things to be lawful which are a&ed therein ; for other wife evencontradi&ory Propofitions may be alike true; and Titita, for example, might have a Right to the Life and Goods of Semfroniw, if he thought them neceffary for his own Prefervation; and fo likewife Sem-fronitts would have the fame Right againft Tititt* : which would be contrary to all the Rules of right Reafon, and Equity; and this is To evident, that Mr, H himfelf, although in the latter part of this firft Chapter, De Cive, he affirms, That in the ftate of Na-ture^ there is no difference between juft and unjuft �, yet in the former parts he endeavours to prove, that this power of making War,

ought to be allowedto every Manin that ftate, as necpflary to his own pfefervation; which is all one, as if he had affirmed this War to be juft and lawful on both fides ; tvhich is contrary to Reafon. Buc whofoever will prove any thing to be juft, and lawful in any Sta te,muft like wife fu jjpofe,that there is a di£ ference between lawful nd unlawful in the iame State, and muft fuppofe fome Law in force, by whofe command or permiffion at leaft, that Aft becomes lawful : which, as we endeavour to eftablifh, (b doth Mr. H. as plainly to deftroy, whilft he allows no difference between juft and unjuft; but with what reafon I fhall leave it to the indifferent Reader to judge.

§. 3. Butfince we have already anlweredt thole Preliminary Principles which he hath laid down in his De Cive, to prove the necef-fity of this ftate of War, there remains nothing elfe ^or us to doth nbw,but to examine thpfe new Reafons. "hathHe.given Us; in this Chapter of his Leviathan to prove this ftate of War to be both natural, and iiecelTa-ry ; which he here deduces from three Affections in the nature of Man. i. Competition for the fame thing. 2. Diffidence of each b-ther. 3. G/^tohifnfelf. Thefiritisrha-nifeft j That during the5 time Men live with-

out a Common Power to keep them in awe, they are in that Condition which is called War.

Whence I cannot but again obferve,That this Author takes the natural ftate of Mankind only from its Paflions, without any confiderationof Reafbn, or Experience ; although he hath already fuppofed both of thefe to be natural Faculties of the Mind : and the true nature of a thing is to be taken not from its wants and imperfections, but from the utmoft perfe&ion that it is by nature capable of; and therefore this Author hath dealt very prepofteroufly to treat of the natural State of Man, as of ameer Animal, only governed by the force of his Paflions ; whereas, the principal part of Man, and which ought to have the government over all the other Faculties,is Reafon; or that Faculty of the rational Soul, whole due ufe and exercife ought not to be excluded, but rather conjoined with the operations of all the o-ther natural Faculties, by any Writer who Will truly defcribe the Nature of Man ; nor yet are men neceflarily impelled by thefe Paf-iions, as meer Machines are driven or moved by the Wind, or Weights; but that they may be governed,and reft rained by Reafon, or fear of future evil: fo that they do not hurry men into War by any natural, or

inevitable neceflity.Indeed thofeldea's of the. Mind,whichare neceffarilygenerated therein from the impulfe of outward Objefts,are not prohibited by the LawofNature,becaufe we are defign'd by God to govern thofe <\fti-ons only which are in our powers : Whereas thefe Paffions and Ideas, from whence Mr. H. col lefts this ftate of War to be neceffary,, are of this fort, fince being concerning things future, and at a diftance, and. depending upon Men's reafon,and forefight, they may be alfo governed thereby; and Mr. ti. himfelf acknowledges in his De Give, Chap. 3.$. ji.' That though Men, becaufe of their different Appetites, cannot agree of the prefent, yet they may of the fut«jfe,and from thence con-feffes,that Peace is to be fought as the foundation of all natural Law,

, .- . .^

6.4- And therefore 1 think tfiiallhea,ble: cafily toflicw, tlut every one.ofthefc three Mafter Pafljbns, which he hath here de-. icribcd astheCaufes of War, ought (if governed by reafon) to psrfuade to tlie contrary.. And in the firft place, for his PafUon of Com-. pstition/Tha't whsn t\,v.> Men delire the fanitf tiling, w'licluhsy caiiao!; boch enjoy, they bs'comi Ea^rriie>;a:id in the way to tlisir end, eo/l-AVourto'dsftroy, qV fabdue one another,.' No'.vcertainly II^ilb.iin this Cafe wiU'niver.

incite a rational Man to enter into a ftate of War with another, for the obtaining of that which he hath a mind to as well as he. For if it be a thing the other is already polTefTed of, he ought by the Rules of Reafon,and Equity, to let him enjoy it by right of Occupancy or PofTeffion, it being then neceflary for his pre-fervation, or happinefs �, and hehimfelf,if pof-fefled of the like thing, would think it rea-fonable that he fhould be likewife permitted quietly to enjoy it: So that, if he acl: by one Rule in relation to himfelf,and by another in refpeft to all other Men,in the fame Cafe, or Circumftances, this muftbe altogether un-reafonable andunjuft. And Mr. Hhimfelf doth fufficiently {hew the grievous mifchiefs x)f fuch an unreafonable way of proceeding, when he tells us, That from hence it comes to pafs ; That where An Invader hath no mere to fear than anotherMari's fwgle Power,If one plant, ft>w, build vr poffefs a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with Forces united to dijpoffefs and deprive him,not only of the Fruit of his Labour, but alfo of his Life, or Liberty ; and the Invader again is in the like danger of another. To which I may alfo add, and he again of a third ; till at laft all the Owners of it being fucceffively deftroyed,the Houfe or Seat will become void,and no Man left to inhabit it: which Condition Mr. H.

himfelf confeites robefad,£nd deplorable fb; that he will have Mankind from theDi&ates of reafon to do all they can to get out ofit,by entering into a Civil Society. But I fuppofe that right R>eafon will rather hinder all rational Men from ever falling into this State at all, if they can by any means avoid, or pre* vent it; fince Peace is to be valued from its own Conveniences without trying, or comparing it with the Evils of War, as Health is valuable for its own agreeablenefs to our Natures, without trying by woful experience, what ficknefs is.

§.5. And as for his next Paflion, Diffidence of each other ; That there is no way for any Man to fe cure himfelf, foreafonable as Anticipation ; that is, by force, or wiles, to mafler the yerfons of all Men he can, fo lon%, till he fee no other Power great enough to endanger him. And that this it no more than his own confervatiott requires, and is generally allowed. Now can all this reasonably perfuade aMan to put himfelf in fo hazardous a condition, as by force, or fraud, to go about to matter and fubdue all thofe he will be afraid of- or to think he is able to do this by his own fingle frrength,titt he fees no other Power great enough to endanger him ? Since for any Man to be able to dothis,he mull have more Cunning, natural

Strength and Courage & Cunning than ever Homer fuppofed Vlyffes, or Jchilles, to have been Matters of, or our Modern Romance-makers can feign in their Heroes;Since upon thefe Terms of Self-prefervation, a Man (like a Game-Cock) would be forced to fight a Battel,or two,every day whilft he lived, and how long this would (aft, fuppofing other Men of equal ftrength, and as well prepared as himfelf, I refer him to the experiment of fighting-Cocks, who feldom furvive the twelfth or thirteenth Battel; and though it be true, that there are fome that take pleafure in contemplating their own Power in A&s of Conquefts, which they may purfue farther than their own Security requires; yet this was never known to be performed by any Man's fingle ftrength, but by Combination with divers others, who through the efteem they had of his Integrity,or Charge, chofe fuch a Man to be their Leader, or Prince, before another : And this Account, both the AntientHiftorians, and Poets, give of the Original of the firft Monarchs, and Antient Kings, in the Heroical Times. And admitting the firft Kingdoms to have begun by Fathers,or Patriarchs cfFamilies,asfome Divines fuppofe, yet they cculd never have raifed a fufficient Force to have conquered others. without the Combination of

.the Heads or Fathers of other Families; Nor could Nimrod himfelf, (who is fuppofed the firft Tyrant, or Conqueror,) ever have enlarged the Bounds of his Empire by his ownfmgle ftrength, or that of his particular Family, without fuch a Combination which requires Compacts between the Per*, fons that make it; and when they once dp this,they are then flQ longer in the meer ftate of Nature, having fet up and acknowledged a common Power over them to, keep them in awe: from whence it appears, that it is ridi-culpus, nay abfolutely impoflible, for any (ingle A/an to take picafure in contemplating 'his pwn Power in A&s of Conquer! by his pwn perfbnal Valour, or Cunning, as Mr.H. fuppqfesa A/in may do in the ftate of Nature.

§. 6. And as for his, appeal to Experience, That when a. Man taking a, journey ^ arms him-filf'i when going to Bed^ he locks his Doors; when even in his Houfe, he locks his Ckefts : And asks what opinion he hath of his Fellow-fab-jects, when he rides armed, and (huts his Doors ; or of his Children and Servants, when he locks his Chefts ; And whether he doth not thereby ac~. cnfe Mankind as much by his Attions, as In doth by his Words ? To all which lanfwer, No, he doth not. For though I grant it is nq fault to diftruft,and fecureliirnfelFas well

as he can againft violent and unjuil Perfons, cither upon the Road, or in his own Houfe ; yet doth not this Diffidence accufe all his Fellow-fubjefts, or all his Children, and Servants, much lefs all Mankind, of a defigiuo murther, or rob him; or give him any Right to make War upon them by way of anticipation ; for when he goes armed, or locks his Doors, or Chefts, 'tis true, he grants there are Ibme violent and wicked Perfons, whom he would fecure himfelf again ft :yet doth not this accufe all Mankind of this wicked Defign, fmce a Man will do all This, if lie be fatisfied that there are but two or there Thieves between his own Houfe and London, or but one thievifh Perfon in his Family; which is but a fmall proportion to a whole Countrey, or Kingdom; much lefs doth he thereby pafs a Cenfure upon all Mankind : though it is true, he thereby acknowledges, rthat there are, and ever will be, amongft Men, divers who are more governed by their prefent Appetites and Pa (lions, than by Reafon, or the Laws of Nature. Much lefs doth fuch a diffidence give a Man a right in the irate of Nature of fet-ting upon, mattering and killing all Perfons whatfoever, that he fanfies have power fufficient to endanger him in his Life, or Goods) before they have given fomefuffi-

dent iigns that they intend fo to do ; for then it might be lawful (were it not for the Laws) for a Man, when he is thus armed, to fet upon, not only Thieves, but every Man he meets, for fear he fhould fet upon him firft; nay, mig% likewife kill, or knock, on the Head, (if he were in the meer frate of Nature) any of his Children, or Servants, or even the Wife of his own Bofom, if he did but fanfie they went about to tnurther, or rob him; which how wicked and unreafo-nable a thing it would be, I leave to any Man's Reafon and Confcience to judge. Nor does his comparing the ftate of War to the aature of Foul-weather, at all help him, which he faith, doth not lie in a/bower or two of Rain, but in an inclination thereto of many dayf^together : So the nature of War conpfts net in actual fight ing, but in the known difpofition thereto: all which I readily grant, but he muft likewife own that it is never called a Rainy, or foul Seafon, till it hath actually Rained ; till then we never fay it is foul weather, though it be never fp cloudy ; fo neither is this bare inclination to hurt, an aftual War, till there hath been fome figns or tokens of hofti-lity expreffed.

$. y. Yet he grams there was never fuch a condition of War as this that he dcfcribes generally all over the World : But that there are many places where Men live fo now, and Inftances in many favage People of America,; where, except the Government of fmall Families (the concord whereof depends on Natural LuflJ they have no Government at all, and live at this day in that brutiili manner he hath before defcribed : But were it fo as he affirms that brutifh way of, living, which is In too many Particulars pra&ifed by thefe favage People, Both in' Afriwy and America, w here they"have aim oft loft all know ledgeof a God, or of a Moral Good and Evil; Ought the Praclice'of fuch Barbarous People to be of fuiScient Authority to prove, that they Jive according to thetrue ftateofHuman Nature, or that they have a Right to live ami a£b thus in all things they thus unreafonably pra&ife ? But had This Author read any true or exaft relations of tho'fe Places in America, he mentions, he ought have found in many of thofc JSlations, even where there is no Civil Power to keep them in awe, and where they ha ve no or her Government in time of Peace, butthatof rhe Fathers, cr Heads of Families; that iheir Concord doth no: wholly defer-c! upcn Natural Luft:

VI fo. Lerius hi ft. Biai-i; &,- j//"; th" Fr^th fli'io-n t/' tk<: C^-ribbt Jfuiids.

For befides the Government of Husbands ,o-ver their Wives, and thofe conjugal Duties and Services which their Wives yield them m thefe Places ; Parents are more fond of their (Children, and Children again are more dutiful and kind to their Parents, and take more care of them when they are fick or old, than they commonly do with us: And though there be no Common Power to keep them in awe, yet havingno riches,but the meer necefTary u» tenfils of Living,nor any Honours,except Military,to contend for, and which are not obtained without great hardfhips and fufferings; rind having alfo few Words of contempt, or difgrace among them;whole Towns,nay Nations, have lived together for many Ages in fufficient Amity and Concord, without ever falling together by the ears. And if there be any Murthers and Adulteries committed a-mong them, every particular perfon injured, or elfe the Relations of the Party (lain, are their own Judges and Executioners; the mutual fear of which, joyned with the Natural Peaceable Temper of the People,caufes fewer of thofe Crimes to be committed among them, than with us, where there are Laws and Publick Officers appointed to punifhall fuch Injuries : And for the Truth of this, I refer you to two Authors of undoubted Credit (i>/£.) Lerius in his Hiftory of his Navi-

gation to Brazil, Chap. 18, and the French Author of the Natural Hiftory of the Caribl& Iflands, Parted. Chap. 11.and §. 19. befides other Authors on this Subject:, whom you may confult in Purchases Pilgrimes, in his Volume of America. And though thefe People have often Wars with their Neighbours, yet is it not with all, but only fome particular Nations, with whom they have con-ftant Wars, and whom they eat, whenfo-ever they can take them Prifoners : Yet do they at the fame time maintain Peace with all others. So remote is it from Truth, that any Nation in the World can live and fubfiit, by maintaining aconftant War a-gainft a 11 others. Nor did I ever hear of any more than one People or Nation in the IVeft-Indtes* near Carolina^ called the Wefoes^ that xn.sde this Fatal Exp^- imentvby making War fcpon all their Neighbours, one after another, till they were in a i'hort time reduced from 7000 Fighting Men, to 700, and were afterwards quite extirpated by thofe Nations they had injured: Which Relation I receiv'd from a Gentleman of very good Quality and Erudition, who hath a confiderable Intereft in thofe parts. So impoflible a thing it is, for Mankind to fubfift, or be preferved a year together in Mr. PPs imaginary State of War, §.8.Nor is his other Inftance from the Actions of Kings, and Perfons of a Sovereign Au-

thority,any better,whom he makes likes Gladiators, Having their Weapons pointing ai9 a%d their eyesfxed on each other; That isfhsir forts, Girrijons and, Guns, upon the Frontiers oftbsir XJnrdoms,and continual Spies upon their Neighbours, which if apofture of War. Where I snay firft obferve,tbat he doth not directly affirm, That all Princes are in a State, but only in a Pofture of War, which I grant is both lawful and neceflary : Since no Prince or Common-wealth can be fecure, that his Neighbours will conftantly obferve the Laws of Nature, and not invade his Territories,with-out any juft caufe given.Yet I think no Prince, or other Supreme Power (whom he makes the only Judges of Good and Evil,) will be fo wicked or unreafonable to affirm, that they have a natural Right to invade the Territo-ries,Lives andEftates of allNeighboring Princes, and their Subjects; much lefs,when they have made Leagues or Compacts of Peace with each other, that they are not obliged to obferve them, only for prevention that they may not do the like to them, and break their Compacts firft: For that he himfelf confeffes to be abfolutely contrary to the Laws of Na-ture,and of Right Reafon.But that upon Mr, H's Principles fuch Compacts being made in the meer State of Nature,and without any Common Power to fee them obfervedjdo not

at all oblige, I {hall (hew you more particularly by and by.

§. 9.1 come now to his laft Paffion, (viz,.") Glory, for which he would have all Men to be naturally in a State of War. But admitting that divers Men look that their Companions fhould value them at the fame rate as they do themfelves ; and upon the leaft figns of Contempt^ or undervaluing, naturally endeavour as far a* they dare^ to extort a greater value from their Contemners, which amongft them that have no Common Power to keep them quiet, maybe enough to make thert de/lroy each other. Yet doth not this hold true in every Man � for even among thole that labour under this Paflfioa of Vainglory ,there are many in whom fear of others is a much more predominate pa{!ion,and fuch will rather take an affront, than venture to beat or kill another to revenge it : Since the hazard is certain, but the Victory (fuppofing the perfon every way his equal) uncertain. And if this Vain-glory may be fo far mattered by another ftronger Paffion; why may it not alfo be overpowered by Reafon ? Fora rational Man will cpnlider, that he cannot force Men to have a better efteem of his Wordsor Actions by fighting every one that (hall declare their difiike of them, or elfe knows that he is not at all the worfe for the foolifh cen-fures of unreasonable Men : or that he is ob-

ligedtotakeforan affront, whatfoever any fcurrilous impertinent Fellow fhall intend fo: Andhehimfelfdoth here likewife fuppofe that there are other Paflions as ftrong that incline Men to Peace, as fear of Death, de-fire of fuch things as are necefTary for commodious living ; and a hope by their Induftry to ohtain them ; from whence I obfcrve, that the greateft part of thefe Paflions which now incline Men to Peace, are but the fame in other words, which before inclined them to War : For what is this Diffidence of another, and this Anticipation, which he makes fo reafonable, but a fear of Death, or other mifchief, from thofe whom he thus goeth about to prevent ? And what is this defire of things neceifary for life, but a Branch of that Right which fuppofes all Men have to all things ? Bur granting that the fame Paflions may in feme Men produce different effects ; yet if thefe Paflionsthat incline Men to peace are more ftrong and powerful than thole that excitcthem to War,then certainly Peace will be their more conihnc and Natural State: Since as Mariners relate the violent blowing of two conirary Winds, doth often in the Center of their Motion produce a Calm. And therefore Mr. H. proceeds very rafhly, to lay fuch a great ftrels on thpfe Paffions, which provoke Men to War, without al(bconfidering,and putting into the

contrary Scale all thofe that incline Men to the contrary, which certainly are more prevalent in moft Men : For what can more ftrongly influence Men's A�kions,than fear of Death, and all thofe other miferies which he himfelffo lively defcribes to be the neceffary Confequences of the State of War ? And whereas he tells us, that reafon fuggefteth convenient Articles of peace; I think I have fufficiently proved,that Reafon is fo far from needing Articles of Peace, that it can never prompt confideringMen to believe themfeives naturally in fo dangerous and miferable a State, as this which Mr. H. fuppofes; much lefs to fall into it on purpofe, without any juft caufe given. But fince this Author undertakes to offer us manyReafons why Men's Faflions will not permit them to live in Peace as well as divers other Creatures, whom he confefles can do fo without Laws; We will a little examine thofe Reafons he brings, Why Men'sNature will not naturally permit them to live in Peace, as well as thofe brute Creatures ; and therefore I fhall put them down in his own Words, as you may find them in his Lev. Chap. 17*

§. 10, It is true, that certain living Creatures, as Bees and Ants^ livefociably one with a-notker (which are therefore by Ariftotle, num-

ired Amongft Political Creatures) and yet have no other Direction than their particular Judgment s^and Appetites; not Speech, whereby one of them canfgnifie to another, what he thinks expedient for the Common Benefit. And therefore fome Men may perhaps defire to know why Mankind cannot do the fame ? To which I anjwer.

Firft, That Men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity, which thefe Creatures are not; and conftquently amongft Men, there a-rifethfrom that ground, Envy and Hatred, and fnally War; but amongft thefe notfo.

To which I reply, That thefe Civil Ho* nours, about whicn he fuppofes thefe Contentions do ib often arife amongft Men, have no place in the State of Nature, being not known amongft Men, before the Inftitution of Commonwealths; and therefore they cannot in this State,wluch he now treats of, contend for them more than Brutes. So that the only true Glory and Honour which can be found,out ofa Civil Governments, as Cicero very well defines it in his Tufc.Queft. the a,-greeing praife of good Men, and the uncorruptetl Suffrages of thofe that rightly judge of excellent Fertue. But all the Vertues being contained under the ftudy of the Common Good of Rational Beings, from thence alone can fpring the praife of good Men : And the de-fire of fuch Honour, is fo far from cauOog a

War againft all Men, that as from a contrary., Principle, Men may by this be excited to the exercife of all thole Virtues, which Mr. H. himfelf allows, Lev. Chap.. 15. to be the ne-cefTary means of Common Peace and Safety.

§. II. His Second Reafon is, that amongH thefe (Creatures, the Common Good differeth not from the Private ; and being by nature inclined to their Private, they procure thereby the Com-, mon Benefit. But Man, whofejoyconpfteth in comparing himfelf with other Men, can rel/fb KO-thing, but what a eminent.

To which we may reply, that Mr. H has done us a Courtefie,in acknowledging before he is aware, that even out of Civil Government, there is (bme common and public!* Good, which may indeed be procured even by Brutes themfelves: And he has elfewhere alfo told us (as in his Treatife De Homing, Chap. 10. the very laft Words) But.we fu'p~ poje the knowledge of the Common Good, to be a ftmzans to bring men both to Peace, and Vertue\ becaufe it is both amiable in its own Nature, and. the fur eft defence of each man's private Good. And fure its difference in foms cafes from the private good of fo us Msn, is no faHictent Reafon why M-2ti fliould rather fall out and fight arh'Dag thstn:felves,tliin IVses or Ants, whofe Gommo,nGobd is like\Vife dillinguifhed from

the private. But as for what he affirms, concerning the Nature of Men, if it beuniver-fally under flood of all Men (as his words feem to intend) 'tis falfe, and fpoken without all manner of proof, unlefs we mult be fent back to his general Dernonftration of thefe things in his Introduction to his Lev. where he ad vifes every Man to this Rule,A^ ce teipfum; and therefore would teach w that from the Sitniititide of the thoughts andpaffions of one M&n to the thoughts andpaffions of another, he jhall thereby read, and know what are the thoughts and paffiow of all other Men-^ufon the like occapoz. Perhaps Mr. Hobbs knew himfelf very well, and was fenfible there was nothing more plea-fant to him, than comparing himfelf with o^ ther Men,andfo could relifh nothing in himfelf, either as his own Natural Endowments, or acquired Improvements, but what was moreeminent,and greater than other Men's; and from thence gathered the fame thoughts^ to be in all others : But he ought to have (hewn fomething in the Nature of Man,from whence it is neceffary that all Men fhouid fo judg; for certainly all that are truly rational! can know from the true ufe ofthings,and froni the necellity of their own Natures, how to judg concerning their own things, whether they are pleafant or not j and to what degree they do delight them, without comparing

them with thofe of other Men : So that indeed none but the foolifh or envious can only be pleafed, as far as their own things exceed thdfe of othecs; But if he would have this cerifure only to concern fuch Men, it will not then afford a fufficient caufe of an Univerfai War of all Men againft all. And though perhaps Strife and Contention may be begun amongft fuch envious, foolifh People, yet the ftrength or reafon of the more prudent and peaceaBle may eafily reftrain it, that it (hall never hurt, or deftroy all Men, by making thern enter into a ftate of War againft all.

j§. 12. His Third Reafon is, That theje Creatures having not (as Man) the ttfe of Reafon, do not fee (or at leaft think they fee) any fault in the adminiftration of their Common bit-finefs: Whereas amongft Men, there Are 'very many that think \themfelves Wifer, and more able to govern the Publick, tha the reft ; and thofe jtrive to Reform, and Innovate, one this way, another that way, and thereby bring it into Difraft ion, and Civil War.

To which we may thus Reply, That this Reafon offers nothing whereby Men may live lefs peaceably among themfelves,thanBrutes, if they were in the llate of Nature, and Sub-jefts to no Civil Government : But in this ftate, Men's Natural Propenfions to uni-

verfal Benevolence, and to the Laws of Nature, would have fome place, notwithftand-ing what he hath here alledged to the contrary ; as I have fufEciently proved in the precedent Difcourfe. Nor doth he here offer any thing whereby Men could lefs agree among themfelves to inftitute a Commonwealth, for this is the thing whofe caufes we are now feekingfor. But he only objects fomething,\vhich will hinder them from pre-ferving it, when it is inftituted ; and therefore this will allo (hake all the foundations of Peace, even in a Common-wealth, when it is made never fofirm according to his own model. But we do well to confider, whether Men's Reafon does not more powerfully promote Peace and Concord, by detecting rfia-ny errors of the Imaginations and PafTions, than it doth Difcord, by its fallibility about thole things which are "neceffary, being but few, and thofe plain enough. Betides, Men do not prefently make War, fo foon, as they fuppofe they fpy out fomewhat they may blame in t'^e Adniiniftration of publick Affairs; for the fame reafon which difcovers the fault,does alfo tell them,that many things are to be born with for Peace fake, and fug-gefts divers means whereby an emendation of Uiat fauk, or mifcarriage, may be peaceably prociired, -. . ' .. ,

Wherefore I dare appeal to the Judgment of any indifferent Reader,whether the condition of Mankind is worfe than that of Brutes, becaufeit is rational; and whether Mr. H. doth not judg very hardly of all Men, by making their Reafon guilty of all thefe mi-feries, which in other places he imputes ort-ly to the Paflions; and from this caufe would prove that Men muft live lefs peaceably with each other than Brute Creatures. In fhort, Mr.H^s Anfwer is nothing to the purpofe,for our enquiry is concerning the Obligation of the precepts of Reafon in the ftate of Nature ; and his Anfwer is, That moft Men's Reafon is fo falfe, as that it would diitolve all Commonwealths already conftituted.

$. 13. His fourth Reafon is, That thefe Creatures, tho* they havefome ufe of voice in making known to one Another their defires, and other affections ; yet they want that Art of words by which (bme Men can reprefent to others, that which is Good in the likenefs of £i//7, and Evil in the likenefs of Good ; and augment or diminish the apparent greatnejs of Good and Evil, difcon-tenting Men^ and troubling their peace at their pleafure.

The force of which .Anfwer is no more than this; Becaufe it fometimes falls out, that the Common People are moved to Mutiny

and Sedition by a fpecious, or fophilKcal Sermon, or Oration, that therefore Men, as having the ufe of Speech, cannot maintain peace among themfelves : which confe-quence is certainly very loofe; for he ought to prove, that all Men do neceflarily and conftantly make fuch Speeches, tending to Civil War, and Sedition ; and alfo that fuch Speeches, when heard, do conftantly prevail on their Auditors, or the moft part of them, that they fhould prefently take up Arms : For it may be, that even the Vulgar may fee through fuch lalfe and fpeeious Speeches, and perhaps they may not fuffer themfelves to be deluded by them. It may alfo happen, that they may rather give credit to the peaceable Speeches of the more wife, and moderate, as founded upon more folid Reafons: And it may be, that they will rather confider the true weight of the Arguments,than the empty found of the Words; and certainly Men's Rational Nature leads them to do this; for they know they cannot be fed5 or defended by Words, but by Actions proceeding from mutual Benevolence : What then doth hinder, but that the Eloquence and Reafon of the Good and Peaceable may not often prevail, with which both the Reafon of the Speaker, the true intereft of the Auditors, and ths nature of things do ail agree ; But I

fhallfpeak no more of this Subject now, having in the precedent DifcoiuTe fufficiently proved, That Men receive much greater Benefits from the ufe of Speech (though it may fometimes bethecaufe of Civil Difcords,and, Wars) than they do Evils and Mifchiefs thereby. And I fuppofe Mr. H. himfelf (were he alive) would confefs, that Man-. kind would not be governed, had they been all borndumb,orelfe had had their Tongues cut out by the irrefiftible power of his great Lmiathaa, the Civil Sovereign.

§.14. His fifth Reafon is, Thai� irrational., Creatures catMot dijlingnijh between In jury ^ an& Damage ; And. therefore as long as they be At eafe, then an1 not offended At their Fellows : Where as M&n is then mo ft tro&b'lefbm , when he is moft At Ca.fe ; for then it is that he loves to fljeiv his wifdowrtttd controtdthe Actions of them that govern the Commonwealth,

By which Antithefis,he would infer,That Men live togetlier lefs peaceably than Brutes, bccaul'j they diftinguifh between Injury and D.i mage : But we think much otherwife ; and that moil Men would more willingly faffer iome damage,even done by other Men, ib it h j not done mjurioufly. And I acknow-led?e that all the diilinclion between thefe


two, is founded in the knowledg of Right, and Law, which indeed is only proper to Men. But that this Knowledg mould make them more prone to violate the publick Peace, and to trample upon the Laws and Rights of their Superiors, I can by no means admit; much lefs, that Subjects that abound in Peace and Riches, are more apt to envy their Superiors, and to fhew their Wifdom in finding fault with their Rulers ; or that the Subjects of England, for Example, who (God be thanked enjoy both fufficient Peace, and Plenty) are more apt to find fault with their Governors, than thofe in France or Turkey, where they are poor and miferable by Taxes, and other Severities; or that they can even there forbear repining at the cruel Treatment of their Rulers, though perhaps their Spirits may be fo debafed, and their Powers fo" weakned by this Oppreflion,that they may not be fo able to fhew it by publick difcourfe, much lefs by refiftance ; and fo free them-lelves from this Tyranny, as perhaps they would do, if they had fufficient Riches and Courage. And that I conceive is the true reafon why this Author is fuch an Enemy in all his Books to the happinefs and wealth of the People, whom he would all a-long make Slaves inftead of Subjects.

But fuppofe that the lawful Rights of Princes are fometimes violated by the imbri-dled Lufts ot fome evil Men, yet I do not fee how this knowledge of the difference between thofe things which are done by Right, snd thofe winch are done by Wrong,do render them more apt to do Injuries to others. But he tells us, That Mtn it then mo ft trouble-fomy when he is At eafe. But fare, it is not without Injuftice, that he imputes the Faults of fome Men to all Mankind, and that without any proof; unlefs, perhaps, finding fuch Paflionsin himfelf,he from thence concluded, that they muftlikewife be naturalto allothers, according to the method he makes ufe of in his Introduction to this Book ; which I have before taken notice of, when he bids us examine this fimllitude ofPaflions, and fo whether they df"» not agree with his own Thoughts. But I mult freely confefs they do not agree with mine ; let me but be happy ,and want nothing,and though others may be richer, or happier, I fhall not envy them, nor am I at all the worfe font : But indeed Mr. H. does very prepofteroufly to alledg this fault of Men's love to fhew their Wif-dom, and controul the Actions of them that govern the Commonwealth,againft all Mankind ; whilft he ytt fuppofes Men in the ftate ot Nature, which fure (according to his

own Hypothefis) precedes all Civil Govern-^ ment.

But we are now corne to Mr. H's laft Rea-fon; and let us fee if he can thereby prove any better, That Mankind is lefs prone to Peace than Brute Creatures.

§. 15, Laftly, The agreement of thefe Creatures is natural, that of Men is by Covenant only, which u artificial-, and therefore it is no wonder if there be fomewhat elfe required, bejides Cove" nants to make their Agreement conjlant, and lafting ; which is a Common Power to keep them in awe, and to diretf their Actions to the common benefit.

To which I reply, That the true natural Caufesintrinfical toMenasthey are Animals, and which can bring them to confent to the exercife of Peace, and mutual Benevolence a-mongft themfelves, are alike with thofe that are found in other Animals,even the fiercer!, and cruelleft, fuppofe Lions, or Bears, (if you pleafe)as I hope I havefuflkicntly proved in the former part of this Treatife. Nor can Mr. H. (hew any thing which is wanting to Man, but yet is found in Brutes as a caufe of their peaceable agreement ; for that which he urges, That the Agreement of theie Creatures is natural, that of Men is by Covenant only, and therefore artificial, may

perhaps impofe upon the Vulgar, but may eafily be confuted by any one that will but confider the next Cqnfequence: For thofe very Compa&s or Covenants he mentions, are made by the power,as well of Men's Rational, as Animal Natures: And certainly if there had been no Covenants made among Men,and that they had not the ufe of Reafon, yet the common Nature of Animals of the fame kind, would have had as much force with them,as with other Creatures,that they (hould agree to maintain a mutual benevolence, as well as Brutes of the fame kind? without destroying each other, whofe agreement is by him acknowledged to be natural: What then hinders, but after there is befides added to Mankind Reafon, and the ufe of Speech, but that the fame natural agreement may ftill remain ? Reafon fure doth not take away the natural endeavours, and propen-fions to Concord in Man, more than other Animals ; neither is this agreement lefs natural, or conftant, becaufe it is exprefTed by words : As our Appetite, and taking in of Food, do notceafe to be natural Actions in us, although we may exprefs this Appetite by words, or figns ; and may alfo appoint the time, place, and what fort of Meat we will eat. And Mr. H. himfelf (as well as others) does fometimes acknowledge Reafon

to be a natural Faculty, as he does in his De Cive, in the place already quoted : From whence it follows,That this ftricter Society or Agreement which Reafon dictates fhould be eftablifhed by Compacts,wholly proceeds from the rational Nature of Mankind. But it will farther appear, That this Agreement proceeding from the ufe of Speech, is therefore more fitly called natural, if weconfider our practical Reafon to be altogether determined from the nature of the beft End we can forefee or propofe ; and the beft means we can ufe thereunto. And farther, there is nothing more can be effected by the utmoft en-d.eavors of our Reafon, than that thofe pro-penfions to Concord,with others of our own kind, (which are ib natural to all Am-, malsj fhould be directed to their fit object (viz,.} all other rational Creatures, and that all our particular actions fhould be thenca exerted according to their due place, time, and other Circumftances. So that the very taking in of Meat, and Drink, is moft natural, and proceeds from the natural conftituti-onofan Animal. Yet this in all particular cafes, is beft governed,and directed by a Man's Reafon, taking care of his own Health without any irregularities in his Diet ; whilft thofe precepts of thus regulating hi s Diet, whofe force and certainty he obferves

from the Nature of things, and his own particular Conftitution, may very well deferve in fome cafes, the name of an Art.

Therefore Mr. H hath done very ill in making that agreement among Men, which is exprefled by Compacts, to be fo artificial, as it muft be quite oppofed to what is natural.

I fhall not indeed deny, thofe words by which Compacts are exprefled, to have proceeded from the Arbitrary agreements of Men : Yet thatconfent of their minds, concerning the mutual Offices of Benevolence, of which words are only the figns, is altogether Natural: For in that content of minds concerning the mutual commutation of Duties, confifts the whole Nature of Compacts; as all its obligation proceeds from thence: But the knowledg and will of confthuting fome figns, either by Words or Actions, whereby this fort of Confent may be declared, is fo natural, and eafie to Men, without any Teaching, that it may be obferved in perfons born Deaf and Dumb ; as I have given fome inftances in the foregoing Dif-courfe. In fhort, this Confent exprefs'd by Compacts, concerning thefe moft general acts ofBenevolence,which may be confidered in any difquifition concerning the Laws of nature, is either not to be called Artificial, or if it be fo termed .that Term is fo to be under-

ftood,as it agrees with all Men's naturalCon-fents, and not as it may be oppoied to them; that fb it may become thereby lefs firm and durable, as Mr. H. fuppofes it. For the figni-ficationof a natural Confent, conftituted by words, tho' with fome kind of Art, doth not at all diminifh its firmnefs or duration ; and therefore I think it doth fufficiently appear, that Mr. H. is very much miftaken, when he fuppofes that the agreement of Brutes of the fame kind is more conftant and natu* ral than that among Men; and that Men's natural Propenfions to a Benevolence towards others, are not fo ftrong in Men, as in other Animals: So that I fhall leave it to the impartial Reader, whether upon a due confide-ration of his Anfwers, and our Replies, he will conclude, as this Author doth in his Treatife^ Hw«/V^,criap.io. That Men do exceed Wolves, Bears, and Serpents, in Cruelty and Rapacity, who are not rapaciott* beyond hunger ; which if he had affirmed of fome Men who are degenerated from all fentiments of humanity, had not been much amifs ; but to affirm it of all Mankind in general, is too fevere and falfe a cenfure to be let pafs: Whereas it muft be, at the worir, acknowledged, That no general Propofitions can be made, concerning the particular Paffions and Humours of all Men j fince there is not only

a greater difference of Wit,but alfo a greater variety of Paffions and Inclinations amongft Men,than Brutes; and that not only among whole Nations, but particular perfons : For all the kinds of Brutes have almoft the like Inclinations, and are governed by the like paffions and appetites ; fo that if you know one of them, you almoft know them all. put in Mankind, fo many Men, fo many Minds, and fo many almoft feveral Humours and Difpofitions : And which is more, the lame Man doth not only differ from others, but alfb oftentimes from himfelf; and that which at one time he mightily loves and approves of,at another he abhors and condemns.

§. 16. Yet fo much I {hall grant Mr. H. That Men are tormented with many Paflions unknown to Brutes, fuch as are Covetouf-oefs, Ambition, Vain-glory, Envy, Emulation, or Strife of Wit, with theSenfe of which, Brutes are not at all concerned; all which I confefs,do extremely hinder Men's natural Peace and Concord : So on the other fide, he hath not only feveral other Paflions, that as ftrongly perfwade him to feek and ob-ferve them, yet God hath alfo endued him with Reafon,whereby from the confideration of his own Nature,and of other things,hemay attain a knowledg of his Deity, and be there-

by led to difcover, that all the Laws of Nature are not only bare diftates of Reafon, but are alfo Laws truly eftablifhed by the Will of God the Legislator, for his, own Honour, and the Happinefs and Prefervati-on of Mankind. But fo far I fhall agree, with Mr. Hthat in any Country,where Men live without any knowledg of a Law, either natural or reveal'd, there,where ever it is, they are in as bad an eftate, if not worfe, than Brutes can be imagined to be.

§. 17. To conclude^ I cannot but take no-tic^ that Mr. H's. Hypothefis laboursunder thefe great Abfurdities. Firft, Hefuppofes that in the State of Nature a Man's Reafon tells him, that his Self-prefervation cannot be obtained without this War againft all Men ; but afterwards his experience making him fenfible of the fatal Evils and Mifchiefs which proceed from this kind of Life, he by his reafon found out,and then propoled thole Conditions of Peace, called Laws of Nature, in order to his own Happinefs and Self-prefervation, ; as if Right Reafon could ever dictate contradictory or oppofite means to this lame end,fuch as are a State of War, and a State of Peace; a negleft and violation of all the Laws of Nature, as lawful and neceffary for a Man's fafety in the State of Nature,and

a ftriftobfervation of them*when once entered intb a Civil State, for the fame de-fign.

Secondly, This Hypothefis is highly derogatory to the Goodnefs and Providence of God ; for if he were the Author and Creator of Mankind (as certainly he was,) then whoever believes this * Hypothefis, mull alfb believe that God contrived things fo ill, that unlels his Creatures had been more cunning and provident than himfelf, they muft of neceflity (like the Earth-born Brethren in OviePsMettntorphoJis) have perilhed by each others hands as foon as they were made. So that the preferva-tion and well-being of Mankind would be entirely attributed to their own Wit and Cunning, and not to God's Goodnefs or Providence, who muft have fent his Creatures into the World in fuch an evil ftate as {hould oblige them firft to feek their own mutual Ruin and Deftrudion, as the way to their Prefervation. So that Mankind muft owe all the happinefs and comfort of their Lives, not to their Creator, but themfelves: fince with him the Laws of Nature, whereby they are preferved,were not given or eftablifhed by God, their Legiflator, but are only fo many Rules of Art or human Wit, like other In-

Vid. Dr. Parker'* Eecleftjijtial Polly, Chap. 4. p. 126,127*

ventions of Men's contriving, and ftill fup-. pofe Man to be departed from that Natural Irate of War in which God put him, into an Artificial one of Peace of his own ihaking.But certainly the Deity that rnade us (if we fup-pofe him Good and Wife) made us hot to be1 miferable, as Mr. H. himfelf confefjes we ihuft have been, had we continued in this ftate of War. So that to fuppofe God made us, and left us in that condition, it is directly to deny our Creator's Goodnefs. And then if we fuppofe him Wife, we cannot imagine that he Would frame a fort of Creatures only to deftroy themfeives, unlefs we can believe his Sole defign wastofpcrt himlelf in their folly and madtiefs, ifl beho'd ng them by all the ways and arts bf Force and Fraud contriving their own mutual Deliruftion. And therefore if the Creation of Man were the produft of the Divirie Wifdoth anc! Goodnefs, his Natural State miiii have Been that bf Peace, and not fuch a Condition as tliat which this Author fuppofes.

Laftljr Mr. H. doth himfelf ihgenioufly confefs, that he believes there was neves actually filch a ftate of War^ as he fuppdfes and delcribes : And therefore, tho I^grant it is both lawful and ufiial for natjjral PKilofo^ pliers, who nbt being able, riv0jgh the imbecility of our lutnldne Faci^ies,.tadif:6ver:

the true Nature and EfTences of Bodies, or o-ther Subftances, do therefore take a liberty to feign or fuppofe fuch an Hypothecs, as they think will bed luit with the nature of the things themfelves, of which they intend to treat; and from thence to frame a body of natural Philofophy, or Phyficks, as Arijtotle of old, and Monfieur det Cartes, in our age have performed : Yet can we not allow the fame liberty inMoralorPraftical Philofophy, as in Speculative. And therefore fuch a precarious Hypothefis, as this of a natural ftate of War, is by no means to be admitted as the neceflary confequence of that natural Right, which every Man hath to preferve himfelf: For whether we con fider Mankind to have been together with the world, generated from all Eternity, as Aripotle, and the more modern PUtomfs did believe ; or elfe to have fprung out of the Earth like Mufh-rooms, as Epicurus of old, and Mr. H. in his De Cive fuppofe ; or elfe as we, according (to the Divine Revelation of the holy Scriptures, do believe, That Mankind, was at firft propagated from one Man, and one Woman, created for that purpofe by God: Now let us at prefent fuppofe whichofthefewepleafe to be the true Original ofmankind,we cannot from thence with any Reafon conclude,that there was at any time fuch a ftate of War of

all Men againftall; for if, according to 4:fie firft Hypothefis, we fuppofe .Mankind to bp Eternal, they were likewife from all Eternity propagated by diftin£t Families,and divided into feverat Nations, and Commonwealths, as they are at this day. But if it be objected, that, thofe diftinft Nations or Commonwealths, were always fuch. from all Eternity ; Then it will likewife follow^ that they "were alfo from all Eternity in the fame ftate they now are ; that is, not cf War,but Peace. But we fhall further fhew the abfurdity of this Suppofition, before we have concluded our Confiderations upon this Head. So, on the other fide, if we proceed upon the Epicurean Hypothefis^ of Mankind's Springing out of the Earth ; if we do hot like\vife fuppofe them to have been made like Game-Cocks, or thofe Earth-born Meti I have already mentioned,who prefently fefl a fighting and deftroying each other without any Caufe, it will not do the bufinefs: And therefore let us now with.Mr. H fuppofe thefeMen, to be all made of equal ftrerigthj both of body and mind ; it is plain, that they muft be at firft in a ftate of Peace, before they could ever fall together by the Ears; ibthen the ftate of Peace was Prior in Nature td that of War^ jirid alfo nio're agreeable td Hu'ntajrt Nature;

izdfy, Suppofing thefe Earth-born Men ro have been all Rational Creatures,and equal in ftrength and cunning, they would never have entered into a ftate of War, and have fallen to cut each other's Throat's without fomejuft Caufe, or Provocation firft given. For if they were all equal, every Man would confider each of his Fellows as of a like ability with himfelf; and that if he ftruck him firft without any caufe, he would be as well abletorefift, and make his party good with him, as he could be to hurt him; the fear of which would have rather caufed Peace than War: Since whoever ftruck firft, could not be fure of the Vi&ory; And if any two fhould have fallen to Cuffs, this could be no Reafon for all the reft to have alfo fallen together by the Ears, (ince there was no caufe why they fliould fuppofe a Will or Inclination in each other to War, till they had exprefled it by fbme outward figns: fo that this natural E-quality among Men,and mutual fear ot each other,\vhich Mr. H fuppofes to be the chief Oufes of War, would certainly have rather inclined thefe Men to Peace.

But if we follow the Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures, it is then certain, That all Mankind being derived from one Man, and one Woman,their Children could never be in this ftate of War towards their Parents,

by Mr. /Ts own confeflion; much lefs could the Parents ever be ibunnatural towards their Children, who were made out of their own Subftance ; nor yet could the Brothers, or Sifters, who partake of the fame Human Nature derived from their Common Parents,ancl who were bred up together from their Infancy in a ftate of Peace and Amity, be rationally fuppofed prefently to have fallen together by the ears without any other caufe, or provocation given, than Mr. HJs Paflions of mu» tualdiftruft, and defire of glory : Therefore when after the Fall of -^£w,Man's Nature was degenerated into that ftate we now find it, wherein Men's Paflions, I own, do too often domineer over their Reafon ; and that Cw0,through Malice and Envy,flew his Bro-ther, as we read in Genefis^ as it is the firft Example of Man's Degeneracy, fo it is alfo of God's diilike, and punifliment of tnis cruel Sin of Murther, which is indeed but the effect of this Author's ftate of War.

But I beg the Reader's pardon if I have been too prolix in the confutation of this Principle ; this being the main foundation of all thpfe Evil andFalfe Opinions contained in this Author's Moral and Political Works: if therefore this is throughly deftroyed, all that is built upon it will fall of it felf. But fince Mr. //, hath by his Suppofition Of certain

Compactor Covenants,undertaken to fheW; a Method bowMen/got out of this wretched ftate of War> let us fee whether his next Principle: will anfwer the Defigns he pro-pofes.


4* I. That mutual. Compafis of Fidelity in the: ' State* ofNkture, Are void, but not fo in A Com^ zwamvealth.

WHich Principle he expreflbs and proves at large , in his de Cm?,, ifc'thefe words 1: 'But thofe Covenants that are mAfa fyContffifffyvrbere there is A mutuAl Truft^ i&ither :pariy ferfawing Any. thing prefently in tfidftate of Nature, tf Any juft Fear Jhall arife 0& either fide^ Art void. For he who fir ft perform^ fotaufe of the full difyofltion of. the great eft part of Men, only (IMying.isJjeir ownprofi^ no matter whetbet. by right(Vt wrong; betrays himfilf to thvluft of him with whom 'he contracts : For tfaerei is.no xeajbx that.any Man-jkou Id per form foftr tfi* 'be not likely that the other will perform sftmVAtdf ; \ivh>ich Whether it be4ikely or not\ he Tffhafears^mttftjifdgeyasit is jheivn' in the former Chapter, Art 9;-J-'fiy, lthings< Are thus in tbs flats of nature *'but in \A QVuil ft ate. where

J J f J " _

there if one who can comfel them both, he who by Contract is frtt to perform, ought frft to do it. For finct the other may be compelled, the reafott ceafes, for which he feared the other would not perform.

Which Principle is fomewhat otherwife expreffed in i^his Lev. chap. 14. and fince it differs from the other, in the manner of expreffion,! fhall likewifegive it you in his own words. If a Covenant be made wherein neither of the Parties perform prefently, but tr a ft one another, in the condition of mere Nature (which u a condition of War of every man again ft every man) upon any reasonable fuppoption, it if void ; but if there be a common Power fet over them both, with right and force fufficient to compel performance, it it not void \for he that per-formethfirft, hath no affurance the other will perform afterwards , beciufi the mere bonds of words are too weak to bridle Men's Ambit ion, A-varice, Anger, and other Pajfions, without the fear offome coercive Power, (which in the condition of mere Nature, where all Men are equal, and judges of the juftnefs of their own fears,cannot pofKbly be Cuppofed) : and he which performs

* «^ J L i J * ' L J

frft, doth but betray himfelf to his enemy, contrary to the Ripht (he can never abandon} vf

j r j> j � i-9 j f r � J J

dejending bis life, and means of living*

§. 2, You may now more plainly fee the reafon why he fuppofes in the foregoing Chapter, That all Kings and perfbns of Sovereign Authority, are always in a pofture, or ftate of War; which he more plainly ex-prefles in his de Cive, chap. 10. §. 17. in thefe words ; But what are divers Commonwealths, but (b many Garrifons fortified again ft each other with Arms And Ammunition ? Whofe State,be* caufe they are kept in awe by no common Power.

r n ' �

(attho* a,n uncertain Peace, or jbort Truces, max intervene) is yet to be accounted for the ft ate of Nature, that is, for a ft ate of War. From all which it is eafie to deduce the grievous mi£ chiefs that would thereby happen to mankind. For in the firft place thefe Civil Sovereigns he mentions, can never be obliged by any Covenants from making War upon, and ruining each other, nor can be accufed for breach of Faith, or Infidelity, when they do fo; for being ftill in the ftate of Nature, that will neceffarily follow, which he lays down at the end of his former Chapter, as the con-fequencesofthis flate: To this War of every

�*'./» ' i � ir � r

man againjt every man, this aljo is conjequent, that nothing can be unjuft. The notions of Right and Wrong, tyftice and Injuftice, have there na place ; where there is m common Power^ there is no Law ; where no Law, no Jnjuftice. Force and Fraud Are in W*r the two CardinalVertues.

§. $. So that you fee upon thefe Principles it is altogether in vain for Princes to make any Articles or Covenants of Paace with each other; no, not if they fwear to them never fo folemnly ; for in thelaft words of this Chapter he tells u$, That the Oath adds nothing to the Obligation; for a Covenant, if lawful, binds in the fight of God, without the Oath, as much as wit hit j if unlawful, binds not at att, tbo it be confirmed with an Oath: So that if the Covenant could not oblige, the Oath will ferve to as little purpofe: What Princes will thank him for this Doftrine, I know not; but I hope it is not an Apology fpr the late aftions of any Princes but the Ot-ton^an Emperor, and our Chriftian Grand Segnior on the other fide the water. But if the ftate of Princes toward/ each other is (b bad, that of the Subjects is rnuch worfe; for from thefe Principles the fafety of all Ambaf-fadors, Merchants, and Travellers in the Territories of any Prince or State with whom we are at Peace, is thereby utterly taken away; nor can the Subjects be in a better condition than their Matters ; for by this Author's determination, they are prefent-ly Enemies as foon as they come under 3. Foreign Power : for fuch Princes being always in the ftate of Nature towards each other, jt is apart of their Natural Right or

Prerogative, to force allthofe that are weaker to give a Caution of their future Obedience (and good behaviour) unlefs they will rather fuf-fer Death. For nothing can be imagined more abfurd) than that he who being weak you have inyourfoweryby letting him go, you may render both firong) and your Enemy. All which are his own words, in his De Cive, Cap. ir §. 14. Norcanlunderftand what he means by a Caution of future Obedience, but the Submiflionof thoie who are thus feized upon, and their coming into the fame Cbm-monwealth,andfubjefting themfetves wholy to their Empire,whothus lay hold on them: For he tells us prefently after, That a certain Andirreftfiible Power confers a Right of Govern* ing and Ruling ihofe, who cannot refft it. So that if this Do£lrine be true, in what ,an ill condition are AmbaflTdors, and othei/ Strangers in foreign Countries now atLeague; withusjanyohemay eafily perceive. Well, but fuppofe fueh Strangers could, or would fubmit themfelves abfolutely to t hefeForeign Powers,1 they may yet chufe whether they will accept itj fince no Law of Nature,, ac-coi'ding'tdMr.H's Principles, can oblige Foreigners to r£ny outward Afts of Kitidnel^ or Mercy towards others, who are not of the farn?: C-ornrnon^wearthyfince they may either accent oifsis theirSubmiffi.on.or elle refiife it:

and put them to Death; tho otherwife never fo innocent.

§. 4. But if Cbmpa&s with thole of different Commonwealths, whether Princes or Subjefts, are of fo little force, let us fee whether they will fignify any more among thofe,' who having agreed to renounce this State of Nature, are willing to transfer all their Power upon one, or more Perfbns, and fo enter into his Corpnipnwealth. Where, //�//, I defire you to obferve,, that thefe feels or Covenants, by which every Man renounces his Natural Right, are ftill made in the State of Nature, in which State, it is lawful for any Man to doubt of another's Fidelity; but whether a Man Juftly fears that, another will not perform his part^ he that fears, is the only Judge ; and'therefore Mr. H. concludes, that every Man hath caufe to fear, whenever he is afraid. Which reafbhj if it were of any force, would infer, that not only thole Compacts are invalid, in which nothing is perform'd on either part; but alfo thofe in which any thing of any moment remains yet to be done by either Party ; for he who will not keep Fdith any longer, may when he pleafes pretend,to be afraid, left the other fliould break 'his Faith with him, and that very juffly. whilft he himfelf is the

only Judge of it; and therefore hisRcafon (which is always fuppofed to be right) may not only tell him, that he need not perform his part of the Covenant, but alfo that it is abfolutely void, if he thinks fit to make it fo, But if any one will fay, that he himfelf hath prevented this Objection by his Annotation to this Article;as alfo in his Lev. in this Chap, That the Caufe of fear, which makes fitch 4 Co-�venant invalid^ mttfl be ah Ays fomething art" fag after the Covenant made, as fomenewfaft) or other fgn of the WiV, not to ferfom, elfe it cannot make the Covenant void. For that which could not hinder a Man from fromifing, ought not to be admitted as an hindrance of performing. All which, tho it be very true, yet if what he hath already alledged in his foregoing Section be alfo true, it will not fignify any thing; becaufe he there tells us, that whether it is likely that he will perform, or not, he who is afraid, is the only Judge,(right or wrong, it is all one) and therefore this fear of another Man's failing in his truft, may either arife from his calling to mind the falfe and evil Difpofition of all Men, which before the Compact he had not well confidered, ,or elfe he may fuppofe any Aft of the other Parties (tho never fo innocent) to be a fufficient fign of his Will not to perform his part. Nor is there any thing in the Sta.te

of Nature,which can make fuch a timorous Man fecure of the Fidelity of others, for the performance of their Compact ; becaufe as Mr. H tells us in his De Cive, Cap. 5. §. i, 2.Cap. 7. §. 27. AH the hope ofjecurtiy if placed, in that a Man may prevent aH others, either openly, or byfurprife. So, that altho it appears that the Utility of obierving of Compacts be never fo manifcft, yet cannot it by this Principle lay any firm Obligation upon Men's minds,but that they may depart, from them, whenever they will neglect or overfeethis Utility, or that they think they may better fecure their own Intereft by any other means; fincethe Will and Confcience of Man can never be fo obliged by their naked Compacts, that they may not depart from, or ad contrary to them, whenfoever they think they may fafely, and for their own private advantage do it. For the Obligation will not only ceafe, if it fhall pleafc all thofe who have fo covenanted to depart from their Covenants at once, as when Men difcharge themfelves of them by mutual con-fent : But iuppofing this confent ftill to con-tinue,theforce of an Obligation will however be wanting; forfince that dictate of Rcafon of keeping Compacts, has not as yet attained the force of a Law, as being made (as I have already obterved) in the meerftateof

Nature ; any fingle Perfpn, according to his particular Hurnbiir, or predotninant Paf-fionof Fear, or Sufpicion, or Self-inter eft, may depart froth this diftate of Reafoii, tho the reft dp hot agree fo to do; becaufe no Man according to Mr.H in the Law of Na-ture#ah ever be tied by any Cbmj5a& to quit the doing of that which he judges neceuary for his own Intereft, br Self-defence. For in the very beginning of this i4th Chapter in his .'Lev. he defines a Law of Nature to be a Precept ^.or general Rule found out by Reafon, by which A Man is for bidden to do that which is deftrucfive of his Life, or takes away the means of preferring the jame^ and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be beft preferred. So that for the prefervation of a Man's life, or whenever bethinks thofe Compacts may take away the means of preferving it, he may without crime fail in keeping his Com-paas either for Publick Peace, or the bb(er-vation of Juftice with his Fellow-fubjefts,or of Fidelity, or of Obedience to his Civil Sovereign ; who upon thefe Principles, is in no better a condition, nor fo good, as any of his Subjects: Becaufe Mr. H. doth not allow in his Leviathan, Cap. 18. of any compacts to be made between the Sovereign, and the Subjects; who only Covenant one with the other, and not with him, to give up their

right of governing themfelves to this Man, or Affembly of Men,and that they do thereby authorize all his Aftions-Sothat fince this Compact is made in the ftate of Nature, and that this Law of keeping of Compa&s, is only a dictate of Reafon, and no Law; it can lay no higher obligation upon Men'sConfci-ences in the ftate of Nature, than any other Law of Nature,which Mr.H. plainly tells us Chap. 17 .In the ftate of Nature do not oeligemor can the Common Power fet over Men, lay any obligation in Confcience upon them,why they (hould not break thefe Compacts towards each other, when ever they think it convenient:For fince the Civil Sovereign can only oblige them to its outward obfervation by thofe Punifliments which he is pleafed to appoint for fuch offences as are deftruftive to the Publick Peace,every Man that will venture the fear of difcovery, or being taken, or whenever he thinks he can make a Party ftrong enough to defend himfelf from thofe that would punifh him for the breach oPerri ; may fafely, nay lawfully, tranfgrefs them, when-ever the awe,or fear of the Civil Sovereign ceafes. So that it is evident there doth ftill need fome higher Law,or Principle than this of meer Fear of theCivil Power, to make Men honefr, or to keep their Compacts when they have made them.

§. $. To Conclude, Mr. H. doth far ex-* ceed his Matter Epicurus in this rarb invention ; for that old Fellow, one would think, had fufficiently fhaken the foundation^ of all common Peace, and Juftice, when he laid down in his ratis fsntentiis or eftablifhed dictates, That there is no fetch thing to Jo/lice between thofe Naticns who either could not, or would not enter into mutual Covenants that they fbould not hurt, or be hun byeatk other ; Yet however, he thought fit to leave the force of thofe Compacts unviolated,although there was no common Power over them, which might keep thofe Nations in awe. But Mr. H. that he might indulge as much as he could to his darling paflion of Fear, hath alfo allowed Men this Liberty, That in the ftate of Nature, Compacts of mutual Fidelity maj by right be violated, without any otlur caufe given,than the fear of fufp'.don of the Party afraid.

VideDiog. Laert. in vita Epicuri.


the LAW of Nature is not properly A Law, un* lefs as it is delivered in the Holy Scriptures.

§. i. T T THich Principle he endeavours to VV pro vein his DeCive Cap. J. Art. the loft, in thefe words : But thofe that we call Laws of Nature, being nothing elfe but certain fdnclupons under food, by reajon concerning the doing of things; (whereas a Law, properly and accurately {peaking, is the word of him that commands Jomething to be done, or not done by Others); they are not Laws, proper lyfpeaking, as they proceed from Nature : Yet as far as they are given by God in the Holy Scripture, they are properly called by the name of Laws; Which likewife he hath giverilus by another turn in his Levia^ tha#,Ca$. 15. in thefe words : Thefe diftates ofReafon, Men ufe to call by the Name of Laws, but improperly, for they are but Conclusions, or Theorems concerning what conduceth t& the con-Jervation and defence of themfelves ; whereas Law properly is the word of him, that by right hath a commandwer other Si But yet if we con-fider the fame Theorems as delivered in the word of God, that by Right commands all things, theii are they properly called Laws.

§. 2. The Reafon for which opinion he

give us in his De Cive Cap.^, $. i, 2,3. in thefe

words ; /f isfelf-manife/, that the aflicns of

Men do Proceed from their Will, and their Will

from Hope and Tear : So that as often as it

feems, that a greater Good, or lefsEvil is like

to happen to them , from the violation of

Laws, Men willingly violate them ; therefore

every Man's hcpe cf ' fecuritj and prefer-

vation' is placed in this, that he may be able to

prevent his Neighbour either by his own force or

arty openly or at unawares. From whence it is

flainy that the Laws of Nature do not prefently^

fofoon as they are known, give ffifficient fecurity

to every one^ of obfervittg them ; and therefore

fo long O'S no c.iution can be obtained from the In-

vafionof others, that Primitive Right muff ill

remain to every one, of taking dire of himfelf

by all the ways that he will, or can ; which is the

Right of all Men, to all thine s. or the Rivht of

1X7- i � r ff r ° 'i c ,,-n- ,-

War ; and it fuffices for the ji{ljilling of the Law of Nature, that any one jhould be ready or willing to have Peace when it may be had with fecurity.

§. 5. So likewife in his Leviathan, Chap. 14. tho he grants that the Laws of Nature ought to be obferved, yet becaufe they are contrary to our Natural Paffiotts^ that carry m to Partiality, Pridet Revenge, and the like and their Cove-

nants without the Sword, are but Words, and

have no ftrength to fecure a Man at all; there'

fore, .notwithstanding the Laws cf Nature, if

there be no Power erecied, or not great enough

for our. fecurity, every Man will, and maylAVf-

fully rely on his own Strength and Art,for caution

agdinjl all other Men. And in his 15th. Chap.

of his Leviathan^ farther tells us, The Laws.

of Nature oblige in foro interne, that is to fay 9

they bind to a defire that they foould takeplace:But

in foro exterho, that it, to the putting them in

AEt, not always. For he that fbould be modeft

and tr affable, and perform all he promifes infuch

time, and f lace, where no Man clfe would do fo,

fbould but make himfelf a Prey to others, and

procure his own certain Ruin, contrary to the

ground of all the Laws of Nature, which tend

to Nature's Prefervation.

§. 4. I have been the larger in giving you his own words in this place, becaufe I could not well contract them without fpoiling his Senfe ; andalfo that you may the better fee whether he be clearly anfwered, or not. In the Firft place therefore , if it be already made out in the precedent Difcourfe, that in this Proposition of endeavouring the Common Good of Rational Beings, are contained all the Laws of Nature, and that it doth like-^ife appear to proceed from God, from the

Nature of things, and thofe Rewards and Punilhments he hath annexed to its obfervati-on or tranfgreflion : Then notwithstanding what Mr. H hath here faid,this Law of Nature is properly a Law ; as having all the conditions neceflary thereunto ; But that which might lead Mr. H into this Error, was, That all Writers u'pon this Subject, thought it fufficient to define the Law of Nature to be only a Diftate of right Reafon, without deducing its Authority from God, as a Legiflator : Or if they have fuppofed God the Author of it, as Suarez'm his Book de LegikiM; and Grotius in his de 'Jure Belli & paw have done, Yet they contented them-felves with fuppofing,that God had imprefs'd thefe idea's upon Men's Souls, as fo many innate Notions, which they call the Light of Nature, without (hewing us by fome more plain or certain means (as our Author hath done in the preceding Difcourfe) how we may attain to the knowledge of this Law. The weaknefs, or pecarioufnefs of which Hypothefis being difcovered by Mr. H. gave him occafion to luppofe that the Law of Nature \vasnot properly a Law, for want of a Legiflator; and farther, they having defined this Law of Nature to be a ditfate of right Reafon, which feemsonly proper to revealed or Civil Laws, delivered in fome fet form of

words, Mr. H hath here alfo defined a Law, To be the Word, or Speech of him who hath a, Right to Command A thing to be done, or not to be done: And fp the Laws of Nature, not being delivered in any fee form of Words, cannot be upon thefe grounds properly Laws.

§. 5. But I think we have already fuffici-ently proved, that the Law of Nature, being to be collected from our own Natures, and that of other things without us,does not con-fiil in any fet form of Words, but in thofe true Notions or Idea's taken from the things themfelves : And we have already fhewn, thatPerfons born deaf and dumb,are capable of underftanding this Law, though they have not the ufe of Words. And Mr. A himfelf before he is aware, doth Sufficiently confefs this Truth in more places than one of fas tie Give. For after he hath in the laft Art. of his Third Chap, denied the Laws of Nature to be properly Laws, he begins his yh. Chap, with thefe Words,

That which is called the Natural, and Moral, the fame # wont to be alfo caHed the Divine Law, nor undefervedly ; becaufe Reafon, wbith » the very Law of Nature, is immediately given by God to every Man, as the Rule of his Aftions; jts aljb becaufe the Precepts of Life which are

thence derived, ate the fame which are given by tke Divine Majepyfor the Laws of his Heaven-lj Kjngdom by vur Lord Jefw Chrift, itnd his Holy Afo'ftles. Thofe things therefore which may be before underftood by Reafon concerning the Law of Nature, the fame we ft^ll endeavour to confrm from the Holy Scripture.' So like wife in his iyb. Chap. Article 3. he tells us, Tk*t the Laws'of God are declared after a Threefold manner. The- Fir ft of which is by the Tt.ctt Dictates of Right Reafon : From both which places we may plainly collec1:,T'te if the LAWS of Nature are Dictates of Right Rwfon, and if the Laws of God and Nature, or Reajon, are all one and the fame, and that Right Reafon is the very Law of Nature, and is immediately given by God to every Man as a Rule of his Actions; it Witt likewife an neceffarily follow, that thofe LAWS or Dictates of Reafon are a/jo Divine, fynce they proceedfrom God as A Legi/l.ttor. Nor will it ferve his "turn to alledg, as he doth in his Leviathan 15. Chap, lhat the JAMB Laws (viz.") of Nature, bectiufe they oblige only to a define, aad endeavour (I mean an unfeigned and conttant Endeavour) at e eafy to be obferved; For in that he r-eqiiireth nothing but endeavour. He thatendpavcirreth their performance as far as he can,hath really performedthemj And he that fulfiileth the Law, is juft.

§, 6. This will prove a meer Evafion, if you pleafeto confider, That unlefs the Laws of Nature regard the outward Actions of Men, they cannot partake of the nature'of Laws,nor do they carry any obligations along with them, becaufe it is impoflible to feek Peace with others, or to depart from our natural Rights by any internal Aft of the Mind alone,without outward A£tions;and moft of thofe Actions do in their own nature neceffa-rily regard, and concern others befides our felves. But if he fhould reply, that fuch Actions are improperly called Laws,for want of Rewards and Punifliments: To this we may likewife return, That we have already fully proved in this Difcourfe,that they carry with them the true force, of Laws, as containing all the Conditions neceffary thereunto. Andhehimfelfinhis Leviathan, chap. 21. doth exprefly acknowledge, and fet down divers of thofe natural Punifbments which are appointed by God as natural eflfeds of the TranfgrefTion, or breach of the Law of Na-tujec Which PaiTage, becaufe I have already tranlcribed it in the Difcourfe it felf,Ghap.j. I fhali therefore refer you thither. But in fhortj If there be no Laws of Nature properly fo called,in the (late of Nature, it will then likewife "neceflarily follow, that there no fuch thing as Natural Rights properly fo

called ; And fo his Right of all Men to all things, and to make War upon all Men, will be very improperly called a Right; for they cannot be properly fo, but as they are granted,or permitted tous,by fome Laws properly ipcalled,which in this ftate can only be thofe of God, or Nature,

§. 7. But we are weary pf {uch Contra-cli&ons, therefore let us now proceed to examine the only Reafon he brings why he denies the obligation to external A&s in the ftate of Nature, ('viz,.) Becaufe we cannot be fecund that others will obferve them in thofe things which are ntceffary to our prefervation ; [and therefore infers] that every Matfs hopes of his own Security are placed $» this. That by his anon Force or Wiles he may prevent his Neighbour openly, or at unawares. This is that invincible Argument which feems ftrong e-jiough in his Judgment to deftroy all outward Obligations to the whole Lav? of Nature. Yet I think for all that, it is eafy enough to be anfwered. And therefore in the firft place, I fay, That there is no need of fup-pofing fuch a perfect Security to be afforded by the Laws of Nature concerning other Men's obferving them, as muft needs be free from all Fear, before we can be obliged to external A&ions conformable to them ; for

the Will ofGod,the firft Caufe,being known, whereby he eftabliflies thefe Laws, there will arife a certain obligation to the performance of fuch external Actions; though fome Men may be fo wicked, as to break, ornegle& them, and to praftice evil and violent Actions towards thofe that would obfervethem. But I fhall now farther prove (notwith-ftanding thisObje&ion) that we are under a greater obligation to the Laws of Nature, than we are to the Civil Laws of our Coun-try,to whofe external obedience he will have all Men whatfoever obliged. For all Perfbns, although they are not under the lame Commonwealth, yet are all Members of the fame more large Empire of God himfelf. Now it is moil notorious, that thofe that are Subjects to the fame Civil Power, cannot be perfectly fecure, either that their Fellow-fubje£b will obferve all the Civil Laws,by abftaining from Murther, Robbery, or Rebellion, &c. or that the Civil Sovereign can, or will always punifh all thcTranfgreffors of his Laws, efpecially where Factions are potent or Pardons prove eafy to be obtained by Money or Favour, though he is never fo watchful over the Publick Good. So that if to thefe cautious Men of Mr. HV Principles, it feems a fufficient Reafon for their outward obligation to the Civil Laws, that it appears more

probable that the Civil Sovereign both will & can take care of the Authority of his Laws, by protecting theObedient,and punifhing the Refra&ory$ thari that he will forbear, or negleft fo to do ; it will likewife follow, That to all Men who exercife true Piety, and Obedience t6 God's Natural Laws, their obligation to obferve them will not prove the more infirm, though God doth not always prefently, and immediately punilh all the Tranlgreffions and'Violations of his Natural Laws;it being a fufficient fecurity to them of his Goodnefs and Juftice; fmce he will certainly inflift more fevere Puniftiments upon their Tranfgreflbrs, either in this life, or in that to come, than any Humane Power can do upon Offenders again ft their Civil Laws. So that if Mr, H's Argument were valid, not only the outward obligation of all Natural, but alfo of all Civil Laws, would be quite deitroyed ; becaufe in neither State we can be perfectly fecure,that all others will obferve them : and indeed he demands that which is altogether impofli-ble, when -he requires an abfolute and per-feft Security concerning future voluntary Actions, either in a Civil, or a Natural State ; which as fuch can be only contingent.

§. 8. But if he will permit us to call ,1 at a State of fecurity, which is the moft .. e of any from the fear of future Danger, or Mifery9we aflert, That God has made it ma-nifeft to all Men, by all thofe figns, (which we have already fhewn to be fufficient to evince our Obligation) that even out of a Civil Goverment, he fhall be much more fafe from all forts of Evil, who fhall moft ftricTily and conftantly obferve all the Laws of Nature in his outward Actions, as well as internal Inclinations, than he who (according to Mr. -fifs Doftrine) fhall feek this Security by endeavouring to prevent, and aiTault all other Men by force or fraud.

But it is necefTary5when we compare the dangers, or fecurity of good or juft Men, (which are only thofe who obferve the Laws of Nature in their outward Actions) as alib of the wicked or unjuft, who dp otherwife, to make a true Experiment^ which of thefe will give moft certain fecurity ; there is not only to be reckoned into this account , thofe Evils which may happen to them from the Violence of other Men,but al-fo thofe, which fuch wicked Men bring upon thcmfelves by their inconftant and unreafon-able way of living,as alfo by their inordinate

Paffions, fuch as Envy, Anger, Intemperance, rf*. and moreover, all thofe Evils, or Punifhments, which may with reafon be feared from God, both in this Life, and in that to come; which alfb are to be confidered not in any one particular cafe, or in a few circumftances only, but in all thofe that may happen through the whole courfe of their Lives; for otnerwife it is impoflible, thatweftiould truly judge which courfe of Life, either that or conftant Juftice or In-juftice would bemorefecure. But we have, I hope already, fufficiently made out, that their condition is much more happy and fe-cure,whoobferve the Laws of Nature in the whole courfe of their Aftions,than thofe who a& otherwife. ,

To which I fhall only add, That altho Mr. H. himfelf, when he treats of the fecu-rity requifite to the outward Obfervation of the Laws of Nature, doth wholly infift upon a perfect fecurity from the Invafion of other Men, and affirms, Becaufe it is not to be had in the State of Nature, that therefore no body is obliged in that State to outward a&s of Juftice, but hath ftill a Right to all things, and of making War upon all Men ; Yet in other places of his Book, as if he had forgot himfelf, he doth acknowledg (altho but fparingly) that he himfelf perceived that

there was a fufficient Obligation to an external Conformity to the Laws of Nature, even out of a Civil State, left we (hould fall into other Evils befides thofe which may be feared from the violence of Men. As for Example, when he endeavours to prove in his De Cive, CAP. $.§.2, $. That Faith is to t?g kept with all Men, he fetches his realbn from hence, That he who violates his Covenant, commits A Contradiction^ which he Acknowledges to be An Jlbfurdity in Humane Convention. And therefore, if he can admit in this cafe, that it is better to obferve, than to violate our Covenants, left we {hould fall into a Contradiction ; what reafon is there, why we ihould not alfo univerfally infer the fa me confequence from the breach of every Law of Nature, and confequently an Obligation to all their outward Actions ? Since whoever does fo, cannot avoid falling into as grofs a Contradiction or Abfurdity in Humane Society or Conversion; for whoever will ieri-oufly confider the Nature of rational Agents, will acknowledg, that all the Felicity pofli-ble for them, doth depend upon the Common Good and Happinefs of the whole" Syftem, as its necefTary and adequate Caufe; and therefore every Man ought to feek both of them together ; for whenfoever he tranfgrefTes any Law of Nature, he then

feparates his own private Good or Advantage, from that of the publick; which being contradictory ways of a&ing,muft needs raife a Civil War, or Conteft in a Man's own Confcience, between his Reafon, and his Paflions, which muft grievoufly difturb its Tranquility ; which Evil, fui.ce it aifo takes away his Peace and Security,is no contemptible Punifhment naturally inflifted by God for fuch Offences.

6. 9. I (hall now only propofe two Rea-fonsmore, whereby I think we may demon-ftrate the falfenefs of this Argument of Mr. H The firft is, That Preemption of the Civil Laws, both in our own, and all other Kingdoms, which fuiliciently declares what Judgment Civil Sovereigns � (whom this Author makes the only Judges of right or wrong) have made of Humane Nature; to wit, that every one is prefumed to be good, until the contrary be proved by fome outward Action, and that made out by fuffici-ent Proof or Teftimony ; and therefore, if their Judgment be true, he muft own all other Men ought not to be efteemed as Enemies, or fo wicked as he is pleafed to fup-pofe ; fo that they may be fet upon and killed, tho never fo innocent, for any private Man's fecurity. And this f refumption

is more ftrong againft Mr. H becaufe he founds that Security, which he acknowledges, to befufficient in Commonwealths, upon thofe Punifhments by which the Supreme Powers can reftrain all Invaders of other Men's Rights ; but it is certain, that no Punifhments are inflicted in Civil States, unlefs according to the Sentence of ibme Judges, who always give Sentence according to this Prefumption. This thefore is either a true Prefumption, and ib able to direftour Actions in the State of Nature, or elfe even in Commonwealths there is not to be found a fufficient fecurity by the Laws made, and Punifhments inflicted according to this Prefumption; and fo neither Civil Laws themfelves can oblige us to outward Afts, and thus every Commonwealth would foon be diifolved. But fince we are fatisfied, that publick Judgments given according to this Prefumption, do for the moft part render Men's Lives fecure enough, and certainly much more fafe, than if all who are arraigned at the Bar were prefumed to be Enemies, and according to Mr. //'s rule of prevention, fhould be all forthwith condemned to furFer as guilty ; therefore It alfo follows, that the private Judgments of particular Men concerning others, made according to this Prefumption, do more conduce to the fecurity

of all Men, than this Author's rafh Prefump* tionof the UniveHal Pravity of all Mcn,and would thence perfuade us that all others in the State of Nature are to be prevented, and fet upon by force and fraud.

$. ip. A fecond Reafon to prove, that the violation of the Laws of Nature, as to outward ads, will procure us lefs fecurity than their exad obfervation, may be drawn from hence, That Mr. H himielf confeues, there will thence neceflarily follow a War of all Men againft all; which War being once fup-pofed,he rightly acknowledges, that all Men would become miferable,and muft prefently perifh : From whence it appears, that all fecurity is fought for in vain, by this mad (late; lo that there can remain no more hopes of it; tho Mr. H. teaches otherwife in his de Cive, cap. 5. §. i. and Lev. cap. 13. viz. That in the mutual fear of Men, no boa} hath A better waj of 'fecurity, than by this anticipation or prevention ; that is^ every one may endea* vourfo long to fubjetf all others byforce or fraud, of he fees any Man left, of whom he ought to beware \ that is, fo long as there is one Man left alive; and fo the whole Earth would foon become a defarE,andthe common fepulchre ot Mankind; for no Man can provide any aid or afliftance for himfelf from Other Men

in this ftate, becaufe Covenants of mutual Faith, by which alone others can be joined in Society with him, will not oblige to external afts in this ftate, as I have ihown he acknowledges; and therefore there remains no fecurity by this way of anticipation : So that if there be any fecurity in Nature, I appeal to the Reafbns and Confciences of Men^ whether this is not more likely to be had by the endeavour of the common Good of Man-kind,by doing good and not evil to thofe who have done us no harm, than by Mr. H's method of Anticipation which can yield no fecurity at all.


That the LAWS of Nature are alterable at tfa Will of the Civil Sovereign,

§. i/T^His is a natural confequence frorn JL what he hath already laid down. That nothing is morally good or evil in the ftate of Nature, before the Inftitution of a Commonwealth. Yet that you may fee that I do not impofe upon Mr.Hin this AfTertion, I will give you his own words, in his de Give, cap. 14. §. 9, 10. But kecaufe it arifes from Givil Laws, that as mil every one fhould

have a froper Right to hint/elf, diftinft from that of another', as alfo that he may be forbidden to invade other Metfs Properties, it follows that ihefe Precepts, Honour thy Parents, Thou/halt wot defraud any Man in that which if appointed by the Laws ; Thou may eft not kill a Man whom the Laws forbid thee to kill ; Thou (halt avoid all Carnal Copulation forbidden by the Laws; Thou {halt not take away another Man*s Goods without hit confent; Thou /halt not fruftrate Laws and Judgments by falfe Witnefs, are all Civil Laws. It is true, the Laws of Nature f referibe the fame things, but implicitly ; for the Law of Nature, as is f aid before, Cap. 5.^. z.ccm-mands .Compatfs to be obferved; and therefore, Alfo to yield Obedience when Obedience was covenanted ; and to abftainfrom what is anothers, when it if defned by the Civil Law, what it is but all the Subjects do Covenant from the Confti-tution of the Commonwealth, to yield Obedience to his Commands, who hath the fupreme Power, that isyto the Civil Laws. For the Law of Nature did oblige in the ft ate of Nature* where frft of all Nature gave aH things to all Men, nothing was another s, and therefore impofftble to be invaded j and in the next place, where aH things were common ; therefore alfo all Carnal Copulations were lawful. Thirdly, Where there was a ft ate of War, it was then lawful to kill any Man. Fourthly, Where all things were

determined by A Man**s<mn Judgment, therefor6 *lfb toere the Honours and Duties due to Fathers. Laftly, Where there were no fublick 'Judgments, therefore there was no need of giving Teflimony either true or falfe ; finee there" fore the Obligation to obferve thofe Laws, is prior to the Promulgation of them* as being contained in the very conflitution of the Common-wealth,by vertue of thfc Law of 'Nature', which prohibits the violation of Compacts; the Lap of Nature commands all Civil Laws to be obfer-ved. For where we are under an Obligation to Obedience, before we know what will be commanded, we are there univerfally, and in alt things, obliged to obey; from whence it follows', That no Civil Law which is not made in ref roach to God, (in refpeft of whom, all Commonwealths are not at their own Difpofals, nor can be faid to give Laws}) cannot be againfl the Law of Nature. For altho the Law of Nature prohibits Theft) Adultery fec.Tet if the Civ.il Lawsfhould command you to take away any thing from another, or to lye with any Woman ; that is not Theft, Adultery, Sec. f or the Lacedemonians of old, when by a certain Law, they per-mitud their Boys privately to take away other peoples Goods; they then com manded thoje Goods not to be the Owners, but theirs who thus ftole them. And therefore fttch a private taking,wa* no Theft. Jn like manner, the promifcuous Co-

fulation of Sexes tmongft the Heathens, Ac-carding to their own Laws, were tawful Mar* riages.

§. 2. There is nothing that Mr. K hath written more crudely and wickedly, and wherein he ftiore contradids himfelf, than in this AlTertion, concerning the mutability oftheLaws of Nature,as tooutward Actions; fmce he himfelf tells us immediately after, That the -Laws of Nature are immutable ande-ternal; and that Injuftice, Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acceftion of Perfons, and the like, tan never be made lawful :for it can never be that WAY ft all preferve life, and Peace defroy it. But how the Laws of Nature ca n be immutable,and yet alterable as to outward Actions, at the Will of the Civil Sovereign, I cannot comprehend.

But fince we have already deftroyed thofe two main Principles intrpduftive to this, (T//-C.) That rid A£tlon is good or evil in the ftate of Nature, till either the revealed Law of God, prvthat:;oft:he Civil Sovereign hath made it fo; and alfo that tl>e Laws of N£r ture are not properly Laws in the ftate of Nature; Let us now exartiihe the only realbn he here gives us for this Aflertion, which is this ; That the Law of Nature which prohibits the violation of Compatfs, commands all Civil

LAWS to beobferved; f nee our Obedience to the Supreme Powers is one of thefrf Compacts that Me* made at thelnjtitution oftmCommonmalth^ granting all which to be true, j'et was it, not absolutely, or in all thingi, that this. Obedience was promifed, but only in fuch as regard the publick good of the Commonwealth, or tend to the common Good or Prefervation of Mankind ; for if the Civil Sovereign fhould make a Law, that every one might knock his Father on the Head, when he came to fuch an Age, and Marry his Mother, or rob any other Man, tho' his deareft Friend, of all the neceffaries of Life : All thefe wicked Actions would become lawful to be done, nay, every Man fhould be oblig'd to do them, if the Law of Nature commanded all Civil Laws to be ob-ferved without diftinftion; but he here tells us, That no Civil LAWS can be againft the LA& of Nature, which Are not made in direfl reproAch to God. And upon this Principle no Law can be fo, but what direftly denies his Exigence ; fince in his Leviathan, Gk-he makes even Idolatry lawful, if it be once commanded by his infallible Leviathan, the Supreme Power : But if Mr. H. had but read and eonfidered any ordinary ,Syftem of Ethicks, he would have found, that it was one of the

firft Principles iff that Science,that the Laws of Nature (like the Moral Vertues) are fo nearly linked^ and have fuch an infeparable dependance upon each other, that the fifft and prior Laws of Nature, can never be contradicted by the latter, orfecondary. And therefore, tho' it is true, that Compacts are tbbebbferved by the Law of Nature, and that Obedience to the Commands of the Civil Sovereigfijis one of thofe Compacts which Men make when they inftitute, and enter ihto a Commonwealth^ or Civil State; yet were thofe Promifes of Obedience only made concerning fuch things, which the Laws of Nature have commanded, or permitted to be done, in order to the common good of rational Beings. I grant therefore, That the Civil Laws of every Commonwealth , as they may appoint what outward Rewards or Punifhments they pleafe for the Obfervati-pn or Tranfgreffion of the Law of Nature; and alfb in order to this end may ordain what outward Afts fhall be called Murther, Adultery, Theft, &c. yet doth it not therefore follow, That they have a Power to alter the Nature of all Moral A&ions, and fo make a new Law of Nature ; tho' I own they may enlarge or reftrain their exercife in fome particular Aftions or Inftances. But fmce this is beft cleared by examples, I fliall here give

youfome of each fort. .F/r/?, Therefore tho' our Laws give leave to Men to converfe alone with Married Women without any Crime, yet in divers Countries it isnotfo; But whoever is found alone in the Company of another Man's Wife without his leave, it is lawful for the Husband to kill them both; becaufe,fuch private Congrefles being efteem-ed as Criminal as downright Adultery, the Punifhment of it is left as it was in the ftate of Nature, to the difcretionof the Husband: But doth it therefore follow, That the Supreme Power might make a Law, whereby it may be lawful fora Husband to kill every Man that fnould but happen to look upon his Wife, becaufe he may at the fame time commit Adultery with her in his heart? So likewife by our Law, the Husband is to be efteemed the Father of all Children which his Wife (hall bring forth, if he were within the Englifh Dominions at the time when the Child was begot, though he were at that fame time an hundred Miles off, and though the Mother fhould aflure the Child, that not her Husband, but another Man were really his Father; Yet is not fuch a Child obliged to believe her, or to pay any Duty or Refped to that Perfon, tho he be really his Father : But will it therefore follow, that the King and Parliament may make a

Law, That no Child whatfoever fhould honour and obey his Parents ? But to come to the Author's laft Inftance of the Lacedsmoni-An Boys; I will not deny butit might be lawful for the SpArtaw (as the Egyptians like wife did) to make a Law, that private Thefts committed without difcovery, or violence to Men's Perfons, (hould not only alter the Property in the things ftolen, but alfo pafs un-punifhed : fince this may very well confirt with the Publick Peace and Safety of the People, and may alfo tend to the Publick good of the Commonwealthibecaufe it might not only make Men more careful of their Goods, but might alfo ferve to make thole Boys more crafty, fecret, and undertaking in greater matters, when they fhould come to be Men ; which, as Plutarch tells us, was the main reafon why Licurgm made this Law: But docs it therefore follow, that either the Lacedemonians or Egyptians might have made it lawful for Thieves and Robbers to aiTault all Men's Perfons, and take away their Goods by Force, or to rob Men of thofe things (fuchi as Food and Rayment) which are abfolutely necelTary for Humane Life, or that fuch a Law could ever have been made practicable, or have been obferved, without the abfolute DifTolution of the Civil Government ? Whereas if Mr. Hobbs

had but confidered the Diftin&ion between that Natural and Civil Property, which we have, made out in the firft Chapter of the preceding Difcourfe, he had never fak len into this Errour, of fuppofjng all Theft or Robbery whatfoever to become Lawful, if once ordained fo by the Supreme Power.

§. 3.1 ftiall give you but one inftance more from the Laws of our own Kingdom, by which it is enafted, That whoever fhall relieve a way-going �*?**� 7-Jac.L Beggar, lhall forfeit Ten (hillings Caf'7' to the Poor of the Parifh ; which Law was made for thePublick Good, and to prevent Wandering, Idlenefs, and Beggary in th& Poorer fort of People. But doth it therefore follow, that it might be Lawful for the King and Parliament to make a Law againft all Charity, or Relief of the Poor whatfoever? So that you may fee, that no Civil Laws whatfoever, can lay any obligation upon Men's Confciences, but as they either regard the publick Good of the Commonwealth, or the more general good of all Rational Beings.

§. 4. But whether Mr.H fell into this Er* ror for want of a due knowledge and confide-ation of this great Law of Nature; or elfe

put of a defire to flatter all Civil Sovereigns, is hard to determine; though it be very fuf-pitious, that he did it rather out of defign than ignorance; fince he teaches us in his de C«v, *WLev. That Princes being free from All Promfes tnACompacJs to their Subje&s, may diffoje vf their Lives and Fortunes at their fleajure, avd therefore can do them no injury, though they treat them never fo cruelly, be-ctufe he is in re foe ft of them fill in the fate of Nature: by which means he at once endeavours to deftroy all Vertueand Goodnefsin Princes,and all Reverence and Refpecl: in the Minds of their Subjects; and makes no difference between a Nero or Caligula, and a Trajan or an Antonine. And confequential to this, he likewife makes the will of the Supreme Power, though perhaps but one firigle Man, to be the only Meafure of Good and Evil, Juft and Unjuft: So that whatever he Commands or Forbids,muft immediately be look'd upon as Good or Evil, becaufe he hath Commanded it, or Forbidden it; by which means, Princes would have no other Rules left them of their Moral, or. Politick Actions, but their owp Arbitrary Humours, or Wills: Which if it were fo, Men would be in a much worfe condition under the Power of this irrefiftible Leviathan, than they were in the ftate of Nature 5 fince a Man is in

more danger, as to his Life and Fortune, who is at the Mercy of one Cruel and unrea-fonable Man, that commands an Hundred thoufand Men, than he who was beforein danger of the violence of an Hundred thoufand fingle Men in the ftate of Nature, fince it was Lawful for him to have provided for his own fecurity by combination with others^ which in a Civil ftate it is upon his Principles unlawful to do; though I confefs, not being true to them,he leaves every Man a Right of felf-defence, or Refiftance, even under a Civil Government whenever he is ftrong enough to Rebel, or Refift the Magiftrate, by which means he takes away with one hand, all that he had before beftowed with the other.

$. 5. But I think I have now fufficiently cxpofed the Falfenefs, as well as Wickednefs of thofe Principles : And though I will not be fo uncharitable as to affirm, that either Mr. H. or all his Followers did, or would always acl: according to them, (yet as Cicero long fince obferved in his Excellent Treatife de Officiis concerning the Epicureans, and their Principles they have more reafon to thank the innate goodnefs and gtneropty of their own Natures, than the Doctrines they have embraced, if they do not. But if I have been too tedious

in this performance, I hope the Reader will pardon me, if thefe pernicious Principles are fufficiently Confuted at laft, fince it is im-poflible for any Man to judge of their Truth or Falfehood, without fjrft confideringthe Author's Opinion, in his own words, and then ftri&ly examining theReafons he brings for them; which could not well be contracted into a lefs compafs. But having not only, I hope, laid foundations for a more folid building in the precedent Difcourfe; but alfo cleared off that Rubbifh in thisfecond Part, that might obftruft its Evidence in the Minds of all Candid and indifferent Readers; I fhall therefore befeech God, the great Ruler of Men's hearts and affections, That what we have faid in this Treatife,may have that good effeft, as if not to produce, yet at leaft to increafe true Piety towards God, and good Will and Charity among Men.