Chapter VIII.



Of the Rights of Lords over their Servant



I. In the two fore-going Chapters we have treated of an institutive, or

fram'd Government, as being that which receives its originall from the

consent of many, who by Contract and Faith mutually given, have oblig'd

each other. Now followes, what may be said, concerning a naturall

Government, which may also be call'd, Acquired, because it is that which

is gotten by power, and naturall force. But we must know in the first

place by what means the Right of Dominion may be gotten over the Persons

of men. Where such a Right is gotten, there is a kind of a little

Kingdome; for to be a King, is nothing else but to have Dominion over

many Persons; and thus a Great Family is a Kingdom, & a Little Kingdome

a Family. Let us return again to the state of nature, and consider men

as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddainly (like

Mushromes) come to full maturity without all kind of engagement to each

other: There are but three wayes only whereby one can have the Dominion

over the Person of another; whereof the first is, if by mutuall Contract

made between themselves (for Peace, & self-defences sake) they have

willingly given up themselves to the Power and Authority of some man, or

Councel of Men, & of this we have already spoken. The 2d is, If a man

taken Prisoner in the Wars, or overcome; or else distrusting his own

forces, (to avoid Death) promises the Conquerour, or the stronger Party,

his Service, i.e. to do all whatsoever he shall command him; in which

Contract the good which the vanquisht, or inferiour, in strength doth

receive, is the grant of his life, which by the Right of War in the

naturall state of men he might have depriv'd him of, but the good which

he promises, is his service and obedience. By vertue therefore of this

promise, there is as absolute service and obedience due from the

vanquisht, to the vanquisher, as possibly can be, excepting what repugns

the Divine Lawes; for he who is oblig'd to obey the Commands of any man

before he knowes what he will command him, is simply, and without any

restriction tyed to the performance of all Commands whatsoever. Now he

that is thus tyed, is call'd a SERVANT, he to whom he is tyed, a LORD.

Thirdly, there is a Right acquir'd over the Person of a Man, by

Generation; of which kind of acquisition somewhat shall be spoken in the

following Chapter.



II. Every one that is taken in the War, and hath his life spar'd him, is

not suppos'd to have Contracted with his Lord; for every one is not

trusted with so much of his naturall liberty, as to be able, if he

desir'd it, either to flie away, or quit his service, or contrive any

mischief to his Lord. And these serve indeed but within Prisons, or

bound within Irons, and therefore they were call'd not by the common

name of Servant onely, but by the peculiar name of Slave, even as now at

this day un serviteur, and un serf or un esclave have diverse

significations.



III. The obligation therefore of a Servant to his Lord ariseth not from

a simple grant of his life, but from hence rather, That he keeps him not

bound, or imprison'd, for all obligation derives from Contract; but

where's no trust, there can be no Contract, as appears by the 2. Chap.

Artic. 9. where a Compact is defin'd to be the promise of him who is

trusted. There is therefore a confidence and trust which accompanies the

benefit of pardon'd life, whereby the Lord affords him his corporall

liberty; so that if no obligation, nor bonds of Contract had happen'd,

he might not onely have made his escape, but also have kill'd his Lord,

who was the preserver of his life.



IV. Wherefore such kind of Servants as are restrain'd by imprisonment,

or bonds, are not comprehended in that definition of Servants given

above, because those serve not for the Contracts sake, but to the end

they may not suffer; and therefore if they flie, or kill their Lord,

they offend not against the Lawes of Nature, for to bind any man is a

plain signe, that the binder supposes him that is bound not to be

sufficiently tyed by any other obligation.



V. The Lord therefore hath no less Dominion over a Servant that is not,

than over one that is bound, for he hath a Supreme Power over both, and

may say of his Servant no lesse than of another thing, whether animate,

or inanimate, This is mine; whence it followes, that whatsoever the

Servant had before his servitude, that afterwards becomes the Lords; and

whatsoever he hath gotten, it was gotten for his Lord: for he that can

by Right dispose of the Person of a man, may surely dispose of all those

things which that Person could dispose of. There is therefore nothing

which the Servant may retaine as his own against the will of his Lord;

yet hath he, by his Lords distribution, a propriety, and Dominion over

his own goods, insomuch as one Servant may keep, and defend them against

the invasion of his fellow Servant, in the same manner as hath been

shewed before, that a subject hath nothing properly his owne against the

will of the Supreme Authority, but every subject hath a propriety

against his fellow subject.



VI. Since therefore both the Servant himself, and all that belongs to

him are his Lords, and by the Right of Nature every man may dispose of

his owne in what manner he pleases; the Lord may either sell, lay to

pledge, or by Testament conveigh the Dominion he hath over his Servant,

according to his own will and pleasure.



VII. Farthermore, what hath before been demonstrated concerning subjects

in an institutive Government, namely, that he who hath the Supreme Power

can doe his subject no injury; is true also concerning Servants, because

they have subjected their will to the will of the Lord; wherefore,

whatsoever he doth, it is done with their wills, but no injury can be

done to him that willeth it.



VIII. But if it happen that the Lord, either by captivity or voluntary

subjection, doth become a Servant or Subject to another, that other

shall not onely be Lord of him, but also of his Servants; Supreme Lord

over these, immediate Lord over him. Now because not the Servant only,

but also all he hath are his Lords; therefore his Servants now belong to

this man, neither can the mediate Lord dispose otherwise of them than

shall seeme good to the Supreme. And therefore, if sometime in civill

Governments, the Lord have an absolute power over his Servants, that's

suppos'd to be deriv'd from the Right of Nature, and not constituted,

but slightly pass'd over by the Civill Law.



IX. A servant is by the same manner freed from his servitude, that a

Subject in an institutive government, is freed from his subjection;

First, if his Lord enfranchize him, for the Right which the servant

transferred to his Lord over himselfe, the same may the Lord restore to

the servant again. And this manner of bestowing of liberty is called

MANUMISSION; which is just as if a City should permit a Citizen to

conveigh himselfe under the jurisdiction of some other City. Secondly,

if the Lord cast off his servant from him, which in a City is

banishment; neither differs it from Manumission in effect, but in manner

onely: for there, liberty is granted as a favour, here, as a punishment:

In both, the Dominion is renounced. Thirdly, if the servant be taken

prisoner, the old servitude is abolished by the new; for as all other

things, so servants also are acquired by warre, whom in equity the Lord

must protect, if he will have them to be his. Fourthly, the servant is

freed for want of knowledge of a successour, the Lord dying (suppose)

without any Testament, or Heire, for no man is understood to be obliged,

unlesse he know to whom he is to perform the obligation. Lastly, the

servant that is put in bonds, or by any other means deprived of his

corporall liberty, is freed from that other obligation of contract, for

there can be no contract where there is no trust, nor can that faith be

broken which is not given. But the Lord who himselfe serves another,

cannot so free his servants, but that they must still continue under the

power of the supreme, for, as hath been shewed before, such servants are

not his, but the supreme Lords.



X. We get a right over irrationall Creatures in the same manner, that we

doe over the Persons of men, to wit, by force and naturall strength; for

if in the state of nature it is lawfull for every one, by reason of that

warre which is of all against all, to subdue, and also to kill men as

oft as it shall seem to conduce unto their good, much more will the same

be lawfull against Brutes; namely at their own discretion, to reduce

those to servitude which by art may be tamed, and fitted for use, and to

persecute and destroy the rest by a perpetuall warre, as dangerous and

noxious. Our Dominion therefore over beasts, hath its originall from the

right of nature, not from divine positive Right: for if such a Right had

not been before the publishing of the sacred Scriptures, no man by right

might have killed a beast for his food, but he to whom the divine

pleasure was made manifest by holy Writ; a most hard condition for men

indeed whom the beasts might devoure without injury, and yet they might

not destroy them: Forasmuch therefore as it proceeds from the right of

nature, that a beast may kill a man; it is also by the same Right, that

a man may slay a beast.