[§1. Convention has sole power over its own proceedings.]

{170} WHATEVER control the other departments of the government have over a convention, it is obvious that the internal control of the convention by itself presents an entirely different question. As Dodd says:

Even if we should assume that the legislature may limit a convention as to the submission of a constitution, or as to methods of submission, it would yet seem clear that the legislature cannot deprive a convention of powers necessary for its conduct as a deliberative assembly. The convention would seem in any case, in the absence of constitutional requirements in the matter, to have power to establish its own rules of order and of procedure, elect its officers, pass upon the qualifications and election of its members, and to issue orders for elections to fill vacancies in its membership.1

And compare:

It is a deliberative body, having all the necessary authority to make rules for its own procedure, and to decide upon all questions falling within the scope of its authority.2

We have already seen in the discussion of the legislative powers of a convention that it has undoubted power to pass such rules and ordinances as are necessary for its own proceedings.3

[§2. Convention is the sole judge of the elections of its own members.]

Primarily, a convention is the sole judge of the elections of its own members. This is illustrated by the case of the New York convention of 1894. The convention was proceeding to determine a contested election case, whereupon one of the contestants applied to the Supreme Court for an injunction to prohibit the convention from passing upon the question, claiming that whether or not he was entitled to the seat was {171} a question for the determination of the courts. The court assumed jurisdiction and was about to proceed with the case, but the Judiciary Committee of the convention adopted a strong report denying the power of the court, and the court promptly accepted the rebuke and discontinued the case.4 The following quotation from the convention report, to which the court yielded, is instructive:

It is of the greatest importance that a body chosen by the people of this state to revise the organic law of the state, should be as free from interference from the several departments of government, as the legislative, executive and judiciary are, from interference by each other.5

This report also contains a valuable collection of precedents of contested elections in ninety-four American conventions, and concludes therefrom that:

Without any exception, the practice has been uniform from first to last in favor of the Convention exercising the prerogative of deciding who were elected members.6

[§3. Convention may fill vacancies, subject to convention act.]

The power to be the judge of their own elections may carry with it by implication the power to fill vacancies. This, however, is denied by Jameson at considerable length. Jameson denies that a convention can itself fill vacancies in its own ranks because, as he says, that would render the convention pro tanto self-appointing; and for the same reason he denies its right to authorize the colleagues of resigning or deceased members to name their successors.7 No cases have arisen in which a convention has tried to do either of these things without being expressly authorized by the convention act.

A different question is presented, however, when we consider whether a convention can issue precepts to the constituencies of retiring or deceased delegates, directing new elections to fill the vacancies. The only case in which any dispute has arisen over this power was the Berlin controversy in the Massachusetts {172} convention of 1853, which is discussed at length by Jameson.8 It must be remembered, however, that this contest was in reality the first struggle for supremacy between two opposing parties in that convention, and was based more on the question of the power of the legislature to amend the convention act by abolishing the secret ballot, than on the question of the power of the convention to authorize the filling of vacancies. But, whatever we may think of the arguments pro and con in that convention, we cannot evade the fact that the convention by an overwhelming majority decided in favor of its power to authorize the filling of vacancies.

This precedent, coupled with the well-known power of all parliamentary bodies to provide for the filling of vacancies in as near as possible the same manner as the original seats were filled,9 leads inevitably to the conclusion that conventions do have the power which was successfully asserted by the Massachusetts convention of 1853.

A book published by the recent Constitutional Convention Commission in New York says:

Another question of importance is that as to the filling of vacancies which may occur after delegates have once been elected to a constitutional convention. In conventions there have been a number of elaborate and somewhat theoretical arguments regarding the power of a convention to provide for the filling of vacancies therein, in the absence of constitutional or statutory provision for this purpose. The more sensible view under such circumstances is that the convention may direct an election to fill a vacancy.10

The status and oaths of delegates are discussed in the next chapter.

[§4. Convention has power and duty to obtain quarters and officers.]

Obviously the first duty of a convention is to obtain quarters. Jameson says:

The general rule is undoubtedly this: — as Conventions are commonly numerous assemblies, containing, in most cases, the same number of members as the State legislatures, they are {173} possessed of such powers as are requisite to secure their own comfort, to protect and preserve their dignity and efficiency, and to insure orderly procedure in their business. For the attainment of these ends, they are not without the authority possessed by agents in general, and, in my judgment, they are possessed of no other or greater. Thus, they must have a suitable hall, adequately warmed and lighted; and, though the Acts calling them were silent on the point, they would unquestionably have power to engage one, and to pledge the faith of the State for the rental thereof.11

The next requirement would be to obtain suitable officers.

There can be no doubt, a Convention would be authorized to appoint such officers and servants as the custom of public assemblies, in free communities, has sanctioned, or as may seem under the circumstances to be necessary.

In respect to a president and secretary or secretaries there can be no question. The convenience of members and the despatch of business would point also to messengers or pages as requisite. The same may be said perhaps of one or more door-keepers, since, if the hall where the session is held, were accessible to everybody, at all hours, the functions of the Convention might be seriously interrupted, and its dignity insulted. With respect to a sergeant-at-arms, some doubt exists. It is a universal practice in Conventions to appoint such an officer, and the right of doing so for certain purposes cannot be denied.12

The doubt with relation to the powers of this officer comes under the head of maintaining order to be discussed a little later in this chapter.13

[§5. Convention has power and duty to adopt rules of procedure.]

Having engaged its hall and chosen its officers, the convention must next adopt some method of procedure, and to this end may establish all necessary rules. These are frequently modeled after the rules of the more numerous legislative body of the State.

A Convention having provided itself with the officers needed to do or to expedite its work, its attention would be next directed to the subject of maintaining order in the transaction of its business, and in the conduct of its members. For this purpose rules of order are necessary. There is sometimes inserted in the Act calling the Convention, a power to establish such rules as should be deemed {174} requisite; but, without such a clause, a Convention would clearly be authorized so to do. It is usual, before rules have been reported by the special committee for that purpose, to adopt temporarily those of the last Convention, or of the last State House of Representatives. In the absence of such a vote, it has been said that the lex parliamentaria, as laid down in the best writers, is in force.14

Legislative acts, under which conventions have been assembled, have usually not attempted to determine in any detail how conventions should proceed. A constitutional convention should have freedom to determine its own organization and procedure.15

If the purpose is merely that of proposing a few amendments to the constitution, as has several times been the case in New Hampshire, the procedure should naturally differ from that in a convention which proposes to submit a complete revision of the constitution, or at least to scrutinize carefully all provisions of an existing constitution.16

Jameson points out that the convention may enter upon its task of framing or amending the constitution either directly as a body or by resolving itself into a committee or committees. Two of the three common methods of procedure by committees are (a) the committee of the whole, or (b) to appoint a single selected committee of limited numbers to draft the amendments. Jameson refers to only ten conventions which have adopted the second plan, all but two of these occurring during the Revolutionary War period.17 It is obvious that the reason for adopting this method at that time was that the main duties of those conventions was governmental rather than constitution-framing.

[§6. Convention has power to appoint committees.]

The third and most common method of procedure is for the convention to apportion the work among several committees.

The Cyclopaedia of American Government says of these three alternative methods:

In the framing of a constitution it, of course, may be possible for a convention to conduct all of its work directly in convention — that is, acting, as a body, without going into committee of the whole or dividing the work among committees. But such a plan would be cumbersome and unsatisfactory and has not been employed. {175} The plan ordinarily employed is that of using committees. In the use of committees three methods have been employed: (1) The transaction of business mainly in committee of the whole, with perhaps some smaller committees appointed to handle particular matters. This method is one which would be apt to work unsatisfactorily unless the plans for a constitution had been pretty well matured before the meeting of the convention. The committee of the whole was used to a large extent by the federal convention of 1787, and was adopted also by the Pennsylvania convention which met in 1789.

(2) In a number of the earlier conventions the plan was adopted of appointing a small committee, with full power to prepare and report a draft of a constitution to the full convention. This plan was adopted by the revolutionary conventions of Maryland, Virginia, New Jersey and Pennsylvania in 1776, and by those of New York and Vermont in 1777, but the conventions in these cases were assembled not only for the framing of constitutions, but also for the conduct of warlike operations, and the appointment of a special committee left the other members of the convention free to attend to the general duties of these bodies, which were equally urgent. The Massachusetts general court in 1778 appointed a special committee to frame a constitution, as also did the Massachusetts convention of 1779-80, the Tennessee convention of 1796, and the California convention of 1849.

(3) But the more usual practice has been for a convention to appoint a number of committees, and to distribute among them the several parts of the constitution, to be considered and reported upon to the convention either in regular session or in committee of the whole. The number of committees appointed for such a purpose has varied considerably, running from four in one case to more than thirty in others. The members of such committees have been as a rule appointed by the president of the convention. One of the most important committees of a convention is the committee on style or on arrangement and phraseology, which is usually appointed for the purpose of harmonizing the various proposals adopted by the convention and putting a constitution into something like the final form in which it should be adopted.18

It is well not to model these committees directly on the committees of the legislature, for if this is done, some committees will be found overburdened by work and others without a single matter referred to them.

{176} See the following further quotations on the number and make-up of committees:

The New York convention of 1894 had thirty-one committees; the Virginia convention of 1901-02, sixteen; the Michigan convention of 1907-08, twenty-nine; the Ohio convention of 1912, twenty-five. The Illinois convention of 1869-70 had thirty-nine committees, a number much larger than was needed; of these committees, six made no report whatever to the convention.19

For a convention there may be said to be three types of committees: 1, those on the formal business of the convention, such as committees on rules, on printing, etc.; 2, those whose functions are largely technical, such as a committee on arrangement and phraseology; 3, those whose function would be largely that of obtaining agreement upon broad questions of principle, such as might be to a large extent a committee dealing with the subject of municipal home rule. Of course, most committees will have duties of all three types, but some difference in size is justified. Committees of the first type should naturally be small; those of the second type may well be larger, but even for the third type committees having many more than nine members are not apt to work very effectively. The average size of committees in the Illinois convention of 1869-70 was nine. The average size of committees in the Ohio convention of 1912 was seventeen, and because of this the committee work was less effective than it might have been.20

In the Michigan convention of 1907-08 the first committee appointed was one on permanent organization and order of business. This committee was afterward made permanent. It reported the plan of committee organization, and made other reports during the session of the convention. One of its recommendations, which was adopted, provided for a weekly meeting of chairmen of committees, to be presided over by the president of the convention, "at which meeting the chairmen of the several committees shall report progress and consider such other matters as may be of interest in advancing the work of the convention." Such a plan, if properly carried out should do much to unify the work of a Convention.21

The committee on arrangement and phraseology should serve in large part as a central drafting organ to give unity to the work of the convention.22

{177} Separate committees will also be necessary to deal with questions which are at the time of great popular interest, because an effort will naturally be made to have these subjects dealt with in the constitution. For example if a convention were assembled in Illinois today it would be almost necessary to have separate committees upon the liquor traffic, taxation, the initiative and referendum, and apportionment and minority representation.23

The following are the more important committees common to three of the most recent constitutional conventions: Arrangement and Phraseology, Banks, Corporations, Counties and Towns, Education, Suffrage, Judiciary, Bill of Rights, Legislature, Methods of Amendment, Miscellaneous, Municipal Government, Rules, Submission and Address, Taxation.24

Committees are of course organs of the convention, appointed for the purpose of maturing matters for consideration by that body. A committee should therefore at all times be subject to control by a majority of the convention, and should have no power (by failing to report upon any matter) to prevent its consideration by the convention.25

The committee must do the detailed work of the Convention, and each committee should have before it as soon as possible all of the proposals relating to the subject which it is to consider. In order to accomplish this purpose, some conventions have definitely agreed that after a certain day no proposals should be entertained, unless presented by one of the standing committees.26

Many convention rules have very properly prescribed the form in which the proposals should be introduced, requiring that all proposals be in writing, contain but one subject, and have titles.27

[§7. Convention has power to pledge the faith of the State for expenses.]

A convention may undoubtedly incur expense for its legitimate needs. We have already seen that a convention can pledge the faith of the State for the expense of hiring a hall.28 But it is a far cry from pledging the faith of the State to pledging the credit of the State. Thus, although the attempts {178} of the earlier conventions to appropriate money were successful,29 they have been uniformly unsuccessful in later years,30 and the attorneys general of three States have ruled against the legality of such a proceeding.31 Nevertheless, the legislature, when called on, has never failed to make the necessary appropriations to meet the expenses incurred by the convention.32

Reverting now to the various proper objects of expenditure. A convention undoubtedly has power to supply its members with stationery, and probably with newspapers33 Jameson has the following valuable suggestions to make, relative to the stenographic reports and printing for the convention:

The same principle applies to the case of phonographic reports and printing for the Convention. It would be a most niggardly policy which would refuse the expenditure necessary to the preservation of most full and accurate reports of its debates and proceedings. Upon this subject, however, there has been very great difference of views in different Conventions. In many of the States, volumes have been published, containing both the journals and the debates of all their Conventions. In others, the subject seems not to have been regarded as of any consequence whatsoever; and what little has been preserved has been owing to the private enterprise of the newspaper press. The result is, that the memorials of the most important public bodies ever assembled in those States, are often very meagre, and more often confused and inaccurate. Such a policy is "penny wise and pound foolish." In after years, when it has become impossible to replace what has been lost, more enlightened public opinion commonly finds cause to regret a paltry economy which deprives history of its most important data. It should be remembered, that our Conventions lay the foundations of States, many of which are to rival the greatness and glory of Rome, of England, and of France. In a hundred years from now, what treasures would they not expend, could they purchase therewith complete copies of their early constitutional records — documents {179} standing to their several organizations in the same relation as would the discussions of those ancient sages who framed the Twelve Tables of the Roman law, to the Republic of Rome.34

[§8. Convention has power over recording and reporting of its proceedings.]

The question of printing the proceedings of the Minnesota convention of 1857 came before the courts because Goodrich, the State printer, claimed that he was entitled, by virtue of his business, to do the printing, and obtained an injunction from the lower court to prevent Moore, the convention printer, from doing it. The Supreme Court said, in dissolving this injunction:

But even had the legislature intended and attempted to claim and exercise the act of providing a printer for the constitutional convention, it would have been an unauthorized and unwarrantable interference with the rights of that body. The admission of such a right in the legislature, would place the convention under its entire control, leaving it without authority even to appoint or elect its own officers, or adopt measures for the transaction of its legitimate business. It would have less power than a town meeting, and be incompetent to perform the objects for which it convened. It would be absurd to suppose a constitutional convention had only such limited authority. It is the highest legislative assembly recognized in law, invested with the right of enacting or framing the supreme law of the state. It must have plenary power for this, and over all of the incidents thereof. The fact that the convention assembled by authority of the legislature renders it in no respect inferior thereto, as it may well be questioned whether, had the legislature refused to make provision for calling a convention, the people in their sovereign capacity would not have had the right to have taken such measures for framing and adopting a constitution as to them seemed meet. At all events there can be no doubt but that, however called, the convention had full control of all its proceedings, and may provide in such manner as it sees fit to perpetuate its records either by printing or manuscript, or may refuse to do either.35

And Ruling Case Law says:

A constitutional convention has full control of all its proceedings, and may provide in such manner as it sees fit to perpetuate its record, either by printing or by manuscript.36

{180} The convention has equal control over other printing necessarily incidental to its business. As Jameson says:

In relation to the printing for the Convention, the case is very clear. If the Act calling the body provides for it, or requires it to be done in a particular manner or by a designated person, or limits it in amount or in cost, doubtless the Act should be obeyed. But, unless thus restricted, the power of the body to order its printing to be done, is as undoubted as to engage a hall or the requisite executive officers. The only alternative is, the employment of secretaries enough to furnish written copies of all papers and documents used in the course of its business. This would be possible, and such provision would, after a sort, answer the purpose. But it is certain, that the measures proposed would be neither so well understood nor so rapidly matured, if thus presented, as if they were printed. To this may be added, that the expense of printed would be much less than of written copies, and that the length of the session would probably be reduced by the use of them. The employment, then, of printed matter, being clearly within the power of the Convention, as incident to the speedy and convenient execution of its commission, the extent of it rests in the discretion of that body, and it can bind the government, within reasonable limits, by its contracts therefor.37

[§9. Convention has power to expel, and, subject to the convention act, to punish members and outsiders.]

A further important consideration is the power of the convention to maintain order and punish for contempt. Jameson doubts the power of the Sergeant-at-Arms of the convention to be anything more than a mere doorkeeper.38 But that really is a subsidiary question depending on what power the convention itself has to enforce order. Jameson says:

The power of a Convention to discipline its own members for offences committed in its presence is undoubted, and of considerable extent. The order and dignity of public deliberative bodies may, in many ways, be so assailed as seriously to interfere with the progress of business, if not wholly to interrupt it, yet without the commission of any misdemeanor for which the offenders would be amenable to the laws. A Convention, having no power to make laws giving the magistrates jurisdiction of such offences, unless it could, by sanctions of its own, enforce its rules for the preservation of order, it would be at the mercy of such members as chose to do the work of violence, but to do it in such a manner as to elude the penalties for a breach of the peace. To prevent this is the principal {181} object of rules; and every public assembly, by its very nature, must have power to make and to enforce them in some modes appropriate to its own Constitution. To Conventions, however, it must be admitted, the range of sanctions is not very wide. For minor offences, it would be confined, probably, to reprimand, and for the more heinous, to expulsion from the body; or, in cases of actual violence to arrest and tradition to the public authorities. Power to this extent I conceive to be indispensable to the existence of any deliberative assembly; and, without assuming the character of a legislature, with power to create and to invest officers and tribunals with jurisdiction to punish offences, I can imagine it possessed of no greater. The power to arrest an offender, in the case supposed of actual violence, would involve that of safely keeping, and, if necessary, of confining him until he could be delivered to the officers of the law. So, the power to expel a member would carry with it that of suspending, which is less, or of suspending with forfeiture of pay, temporarily or altogether, according to the degree of the offence. But the power could not be claimed, in the former case, to imprison as a punishment, or for a longer time than should be necessary to secure the arrested member until he could be transferred to the magistrates, on complaint regularly made; or, in the latter, to pass from a forfeiture of pay (if that be regarded as allowable) to the imposition of pecuniary mulcts.39

Many convention acts expressly give to conventions the power to expel members and punish its members and officers by imprisonment or otherwise. The Georgia convention of 1867 expelled a member for insulting the president of that body.40

The report of the Judiciary Committee to the New York convention of 1894 asserts that a convention has the power of expulsion.41

The power of a convention to discipline strangers is a different question. Jameson denies this power, because of his desire to belittle conventions in comparison with legislatures, for the purpose of the main thesis of his book, namely legislative supremacy over conventions. Thus Jameson says:

As a Convention is not a legislature, though a body, by delegation, exercising some legislative functions, but of so limited and subordinate a character as to entitle it to rank only as a legislative {182} committee, it cannot do, even for its own defence, acts within the competence only of a legislature, or of a body with powers of definite legislation.42

But in view of the modern theory that a convention is a legislative body of superior standing to the ordinary legislature,43 it would appear that a convention would have at least the same degree of powers in this particular as is inherent in inferior legislative bodies.44

The Illinois convention of 1862 appointed a committee to investigate charges against certain of its members, with power to send for persons and papers and to swear witnesses.45 The Louisiana convention of 1864 caused a newspaper editor to be arrested and brought before it for contempt for publishing certain criticisms of the president and other members of the convention. In this they had the assistance of the Federal Department Commander and the Federal Provost Marshal. General Banks released the editor, however, before the contempt proceedings were completed.46

Various convention acts have contained provisions expressly authorizing conventions to discipline strangers.47 The author knows of no case in which this has been done, however, either with or without the express authority of the convention act.

In all the foregoing discussion the author has assumed the absence of anything in any popular statute, restricting or enlarging the powers and duties of the convention. The convention has certain express powers and certain powers implied from the inherent nature of the body, all of which are delegated to it by the people in their sovereign capacity. No constitution except that of the Federal government can restrict the people in delegating to a convention or in withholding from a convention any powers that they choose.48 Therefore the language of any convention act, provided it be passed by the people, should be carefully consulted upon the question of determining the powers of any particular convention.

[§10. Convention may have power to reconvene to codify constitution ratified by the people.]

One very important power of the convention has been {183} reserved for the last, and that is the power of the convention to reconvene after the election (to which it submits its proposed changes in the constitution), in order to make and promulgate a codification of the constitution. The convention act which created the Kentucky convention of 1890 provided that, before any changes in the constitution should become operative, they should be submitted to the voters of the State and ratified by a majority thereof. Proposed changes were ratified by a popular vote in April, 1891. The convention reconvened in September, 1891, to which date they had adjourned, and made numerous changes in the constitution, some of which were claimed to have been material, and promulgated the codified instrument. An effort was made to enjoin the printing and preservation of this constitution, but the Court of Appeals recognized as valid the constitution promulgated by the convention.49 It is probable that the court was influenced by the extreme practical convenience of enabling a convention to make a codification of the instrument after the adoption of changes by the people.

The convention which framed the original constitution of Massachusetts assumed that it had a similar power, although no such power had been granted it by the convention act. The convention act provided that the constitution should not take effect unless ratified by a two thirds vote of the people.50 The convention, however, desiring to secure an acceptable constitution, provided that the instrument which it drew should be voted on, article by article, by the people of the State, and that in any town where a majority voted against an article, the town meeting should suggest what changes would render that article acceptable.

In order that the said Convention, at the adjournment, may collect the general sense of their constituents on the several parts of the proposed Constitution: And if there doth not appear to be two thirds of their constituents in favour thereof, that the Convention may alter it in such a manner as that it may be agreeable to the sentiments of two thirds of the voters throughout the State.51

This power of altering was not exercised, for it appeared from the returns that two thirds of the voters were in favor of the instrument as drawn; and it was accordingly promulgated by {184} the convention without change.52 But the assumption by the convention of its power to make changes after submission is an important precedent. A fortiori would a convention have the power to codify the constitution without making any changes.

An alternative method of procedure would be for the convention to submit on the ballot a proposition authorizing the convention, or a committee thereof or some other body, to codify the constitution as amended at that election, and to promulgate the codification.

The legislature of Maine, in submitting various amendments in 1875, submitted a proposition that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court should have power to codify the constitution, by including amendments then adopted and all prior amendments, and by striking out all obsolete matter. This proposition was accepted by the voters and was accordingly followed by the Chief Justice, with the result that the constitution of Maine was brought up to date and put into a much more workable form than formerly.53

Similarly a convention might submit to the people an ordinance authorizing itself to make such a codification, although it would probably have power to do this without such authorization, particularly in States where the convention procedure is extraconstitutional rather than constitutional.

The importance of such a power of codification is not to be overlooked.

Thus we see that a convention ordinarily has full control over its internal affairs, including its own membership, the filling of vacancies, the obtaining of quarters, the election of officers and employees, the establishment of rules, the purchasing of supplies, the printing of records, etc., the maintenance of internal order, and even the disciplining of strangers; but these powers may be enlarged or curtailed by popular vote.

The convention's control over the process of submitting its work for popular ratification will be discussed in a later chapter.54 Its power to pass necessary incidental legislation has already been discussed.55

1. Dodd, p. 88.

2. Wells v. Bain (1872), 75 Pa. 39, 55.

3. See [Ch. XI §11] pp. 146-147, supra.

4. Lincoln, Const. Hist. of N. Y., Vol. III, p. 666. Elihu Root was chairman of this committee. Lincoln himself drew the report. It was unanimously accepted by the convention. Rev. Record, N. Y. Conv. 1894, Vol. I, p. 270.

5. Rev. Record, N. Y. Conv. 1894, Vol. I, p. 250.

6. Rev. Record, N. Y. Conv. 1894, Vol. I, p. 267-270.

7. Jameson, p. 331.

8. Jameson, pp. 333-342.

9. Opinion of Justices (1826), 3 Pick. 517, 520.

10. N. Y. Rev. of Consts., p. 58. The full title is "Revision of the State Constitution," published by the New York Constitutional Convention Commission in 1915.

11. Jameson, pp. 455-456.

12. Jameson, p. 456.

13. See [Ch. XIV §8] p. 180, infra.

14. Jameson, pp. 460-461.

15. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 60.

16. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 62.

17. Jameson, pp. 287-289.

18. I Cyc. American Govt., 428.

19. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 63.

20. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 64.

21. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 69.

22. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 69.

23. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 63.

24. Journal, Mich. Conv. 1907-1908, Vol. I, p. 15; Journal, Ohio Conv. 1912, p. 41; Rev. Record, N. Y. Conv. 1915, Vol. I, pp. 49-52.

25. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 64.

26. N. Y. Revision of Consts., pp. 66-67.

27. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 67.

28. See [Ch. XIV §4] p. 173, supra.

29. Pennsylvania (1837); Louisiana (1844 and 1864). Jameson, pp. 436-437.

30. Illinois (1862); New York (1867); Georgia (1867 and 1877); Pennsylvania (1873). Jameson, pp. 437-438, 441-442, 444-446. But see p. 180, infra.

31. Massachusetts (1779-80); United States (1787); Illinois (1862); New York (1867); Georgia (1877); Pennsylvania (1873). Jameson, pp. 435-436, 438, 445, 446.

32. Hon. J. H. Martindale of New York in 1867; Hon. R. N. Ely of Georgia in 1877; and Hon. Samuel E. Dimmick of Pennsylvania in 1873. Jameson, pp. 442, 445-446.

33. Jameson, pp. 457-458.

34. Jameson, p. 458.

35. Goodrich v. Moore (1858), 2 Minn. 61, 66.

36. 6 R. C. L., § 17, p. 27.

37. Jameson, p. 460.

38. Jameson, pp 456-457.

39. Jameson, pp. 463-464.

40. Jameson, p. 466.

41. Rev. Record, N. Y. Conv. 1894, pp. 267-269.

42. Jameson, p. 461.

43. See [Ch. VII §1] p. 90, supra.

44. Jameson, pp. 466-467. See 36 Cyc. 851 on the contempt and other powers of legislatures.

45. Jameson, pp. 468-470.

46. Jameson, pp. 470-472.

47. Jameson, pp. 472-473.

48. See [Ch. XIII §1] pp. 165-168, supra.

49. Miller v. Johnson (1892), 92 Ky. 589.

50. Journal, Mass. Conv. 1779-1780, p. 6.

51. Journal, Mass. Conv. 1779-1780, p. 169.

52. Journal, Mass. Conv. 1779-1780, pp. 186-187.

53. Thorpe, Vol. III, p. 1646, n. a.

54. See [Ch. XVI §3-13] pp. 196-213, infra.

55. See [Ch. XI §11] pp. 146-147, supra.

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