THE SECOND BOOK ON 

               THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN



                            BY



                  SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF



                         CHAPTER I 

                On the Natural State of Men



1. We have next to inquire about those duties whose performance is incumbent 

upon a man, in view of the particular state in which we find him living the 

common life. And by state I mean in general that condition in which men are 

understood to be placed, for the exercise of a certain kind of actions. 

Special rights also generally accompany that state.



2. The state of men is either natural or adventitious. The natural state can 

be considered under three heads, so far as mere reason lights the way; 

either in relation to God the Creator, or in relation to individual men, as 

regards themselves, or as regards other men.



3. Viewed in the first way, the natural state of man is that condition in 

which he was placed by the Creator, when He willed that man should be an 

animal superior to all the rest. From this state it follows that man should 

recognize and worship his Author, and marvel at His works; and also pass his 

life in a very different manner from the brutes. Hence this state is 

contrasted with the life and condition of the brutes.



4. In the second way we can consider the natural state of man, if we imagine 

what his condition would be, if one were left entirely to himself, without 

any added support from other men, assuming indeed that condition of human 

nature which is found at present. Certainly it would seem to have been more 

wretched than that of any wild beast, if we take into account with what 

weakness man goes forth into this world, to perish at once, but for the help 

of others; and how rude a life each would lead, if he had nothing more than 

what he owed to his own strength and ingenuity. On the contrary, it is 

altogether due to the aid of other men, that out of such feeble-ness we have 

been able to grow up, that we now enjoy untold comforts, and that we improve 

mind and body for our own advantage and that of others. And in this sense 

the natural state is opposed to a life improved by the industry of men.



5. In the third way we consider the natural state of man according as men 

are understood to be related to each other, merely from that common kinship 

which results from similarity of nature, before any agreement or act of man, 

by which one came to be particularly bound to another. In this sense we 

speak of men as living together in the natural state, if they have no common 

master, and one is not subject to the other, and they are not known to each 

other by kindness or injury. In this sense the natural state is opposed to 

the civil state.



6. Again, the character of this natural state can be considered either as it 

is represented by a figment, or as it really exists. We have the former, if 

we conceive that from the beginning a multitude of men came into being at 

once, without any interdependence, as the story of the Cadmean brothers has 

it; or else, if we imagine the whole human race as now so broken up, that 

each man would govern himself apart, and none be bound to any by other bond 

than similarity of nature. But the state of nature which really exists, has 

this feature, that one is joined to some men by a special alliance, but with 

all the others has nothing in common except one's humanity, and owes them 

nothing on any other account. Such a condition now exists between different 

states, and between the citizens of different nations, and formerly it 

obtained among the scattered patriarchs.



7. For it is clear that the whole human race has never at one and the same 

time been in the natural state. For those who were horn to our first 

parents, from whom all mortals draw their origin, as the Holy Scriptures 

relate, were subject to the paternal authority. Later, however, this natural 

state did appear among some men. For the first men, in order to fill a world 

still empty, and to seek a roomier habitation for themselves and their 

flocks, left the paternal homes, separated in different directions, and 

nearly every male set up a household for himself. Among their descendants, 

who scattered in the same way, the special bond of kinship, and the 

affection springing from it, gradually vanished, and there remained only 

that community which results from a like nature; until later, when the race 

had multiplied remarkably, and they had discovered the inconvenience of the 

isolated life, by degrees the nearest neighbors united to form societies, 

first smaller, then larger, by the voluntary or enforced union of several of 

the smaller. Between these communities, as they are joined by no other bond 

than that of common humanity, the natural state certainly still exists.



8. Now those who live in the natural state have this particular right, that 

they are subject and responsible to none but God. From which standpoint that 

state is called natural liberty; by which, unless there has been some 

previous act of man, everyone is understood to be his own master, and 

subject to the authority of no man. And from the same standpoint each is 

accounted equal to every other, and neither is subject to him, nor holds him 

in subjection to himself. Moreover, since the light of reason has been 

placed in man, and, by its beams he can guide his actions, it follows that 

every roan living in natural liberty depends upon no one for the regulation 

of his conduct; but, in accordance with his own judgment and will, has the 

power of doing everything that agrees with sound reason. And on account of 

the common inclination, implanted in all creatures, a man can but endeavor 

by every means to preserve his body and his life, and to banish what seems 

to destroy life, and must employ the means to that end. For this reason, and 

because in the natural state no one has another man as his superior, to whom 

he has submitted his own will and judgment, therefore in that state every 

one of his own judgment determines the fitness of means, and whether they 

conduce to self-preservation or not. For, no matter how much he hears the 

advice of another, it is none the less in his own power to decide whether he 

wishes to approve of the other's advice or not. But that this 

self-government be rightly conducted, it is required that it be undertaken 

according to the dictate of right reason and the natural law.



9. However much the natural state allures by the name of freedom and 

immunity from all subjection, still, until men have united into communities, 

it has many added disadvantages, whether we imagine all men as existing 

singly in that state, or consider the situation of the scattered patriarchs. 

For if you conceive a man who even in adult age is left alone in this world, 

and without any of the comforts and supports with which the ingenuity of men 

has made life more civilized and less hard, you will see an animal, naked, 

dumb, needy, driving away his hunger as best he can by roots and herbs, his 

thirst by any water he chances upon, the severity of the weather by caves, 

an animal exposed to the wild beasts, and alarmed when he meets any of them. 

A life somewhat more civilized was possible among those who lived in 

scattered families, -- a life, however, which could not be compared in any 

way with civil life, not so much on account of want, which the household, 

with its limited desires, seems fairly well able to banish, as because 

security is not fully provided for there. And, to be brief, in the natural 

state each man is protected by his own powers only, in the community by 

those of all. In the former no one has a certain reward of his industry; in 

the latter all have it. In the one there is the rule of passion, war, fear, 

poverty, ugliness, solitude, barbarism, ignorance, savagery; in the other 

the rule of reason, peace, security, riches, beauty, society, refinement, 

knowledge, good will.



10. Moreover in the natural state, if a man does not willingly perform for 

another what he ought under an agreement, or if he has injured him, or if 

some controversy arises otherwise, there is no one who by authority can 

compel the other to perform what he ought, or repair the injury, and can 

thus settle the quarrel, as in states, where one may implore the aid of a 

common judge. But because Nature does not permit us to go to war for any 

cause indifferently, even where one is amply persuaded of the justice of 

one's cause, therefore we must first try to see whether the matter can be 

adjusted in a gentler way, namely, by a friendly discussion between the 

parties, and by a pure (not conditionate) compromise, that is, an appeal to 

arbiters. These arbiters should conduct themselves with fairness to both 

sides, and in giving their decision make no concession to hatred or favor, 

but regard solely the merits of the case. For this reason a man is not 

usually taken as arbiter in a case in which there appears to be greater hope 

of advantage or special distinction for himself from the success of the one 

side, than from that of the other, and so where it is to his interest that 

one of them win the case by whatever means. Hence also there should be no 

agreement or promise between the arbiter and the parties, by virtue of which 

he may be bound to pronounce in favor of the one. And if the arbiter is" 

unable to find out what the fact is, either from the common confession of 

the parties, or definite instruments, or unmistakable arguments and signs, 

he will be obliged to find it out from the depositions of the witnesses. 

These may indeed be constrained to tell the truth by the natural law, and 

generally by the sanctity of an oath, still it would be safest not to admit 

such persons as are so disposed towards one or the other of the parties that 

their conscience must struggle as it were with favor, hatred, lust for 

revenge, and other violent passion, or even some very close he, -- motives 

which not all have firmness enough to conquer. Sometimes, too, quarrels are 

ended by interposition of common friends, and this is with good reason 

accounted one of the most sacred duties. But as for the performance, in this 

state, that is each man's affair, when the other does not voluntarily 

fulfill his obligation.



11. Again, although it was the will of Nature herself that there should be a 

certain kinship between men, and that, by virtue of this, it should be wrong 

for one to injure another, and -- better still -- right for every man to 

spend himself for the advantage of others, nevertheless among those who live 

together in natural liberty this kinship generally exerts a very feeble 

force. Hence any man who is not our fellow-citizen, or one with whom we live 

in the natural state, is to be regarded, not indeed as an enemy, but still 

as an inconstant friend. The reason for this is that men are not only 

perfectly able to injure each other, but for various reasons very often 

willing to do so. For in some cases perversity of nature, or the passion for 

ruling and possessing superfluities, spurs men on to injure others. Other 

men, though of modest temper, rush to arms in the desire to preserve 

themselves, and not to be anticipated by others. Many are matched against 

each other by desire for the same thing, others by a rivalry of talent. 

Hence in this state suspicions all but perpetual are rife, as are distrust, 

the desire to undermine the strength of others, the passion for getting 

ahead of others, or of strengthening one's self by the ruin of others. 

Therefore, as it is the part of the good man to be content with what he has, 

and not to attack others, nor seek their property, so the cautious man who 

is devoted to his own welfare, believes all men his friends, with the 

possibility, however, of presently becoming his enemies, and keeps the peace 

with all, as something which can presently change into war. For this reason 

also happy is that state regarded which even in peace thinks of war.