CHAPTER VII 

       On Recognition of the Natural Equality of Men



1. Man is an animal not only most devoted to self-preservation, but one in 

which has been implanted a sensitive self-esteem. And if this be in any way 

slighted, he is in general no less perturbed, than if an injury has been 

inflicted upon his person or property. Even the word man is thought to 

contain a certain dignity, so that the last and most effective argument in 

repelling the insolent contempt of others is this: "I am certainly not a 

dog, but a man as well as you." Inasmuch then as human nature is the same 

for all alike, and no one is perfectly willing or able to be associated with 

another, who does not esteem him as at least equally a man and a sharer in 

the common nature; therefore, among the mutual duties the second place is 

given to this: that each esteem and treat the other as naturally his equal, 

that is, as a man just as much as himself.



2. But this equality of men consists not only in the fact that adult men are 

about equal in strength, in so far as the weaker can inflict death upon the 

stronger by ambush, or with the help of dexterity, or an effective weapon; 

but also in this, that, although one has been fitted out by nature with 

various gifts of mind and body beyond the other, he must none the less 

practice the precepts of natural law toward other men, and himself expects 

the same treatment from others; and in the fact that no more freedom is 

given the man to injure others on that account. So, conversely too, 

niggardliness of nature or straitened circumstances do not of themselves 

condemn a man to a lot inferior to that of others as regards the enjoyment 

of the common right. But what one can demand or expect from another, that 

others too must demand of him, other things being equal. And it is eminently 

proper that one should himself practice the law which he has set up for 

others. For the obligation to cultivate the social life with others binds 

all men equally, and one is no more permitted than another to violate the 

natural laws in their dealings with each other. And yet popular arguments 

are not lacking to illustrate that equality; for example, that we all 

descend from the same stock, and are born, fed, and die in the same manner; 

and that God has given no man assurance of a stable and unshaken fortune. So 

also the injunctions of the Christian religion do not commend nobility, 

power, or wealth, as a means of gaining the favor of God, but sincere piety, 

which can be found in the humble, just as well as in the great.



3. Moreover, it follows from this equality that he who wishes to use the 

services of others for his own advantage, is bound in turn to spend himself, 

that their wants may be satisfied. For the man who demands that others serve 

him, but on the other hand desires to be always immune himself, is certainly 

considering others not equal to himself. Hence, as those who readily allow 

the same permission to all as to themselves, are the best adapted to 

society, so those are plainly unsociable who, thinking themselves superior 

to others, wish to have all things permitted to themselves alone, and 

arrogate honor to themselves above the rest, and the lion's share of the 

things common to all, to which they have no better right than the others. 

Accordingly this too is one of the common duties of the natural law: that no 

one, who has not acquired a peculiar right, arrogate more to himself than 

the rest have, but permit others to enjoy the same right as himself.



4. The same equality shows how a man should conduct himself, when he must 

assign their various rights to others, viz., that he must treat them as 

equals, and not indulge the one as against the other, except on the merits 

of the case. For if this is not done, the man not favored is affronted as 

well as injured, and the esteem Nature gave him is taken away. It follows 

then that a common thing must be duly divided in equal portions among 

equals. When it does not admit of division, those who have an equal right 

ought to use it in common, and this as much as each shall please, if the 

amount permits. But if this is impracticable, they should then use the thing 

after a manner prescribed, and in proportion to the number of the users. For 

no other method of respecting equality can be devised. But if the thing can 

neither be divided nor held in common, let the enjoyment of it be alternate; 

or if this also fails, or no equivalent can be furnished the rest, the thing 

must be awarded to one by lot. For in cases of this kind no better remedy 

than the lot can be found, since this takes away the sense of a slight, and 

if it fails to favor a man, it does not detract from his esteem.



5. Men sin against this duty by arrogance, thanks to which a man, for no 

reason, or an insufficient one, prefers himself to others, and despises 

them, as though they were not his equals. I say "for no reason"; for when a 

man has duly acquired a right, which gives him preference over others, he is 

justified in exercising and maintaining it, short of vain conceit, however, 

or contempt for others. So, conversely, anyone does well in yielding to 

another the precedence and honor which is his due. For the rest, true 

generosity always has as its companion a certain humility, which consists in 

reflecting upon the weakness of our nature, and the errors we may have 

formerly committed, or may hereafter commit, -- errors not less than those 

which others may commit. The result of this humility is that we do not 

prefer ourselves to anyone, reflecting that the rest can use their free will 

quite as well as ourselves, as the same power is theirs. And its legitimate 

use is the one thing which a man can count as his own, and by which he is 

enabled to esteem or despise himself. But to be puffed up for no reason, is 

a fault truly ridiculous; because it is foolish in itself to think much of 

one's self for nothing; and also because one is judging all others fools, as 

if they would esteem you without reason.



6. A greater sin still is committed, if one show contempt for others by 

outward signs, acts, words, countenance, a laugh, or any kind of slur. And 

this sin is to be rated the worse, in proportion as it excites men the more 

fiercely to anger and lust for revenge. So much so, that many are found who 

prefer to expose their lives to immediate danger, -- much more to break the 

peace with others, -- than to let an insult go unavenged. For this damages 

reputation and esteem, upon whose maintenance and strength depends all their 

inward pleasure.