PIML 96061806 / Forwarded to Patriot Information Mailing List: [Technical info on the Ron Brown crash.] PIML ================================================================== At 11:16 PM 6/14/96 -0400, you wrote: >>From: HSprunt@aol.com >>Date: Fri, 14 Jun 1996 14:16:33 -0400 >>Subject: Re: Your Ron Brown Crash Analysis >>I am very interested in the Ron Brown crash. I have been communicating with >>vairous sources about the crash including Matt Wald of the NYT (before his >>aritcles on the crash came out), Robert Davis of USA Today, and Dave Hughes >>of Aviation Week and Space Technology. Ditto Bernie Loab's people at the >>NTSB and the folks at the USAF Office of Flight Safety at Kirkland AFB. >> >>I have a cover article on the aviation aspects of the Ron Brown crash in the >>June issue of a magazine -- mailed to subscribers around May 26. I would be >>delighted to fax you a copy of the article if you would like a copy. If so, >>please email me a fax number (or last resort, a snail mail address). I do >>not have an electronic copy of the final version of the article. >> >>Although not covered in detail in the article, I wrote a fairly detailed >>"spoofing" hypothesis shortly after the crash. It looks like we are coming >>from the same direction, more or less. I will append my spoofing hypothesis >>below along with some comments I made to it today updating it slightly and >>also including some commentary on your post above that was forwarded to me. >> >>I would like to chew the fat with re re the Crash since your aviaiton >>experience far exceeds mine. >>======================================= >>Feel free to post this anywhere you think there will be interest. No >>spamming, please. HHS. >> >>In a message dated 96-06-13 16:52:58 EDT, you write: >>> >>> PIML 96061203 / Forwarded to Patriot Information Mailing List: >>> >>> [Speaking as a currently certificated FAA flight instructor with >>> 2500 hours flight time and 1250 hours instruction given time, and >>> with two years experience as a civilian contract instructor pilot >>> for the Air Force and eleven years search and rescue flying with >>> Civil Air Patrol, plus four years Air Force air operations >>> experience and three years FAA air traffic controller experience, >>> the official Ron Brown crash story stinks. >>> >>> The fact that the Air Force decided not to do a safety crash >>> investigation should be enough to cause the odor, but there is >>> more: The Air Force revealed that the aircraft's landing gear >>> and flaps were retracted when ground impact occurred. The >>> procedure is to lower the gear and flaps after crossing the final >>> approach fix. The final approach fix was a non-directional radio >>> beacon (NDB) on the flight path in front of the airport. The fact >>> that the gear and flaps were not lowered is a clear indication >>> that the pilot never received radio indication of crossing the >>> NDB. This could have been caused by turning off the NDB and >>> turning on another, located to guide the aircraft slightly off >>> course into the hill where it crashed. In this scenario, the >>> pilot would crash into the hill before he crossed the false NDB >>> and never receive the crossing indication that would prompt the >>> lowering of the gear and flaps. Mobile NDB radio transmitters >>> are obsolescent military equipment. >>> >>> It is a fact that there is no reason for the aircraft to be down >>> at approach altitude with the gear and flaps still retracted after >>> crossing the NDB -- unless he received no crossing indication. It >>> is also a fact that the Bosnian radio navigational aid supervisor >>> responsible for the final approach fix NDB "committed suicide" >>> shortly after the crash occurred. How obvious can it get?] PIML >> >>This expert opinion re spoofing is very interesting to me. See the post I >>put up shortly after the crash -- pasted in below: >> >>Here is a scenario for spoofing the Brown CT-43A that fits nicely with the >>local geography and navaids. I am crushed for time today. I would >>appreciate someone posting this to the Whitewater Newsgroup for me. AOL will >>just truncate this post if I try to post it in my simplistic fashion. >> >>Caution: this will be hard to follow (visualize) unless you have access to >>the diagram printed on page 26 of the current Aviation Week (I faxed a copy >>of this diagram to Mike Rivero yesterday -- perhaps he will put it up on his >>web page). It may also be hard to swallow, but remember, all I am doing is >>putting together publicly available informaiton and asking what I hope are >>some reasonable (if cynical) questions. >> >>This analysis assumes the Aviation Week diagram is accurate and also must be >>assumed to be very tentative, at least until/if some more (consistent) facts >>come out. In any event, this scenario would benefit from a ready-through by >>a experienced current pilot (an opposed to me, a rlaitvely inexperienced, >>noncurrent pilot!). >> >>In a message dated 96-04-09 01:16:51 EDT, a poster to the CS list wrote: >> >>>This is >>>simply the technique of broadcasting a radio beacon's signal at a higher >>>power from a different location, say twenty miles away. Typically, a >>>radio beacon broadcasts a two or three letter identification code in morse >>>code, which the pilot uses to identify the beacon. The pilot will then >>>think that he is tuned to the correct beacon and the direction finding >>>equipment is pointing to it. But, the direction finding equipment will >>>merely point in the direction of the strongest signal. >> >>Let me guess: Nobody tapes the NDB tone, right? Therefore, there will be no >>records of even an unexplained increase in the signal strength (let alone a >>change in direction). >>That is, unless there was another aircraft in the immediate area whose nav >>radio was tuned to the frequency of the NDB in question whose crew noted a >>sudden change in the direction of the signal. . . >> >>I assume that the decsion when to turn on the spoofing signal is trivial if >>one listens to the local air traffic control and therefore knows about when >>the T-43 crew would activate their own nav radio to hunt for the signal >>(e.g., the crew reports turning on final having passed over KLP NDB some 11.8 >>miles to the NW of the runway threshold -- see the analysis below). >> >>I rather doubt the spoofer, if there was one, was twenty miles away. I would >>suggest a nearby mountainside or hillside, on a line between the aircraft's >>heading just before the crash and the actual crash location itself. >> >>According Aviation Week (issue arrived yesterday, dated 4/8): "The USAF >>Aircraft was cleared for the NDB approach to Runway 12 and crossed over the >>KLP NDB beacon inbound to the runway [the KLP beacon is 11.8 miles, 299 >>degrees True FROM Runway 12]. There is a second beacon near the runway, but >>it was unclear which one the crew [was] using for guidance [that is, was the >>crew steering directly toward the NDB on the field (?) or steering directly >>AWAY from the KLP NDB -- 180 degrees away from 299 degrees is 119 degrees, >>more or less the direct approach heading for Runway 12 whose azimuth is 120 >>degrees]." >> >>The second beacon, CV LCTR is apparently located 1.9 miles 299 degrees true >>FROM the threshold of Runway 12 [see the color diagram on page 26 of the >>4/8/96 Aviation Week]. >> >>Now, assuming the diagram in Aviation Week is corrrect and one wanted to >>investigate the "spoofing" hypothesis, where would one expect the "fake" >>beacon to be IF either the aircraft was flying TO the CV LCTR beacon or, I >>assume, FROM the KLP NDB (that is, if the MDI aboard the aircraft could not >>readily distinguish reciprocal bearings in this situation -- remember my >>short preparatory stories a few days ago re reciprocal bearing issues when >>using this old style equipment?)? >> >>Well, a good spot to consider for the location of the fake beacon would be on >>the southern slopes of some hills about 5.5 miles to the SE of the crash >>site, say at about the three thousand foot level. You wouldn't want to be on >>the peaks at roughly 4,200 feet since that would be a lot more work and might >>outline your vehicle on the skyline unless the visibility was bad the enitre >>time the vbehicle was present. >> >>The altitude is right -- you would want to have the beacon both high >>enough/near enough to be able to "swamp" the real signal coming from CV LCTR >>(or NDB KLP, as the case may be). >> >>***Of course, if the signal from CV had been shut off -- remember the person >>in charge of the navaids committed "suicide" the Saturday after the crash >>before he could be interviewed -- then there would be no need to "swamp" the >>signal from CV. Since then I havre confirmed that there ARE portable NDBs. >> There are at least two versions -- a 25 watt verrsion that is portable by >>one man and a higher powered version that would need a couple of guys, or >>perhaps a jeep, depending on how far you had to carry it. People have told >>me that the ADF/RMI in the aircraft will point to the strongest signal if >>more than one signal on the same frequency is detected.*** >> >>It turns out that if one draws a line FROM the KLP NDB TO the crash site >>(again, assuming Aviation Week's diagram/map is accurate) on a course of >>about 115 degrees true FROM the KLP NDB TO the crash site and extends this >>line to the SE, one finds that one reaches a roughly 3,000 foot high side >>slope approximately 5.5 miles past the crash site. It all works out rather >>nicely, but this doesn't mean there WAS spoofing, just that the geometry >>works out right. >> >>One other reason the geometry works out right is that the 2,300 foot altitude >>of the crash site is HIGHER than one would expect the aircraft to have been >>at that point in its approach (the whole idea is to have the aircraft hit the >>approximately 2,500 foot high hill and it wouldn't have done so unless it >>would have been below that altitude had it been following a more or less >>normal approach to the airport (which for this scenario we assume was the >>goal of the pilots on board). >> >>***The latest numbers I have indicate that the Hill itself was 2300 feet high >>and that the aircraft hit the hill at about the 2175 foot level. The Minimum >>Descent Altitude for an approach to Runway 12 is 2,150 feet, so the plane was >>just about exactly AT the MDA when it hit the hill. Good pilot practice on >>an approach like this one is to truck on down to the MDA relatively early in >>the approach (that is 3-4 miles BEFORE you expect to make the "go-around or >>land" decision at the MDA over the "inner" beacon 1.9 miles 300 degrees from >>the Runway 12 threshold. This gives you time to get all set in every other >>respect (height, speed, etc.) so you can concentrate better on the decision >>to land or execute a missed approach.*** >> >>One other point that fits nicely is that we would want to point of impact to >>be BEFORE the pilots expected to reach the runway. That is, if the crash >>site we were tyring to spoof the aircraft to was significantly PAST the >>runway threshold, the pilots might start thinking (based on the time their >>MDI reversed when they overflew KLP NDB some 11.8 miles FROM the runway to >>the Northwest [299 degrees true] ) Geez, we must be screwed up, we've flown >>past the runway for some reason and didn't see it. >> >>If the crew flew longer on their approach than they thought they should have >>they would get worried immediately since they would know of the roughly 4,000 >>foot peaks a few miles to the SE of the airport (on whose southern sideslopes >>our scenario indicates the "spoofing" beacon was located) and would doubtless >>go to full power to climb to avoid the mountains (better to also execute a >>radical turn to the right where the ground is lower), ascending rapidly from >>just over 2,000 feet to 5,000 or so. >> >>Thus, the location of the crash site at the 2,300 foot level of the roughly >>2,500 hill that is a somewhat shorter distance from KLP NDB than the runway >>threshold also fits nicely. >>***As indicate above the latest info is that the hill was 2,300 feet tall and >>that the impact height was 2,175 feet. This does not change the analysis one >>iota.*** >> >>One other little point that also fits nicely. The MDA (Minimum Decent >>Altitude -- the altitude below which one does not descend at a given >>location) over the CV LCTR (or, if you wish, the MDA at the equivalent >>bearing and distance from KLP NDB) is 2,150 feet. The crash site is roughly >>some 3/4 mile further along the aircraft's track than CV LCTR and guess what, >>the aircraft hit the hill at 2,300 feet some 18 seconds (.75 miles at >>roughtly 150 mph approach speed) after it would have passed over CV LCTR had >>it been on a normal course. Tentative Conclusion -- the USAF guys were doing >>fine, altitude wise had the approach been a normal unspoofed one -- they were >>still hanging a little above the MDA of 2,150 feet that exists at CV LCTR, >>but since the were off course to the left, they still hit the hill to the >>north at 2,300 feet. >> >>A couple of other comments. IF the aircraft grocompasses (and any other >>instruments indicating the plane's heading on impact -- when the crash would >>have frozen them) indicate the aircraft was on a true heading of 113 degrees >>true (or more to the right) rather than 120 (the runway heading) or more to >>the left, that would reinforce this scenario. Note that according to >>Aviation Week the wind was steady and right on the aircraft nose (from 120 >>degrees) at about 14 mph -- thus the pilots were facing no heavy cross wind >>that they had to continually adjust for, adjustments that would tend to place >>them on a different heading than 120. A little side issue -- flying on the >>"spoofed" beacon signal would have meant flying (from KLP NDB a heading of >>around 113 degrees. Would the pilots have notices this seven degree >>discrepancy as they were letting down or would one pilot be flying the beam >>and maintaining descent and the other pilot be looking out of the cockpit for >>ground references, making it tough to continuously check their heading by >>gyro. >> >>***Better figures for the 7 degree discrepacny now place the discrepancy at >>9-10 degrees, but the point still stands. The USAF Report issued 6/7 (copy >>on the way to me -- 7000+ pages) indicates that there WAS a crosswind at the >>altitude the pilots were flying afdter leaving KLP -- that is a corss wind >>spanning 4000-2000 feet MSL. The first mention of a cross wind I have heard >>(other than specualtion that a cross wind from the right would tend, >>obviously, to puch the plane to the left unless the pilots corrected for it) >>is apparently in the USAF report.*** >> >>It was reported over the AP wire yesterday that the Dubrovnik airport's >>navigation maintenance chief committed suicide at his home Saturday, three >>days after the crash. This is very speculative, but let's ask the question: >> Did the Dubrovnik airport have a backup beacon mounted in a vehicle? Did >>the maintenance chief put two and two together (or worse)? Another straw in >>the wind. >> >>Note that five aircraft landed in the 3-4 hours right before IFOR 21 (the >>Brown plane's call sign) and experienced no difficulty with the weather or >>with the navigation aids. The CT-43 [I assume the "C" means that it was >>designated as both a cargo transport and a trainer] in question was Boeing >>Line #347, Serial Number 20696 [the number on the wheel gear door was >>apparently 1194]. >> >>Anyway, speculation, but something worth checking out. . . >>========================================== >>Additional notes written 6/14 by Sprunt: >> >>I do have one comment on the expert's opinions pasted above. I agree >>completely that the landing gear is not lowered and full flaps are not set >>until the decision is made to actually land (that is, you reach the MDA, you >>see the runway, and therefore do NOT executre a missed approach. The reason >>for this is the severe drag imposed by the landing gear and full flaps -- you >>do not want to incur this drag unless you know you are going to make an >>actual attempt to land on the runway. >> >>I do differ in one respect re his comments on flaps [Remember that I am an >>"old slow and non-current" pilot]. I think it is quite possible that the >>pilots would have and should have put on PARTIAL flaps (first setting or >>maybe first and then second setting depending on how many options there are >>for flap settings on the aircraft) during the 9.9 mile approach from the out >>beacon (KLP) to the inner beacon (CV). This should have been done in my >>opinion to begin to slow the aircraft closer to landing speed in anticipation >>of landing. >> >>I do not know how many flap settings the 737-200 (USAF designation T-43A) >>had. I would guess three or four -- the full flap setting imposes a huge >>amount of drag for the additional lift and would not be put "on" until a >>landing committment was made for the reasons described above. Maybe by >>indicating "no flaps" the aritcle was merely indicating that "full flaps" had >>not been applied. Of course, the article could literally be correct -- maybe >>NO flaps at all had been put "on." I'll jsut have to wait and read the USAF >>reprot issued on 6/7. >> >>A story in the NY Times written 6/7" "Mr. Perry [Secretary of Defense] said >>that the Air Force had determined that a radio beacon on the approach to >>Dubbrovnik airport may not have been working on April 3, adding to the >>pilots' confusion in the final moments before the crash." Whoa! Context >>indicates that the reference to a nonworking beacon refers to the "inner" >>beacon (NOT to be confused with the inner marker of an ILS approach -- there >>was no working ILS at the Dubrovnik Airport), CV, 1.9 miles 300 degrees from >>the Runway 12 threshold. >> >>Was it not working because another beacon (the clone of CV located three-four >>miles past the impact point in the hills to the SE of the impact point) WAS >>working and spoofed the pilots of the Brown plane as described in the >>article. >> >>Note that one difficulty with the spoofing hypothesis is that it required a >>solid overcast with a bottom around or somewhat lower than the 2,000 feet AGL >>figure reported to the pilots on final (2,000 feet Above Ground Level is >>2,500 feet MSL -- above Mean Seal Level -- since the airport runway threshold >>is about 500 feet above MSL). If the bottom of the solid overcast were much >>higher, the mountain would have been seen by the pilots. Much lower and no >>one would be landing at the airport. >> >>Obviously, one cannot be sure that the Brown plane would be approaching the >>airport at a time when the ceiling was just about right for spoofing. Of >>course, other means could have been in reserve to bring the plane down if the >>ceiling had not been right. Furthermore, perhaps Brown's plane as such was >>not specifically targeted -- perhaps there was a longstanding desire on the >>part of someone to bring down an aircraft approaching the airport and the >>Brown plane merely presented a convenient target (cui bono?). >> >>The NYT Article goes on to state, "Only one of the two beacons for some >>reason was operating, or at least the plane was only picking up one of the >>two beacons." I have heard nothing indicating that the pilots of the five >>planes that landed before the Brown plane had any trouble picking up the >>inner beacon, CV. One of them landed ~35 minutes before the Brown flight >>would have landed at the airport. Wouldn't the tower KNOW if one of the two >>beacons went off the air? The NYT article indicates that the Craotians >>insist both bedacons were working. >> >>The article also notes that all the navaids were checked out nby an FAA >>aircraft a few days after the crash and found to have been working. The NDBs >>are not real hi-tech -- they merely put out an AM signal on a specific >>frequencuy. Not the sort of gadget to go sour -- unless of course its power >>supply was cut off. . . >> >>Why the uncertainty re was it not working or was it working and the Brown >>pilots did not hear it? Clearly the entire USAF report will be worth a quick >>skim and certain parts of it will merit careful study. >> >>A June 10 article in the NYT refers to the fact that neither the flaps nor >>the landing gear had been lowered -- confirming what the expert's post >>(pasted above) indicated. >> >>I hope to have the full Air Force report in my hands within a few days -- >>it's coming to me UPS ground. I checked in with the USAF PAO office at the >>Pentagon early this week and they indicated they would hold a full copy (35 >>pounds and 7,100 pages) for pickup for me. The fellow picking it up is >>shipping it to me UPS ground since it is so heavy! >> >>Warm regards, >>Hugh S. ================================================================== Hugh: I may not be as much of an expert as you may think. While I am familiar with USAF procedures I was never a USAF pilot and all of my flight experience is in small single engine prop planes. I do hold an instrument rating but it has been a long time since I have been current on instruments. A better expert would be a current Boeing 737 pilot and the best expert would be a current USAF T-43 pilot. As to the flaps being either fully retracted or partially lowered, I am just going by the USAF briefing on CNN that said the gear and flaps were retracted on impact. From a USAF pilot's standpoint, first concern would be the required procedure. If procedure allowed flap position to be optional at that point in the approach, you would want the flaps to be fully retracted until they had to be lowered so that a missed approach would be expedited. You can be sure that the pilots in question were set on a hair trigger for a missed approach, considering the local terrain and the type of approach (NDB) they were making. With a probable crosswind at altitude the 10 +/- degree discrepancy would not be so noticeable as the wind correction applied would make the heading close to 120 while tracking inbound to the clone CV NDB. A portable NDB would more likely be military (or CIA) equipment than civilian airport equipment. The height of the ceiling, as you say, was critical to the clone CV scenario. A thorough investigation (not likely to occur) would review Brown's entire itinerary and look for alternate hit possibilities, then look for possible evidence of contingency hit plans which did not need to be activated. For example, once on the ground, was there a point in the schedule where Brown or a small group including Brown would be placed in a good position for some other type of 'accident'? As to whether KLP or CV was being used for guidance: if you are tracking outbound from KLP and you know you will have to switch to CV for final approach fix crossing indication, you would want to switch to CV as soon as possible after crossing KLP (1) in the interest of planning ahead, always a good idea on an approach and (2) to avoid the requirement to think 'upside down' to track outbound from an NDB (figuring your wind correction angle mentally is easier when tracking inbound to, rather than outbound from an NDB. While the pilots were supposedly current on NDB approaches through training, nobody likes NDB approaches because more modern approach navaids are much easier to use.) Please let me know exactly what the USAF report has to say about the USAF having determined that CV may not have been working (when the other aircraft apparently experienced no problem receiving a useable signal from CV). In CT-43, the C placed before the T means that the aircraft was originally configured as a (navigator) trainer and was later reconfigured to a cargo (passenger) aircraft. I question that the official designation might be VCT-43, indicating VIP transport. Please fax me a copy of your article (what magazine?) to 210 342-4867. I will be glad to discuss with you any other details that may be of interest. for Liberty, Bill ================================================================== * Patriot Information Mailing List * http://constitution.org/piml/piml.htm * A service to help inform those who have an active interest in * returning our federal and state governments to limited, * constitutional government * Send messages for consideration and possible posting to * butterb@sagenet.net (Bill Utterback). * To subscribe or unsubscribe, send message with subject line * "subscribe patriot" or "unsubscribe patriot" * Forwarded messages sent on this mailing list are NOT verified. * See World's Smallest Political Quiz: www.self-gov.org/quiz.html * Libertarian is to LIBERTY as librarian is to library (DePena) * PIML grants permission to copy and repost this message * in its entirety with headers and trailers left intact.