CHAPTERS XXIX-XXXVII

SECULAR ADMINISTRATION

We have completed our discussion of the ecclesiastical administration of the magistrate, and turn now to secular or civil administration. Secular administration is the process by which the magistrate rightly and faithfully attends to the civil functions of the second table of the Decalogue. These pertain to the establishment and conservation of good order, proper discipline, and self-sufficiency in the commonwealth, and to the extension of the advantages and aids of this life and the avoidance of disadvantages....

In this administration of justice the magistrate should always and regularly observe that moderation is exercised, and that the right of each member of the commonwealth is conserved, neither diminished nor increased to the detriment of another. The imperium of the king ought not to be so enlarged that the liberty of the people is suppressed. Nor should the orders and estates be so amplified that they treat the king with contempt and violate the populace. Nor should popular licence be permitted to the extent that it reduces respect for the king or upsets the affairs of the commonwealth.

The responsibility of the magistrate in this civil administration of the functions of the realm is twofold. It pertains, first, to the general right (jus generale), and concerns the management of the necessary means for conserving justice, peace, tranquillity, and discipline in the commonwealth. It pertains, secondly, to the special right (jus speciale), and concerns the management of the means necessary for procuring advantages for the social life.[1] General right, in turn, involves (1) the enactment and execution of useful laws, and the administration of justice, or nomoqesia and dikaiodosia ,[2] and (2) the endeavour to preserve concord....[3]

The enactment of law is the process by which the magistrate, with the consent of the optimates and estates of his imperium and realm, legislates what is fair, useful, and necessary to the commonwealth.[4] The magistrate shall especially see that the customs, temperament, and ancient rights of the nation are respected, and that new laws are accommodated to them. Moderation is thus to be exercised in writing new laws and edicts, and the wishes of those who must maintain these laws — that is, of the optimates and counsellors of the realm — are to be ascertained. In the time of the monarchy, the Roman emperors enacted laws with the counsel of the senate, and in the time of the democracy laws were enacted through the classes and centurial divisions, a proposed law having been made public for seventeen days. So today general laws are produced in councils. It would be a sign of indiscretion and foolish arrogance for one man or a few to presume so much upon themselves that they considered themselves to be able to produce laws sufficiently suitable to a nation without its consent and the united judgments and counsels of many persons.[5]

The magistrate should enact law that is equitable and useful. Equity makes law efficacious, august, and inviolable. Utility calls forth and retains an appreciation and respect for law....

The magistrate shall interpret the fundamental laws of the realm in keeping with the counsel of the ephors, and shall not abolish, annul, or reject something in them except with the expressed judgment, will, and command of the ephors. Much less shall he change, overthrow, or abolish laws concerning the legitimate worship of God once it has been introduced into the realm. Rather shall he strengthen true religion and its practice, not according to the mandates of men, but the Word of God. Finally, he shall uphold and defend the fundamental laws of the realm by force and arms, if necessary, even if he shall thereby be pitted with one part of the realm against another, albeit a majority....

Law should be accurately and precisely executed. For law without execution is like a bell without a clapper. It would be as if the magistrate were mute or dead. And commonwealths thrive only so long as good laws, which are the soul of a commonwealth, are respected in them. The magistrate has been constituted for the sake of executing law, and in this sense he is a living law....

There are two species of the execution of law: the administration of justice, and censorship.[6] The administration of justice consists in rendering to each his due according to corrective or distributive justice. Corrective justice presupposes equality or arithmetic proportion. Distributive justice, on the other hand, observes geometric proportion in its assignment of punishments and rewards....[7] The magistrate shall apply punishments to evil doers who offend against the first or second table of the Decalogue in order that others who witness them may become apprehensive and be deterred from evil-doing by the fear of punishment. Thus the desire and courage to sin are lessened in others.... He shall distribute rewards to the upright who properly deserve them in order that the love and desire for virtue may be stimulated, nourished, and retained among others. When honours and rewards are granted to the unworthy, renown is not esteemed and dies, and there is no stimulus to virtue. But reward is the food, nourishment, and incentive of virtue. The desire to do good and to receive renown is implanted by nature in man, for the sake of which he will attempt the most demanding things. And rivalry in virtue is nourished by the example of honour to another, so that rewards accomplish much more than punishments....

The administration of justice is twofold. One part of it takes place between the magistrate and the subjects. The other occurs between one subject and another. The first part holds that the people should give to the magistrate what they owe him, and on the other hand, that the magistrate should render to the people what he owes them. The subjects owe everything to the magistrate that is necessary for the administration of justice, for the defence of the subjects against violence and injury, for the removal of perils and disadvantages to the fatherland, and for the promotion of its benefits. The second part contains those things that pertain to the guardianship of subjects. By removing abuse, circumventing deceit, and punishing evil-doers, conflicts are resolved. The magistrate himself ought to judge conflicts and controversies between his subjects, and to appoint other pious and honest men as judges. As far as he is able, he should become acquainted in his own person with these conflicts, and judge them according to the properly acknowledged processes of law.... Other judges should be appointed by the supreme magistrate for less important cases in the administration of justice, and should be given the power and jurisdiction necessary for the fulfilment of their responsibilities....

It is useful to make court proceedings public because greater respect is thereby produced for their decisions, and those persons who are in similar situations become apprehensive when instructed by such examples and learn from them not to stir up controversy. Judges also are afraid to render corrupt decisions as long as they know public censure may be brought to bear.... The power of appealing freely to the superior magistrate from these intermediary and inferior judges ought to be granted persons who consider themselves to have been unfairly treated in a judgment against their right. The supreme magistrate should therefore establish a supreme tribunal and consistory for appellate cases. Cases that are said to be wrongly decided are accepted, examined, and ruled upon in this appellate tribunal by a number of judges from the various estates and orders of the realm. From this tribunal there is no power of appeal. This superior tribunal is said to belong not so much to the supreme magistrate as to the entire realm. For in it the king and ephors, or estates and orders of the entire realm, deliver judgments in the name of the realm, or learned and pious men judge in their name....

Censorship is the inquisition into and chastisement of those morals and luxuries that are not prevented or punished by laws, but which corrupt the souls of subjects or squander their goods unproductively.[8]

Therefore, censorship corrects the things that are not yet worthy of legal punishment, but when neglected or treated with disdain furnish the cause of many and great evils....

Among us today the censorship and inquisition of morals is customarily entrusted to the sacred collegium, or the presbytery. Whoever does not obey it is forbidden by it to attend sacred services, so that he becomes ashamed by this disgrace and exclusion.[9] If he is contemptuous of this exclusion and excommunication, he is accused of the contemptuous offence by an officer of the court before the magistrate, by whom he is deservedly punished.[10] Among the Jews it would seem that the right of censorship, even over kings, was entrusted to the prophets, as becomes apparent from the example of Samuel,[11] as well as of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others....[12] The Romans are also observed to have had censors of their morals. The Spartans had their ephors as censors of kings. And to these ephors, optimates, and leaders of the orders of the realm was given the right and power of censorship over the supreme magistrate himself.

The form and practice of censorship consist of inquisition and stigmatization. Inquisition occurs with respect to vices that do not come into the courts because of the lack of an accuser or denouncer, and yet offend the eyes of good and pious citizens. For the sake of example, these vices receive a most serious rebuke and notation, even though recourse is not had to legal punishment. Such vices are bad morals and luxuries. I understand bad morals to include depraved actions, lewdness, wantonness, drunkenness, brawls, errors, schisms, heresies, perjury, and anything else that probity and modesty condemn in every age and sex by which subjects are pauperized by the misuse of their goods or depraved and corrupted by vices.... Luxury, on the authority of Lipsius, appears in respect to four things, namely, money, housing, food, and clothes....

The stigmatization of censorship is the public declaration of shame and disgrace, possibly with some kind of fine, administered by the censor because of a less than decent life....

Chastisement and reproach by our censors, that is, by the presbyters, consist in suspension from the use of the sacraments, and prohibition and excommunication from the fellowship of the pious.... These are the steps to be observed by censors; first admonition, then corrective action or fines, and lastly, if these are disregarded, excommunication. Such ecclesiastical discipline is rightly called the teacher of virtue, the custodian of faith, the walls and bulwark of piety, and the bond and sinew of the church....

Where there is no such censorship, the life of the prince, if it is moral and pious, can be put forth and established in its place. For Pliny rightly said that the life of the prince is the censure of citizens, which when constant directs and transforms us.[13]

It is also important that not everything be corrected at once, but gradually. For as Cicero says, none of us can be changed quickly. Nor can one's life be altered or his character transformed suddenly. Some evils the prince can remove more easily if he is patient with them. Shame changes some men for the better, necessity others, and satiation still others. For the souls of some men journey into evil, but do not remain there....[14]

So much for the administration of justice and for censorship. We turn now to the endeavour to conserve concord and tranquillity in public life. Concord and tranquillity consist in consensus, peace, and good will among subjects and between subjects and their magistrate, without mutual deceits or hatreds, for the purpose of preserving the public entity.[15] They are absolutely necessary in a commonwealth. For nothing is better for a commonwealth than unity, and nothing worse than divisiveness. Therefore, concord is rightly called the unconquerable bulwark of the commonwealth....

The care of this concord is entrusted to the magistrate. He should conserve it by removing all causes of factions and seditions, and by entering into alliances with neighbouring countries. For a city or commonwealth is like the physical body. Civil disturbances are its sicknesses, and the king or magistrate is its doctor. His first responsibility is to preserve it in good health, and his second is to restore it to good health if it has been weakened by illnesses. Consequently, the magistrate is called the custodian of the common society.

In every conflict between persons, in every faction and sedition, there are always two different parties. One defends the laws and rights of the commonwealth against those who act unjustly. The other resorts to force without adequate reason. When a faction or sedition is confirmed by an oath, it is called a conjuration; when organized around a covenant, it is called a conspiracy.

A faction is a conspiracy or union of a few or of many in dissension with other citizens. If the people divides into more than two factions — into three, four, or five factions — friendship alliances will combine them into two; or else one united with another will subdue and overcome the others. Factions have their origin in the private and public hatreds of different families, or in ambition, arguments, discord, animosities, jealousies, and sinister suspicions. In former times such factions existed between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines, the Samaritans and the Jews, and the Israelites and the Judeans....

The magistrate overcomes factions when he destroys the seeds that cause them — hatred, ambition, arguments, jealousies, strife — and reconciles the parties. He does this when he takes precautions that one party does not act abusively toward another, nor provoke it with words; when he does not permit intermediate magistrates and rulers to nourish hatreds and factions among themselves; when he anticipates and heads off by just means the envy that arises from virtue and renown; and when he defends good men from the calumny and injury of the envious. For a small spark when neglected has often started a great fire. Secondly, he should abolish the names and insignia of factions. Thirdly, he should not permit secret deliberations and meetings....

Sedition is the dissention of a united group against the magistrate, or the sudden and violent uprising against the magistrate.... There are various causes of sedition. The first is excessive and unusual taxation by which the magistrate impoverishes his subjects, especially when imposed for unnecessary expenses.... The second cause of sedition is the fear of those who have done harm and are afraid of punishment.... The third cause is excessive indulgence and laxity, or the distress and indigence of the poor, as well as excessive riches. Great riches produce luxury, sloth, a desire for political changes, and disorders. Poverty causes the same desire for political changes, a large number of crimes, and many disgraceful things....[16]

The remedies by which sedition may be overcome are either general or special. Peter Gregory sets forth three general remedies.[17] First is precaution, prevention, and foresight that seditions do not occur. The second is appropriate corrective measures when they do arise. The third is penalties and exemplary punishment of seditious persons.... There are two special remedies for overcoming sedition. The first is negotiation and compromise, and the second is civil war....

The removal of factions and seditions is the first means of conserving concord. The other, as I have said, is alliances. An alliance with neighbouring countries is entered into for the sake of peace, tranquillity, and concord, or of aid against enemies....

This concludes the discussion of the secular administration of the general right, that is, of the office of the magistrate in administering the means for conserving justice, peace, concord, and discipline among the subjects and inhabitants. We turn now to the administration of the special right, that is, to the administration of the means for procuring advantages to the social life, or for avoiding disadvantages to it. The administration of these special rights involves the care and direction of (1) commercial activity, (2) money, (3) language, (4) duties and privileges, (5) public security, (6) councils of the realm, and (7) arms and war....[18]

A universal council is a meeting of each and all members and estates of the realm called for the purpose of deliberating and making decisions about the condition and welfare of the common universal association, of averting troubles to it, and of attending to and improving its advantages. This council is called a universal meeting, a senate of the imperium or realm, an assembly of the realm, an epitome of the realm, ein Reichstag, ein gemeine Reichsversamlung.

The requisites of a legitimate council are (1) a purpose or matter to be acted upon in the council, (2) personnel, (3) a time and place, and (4) an order and form for holding the council. The purposes for which an assembly is held are those that concern the entire realm or associated body, one or more estates, or the subjects of the realm. Some of these purposes are grave and difficult. They relate to religion and divine worship, war, establishing peace and public tranquillity, taxes and collections, money, the ordering of political and ecclesiastical affairs, commerce, safe conduct and transit privileges, the supreme court of the realm, tyranny, public goods, and other rights of the realm. Some purposes are principally private in nature, such as the right of discussion, the possession of a castle, public violence, disagreements between estates, privileges, and the like.

The persons who hold an assembly and come together in council are twofold, namely, the supreme administrator or magistrate of the realm, and all the representatives of the realm. The supreme magistrate presides over universal councils. Whence he has the right of directing and governing the whole proceeding: the right of calling a universal and ecumenical assembly, the right of proposing the things that are to be transacted, the right of gathering the members' opinions, the right of promulgating those things that have been decided by the assembly, and the right of adjourning it. The supreme magistrate, either in his own person or through others, carries out all those things in which the direction of the council consists.

The right of calling an assembly and convoking the estates and orders is carried out by letters of announcement and summons sent to the individual estates of the realm. In these letters are contained the purpose of the assembly, and the time and place of it. Thereby those who are called can study the purpose and come instructed and informed, as well as know when and where they are to come.

The proposition is the public declaration delivered vocally in the presence of all the orders that defines the purpose for which the assembly has been called together. The rogation is the collecting of the judgments of the deliberating and consulting estates. The promulgation of the things decided in the assembly is the reading aloud in the presence of all the orders of decisions confirmed by signed and sealed documents, and then their publication throughout the entire realm.

The representatives of the realm called to the assembly are partly consultants, deliberants, and judges, partly petitioners, complainers, and defenders of their own interests in the matter at hand. The persons who consult and render opinions are all the members of the realm, or the estates and orders organized in their various collegia, or legates who have a mandate from these estates to perform this function. It is best that the collegia of the orders be of an uneven number in order that disagreement can be resolved between differing opinions of the orders by a majority vote, and that something definite can thereby be established. Or if the number is even, it is necessary that the supreme magistrate be granted a vote. By this means controversy is overcome and a definite decision is made. It is advisable that there be both ecclesiastical and secular persons in each collegium of the orders or estates, that each collegium have its own chamber, and that all the collegia combined have one common chamber. Those persons who have been called to the council and do not come lose their vote for this occasion. Those who are present reach their conclusions in their individual collegia either by unanimous consensus or by a majority of those voting.

All the members of the realm are also expected to be petitioners and to make complaints. For it is permitted to all to complain freely in that estate in which they abide. And anyone who wishes to denounce things that need correction in the commonwealth is to be patiently heard. Thus the superior is informed about the state of the commonwealth and realm by such denunciations, and can discuss with the assembled orders the means by which the wants of the commonwealth can be relieved, its perils and disadvantages averted and removed, its advantages increased, and common support and aid made available. Those who defend their own interests are to be heard so that an injustice may not be committed against innocent persons.

The place of the assembly is determined at the discretion of the person who calls it. Those who are called should be able to come to it conveniently and safely, and to find adequate lodging there. Or else it should be held where a remedy can best be found for some troubled part or estate of the commonwealth. Whence the place is to be decided according to discretion and the usual practice. The time of holding the assembly is also discretionary and according to custom.

The general order and form of holding this assembly is that, after prayers have been said, an address is made concerning the matter to be decided, or else both sides of the issue are set forth, argued, and considered. The voting is first within the orders meeting separately in their collegia, and then in a combined public session of the collegia. Opinions are asked for, listened to, compared, pondered, and examined. When all or a majority agree, a common judgment is established by which even a minority with another opinion is bound.... The opinion of the combined orders and estates prevails over the opinion of the presiding officer or the supreme magistrate. For greater is the authority and power in the many than in the one who has been constituted by the many and is less than they are. Many are also better able than one to see, understand, and judge. One is more likely than many to err and to be deceived, or to be carried away by feelings to make decisions that are not suitable. What is sought by many is more easily achieved, and what is decided by the authority of many is carried out and defended with greater concord, respect, and fidelity. Then too, if the opinion of the supreme magistrate, when contrary to the opinion of the orders and estates individually and collectively, were alone to be promulgated as the opinion of the universal council, then this council would be made useless....

From all these things it is apparent that the use of assemblies was introduced because of the most just and necessary reasons. For the welfare of the people and the excellence of counsel depend upon a large number of prudent men, as Solomon says. Then it is an aspect of liberty that an enterprise should be administered with the counsel and authority of those who bear the danger of it, and supply the capabilities, support, goods, and spirit for it. Furthermore, the voices of individuals are less heeded than those of an entire province. Indeed, the voice of the realm is heeded most clearly, and its request is sufficiently powerful that the prince, even if he wishes, cannot fail to listen to it. Also, there are some public matters that cannot reasonably be handled by individuals. Rather they can best be investigated, deliberated, and settled by the whole to whom the matters at hand are better known than they would be to one or a certain few. Moreover, the prince or the supreme magistrate retains the favour of his subjects by the use of assemblies because the subjects thereby see themselves as not excluded from the care and administration of the commonwealth, and they do not suspect evil counsel to be the cause when an activity perchance does not go well. But if none of the subjects is admitted to the counsels of the prince in difficult matters, the subjects would consider themselves to be despised, and would develop a hatred against the prince. Finally, those who have great influence with the king and hold major positions in the realm are held to their responsibilities by the fear of a council in which the demands of cities and others are heard. Whence the spirit of liberty is retained through this right of holding assemblies, and a remedy is thereby found for the machinations of the mighty, the flatterers, the unjust, and the greedy. Francis Hotman presents many examples of this....[19]

The care of arms is the process by which the supreme magistrate keeps his forces always prepared and ready so that if an unexpected emergency should arise, or a hostile force should suddenly attack, he can defend the commonwealth and realm from harm and destruction.

The care and handling of arms is twofold. One function of it is exercised in time of peace, and the other in time of war.[20] The care and handling of arms in time of peace is the programme by which the citizens are trained in the arts of war at a time when there is no war, or by which the science of waging war is demonstrated to subjects and they are given practice in military exercises....

We turn now to the care and handling of arms in time of war. War is a hostile action legitimately undertaken and administered by the magistrate for the sake of preserving or seeking peace, and for deterring injury or defending the commonwealth against its enemies by force and arms....[21] War is therefore a general state of strife, and a proceeding in which two conflicting peoples who submit to no common magistrate settle their controversy by force and arms.[22]

The conduct of war contains two parts, namely, the undertaking and the waging of war.[23] The undertaking of war is the process by which the just principles and foundations of war are laid out and examined. Such are the just cause of war and the necessary preparation for war. A just cause of war is considered to be one that depends upon both right and the authority of the supreme magistrate. The causes of war that rely upon right are (1) defence of liberty and of one's rights, and repulsion of a launched attack, (2) defence of the pure religion, (3) recovery of properties unjustly seized, (4) denial of justice, and (5) conspiracy with an enemy, and rebellion....[24] But these causes can easily be reduced to two, the first of which is defence and the other vindication. The former repulses and the latter vindicates injury launched against God, the commonwealth, its subjects, or the church. I understand defence to be either of your own nation or of another.... Vindication is a legitimate cause for war when a judgment and recovery of what has been seized has not yet taken place....

The authority of the supreme magistrate in undertaking war, and the agreement of the orders of the realm, are so necessary for the waging of war that without them a war is said to be unjustly and unlawfully undertaken. This authority to undertake war ought not to be employed by the magistrate unless all other remedies have failed, and there is no other way to repel an attack upon his subjects, to avoid and vindicate injustice to them, or to obtain peace and tranquillity in the realm....

There are two cases in which even an inferior magistrate without consulting his superior can undertake war. The first is when he is assaulted unjustly by another force and defends himself and his subjects against violent invasion. The second is when the superior magistrate does not do his duty, or exercises tyranny over his subjects.[25]

But before undertaking war a magistrate should first check his own judgment and reasoning, and offer prayers to God to arouse and direct the spirit and mind of his subjects and himself to the well-being, utility, and necessity of the church and community, and to avoid all rashness and injustice....

The necessary preparation for war is the procurement of all that is required for the prosecution of war, together with a declaration of war. Things and persons are required for prosecution of the war. Necessary things for war are money, arms, supplies, and the removal of goods by which the enemy can be benefited.... The persons necessary for war are officers and soldiers....

The waging of war is the execution by military actions of that which has been legitimately undertaken. It can be called the conduct or administration of war. Military or warlike actions are those that are used to break the forces and strength of the enemy and to attain victory. These are the establishment of military discipline, and the inflicting of wartime losses upon the enemy and the avoidance of the same to oneself. Military discipline is the training of the soldier to a hardy and brave life, as established by the leader of the war.... The other action of war is the inflicting of losses by soldiers. These losses result from the pillaging of enemy lands, the siege of places and towns belonging to the enemy, combat, fire and demolition of villages and fortified places, deaths, captivities, and other similar war-inflicted disasters, miseries, and injuries....

This completes our discussion of the civil administration of the public functions of the realm. We turn now to the civil administration of public and private things of the realm. The civil administration of public things — of which the ownership and usufruct belong to the people — is the process by which the supreme magistrate, serving as curator, guardian, and father, prudently employs and distributes these things in the service of the commonwealth according as the need and utility of the realm require. He receives these things from the people, which remains their owner. Only the management of them has been granted to him by the general mandate of the people or realm....

The necessity of disbursing public things of the realm or associated body is twofold. One is the maintenance of the magistrate. The other is the administration of public functions requiring outlays and expenses. Maintenance of the magistrate suitable to his person, office, dignity, and splendour requires expenses for food, fine and distinguished clothes, and for employment of servants and attendants.... The administration of things of the realm is the other reason for making outlays. For expenses are required in the administration of the functions of the realm and in paying salaries and stipends for food, housing, and clothing of ministers, overseers, officers, princes, and others who are necessary to maintain the government of the commonwealth....

Although the rule is that the magistrate cannot alienate the goods of the realm by any manner or means, or dispose of them in his will, nevertheless when public necessity and utility require he should be able to alienate them for any of three principal reasons. The first occurs when he has children. For then he can make one of them his heir, and give the remaining children other goods for their possession, but without the latter holding the right of royal power or the right of succession.... The second reason for the alienation of things is war or ransom for himself, or other causes such as dowries in the event of matrimony. The third reason is the necessary defence of the commonwealth for which only the sale of property will avail.... For no other reasons, however, can the magistrate alienate the goods of the commonwealth, especially the cities, towns, and other places of the realm, which he can least of all remove from his imperium and jurisdiction. Nor can he grant to any of them privileges freeing them from obedience....

Next is the care of the goods of private men that is entrusted to the magistrate with respect to their protection and defence against violence and injury. Private goods are of three sorts. The first are life and physical safety. The second are honour and reputation. And the third are outward goods....


1. [General right is discussed in Chapters XXIX-XXXI and special right in Chapters XXXII-XXXVI. The latter refers to provisions for commerce, a monetary system, an official language, special duties and privileges, public security, councils of the realm, and military matters.]

2. [the making of law and the administration of justice.]

3. [Chapters XXIX-XXX and XXXI respectively.]

4. In Psalm 108: 9 Judah is called a legislator because of the power entrusted to it of making and administering laws for the realm. [The Tremellius-Junius translation of the Old Testament from the Hebrew into Latin (Frankfurt on the Main, 1579) renders the last line of Psalm 108: 9 (108: 8 in the R.S.V.) as 'Judah is my legislator'.]

5. See Innocent Gentillet, Against Nicholas Machiavell, III, theor. 22; Junius Brutus, Defence of Liberty Against Tyrants, quest, 1 and 3.

6. [Althusius devotes the rest of Chapter XXIX to the administration of justice, and the whole of Chapter XXX to censorship.]

7. [Aristotle, Ethics, 1130b30-1132b 20.]

8. [Althusius draws heavily from the Bible in this discussion of censorship, and then most often these contemporary writings: Jean Bodin, The Commonweale; Peter Gregory, De Republica; Justus Lipsius, Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae; Philip Camerarius, Meditationes historicae; Wilhelm Zepper, De politia ecclesiastica; and Benedict Aretius, Problemata theologica.]

9. I Corinthians 5.

10. Matthew 18.

11. I Samuel 12-14.

12. Jeremiah 1: 10; 20; I Kings 17: 1; II Kings 3: 13. With a sharp censure Jeroboam was rebuked by a prophet (I Kings 13), Asa by Hanani (II Chronicles 16), and David by Nathan (II Samuel 12). So Jeremiah reprimanded the people and the king (Jeremiah 17: 20), Elijah rebuked Ahab (I Kings 18), and John the Baptist rebuked Herod (Matthew 14), and Elisha rebuked the king of Israel (II Kings 3).

13. [Pliny the Younger], Panegyric on Trajan.

14. As Lipsius teaches from Seneca and others. See also Peter Gregory, De republica, IV, 12; Lambert Daneau, Politices christianae, VI, 4.

15. See Novel IV; Digest I, 18, 13.

16. [Althusius presents seven more causes of sedition: unfairness in the administration of justice, ambition for office, conflict of religion, the admission of foreigners with different customs to the social life, factions among the people, idleness that comes from excessive abundance, and certain persons who would overthrow imperium in the name of liberty.]

17. De republica, XXXIII, 9. [The extensive discussion of these general reasons is drawn largely from Gregory, and is omitted in this translation except for the initial listing of them.]

18. [The first five are discussed in Chapter XXXII, the sixth in Chapter XXXIII, and the seventh in Chapters XXXIV-XXXVI. All seven have already been set forth in Chapters X-XVII on 'Secular Communication'. The present discussion of the last two contains new material that is of some importance in understanding the structure of Althusius' political thought, and is therefore partly included in this translation.]

19. De antiquo jure regni Gallici, I, 14. [The remainder of Chapter XXXIII is devoted to long discussions of universal councils in ancient Israel, Greece, and Rome, and in contemporary Germany, France, England, Belgium and the Netherlands, Poland, and the free city of Venice.]

20. [Chapters XXXIV and XXXV-XXXVI respectively.]

21. So Georg Obrecht defines it. [De bello.]

22. So Lambert Daneau says. [Politices christianae.]

23. [Chapters XXXV and XXXVI respectively.]

24. See what I have said in Chapter XI [XVI in the 1614 edition, XIII in the 1603 edition]. Also see the following writers: Lambert Daneau, Politices christianae, VI, 3; Justus Lipsius, Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae, V, 4; Diego Covarruvias, Regulae peccatum, II, sect. 10; Henry Bocer, De jure belli, I, 5; Peter Gregory, De republica, XI, 1 and 2; Elias Reusner, Stratagematographia, I, 10; Peter Martyr, The Common Places, IV, 16-18 and Commentarii (Judges 11). For examples of just wars see Genesis 14; I Kings 30; I Chronicles 10; Nehemiah 4; I Samuel 11; and throughout the books of Kings and Chronicles.

25. See Chapters XVIII and XXXVIII.