WEDNESDAY, June 4, 1788.



Mr. HARRISON reported, from the committee of privileges and elections, that 

the committee had, according to order, examined the returns for electing 

delegates to serve in this Convention, and had come to a resolution 

thereupon, which he read in his place, and afterwards delivered in at the 

clerk's table, where the same was again twice read, and agreed to by the 

house, as followeth: -- 



Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee, That the returns for 

electing delegates to serve in this Convention for the counties of 

Albemarle, Amelia, Amherst, Bedford, Botetourt, Burnswick, Buckingham, 

Caroline, Charlotte, Charles City, Chesterfield, Culpepper, Cumberland, 

Dinwiddie, Elizabeth City, Fauquier, Fairfax, Fayette, Fluvanna, Frederick, 

Gloucester, Goochland, Greenbrier, Greenesville, Halifax, Hampshire, Hardy, 

Harrison, Hanover, Henrico, Henry, James City, Jefferson, Isle of Wight, 

King George, King and Queen, King William, Lancaster, Lincoln, Loudon, 

Louisa, Lunenberg, Madison, Mecklenburgh, Mercer, Middlesex, Monongalia, 

Montgomery, Nansemond, New Kent, Nelson, Norfolk, Northampton, 

Northumberland, Ohio, Orange, Pittsylvania, Princess Anne, Prince George, 

Prince William, Prince Edward, Powhatan, Randolph, Richmond, Rockbridge, 

Rockingham, Russell, Shenandoah, Southampton, Spottsylvania, Stafford, 

Surry, Sussex, Warwick, Washington, York, and of a delegate for the borough 

of Norfolk and city of Williamsburg, are satisfactory.



Mr. HARRISON reported, from the committee of privileges and elections, -- 



That the committee had inquired into the elections of delegates for the 

counties of Accomack and Franklin, and had agreed to a report, and come to 

several resolutions thereupon, which he read in his place, and afterwards 

delivered in at the clerk's table, where the same were again twice read, and 

agreed to by the house, as followeth: -- 



It appears to your committee, that no returns have been made of the 

election of delegates to serve in this Convention for counties of Accomack 

and Franklin; that, as to the election of delegates for the said county of 

Accomack, it appears from the information of Nathaniel Darby and Littleton 

Eyre, Esquires, that they were at the election of delegates for the said 

county of Accomack, in March last, and that George Parker and Edmund Custis, 

Esquires, (the sitting members,) were proclaimed by the sheriff, at the 

close of the poll, as duly elected delegates to represent the said county in 

this Convention.



That, as to the election of delegates for the said county of Franklin, it 

appears to your committee, from the information of Robert Williams, Esquire, 

that he was at the election of delegates for the said county of Franklin, in 

March last, and that John Early and Thomas Arthurs, Esquires, (the sitting 

members,) were proclaimed by the sheriff, at the close of the poll, as duly 

elected delegates to represent the said county of Accomack in this 

Convention.



{6} Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee, that John Early and 

Thomas Arthurs, Esquires, were elected delegates to represent the said 

county of Franklin in this Convention.



Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee, that Edmund Custis and 

George Parker, Esquires, were elected delegates to represent the said county 

of Accomack in this Convention.



Ordered, That Mr. Madison and Mr. Lawson be added to the committee of 

privileges and elections.



Mr. ARCHIBALD STUART presented a petition of Samuel Anderson, of the county 

of Cumberland, setting forth, -- 



That Thomas H. Drew, Esquire, one of the delegates returned for the said 

county to serve in this Convention, was not, at the time of his election, a 

freeholder in this commonwealth; and praying that the election of the said 

Thomas H. Drew may be set aside, and another election directed to supply his 

place; which was read, and ordered to be referred to the committee of 

privileges and elections.



The Convention, according to the order of the day, resolved itself into a 

committee of the whole Convention, to take into consideration the proposed 

plan of government, Mr. Wythe in the chair.



Mr. HENRY moved, -- 



That the act of Assembly appointing deputies to meet at Annapolis to 

consult with those from some other states, on the situation of the commerce 

of the United States -- the act of Assembly appointing deputies to meet at 

Philadelphia, to revise the Articles of Confederation -- and other public 

papers relative thereto -- should be read.



Mr. PENDLETON then spoke to the following effect: Mr. Chairman, we are not 

to consider whether the federal Convention exceeded their powers. It strikes 

my mind that this ought not to influence our deliberations. This 

Constitution was transmitted to Congress by that the Convention; by the 

Congress transmitted to our legislature; by them recommended to the people; 

the people have sent us hither to determine whether this government be a 

proper one or not. I did not expect these papers would have been brought 

forth. Although those gentlemen were only directed to consider the defects 

of the old system, and not devise a new one, if they found it so thoroughly 

defective as not to admit a revising, and submitted a new system to our 

consideration, which the people have deputed us to investigate, I cannot 

find any degree of propriety in reading those papers.



Mr. HENRY then withdrew his motion.



The clerk proceeded to read the preamble, and the two first sections of the 

first article.



                       {7} PREAMBLE.



We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, 

establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common 

defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to 

ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for 

the United States.



                    House of Representatives.



Art. 1. Sect. 1. -- All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested 

in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and 

House of Representatives.



Sect. 2. -- The House of Representatives shall be composed of members 

chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the 

electors in each state shall have the qualifications for electors of the 

most numerous branch of the state legislature.



No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the age 

of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, 

and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he 

shall be chosen.



Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several 

states which may be included within this Union, according to their 

respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number 

of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and 

excluding Indians not taxed three fifths of all other persons. The actual 

enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the 

Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten 

years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of 

representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each 

state shall have at least one representative; and until such enumeration 

shall be made, the state of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, 

Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, 

Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, 

Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South 

Carolina five, and Georgia three. When vacancies happen in the 

representation from any state, the executive authority thereof shall issue 

writs of election to fill such vacancies.



The House of Representatives shall choose their speaker and other officers, 

and shall have the sole power of impeachment.



Mr. NICHOLAS. Mr. Chairman, the time being now come when this state is to 

decide on this important question, of rejecting or receiving this plan of 

government, it gave me great pleasure, yesterday, when the Convention 

determined to proceed with the fullest deliberation on the subject; as 

every gentleman will, in the course of the discussion, have an opportunity 

to urge every objection that may arise in his mind against this system. I 

beg gentlemen to offer all their objections here, and that none may be 

insisted on elsewhere; and I hope nothing urged without these walls will 

influence the mind of any one. If this part of the plan now under 

consideration be materially defective, I will readily {8} agree it ought to 

be wholly rejected, because representation is the corner-stone on which the 

whole depends; but if, on investigation, it should be found to be otherwise, 

the highest gratitude should be shown to those gentlemen who framed it: 

although some small defects may appear in it, yet its merits, I hope, will 

amply cover those defects.



I shall take it into consideration, 1st, as it affects the qualifications 

of the electors; 2dly, as it affects the qualifications of the elected; 

3dly, as to their number; 4thly, the time of their continuance in office; 

5thly, their powers; and 6thly, whether this power be sufficient to enable 

them to discharge their duty without diminishing the security of the people 

-- or, in other words, their responsibility.



I will consider it first, then, as to the qualifications of the electors. 

The best writers on government agree that, in a republic, those laws which 

fix the right of suffrage are fundamental. If, therefore, by the proposed 

plan, it is left uncertain in whom the right of suffrage is to rest, or if 

it has placed that right in improper hands, I shall admit that it is a 

radical defect; but in this plan there is a fixed rule for determining the 

qualifications of electors, and that rule the most judicious that could 

possibly have been devised, because it refers to a criterion which cannot be 

changed. A qualification that gives a right to elect representatives for the 

state legislatures, gives also, by this Constitution, a right to choose 

representatives for the general government. As the qualifications of 

electors are different in the different states, no particular 

qualifications, uniform through the states, would have been politic, as it 

would have caused a great inequality in the electors, resulting from the 

situation and circumstances of the respective states. Uniformity of 

qualifications would greatly affect the yeomanry in the states, as it would 

either exclude from this inherent right some who are entitled to it by the 

laws of some states at present, or be extended so universally as to defeat 

the admirable end of the institution of representation.



Secondly, as it respects the qualifications of the elected. It has ever 

been considered a great security to liberty, that very few should be 

excluded from the right of being chosen to the legislature. This 

Constitution has amply attended to this idea. We find no qualifications 

required except those of age and residence, which create a certainty of 

their judgment being matured, and of being attached to their state. It has 

been objected, that they ought to be possessed of landed {9} estates; but, 

sir, when we reflect that most of the electors are landed men, we must 

suppose they will fix on those who are in a similar situation with 

themselves. We find there is a decided majority attached to the landed 

interest; consequently, the landed interest must prevail in the choice. 

Should the state be divided into districts, in no one can the mercantile 

interest by any means have an equal weight in the elections; therefore, the 

former will be more fully represented in the Congress; and men of eminent 

abilities are not excluded for the want of landed property. There is another 

objection which has been echoed from one end of the continent to the other 

-- that Congress may alter the time, place, and manner of holding elections; 

that they may direct the place of elections to be where it will be 

impossible for those who have a right to vote, to attend; for instance, that 

they may order the freeholders of Albemarle to vote in the county of 

Princess Anne, or vice versa; or regulate elections, otherwise, in such a 

manner as totally to defeat their purpose, and lay them entirely under the 

influence of Congress. I flatter myself, that, from an attentive 

consideration of this power, it will clearly appear that it was essentially 

necessary to give it to Congress, as, without it, there could have been no 

security for the general government against the state legislatures. What, 

Mr. Chairman, is the danger apprehended in this case? If I understand it 

right, it must be, that Congress might cause the elections to be held in the 

most inconvenient places, and at so inconvenient a time, and in such a 

manner, as to give them the most undue influence over the choice, nay, even 

to prevent the elections from being held at all, -- in order to perpetuate 

themselves. But what would be the consequence of this measure? It would be 

this, sir, -- that Congress would cease to exist; it would destroy the 

Congress itself; it would absolutely be an act of suicide; and therefore it 

can never be expected. This alteration, so much apprehended, must be made by 

law; that is, with the concurrence of both branches of the legislature. Will 

the House of Representatives, the members of which are chosen only for two 

years, and who depend on the people for their reëlection, agree to such an 

alteration? It is unreasonable to suppose it.



But let us admit, for a moment, that they will: what would be the 

consequence of passing such a law? It would be, sir, that, after the 

expiration of the two years, at the next {10} election they would either 

choose such men as would alter the law, or they would resist the government. 

An enlightened people will never suffer what was established for their 

security to be perverted to an act of tyranny. It may be said, perhaps, that 

resistance would then become vain; Congress are vested with the power of 

raising an army; to which I say, that if ever Congress shall have an army 

sufficient for their purpose, and disposed to execute their unlawful 

commands, before they would act under this disguise, they would pull off the 

mask, and declare themselves absolute. I ask, Mr. Chairman, is it a novelty 

in our government? Has not our state legislature the power of fixing the 

time, places, and manner of holding elections? The possible abuse here 

complained of never can happen as long as the people of the United States 

are virtuous. As long as they continue to have sentiments of freedom and 

independence, should the Congress be wicked enough to harbor so absurd an 

idea as this objection supposes, the people will defeat their attempt by 

choosing other representatives, who will alter the law. If the state 

legislature, by accident, design, or any other cause, would not appoint a 

place for holding elections, then there might be no election till the time 

was past for which they were to have been chosen; and as this would 

eventually put an end to the Union, it ought to be guarded against; and it 

could only be guarded against by giving this discretionary power, to the 

Congress, of altering the time, place, and manner of holding the elections. 

It is absurd to think that Congress will exert this power, or change the 

time, place, and manner established by the states, if the states will 

regulate them properly, or so as not to defeat the purposes of the Union. It 

is urged that the state legislature ought to be fully and exclusively 

possessed of this power. Were this the case, it might certainly defeat the 

government. As the powers vested by this plan in Congress are taken from the 

state legislatures, they would be prompted to throw every obstacle in the 

way of the general government. It was then necessary that Congress should 

have this power.



Another strong argument for the necessity of this power is, that, if it was 

left solely to the states, there might have been as many times of choosing 

as there are states. States having solely the power of altering or 

establishing the time of election, it might happen that there should be no 

Congress. Not {11} only by omitting to fix a time, but also by the elections 

in the states being at thirteen different times, such intervals might elapse 

between the first and last election, as to prevent there being a sufficient 

number to form a house; and this might happen at a time when the most urgent 

business rendered their session necessary; and by this power, this great 

part of the representation will be always kept full, which will be a 

security for a due attention to the interest of the community; and also the 

power of Congress to make the times of elections uniform in all the states, 

will destroy the continuance of any cabal, as the whole body of 

representatives will go out of office at once.



I come now, sir, to consider that part of the Constitution which fixes the 

number of representatives. It is first necessary for us to establish what 

the number of representatives is to be. At present it only consists of 

sixty-five; but let us consider that it is only to continue at that number 

till the actual enumeration shall be made, which is to be within three years 

after the first meeting of Congress; and that the number of representatives 

will be ascertained, and the proportion of taxes fixed, within every 

subsequent term of ten years. Till this enumeration be made, Congress will 

have no power to lay direct taxes: as there is no provision for this 

purpose, Congress cannot impose it; as direct taxation and representation 

are to be regulated by the enumeration there directed, therefore they have 

no power of laying direct taxes till the enumeration be actually made. I 

conceive no apportionment can be made before this enumeration, there being 

no certain data to go on. When the enumeration shall be made, what will be 

the consequence? I conceive there will be always one for every thirty 

thousand. Many reasons concur to lead me to this conclusion. By the 

Constitution, the allotment now made will only continue till the 

enumeration be made; and as a new enumeration will take place every ten 

years, I take it for granted that the number of representatives will be 

increased, according to the progressive increase of population, at every 

respective enumeration; and one for every thirty thousand will amount to one 

hundred representatives, if we compute the number of inhabitants to be only 

three millions in the United States, which is a very moderate calculation. 

The first intention was only to have one for every forty thousand, which was 

afterwards estimated to be too few, and, according to this proportion, the 

present temporary {12} number is fixed; but as it now stands, we readily see 

that the proportion of representatives is sufficiently numerous to answer 

every purpose of federal legislation, and even soon to gratify those who 

wish for the greatest number. I take it that the number of representatives 

will be proportioned to the highest number we are entitled to; and that it 

never will be less than one for every thirty thousand. I formed this 

conclusion from the situation of those who will be our representatives. 

They are all chosen for two years; at the and end of which term they are to 

depend on the people for their reëlection. This dependence will lead them to 

a due and faithful discharge of their duty to their constituents: the 

augmentation of their number will conciliate the affections of the people 

at large; for the more the representatives increase in number, the greater 

the influence of the people in the government, and the greater the chance of 

reëlection to the representatives.



But it has been said, that the Senate will not agree to any augmentation of 

the number of representatives. The Constitution will entitle the House of 

Representatives to demand it. Would the Senate venture to stand out against 

them? I think they would not, sir. Were they ready to recede from the 

evident sense of the Constitution, and grasp at power not thereby given 

them, they would be compelled to desist. But, that I may not be charged with 

urging suppositions, let us see what ground this stands upon, and whether 

there be any real danger to be apprehended. The first objection that I shall 

consider is, that, by paucity of numbers, they will be more liable to depart 

from their duty, and more subject to influence. I apprehend that the fewer 

the number of representatives, the freer the choice, and the greater the 

number of electors, the less liable to the unworthy acts of the candidates 

will they be; and thus their suffrage, being free, will probably fall on men 

of the most merit. The practice of that country, which is situated more like 

America than any other country in the world, will justify this supposition. 

The British House of Commons consists, I believe, of five hundred and 

fifty-eight members; yet the greater number of these are supposed to be 

under the undue influence of the crown. A single fact from the British 

history illustrates these observations, -- viz., that there is scarcely an 

instance, for a century past, of the crown's exercising its undoubted 

prerogative of rejecting a bill sent up to it by the {13} two houses of 

Parliament: it is no answer to say, that the king's influence is sufficient 

to prevent any obnoxious bills passing the two houses; there are many 

instances, in that period, not only of bills passing the two houses, but 

even receiving the royal assent, contrary to the private wish and 

inclination of the prince.



It is objected, however, as a defect in the Constitution, that it does not 

prohibit the House of Representatives from giving their powers, 

particularly that respecting the support &c., of armies, out of their hands 

for a longer term than two years. Here, I think, the enemies to the plan 

reason unfairly; they first suppose that Congress, from a love of power 

natural to all, will, in general, abuse that with which they are invested; 

and then they would make us apprehend that the House of Representatives, 

notwithstanding their love of power, (and it must be supposed as great in a 

branch of Congress as in the whole,) will give out of their hands the only 

check which can insure to them the continuance of the participation of the 

powers lodged in Congress in general. In England, there is no restraint of 

this kind on the Parliament; and yet there is no instance of a money bill 

being passed for a longer term than one year; the proposed plan, therefore, 

when it declares that no appropriation for the support of an army shall be 

made for a longer term than two years, introduces a check unknown to the 

English constitution, and one which will be found very powerful when we 

reflect that, if the House of Representatives could be prevailed on to make 

an appropriation for an army for two years, at the end of that time there 

will be a new choice of representatives. Thus I insist that security does 

not depend on the number of representatives: the experience of that country 

also shows that many of their counties and cities contain a greater number 

of souls than will be entitled to a representation in America; and yet the 

representatives chosen in those places have been the most strenuous 

advocates of liberty, and have exerted themselves in the defence of it, even 

in opposition to those chosen by much smaller numbers. Many of the 

senatorial districts in Virginia also contain a greater number of souls; and 

yet I suppose no gentleman within these walls will pay the senators chosen 

by them so poor a compliment as to attribute less wisdom and virtue to them 

than to the delegates chosen from single {14} counties; and as there is 

greater probability that the electors in a large district will be more 

independent, so I think the representatives chosen in such districts will be 

more so too; for those who have sold themselves to their representatives 

will have no right to complain, if they, in their turn, barter away their 

rights and liberties; but those who have not themselves been bought, will 

never consent to be sold. Another objection made to the small number of 

representatives, is, that, admitting they were sufficient to secure their 

integrity, yet they cannot be acquainted with the local situation and 

circumstances of their constituents. When we attend to the object of their 

jurisdiction, we find this objection insupportable. Congress will 

superintend the great national interests of the Union. Local concerns are 

left to the state legislatures. When the members compare and communicate to 

one another their knowledge of their respective districts and states, their 

collective intelligence will sufficiently enable them to perform the objects 

of their cognizance. They cannot extend their influence or agency to any 

objects but those of a general nature; the representatives will, therefore, 

be sufficiently acquainted with the interests of their states, although 

chosen by large districts. As long as the people remain virtuous and 

uncorrupted, so long, we may fairly conclude, will their representatives, 

even at their present number, guard their interests, and discharge their 

duty with fidelity and zeal: when they become otherwise, no government can 

possibly secure their freedom.



I now consider the time of their continuance in office. A short continuance 

in office, and a return of the officers to the mass of the people, there to 

depend solely on their former good conduct for their reëlection, is of the 

highest security to public liberty. Let the power of the persons elected be 

what it may, they are only the trustees, and not the masters, of the 

people; yet the time ought not to be so short that they could not discharge 

their duty with ability. Considering this, a term of two years is short 

enough in this case. Many will have a considerable distance to travel from 

the places of their abode to the seat of the general government. They must 

take time to consider the situation of the Union, make themselves acquainted 

with the circumstances of our finances, and the relative situation of, and 

our connections with, foreign nations, and a variety of other objects of 

importance. {15} Would it not be the height of impolicy that they should go 

out of their office just as they began to know something of the nature of 

their duty? Were this the case, the interest of their constituents could 

never be sufficiently attended to. Our representatives for the state 

legislature are chosen for one year, and it has never been thought too long 

a term. If one year be not too long to elect a state representative, give me 

leave to say, that two years ought not to be considered as too long for the 

election of the members of the general legislature. The objects of the 

former are narrow, and limited to state and local affairs; the objects of 

the latter are coëxtensive with the continent. In England, at the time they 

were most jealous of the prerogative of the king, triennial elections were 

their most ardent wish; they would have thought themselves perfectly happy 

in this acquisition; nor did they think of a shorter term of elections. Let 

gentlemen recollect that it is to septennial elections we owe our liberties. 

The elections were for seven years in most of the states before the late 

revolution.



I now consider their weight and power, and whether these will be sufficient 

to give them, as the representatives of the people, their due weight in the 

government. By the Constitution, they are one entire branch of the 

legislature, without whose consent no law can be passed; -- all money bills 

are to originate in their house; -- they are to have the sole power of 

impeachment; -- their consent is necessary to all acts or resolutions for 

the appropriation of the public money; to all acts for laying and collecting 

duties, imposts, and excises; for borrowing money on the credit of the 

United States; for creating all officers, and fixing their salaries; for 

coining money; for raising and supporting armies; for raising and 

maintaining a navy; and for establishing rules for the government of the 

land and naval forces: these are the powers which will be fixed in the House 

of Representatives.



Hence, it appears, our representatives have more comparative power in the 

scale of government than the commons of England; and yet, in that country, 

the commons, possessing less powers, opposed with success much greater 

powers than our representatives have to encounter. In that country, the king 

is one entire branch of the legislature, and an hereditary monarch; can 

prorogue or dissolve, call or dismiss, the two houses at his pleasure. 

Besides his judicial influence, {16} he is head of the church, fountain of 

honor, generalissimo of the forces by sea or land, may raise what fleets and 

armies he pleases, is rendered personally sacred by the constitutional maxim 

that he can do no wrong; and, besides several other great powers, has a 

grand revenue settled on him, sufficient to answer the ordinary ends of 

government; it being established as a custom, at the accession of every new 

king, to settle such a revenue on him for life; and can increase the House 

of Lords at any time, and thereby extend his legislative influence. 

Notwithstanding the enormity of these powers, it has been found that the 

House of Commons, with powers greatly inferior to those of our 

representatives, is a match for both the king and the nobles. This 

superiority resulted from their having the power of withholding or granting 

supplies. What will put this in a still clearer point of view, is, that the 

House of Commons were not originally possessed of these powers. The history 

of the English Parliament will show that the great degree of power which 

they now possess was acquired from beginnings so small, that nothing but the 

innate weight of the power of the people, when lodged with their 

representatives, could have effected it. In the reign of Edward I., in the 

year 1295, the House of Commons were first called by legal authority; they 

were then confined to giving their assent barely to supplies to the crown. 

In the reign of Edward II., they first annexed petitions to the bills by 

which they granted subsidies. Under Edward III., they declared they would 

not in future acknowledge any law to which they had not consented: in the 

same reign, they impeached and brought to punishment some of the ministers 

of the crown. Under Henry IV., they refused supplies until an answer had 

been given to their petitions; and have increased their powers, in 

succeeding reigns, to such a degree, that they entirely control the 

operation of government, even in those cases where the king's prerogative 

gave him, nominally, the sole direction.



Let us here consider the causes to which this uncommon weight and influence 

may be assigned. The government being divided into branches, executive and 

legislative, in all contests between them the people have divided into the 

favorers of one or the other. From their dread of the executive, and 

affection to their representatives, they have always sided with the 

legislature. This has rendered the {17} legislature successful. The House of 

Commons have succeeded also by withholding supplies; they can, by this 

power, put a stop to the operations of government, which they have been able 

to direct as they pleased. This power has enabled them to triumph over all 

obstacles; it is so important that it will in the end swallow up all others. 

Any branch of government that depends on the will of another for supplies of 

money, must be in a state of subordinate dependence, let it have what other 

powers it may. Our representatives, in this case, will be perfectly 

independent, being vested with this power fully. Another source of 

superiority is the power of impeachment. In England, very few ministers have 

dared to bring on themselves an accusation by the representatives of the 

people, by pursuing means contrary to their rights and liberties. Few 

ministers will ever run the risk of being impeached, when they know the king 

cannot protect them by a pardon. This power must have much greater force in 

America, where the President himself is personally amenable for his 

mal-administration; the power of impeachment must be a sufficient check on 

the President's power of pardoning before conviction. I think we may fairly 

conclude, that, if the House of Commons, in England, have been able to 

oppose, with success, a powerful hereditary nobility, and an hereditary 

monarch, with all the appendages of royalty, and immense powers and 

revenues, our federal House of Representatives will be able to oppose, with 

success, all attempts by a President, only chosen for four years, by the 

people, with a small revenue, and limited powers, sufficient only for his 

own support; and a Senate chosen only for six years, (one third of whom 

vacate their seats every two years,) accountable to the state legislatures, 

and having no separate interest from them or the people.



I now come to consider their responsibility to the people at large. The 

probability of their consulting most scrupulously the interests of their 

constituents must be self-evident; this probability will result from their 

biennial elections, whether they wish to be reëlected or not. If they wish 

to be reëlected, they will know that on their good conduct alone their 

reëlection will depend: if they wish not to be reelected, they will not 

enter into a fixed combination against the people, because they return to 

the mass of the people, where they will participate in the disadvantages of 

bad laws. {18} By the publication of the yeas and nays, the votes of the 

individual members will be known; they will act, therefore, as if under the 

eyes of their constituents. The state legislatures, also, will be a 

powerful check on them: every new power given to Congress is taken from the 

state legislatures; they will be, therefore, very watchful over them; for, 

should they exercise any power not vested in them, it will be a usurpation 

of the rights of the different state legislatures, who would sound the alarm 

to the people. Upon such an appeal from the states to the people, nothing 

but the propriety of their conduct would insure the Congress any chance of 

success. Should a struggle actually ensue, it would terminate to the 

disadvantage of the general government, as Congress would be the object of 

the fears, and the state legislatures the object of the affections, of the 

people. One hundred and sixty members, chosen in this state legislature, 

must, on any dispute between Congress and the state legislature, have more 

influence than ten members of Congress. One representative to Congress will 

be chosen by eight or ten counties; his influence and chance of reëlection 

will be very small when opposed by twenty men of the best interests in the 

district: when we add to this the influence of the whole body of the state 

officers, I think I may venture to affirm that every measure of Congress 

would be successfully opposed by the states. The experience of this state 

legislature hath fully satisfied me that this reasoning is just. The members 

of our Senate have never ventured to oppose any measure of the House of 

Delegates; and if they had, their chance of being reëlected, when opposed by 

the delegates of the different counties, would be small. But what 

demonstrates that there is sufficient responsibility in the representatives 

to the people, and what must satisfy the committee, is this -- that it will 

be their own interest to attend to that of the people at large. They can 

pass no law but what will equally affect their own persons, their families, 

and property. This will be an additional influence to prevail with them to 

attend to their duty, and more effectually watch and check the executive. 

Their consequence as members will be another inducement. If they will 

individually signalize themselves in support of their constituents, and in 

curbing the usurpations of the executive, it will best recommend them to the 

people, secure their reëlection, and enhance their consequence. {19} They 

therefore will become watchful guardians of the interests of the people.



The Constitution has wisely interposed another check, to wit: -- that no 

person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States shall 

be a member of either house during his continuance in office. No powers 

ought to be vested in the hands of any who are not representatives of the 

people, and amenable to them. A review of the history of those countries 

with which I am acquainted, will show, that, for want of representation and 

responsibility, power has been exercised with an intention to advance the 

interest of a few, and not to remove the grievances of the many. At the 

time the Romans expelled their kings, the executive authority was given to 

consuls, and the people did not gain by the change; for the plebeian 

interest declined, while that of the patricians rapidly advanced, till the 

oppressions of the latter caused the former to retire to the Sacred Mount; 

and even this struggle terminated only in the creation of the tribunes of 

the people. Another struggle produced only the advantage of their admission 

to the consular dignity, and permission to intermarry into patrician 

families; so that every success on the side of the people only produced a 

change in their tyrants. Under Louis XI., in France, a war took place 

between the king and his barons, professedly for the public good only; and, 

they being successful, a treaty was made for the securing that public good; 

but it contained stipulations only in favor of a few lords, -- not a word in 

favor of the people. But in England, where the people had delegated all 

their power to a few representatives, all contests have terminated in favor 

of the people. One contest produced Magna Charta, containing stipulations 

for the good of the whole. This Great Charter was renewed, enlarged, and 

confirmed, by several succeeding kings: the Habeas Corpus under Charles II., 

and Declaration of Rights under William and Mary, -- the latter limiting the 

prerogative of the crown, the former establishing the personal liberty of 

the subject, -- were also in favor of the whole body of the people. Every 

revolution terminated differently in Rome and in England; in the first they 

only caused a change in their masters, in the second they ended in a 

confirmation of their liberties. The powerful influence of the people in 

gaining an extension of their liberties will appear more forcibly, and our 

confidence in our House of {20} Representatives must be increased, when we 

come to consider the manner in which the House of Commons in England are 

elected. They consist of five hundred and fifty-eight members, two hundred 

of whom are chosen by about seven thousand freeholders in the counties, out 

of eight millions of people: the rest are chosen by towns, several of which, 

though small, elect five members; and even there are instances of two 

representatives being chosen by one elector. The most baneful elections 

procure seats; one half of the candidates purchase them: yet the people in 

England have ever prevailed when they persisted in any particular purpose. 

If, then, they have prevailed there when opposed by two other powerful 

branches of the legislature, and when elected so unduly, what may we not 

expect from our House of Representatives, fairly chosen by the people? If 

the people there prevail with septennial elections, what may we not expect 

from our representatives, chosen only for two years, and who only have to 

encounter the feeble power of the President, and a Senate whose interest 

will lead them to do their duty? The opposers of this plan of government 

dread the exercise of the most necessary, the most indispensable powers, and 

exercised by their own representatives. Magna Charta, and Declaration of 

Rights, only say that such powers shall not be exercised but with consent of 

Parliament; and experience has proved that the making their consent 

necessary has sufficiently secured a proper exercise of those powers. The 

best writers also agree that such powers may always be lodged with 

representatives. We have all the security which a people sensible and 

jealous of their liberties can wish for. Experience has evinced that mankind 

can trust those who have similar rights with themselves. Power lodged in the 

hands of representatives, chosen as ours must be, cannot be abused. The 

truth of this cannot but strike every gentleman in the committee: and still 

the people can, when they please, change the government, being possessed of 

the supreme power. Mr. Nicholas then quoted a passage from the celebrated 

Dr. Price,[1] who was so strenuous a friend to America, proving that, as 

long as representation and responsibility existed in any country, liberty 

could not be endangered; and concluded by saying he conceived the 

Constitution founded on the strictest principles of true policy {21} and 

liberty, and that he was willing to trust his own happiness, and that of his 

posterity, to the operation of that system.



Mr. HENRY. Mr. Chairman, the public mind, as well as my own, is extremely 

uneasy at the proposed change of government. Give me leave to form one of 

the number of those who wish to be thoroughly acquainted with the reasons of 

this perilous and uneasy situation, and why we are brought hither to decide 

on this great national question. I consider myself as the servant of the 

people of this commonwealth, as a sentinel over their rights, liberty, and 

happiness. I represent their feelings when I say that they are exceedingly 

uneasy at being brought from that state of full security, which they 

enjoyed, to the present delusive appearance of things. A year ago, the minds 

of our citizens were at perfect repose. Before the meeting of the late 

federal Convention at Philadelphia, a general peace and a universal 

tranquillity prevailed in this country; but, since that period, they are 

exceedingly uneasy and disquieted. When I wished for an appointment to this 

Convention, my mind was extremely agitated for the situation of public 

affairs. I conceived the republic to be in extreme danger. If our situation 

be thus uneasy, whence has arisen this fearful jeopardy? It arises from this 

fatal system; it arises from a proposal to change our government -- a 

proposal that goes to the utter annihilation of the most solemn engagements 

of the states -- a proposal of establishing nine states into a confederacy, 

to the eventual exclusion of four states. It goes to the annihilation of 

those solemn treaties we have formed with foreign nations.



The present circumstances of France -- the good offices rendered us by that 

kingdom -- require our most faithful and most punctual adherence to our 

treaty with her. We are in alliance with the Spaniards, the Dutch, the 

Prussians; those treaties bound us as thirteen states confederated 

together. Yet here is a proposal to sever that confederacy. Is it possible 

that we shall abandon all our treaties and national engagements? -- and for 

what? I expected to hear the reasons for an event so unexpected to my mind 

and many others. Was our civil polity, or public justice, endangered or 

sapped? Was the real existence of the country threatened, or was this 

preceded by a mournful progression of events? This proposal of altering our 

federal government is of a most alarming {22} nature! Make the best of this 

new government -- say it is composed by any thing but inspiration -- you 

ought to be extremely cautious, watchful, jealous of your liberty; for, 

instead of securing your rights, you may lose them forever. If a wrong step 

be now made, the republic may be lost forever. If this new government will 

not come up to the expectation of the people, and they shall be 

disappointed, their liberty will be lost, and tyranny must and will arise. I 

repeat it again, and I beg gentlemen to consider, that a wrong step, made 

now, will plunge us into misery, and our republic will be lost. It will be 

necessary for this Convention to have a faithful historical detail of the 

facts that preceded the session of the federal Convention, and the reasons 

that actuated its members in proposing an entire alteration of government, 

and to demonstrate the dangers that awaited us. If they were of such awful 

magnitude as to warrant a proposal so extremely perilous as this, I must 

assert, that this Convention has an absolute right to a thorough discovery 

of every circumstance relative to this great event. And here I would make 

this inquiry of those worthy characters who composed a part of the late 

federal Convention. I am sure they were fully impressed with the necessity 

of forming a great consolidated government, instead of a confederation. That 

this is a consolidated government is demonstrably clear; and the danger of 

such a government is, to my mind, very striking. I have the highest 

veneration for those gentlemen; but, sir, give me leave to demand, What 

right had they to say, We, the people? My political curiosity, exclusive of 

my anxious solicitude for the public welfare, leads me to ask, Who 

authorized them to speak the language of, We, the people, instead of, We, 

the states? States are the characteristics and the soul of a confederation. 

If the states be not the agents of this compact, it must be one great, 

consolidated, national government, of the people of all the states. I have 

the highest respect for those gentlemen who formed the Convention, and, were 

some of them not here, I would express some testimonial of esteem for them. 

America had, on a former occasion, put the utmost confidence in them -- a 

confidence which was well placed; and I am sure, sir, I would give up any 

thing to them; I would cheerfully confide in them as my representatives. 

But, sir, on this great occasion, I would demand the cause of their conduct. 

Even from that illustrious man who saved us {23} by his valor, I would have 

a reason for his conduct: that liberty which he has given us by his valor, 

tells me to ask this reason; and sure I am, were he here, he would give us 

that reason. But there are other gentlemen here, who can give us this 

information. The people gave them no power to use their name. That they 

exceeded their power is perfectly clear. It is not mere curiosity that 

actuates me: I wish to hear the real, actual, existing danger, which should 

lead us to take those steps, so dangerous in my conception. Disorders have 

arisen in other parts of America; but here, sir, no dangers, no insurrection 

or tumult have happened; every thing has been calm and tranquil. But, 

notwithstanding this, we are wandering on the great ocean of human affairs. 

I see no landmark to guide us. We are running we know not whither. 

Difference of opinion has gone to a degree of inflammatory resentment in 

different parts of the country, which has been occasioned by this perilous 

innovation. The federal Convention ought to have amended the old system; for 

this purpose they were solely delegated; the object of their mission 

extended to no other consideration. You must, therefore, forgive the 

solicitation of one unworthy member to know what danger could have arisen 

under the present Confederation, and what are the causes of this proposal to 

change our government.



Gov. RANDOLPH. Mr. Chairman, had the most enlightened statesman whom America 

has yet seen, foretold, but a year ago, the crisis which has now called us 

together, he would have been confronted by the universal testimony of 

history; for never was it yet known, that, in so short a space, by the 

peaceable working of events, without a war, or even the menace of the 

smallest force, a nation has been brought to agitate a question, an error in 

the issue of which may blast their happiness. It is, therefore, to be 

feared, lest to this trying exigency the best wisdom should be unequal; and 

here (if it were allowable to lament any ordinance of nature) might it be 

deplored that, in proportion to the magnitude of a subject, is the mind 

intemperate. Religion, the dearest of all interests, has too often sought 

proselytes by fire rather than by reason; and politics, the next in rank, is 

too often nourished by passion, at the expense of the understanding. Pardon 

me, however, for expecting one exception to the tendency of mankind from the 

dignity of this Convention {24} -- a mutual toleration, and a persuasion 

that no man has a right to impose his opinions on others. Pardon me, too, 

sir, if I am particularly sanguine in my expectations from the chair: it 

well knows what is order, how to command obedience, and that political 

opinions may be as honest on one side as on the other. Before I press into 

the body of the argument, I must take the liberty of mentioning the part I 

have already borne in this great question; but let me not here be 

misunderstood. I come not to apologize to any individual within these walls, 

to the Convention as a body, or even to my fellow-citizens at large. Having 

obeyed the impulse of duty, having satisfied my conscience, and, I trust, my 

God, I shall appeal to no other tribunal: nor do I come a candidate for 

popularity; my manner of life has never yet betrayed such a desire. The 

highest honors and emoluments of this commonwealth are a poor compensation 

for the surrender of personal independence. The history of England from the 

revolution, and that of Virginia for more than twenty years past, show the 

vanity of a hope that general favor should ever follow the man who, without 

partiality or prejudice, praises or disapproves the opinions of friends or 

of foes: nay, I might enlarge the field, and declare, from the great volume 

of human nature itself, that to be moderate in politics forbids an ascent to 

the summit of political fame. But I come hither, regardless of allurements, 

to continue as I have begun; to repeat my earnest endeavors for a firm, 

energetic government; to enforce my objections to the Constitution, and to 

concur in any practical scheme of amendments; but I never will assent to any 

scheme that will operate a dissolution of the Union, or any measure which 

may lead to it.



This conduct may possibly be upbraided as injurious to my own views; if it 

be so, it is, at least, the natural offspring of my judgment. I refused to 

sign, and if the same were to return, again would I refuse. Wholly to adopt, 

or wholly to reject, as proposed by the Convention, seemed too hard an 

alternative to the citizens of America, whose servants we were, and whose 

pretensions amply to discuss the means of their happiness were undeniable. 

Even if adopted under the terror of impending anarchy, the government must 

have been without the safest bulwark -- the hearts of the people; and, if 

rejected because the chance for amendments was cut off, the Union would have 

been irredeemably lost. This {25} seems to have been verified by the event 

in Massachusetts; but our Assembly have removed these inconveniences, by 

propounding the Constitution to our full and free inquiry. When I withheld 

my subscription, I had not even the glimpse of the genius of America, 

relative to the principles of the new Constitution. Who, arguing from the 

preceding history of Virginia, could have divined that she was prepared for 

the important change? In former times, indeed, she transcended every colony 

in professions and practices of loyalty; but she opened a perilous war, 

under a democracy almost as pure as representation would admit; she 

supported it under a constitution which subjects all rule, authority, and 

power, to the legislature; every attempt to alter it had been baffled: the 

increase of Congressional power had always excited an alarm. I therefore 

would not bind myself to uphold the new Constitution, before I had tried it 

by the true touchstone; especially, too, when I foresaw that even the 

members of the general Convention might be instructed by the comments of 

those who were without doors. But I had, moreover, objections to the 

Constitution, the most material of which, too lengthy in detail, I have as 

yet barely stated to the public, but shall explain when we arrive at the 

proper points. Amendments were consequently my wish; these were the grounds 

of my repugnance to subscribe, and were perfectly reconcilable with my 

unalterable resolution to be regulated by the spirit of America, if, after 

our best efforts for amendments, they could not be removed. I freely indulge 

those who may think this declaration too candid, in believing that I hereby 

depart from the concealment belonging to the character of a statesman. Their 

censure would be more reasonable, were it not for an unquestionable fact, 

that the spirit of America depends upon a combination of circumstances which 

no individual can control, and arises not from the prospect of advantages 

which may be gained by the arts of negotiation, but from deeper and more 

honest causes.



As with me the only question has ever been between previous and subsequent 

amendments, so will I express my apprehensions, that the postponement of 

this Convention to so late a day has extinguished the probability of the 

former without inevitable ruin to the Union, and the Union is the anchor of 

our political salvation; and I will assent to the {26} lopping of this limb, 

(meaning his arm,) before I assent to the dissolution of the Union. I shall 

now follow the honorable gentleman (Mr. Henry) in his inquiry. Before the 

meeting of the federal Convention, says the honorable gentleman, we rested 

in peace; a miracle it was, that we were so: miraculous must it appear to 

those who consider the distresses of the war, and the no less afflicting 

calamities which we suffered in the succeeding peace. Be so good as to 

recollect how we fared under the Confederation. I am ready to pour forth 

sentiments of the fullest gratitude to those gentlemen who framed that 

system. I believe they had the most enlightened heads in this western 

hemisphere. Notwithstanding their intelligence, and earnest solicitude for 

the good of their country, this system proved totally inadequate to the 

purpose for which it was devised. But, sir, this was no disgrace to them. 

The subject of confederations was then new, and the necessity of speedily 

forming some government for the states, to defend them against the pressing 

dangers, prevented, perhaps, those able statesmen from making that system as 

perfect as more leisure and deliberation might have enabled them to do. I 

cannot otherwise conceive how they could have formed a system that provided 

no means of enforcing the powers which were nominally given it. Was it not a 

political farce to pretend to vest powers, without accompanying them with 

the means of putting them in execution? This want of energy was not a 

greater solecism than the blending together, and vesting in one body, all 

the branches of government. The utter inefficacy of this system was 

discovered, the moment the danger was over, by the introduction of peace; 

the accumulated public misfortunes that resulted from its inefficacy 

rendered an alteration necessary: this necessity was obvious to all America: 

attempts have accordingly been made for this purpose.



I have been a witness to this business from its earliest beginning. I was 

honored with a seat in the small Convention held at Annapolis. The members 

of that Convention thought, unanimously, that the control of commerce should 

be given to Congress, and recommended to their states to extend the 

improvement to the whole system. The members of the general Convention were 

particularly deputed to meliorate the Confederation. On a thorough 

contemplation {27} of the subject, they found it impossible to amend that 

system. What was to be done? The dangers of America, which will be shown at 

another time by particular enumeration, suggested the expedient of forming a 

new plan. The Confederation has done a great deal for us, we all allow; but 

it was the danger of a powerful enemy, and the spirit of America, sir, and 

not any energy in that system, that carried us through that perilous war: 

for what were its best arms? The greatest exertions were made when the 

danger was most imminent. This system was not signed till March, 1781; 

Maryland having not acceded to it before; yet the military achievements and 

other exertions of America, previous to that period, were as brilliant, 

effectual, and successful, as they could have been under the most energetic 

government. This clearly shows that our perilous situation was the cement of 

our union. How different the scene when this peril vanished, and peace was 

restored! The demands of Congress were treated with neglect. One state 

complained that another had not paid its quotas as well as itself; public 

credit gone -- for I believe, were it not for the private credit of 

individuals, we should have been ruined long before that time; commerce 

languishing; produce falling in value, and justice trampled under foot. We 

became contemptible in the eyes of foreign nations; they discarded us as 

little wanton bees, who had played for liberty, but had no sufficient 

solidity or wisdom to secure it on a permanent basis, and were therefore 

unworthy of their regard. It was found that Congress could not even enforce 

the observance of treaties. That treaty under which we enjoy our present 

tranquillity was disregarded. Making no difference between the justice of 

paying debts due to people here, and that of paying those due to people on 

the other side of the Atlantic, I wished to see the treaty complied with, 

by the payment of the British debts, but have not been able to know why it 

has been neglected. What was the reply to the demands and requisitions of 

Congress? -- You are too contemptible; we will despise and disregard you.



I shall endeavor to satisfy the gentleman's political curiosity. Did not 

our compliance with any demand of Congress depend on our own free will? If we 

refused, I know of no coercive force to compel a compliance. After meeting 

in Convention, the deputies from the states communicated {28} their 

information to one another. On a review of our critical situation, and of 

the impossibility of introducing any degree of improvement into the old 

system, what ought they to have done? Would it not have been treason to 

return without proposing some scheme to relieve their distressed country? 

The honorable gentleman asks why we should adopt a system that shall 

annihilate and destroy our treaties with France and other nations. I think 

the misfortune is, that these treaties are violated already, under the 

honorable gentleman's favorite system. I conceive that our engagements with 

foreign nations are not at all affected by this system; for the 6th article 

expressly provides that "all debts contracted, and engagements entered into, 

before the adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the 

United States under this Constitution as under the Confederation." Does this 

system, then, cancel debts due to or from the continent? Is it not a 

well-known maxim that no change of situation can alter an obligation once 

rightly entered into? He also objects because nine states are sufficient to 

put the government in motion. What number of states ought we to have said? 

Ought we to have required the concurrence of all the thirteen? Rhode Island 

-- in rebellion against integrity -- Rhode Island plundered all the world by 

her paper money; and, notorious for her uniform opposition to every federal 

duty, would then have it in her power to defeat the Union; and may we not 

judge with absolute certainty, from her past conduct, that she would do so? 

Therefore, to have required the ratification of all the thirteen states 

would have been tantamount to returning without having done any thing. What 

other number would have been proper? Twelve? The same spirit that has 

actuated me in the whole progress of the business, would have prevented me 

from leaving it in the power of any one state to dissolve the Union; for 

would it not be lamentable that nothing could be done, for the defection of 

one state? A majority of the whole would have been too few. Nine states 

therefore seem to be a most proper number.



The gentleman then proceeds, and inquires why we assumed the language of 

"We, the people." I ask, Why not? The government is for the people; and the 

misfortune was, that the people had no agency in the government before. The 

Congress had power to make peace and war under {29} the old Confederation. 

Granting passports, by the law of nations, is annexed to this power; yet 

Congress was reduced to the humiliating condition of being obliged to send 

deputies to Virginia to solicit a passport. Notwithstanding the exclusive 

power of war given to Congress, the second article of the Confederation was 

interpreted to forbid that body to grant a passport for tobacco, which, 

during the war, and in pursuance of engagements made at Little York, was to 

have been sent into New York. What harm is there in consulting the people on 

the construction of a government by which they are to be bound? Is it 

unfair? Is it unjust? If the government is to be binding on the people, are 

not the people the proper persons to examine its merits or defects? I take 

this to be one of the least and most trivial objections that will be made to 

the Constitution; it carries the answer with itself. In the whole of this 

business, I have acted in the strictest obedience to the dictates of my 

conscience, in discharging what I conceive to be my duty to my country. I 

refused my signature, and if the same reasons operated on my mind, I would 

still refuse; but as I think that those eight states which have adopted the 

Constitution will not recede, I am a friend to the Union.



Mr. GEORGE MASON. Mr. Chairman, whether the Constitution be good or bad, the 

present clause clearly discovers that it is a national government, and no 

longer a Confederation. I mean that clause which gives the first hint of the 

general government laying direct taxes. The assumption of this power of 

laying direct taxes does, of itself, entirely change the confederation of 

the states into one consolidated government. This power, being at 

discretion, unconfined, and without any kind of control, must carry every 

thing before it. The very idea of converting what was formerly a 

confederation to a consolidated government, is totally subversive of every 

principle which has hitherto governed us. This power is calculated to 

annihilate totally the state governments. Will the people of this great 

community submit to be individually taxed by two different and distinct 

powers? Will they suffer themselves to be doubly harassed? These two 

concurrent powers cannot exist long together; the one will destroy the 

other: the general government being paramount to, and in every respect more 

powerful than the state governments, the latter must give {30} way to the 

former. Is it to be supposed that one national government will suit so 

extensive a country, embracing so many climates, and containing inhabitants 

so very different in manners, habits, and customs? It is ascertained, by 

history, that there never was a government over a very extensive country 

without destroying the liberties of the people: history also, supported by 

the opinions of the best writers, shows us that monarchy may suit a large 

territory, and despotic governments ever so extensive a country, but that 

popular governments can only exist in small territories. Is there a single 

example, on the face of the earth, to support a contrary opinion? Where is 

there one exception to this general rule? Was there ever an instance of a 

general national government extending over so extensive a country, abounding 

in such a variety of climates, &c., where the people retained their liberty? 

I solemnly declare that no man is a greater friend to a firm union of the 

American states than I am; but, sir, if this great end can be obtained 

without hazarding the rights of the people, why should we recur to such 

dangerous principles? Requisitions have been often refused, sometimes from 

an impossibility of complying with them; often from that great variety of 

circumstances which retards the collection of moneys; and perhaps sometimes 

from a wilful design of procrastinating. But why shall we give up to the 

national government this power, so dangerous in its nature, and for which 

its members will not have sufficient information? Is it not well known that 

what would be a proper tax in one state would be grievous in another? The 

gentleman who hath favored us with a eulogium in favor of this system, must, 

after all the encomiums he has been pleased to bestow upon it, acknowledge 

that our federal representatives must be unacquainted with the situation of 

their constituents. Sixty-five members cannot possibly know the situation 

and circumstances of all the inhabitants of this immense continent. When a 

certain sum comes to be taxed, and the mode of levying to be fixed, they 

will lay the tax on that article which will be most productive and easiest 

in the collection, without consulting the real circumstances or convenience 

of a country, with which, in fact, they cannot be sufficiently acquainted.



The mode of levying taxes is of the utmost consequence; and yet here it is 

to be determined by those who have neither {31} knowledge of our situation, 

nor a common interest with us, nor a fellow-feeling for us. The subject of 

taxation differs in three fourths, nay, I might say with truth, in four 

fifths of the states. If we trust the national government with an effectual 

way of raising the necessary sums, it is sufficient: every thing we do 

further is trusting the happiness and rights of the people. Why, then, 

should we give up this dangerous power of individual taxation? Why leave the 

manner of laying taxes to those who, in the nature of things, cannot be 

acquainted with the situation of those on whom they are to impose them, when 

it can be done by those who are well acquainted with it? If, instead of 

giving this oppressive power, we give them such an effectual alternative as 

will answer the purpose, without encountering the evil and danger that might 

arise from it, then I would cheerfully acquiesce; and would it not be far 

more eligible? I candidly acknowledge the inefficacy of the Confederation; 

but requisitions have been made which were impossible to be complied with -- 

requisitions for more gold and silver than were in the United States. If we 

give the general government the power of demanding their quotas of the 

states, with an alternative of laying direct taxes in case of 

non-compliance, then the mischief would be avoided; and the certainty of 

this conditional power would, in all human probability, prevent the 

application, and the sums necessary for the Union would be then laid by the 

states, by those who know how it can best be raised, by those who have a 

fellow-feeling for us. Give me leave to say, that the sum raised one way 

with convenience and ease, would be very oppressive another way. Why, then, 

not leave this power to be exercised by those who know the mode most 

convenient for the inhabitants, and not by those who must necessarily 

apportion it in such manner as shall be oppressive? With respect to the 

representation so much applauded, I cannot think it such a full and free one 

as it is represented; but I must candidly acknowledge that this defect 

results from the very nature of the government. It would be impossible to 

have a full and adequate representation in the general government; it would 

be too expensive and too unwieldy. We are, then, under the necessity of 

having this a very inadequate representation. Is this general representation 

to be compared with the real, actual, substantial representation of {32} the 

state legislatures? It cannot bear a comparison. To make representation real 

and actual, the number of representatives ought to be adequate; they ought 

to mix with the people, think as they think, feel as they feel, -- ought to 

be perfectly amenable to them, and thoroughly acquainted with their interest 

and condition. Now, these great ingredients are either not at all, or in a 

small degree, to be found in our federal representatives; so that we have 

no real, actual, substantial representation: but I acknowledge it results 

from the nature of the government. The necessity of this inconvenience may 

appear a sufficient reason not to argue against it; but, sir, it clearly 

shows that we ought to give power with a sparing hand to a government thus 

imperfectly constructed. To a government which, in the nature of things, 

cannot but be defective, no powers ought to be given but such as are 

absolutely necessary. There is one thing in it which I conceive to be 

extremely dangerous. Gentlemen may talk of public virtue and confidence; we 

shall be told that the House of Representatives will consist of the most 

virtuous men on the continent, and that in their hands we may trust our 

dearest rights. This, like all other assemblies, will be composed of some 

bad and some good men; and, considering the natural lust of power so 

inherent in man, I fear the thirst of power will prevail to oppress the 

people. What I conceive to be so dangerous, is the provision with respect to 

the number of representatives: it does not expressly provide that we shall 

have one for every thirty thousand, but that the number shall not exceed 

that proportion. The utmost that we can expect (and perhaps that is too 

much) is, that the present number shall be continued to us; -- "the number 

of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand." Now, 

will not this be complied with, although the present number should never be 

increased -- nay, although it should be decreased? Suppose Congress should 

say that we should have one for every forty thousand; will not the 

Constitution be complied with? -- for one for every forty thousand does not 

exceed one for every thirty thousand. There is a want of proportion that 

ought to be strictly guarded against. The worthy gentleman tells us that we 

have no reason to fear; but I always fear for the rights of the people. I do 

not pretend to inspiration; but I think it is apparent as the day, that the 

{33} members will attend to local, partial interests, to prevent an 

augmentation of their number. I know not how they will be chosen, but, 

whatever be the mode of choosing, our present number will be ten; and 

suppose our state is laid off in ten districts, -- those gentlemen who shall 

be sent from those districts will lessen their own power and influence in 

their respective districts if they increase their number; for the greater 

the number of men among whom any given quantum of power is divided, the less 

the power of each individual. Thus they will have a local interest to 

prevent the increase of, and perhaps they will lessen their own number. This 

is evident on the face of the Constitution: so loose an expression ought to 

be guarded against, for Congress will be clearly within the requisition of 

the Constitution, although the number of representatives should always 

continue what it is now, and the population of the country should increase 

to an immense number. Nay, they may reduce the number from sixty-five to one 

from each state, without violating the Constitution; and thus the number, 

which is now too small, would then be infinitely too much so. But my 

principal objection is, that the Confederation is converted to one general 

consolidated government, which, from my best judgment of it, (and which 

perhaps will be shown, in the course of this discussion, to be really well 

founded,) is one of the worst curses that can possibly befall a nation. Does 

any man suppose that one general national government can exist in so 

extensive a country as this? I hope that a government may be framed which 

may suit us, by drawing a line between the general and state governments, 

and prevent that dangerous clashing of interest and power, which must, as it 

now stands, terminate in the destruction of one or the other. When we come 

to the judiciary, we shall be more convinced that this government will 

terminate in the annihilation of the state governments: the question then 

will be, whether a consolidated government can preserve the freedom and 

secure the rights of the people.



If such amendments be introduced as shall exclude danger, I shall most 

gladly put my hand to it. When such amendments as shall, from the best 

information, secure the great essential rights of the people, shall be 

agreed to by gentlemen, I shall most heartily make the greatest concessions, 

and {34} concur in any reasonable measure to obtain the desirable end of 

conciliation and unanimity. An indispensable amendment in this case is, 

that Congress shall not exercise the power of raising direct taxes till the 

states shall have refused to comply with the requisitions of Congress. On 

this condition it may be granted; but I see no reason to grant it 

unconditionally, as the states can raise the taxes with more ease, and lay 

them on the inhabitants with more propriety, than it is possible for the 

general government to do. If Congress hath this power without control, the 

taxes will be laid by those who have no fellow-feeling or acquaintance with 

the people. This is my objection to the article now under consideration. It 

is a very great and important one. I therefore beg gentlemen to consider it. 

Should this power be restrained, I shall withdraw my objections to this 

part of the Constitution; but as it stands, it is an objection so strong in 

my mind, that its amendment is with me a sine qua non of its adoption. I 

wish for such amendments, and such only, as are necessary to secure the 

dearest rights of the people.



Mr. MADISON. Mr. Chairman, it would give me great pleasure to concur with my 

honorable colleague in any conciliatory plan. The clause to which the worthy 

member alludes is only explanatory of the proportion which representation 

and taxation shall respectively bear to one another. The power of laying 

direct taxes will be more properly discussed, when we come to that part of 

the Constitution which vests that powers in Congress. At present, I must 

endeavor to reconcile our proceedings to the resolution we have taken, by 

postponing the examination of this power till we come properly to it. With 

respect to converting the confederation to a complete consolidation, I think 

no such consequence will follow from the Constitution, and that, with more 

attention, we shall see that he is mistaken; and with respect to the number 

of representatives, I reconcile it to my mind, when I consider that it may 

be increased to the proportion fixed, and that, as it may be so increased, 

it shall, because it is the interest of those who alone can prevent it, who 

are our representatives, and who depend on their good behavior for their 

reëlection. Let me observe, also, that, as far as the number of 

representatives may seem to be adequate to discharge their duty, they will 

have sufficient information from the laws of particular states, from the 

state legislatures, from {35} their own experience, and from a great number 

of individuals; and as to our security against them, I conceive, sir, that 

the general limitation of their powers, and the general watchfulness of the 

states, will be a sufficient guard. As it is now late, I shall defer any 

further investigation till a more convenient time.



The committee then rose, and on motion



Resolved, That this Convention will, to-morrow, again resolve itself into a 

committee of the whole Convention, to take into further consideration the 

proposed Constitution of government.



And then the Convention adjourned until to-morrow morning, eleven o'clock. 







1. Observations on Civil Liberty.