A Da Capo Press Reprint Series

THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

GENERAL EDITOR : LEONARD W. LEVY

Claremont Graduate School

POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS

An Enquiry into Public Errors, Defects, and Abuses

Calculated to Draw the Timely Attention of

Government and People to a Due Consideration

of the Necessity, and the Means, of Reforming

Those Errors, Defects, and Abuses; of Restoring

the Constitution, and Saving the State

By James Burgh

VOLUME II

DA CAPO PRESS • NEW YORK • 1971

POLITICAL

DISQUISITIONS, &c.

Meta ton peri qewn logon, k. t. l. After treating of our duty to the Gods, it is proper to teach that which we owe to our Country, For our Country is, as it were, a secondary God, and the first and greatest Parent. — It it to be preferred to Parents, Wives, Children, Friends, and all things, the Gods only excepted, — And if our Country perishes, it is as impossible to save an Individual, as to preserve one of the fingers of a mortified hand. HIEROCL.

POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS:

OR,

An INQUIRY into public ERRORS, DEFECTS, and ABUSES. Illustrated by, and established upon FACTS and REMARKS, extracted from a Variety of AUTHORS, ancient and modern.

CALCULATED

To draw the timely ATTENTION of GOVERNMENT and PEOPLE to a due Consideration of the Necessity, and the Means, of REFORMING those ERRORS, DEFECTS, and ABUSES; of RESTORING the CONSTITUTION, and SAVING the STATE.

VOLUME II.

LONDON:

Printed for EDWARD and CHARLES DILLY. MDCCLXXIV.

PREFACE

TO VOLUME II.

I SHALL, perhaps, be accused of deviating towards superstition, if I observe, that the favourable reception given by the public to the former volume of these collections has the appearance of a good omen, that the people will at last direct their attention to the important subjects treated in them, and to the fearful and alarming Condition, into which the villainous arts of a succession of wicked ministers have brought this great empire; and that they will be no longer abused by thole at the helm; but will insist upon such a change of measures as may save our country, if our sins have not unchangeably pointed against us the vengeance of the supreme Governor of states and kingdoms.

I am afraid, the public has found in the former volume, and will find in this, many inaccuracies, as well as other deficiencies, not such as the great Roman critic comprehends under his phrase, maculæ, quas incuria fudit; for indeed I cannot accuse myself of carelessness in preparing these collections for the public, excepting only that I have not pretended to bestow much

time in polishing and working up the style of those parts which are written by me; because indeed, as I have hinted in the general preface, I should have thought such labour supererogatory and impertinent in a work of this kind. The inaccuracies I am anxious about, are those, which Horace understands by the words immediately following the above-quoted, quas humana parum cavit natura, those faults, to which the weakness of human nature, or of such poor abilities as mine at least, exposes a writer, as a less advantageous disposition of the matter, a seeming repetition of the same thoughts, and the like. My apology for these deformities must be drawn from the vastness of the variety of the matter I had to dispose of, which made it difficult to remember every thought and fact I had set down, and made it almost impossible to avoid repeating some of the same thoughts and arguments, as they occur repeatedly in the different quotations I have collected, and I could not always leave out the part, which was a repetition, without disfiguring the speeches in such a manner, as would have made them incoherent, and displeasing to the reader.

The public will, I hope, agree, that it was better to insert a weighty argument twice, than to run the hazard of leaving it out, through suspicion of its being already inserted.

I hope it will be acknowledged, that far the greatest part of the matter I have collected from authors and speakers in parliament, is weighty, forcible, pertinent to the purpose for which I advance it, and decisive upon the great political points proposed to be determined.

I beg leave just to mention, that the IId book, which treats of the COLONIES, differs from the others, both in the former volume and this, in that there is a great deal of the matter in it, not written by me, and yet not referred to the respective authors, from whom I extracted it, particularly what I have transcribed from a collection in 6 or 8 volumes 8vo. being a set of all the best pamphlets and tracts written since the beginning of the contest between Britain and the colonies. When I collected from those volumes, the passages, which are inserted in the IId book of this volume, I neglected quoting the pages of the authors, and could not afterwards, without more labour than the matter was worth, because the authority of those pamphlets and tracts is not of great consequence, unless readers will make farther enquiry, or happen, which is generally the case, to know that what is affirmed in them is true.

BOOKS quoted, or referred to, in this Second Volume.

A

ARlSTOTELIS POLITICA. Anderson's HISTORY of COMMERCE. ANTIENT UNIVERSAL HISTORY, 21 Volumes. ACTA REGIA, 4 Volumes. AMERICAN TRACTS, in 6 or 8 Volumes.

B BIBLE.

Bernard's (Governor) LETTERS.

Bacon's (Nathan.) DISCOURSES ON THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND.

Blackstone's (Judge) COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.

Burnet's HISTORY OF HIS OWN TIMES.

Brady's HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

Bolingbroke's (Lord) WORKS.

Bacon's (Lord) LETTERS.

Beccaria, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

C

Clarendon's HISTORY.

Camden's BRITANNIA. Cato's LETTERS. Ciceronis (Tullii) OPERA.

Cole's MEMOIRS.

D

DEBATES (Chandler's) OF THE LORDS, 8 Vol. 8vo.

— — — — — OF THE COMMONS, 14. Vol. 8vo.

— — — — — (Almon's) OF LORDS AND COMMONS.

Davenant's (Dr.) WORKS.

DIVINE LEGATION (Warburton's). DISSERTATION ON PARTIES, by Bolingbroke. Dalrymple's MEMOIRS.

E

Elfynge's ANTIENT METHOD OF HOLDING PARLIAMENTS.

Epernon (Duke d') LIFE OF. Emmii (Ubbonis) RESPUBLICA ATHENIENSIS.

F

FACTION DETECTED BY FACTS. Fletcher's WORKS. Franklin's (Dr.) LETTERS. Ferguson's HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

G

Guthrie's HISTORY OF ENGLAND. Gordon's TRACTS.

GRANDEUR ET DECADENCE DES ROMAINS. Gee, ON TRADE AND PLANTATIONS.

H

Horatii OPERA.

Hume's HISTORY OF ENGLAND. HUDIBRAS (Butler's). Harrington's OCEANA.

I

Janiçon, ETAT PRESENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DES

PROVINCES UNIES. Johnson's ENGLISH DICTIONARY,

L

Ludlow's MEMOIRS.

Livii HISTORIA ROMANA.

Lipsii (Justi.) DE MAGNITUDINE ROMANA LIBER. Laet (De) PERSIÆ DESCRIPTIO. Lyttelton's (Lord) HISTORY OF HEN. II.

M

Milton's PARADISE LOST, and POLITICAL WORKS. Macaulay's HISTORY OF ENGLAND. MAGAZINES.

Montalbani RERUM TURCICARUM COMMENTARIUS. MAGNI MOGOLI (COMMENTARIUS DE IMPERIO). Montesquieu L'ESPRIT DES LOIX, 3 Tom. 8vo. Mountague ON ANTIENT REPUBLICS. MODERN UNIVERSAL HISTORY, 44 Vol. 8vo.

N

Nepas (Corn.) VITÆ, &c.

P

PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, 24 Vol. 8vo.

POLITICAL REGISTER.

Pierre (St.) OUVRAGES DE.

Pope's WORKS.

Plutarch APOPHTHEGMATA, &c.

Polybius (PREFACE TO A FRAGMENT OF).

Petyt's RIGHTS OF THE COMMONS.

R

Rapin's HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 2 Vol. Fol. Richelieu's TESTAMENT POLITIQUE. Robertson's HISTORY OF CH. V. Rushworth's COLLECTIONS.

S

STATE TRACTS in the time of k. William, 3 Vol. Fol. STATUTES AT LARGE.

Schooch, DE REPUBLICA ACHÆORUM LIBER.

Suetonii CÆSARES.

T

Thurloe's STATE PAPERS.

Tindal's CONTINUATION OF Rapin's HISTORY,

2 Vol. Fol.

Temple's (Sir Will.) WORKS. Thysii (Antonii) DE REPUBLICA ATHENIENSE LIBER, Trenchard's HISTORY OF STANDING ARMIES,

U V W

UNIVERSAL HISTORY (ANTIENT) 21 Vol.

— — — — — MODERN, 44 Vol.

Valerii Maximi HISTORIÆ. Virgilii ÆNEID.

Voltaire's ESSAIS SUR L'HISTOIRE, WHITEHALL EVENING POST. Whitelocke's MEMOIRS.

CONTENTS

OF VOLUME II.

BOOK I.

Of Places and Pensions.

CHAP. I. Page 1.

Idea of a Parliament uninfluenced by Places and Pensions; taken from the best historical and political Writers, &c.

CHAP. II. Page 37.

Placemen and Pensioners unfit for Members of Parliament, because not likely to be uninfluenced.

CHAP. III. Page 75.

That Placemen often hold a Plurality of Employments, incompatible with one another.

CHAP. IV. Page 80. Places and Pensions not given according to Merit.

CHAP. V. Page 91. Profusion in Places and Pensions.

CHAP. VI. Page 131.

That Places, Pensions, Bribes, and all the Arts of Corruption, are but false Policy, being endless and insufficient.

CHAP. VII. Page 168.

Bills, Statutes, Resolutions, &c. shewing the Sense of Mankind on the Evil of Placemen and Pensioners in Parliament.

CHAP. VIII. Page 195.

Speeches on the Danger of Placemen and Pensioners in Parliament.

CHAP. IX. Page 269. Of Qualifications for Members of Parliament.

BOOK II.

Of taxing the Colonies.

CHAP. I. Page 274.

That the Object, our Ministers have had in view in taxing the Colonies, was, enlarging the Power of the Court, by increasing the Number of Places and Pensions for their Dependents.

CHAP. II. Page 281.

Our Colonies of great Advantage, and therefore deserved better Treatment.

CHAP. III. Page 291.

The Colonies, though so valuable to Britain, have been greatly oppressed by the Mother Country.

CHAP. IV. Page 299. Precedents respecting Colonies.

CHAP. V. Page 302. Of Taxation without Representation.

BOOK III.

Of the Army.

CHAP. I. Page 341.

General Reflections on standing Armies in free Countries in Times of Peace.

CHAP. II. Page 361. Facts relating to the Army.

CHAP. III. Page 389.

A Militia, with the Navy, the only proper Security of a free People in an insular Situation, both against foreign Invasion and domestic Tyranny.

CHAP. IV. Page 426.

Parliamentary Transactions, Speeches, &c. relating to the Army.

ERRATA.

Page 2, Line 10 from the Bottom, for parliament,

read parliaments.

— — 39, — — 10 from the Bottom, for have wrote, read have written.

— — 73, — — 8, for a year? read a year.

— — 122, — — 70, for government, read governments, — — 168, — — 9, dele Speeches.

— — 275, — — 12 from the Bottom, for have their

all, read have but their all. — — 360, — — 5, for A.D. read A.D. 1718.

POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS, &c.

BOOK I. Of Places and Pensions.

CHAP. I.

Idea of a Parliament uninfluenced by Places and Pensions; taken from the best historical and political Writers, &c.

AFTER wading so long in the Serbonian bog of corruption, after having Escap'd the Stygian pool, tho' long detain'd In that obscure sojourn, whilst in our flight Through utter and thro' middle darkness borne, With other notes, than to th' Orphean lyre We sung of Chaos and eternal night; MILTON.

[ministerial influence in parliament will soon bring chaos and eternal night upon England, if not dissipated by the exertion of the spirit of a brave people] to speak plain prose; after tracing out such a multitude of foul and shameful instances of the ascendancy ob-

tained by flagitious courts over parliament, it may be some relief (it will certainly be some instruction) to the reader, to observe the difference between the conduit of corrupt^ and that of uninfluenced parliaments.

What a parliament compleatly independent would be; and what parliaments accordingly have sometimes been, may, in some measure, be conceived from this chapter, which he who can read, comparing the idea here given of incorrupt parliaments with what we have seen in our debauched times; the Englishman, I say, who can read what follows without grief and indignation, must either be incapable of forming any judgment, wherein the interest of his country lies, and ignorant of what intimately concerns every subject of the British empire; or he must be void of all regard for his country, and confequently of every virtuous attachment ; or he must be attached to an interest contrary to that of his country, by the sordid love of money, as being himself a dealer in rank bribery and corruption.

Every free Briten has reason to wish that darkness may overihadow the anniversary of his birth, who first introduced places and pensions into parliament. When I have made a few observations on the complexion of parliament in those times, in which it is certain that the court did not, because it could not influence them by emolumentary means, every reader who recollects any thing of the politics of modern times (the present always excepted) will, on making a comparison, join me in saying

Hoc fonte derivata clades

In patriam populamque fluxit. HOR.

From this impure fountain flows the stream, which is likely to poiibn our country and posterity.

In ancient times, when the parliaments of England were unpensioned, we find them, even in spite of Popish darkness, and of the extravagant notions of prerogative which were the disgrace of those ages, ever faithfully labouring for the public good, and especially seizing all opportunities far obtaining an enlargement of liberty.

So early as 1290, we find a set of unjust judges mulcted by parliament, to the amount of 100,000 marks. The parliament obtained of Edw. I. a promise, that he would (contrary to the usage of former times) quit all pretension to the right of levying taxes by his own authority, and would raise none but with confent of the " archbishops, bishops, and other prelates, earls, barons, knights (of ihires), burgefles, and other freemen of this realm." The numerous confirmations of Magna Charta were obtained by parliaments, and always with reluctance on the part of the kings, as the first grant was extorted by the barons (which, by the bye, shews the justness of the observation,

that parliaments are as naturally friends to liberty as kings are to prerogative.) So high was the reputation of the commons, in the same reign, for integrity and judgment, that the barons proposed tq the king, that they should have the choice of the chancellor, chief justice, and other great officers of state, To which that prince answered them by aflc-; ing, Why they did not demand his crown ? That they chose their own servants: Why might not he enjoy the same privilege ? [not considering that the people are deeply concerned in the choice of the king's servants;

whereas nobody has any thing to do with those of a duke or an earl.] In Edw. IIId's time, we find the commons refusing to grant an aid, till they had ronfujted their constituents. [In those days they con-

sidered themselves as responsible not to the ministry, but the people.]- In the same reign we find it recorded 1>)r hiftoriaris, ** ThaJ since the aids given in the last parliament were not duly answefed to the king by those who had the care thereof, certain persons were appointed to take the accounts of William de la Poll, and others, who had received the money, wool, [taxes were, in those days, often paid in wool] &c. and they had a day assigned them to produce their accounts, and in the mean time several noblemen and gentlemen of fortune became bound, &c." [This was the true way of preventing complaints against defaulters of millions.] In the same reign (about four hundred years ago) we find the commons refusing to grant supplies till grievances were redrefled; fixing by law what shall be deemed treason; propofmg regulations. for preventing the subjects being compelled to mak« loans to the king, for that it was " against reason, and the franchife of the land ;" making an aft for holding annual parliaments [no ministerial schemes to be gained by rewarding, with places and pensions, those who v6ted fevert years together as they were bid] limiting the power of the clergy and the lawyers ; preventing the union, in the same persons, of legislative power and of court emoluments, by a law prohibiting any collector of taxes to represent any place in parliament; [fb early were our ancestors aware of the usefulness of a place-bill, repeatedly rejected in our degenerate times.} In Ri<b. lid's days, we find the commons requesting that he would inform them how the public money was laid out, and who were to be his counsellors and great officers; to which requests they insisted on, and obtained an anfvitr. In the same reign the commons refuse to lay any taxes on the people, because they were disgusted, as had just before appeared by

Wat Tyler's infurre&ion. [In those days some regard was shewn to the sense of even the lowest of the. people.] The commons fequest the removal of Michael de la Pole. The king gives them an answer in chara&er, that is, a silly one. But they insist on compliance, and after some struggles, not only overthrow the minister, but at last dethrone the king himself. The parliament appoints a commission of enquiry to try the favourites. They impeach them of engaging the king to stand by them, right or wrong;

of excluding all persons without the circle of the junto; of embezzling the public money ; of laws

dispensed with ; of unjust punishments and pardons > of bribes taken of both parties, &c. In consequence, the archbishop and others are declared guilty of high treason, Michael de la Pole is impeached, the high treasurer, Trejilian, Brembre, and many others, are hanged. [Thus in the heat of their honest zeal for the public good, overleaping their due boundaries, as a third part only of the legislature, and breaking. into the fphere of the executive. See vol. i. p. 205, ei feq.] Yet this very parliament, in the inidft of feverity, remembers decency. They make an exprefs fesolution for exempting the king, and laying the whole blame on his ministers. Happy had he flopped while his ruin might have been prevented ! They oblige him to renew his coronation oath. [Kings often want to have their memories refrefhed on this subjecl.] He shews a mighty defire of holding tKe reins of government in his own hand. He no sooner gets power, than he shews his incapacity for being trusted with it. He displaces all the faithful servants of the state, to make room for his worthless favourites. He seizes the charters of London, imprifo'ns the mayor and flieriffs, fines the city, and

lofing the ineftimable affe&ions of the inhabitants of the capital, haftens his own destru&ion. He tries to pack parliaments, to influence returning officers, to force elections, to raise money without parliament; obtains, by unfair means, the opinions of his servile judges in favour of his wicked measures; the very proceedings which afterwards brought Charles I. to the block. [If the old saying be true, experientia docttjlu/tos, it is plain, that kings are not fools; for experience does not teach some of them.] The parliament impeaches him for unwarrantable liberality to worthless favourites ; encouraging a junto to take upon them parliamentary power ; caufing the parliament roll to be altered and blotted at his pleasure; forbidding his subjeits to petition him ; fending into the house men not elected by the people, but nominated by himself; biafllng members by threats and promises; refusing the faithful advice of his subjects, and threatening those who offered it, &c. The parliament formally dethrones him, as is known to cvety reader.

Uninfluenced parliaments, inftead of giving, as we have seen, the people's money by millions upon every call of the miniftcr, have been remarkably delicate upon that point.

Hen. III. A. D. 1255, demands an aid. Parliament requires two conditions, viz, i. Observance of the twocharteis; and 2. That parliament have the appointing of the juiUciary, trcafurcr, and chancellor. Henry, inftead of complying, prorogues the parliament ".

The struggle between Cl\ I. and his brave and free parliament is one of the most finking instances in the hiftory of the world, of the glorious cffecls produced

' Rai>m, i. 3-9-

duced by the love of liberty and their country in the uninfluenced minds of a set of honcft and courageous representatives. Let us contemplate a few instances of what is so much to the honour of human nature.

When that prince begun to demand money of parliament, there was great opposition made. Pym, and the other patriots, said, the war was entered into raftily, and therefore the nation was not obliged to support it. He demanded an account of the money raised by Janus I. by refumption of crown-lands, and fale of titles and places. The commons .accordingly) inftead of supplies, proceeded to the consideration of grievances^a. The king diflblves the parliament, because they would grant nothing^b. When he fent repeated meflages to the commons, preffing them to go upon supplies, and let grievances alone, Sir Robert Philips proposed to addrefs the king, and let him know what they intended to do, if he would not interrupt them. If the king would not fuffer them to go on with the publick bufmefs, they must then depart in peace, and every man betake himself to prayer, that the confufions to be apprehended might be averted. The speaker, by the king's order, interrupts Sir J. Elliot in his remarks on the conduct of the ministry. Upon this, Sir Dudley Digges said, " If we must not speak of these things in parliament, let us be gone.^u A mournful filence, for some time, enfued. Then Sir Nathaniel Rich observed, " That it was neceflary they should take care of those, who fent them to parliament ;" and proposed to go to the lords, and,' with them, wait on the king. The commons refolve, that neither Sir J. Elliot (who was interrupted by the flavifh speaker) nor any other member, had fpoken any

* PARL. HIST. vi. 40*.

^k Ibid. 403.

thing undutiful during that parliament. A committee is ordered to consider what may be done for the safety of the kingdom, and that no member leave the house, on pain of being fent to the Tower. The speaker defired to go out for half an hour. Mr. Kirton observed, that this was unprecedented and ominous. It was observed by Mr. Kirton (with too much goodnature) that the king was a good prince; but perfuaded by enemies to him and the nation. * Let us try to difcover them,' says he, * and I doubt not, but God will tend us hearts, hands, and swords, to cut all his and our enemies throats.' Sir Edw. Cote observed, ' That greater moderation never was known, than theirs had been, considering, that their liberties had'been so shamefully violated. That former parliaments had boldly pointed out evil counsellors about the kings.' [He mentions several initances; but, as they occur in other parts of tbefe collections, I shall not enumerate them here.] « How {lull we answer to God and men,' says he, ' if we do not make proper enquiry into the abuses of our times ? Nothing grows to abuse, but this house hath power to treat of it. All men agree, that the duke of Buckingham is the cause of all the evil,' &c. The flavifh speaker, who had ftolen to the king (which was what he meant by aflcing to go out for half an hour) returned, and brought a meffage from the king, adjourning the house, and all committees, till next morning*. The speaker, by the king's command, adds, That he did not mean to restrain them in their just privileges; but only, that they should avoid reflections [no matter how just'] on himself and his ministers^b. What would have been, ac-

³ PARI, HUT. vin. 191, 192, J9⁶- " ^Ibidl '97-

cording to this monarch'* idea, ntfraitaig, if it pas not restraining, to -ftop the common* from enquiring into the conduct of bad ministers? A power, w.kteh, as Sir Edw. Ctke thews, had been fa wt/iantly aflumed by parliament. Which thews the common apology for Charles I. viz. That he did not abridge liberty; but only refused to grant new privileges; to be greatly too indulgent to the violences of . that defperate tyrant.

The commons instru&ed their speaker to answer to one of his threatening meflages, That it is the ancient right of parliament to debate in their own method, without interruption from the foveraine. That it is their ancient cuftom to consider of grievances first, and supplies afterwards. That they thought it abfolutely neceflary to join with the supplies a due care of the eflentials of liberty, without which there is no government, nor any thing great or valuable that can be done either in peace or war^a.

In one of their remonftrances to the king, A. D. 1626, they exprefs themselves in these words: — * Your faithful commons, who can have no private end, no object, but your majefty's service, and the good of our country⁶.' [Had there been in that house of commons two or three hundred placemen, they would not have dared to say, * We tan have no private end.'] It hath been the ancient, conftant, and undoubted right and usage of parliaments to question, and complain of all persons, of what degree foever, who have been found grievances to the commonwealth in abufing the power committed to them by their foveraine — without which liberty in parliament, the

* PARL. HIST. vn. 441. ^b Ibid. vi. 467.

commonwealth might languish under the preffure [of those grievances] without redrefs.' The intractableness of his parliaments (an honest parliament will always be intradable, because a court will always be making exorbitant demands^ made him determine to govern without them. When he could no longer put it off, he called one i but, says Voltaire^ 'C'etait affembler des citoyens irritez;' this was calling together a set of enraged subjects, and giving them an opportunity of confuting about the-destruction of his tyranny. For the court had not then, as now, millions to dole away, by which to put a grumbling house of commons in good humour.

The fafiiion was not in those days, as we have seen it fmce, to nine all enquiries into the dispofal of the public money. Therefore it was « ordered, A. D. 1648, by the house of commons, That the committee of Goldfmith'i Hall do print all their receipts for compositions, and how the moneys have been difbutfed, that afperfions upon parliament may be

cleared".'

In those tyrannical times, the tnjlruments of the tyranny were the grandees of the court, who were gainers by it; and the vindicators of the public liberty were the commons of England, who had no fhare in the fpoils, but were lofers, and had nothing to make up their lofles. Had the commons of those days had a fellow-feeling wth the court; had there been two or three hundred placemen in the house of commons, would they have flood up so boldly for the interest of their country ? It was the court that imposed ship-money, that condemned Prynne, Ba/iwick, Burton,

» fait. Ess. SUR L'HIST. iv. 147. * WbiteL MEM. 308.

Leigkton, &c. It was the brave commons that reverfed the cruel fentences, and caft their enemies in damages for unjust imprifonment, tyrannical seizure of papers, exorbitant fines, cruel pilloryings and mutilations, {tar-chamber, court of York, &c.

« Refolved, (A. D. 1647) That no member fhall receive any profit of any office, grant, or fequestration from parliament: That whatever any members have received shall be repaid for public use, and the estates of members liable for their debts*.' A day was appointed for hearing complaints against members, and no member to receive any reparation for lofles, till the public debts be paid. [Our gamblers are wallowing in the public money, while the nation is in debt 130 millions.] And tho' the self-denying ordinance was not ttrictly kept; (for Ireton, Fleetwood, Harris, and others, were elected into the house) a few corrupt men could carry no point; and the ordinance itself shews the sense of the times, and of all times, and all men, who pretend to have any regard for their country, concerning placemen in the house. And the many regulations made since for the pretended purpose of making parliament free, though ineffectual, and perhaps not always intended to be effectual, yet have a decent appearance, as coinciding with the general sense of mankind on this point.

The commons under Ch. I. were almost always unanimous. No wonder: they had no indirect ijiterest to divide them ; no places,, no pensions, &c. to put them upon oppofing what was plainly for the public good. Therefore we do not find in those times any abandoned fpcechifiers in the house, like our Jf'alpclcs and our Pelhants, supporting the ufcful-

* PARL HIST. xv. 422.

jiefs of court-Influence in parliament, in direct oppofitkm to common sense and common decency.

« Refolved, (A. D. 1640) That no monopolift or patentee shall At in the house.' Many were expelled, and new writs iffued». Parliament} A. D. 1645, publimes a declaration, * That it would be an acceptable service, if any person would inform of any members taking bribes for any matter depending in the houseV The brave commons under Ch. I. brought the lord keeper Finch upon his knees before them, and proving inexorable, obliged him to make his escape^c. They prosecuted Strafford and Laud to death, they forced IVindtltankt to fly. They struck with terror all the tools of the tyrant, and punished all their proceedings, however supported by precedent, which were not warranted by some exprefs law^a. They condemned the monopolies restored by Charles after their being, by a former parliament, folemnly declared illegal; and punched those concerned in them, expelling some members of their own house on that account. They changed, in less than a month, the face of affairs in England^ from the most abfolute monarchy to a democracy, without other difturbance than a fcuffle between the king's army and the Scotch at patting the Tynt\ and roused that spirit in the nation, which brought the bloody tyrant, commonly called the blefled martyr, to his merited end".

Sir Harbottle Grimftone thus describes a parliament answering the design and exhibiting the true spirit of a parliament. • Of such awful 'predominancy is the

* PARL. HIST. ix. 14.8.

^b PARL. HIST. xiv. 140.

^c Humt, HIST. STUARTS, i. 244.

^dlLbiJ. 246. ^e Ibid. 247.

very name of a parliament to the nation, that it ftrikes with terror and defpair all rail doers, and enriches and tomforts the spirits of many groaning under the burden of oppreflion, • inflicted on them unjustly and malicloufly by unmerciful and wicked men, who have usurped to themselves places and offices of power and authority in church and state. It is not only the powerful left of all courts, but the iviftjl. made and compacted not only of men found in religion, and well learned, but ripe in their judgments, feledled from all parts of the kingdom, chosen with the free confent of the whole body politic of the kingdom.' [A man mu.ft be out of his wits to

describe parliaments in our times in this manner.] This great and high council is not only of such power and wisdom, but endowed with the greatest privileges, that not only the meaneft of his majefty's subjects, but the greatest persons of the kingdom are in danger, if infringers of the same, to be called in question, and puniOied.' Gripiftone'i speech on

occafion of Charles's demanding the five members*.

He then mentions the privileges of parliament: viz. To speak or debate, vote, impeach, condemn, acquit, protest, or remonftrate according to evidence, and the state of things,' [in spite of minifte-

rial, or regal interpoution.] * No member to be prosecuted but by the house for things said in the house, nor to be apprehended, his ftudy broke open, or his papers seized, but by order of the house. To make or unmake laws, raise taxes, do what business they please first, without superior compulfun or influence; nor to be diflblved capricioufly when they are redreffing wrongs and framing good laws,

^a PARL. HI«T. x. 180.

* or prosecuting delinquents.' To Grim/lane's Jpeech may be added the answer of the commons in their declaration, A. D. 1642. The king pretended, that the measures he purfued, were more for the good of the kingdom, than those, which they proposed, on which account he rejected all their wife and pacific propofals, and was not to be fatisned, 'till he made his country a fea of blood.

* Is it likely, say they, that those, who are especially chosen' [electors were then unbribed, and unterrified by ministers or by grandees] ' and introduced for the purpose, and who themselves must needs have so great a {hare in all grievances of the subje<5ts' [no member had then any idea of indemnifying himself, by a place, or a pension, of the burden he brought upon his country by voting according to the minister's direction] « ihould wholly caft oft" all care of the public good, and the king only take it up ?' ' Heretofore, says Mr. Holies, in his speech before the lords, A. D, 1641, parliaments were the catholicon, the balm of Gilead which healed our wounds, restored our spirits, and made up all breaches of the land. Of late years they have been without fruit, &c.' Parliaments were then become ineffectual because diflblved by the tyrant. Now we often wifli them diflblved *.

Sir jyiHiam Jones answered Ch, II's proclamation, and apology for diflblving his parliament at Oxford in a pet, and says, inter alia, ' The court never diflblved a parliament abruptly and in a heat, but they found the next parliament more averfe, and to insist on the same things with greater eagerness, than the former. — A parliament always participates of the

" PARL. HI$T. ix. 298.

p.refent temper of the people*' Thofe times differed from ours (the present always excepted) for we have Teen the times, wheji the true account of the matter would have been, that parliament is what the court (net the people) would have it to be.

When Mr. Holies impeached the nine peers before the lords^k, in his speech he {hewed the importance of parliaments, and that the enemies of the public tranquillity, have always fought the destru&ion or diminution of the power of parliaments. ' Parliament, says he, is the foundation of government; it creates and prcserves law; watches over religion* [the members in those days had some religion,] ⁽ prevents licentioufness of manners; preserves the rights and liberties of the subjecl; provides for common neceffities; prevents public fears; the kingdom can rest on no other foundation, than that of parliament.' It is remarkable, that, when he mentions the arts of enemies for defeating the use of parliaments, as refusing to call them, diverting, obstructing, interrupting, or abruptly diflblving them ; he never mentions corrupting them by places, pensions, &c. the moil effectual pf all means for deftroying their usefulnefc. What had been done in that way before those times, had answered little purpose. Ch. lid's pension parliament was the first fuccefsful.experiment of that black art, so fatally improved since. «When Ch. I. (says lord Lyttelton, in his speech on the Sptmijb convention') ' told the commons, who were preparing complaints against Buckingham, that he would not allow any of his servants to be questioned in

* DEB. LORDS, i. 264. ^b PARL. HIST. xi. 200. " DEB. COM. xi. 312.

parliament, he fpoke the language of defpetic power, and such as this house would never endure. But if inftead of speaking so openly, helifld a little foftened his style; confeffed their right to question his servants, but at the Came time denied them the means: if Buckingham himself had challenged them to examine hibconduft, or the conduit of those who a£ted by his instrudhons and under his orders; and then rcfused them the fight of these instrustions, and the regular methods according to the usage of parliament of examining into these orders ; the appearance indeed woujd have been fairer, but the proceeding itself would have been equally dangeious, equally fatal to the rights of this house. Sir, that parliament would not have borne it; for it was composed of such men as had no influence upon them to abate the spirit and zeal with which they proceeded to enquire into and punish mal-adminiftration : such men at their first meeting, before they would give one penny of money to support the king in a war with Spain which had been begun at the defire of parliament, appointed a committee to consider of fecret affairs, and another for grievances. They refolved to enquire into the mifemployment of the public treafure, and dishonour brought upon the nation, before they voted any supply, without apprehending any reproach of want of zeal for the king or the war; but that they might know the true state of the nation, and carry on the war with more chearfulness when judice was done upon those who had involved them in so many difficulties, the same parliament declared, and it stands uncontroverted yet upon your journals, That common fame is a good ground of proceeding for this house either by enquiry, or if the

bouie find cause, by impeachment. Accordingly queries were drawn up to enquire into the conduct of BufklngbaHh which were afterwards turned into articles of impeachment against him; and the king to fave his minister.bad no other way than diflblving that parliament; for the art of foftening them by corruption was not in use in those days. Sir, 1 hope I have not mifpent your time in calling back to your memory the proceedings of a former house of commons which deserve, I think, the greatest re,, fpedlt, and are mentioned with reverence by the most impartial historians. How hiftory will mention ours, J wi/h we may think worth our concern > but how the nation will judge of them now, I am fure we ought to consider, Sir, if a king has loft the efteetn and the hearts of his people, the interposition of parliament may awaken him to a sense of his error, and by healing counsels reconcile and restore them again; but if parliaments themselves act so as to lofe their own dignity and by consequence the efteem and love of the people, who fliall then interpose or what mediator is left ? It is such an evil as admits of no remedy: it is the worft misfortune that can ever befal a free government. To have approved the convention, to have rejected a motion for laying before parliament the instru&ions of the minister who concluded and figned that convention, and then to deny -the means of examining into these negotiations upon which S/w'^-grourids these very pretensions, which we are now fighting to deftroy — these measures will certainly do us great honour in the opinion of those who are this year to pay four millions for supporting the war. What they will think of all this I do not know; but I am apt to

believe tkey will never think about it, without having at the same time in their thoughts that the same house of commons has three times rejected the place bill.'

In the fliort, the too {hort period of the republic (for how happy had it been for England if fhe had been governed by the republican parliament during the period of her disgraces under Charles II. and James II.) in that (hort period we fee what may be expected from a set of un-bribed, un-biafled men assembled together to confult for the public good, without fears, and without hopes, from a bribing court* and free from the incumbrances of filch kings, or houses of peers, to negative, or at least to entangle and impede their measures for the general advantage. How unfriendly to liberty kings and lords have been, will too plainly appear on perufing the articles Kings and Lords in the fequel. I write in this seemingly republican ftrain, not that I have the least thought of fuggefting the neceflity, or propriety, of changing the form of government in Britain, from regal to republican, though the latter is undoubtedly preferable to the former, fuppofing a state to be fettling its form of government; but to caution kings and lords, not to bring on, as they have formerly done by their misbehaviour, their owa exclufton. But let us hear our incomparable femals historian.

* On the subject ofjlhe glory acquired by the Engltfi republic in this infant state, we shall observe the following incautious testimonies of its inveterate enemies. Heatbt on entering into the subjed of the parliament's forced diflblution, and the ruin of the republic, breaks out in the following exclamation. " Now to the reproach of Fortune and her

glorious pageant of an Englijb commonwealth, which (he had set up for another wonder of the world, to brave the pyramids of (tone, and coloflus of brafs, as to the defiance of time's injury, having subdued all likelihood of danger from without; all princes being ready to entertain their friend(hip." — Clarendon, who with a heart replete with selfifh malice, In prospective faw and fighed over the future grandeur of his country, on speaking of the political conduct of cardinal Mazarine, makes the following observation: " After the battle of Nafeby was loft, and the king seemed so totally defeated, that he had very little hope of appearing at the head of an army which might be able to resist the enemy, the cardinal was awakened to new apprehensions, and faw more cause to fear the monftrous power of the parliament, after they had totally subdued the king, than ever he had to apprehend the excefs of greatness in the crown." Treating of the Dutch war he observes: " The United Provinces now difcerned, that they had helped to raise an enemy which was too powerful for them, and which would not be treated as the crown had been." Guthrie, an historian of monarchical principles, makes the following observation : " Mazarine imagined, and that not without good grounds, that the natural interest of France led her to wish Cromwell to be at the head of the Englijb, rather than it (hould be formed into a republic of brave and wife patriots."

On this aft of violence,' [Cromweirs turning out the republican parliament] * Cake (an enemy) exclaims, " Thus fell the victorious parliament, whofe mighty actions will fcarcely find belief in future generations; and to say the truth, they were a set of

men mod indefatigable and induftrious in bufmefs, always feeking for men fit for it, and never preferring any from favour and importunity: As they excelled thus in civil affairs, so it must be owned they exercifed in matters ecclefiaftic no such feverity as others before them, upon such as dhTented from them." Guthrie, an anti-republican, expreffes the following favourable opinion of this parliament: " The English republicans by their vigor and spirit, struck. Europe with confirmation; and the English flag was such a protection to commerce, that the trade of the world seemed now to center in Europe. Had this vast expence been drained from the fweat of the people, the furnifhing it would not have so much alarmed the Dutch: but there had been a great reduction in taxes, the cuftoms alone furnifhed 250,0007. clear of all deductions ; the people fcarce felt their burthens; and even the greatest enemies the government had, were pleased with the figure which England made abroad. Hiftorians in general, eftimating things by events and prejudices, have represented the late parliament in a pitiful light, despised and difregarded by the people, which gave Cromwell the boldness to aft as he did. But the reverfe of this is true ; for Cromwell diflblved them because he knew they must in time win upon the people; that the spirit with which they proceeded would soon render him and his army useless; and that they were pointing towards an establishment which must check the carreer of all inordinate ambition." " This parliament (hysTrenchard, in the Hiftory of standing armies in England) made their name famous through the whole earth, conquered their enemies in England, Scotland and .Ireland; reduced the kingdom of Portu-

gal to their own terms, recovered our reputation at fea, overcame the Dutch in several famous battles; fecured our trade, and managed the public expencts with so much frugality, that no estates were gained by private men upon the public miseries, and at last were paffing an aft for their own diflblution and fettling the nation in a free and impartial commonwealth." Ludlow on the praises of this renowned afTembly writes. " It will appear to unprejudiced posterity that they were a difmterested and impartial parliament, who though they had the fovereign power of the three nations in their hands for the space of ten or twelve years, yet did not in all that time give away amongft themselves so much as they fpent for the public in three months." In a Difcourfe of tbt national excellency of England, here is the following honourable character given of the Englijb government during the (hort time it remained a republic. " If you refpeft its infancy and beginning, it outwent in warlike atchievement all other common-wealths. I lay before me the exploits of Sparta, Athens, Carthage, and Venice; and know that the Venetians, Switzers, and United Provinces at this day, being contemptible for territory, are those only that appear fittest matches for the greatest empires, I know alfo, that Rome, the only miftrefs of the world, was justly celebrated for large conquests ; and yet none of these states gave such ftarts, and made such acquests at their rife as our English common-weakhf Certainly so many advantages conduced to its greatness and increase, and at its first appearing fn large were its territories, that it may well be affirmed, never was a commonwealth in that refpeft laid on so large a foundation ; and if in our conceit we should give it an answerable growth, we could not aflign it

less that) the whole globe at last for its portion. At first, if you will judge by the affections of the people, it had not the hundredth part of England itself, and was to go through difficulties which would have confounded any but a free state; yet how quickly had it brought the nation to somewhat a better understanding and a fair way of fettlement: so that there are some who question whether any natural prince of England had ever been aflifted on any occafion with such great forces so fuddenly and with such alacrity raised, as they were at Worcefter; and on the other side, how few went over to the king of Scats, though generally looked on as a rightful prince, deserves consideration. It lived not out a luftre; yet conquered Scotland, (introducing more liberty and greater privileges than they had before) Inland, and several other (mailer iflands; made other nations feel its force, as the French and Portuguefe; and was going on in such a carreer of action as was not to be flopped by human power. This government began a war with the Dutch, which it would have ended with abfolute conquest, or fallen in the attempt; and after this probably, it would have entered on more honourable enterprizes, and not fuffered the nation to grow effeminate by eafe and vice. In a word, it had brought in an irfitant the nation to a full glory, and such a fplendour as caft a darkness, as it is affirmed by some, on the greatest actions of former times. This is certain, that the neighbouring states trembled at its fudden and prodigious greatness, and remote potentates did court and feek a good understanding from its hands; and its diflblution brought no ordinary content to those who had cause to fear it." " The agent from the Stewarts (as a late \vriter reports) at

the first appearance of this commonwealth urged the United Provinces, that if England were free, it would be formidable to them not only by interrupting their fifhing, and all other maritime advantages, but by robbing them of traffic, as they had done the Volitions \ and not only fo, but give law to all Cbrifttndim by reason of the commodioufness of its harbours and the number of its flaps." To the juA and high elogiums which have been made on the government of the parliament it is to be remembered, that to them'is due the fingular praise of having purfued the true interest of their country, in attending particularly to its maritime strength, and carrying on its foreign wars by its naval powers. This example, which raised Eng~ land to so great an height of glory and prosperity, has never yet been followed, and in all probability never will, by the fucceeding monarchs. The aim of princes is to make conquests on their subjeds, not to enlarge the empire of a free people. A standing army is a never-failing instrument of domestic triumph ; and it is very doubtful whether a naval force could be rendered useful in any capacity, but that of extending the power and prosperity of the country ».'

* If the very rump of a parliament' (says a writer in. STATE TRACTS, time of king William) ' even in the midft of domestic difcontents, and befet on all sides with foreign aflaults, and invafions at home; if that small and broken number without any head, and under so many difadvantages, could by this only means fecure our peace, and so widely extend the repute and honour of the Englijb name; what country or what region could ever give limits to the un~

* Macaul. HIST. ENGL. v. 107.

bounded reputation of a full and legal parliament so nobly qualified ? What nation could there be so powerful as to resist our forces, or so politick as to infatuate our counsels ? There is nothing within the compafs of human wifties of which we might not allure ourselves, from the wisdom and virtue of such a difmterested aflembly \'

Fairfax's plan shews what an idea people had in those times, (viz. before parliamentary corruption prevailed) of the safety of confiding in them. He proposes that the two houses have the supreme judgment of offenders, with power of exposition and application of law without appeal. No state-criminal to be pardonable by the king, without their confent. The house of peers no longer to be alone the supreme court, grand juries to be nominated, not by the under-flieriff, but by the people of the counties mutually. Militia to be under power of parliament for ten years, and not under the king alone. The public treafure the same. Regulations for the militia or army to be made in parliament. Great offices of state to be disposed of by parliament for ten years. Afterwards parliament to give in to the king three names, and he to appoint one. No new-made peer to fit without leave of parliament. All declarations against parliament to be void. In modern times, it is altogether the same to the people, -whether the command of the army, treafury, state-offices, &c. be in the court, the lords, or the commons. For these three are one.

When a reward was proposed for Mrs. Lane, for faving that blefled faint Charles II. some of the members said, the house had no right to give away in this manner the people's money to any but the king for

¹ STATE TRACTS, time of King William, II. 644.

public use *. On the contrary, in modern times we fee our parliaments so motherly to our ministers, they know not how to refuse them any thing they aflc; at one time our kjngs are to have their civil lift (formerly granted annually) fettled on them for life; at another 500,000/. voted to pay the civil lift debts; at another an account of 250,000 /. of 60,000 /. of 35,oco/. pafied unexamined, because the court gave their word of honour the money was all fpent in the public service; of which more elfewhere.

Clarendon says, Charles II. defpaired of his restoration, when he heard of the rcfurrecYion of parliament after Richard Cromwell's refignation. An incorrupt parliament is never very courtly, and contrariwife, a corrupt one can deny nothing to kings and courts. But if Charles had recollected, that his friend Jkfonihzi an army at his command, he would not have defpaired. Armies and kings have a great tenderness for one another, and are particularly ufcful to one another. Both depend more upon power, than upon juflice; both love to rule without controul; kings love armies, because an army can support them in tyrannical measures without the trouble offatisfying the subje£rs; and armies love kings, because they are indulged by kings (on account of their usefulness) in a different manner from what they experience under republican government. But of this I fhall have occafion to treat fully in the article Army.

« There is nothing of greater importance to the safety and good of the kingdom, (says Mr. Pymme, A. D. 1641) than that this high court of parliament, which is the fountain of judice and government, should be kept pure, uncorrupt, and free from

* PARL. HIST. xxm.

partiality and. bye-refpe&s. This would not only add luftre and reputation, but strength and authority to all our ads. la, this the lords are specially interested, as being a third estate by inheritance and birthright. The commons are publickly interested by representation of the whole body of the commons of this kingdom, whofe lives, fortunes, and liberties are deposited under the cuftody and trust of the parliament '.'

— * Leaft of all will it be fwallowed by a parliament? says Thurloe, in one of his letters, speaking of certain schemes proposed for keeping Cromwel in power ^b. In our times we never hear of any body afraid of parliament, but writers on the side of the opposition.

There were not wanting court-fycophants in the time of Charles II. who celebrated hini to the sides, and justified all his ruinous proceedings. But his parliaments did not always eccho back, as in our times, the falfe panegyric.

* Long, loqg, may that royal tree live and flourifli, upon which those fruits do grow !' says Shaftejbury, in his speech to parliament, A. D. 1673, with a great deal more to the same beflobbering purpose, to blind the eyes of both parliament and people, and to incline them to be contented with the proceedings of the times. Shafte/bury in this rhetorical flourifli hits off pne undoubted property of Charles. He was so very fruitful of baftards, that the wags of the times observed, that he might be said almost literally, as well as figuratively, to deserve the ancient most honourable title of pater patria, the father of his people. Both lords and commons however shewed themselves very

much

" PARL. HIST. x. 13. > Macaul. HIST. v. 199.

much difcontented at the continuance of the Dutch war, the exorbitant power of France, prevalence of popifli counsels, &c. which they take care to flgnify to the king in an addrefs for a fad ». And the commons feeing at lad his worthleflhefs in joining France against Holland, and that the design of his five villainous tools, whofe initials form the famous word CABAL, was to make him abfolute, oppose him openly. They refolve, that Lauderdale, and the French alliance, are grievances. The king prorogues them immediately. On their meeting again, they addrefs him against his guards ; and impeach Buckingham and Arlington. Charles finding that they were too honest to grant him further supplies for an odious war, makes peace with ihe Dutch ^b.

* Were the house of commons' (says a writer in the STATE TRACTS, time of king William) * a true representative, and free from external force and private bribery, nothing could pafs there, but what they thought was for the publick advantage. For their awn interest is so interwoven, with the people's, that if they act for tbemselves (which every one of them will do as near as he can) they must ad for the common interest of England. And if a few among them should find it their interest to abuse their power, it will be the interest of all the rest to punilh them for it: and then our government would act mechanically, and a rogue would as naturally be hanged as a clock ftrikes twelve when the hour is come. This is the fountain head from whence the people expect all their happiness, and the redrefs of their grievances; and if we can preserve thepi [-viz. parliaments] free from corruption, they will take care to keep every

^a DEB. COM. i. 191.

^k Hume, HIST. STUARTS, n. 236.

body elfe fo. Our constitution seems to have provided for it by never fuffering the king (till Charles Ift's reign) to have a mercenary army to frighten them into a compliance, nor places nor revenues great enough to bribe them into it. The places in the king's gift were but few, and most of them patent places for life, and the rest great offices of state enjoyed by fmgle persons, which feldom fell to the fhaie of the commons, such as the office of a lord chancellor, loid trcafurer, privy feal, lord high admiral, &c. and when these offices were poffeffed by the lords, the commons were fevcre inquifitors into their actions. Thus the government of England continued from the time that the Romans quitted the ifland to the time of Ch. I. who was the first I have read of that made an opposition to himself in the house of commons the road to preferment, of which the earls of Strafford and Noy were the most remarkable instances; who from great patriots became the chief affertors of defpotick power. But this served only to exafperate the rest ; for he had not places enough for all that expefted them, nor money enough to bribe them. It is true, he raiftd great fums of money upon the people ; but it being without authority of parliament, and having no army to back him, it met with such difficulties in the raifing, that it did him but little good, and ended at last in his ruin ; though by the means of a long and miserable war which brought us from one tyranny to another : for the army had got all things into their power, and governed the nation by a council of war, which made all parties join in calling in Ch. II. so that he came In with the general applause of the people, who in a kind fit gave him a vast revenue for life. By this he was enabled to wife an army,

« and.

and bribe the parliament, which he did to the purpose: but being a luxurious prince, he could not part with great fums at once. He only fed them from hand to mouth : so that they found it neceflary to keep him in a conftant dependance upon them, as they were upon him. They knew he would give them ready money no longer than he had an abfolutc necessity for them, and that he had not places enough in his dispofal to fecure a majority in the house : for in those early days the art was not found out of fplitting and multiplying places ; as inftead of a lord treasurer, to have five lords of the trcafury ; inftcad of a lord admiral, to have feven lords of the admiralty ; to have feven commiflioners of the cuftoms ; nine of the excife; fourteen of the navy office; ten of the ftamp-office; eight of the prize-office; fixteen commissioners of trade; two of the poft-office ; four of the tranfports ; four for hackney-coaches; four for wine-licences ; four for the victualling-office, and multitudes of other offices which are endless to enumerate. I believe the gentlemen, who have the good fortune to be in someof those-employments, will think I compliment them, if I say, they have not been better executed since they were in so many hands than when in fewer: and I must confefs, I fee no reason why they may not be made twice as many, and so on ad infinitum (unless the number be afcertained by parliament) and what danger this may be to our constitution I think of with horror. For if in ages to come they should be all given to parliament-men, what will become of our so much boafted liberty ? What fhall be done, when the criminal becomes the judge, and the malefactors are left to try one another * ?'

¹ STATE TRACTS, time of king William, n. 654.

The commons, A. D. 1673, vote in a grand committee that no more supplies ought to be granted during a certain period, unless they fee necessity, on account of the Dutch war, and till the kingdom be fecured against popery, and grievances redrefled *.

The commons, A. D. 1678, vote supplies, but with Ariel limitations ^b.

The commons, A. D. 1678, give a direct denial to the king's request in his speech for an additional revenue of 300,000 /. a year^e.

A supply was granted, A. D. 1679, but with an appropriation to certain purposes only, and penalty in case of mifapplication ^d.

The commons complained of unaccounted millions, A. D. 1701^e. Now the people complain, not the commons. Why, indeed, should the commons complain ? The court and they divide the fpoil between-them.

It is remarkable, how directly in the teeth of the court, the commons often proceeded in former incorrupt, or Icfs corrupt, times. In former times the court and commons were generally oppofite; in ours the constituents and representatives. There was much corruption in king Iff Hi am's time; but we sometimes fee the stream of parliamentary proceedings in those days run very clear. King William had given away immense grants of forfeited estates in Inland. The commons refolved, A.D, 1699, that a bill be brought in for reverfing every one of those grants, and * applying all the forfeited estates and interests in ' Ireland, to the use of the public, and that a judi-

• Rafin, ii. 672.

» DEB. COM. i. 276. « Ibid. 286.

• DEB. COM. i. 344.

• 'find. CONTIIC. i. 479.

catory be creeled for determining claims, and that they [the commons] will receive no petition* concerning grants.' The courtiers in the house moved, That some part of the forfeited estates might be left in the king's dispofal. It pafled in the negative} and they made a resolution condemning the advifing and procuring those grants to be pafled *. The commons addrefled the king on these resolutions. The king answered, that his intention in giving those grants was to reward those, who had behaved well, particularly in the reduction of Ireland, which he thought himself in justice obliged to do. The uncourtly commons thought he was more justly bound to pay the just debts contracted in the late war; and they thought the forfeited estates a very proper fund for the purpose. How did the Romans, in their best times, reward their heroes ? With a wifp of hay round their heads, or a ride through the town, and up to the capitol. The commons, provoked at this answer, refolved, That whoever advifed it, intended to create a mifunderstanding between the king and people ^b. All the proceedings were ordered to be printed, and it was refolved, ' That the procuring, orpaffing exorbitant grants by any member of the privy council, to his own private use, is a high crime and mifdemeanor'.' Thofe brave men were jealous even of our great deliverer, and would not bear mif-government even by him. The lords (generally on the wrong side) oppose these brave and wife measures. Conferences followed, and warm disputes between the houses. At last the good king defires the lords to yield the point. Lord Summers was found to be at the bottom of all this opposition. The commons put

^a DEB. COM. in. 123. ^k Ibid. 124. ' Ibid. 126.

the question, that the king be defired to remove him This was not carried; but a resolution was made, that no foreigner (except the prince of Denmark) be admitted to his majefty's counsels in England, or Ireland. The king, to avoid this addrefs, prorogues, and afterwards diflblves the parliament.

The commons, A. D. 1700, went upon a scheme for applying the value of forfeited estates, granted away since 1688, to the payment of the public debts. The value of them was thought to be almost two millions. The commons refolve, That these grants were against the king's honour and the public good. This resolution was presented to the king in form of an addrefs; to which the king gives an answer, justifying the grants, as given to deserving persons. The commons, enraged, make a resolution against the king's advifers. They proceeded to a bill of refumption. Thirteen trustees are appointed to hear claims, &c. None to be trusted, who had any dependence oil the king. An addrefs proposed to the king that he would remove jord S:n:mers from his councils and prefence, bccaufc he had opposed the bill of refumption. The king, provoked, wants to overfct the bill. But many of the king's friends were for pailinj it to prevent mischief, the commons being set upon, it. The commons in those days were too mighty Cor the court. It is true, that, according to Tindal^y it was found afterwards, that the bill was not well contrived, and was therefore fpontaneoufly dropt by the commons. But the bold opposition of the commons to the court, 10 different from what we ue in our times, is what I mean to point out.

Incorrupt parliaments, inftead of being flaves to ministers, have kept ministers in conftant fear of

* CONTIN. I. 399, 400.

being called to an account by them. ' In former times, parliaments were every moment upon the wing, and kept this noble band [the privy councilj in awe, by taking them into their cognizance, placing, or mifplacing some, or all of them, directing, or binding them by oath, as they faw occafion \ of which the records are full *.' It is observed by Mr. Kirtan ^b, in his speech in the time of Ch. I. that * former parliaments had boldly pointed out evil counsellors about the kings, as 30 Edw. III. John of Gaunt, the king's fon, lord Latimer, and lord Neville, who were fent to the Tower. 7 Hen. IV. and n Hen. IV. parliament Complained of the king's council, and obtained their removal, for befetting the king and difluading him from the public good. 4 Hen. III. 27 Edw. III. and 13 Rich. II. parliament moderated the king's prerogative.' Lord Middlefex was accused, in the time of Jam. I. and convicted of grofs and sordid griping, and of procuring good regulations to be altered, as those concerning the court of wards, &c. of extortion in creating new places, and enhancing the perquifites of the old, &c. All the commons to a man joined in the impeachment. Not one to stand by a public robber ^c. Hereby was fulfilled the prediction of lord Bacon, A. D. 1624, who, meeting Middlefex soon after his advancement to the head of the treafury, congratulated him, and wished him, and all great itate-officers, always to remember, that a parliament will come ^d. [ In our times, you may as well tell ministers of the day of judgment, as of parliament.]

» N. Bacon's Disc. Gov. ENGL. P. 11. p. 18.

^b PARL. HIST. vin. 191.

^c Jbid. vi. 132, tt /cj. * Ibid. vi. 309.

To the same purpose was the saying of lord Coke* That no subjeft, however potent, or subtiJe, ever joftled with the law, but k broke his neck. But, in our times, it may be {aid, as Remus remarked to his brother Romulus, « Laws serve only as cobwebs, to catch the small flies : the great ones break through

them.'

The worthy and fagacious Daveaanf*, in the end of last century, wrote concerning parliamentary corruption, as if his pen had been guided by a prophetic infpiration. « Our wealth and greatness, says he, depend abfolutely upon keeping the legijlathe power to future ages untainted, vigilant for the public safety, jealous of the people's rights, watchful over ministers, unawed by armies, vnfeduced by preferments, bribes, or pensions. That we are safe at present; that this important poft is well fecured, is granted,' [some honest hearts, on reading this, and comparing the state of things in latter times, will, perhaps, bleed for their degenerate country] but writing for posterity, to which these papers may, peradventure, be tranfmitted, I think it needful to give these cautions.'

* Let the injured refort to the courts of law, and if there they fail of justice, in parliament they may be consident to receive it.' Smith's speech on the state of the nation, 1641. ^b

Sir Robert Naunton ascribes the happiness in Elizabeth's days, to the wisdom and patriotifm of the members of the house of commons. There was nothing then to give them. Therefore they had nothing to draw them from the good of their country ^c.

* ii. 308. ^b PARL. HIST. x. 16. feq.

' Rap. II. 155.

' Members of parliament' (says the learned judge Black/tone *) ^c are not thus honourably diftinguifhed from the rest of their fellow subjects, merely that they may privilege their persons, their estates, or their domestics; that they may lift under party banners; may grant or with-hold supplies; may vote with or against a popular or unpopular adminiftration ; but upon considerations far more interesting and important. They are the guardians of the English constitution, delegated to watch, to check, and to avert, every dangerous innovation; to propose, to adopt and to cherifli any folid and well weighed improvement. Bound by every tie of nature, of honour, and of religion, to tranfmit that constitution, and those laws to their posterity, amended if pofsible, but at least without derogation.' Camden observes, that no tax disgusts the English which has the fan&ion of parliament. This is true in general. In former times, parliaments had the considence of the people. Have parliaments the considence of the people in our times? « The nation naturally loves parliamentary cures : but is jealous of all others V If, therefore, at any time, the nation is jealous of parliament, it is to be fupposed there is reason ; because the prejudice of the people is m favour of parliament.

Colonel Lundy (though excepted out of the indemnity by the commons, A. D. 1689) dejires to be examined by the commons^c. The commons had then the considence of the people; as juries, or arbitrators, have now. We have seen the times, when an honest,

^a COMMENT, i. 9.

^b Burn. HIST. OWN TIMES, u. 113,

^c DEB. COM. 11. 355.

and consequeotly obnoxious, man, who would have feared nothing, if to be tried by a jury, give his cause for loft, if ordered to appear before parliament. G. GrenviUe, a few years ago, told the house of commons, their manner of deciding contested elections was so grofs, that not one of them would chuse to have any part of his property at the mercy of the house, if a jury of porters or carmen could be had.

' While the commons were raifing money, [//. D. 1695] * they wifely enquired into the dispofal of former taxes, and difcovered so much corruption, that they thought it was high time to punish, and pVevent farther ".' King William celebrates this parliament for forming the national revolution-afTociation; for remedying the debasement of the coin; for restoring credit; for giving supplies for the war; for paying off debts; and for fettling the civil lift^b. A great deal of bufmefs done in one parliament. We too have seen a great deal dispatched in one parliament, but bufmefs of another fort. We have seen in one parliament the power of election of members taken from the people, and usurped by the commons; the colonies irritated by taxing them without representation; the mother country so diflatisfied, that 60,000 petitioned to have parliament diflblved ; 600,000 /. of the people's money given, forely against their will, to pay debts, which none, but the ministry, knew to be real, or if real, how contracted; the Eaji India company deprived of her rights and privileges, without pretence of tranfgreffion against government; religious liberty refused to two different fcts of petitioners humbly

* DEB. COM. 11. 446.

^b Ibid. in. 90.

requesting what all mankind have an unalienable right to enjoy, &c. of all which more fully elfewhere.

From these few pages may be formed such an idea of what parliaments ought to be, of what they have been, and of what, it is to be feared, we fliall not quickly fee them restored to, as may incline us to adopt the antient prophet's complaint;

.' How is the gold become dim ! How is the most fine gold changed ! The precious fons of Zion, comparable to veflels of fine gold, how are they efteemed as earthen pitchers, the work of the hand of the potter ^a!' The true value is only to be restored to our debased parliaments by putting them into the refining furnace, and purging them of the grofs alloy of places and pensions, which have so long debauched and disgraced them.

CHAP. II.

Placemen and Penficners unfit for Members of Parliament, lecause not likely to be uninfluenced,

ONE of the oldeft, if not abfolutely the oldeft, writer in the world, threatens « a fire to confume the tabernacles of bribery V A parliament filled with placemen and pensioners is. literally a tabernacle of bribery. For it is impoflible to give an bone/I reason for any number of placemen's or pensioners havingyZ^r^ in parliament. The house of commons ought to be the people in one room. And why must the people be bribed to confult their own interest ? If indeed the

* LAMENT, iv. i.

^b JOB xv. 34.

court has schemes to carry, dire&ly oppofite to the people's interest, it may he convenient for the court, that many placemen croud the house of commons.

It is not eafy to imagine, even ftretching charity till it cracks, that any one ever ferioufly thought the admiffion of place-men, pensioners, and officers, into the house of commons, safe, or decent; that any man of common sense can think of it otherwife, than as an open and impudent defiance of the sense of the whole independent people of England.

Our court advocates, however, sometimes divert themselves (on a too fatally ferious subje£t) by treating the independent people like children, when they tell us, it is good policy to drop fotne douceurs among the members of both houses, to attach them more clofely to their country's good. As if it were neceflary to bribe mankind to confult their own interest. Take away your douceurs, and every member's interest will be the same with the public. Suppose I give out, that I will not eat, or drink, unless the court bribes me. Would the court think it necessary to fettle an annual pension on me, to make me eat a dinner every day ? or would it be thought proper to give me a place — any where, but in Bedlam ? The court knows full well, that the direct contrary of their scandalous pretence is the truth; and that the members of the legislature would naturally confult but too well for their iniquitous purposes, their own interest, in confulting that of their country, did not they byafs them by throwing another interest and advantage in their way ; which for that reason they accordingly do, at an immense expence to the nation.

He knew human nature well, who said, The love of money is the root of all evil. He. who can refill

the love of money, may be said to be tried as gold in the fire.

Quifquis ingentes oculo irretorto

Special acervos. Her.

But as we know, the number of men capable of standing this fiery trial, is very small, we ought to be the more cautious of laying temptations in the way of those, whofe failure is to be apprehended, and whofe failure may be of such ruinous consequence to the public. To trust our all, without account, to a set of frail men, and then put those men in such circumstances as are likely to lead them to betray us — what can be imagined more contrary to wisdom ? Several millions a year laid out in supportjng the power of the court ! And this not sufficient; of such a growing nature is corruption ! Nothing of this boundless unaccountable wafte could have place in a republic. I do not mention this as any reflection on our kings. It is but a small part pf this immense fum, that is confumed by them in their propria persona, or that is laid out on their families. But in a republic, judge Blackjiont* would not have wrote as follows ; «It is impoflible to support that dignity^ which a king of Great Sritaiif should maintain, with an income in any dtgree iefs, than what is now established by parliament.' According to the learned judge, whatever is, is right. But, furely, with all due lubmiflion, the dignity of a British monarch does not consist in his fptitding large fums of his pqor people's money; but rather in his /paring their purses, and fetting them an example of frugality. With the learned judge's good

¹ COMM. i. 333.

leave, it is the dignity (if dignity it may be called) of the mint/try, and their crew, much more than the king's, that devours the civil lift. So that the plain English of what the learned judge has written, will be what follows; * It is impofsible to support that influence which a Britijb ministry Jhould maintain, with an income in any degree less than several millions per annum :' Than which I cannot conceive a more ruinous political do&rine.

When Sir W. "Temple difluaded Ch. II. from a]l thoughts of making himself abfolute, he observed to him, among other things, that it would be impracticable : for that England was quite a different fort of country from France, where abfolute government was established. That in the land of flavery there was no such independent body as our middling gentry; and that, on the contrary, that country was full of priefts, of needy noblefie, military officers, and revenue-men, all naturally devoted to the support of arbitrary power, as beino- all interested in it themselves; that Charles had but few places and pensions to give, and no army of considerable force ^a. [We have innumerable places and pensions to allure, and a formidable army to threaten our members into court-measures.] Accordingly the pension parliament was very compliant to the court at firit; but grew more patriotic afterwards, most probably disappointed in their voracious expectations.

Ch. I. A. D. 1628, gave out, that it belongs only to the judges to declare the meaning of the laws ^b. But Rapin justly remarks, That this Was making those men the interpreters of the laws, who depended

¹ Hume, HIST. STUARTS, n. 240. ^k Rapin, n. 276.

on him ; for the king could then make or unmake the judges, as he pleased; which was throwing the liberties, properties, and lives of the subjects into the hands of the king or ministry. Is not the reasoning the same with regard to members of parliament ? If they hold places, and expect preferments from the ministry, are they not the dependents on the ministry as much as Charles's judges were on him? And is it not as much to be expected, that they should be /laves to the ministry ?

Ifhitelecke, in oppofmg the self-denying ordinance, observes, That the Greeks and Romani gave the greatest employments to their fenators. But there is always a great difference between a monarchy and a republic. The latter has checks for overgrown power, which the former knows nothing of. And it is the peculiar evil of monarchy, that ministers fcreen themselves behind the throne; and, as kings are facred characters, as our kings can do no evil, and parliaments are bribed, ministerial crimes go unpunilhed. Again ; JWitelocke says, the English have always given great places to the members of both houses. But in those times, the number of places was so small, they could feldom produce any great effect. Accordingly we fee how ftaunch parliaments were in Ch. Ift's time.

The propofals for more effectually putting the self-denying ordinance in force A. D. 1648, were at that time over-ruled, because many of the members held very profitable places. Yet it is certain there were not in those days places for a majority of the house, and all depends on the majority -¹. How then came the minority to sain such a point ?

* PARL. HIST. xvii. 386.

This shews, that the effeft of places and pensions given to parliatnentMijen. extends muph wider than thP places and pensions themselves reach tq. There are Always in parliament a multitude of gapers, who hope to catch a fop by and by, and are therefore ready to £iirry court-favour by {hewing themselves to be on the court side. It is to be fupposed, that was then the case,

Theauthpr of faffion detected by Faftst says, a pension-bill is impofiible, because members may take the money, and conceal their crime, Birt why may not things be put on such a foot, that a minister should not know how to find money enough to bribe 300 men of fortune every time he has an unconstitutional jx>int to carry ? Beftdes, were a double penalty set upon both giver and receiver, the frequency o.f detection, in consequence of party-altercation, would render bribing ve"ry dangerous. And were parliaments annual, with exclufion pf a certain number by rotation for three years, as the law requires in the case of {heriffs, it could be worth no minister's while to bribe.

Qur house of commons pretends to have an abfolute controul over elections, to determine who fhall fit in, their house, and who {hall not. Why then have they Heyer determined, that no member {hall fit, who has given victuals, or drink, or money, to be elected? Why do they not determine that no man fliall fit in their house, who has a dependence of any kind upon the court ? The answer is plain, This would only be for the advantage of the people, and would ruin the trade of parliamentecring; for ' courtiers and king's

servants (says Wbitlocke) fit in parliament rather to

promote their matter's ends [and their own] than,

their country's rights *'

* PAUL. HIST. xix. 231.

On this grievous subject, cruel is the fneer of the courtiers upon us, when we complain of placemen in. the house, viz, ' That the people themselves are in fault; Why do they re-elect them ?' — Ah, ye traitors, who ' grin horrible a ghaftly fmile,' while ye are ftabbing liberty to the heart! full well do ye, know (at the very time ye are mocking us with this xmjust and wicked recrimination of a fault, which owns youiselves only for its authors) that the wretched people re-eleft upon the same principle as they eleff, A handful of beggars either tempted by a bribe, or awed by the threats of a man in power, elect and re-elect as they are bid. And so the house comes to be filled with the tools of a minister. Nothing can therefore be imagined more farcical, than our pretending to make a law rendering it neceflary to re-ele£i every member, who has accepted a place. The only law, that could, to any purpose, have been made, was utter dlfqualification.

One would imagine, there could not be much room for accufmg the republican parliament of places and pensions. Yet it appears, that reflections were even then made upon that account, which shews the delicacy of those times. « What does the enemy say, nay what do many say, who were friends at the beginning of the parliament ? even this. That the members of both houses have got great places and commands, and the sword into their hands, and what by interest in parliament, what by power in the army, will purposely continue themselves in grandeur, and not permit the war fpeeciily to end, left their own profit and power {hould determine with it. This 1 speak to our own faces. It is but what others do utter abroad behind our backs. I hope we ha', c fticli true English hearts and zealous affections toward the

general weal of our mother country, that no membei of either house will fcruple to deny himself and his private interest for the public good, nor account a diihonour done to him, whatever the parliament fliall refolve upon in this weighty matter.' Cromwell's speech, (the only fensible one he ever made) which }ed to the self-denying ordinance».

It was reckoned, there were 232 members of the first parliament of Geo. I. who had places, pensions, or titles, besides a great many brothers, and heirs apparent, of the nobility, or persons otherwife likely to be under undue influence; the number of which was not below 50, which added to the 232 makes 282^b. A frightful majority on the side of the court. And there is no reason to fuppose the jtugean {table is generally cleaner now than it was then.

' Had our new barrier been well fortified,' [that is, the independency of parliament fecured at the revolution] * had the representativc of the people been contrived to answer to the name, all our kings had been queen Elizabeths. But our elections in inconsiderable boroughs, and our members being qualified to serve two mafters, were such mi flakes in our fundamentals, that, as they have produced our paft misfortunes, they must produce the like under bad princes,, or evil projecting ministers. With a house of commons chosen truly by the people incapable of pensions and places, the king and kingdom had been incapable of misfortune : they had been out of the reach of all human power, and with due submiflion, above fate; since such a government would have made us the proper objects of divine protection, and not only

» PARL. HIST. xin. 376. ^k DEB. COM. vm. 210.

have fecured our greatness and glory, but our religion and morals too, which I fear are all going together'.' A parliament is not neceflarily a fccurity more than a court, (as the French king's court) against flavery. James II. A. D. 1689, assembled a parliament in Inland. But what fort of parliament ? Let Tindaf* answer. Slaves to the king, packed by him, bigotted to popery, and furious against the protestants, king William^ and the revolution. Suppose a parliament thoroughly attached to the court by bribery, the effect would be the same as if attached by a falfe principle. * We have seen and heard,' says lord Beiingbreit, ' in a nation hitherto free, such maxims avowed and pleaded for, as are inconsistent with all the notions of liberty. Corruption hath been defended, nay recommended as a proper, a neceflary, and therefore a reasonable expedient of government; than which there is not perhaps, any one proposition more repugnant to the common sense of mankind and to univerfal experience. Both of thefc demonftrate corruption to be the last deadly fymptom of agonizing liberty. Both of them declare that a people abandoned to it are abandoned to a reprobate sense, and are loft to all hopes of political falvation. The dependence of the legislature on the executive power hath been contended for by the same persons, under the same direction, and yet nothing furely can be more evident than this; that in a constitution like ours, the safety of the whole depends upon the ballance of the parts, and the ballance of the parts on their mutual independency on one another; agreeably to which, Tbuanus makes Ftrdinandlvj in answer to the Cajlilianst who prefs'd him to take away the independency of the

• STATE TRACTS, time of king William, u. 645. ^k CONTINUATION, i. 8j.

dates of Arragtn; That the public safety depends on the equal ballance of the power of the king, and of the power of the kingdom, and that if ever it should happen that one outweigh'd the other, the ruin of one, or of both, must undoubtedly follow *.' * It is pleasant to observe a fct of writers charging others with forming republican schemes, when they themselves are the persons who in efFedt, and by the neceflary consequence of their way of reasoning, have been placing our excellent constitution in a most ridiculous and contemptible light. According to them it is no better than a jumble of incompatible powers, which would feparate and fall to pieces of themselves, unless retrained and upheld by such honourable methods as those of bribery and corruption; for how is it poflible for any man under any other notion, to plead for the necessity or for the fitness of places and pennons, or any pecuniary influence among the members of the house of commons ? If any dependence or biafs created by such motives were really neceflary, it would prove that the form of our government itself was defective to a degree of ridiculoufness; that it was a constitution having a representative of the people which must be engaged not to represent them, nor to vote and aft if uninfluenced by private interest or corrupt motives. Now if such an influence or dependence was univerfal and unlimited throughout the whole house, the monarchy would be abfolute; and whenever this influence prevails in any degree, it tends to arbitrary power. For this reason the true friends of liberty must perpetually guard against such influences, which

* Bahnglr. REM. HIST. ENGL. 29.

is not fetting up a new form of governmenf, but prefer ving the old».' That placemen in parliament, are in our times a

ferious evil, appears from this, that * the minister, before he introduces a bill, can foretell, almost with certainty, its fate in the house; and by means of the influence which he has over the members, can command, in most cases, a majority of votes. Nor will this influence appear in the least furprizing, if we consider the great number of lucrative places which the fovereign, that is, the minister, has to dispose of. For though the property of the subjects be much larger than that of the fovereign, yet is the property of this last by no means inconsiderable ; and it is well known, that much less property, in a (Ingle hand, will counterbalance a greater in several hands. According to the most exaft computation, there are near three millions at the dispofal of the crown. The" civil lift amounts to near a million, the collection of all taxes to another, and the employments in the army and navy, along with ecclefiaftical preferments, to above a third million : an enormous fum, and what cannot fail to attach to the court an immense number of dependants; and as few placemen are excluded from feats in parliament, the fovereign'

[say rather the minister] « must have a mighty influence upon all the deliberations of that auguft aflembly. It ought alfo to be observed, that the great increase of our dominions, and the consequent necessity for the proportionable increase in our military establishment,' [there is no need of a military eftablifli-

ment, a militia is every way preferable] * are both of them pernic.ous to liberty; for feldom or never has it

» Bolinglr. POLIT. TRACTS, 251.

been known, that any nation has preserved its liberty, after having greatly extended its conquests, and (till less after having established a large standing army. And though the increase of commerce, which is likewife the consequence of extenfive dominions, be favourable in some measure to the cause of liberty, by introducing among the people a greater degree of equality, and by drawing them into large towns, which always breathe a republican Spirit; yet does it alfo by this very circumstance of drawing them into large towns, tend evidently to corrupt their minds, and to enervate their bodies, and thus to prepare them for the reception of that flavery, which a variety of other causes is likely to bring upon them. With regard to tho people's jealousy of the crown, which is said to be inherent in the Britijb constitution; this jealousy, however great, may yet by an artful minister be laid asleep. The power of the crown is certainly upon the increase, but it advances, at the same time, with such flow and imperceptible fteps, as not to awaken the jealousy of the public; and before this jealousy be effectually awakened, the power of the crown may have become so great, as to be altogether irresistible. Every new tax that is imposed upon the people, every foot of ground that is added to our dominions, every increase that is made in our military eftablimment, all confpire by their united influence to increase the power of the crown; and if things be fuffered to proceed in their present courfe, and no extraordinary convulfion happens in the state, the Britijh liberties must at last be fwal lowed up in abfolute monarchy. Might I prefume, amidft these oppofite arguments, to deliver my own sentiments, I would affirm, that the Britijb government tends immediately neither to a republic, nor an abfo-

lute monarchy, but to an ariftocraey; thougfc this last will in alj probability only pave tha way for die i$trodu&iofi of monarchy. The very effence of out liberty consists in the people's having tho right: *ad the fovef to dmfe Adt jrque&atatwcr in parliament) that k in other words, in being their own kgiflators. But ftould wee ever come to havt a goaat number of hereditary legislatars, or those who are fitch independent of the people's choke, and ftouid theft hereditary legislators be pofle£ed of the whole, or of the gceatcft part of tiw national property, qpd should they, by means of that property, be able to influence the elediong, and to controul the proceeding* of the members of the lower house, though we may be ftill amufod with the pleastng found of liberty, and though the lower house may be permitted to firbiift in its present form, the national liberties are from that moment ruined. For it is wdi known, that the forms of a constitution may long remain, after its spirit has been entirely extinguished. How far this is our case at present, or how far it is likely to be our case, in some not very diftant -period, any one may eafily determine, by considering the great number of wealthy commoners, who within this half century paft have been advanced to the peerage, and the fpiric which ftill prevails of advancing others to the same, dignity. The moment a commoner becomes troublesome in the lower house, if he is poflefled of a competent fortune, he is immediately tranfplanted to the upper, where he at once strengthens the ariftocratic, and proportionably weakens the democratic part of our government. And how g-reat an influence the members of the upper, have upon the elections, and consequently upon the proceedings of those of the lower

house, may be eafily collected from perufing A court calendar, where we shall fee, that almost all the. noblemens fons .in England* who are of a proper age, are members of the lower house, and that many commoners have obtained their feats-there, by the interest and countenance of some powerful nobleman. In a word, we seem to be .in a fair way of becoming in a shorttime, a nation of .great, lords, and of needy vaflals ; the consequence of .which must infallibly be, that the. people, harrafled by the oppreffions of the great, confciqus that their liberties are already ravifhed from them, and chuftng rather to submit to one mild mafter, than to two or three hundred petty tyrants, will petition the fovereign, as the last favour he can grant them, that he will be gracioufly pleased to establish an abfolute monarchy. This was very lately the case in Denmark^ and if nothing extraordinary happens, it will in all probability be very soon the case in Great-Britain. How to prevent the impending calamity, or if it cannot be prevented, how it may at least be for some time warded off, I will not take upon me to say. A peerage bill was some years ago attempted, or an ad to confine within certain limits the number of peers. Perhaps such a scheme may again be revived, but there feeras very little likelihood in the present disposition of parties, that it would meet with fuccefsV No one ever knew human nature better than He, who said, ' No man can serve two matters.' It is a romantic expectation, and unfuitable to what we know of the frailty of our species, to think of a placeman's or pensioner's being altogether unbiafled in favour of the ministry, to which he owes his emolument, and

• POLIT. RECIST. qudfed LOND. MAG. 1787, p. 406.

consequently of those gentlemen's confultirig in their speeches and votes the good of their-country, with the same impartiality as they might be expefted to do, if wholly independent. « The wife of Carfar ought to be not only innocent, but unfujpefled.' Why must the wife of Cafar be more unfufpe&ed, than a Britijb kgiflator ? Could the Britijh. legislators think of pafling unfufpeded, if there were in-the house of commons' more than two hundred notorious dependents on the Court ? As we go on, this {hocking fight may soon be seen.

The courtiers argue, that excluding placemen and pensioners from parliament, would seem to establish an opposition between the crown and people; as if those, who were employed by the one, could not be entrusted by the other. But indeed there seems to be no occafion for mincing the matte'r. Let us fairly own, that We do not think'the same persons, who have the* laying out, ought likewife to have the laying an of taxes. Since it is eafy to imagine, th'at a member, who has a place, will be under little concern how heavily the people are taxed, as his income indemnifies him, and the heavier the taxes, the more money there will be for the court blood-fuckers.

Ch. 1. fairly declares his expectation of indirect service from his convention parliament at tixford, A. D, 1643; I think most of you, says he, are in my service, either in a civil or a martial way*.' To what purpose does he mention this, but to put them in mind, that they ought to exprefs their gratitude, by promoting his wicked schemes at any rate ?

* PARL'. HIST. xui. no.

en&tlfttt toll* u« S tfcrt Cfcw/«, being flfcppoinlttJ ia his fchw«% * took auolbtr courfe to gain eminent paslianjwtf m«n, M?ho wer« against Ww, to tecoine of few party.* aad to do hifn servu;?. He took Si* «T*fl. Weatwortk an4 Sir 7«v &KW& into- favour, a«d nwrfe item p* ivy-cwjnfeUor%, §ir Dudley Big&t wa* made mafter «|f the roll?; #iyf, king** attorney^ an4 Litikta* ftiicitor.' Hi? dependent judg*a decked* fcjp-money lawful. On which, occafon the pious and virtuous lady of judge Crtke (whofe feme be immortal!) said to her hufoand, * fee hoped he would dor nothing againff his honour, for fear of danger or Iqfs, and that (he would be content tofuffer want or misery with him, ra.ther than 6e ait occafion for him to do, or say, any thing against his judgment or conference ^b.' Lotd Digfy, in his speech, A, D. 1640, for frequent ek&icms, mentions A'^v as once a great patriot, and promoter of the petition of right. Afterwards, when inade attorney general, he proved the very inventor ef fliip-money. He likevvife c.aHs Wentworlh a shameful apastate^e,

St. Jfkni one of the patriots- in the time pf Ch. 1^ was made folicitor general, and others were to be taken into places; but refused them, and flood by the parliament. It was afterwards faspected,, that some, if they ha4 accepted places, would have done the king's cause qiore harm than goodj by betraying^ the cou[S-schemes-to the people *. JJesides, the king had not then places enough, to bribe a majority of the commons. This, however, fhews what the court then thought* as well as now, the true means for making members-

» MEM. 13. ^b 1M<!. *4-

^c PARL. HIST- ix. 197.

^d Hum, HIST. STUARTS, i. z6o.

knaves. And it was to toko off the kfcputatiebs* under which the republican fftritaiMfct (tAlt OH BCtouM of placemen being in the house, that tk« self'doa^ing ordinance wu first breached \

Scripture dirwfts to fliwt At *pp&fi*# «f eVil And wfeeever does not f«r the appearance, it fl« ft* front the*vn&>. On this princifdett»t BMVK dom*W*i4 -cf the republica* paflianwnt write «S Mtews t* thd South commtfiooers.

« We know your lordfljips can and will wl&ietk with us, that finc« Dkr 6OV«fl»ht and thttty, we Have not received any dignitStt «r »ftce« flbm the kftjg V When metabers of pafliataent are placemen, thai is, when the same mea ha^e both legirtative and executive power, how ard we to expect that offenders in adminiftratioft Ihottld be punilhed, the criminals being {he judges ? CaA wfe think any let of ipen will be public spirited enough to hang ihemselves for their offences agajnft their country * ?

* ffalfey's ambition (says Eifynge) first brought the privy counsellors, and others of the king's iervants, ijito the hOuse of commoos; from whence they were anciently exempted. The effects are, th« commons baye l9ft their f tyef jewel* fteedom rf speech*.'

It is a mafim in RJclfEtir's ¥tfla*u PtKt. That c jjcing, that js, a minister? flimild never part with a tax he has once got eftabliOied, even though he has no use for the money > because »/ giving up the tax, he

* Xtyff, II. 515.

* PA&L. flpr- xv. lya. ^c Card. TRACTS, i. 61.

* £H?»&t'* ANT. MEttt. ttbto. PARL. 17$.

lofes the officers employed in collecting it. And these pfficers in parliament are fure cards.

Hen. IV. of France gave the marfhal A'Ornant a ftaff to turn papift, and afterwards afked him which' of the two religions he thought the best. « The protestant, undoubtedly, replies the marfhal; elfe your majefty would not have given me a marfhal's ftaff to boot, to engage me to quit it.' I have-forgot to set down the original writer of this anecdote. It is told in Cato's letters, &c,

A Britijb minister gives places and pcnfions to those who vote for him. Suppose one of those members were afked, Whether the service of his country, or voting always with the court, is best; if he were as honest a knave as the marfhal, what could he answer, but, * That certainly voting for the country's good was preferable to flavery under a minister; elfe the minister had no occafton to give him a place or penfton. to booty to engage him to quit his country's service for the minifjer's.' And is not this giving up the point ?

The Emperor, and bloody Mary gave public penlions to fhe members pf parliament. — \Vith what view ? To engage them to vote for the good of their country > No. To establish popery; To vote the queen's marr riage with a papift, Philip II. of Spain; which that venal parliament did accordingly; thereby manifeftjy shewing how foundly Philip and Mary judged of the effect of bribing parliament^a. What difference does jt make to me, as a subjeft, whether I am voted into flavery for gold fent from the continent to bribe parliament, or for gold drawn out of the exchequer of

* Rafiti) ii. 38,

England t Of the two, m'odefn bribery is t&e most-disgraceful. It is making us pay for the rod, which is* to beat us, and the chain, that is to bind us.

Sir Ch. Wagtr^ first lord of the admiralty, Fgx, furveyor general of. the works, and PeJbam (I do not recoiled what place he held at that time) were the speakers against lord Limerick's motion, A. D. 1741* for an enquiry into the conduct of affairs during Waip»U*s 20 years adminiftration, which was carried in the negative 244 against 242 *. And it is, in general, the same in all debates of the kind. The placemen always speak and vote in one tone; so that before you begin their speeches, you are certain, by only reading the name of the speaker, and knowing, that he held a place, what the ftrain of his speech will be,

< An unpensioned subject will always give the most faithful counsel to his prince. And it is the true interest of the prince to have about him those, who' will not flatter him, or be the flaves of his paffions for the fake of his money V When Mr. Pultenty refigned his place, A. D. 1720, he said in the house, * He might now a& with the * freedom which became an Englijbman;' which implied, that a place was incompatible with freedom«. The same gentleman was struck out of the lift of privy counsellors by Gio. II. with his own hand, for his uncourtly behaviour. The duke of Argylet the earl of Stair, Mr. Pitt, Mr. Ltgge, and many more, have been disgraced and displaced on the same account; which fhews what courts expect of placemen. And are placemen then fit to be members of parliament ?

* DEB. COM. xui. 147.

^k Bolingbr, POLIT. TRACTS, 283,

« PEB. COM. vi. 120,

An omraft of S&no Jifoa's army having ptefotMtf to fit in his prefence, the prince deprived him et hi* command. The di%raced office* went <$ the palace next day! and fat down ift the preience chamber. Upon fhe Shah's reproving him, be answered boHly,

Now I am not in your majefty's ^sy, I may vie the

freedom, which belongs to every independent man.' The emperor approve^ and restored him %

ffV^y moved, ^. Z>. 1721* for tire mutiny bill, which is net cpmriioflly brought in till the end of a feffion. y*>iy/ was for going oh with the more neceilary regulations for Supporting credit. Craggs said, he wondered that 4 person who had received fignal favours from the crown ihould oppose a bill so neceflsry for the safety of government. Lord MoltfuMrth flood up, and said, ' Mr. Speaker, Is rt come to this,' [I believe it is come to this] ' that every man who has a place rtiuft

do all the drudgery that is enjoitfed hrm^b f On which principle, officers have bees (as elfewhere observed) fent for from Flctnekrs to vote for the toinrfter. In the yfear 1766, the governor of New Etglttnd (Bernard) in his speech to the council and house of representatives, took occafion to blame thek wife and patriotic conducl; in excluding from the king's council tfce principal crown-officers. This proceeding {at all titties proper, as the people cannot be too Much on their guard agsinft court-tools, nor too »pproh«nfive of the danger of frrufting power is their unhallotnd hwds) was pecultarly necd&ry at a time wbest the ^feJonifts had so lately seen 4 rapaeiow miwifter llfpttM to en* croach in the moil ihamefefs mannet on their liberty by loading them with taxes, to the payment of which

? MOD. UNIV. HIJT. Tr. 583, * DEB. COM. vj. 227.

(they had not given, nor could give their Content, as having no representative in parliament, where those taxes were imposed.

Thofe brave Americans defended their conduct upon jthe principles of their charter right to choofe and refuse as they please, which they should certainly not give up either to their governor, or to the fecretaries of state. They insisted, that their governor's pretending to make observations on their elections, was a high breach of their privilege. That, while they observed the directions of their charter, they were accountable only to God and their own confciances, for the manner in which they gave their fuffrages. And that their charter jtTelf would be of very little value to them, if it required that they should in their elections bp under the controul of their governors. It is with regret I find jnyself obliged to give only heads of this spirited piece» the drain of which is worthy of the most elegant, as well as the freeft age or nation *.

A resolution, A. D. 1683, pa/Ted the affembly of Ptnfylvania, ' That no person appointed by the gever* nor to receive his fines, forfeitures, or revenues what* foever, Hull fit in judgment in any court of judicature, when a fine may accrue to the governor V

No man could be a mogiftrate at Flortnct if he had a brother or ftear relation in the magistracy^c,

¹ Toxs eeux qtii pofftdettt, 6cC. AH military officers arc excluded from fitting in the eflembly of the statea g«»*ral by a refoJatkjH, A. D. 1625".'

» LOND. MAC. 1766, p. 332, 407. ^k MOD. UNIV. HIST. XLI. 8. « Ibid, xxxvi. 77. ^- ETAT PRES. DE LA REPVEL. nts PROV. UKJES, par Janifen, i. 78.

Tmdal observcs *, * It was a very uHufual thing in, England for gentlemen whp held such ps/ls' [of pay-xnafter general and chancellor of the exchequer, held by Mr,,/*/// and Mr, Legge] ' to eppose a fecretary of state, who was fupposed to know and to speak his royal matter's sentiments,' in favour of continental connexions. Accordingly Mr. Legge was quickly, in reward for his obftinacy against the court, turned out. Yet our daring court-jefuits are ever founding in our ears the usefulness of what can alone overthrow the Jlritijh empire; 1 mean, cpurt-influence in parliament. So little do they dread the tremendous curfe of heaven pointed directly at the heads of those who put light for darkness, and darkness for light, who call good evil, and evil good.

The court-tools say, the influence of the court in parliament is neceflary, and that places, pensions, and finecures are neceflary. But what did honest old Epamimtutas say to die embafladors of the king of ftrfta? * If the king wants me to do any thing for the good of my country, I am ready to do it without a bribe. If he wants me to betray my country, his kingdom is below my price ^b*. There might be some pretence for court-influence in parliament when there were many Jacobites. There might in the time of Charles I. when there were many on the side of the. tyrant. Yet the patriots of Char It is .time eftablHhed the self-denying ordinance, on purpose to break through it. And they gained their point more effectually than If^lliem's bribing ministry by the contrary conduct. It is $we, he used to say, If he had places and pensions. enough

* CONTIN. IX. 558.

* Corn. Nep. IN EPAM.

to give, he should soon reconcile whigs and tories *. But what did he mean by enough ? A place for ever/ jacobite of consequence in the three kingdoms ? This is romantic. But this corrupt policy will go a certain length. And if ministers can but fhuffie on a little and a little longer, they do not much care by what means, because the money is flowing in all the while. * Sir Robert,' ( says a friend of the arch-corruptor, whifpering him in the house) ⁽ what are you doing ? This fiction will be detected to-morrow.' * No matter,' says the other; * it will flop that fellow's [Pulteney's] mouth to-day, and let to-morrow take care of itself.' Judge Hales would not fuffer a gentleman's cauf« to be heard, till he paid him for a buck fent him by the gentleman, though the present was a cuftomary one. Compare this delicacy of sentiment, which would not fuffer those great men so much as to seem byafled, with the execrable groflhefs of our times, in which we fee hundreds of court dependents fitting with grave and modeft face in the house of commons, where there ought not to be the fhadow of an influence likely to byafs the members against the jnterest of their constituents.

Some of our court-writers own, that ^c pensions and bribes cannot be too vehemently decryed ;' but openly declare their opinion, that the crown ought to have employments in its gift to engage support. I own I do not understand what need there is of any support, but rectitude of measures; or how a lucrative place can be considered otherwife than as a bribe, jf it inclines a man to support what he would not ptherwife support.

* Rap. ii. §02,

Why do we refuse a right of voting at efe&ions to those who receive titw? Because we fuppose, that such perfofl*, btfihg n«edyt will of coUrfe be depen«tent» and under undue influence, Why do we fufFer nlert to fit in the house of commons who do receive ahtot ttat is, pat/ims, and are upon the parifti, that is, the n&tion ? Beceuse — we hare fchcmes to cany* which are i*u*fjftt*t with the public good,

* Yoyr lordfliips* (says the earl of CbeJIerfitt !n th« debate on a bill for making officers independent of the fritttiftry, A. D. 1734 '.) ' are, I am furc, all convinced, that the happiners, the effence of our constitution does not depend upon outward forms, but upon resides. Our constitution does riot depend upon our having always a parliament» but Upon that parliament's being Independent of the adminiftfation ; ttpofi itt being in the power of parliament to examine feyerely, and judge impartially ^he conduct arid th$ rn«»furts of those employed in the adminiftration? ttt rfeprefcnt the grievances, and Watch over the liberties arid the properties of the people of this hatten, arid to take aWay evil councilors from before the king* But it ever a majority of both houses of parliament (hould come to be composed of gentle«*rt whofe daily bread", 6r at least their chief fuppbrtj depended entirely Up6n thfe favours pf the fcfoWn, carl it be imagined that ;t would then be in Ihtt powitf df parliament to examine freely, or judge hhpftrttalry, the Cohiiu& bf thele favourites; tq relieve the people fVom the bppreflions brought upon thttn 6y fUch favflUflttt; 6t to tell their foverelgq *h/ ttngrateful truths ab&ut those whom he had thought fit to employ as his rninifters ? Would not

? DBS. ^HkD5> iV. 199.

an arbitrary negative be then put upon aH fvcl\ qHeft|pps JA pvliaiwnt? Would not the Wide-i figns of the uncorrupted and ind.epende.wt few b« baflfad by a corrupt aui foyifc oujority ? And fluH any question v.Lich lends. Awards the p«v«atisg such a misfortune^ have now. the ill fto to b« rejected by yam: lordOwp* ?' Jt is well remembered how much, JM»d bo«f JuJily, all rank* in the nation woe. pleastd with, th^ *Q m4d« at the iostanc« of the prffeot king (whom God prc» serve!)^. U. 1762, for preventing the reoioyaj of the judges at the demife of every fovereign, which, naturally tended to put them on courting the heir, apparent, to the violation of justice in their fe^tences. But why were we pleased with, this regulation ? According to the opposers of all schemcs for rcftoririg independency to parliament, there was no need of any such regulation. According to them, there is no corruption, no dependency, no need of any schemes for majcing either judges, or members of parliament independent.

* It would be ridiculous* (says the excellent Trenthard *J ' to throw away reason upon thoft banditti, who go into parliament with the execrable intention of carrying to market a country, which trusted them with its all. Such men are worse than cannibals, who only eat their enernies to fatisfy their hunger; but do not fell and betray their countrymen, who have trusted them with the. protection of their persons and property.' In the debate, 4- £. 1742, about bringing in the ola.ce bill ^b, Sir W. WiH. Wynne feid> • Gentlemen

* CATO'S LSTT. in. 286. ^fc D*B. COM. xiv. 33 — 64,

often change their sentiments with their fituation, and that a gentleman, after he becomes a placeman^ begins to entertain notions of the prerogative of the' trowtt and the liberties of the people, very different from those he had whilst he was a plain, honest, country gentleman. If any thing like this should* happen in the present debate, it may tend to disappoint the motion; but with all those who are neither placemen nor pensioners, I am fure it ought to be an argument in its favour; and, I hope, ie will prevail with some gentlemen, who in former feffions opposed this motion, to alter their sentiments! and their way of voting upon this occafion, when they have such a plain proof before their eyes, that, if a place does not induce a man to vote against his honour and his conscience, it at least byafles his judgment, and makes him conclude that to be wrong, which he before thought and declared to be right.'

Lord Strange's speech in answer to that of Edw. Walpole, A. D. 1742 % is clofe to our present purpose. As we seem to improve every day in those doctrines that are introductory of arbitrary power, the doctrine of corruption has this day been pufhed farther than ever, I believe, it was in this house. It has been represented not only as a harmless, but a neceflary implement of government i and all the laws we have for excluding pensioners, and several forts of officers, from having' feats in this house, may, by the same fort of reasoning, be proved to be subverfive of our constitution, and introductory of anarchy, confufion, and arbitrary power. If a geritle--. man of a small estate, or an estate, however large,

• DEB. COM. xiv. 41.

that cannot supply the wants of his luxury or avarice, cannot be fupposed capable of being induced by any mercenary motive the crown can throw ia his way, to confent to grants or regulations, or to approve of measures that tend towards the introduclion of arbitrary power, or that appear to be inconsistent with the public good; why should we exclude pensioners, why should we exclude the commissioners and officers of our cuftoms «nd excife, from having feats in this house? If the power of granting pecuniary and mercenary rewards to members be so neceflary for the managing of this house, and for answering the neceflary ends of government, why should we, in any respect, abridge that power, which if ever so extenfive, can do us no harm, and which, if top much abridged, may overfet both our government and constitution 7 Surely, no man of common sense would make the least approach towards a precipice, if he could keep his distance without the least danger or inconvenience; therefore, if we admit this doctrine, we must fuppose those parliaments void of common sense, in which the laws we now have for excluding pensioners, and several forts of officers, were agreed to. But experience in all ages, and all countries, must convince us that this doctrine is falfe, deceitful, and pernicious. la all countries where arbitrary power has been, or is now set up, corruption was the footftool upon which it mounted into the throne. By corruption, men are induced to arm their magistrates, or supreme magiftrate, with such powers, as win enable them to deftroy first the eflcnce, and afterwards the very face of public liberty.'

£H« lord/hip then foew*, that jiatlous *W snflavei »ot by a ««P •* «<M'*I but by flow a»d imperceptible, tut therefore more formidable degree*. That de%pwg mea begin with fa««ing »nd bribing, ia order to <*tai» of the people the «ece#ajy advantages; that, by this means, they accordingly do obtain first one degree of power, and then another; till at last they find bribery pe*d!0f», and that they can «rry their designs by maia force, He then goes on a* follows,]

« Let us censider, Sir, in what liberty and property truly consists, and we fliall fee, that where any one man has in his power a large fund for corruption, both may be abfolutely deftroyed, and an arbitrary power eftabliflied before people become generally fensible of their danger. A man's personal liberty consists in its not being in the power of any man, or magiftrate, with impunity, to imprifon or kill him, or inflict any personal punishment upon him, unlcfs he has been formally tried, and justly condemned by that method of trial, and by those laws, which have been established, and are approved of by the majority of the society to which he belongs. Property again consists in a man's being fecure of enjoying, and tranfmitting to his posterity, what has been left to him by his ancestors, or acquired by his own induftry, unless the whole, or some part of it, be taken from him, in purfuance of laws that have been established, and are approved by the majority of the society to which he belongs. Whilft this is the case, every man of the society enjoys liberty and property in their full extent; and this will be our case as long as our

elections and parliaments remain free from any influence either compulfive or corrupt. But, fuppose, Sir, a majority of our house of commons consisted of such as held lucrative places from the crown, and fuppose a judge were to be brought before them who, far the fake of some corrupt consideration, had, at the defire of the crown, illegally and unjustly condemned and imprifoned many of his fellow-subjects; would not the crown, I mean the ministers of the crown, endeavour to protect such a judge ? Would not they give hints to their officers in this house, that a difmiffion would be the certain consequence of their giving a vote against this tool ? And can we fuppose that many of these officers would chuse to lofe a place of 500 /. or 1000 /. a year, rather than give a vote in favour of this judge ? Sir, I have a very great opinion of our present judges, but, without any reflection upon them, I will say, that it is upon the independency and integrity of our parliaments that we mufi: depend for the integrity and impartiality of our judges ; for the crown has many ways to reward a pliable judge, and as many to punish an obftinate one. Nay, if parliaments were once become dependent upon the crown, an obftinate integrity would of itself be sufficient for getting a judge removed by the addrefs of both houses of parliament; for if the majority of parliament were such as depended upon the crown for getting or holding some lucrative employment, they would eafily be perfuaded that such judge had done injustice to the crown, or had somented fedition by shewing favour to the feditious, and under this pretence they would vote for addrefling to remove him, without considering that they thereby eftabliflied arbitrary power; and

made not only &eir own estates, but their lives and liberties dependent upon the arbitrary will of their: forereign; for by this precedent, all our judges would be convinced, that they tnuft take directions from the ministers of the crown in alt prosecutions, trials, and cattfes that might afterwards come before them; and what man could say he had any liberty or property left, if the ministers of the crown had it in their power to take his life, liberty, or estate from him, whenever they pleased, by a falfe arcufation, and a mock trial ? Even after such a fatal turn in our constitution, as long as a spirit of corruption prevailed among the people, and the court kept within the bounds of common decency, there would be no occafion for any compulfive methods, either at eleftions, or in parliament, because the ministers would always find people enough, that would be ready to take their money or their favours, and in expectation or return would agree to vote as directed; but if by the ridiculous conduit of the court, a spirit of liberty fttould arife among the people, the violent and compuliive methods ufual in such cases would be made use of. Informers, or delatorti, as the Ramans called them, would be found out and retained, and fpread over the whole nation, in order to bring falfe informations against those who dared to oppose the court either at elections or In parliament; and in both, men would be found to vote according to the directions of a minister, in order to preserve that property by a flavifh subjection, which they had before been endeavouring to increase by a villainous corruption. After what I have said, Sir, I hope I need not particularly mention all the other methods by which a corrupt dependent parliament may fap the foundations of

our constitution. Enfnaring Itws may be made, or the laws we have for fecuring our liberties may be repealed^ or fufpended under various pretences, without a corrupt man's being fensible that he it thereby expofing his own estate to the precarious tenure of arbitrary laws. On pretence of a (ham-plot or a pretended difaffbaion, the Habtai Corpus aft, that corner ftone of our liberties, may be fufpended for a twelvemonth, and under the same pretence that fufpension may be renewed for another and a third twelvemonth, till at last the annual fufpension of that falutary law may go as glibly down as the mutiny bill, or malt tax, now does; for when these two bills were first introduced, no man fupposed they would ever become bills of courfe, to be pafled without opposition in every fucceeding feffions of parliament.' Lord Strangt then goes on to fhew how, among other particulars, a designing ministry might gradually increase the army to such a pitch as would eafily overthrow liberty.

« Can we fuppose, says his lordfliip, that any man would rifque his lofing a lucrative employment by voting against a small augmentation of the army ? This, Sir, must convince every true lover of liberty, how necessary it is, that no member of this aflembly, or at least as few as pofsible, fh'ould be under such temptation. I fhall grant, that in most points, which come to be debated before this house, some of our members may have a private interest in oppofmg, or agreeing; but as long as this private interest does not proceed from the favours they enjoy, or expefl: from the crown, it can never injure the public good; because if some have a private interest in oppofing, others will have a pri-

vate interest in agreeing to what is proposed ; and those whofe private interest is no way concerned* will always caft the balance in favour of the public good. The granting of money is the only case where we can fuppose the members generally engaged by their private interest, to oppose what is neceflary for the public service; but this interest is so final], with regard to each particular member, that it can never be of any weight. This is demonftrated, Sir, from the whole courfe of our hiftory, for I defy any man to give me one instance where the parliament denied granting what was neceflary for the public service, unless they were denied justice with regard to the redrefs of grievances, or unless they had well grounded apprehensions that the money would be mifapplied. But let us fee, Sir, how this argument will stand upon the other side of the question. It is certain that the parliament ought never to grant more than is abfolutely neceflary for the public service. It is likewife certain, that we never ought to grant even what is neceflary, till all grievances be redrefled, and our former grants regularly and ftridtly accounted for. This is our duty as members of this house: but fliall we perform this duty if a majority of us be greatly concerned in interest to neglect it ? And this will always be the case if a majority of us hold or expect some lucrative office or employment at the pleasure of the crown, because it will always be the interest of ministers, and even their safety may sometimes be concerned in our not performing this duty. Suppose they aflc from parliament 500,ooo/. or a million for carrying on some whimucal, perhaps pernicious scheme of their own ; will a member of this house, who is to pay for his fliare not above 50 £ of this fum, refuse

granting it, when he is to get or hold 500/. or iooo/. a year, by confenting to the grant? Will a member of this house insist upon first redreffing a grievance by which he fuffers little, perhaps no fensible prejudice, when he is to get or hold 2 or 300 /. a year by letting it remain ? And finally, Sir, will a member of this house call ministers to a Aridt account by which he can never expect to put a farthing in his own pocket, when by neglecting to do fo, he may get or hold a good poft or employment, and perhaps procure a round fum, which he himself has purloined from the public. Sir, I was forry to hear a young gentleman talk so much of mens private paflions and affections, and of every man's having a view to the service of some favourite paffion, in every vote he gives in parliament, or at elections. I hope the case is far otherwife; but if it is not, we ought to endeavour to make it fo, by putting it out of the power (at least as far as we can, by such laws as this) of any man to fcrve himself by his way of voting in parliament or at elections, any further than may refult to him from the general good of his country. If we can do this ; if we can put it out of the power of the felnfh and mercenary to fell their votes in parliament, no man will purchafe a feat there at any high price, and this will of courfe put an end to bribery and corruption at elections; for no mercenary foul will purdiafe what he cannot fell; and those who are prompted by their ambition to purchafe, will never go to any high price, nor will they submit to be the flaves of a minister after they have purchafcd. Even ministers themselves would ceafe their bribery at elections, because they could not depend upon bav«jng their candidate's vote in parliament, if he had

no lucrative office depending upon his voting always with the minifler; and if the flood-gates of the treafury were not opened at any election, I am convinced we fljould soon have little or no bribery in the kingdom. Whilft there are purchafers, Sir, there will, be fellers; I am afraid there are at present too many of both : but if you can make it worth no man's while to purchafe, you will put an end to the traffic ; and this is the design of the bill now proposed. I have {hewn, that if you do not agree to it, there will be, there must be, a corrupt dependency in parliament; that by such a dependency our constitution may be overturned, without any compulfive dependency : and that the latter may be made use of by an arbitrary government, and certainly will be made use-qf, as soon as it becomes neceflary for the support of its arbitrary power. Upon this side, Sir, the danger '19 certain and inevitable. Let us then consider the danger pretended to be on the other. If we exclude officers, or the greatest part of them, from having feats in this house, it is said, it will introduce anarchy and confufion, because it will be impofsible to govern such a numerous afiembly as this without a power in the crown to reward those who appear zealous in its service; and that as soon as this impoffibility is perceived, all our officers, civil and military, will join with the crown in laying aside the use of parliaments. What the honourable gentleman may mean, Sir, by governing such a numerous aflembly, I do not know} but according to the common acceptation of the word', I should be forry to fee it in the power of ministers to govern either house of parliament, by any other method than that of convincing the majority that nothing is

proposed or intended hut what is for the public good; for if either houfc woe to be governed by the hopes of reward, I aw fure it could be of no ftrvice to the pcopl*, and of very little even to tht crown itself i because the design and use of parliaments k, that they may be a- check upon the con« du& of ministers; and no «ian, whole behaviour in this house is governed bf his hopes of reward, Twill ever set himself up for a check opon the conduit of those who alone can bestow the reward he- expects. We must, therefore, fuppose that ministers may prevail with a majority of this b&use so approve or agree to what appears to be for the public service, without having it in their power to give a title, poft, or pension to every one that approves of their measures; otherwife we must conclude that no such house ought to exift, and, consequentfy, that the very form of a limited government ought to 'be abolifhed in this selfifli and corrupt nation. What effect some late corrupt practices may have had upon the genius and morals pf the lower fort of people, I do not know, but I hope it has as yet had little or none upon f he generality of those that have; any chance of being members of this houfc; and unlefe they ;»e become very much degenerated¹, we must, from experience, conclude, that when our miwftew puffue popular and right measures', they may depend upon, the affi&ance and approbation- pf parliament. This,. I Jay, we must from experience concludf; for in former ages our mmifters had few rewards te> fceftow, and yet they never failed of having the pwjkunent's approbation, when their nealores were fucn as were agreeable to rhe people. Nay, from the very nature of the case, we must draw the same conclufion ; for a house of

commons freely chosen by the people must approve of what the people approves of. If from selsisti motives they should disapprove or oppose such measures, the oppofmg members would be fure of being turned out at the next electionj and as the king has it in his power to bring on a new election whenever he pleases, his ministers may eafily get rid of such selfifh mean spirited members, and may consequently, if they defire it, always have a parliament generally composed of gentlemen of true honour and public spirit; but the contrary is what most ministers defire, as has of late been manifeft from the characters of those who were generally set up as candidates upon the court interest. We can never, therefore, be in danger of anarchy or confufion from its not being in the power of a minister to bribe a majority of this house into his measures. When bribery and corrupt motives preyail within doors, they will certainly prevail without, and then we may fee a member burnt in effigy one year, in the public ftreets of his borough, and rechosen the year following as their representative in a new parliament. We may fee the most notorious fraudulent practices by the underlings in power, and these underlings encouraged by the minister, and protected by a majority in parliament: we may fee the most unpopu.hr and destructive measures purfued by our ministers, and all approved, nay, applauded by parliament. Thefe things we may fee, Sir : these things we have seen within these last twenty years; and this has brought affairs both at home and abroad into the melancholy fituation which is now acknowledged by all, and will soon, I fear, be feverely felt by the whole nation,'

So just are these observations of lord Strange on the powerful effect of places and pensions on members of parliament, that the very next speech confirms them. For in it we fee Mr. Sandys stately made chancellor of the exchequer) oppofmg the very bill which he himself was concerned in bringing in last feffions ^a.

What makes all dostrines plain and clear ? About two hundred pounds a year ? And these, which were full plain before Obfcure again ? Two hundred more. HUDIB.

Sandys was very feverely handled by Mr. Carnival.

And Sir John Barnard diverted the house with the

following meers upon his ductility.

' From what has been said^b, by some gentlemen in the debate, I forefee, that if our parliaments continue in time to come, as complaifant to our ministers as they have been in time paft, the fate of the question under this adminiftration will be the same with that, which was the fate of the question about reducing our army under the last. The worthy gentleman who was at the head of our former adminiftration, and is now so deservedly fent to the other house, had, whilst he was a country gentleman, so ftrenuoufly opposed keeping up a numerous Handing army in time of peace, that after he became a minister, though excefs of modefty could never be reckoned among his foibles, he had not the aflurance directly to oppose a reduction. No, Sir, during the first part of his adminiftration, he always declared himself for a reduction as soon as a favourable opportunity should offer. But he always endeavoured to shew, that the present, was not a proper opportunity; and at last

'both

> PEB. COM. xiv. 44. " Ibid. 59.

both he and his friends gathered aflurance enough to tell us, that even in times of the rooft profound tranquillity, a greater number of regular troops was, and always would be neceffiuy, than that he had so ftrenuodly opposed in the year I7I7> when there was the highcft probability of our being soon engaged in a war, both with Sweden and Spain. This, Sir, was the conduct of our former minister, with regard to the annual question about reducing our army, and this I could almost lay a wager will be the conduit held by our present miaifters, with regard to the bringing in, and paffing this bill. They cannot directly oppose a bill which they have upon former occafions so often and so ftrenvjoufly patronized : but though lad feffion did, yet this feffion does not, it seems, afford us a proper opportunity for applying a remedy to an evil which they themselves allow, has brought Europe, as well as this nation, to tb,e brink of destruction; and this I am afraid will be their way of reasoning as long as they continue ministers, or at least until they become as hardened as their predecefibr, which they may probably do, if they continue as long in power, and then like him they will freely declare, that they have actually changed their fentirnents, and that no such bill ought ever to be pa/fed.' The corporation of London fhewed their opinion of

the precarioufness of the principles of placemen and.

petitioners, in their rernonftrance to the king, A. D.

1770. * The forms of the constitution, like those ojF religion., were not established for the form's fake, but for the substance. And we call God and men to witness, that, as we do not owe our liberty to those nice and subtle distinctions, which pennons, and lucrative employments have invented, so neither will

we be deprived of it by them; but, as it was gained by the ftern virtue of our ancestors, by the virtue of their descendants it {hall be preserved *.' In 1774, the house of representatives of the province of MaJJachuseti bay, presented a petition and remon* ftrance to the governor and council, for the removal of Peter Oliver, efq; from the superior court. A court wholly erected and conftituted by the general affembly, which power was granted by the royal charter.

They complain that the said Peter Oliver had taken a falary and reward from the king, which was contrary to the plain meaning of their charter, and against the known constitution of that province.

The governor refused to comply with their request, as it would be, he said, counteracting his majefty.

They pray that he would take the advice and affifc* ance of his majefty's council on the above petition and remonftrance, without which advice, he, they (aid, would act directly contrary to the most evident design of their charter.

CHAP. III.

$bat Placemen often bold, a -plurality of Employ' mentSy incompatible with one another.

PLURALITIES in thestate, as in the church, may be for the advantage of those, who hold themj but they are certainly a difadvantage to the public. Let a man's abilities be what they will, he will certainly not fill fix employments at the same time, with the same fuccefs as one.

» CITY'* REMONSTRANCE to the king, A. D. 1770.

Arlflotle blames the Carthaginians for giving different public employments to the same men. What should we think, says he, of a legislator, who should order the same man to be both a (hoemaker, and a mufician ? $«uX0t> fav fofciuv, x. r. X *.

The Guifes, when they had power in Franct, in order to gain popularity, made a regulation, that no person should hold more than one employment at a time ^b.

It was one of the charges against Buckingham, that he had engrofled more offices, than could be duly filled by any one man. That, by that means, he had too much power to do mischief; and too little to do good^c.

When the first land-tax was laid on, in the time of Hen. IV. it was provided, that no member of parliament should be a collector, comptroller, &c.^d

The old writ of parliament for the knights, says exprefsly; Nalumus quod tu nee aliquis alias vie' difti reg'

noflri aliqualiter Jit eleffus' [elefli fitis, it should be]

We will, that neither you [the flieriff, to whom the Vrit is directed] ' nor any lieutenant of the king's, be by

any means elected.' Because it was fupposed, in those fimple times, a man could not be in two places, fewing his country in two capacities, at the same time. We make nothing of a gentleman's being at the same time colonel of a regiment warring in Flanders, governor of a fort in North-Britain, and member of parliament at Weflminjlcr. The duke of Sbrnujbury was in king William's time, lord treasurer, taking care of the king's money; lord chamberlain, taking care of the

* drift. POLIT. ii. 12.

^b Moo. UNIV. HIST. xxiv. 237, ^c PARL. HIST. vn. 50.

* PARL. HIST. n. 121.

palace; lord lieutenant of Ireland, governing that unruly, and (ia those days) rebellious country; and an Englijb peer, trying causes in the last refort; and voting in the greatest national concerns'. What abilities he must have had, to manage such great and widely diftant affairs, at the same time !

A foldier goes altogether upon force. A fcnator ought to be as cool as a judge. It is therefore very unlikely, that a good officer should be a proper person to make a member of parliament.

Mr. Wynne, afterwards S'aWatkin Williams Wynne, in the debate on this subject, shews that placemen and officers are very unfit for being members of parliament. The business of the commons ^k, says he, is to represent to his majefty, the grievances of the people; to inform him if any of his ministers, or officers, makes an ill use of the power he delegates to them, and to impeach and present such evil ministers. Now I would be glad to know who are the most proper representatives for these purposes, gentlemen who have large properties in the country, who are independent of the ministers and officers of the crown, and who by living in the country, are perfectly acquainted with the circumstances of the people; or gentlemen who for their chief support, depend upon the ministers and officers of the crown, who know nothing of those they represent, and are not only ignorant of their true interests, but are really indifferent about their welfare. I hope it will not be controverted, but that the first fort of gentlemen are the most proper representatives of the people.'

¹ Tind. CONTIN. i. 368. ^k DEB. COM. vm. 165.

The brave and free-spirited Flttcber of Scotland, who wrote A. D. 1698, speaks of the returning of military men for members, as a thing of a most formidable nature, and dangerous tendency \ . * The gentlemen of the sword, are not proper representatives of a people, whofe civil constitution abhors Handing armies, and cannot subsist under them. The fortunes and expectations of those gentlemen depend upon observing the word of command ; and it is but natural, that they Should support power, in which they are iharers. . It is not to be cxpe&ed that ever they Should concur in a vote, or an addrefs, to disband or reduce themselves, however defirable or neceflary the same may be to us V

* My lord's fteward is a very honest man; but if I had an affair to fettle with my lord, I would choofe my neighbour, for a referee, rather than the fteward⁰.' Sir Charles Sedley observes, in his speech, A. D. 1699, that there were then 9 commiflioners of excife, 7 of admiralty, 3 .of the poft-office, and 6 of the cuftoms ; and that great part of these places must be superfluous ; but that all were members of parliament; and that many gentlemen held two offices, while they had feats in the house ⁴.

It has been said, it might be dangerous to deprive the greatest part of those, who hold civil, military, or naval employments, of a (hare in the legislation, left they be irritated against that institution from which they are excluded. The answer to this is very Ample. Take away the infamous emoluments annexed to a

» Fletcher's WoRK.5, p. 37.

^k CATO'S LETT. in. 25.

^e Bolingbr. POLIT. TRACTS, 275,

⁴ DBB. COM. in. 195.

feat in parliament, and you will presently remove all eagerness after feats in the house. Why ihould gentlemen want to be in parliament ? To have a troublesome, unprofitable, expenfive office ? Do men want to be church-wardens, Sheriffs, &c. Do they drink with clowns, kifs old women, and expend thousands in obtaining places, by which there is nothing to be got?

It was an article against the earl of Orford in king IPtlliam's time, That he had held fcveral inconsistent offices at the same time, by which means he avoided being called to account for his embezzlements *.

In the time of the late war in Flanders, the ministry were, on some occafion, likely to be so hard prefled, that they thought it neceflary to fend to Flanders for some officers, who were members (hopeful members, who had not the opportunity, in several yean together, of once' saying Aye, or No, in St. Stephen's chapel) to vote for the court. Some of them came accordingly. Others the duke of Cumberland would not fuffer t« leave the army^b. This Shews, that the court looks upon officers as bound to obey the commands of the minister, and to vote as ordered by him.

A. D. 1773, the duke of Ltinfler opposed his brother lord Ch. Fitzgerald's being member for Dublin, ' because he was an officer in the navy, and therefore might by his neceflary attendance on his naval duty be prevented from doing that of a reprcfentativcV

* DEB. COM. in. 147. ^k GENT. MAC. Aug. 1747. •SeeWHiTSH. EVEN. POST, Die. 7, 1773.

CHAP. IV.

Places and Pensions not given according to Merit.

IF the nation is to be plundered, it would be feme comfort to think that the fpoil was divided among the deserving, if it might be fupposed any deserving person would be concerned in plundering his poor indebted country. But it is too notorious, that courts reward according to a different fyftem of morals from that which the antient philofophers, prophets, and apoftles taught; which makes Dr. Johnfon's definition of the word pension * appear but too accurate, viz.

Pay given to a state-hireling for treason to his

country.'

Ariflotle ^b observes, that it is of great consequence in a state, that the persons employed in public bufmefs do pofless not only valuable qualifications in general, but those particular .qualifications which are necefiary for the fuccefsful difcharge of their rcspeclive duties. A man's being honest and benevolent, for instance, is not enough to recommend him to the office of a commander either by fea or land, if he is timid, or unfkilful in war; and another's being full of military courage and conduct, is no reason why he should be a financier, or a treasurer. Tpi* it TII»«, x. r. *. We consider very little, whether the man be fit, or unfit, for the place. We consider chiefly whether the place, that is the falary, is fit for him ; we consider what power he has, by parliamenteering, or otherwife, to Aippoit, or to prejudice, the schemes of the court. If he is likely to

⁸ Jabnhn\ DICT. H. Word PfcKClOtf. * POLIT. v. 9.

stand in the minister's way, we kick him up flairs, if not, down.

Ariflotle observes *, that tbofe who enjoy the honour of great offices in the state, may expect to be envied by those who have no {hare in them. But that if, besides, they load themselves and creatures with the fpoils of the public by turning their duty into a mere matter of emolument, they will be doubly hated by their countrymen, who find themselves excluded from this double advantage.

* Pendant qu' a Rome,' &c. « While at Rome [during the first Punic war] ' the public employment? were obtained only by merit, and were of no advantage to those who obtained them, but in so far as they gave a greater opportunity of being useful} at Carthage all was venal, and every service done by particulars to the public was paid for V The Carthaginians allowed no man to fill any important poft, unless he was poflefled of property as well as merit. And furely, if it were not, that rich men are too commonly admitted to important stations merely in virtue of their wtalth, without regard to merit, the Carthaginian regulation (with all due submiffion to Ariflotle^ who blames it) is not amifs. For power ought certainly, in some degree, to be annexed to property. Yet the Carthaginian law undoubtedly tended, as the philofopher observes, to exclude merit, which is often poor, to excite avarice, and promote bribery ^c.

Before 'Tarquin's time, nobody folicited for a public employment °. Among us, all forts of profitable em-

^a POLIT. v. 8.

^b GRAND. ET DECAD. DES ROM. p. 32.

^c ANT. UNIV. HIST. xvn. 260. * Ibid. xi. 318.

ploymenti are folictted for (excepting tbe office of dUTenting miniftcrs only.) Every man holds himfdf duly qualified for the place, so the profits of the place be fuitable to his circumstances.

Auguftus ordered, that all, Who bribed for offices, fiiould be incapacitated for five years'. And for prevention of* so great an evil, he ordered, that every candidate for an employment should depofit a fum of money to be forfeited, if he was convicted of corruption ^b.

Antony advanced to honours and emoluments all his friends and relations ^e. He gained Lepidus by making him pontjfex maximus. So tPalpole got places or pensions for all, who could claim the most diftant relation or connexion with him.

The emperor Antoninus deprived many persons of pensions fettled on them by Adrian; saying, he could not bear to fee the state devoured by those who were of no use to it^d.

The emperor 'Julian proposed only to employ men of merit, without paying any regard whatever to recommendation or interest '.

Con/iantius used to fell employments, which tempted those who bought them, to opprefs the people, in order to indemnify themselves^f.

The antient Gauls used to fight for pofts and places. If our place-hunters should take to this practice, inftead of the present method of obtaining them by felling their country} we should, besides other advantages, get rid of many worthless individuals. Yet the crime

* ANT. Umv. HIST. xui. 514. * Ibid. 531.

« Ibid. xtu. 297. * Ibid. xv. 198.

« Ibid. xvi. 219. ' Ibid. xvi. 227.

of (bedding blood about a place would be the same as that of our duellifts murdering one another about a point of honour, or a wh — — .

Abu Beer, Mohammed's fucceflbr, used to reward merit with money. Omar gave money only to the neceffitous. We give, or rather heap money upon those, who have neither merit, nor necejjity to plead. Omar thought, merit was to be honoured, not paid.

King John III. of Portugal rewarded all services himself; by which means he knew that they were not over-looked, nor overpaid. He rewarded moderately; for the approbation of a wife and good king, who faw with his own eyes, was to be reckoned up as a prodigious enhancement of a moderate reward. He commonly made an apologyr for that he had many to be bountiful to; which shewed, that he was well served. He created no new employments on purpose to gratify a set of court blood-fuckers. He did not heap several employments upon the same persons. For he said, One public poft, and a man's private concerns were business enough for any one man '.

The barbarous Abyjjiniant have a better notion of encouraging merit, than the civilized Englijb, They do not allow a youth to cut his hair in the manly form, till he has done some feat of valour, and his honours increase according to his behaviour ^b.

The Dutch EaJi-India Company do not prefer according to feniority merely, but according to merit^c.

Cardinal Ximtnts was very curious in enquiring into the characters and abilities of those, to whom he gave employments ^d.

• tyOD. UKIV. HIST. xxu. 237. ^¥ Ibid. xv. 44.

^c Jbid. x. 565. * Ibid. xxi. 214.

Cati}, of Medicisy the mother of the Parijian maffacre of diabolical memory, introduced into France the practice of felling court-places, and of mortgaging the revenues for ready money».

How mean does lord Bacon appear in his letter to Janus I^b. in which he fings his own praises, and labours to shew himself fitter for the place of chancellor, than the great and good lord chief justice Cote, or lord Hobart.

Dr. Pinto, who first set on the revolution in favour •of Portuguefe liberty and the duke of Braganza, w'as never advanced by him, never envied, nor looked upon as a favourite. But he had what he wanted, the king's private friendship and efteem^c. How much disgust and contention had been avoided, had a certain noble earl of our times, very useful^d in* conducting the education of one, who was made for a good king, contented himself with being the king's learned friend, a itation for which he was very fit, and had never

* Polt. Ess. SUR L'HIST. in. 364. ^b Lord Bacon's LETT. p. 85.

^c MOD. UNIV. HIST. xxn. 312.

* Of this I was repeatedly informed by the late excellent Dr. Hales, who prosefl'ed himself a great admirer of that nobleman's abilities and dispositions; and I willingly lay hold of the opportunity of writing somewhat in favour of one, <zf<ri»/?'whom so much has been so raftly thrown^ut. For I would be the defender (as far as lies within my reach) of thofc whom I fee blamed beyond their demerits.

Non tibi Tyndaridis facies irivifa Lacxnx, Culpatufve Paris — Divom inclementia, divom Ha» evertit opes - Vi R c.

It is not lord B — , but lord Corruption, that has brought the Britijb empire to the condition, in which we fee it.

afpired to that of zjiatefman and treaty-moltr, for which he was very unfit!

One Cunningham was made governor of Jamaica for faving PPalpole's bones, when attacked by the London mob, on account of his excife scheme •. « A man totally unqualified either by abilities or experience, and who owed his preferment entirely to the partiality of the mittijier.' He died fix weeks after his arrival of a fever contracted at an entertainment, being habitually intemperate.

While worthless pufliing men obtain rewards for small services, often for cruel injuries, done their country, modeft merit declines its deferred recompence.

Fife, the conqueror of the formidable infurredion of the flaves, modeftly declined a triumph on the occafion.

Cicero, for faving the commonwealth from the fury of Catiline, was rewarded and fatisfied with only a 'corona civita, that is, a wifp of hay put round his head. He had neither floating, nor fixed pension. Yet Cicero's times were not the fimple ages.

The moderation of Sir Henry Vane was truly admirable. Finding, that, as treasurer of the navy, his income, at the low rate of A,d. in the pound cotnmiffion, amounted, in the Dtitcb war, to 30,0007. a year, he said, it was a shameful robbery of the public, and defired to give up his patent, which he had received from the late king for life, and to have, inftead of it, for an agent he had brought up to the business, a falary of 2000/. a year. Several of our blood-fuckers, I mean comtnifiaries, in the late German war, got from 50,000 /. to 500,000 /. and have never fh'ewn any compunction on account of robbing the public.

* MOD. UNIV. HIST. XLI. 409.

Gratuities were given to fufferers in the trouble? under Cb. 1. 5000/. offered Mr. Hollis, were refused by htm. 10,000/. were given Mr. Vaffall for the damages he differed in oppofing fhip-money; and 5000 7. to Mr. Hampdm on the same account *. In this way the public ought to have cbmpenfated a popular gentleman for his late fufferings by ministerial oppreflion, and the truly laudable stand he made against a tyrannical court, by which the public is benefited, and therefore ought to fhew its gratitude; but not by pufhing a man into the station of a legislator, who so far from being qualified according to law, was at that very time collecting money to pay his debts'; not by forcing into the office of a magiftrate, a man, whofe private conduct was notorioufly obnoxious to the magiftrate's just cenfure. But this by the by.

Dr. Walker, who defended Landoadtrry against Jam. II. and his popifh army, when those, whofe duty i.t was, deferted the place, was rewarded with the thanks of the commons. We do not hear of any money given him ^b.

William Sacbevtrell was offered by the king the place of one of the commissioners of the admiralty. He refused, saying, ' He would not accept the falary, be-

cause he did not understand fea affairs ^c.'

A bill was ordered in A. D. 1653, making tbofc persons incapable of holding places who should foliclt for them. ' A bill was proposed, A. D. 1692, against buying and felling offices^d. It was found after the revolution, that there had been a most shameful felling of places under Jemtt II, A.committee was therefore

* PARL. HIST. xv. 278.

^b DEB. COM. n. 360.

^c Tinf. CONTIN. i. 41. ^d Ibid. 193.

appointed to enquire into it, and a bill to prevent the

like for the future *. The c,ommU&an«rs for public

accounts found, A. D. 1713, that p»e Hutck'mfn had

paid iooo/. for die office of regifter of leizures tp the

earl of Wf>*rt»*, «*efolvedf That giving or, taking

money for procuring offices relating to the manage*

meat of the public revenue is a fcanda)ous corruption,

an4 highly detrimental to the public.' But the

offence having been committed before the queen's

pardon wss published, the house proceeded no farther

in the matter *,

To fuffer the buying and felling of places it one of the most effectual methods that can be invented for plucking up by the roqts out of the minds of the people alj emulation, or defire of excelling in any thing either useful or ornamental to a country, If \ know, that jopo /, prpperly diftributed will procure me a place of 500 /. a year, and that unless; carry in my hand the neceflary douceur, I may in vain folicit, and employ friends to folicit for me, though they could with truth affirm, that I pofleffed every accomplifhment that enriches the human mjnd} if I know all this, what am I naturally led tp, but so endeavour by all pofsible means to get fhc ncceflary $poo/. not to lofe time in acquiring a set of unprofitable accpmplifliments. Thus a deadly damp is struck to all jaudable ambition in a people; and >n epdless avidity ?fter sordid riches expited. The nobleft dispqfitipn is checked, and in its place the'baseft encouraged. OuV state-gardeners cultivate the weeds, and pluck up th,e useful plants.

Purchafing of place? tempts the purchafers to extort from the people exorbitant perquifites in order to re-

' D«B. COM. {i. 334.

*! Ibid. v. i*.

imburfe themselves. And then the business comes to be, not how to perform the duties of the place in the most faithful and effectual manner, but how to make the most of it.

By 12 Edw, IV. and 5 Edw. VI. any person, giving money, or reward of any kind, for any office, which, in any way, toucheth the adminiftration of justice, the keeping of towns, or caftles, &c. is difqualified for holding such place".

There was a difficulty about the officers of the court of wards, if the bill abolifhing it should pafs, because they must lofe their places. One said they ought to have nothing, because they had bought their places contrary to law. There was no provifion for them ^b. This is the very argument in our times, for keeping up a multitude of burdensome places; that the annihilating them would ruin innumerable families. But it is a very frivolous pretence, because they may be put upon hall-pay, with a provifion for widows, and then, to be abolifhed ; inftead of which, we are continually multiplying them.

Cardinal Richelieu, in his TESTAM. POLIT. (which the Abbe de S. Pierre thinks the greatest political work ever publifhed before his times) condemns all buying and felling of places; because it leads the subjects not to emulate one another in merit, but in riches⁰.

The Abbe de S. Pierre's propofal, of choofing by fcrutiny to all places of power and trust, would make the office of a prime minister, a fecretary of state, &c. much eafier, and left exposed to envy, and animofity. For, if a candidate's companions in office did not re-

^a PARL. HIST. vn. 54.

* PARL. HIST. xxni. 61.

^c S. Pierre, OUVR. POLIT. xvi. 20.

commend him, there could be no reflection made upon the minister, if he was not advanced. Walpole was always forry, when a place fell vacant. By filling it, he gained one friend, and 20 enemies; any one of which could injure him, more than the person advanced could serve him. When men are gratified without merit, they are not so eafily fatisfied, as when they are rewarded in some proportion to their deservings. For this very proportion will in some degree regulate their expectations. Whereas those, who obtain what they have in no degree deserved, are led to form imaginary pretensions to unknown merits, without all bounds.

The Abbe S. Pierre thinks the French cuftom «f making the great offices of the state, and even the descent of titles and honours, hereditary, hurtful and inconsistent with found policy. All honours and powers (except, for plain reasons, the regal) ought to be personal only, and to be given to no individuals, but such as, upon fcrutiny, were found to be men of such diftinguifhed worth, as to deserve to be raised to diftinguifhed places, though fprung of mean parents*. Suppose the silly fon and heir of a truly great man, who had, by his conduct, raised himself to the rank of it duke, to have 500 /. a year fettled on him out of the estate, would not that be sufficiently rewarding him for all the merit he has, in taking care to be the fon of a duke ? And would not this policy give greater fcope for laudable ambition, than our present, which infures the most worthless and most uncultivated blockhead of a dukedom, and a feat in the house of peers, if he happens to be born by a duchefs, whoever may have begot him ? The eldeft fon of the archbishop of Canterbury,

* OUVR. POLIT. IX. 100, et fa/.

(who ranks above the first duke in England) is only John, pr llamas such-a-one, efq. Yet the fqn of an archbishop, has as good a natural claim tQ be an archbishop, as the foq of a duke, to be a duke,

Kings, and king's favourites often read their fin (in this as in other refpeds) in their punishment. If they will employ unqualified persons, their business will be done accordingly. The great Dutch No/an fleet, fitted out by piince Maurice against the Spaniards in Amtr'tca* and officer'd according to the court interest, did nothing. A ^fleet °f ^ft'P^{3 fittcd out at} P«^v»^te expence, and officer'd according to merit, did great feats *. The French affirm, that their difgraccs in the last war, were occafioned by madam Pompadour's filling all the great ports in their fleet and army, with her creatures;, and those who gained her interest by money.

That the merit chiefly regarded in our times, is the merit of feconding the views of th^ court, and that the greatest demerit, according to our modern way of eft imating demerit, is oppofing court measures ; appears from the court's late proceedings against my incomparable friend, the great Dr. Franklin, whom they have deprived of his place of deputy poft-mafter of North jtmerict, which place he himself improved from being a burthen upon the government, to its bringing in a revenue of several thousands a year; — all because that faithful trustee would not fit filent, and fee his confti. tuents betrayed.

• MOD. UNIV. HIST. xi. 463.

CHAP. V.

Profufiott in Places and Pertfions.

IT is not a little to the disgrace of human nature, that in any age, or in any country, any member of Society should require to be paid, like a hireling, for iterving his country. Every state is a great family. The king is, or should be, the father of it; the grandees, the ejder brothers; and the people the younger children. But what should we think of a family, of which we faw the head, and the elder brothers, plundering the younger children of their portions, and reducing them to a ftarving condition ; insisting that themselves ought to be supported in their grandeur, and recompensed for taking upon them the charge of domestic affairs, in such an exorbitant manner, as the younger part of the family could by no means support. If this head of a family, or these grandees, should demand a recompense for services tjone to a neighbouring family, we should not so much wonder or blame them for a sordid dispofitlon. When the people of Poland wanted to have our celebrated Sir Pb.lip Sidney for thejr king, it had been no matter of wonder, if he had required an ample civil lift revenue, as a recompense for the innumerable disgusts and fatigues ot the regal Itation, or that, like the German generals whom we have employee) in our continental wars, he had been less fparing of the purses of the Palijb people. If we were to do the Dutch any material iervice, it might be expected, that we should demand a proper compenfajtion ; but that Englijbpien should hesitate about serving Englishmen, that a lord, who has no necefTary bufmefs

to fatigue him, but drinking, whoring, mafquerading, and New-marketing, should grudge a few hours in a week to serve his country, unless his country will recompence him ten thousand times above the worth of his service, — this gives a {hocking, idea of the sordid disposition of the grandees of modern times. At the same time the public ought not to be, and hardly ever is, ungrateful. But public rewards ought rather to be honorary, than pecuniary, and if they must be of the latter fort, they ought to be frugal, not profuse ; elfe they do more mischief than good.

The falaries annexed to those places, the holders of which do real service to their country, naturally lead people to a very wrong way of thinking, viz. That we are not obliged to serve our country, unless we be paid for our service. Whereas, the truth is, that serving our country to the utmost of our power, is (like obedience to parents, providing for our wives and children, and worshipping God) our indispensable duty, previously to any emolument we may expect on that account. See Mr. South-wet's speech below.

As for the holders of finecures, and those men who receive annual pensions for nothing, they may be compared to Pluto's three-headed maftiff, Cerberus, who gobbled up the fop thrown to him by the Sibyl, and immediately ftretched out his hairy bulk in his kennel, and fell a fnoring.

Cerberus hxc ingens latratu regna trifauci Perfonat, adverfo recubans immanis in antro. Cui vates, horrere videns jam colla colubris, Melle foporatam et medicatis frugibus offam Objicit; ille fame rabida tria guttura pandens Corripit objeftam, atque immania terga refolvit Fufus humi, totoque ingens extenditur antro. VIRG.

The quoting of this passage from the famous fixth book of the Entid inflames me with a defire to display a portion of the spirit of our learned brfhop who has found in it a myftical sense, which nobody ever dreamed of before his DIVINE LEGATION, nor since. Were my genius brightened with a fpark of his fire, I should shew ( with no less fuccefs, than he has had in proving Afofes's divine commiflion by what will equally establish Lycurgus's, viz. his designed neglect of the mention of future rewards and puniihmems, and with no less fuccefs than he has had in establishing the alliance between the two things in the world which ought the mod carefully to be kept feparate, viz. the state and the church) — were my mind, I say, tinctured with the true JVarburtsr.ian spirit of criticifm, I should fhew that by the sleeping maftiff Virgil intended to point out an idle hanger on at court; by Votes, (the old prophetefs, as lucus a nan lucendo) the prime minirtcr, as statefmen are less remarkable for their prophetical fagacity, than for their refemblance to old women; by the fnakes oa Certerus's neck bridling up at the approach of the Sibyl and the hero, I would fhew, that the poet meant the speechifying, and opposition made by the place-hunter. Being got so far as this, the ojfa, or fop, composed of honey, &c. would fpontaneoufly explain itself into the place, and its douceurs. The dog's opening tbrei throats to fwallow one morfel, does most beautifully set forth the disproportion between a placeman's voracity and the richeft income the minister can afford to give him. In this manner would I attempt to imitate, 'non pajjibus aqu'u, this great difcoverer of fecret meanings, who has left us one thing to regret, among so many things to admire, viz. That he has taken so much pains to find fenfts

where no body was at a lofs, viz. in the Eneld, and has declined pointing out fenfc, where no body has been able to find any, I mean, in the XXXIX ARTICLES, the CREEDS, and the HOMILIES, which he has subscribed, and therefore must understand. But to return to our subje£r, the profufion irr places and pensions.

Lord Moltfwrtb thinks, the servants of the crown iliould be paid by appointment of parliament. It may be said, all monies expended are subject to parliamentary enquiry. But there is a very great difference between appropriating beforehand, and finding fault afterwards, when the money is fpent, and all that can be done is patting a vote. And even that is not to be expelled, if our parliaments, inftead of checks, are to be fharers in the plunder.

* A king, as such, ought not, of all men, to grant bounties ; because what he grants is not out of his own, but the property of others *.' All that a king is, and all that he has as king, is on account of the public, whof€ servant (to use king Jam. Ift's exprefiion) he is. Therefore, whatever he gives to his

wh------, or hjs minion, is a robbery of the public,

because his wh — , or his minion, are of no advantage to the public, and have not earned any part of the public money ; but on the contrary, deserve the ftrapado, or the gallows. And whatever a king gives, or fuffers his ministers to give, to the undeserving, or what they give too profusely to the deserving, is a robbery of the public. A king's income is not as a gentleman's rent, a private fund at his dispofal. For a kingdom is not a private estate; but a trust for which the holder is accountable to his people. And

• St. Pierre, vi. 54.

wo to those king* and ministers, who betray so awful a trust. A king is to dispense, not to fpend the public-money. There are many persons aeceflarily to be employed in a state. Them the king is to pay. How then ( says St. Pierre ^m) can he have bounties to grant ? unless he robs fonie of those who serve the public ? Every guinea he gives to one, who has not deftrvtd it, or who has not deserved it all, is so much kept back from one, who has deserved it, or would, if he had not been difcouraged by feeing a traiterous king or ministry embezzling the public money, by throwing it away on the worthless, to the injury of the deserving. A king, as a gentleman, and out of his official and accountable character, may be/tow upon his lawful pleasures, or upon those who have served his lawful private interests, more than a duke may lay out; but not more than two dukes may fpend. If he lays out the public money, or fuffers his crew to lay it out, in bribing villains to betray liberty, I have only to say, / lifior, deliga ad palum, virgis caditt, taput obnubito, infelid arbori fufpenditt.

Our courtiers find the parliament too ready to give. Therefore, according to the common saying, « Lightly come, lightly gone,' they care not how they dissipate their ill gotten riches. Ch. VII. of France, a prince of an excellent character, was, at his acceffion, so low in both cafh and credit, that he had not ready money to pay for a pair of boots, that were brought him; and the maker,, not caring to trust his poor majefty, carried them away. This narrowness of circumstances gave that wife and good prince a handle to retrench unncceflary expences, and

* »»• 5S'¹

fet out on a foot of great frugality, which he continued after his finances were more flourishing ^a.

The enormous emoluments annexed to our great offices of the state, are big with every evil. They render the sincerity of real patriots fuspecled, and expose the adminiftration to the certain execration of the people, who,, by this means, are often reduced to an uncertainty whom to trust. Pensions and places are rightly bestowed in very few instances. They are a disgrace to men of family and fortune, be their services to their country what they will. For pensioning such men is making.them appear to the public not noble, not generous, not magnanimous ; but greedy, sordid hirelings. A pension may perhaps be rightly given to an ingenious, but poor man, to support him in his purfuit of arts, science, manufa&ures, commerce, or whatever may be for the public advantage. But care ought to be taken, that he be not over-fed, and by that means become lazy.

There is no magnanimity without some degree of self-denial. But what self-denial do our nobility and gentry fhew, when they fcramble for the profitable places, and will not serve their country, unless they be overpaid immensely beyond the worth of their services ? If a nobleman has in his mind nothing more noble, or difinterested, than an artizan or a plough-driver, what claim has he to more respect than they would have, if they had as much money in their pockets, or as much lace on their waiftcoats, as he has ?

If the nobility were to serve their country in the great offices of the state gratis, the heroifm would be

* MOD. UNIV. HUT. x*iv. 45.

nothing more than is {hewn by private trustees, arbitrators, church-wardens, overfeers of the poor, and other parifh-officers. Are those poor low-bred creatures, whom our polite courtiers call the fcum of the earth, nrtore difinterested than the nobility of the land ?

By 43 Eliz. any person elected overfeer of the poor, and refusing to do the duty, is punishable, though he has no reward for doing the duty. Why should not all public offices be filled in this manner* ? If it be alledged that this would be troublesome, and fall heavy upon the nobility, let them take the offices by rotation.

Even in the law some things are appointed to be done gratis^b. It is hard, that our nobility should be loth to do for their country what the lawyers (a sordid enough set of men) do every day.

If the nobility and gentry declined serving their country in the great offices of the state, without sordid hire, let the honest bourgeoifie be employed. They will think themselves sufficiently rewarded by the honour done them.

Why should not our kings, when a court-place falls vacant, publifh, that they want a fecretary of flare, or a lord chamberlain, or a lord fteward ; places which any man of common sense and common honesty can fill; the public bufmefs being all a mere routine. And why should they not order all persons defirous of the vacant employment to fend in their propofals fealed (as when there is a fleet to victual, or a public work to be done) and accept him, who offers to serve his country on the most reasonable terms ? Let

* STAT. AT LARGE, u. 318. ^b Blackji. COMM. in. 128.

the person cbofen, bring in his bill of expences. There is no reason why the public should not repay what is fairly laid out for the public benefit. If it be thought proper to give a statefman, who has shewn himself able and honest, five hundred guineas for a ring, as was given the brave admiral Drake for services of greater danger and more importance, than those of sisty state-fecretaries, I have no objection. But that half our nobility should be upon the pariih, I mean, upon die public, I own I fee no manner of reason ; nor that a set of places, which might be filled at the expence of a few hundreds a year, must cod the nation many hundred thousands, while we are finking in a bottomless fea of debt.

The grand Turk, when he thinks a wazir, an aga, a testardar, a pafha, &c. has, by oppreflion, fpunged up a good deal of money in his service, fqueezes him till he has reduced him to his former condition, which often helps up the fultan's exhauftcd treafure. If we were to introduce such a cuftom as this in England, the fqueezings of a thousand or two of our over-drenched court-ipunges, might do somewhat toward preventing the dreaded necessity of applying a fpunge to our publjc debts.

It is commonly reckoned, that five or fix of our places or pensions are equal in their annual amount to all that is paid in the three provinces of Hollandt Zealand, and Overyjfel, to placemen and pensioners. The burgomafler of a great town has perhaps 20 /. a year falary. The deputies or members of parliament have 200 /. a year. One happy consequence is, that there is * little afpiring to preferment in the * state, because there is Httle to be got that way ^a.'

* Burn. HIST. OWN TIMES, i. 290.

No servant of the Dutch Raft India company has so mean an appointment, as to be pinched, nor so affluent, as to be above his bufmefs ^a.

Afk the courtiers, what produces the present clamours, and all clamours against government, which is always immaculate. They will answer, The defire of places and preferments. Which may be partly true. But why then do they not reduce the incomes of the places as low as in Htlland ? Why do they not abolijb all that are useless ? They do the very contrary. They are continually increafing the number, if not the value of them. They are conftantly heaping on fewel, and then they fwear and blafpheme, because the fire continues to rage.

* I may fuppose,' (says Mr. Southwel in his speech on a motion for a deduction from falaries during the continuance of a war) ' that our falaries and pensions above 50/. a year, amount to at least a million fterling. If I said two, I believe I should,not be miftaken,' &c. If. our placemen and pensioners confume 2,000,000 /. a year of the public income, they fwallow up at once the whole land-tax at four (hillings in the pound.

Mr. Pelbam, brother to the duke of Newcaflle, used to say, he grudged the great incomes enjoyed by the great placemen; for that the bufmefs of the nation was done by the clerks in the offices, who have but 501. a' year, even as the bufmefs of the church is not done by the bijbops and deans, but by the curates of 20 /. and 30 /. per annum.

Immediately after the treaty with Portugal, which fettled Ferdinand and Ifabella on the throne of Spain, the deputies from the cities insisted on a repeal of

* MOD. UNIV. HIST. x. jo"i.

grants made by Hen. IV. of crown lands (among other particulars, Gibraltar was granted to the duke of Medina Sidonia) and of pensions out of the revenues. They gave orders accordingly, and such reforms were made, that 30 millions of maravedis arofe annually from the favings".

The whole revenue given by the Poles for the support of their king's royal dignity, does not exceed 100,000/. a year^b. Five or fix of our courtiers devour as much annually; for which they do nothing, but what were better let alone, as buying votes, and mif-governing the public affairs.

In the kingdom of Siam, the great officers of the state have no falaries. Therefore there can be no fcrambling. But there is great injustice in the courts of law, because the judges have it in their power to enrich themselves by extortion ^c.

The governor of the Dutch Eajl-lndia Company at Batavia is employed from day-break till night in the bufmefs of his office, so that he can hardly allow himself half an hour for dinner^d. Our tinfelled placemen we

— — ftretch on the rack of a too eafy chair,

And hear their everlasting yawn confefs

The pains and penalties of idleness. Pope.

Pope Sixtus V. cut off at once an expence of £00,000 /. per annum, which it coft the apoftolic chamber before his time i:j pensions and gratuities.

When the Spanijb finances were low, A. D. 1608, and the ministry would not retrench the fums laid out on fpies and pensioners, the nation was offended, and

^a MOD. UNIV. HIST. xxi. 161, 192.

^b Ibid, xxxiv. 10. ^c Ibid. vn. 263.

^A Jantfoa, ETAT PRES. DES PROV.UNIES, i. 360.

the historians have handed down to posterity their infamy *. Let our posterity likewife read, for the honour of our ministers, that toward the end of the eighteenth century, when the public debt was greater than had ever been known, there was at the same time more pensioning, than ever was known.

' With a laudable frugality, they' [the Spaniards, in the year 1739, when Britain declared war against them] * retrenched all their extravagant pensions and falaries, and reduced their expences in all the departments of their government V The Spaniard* grew wifer, at last, than they were at first. Let us fee, whether the English will go and do likewife.

Alphonfus V. of Arragan, furnamed the Wife, put off an extravagant, greedy courtier, who was always afking somewhat, by telling him, That a king, who thinks to fatisfy his fpendthrift courtiers, employs himself in a manner as fruitless, as he who should think to fill a hogfliead, which had holes in its bottom. He may impoverifh himself, but will never enrich them.

When Hen. III. complained, that his revenues were hardly sufficient, ad ftmplicem vifiurn, &c. for victuals, clothing, and the accuftomed charities, much less for warlike expeditions; his counsellors faithfully told him, his poverty was occafioned by his giving so much. away. The king took the hint; called many to account, and made them refund^c. We give our ministers half a million on demand, to make good the pretended deficiencies of the civil lift, without so much as afking how there comes to be a deficiency,

^a MOD. L^NIV. HIST. xxi. 336. ^k find. CONTIN. VIH. 425. ^e Brady, ii. 54.9.

much less calling any body to account, or making any one refund.

« The counsellors, and all officers, both great and small, (in the time of Hen. III.) were to fwear, at their creation, that they would, to the utmost of their power, execute their offices, without any other reward than meat and drink^a.' Many a great placeman in our times has, from 500 /. to 5000/. a year. If a minister, in our times, takes this oath, and if he calls 5000 /. a year meat and drink, he must have a very hearty appetite, or a very nice palate; for, evert in thcfc dear times, a man may have for 50 A a year, as much mutton and small beer (and there is no better meat and drink than mutton and small beer) as any Chriftian can decently confume. But it will be answered, Our statefmen do not take this oeconomical oath. Upon which our statefmen will perhaps give jne leave to observe, or, if they do not, I will make the observation without their leave, viz. That we have as much occafion for parfimony, as our ancestors in the time of Hen. III. The public debt was never in those times so high as one million, whereas we have seen the nation indebted to the value of 140 millions. All the incomes of the government-places in Elizabeth's reign, amounted to only 18,000 /. a year. I Ch. I. they were computed at 120,000/. a year^b. In those days, the navy and army coft but little. In our times, it is computed, that the government has the dispofal of 2 or three millions per annum, taking in the navy, the army, and the church : of which the first is our strength, and our glory, and therefore we can hardly cherifh, and maintain it too nobly; the fecond

^a Brady, n. 644.

* PARL. HIST. vi. 367.

is worse than useless; for it is dangerous to liberty, as every officer is a court-place-man, and as the army is the necessary and natural inflrument of tyranny; as fur the third ; the mere expence it cofts the nation, is hardly an object of consequence enough to alarm. Of which more in the ftquel.

The yearly falary of the lord high treasurer of England in the time of Hen. III. was 100 marks. Hurley, in queen Ami* time, laid, a lord high treasurer of England^ if he were indifferent which of the two places he went to in the next world, might get 5,000/. 10,000/. 50,000/. or what he pleased by his place*. Lord Bacon writes to king Jam. I. that the place of attorney general was honestly worth 6000/. a year*. The lord high treasurer MiddUfex, in the time of Jam. I. declared, that the gains of that office bad been 8000 /. per annum, nay more than he could well tell^c.' In the time of Hen. IV. the profits of the hanaper in chancery were only 2000/. a year ^d. The earl of fPiitJbire, rather to queen Anne Btltyn* k^ *O (hillings a day, as lord privy feal^e.

Queen Elizabeth enriched none of her favourites at the expence of her people. She pretended, that her people were her only favourites. She had sense enough to observe a spirit of liberty rifing, and humoured it prudently. Jam. I. and Ch. I. had not the fagacity to imitate her.

Parliament grants a large subfidy, A. D. 1606, which enabled James to gratify his favourites, (his great joy) « out of the money granted by parliament^f.'

* Rapitt, i. 387.

* Lord Sacon's LETT. p. 84.

¹ PARL. HIST. vi. 326. ^d Ibid. u. 80.

^e Andcrf. HIST. COMM. I. 366.

* Rafia, ii. 172.

In this, James acted upon principles diredtly contrary to those of Elizabeth.

Elizabeth's wisdom kept her fleet and forts always in good order. Her frugality displeased her avaricious courtiers; but pleased her people. She bore great national expences with the ordinary revenues, and helped her neighbours; which her predeceflbrs had never done. Moft of them beggared themselves by gorging a few greedy courtiers. She ' difcharged all the great expences of government, (which must be great, considering the number of enemies around her) out of the crown revenue, for flie did not lavifh her money upon the court-leeches like her predeceflbrs * j* [and her fucceflbrs, Rapin might have added.]

The penftonsof 4/. per week (fettled on about 70 members of the commons during the civil war, becau/e their estates were fequestrated by the king [G&. I.], or did not yield a subfistance) were afterwards taken off to relieve the public¹". Compare this integrity and diAnterestedness with our monflrous profuAon in places and pensions needlessly bestowed on the worthless tools of the court, and kept up from year to year, from father to fon, while the nation is finking under a load of debt.

The queen fends a meflage, A. D. 1702, to the commons, That in reward of Marlborough's services, {he had made him a duke, and given him 5000/, a year during her life, out of the pofl-house revenue, and wiflies the house would think of means for continuing to him and his heirs, the pension, as well as the title-. The whole house were struck dumb. The speaker Itood up to fee if any body would speak to the queen'.-.

^a Rapin, ii. 65.

^b PAUL. HIST. xv. 59.

propofal. At last a member opened. The debate ran very high, and it is said that an old member fpokc thus: * Though I have accepted an employment at court, I did not do it with the design that my mouth should be fhut in this house, when any thing is offered that I think detrimental to my- country.' The house lent an addrefs to the queen, in which, after approving the efteem flie had expreffed for the duke of Marlborougbj they beg leave to lay before her the consequences of making a precedent for future alienations of the revenue of the crown, which had been much reduced by the exorbitant grants of the last reign, &c. * The commons in those days hesitated. about fettling a pension on a hero, whofe actions will be celebrated as long as the world stands. We make it a rule to pension every man we employ, deserving and worthless, Because a fcoundrel has received 5000/. a year for many years, for doing the business of a place, in which there is no business to do (that is, in plain Engli/h, 5000/. a year for pocketing 20,000/. a year) therefore we are to fettle 2 or 30007. a year on him for life, after he has refigned his finecure; and perhaps continue the same to his booby fon after him, while thousands of our people are flying, for want of bread, to America, and the nation in continual danger of bankruptcy.

Inftead of the challenge¹", Whofe ox, or whofe afs, has the king [or the minister] taken ; we may afk the crew, Whofe farthing candle, or whofe draught of small beer, have they not taxed ? A poor hard-working man, who has a wife and Ax children to maintain,

" DEB. COM. in. 210. Tind. CONTIN. I. 577. ^h 2 Sam. xn. 3.

can neither enjoy the glorious light of Heaven, nor the glimmering of a tallow taper, without paying the window tax and the candle tax. He rifes early, and fits up late; he fills up the whole day with fevere labour; he goes to his flock-bed with half a belly full of bread and cheefe, denying the call of natural appetite, that his wife and little ftarvelings may have the more. In the mean while the exactors of these taxes are revelling at Mrs. Cornell's mafquerade, at the expence of more money for one evening's amusement, than the wretched hard-working man (who is obliged to find the money for them to fquander) can earn by half a year's fevere labour.

fbyfiu* ascribes the continuance of the Athenian Hate, to their ftridt obfcrvance of the laws; their fevere puniftiments for bribery, which was always capital; and their feverity against offending magiftrates^a.

Noble was the answer of Curius Dentatus to the Samniti embafladors, when they offered him as a bribe a Jarge quantity of plate: they found him fitting on a wooden bench by the fire, cooking his victuals. He rejected their present with difdain, and said, My poverty¹¹ infpires you with hopes of corrupting me, but your attempts are vain. I had rather command the rich, than be rich myself. Carry back with you this fatal metal, which men make use of only for their destrudion ; and tell your countrymen, that they will find it as difficult to corrupt, as to conquer me.

The Achaeans declined to their ruin, from the first Violation of the falutary Jaw, by which the whole con-

³ Aut.Tbyf. Di REP. ATHEN. 261. ^b Plut. APOPHTH. Vol. Max. iv. 3. ANT. HIST. xn. 139.

federacy was bound to take no present, from any of the neighbouring kings*.

Epicrates, the Athenian, was, according to law, capitally condemned for taking a present in his embafly, though he had done great service to his country. Colliers was fined 50 talents or several thousand pounds, for the same crime, though he had made a glorious peace for his country. Phikcrates was puniflied for taking a piefent of Philip of Macedonia*.

* Nulla out admodum exigua, t£c. Pecuniary rewards were fcarce known among the Athenians. Virtue was its own best reward; and was thought to contain all that was defirable. The Athenians were greedy of nothing but glory. Therefore, aa olive wreath was the highest of all prizes V

* Nihil opus petunia, &e. There is no occafion for money; (says the great and good Epaminondas to Diomedes, attempting, by order of Artaxerxes, to corrupt him) for if your king wants any thing of me, that is for the advantage of my country', [Thebes'} I will do jt for nothing. If he defires the contrary, he is not rich enough to bribe me; for I will not fell my country, for the wealth of the world^e.'

The Athenians had their logiftie, eutbyni, and helipjltti or public auditors of all accounts, to whom all, who touched the public money, were answerable annually^f.

' Iftl tjuos paverant, &c. Thofe who had been enriched by the public plunder for many years, when

¹ Schoocb. REP. ACHJEOH. 32. ^b Ibid. 33.

^e Ibid. ^d Jut. Tbyf. DB REP. ATHEN. 251.

* Corn. Nep. in EPAMIN. f Aut. Tbyf. DE REP. ATHEN. 257.

deprived by Hannibal of this unjust gain, thought themselves injured, and in revenge, inftigated the Ramans against that illustrious chief'.' It is capital for a Venetian embaflador to receive a present in his embafly^c.

The duke a" Epernon, upon a ftop of the exchequer in France, was advifed to raise an income from the people under his government, as other grandees did. He answered, that it was not his tufiness to condemn the proceedings of others; but that he could not think of extorting a subsistence from the miserable people, •who were in want of bread ^b.

He afterwards refused to lay impositions on the people for the public service, and wrote to the king, defiring to be excused the odious office of oppreffing the poor. The villainous courtiers immediately set up a clamour against him, that he only aimed at popularity, and was imagining treacherous schemes against the government^c.

When M. dc Voifm, chief clerk of the parliament of Parity received orders to rcfume his office, A. D. 1771, the parliament having been before arbitrarily changed by the tyrant, he declared, that his honour, duty, and conscience, did not permit him to perform the functions of it. He therefore refigned his place, and was rewarded for his integrity by bani/hment, and confifcation of his office, which coft a million of livres, and brought in 100,000 yearly,

The great duke de Sully, ' inftead of making his ministry useful to himself by gaining friends, never hesitated making himself enemies, by standing be-

^a Li-v.

^b LIFE of the DUKE </' EPERNON, p. ceo.

^c Ibid. c8i.

tween his mafter and those importunate courtiers, who were perpetually craving in a degree out of all proportion to their merit'.'

' By the fpoils of conquered nations, Cafar was enabled to corrupt the Roman people, and bribe them to be instruments of their own ruin, by creeping an abfolute monarchy in his favour^b.' The states of Arragon told Don Pedro IV. their king, that' pensions given to courtiers, are wages paid by the subjects to those, who labour for their destructionV

By 29 and 30 Cat: II. a tax of 2 fhillings per pound was laid on places, and on* of 3, upon pensions ^d.

In the year 1600, to the last year but one of queen Elizabeth, the whole of the ordinary public revenue amounted to no more than 600,000/. per annum; in 1633, the 8th of Ch. I. to 800,000/. in 1660, the i2th of Ch. II. to 1,200,000/. in the year 1686, ad of James II. to i,9OO,ooo/. in 1714, the i2th of Anne, to 3,200,000/. in 1751, the 25th of Ceo. II. to something short of 6,000,000/. and in the 5th of his present majefty, the year 1765, to full 10,300,0007. Thus from queen Eliz. to Ch. II's time, our public burdens were doubled, being a space of about 60 years; and from thence to the last of queen Anne, about 54 years, near treble ; from 1714 again, to the year 1751, that again nearly doubled ; and what is ftill more extraordinary, this last enormous burden encreased from 6 to upwards of 10,000,000/.

•Moo. UNIV. HIST. xxiv. 382.

^b Preface to a FRAGMENT of POLYB. p.

^c Moo. UNIV. HIST. xxi. 70.

^d Tindal's CONTIW. vill. 13.

in the narrow compafs of 14 years, from 1751, to

1765*-

There was one million of debt contracted on the

6d. per pound tax, laid A. D. 1760, on pensions^b. The interest of a million, at 4 per cent, is 40,000/. per ann. Therefor^ the pensions must have amounted to i,6oo,ooo/. per ann. at least. For 1,600,000 fix-pences, are only equal to the 40,000/,

A. D. 1744, a motion was made, that the incomes cf places and pensions should be taxed, at lead during the continuance of the war, at the rate of 8 ftullings in the pound. Objections were made to the motion, as might be expected. To these what follows was replied by Robert Vyner^ Efq.

* I do not wonder, Sir, to hear a placeman affirming, that our public employments are attended with vast trouble and expence, and the fabrics and perquifites belonging to them are no more than they deserve ; but most other gentlemen in the kingdom are convinced, that few or none of our public employments are attended with any expence, and that the business in every one of them might be performed for much less than it is at present ; for as to the expence, we all know that every fhilling of it is, in most of our public offices, defrayed by the public. The officers arc not obliged to furnifh themselves with so much as pens, ink, and paper out of their falaries; but have these and many other articles provided for them at the public charge.' [ In the year 1773, it was found, that the public has long been charged near 5000 /. a year for pens, ink, and paper for the houie of commons.] ' And as to the business, it is well known, that in all our offices,

» WHITEH. EVEN. POST, Apr. 10. ^b LOND. MAG. 1760, p. 230.

those who do the most business have the smalleft falaries. Nay, in many of our public pofts, the man who has the place with the falary annexed to it, gets a deputy to do the business for, perhaps, a tenth part of the falary, and sometimes the deputy has no part of the falary, but the perquifites only, or, perhaps, but a {hare of them. Thefe being facts notoriously known, I fliall very readily agrea with the honourable gentleman, that a ftrict parliamentary enquiry into all our public pofts and offices is very neceflary, and might be of great service to the nation. If such an enquiry were ftrictly and impartially carried through, we might not only reduce the falaries and perquifites of most of the officers and placemen in the kingdom, but a vast number of uselc£s officers and placemen might be laid aside, and several of the offices that hive been of late years creeled, might be entirely abolished; which would not only be a great faving to the public, but a great security to the liberty of the people. But such an enquiry, Sir, I defpair of ever feeing set on foot, and much more of ever feeing it carried on with effect; therefore, since we cannot remove the evil, I am for making the most we can of it, by subjecting all falaries and pensions to a double tax ; nor am I in the least afraid of doing injustice to any placeman, by not leaving him a sufficient compenfation for all the business he does for the public; for in all our offices there is so little business done, or such a number of persons employed, that one moiety of the falary, and in many cases much less than a moiety, would be a sufficient reward for all the business they do. With regard to pensioners, I am so far from being afraid of doing them injustice, that, as to most of them, I believe, if we

stripped them entirely of their pensions, we ftould do a piece of fignal service, as well as justice to the public ; for I have a ftrong fufpicion that most of the pensions that have been granted of late years, were granted for what ought rather to be called ministerial than public service.' * The cuftoms and sentiments of a people always depend upon the cuftoms and sentiments of the rich and great families amongft them. If the rich and great are selfifli and mercenary, the same spirit will soon prevail generally among the people.' Prevent its being in the power of the rich and great to be selfifh and mercenary, and they will soon begin to be actuated by motives of ambition and the defire of public efteem ; and from them the same spirit will diffuse itself through the whole body of the people. The monftrous falai ics that have been of late years annexed to all the high offices in our government, and granted without diftin&ion to the rich as well as the poor, have raised such a selfifh spirit among the people, that a man is now reckoned a fool or a madman if he gives himfclf any trouble about serving his country without some pecuniary reward.

Quis nifi mentis inops oblatum refpuat aurum }

Diminish those fabrics, Sir, and grant them to none but such as stand in need of them for their support, or for supporting the dignity of their office, and you will put it out of the power of the rich to be governed by pecuniary motives. Among them the motives of ambition and public efteem will soon refume their proper feat, and a generous defire to serve one's country without any pecuniary reward will from them diffuse itself through the

whole body of the people, infomuch that it may very soon become scandalous to defire any of the public money if a man can serve his country and support himself without it. I know, Sir, it may be said, that unless you grant such falaries as may be a temptation to men of fortune to serve the public, no man of fortune will ever enter into the public service. This I take to be a very fevere fatire upon our men of fortune. It is fuppofing that they are governed by nothing but sordid and mean pecuniary considerations ; that they have no regard for their country, nor will do it any service unless they can thereby supply their luxury or fatisfy their avarice. But I have not so bad an opinion of our men of fortune, or the men of fortune of any country. Put pecuniary considerations out of the way, and mere generous motives will take their place. Nay, men of fortune would engage in the public service, if it were for nothing elfe but to have something to do, for a state of mere idleness is, above all others, the most irksome ; of which we may be convinced, by observing the many inventions of men for preventing their being in such a state. Many other motives would engage them in the public service, and even in that service which, above all others, is the most dangerous and toilsome ; 1 mean the army, especially in time of war. This we may be convinced of from what is now the case in Frana: The pay of the officers of their army is so small, that it can be a temptation to no man of fortune; and the colonel of a regiment must always, in that service, be at a much greater expence than his pay will answer. Yet there is hardly a man of fortune in that country who is not, or has not been, in the army, unless it be such as have been bred to the law. The case

would (boti be the same in this country, Sir, if pecuniary temptations were once removed, or very much diminiftied ; and besides the public faving, it would contribute not a little towards putting an end to the luxury and extravagance that now prevails among our quality and chief gentlemen ; for among men of fortune the public money, like money got by gambling, is generally fpent in luxury and extravagance. I may say it is always fo, except when it falls into the hands of some covetous, avaritious creature, and then it contributes, perhaps, to enrich a family, that was before richer than is consistent with the happiness and constitution of this kingdom ; for it is our bufmefs to have many rich families amongft us, but none too rich : and I am fure it is not the bufmefs of any state to contribute, at the public expence, towards the supply of luxury or the fatisfadlton of avarice, neither of which can ever be fully supplied or fatisfied, nor will ever say he has enough. To a luxurious man, the more you give the more methods of expence he will always invent; and money to an avaritious man is like water to a dropfical, the more you give the more he will deflre. I believe no one who hears me will say, that public spirit and difmterested regard for our country is not now at a very low ebb among the people of this kingdom. What is the cause of this ? The cause is plain and evident. The great falaries, and many unlawful, I may say, cruel, perquifites that have been of late years connived at, or by law, or cuftom, annexed to mo ft of the high offices in the kingdom, have introduced this spirit too generally amongft our noble and rich families; and as such. families may be called the heart and vitals of the people, the corruption hfcs from thence diffused itfclf through

the whole body. This is the true cause, Sir, and the remedy is as obvious as the disease. The rich and great will have a concern in the government of their Country, if they can. You have no occafion to invite them by lucrative temptations. If you do not invite them by such temptations, they will take that concern from motives that are generous and consistent with the public good. Public spirit, and a deftre of efteem, will then be their only motives for engaging, or defiring to be engaged, in the public service; and when this spirit begins to prevail generally among the rich and great, the people, as they always do, will soon begin to follow their example. As men are naturally fond of power, though attended with no sordid gain, ambition may ftill cause a contention who ftiall serve their country in the highest offices; but that contention will never be so violent, as to produce faction, nor can it produce any dangerous opposition to a wife and upright government, because among a people generally governed by virtue and public spirit, no ambitious man can form a party against such a government; and much less can he form a party for overturning the liberties of his country, because the ambition of one man will always be a check to the ambition of another; for no man who is actuated by ambition only, will ever confent tq give htmself an abfolute mafter ; but a luxurious or avaritious man may very readily confent to give even himself an abfolute mafter, if he may ,theraby hope to supply his luxury or indulge his avarice. We may thus fee, Sir, that a flop must be put to the selfifh mercenary spirit that now prevails among the people, if we have a mind to preserve our liberties. Such a law as I have mentioned would certainly be themost

effectual method for this purpose. It must be confeffed by every one who can talk impartially of matters relating to government, that officers and placemen are propoftionably more numerous in this country than in any other on earth; and the profits so vastly exceed the service required, that every man is fond of getting a place under the government, because in no fort of business he can earn so much for so little service. Judice, therefore, can require of us no exception, but that mentioned by my honourable friend who made you this motion, I mean that of the judges ; and no companion can prompt us to go further than to places or pensions of 50 /. a year and under. Thefe are all the exceptions that either justice or companion can require of us, and admitting these, I am convinced the additional tax proposed would produce a very considerable yearly revenue, especially if the commiflioners of the land-tax should fall upon a way of subjedling perquifites, as well as falaries, to this double tax; which, I think, they might eafily do, and ought to doj for the perquifites of offices are very different from the fees of lawyers, phyficians, or parfons, and flill more different from the wages of journeymen. Thefe are the price, and the only price they have for their labour or attendance ; but the perquifites of offices are not the price of labour or attendance. They have their falaries for the price of their labour and attendance ; and their perquifites are the price only of their impudence and imposition, commodities which, I am fure, ought to be taxed as high as any that are produced or imported; and that they may be highly taxed is one of my chief reasons for approving this motion V

^a Aim. DE£. COM. i. 313.

Mr. Soutbwel speaks excellently on this subjetSt, as allows'.

< Sir, As reformation of abuses in the church has always been a most frightful word to priefts, so reformation in government has always, for the same reason, been equally terrible to ministers: Thofe abuses in religion which make a reformation neceflary, have generally been introduced by the cunning of priefts, for increafing their own power or their revenues ; and those abuses in government which render a reformation neceflary, have generally been introduced by the cunning of ministers, in order to encrease their own power or profits. Thefe two orders of men have therefore the same reason to dread a reformation, because it must be attended with a diminution of their power or their profits, and probably with a very great diminution of both. For this reason, Sir, when I hear a minister running out against reformation, and drefling it up in all the hobgobling shapes his fancy can fuggeft, I always think of the priefts of Diana at Epbefus: It is not the danger that threatens the public, but the danger that threatens their fhrine, which they are afraid of; and as 'the over-grown power of ministers is of as pernicious consequence to free government as the over-grown power of priefts is to true religion, a reformation is as often neceflary in one case as the other. This is the foundation of that maxim laid down by Machiavel, that in order to preserve a free government, it often becomes neceflary to bring it back to the first principles, which is a maxim the friends of liberty will always take care to observe, and we may expect that it will bo as conftantly opposed by ministers,

• Aim. DEB. COM. i. 330.

who always ha-e been, and always will be, grafping at arbitrary power. Upon this principle, Sir, let'us examine the motion now before us, in order to fee whether it is not returning a {rep back toward our ancient constitution. I am fure, no man, who has read the hiftory of the nation, will say that our ancestors the Saxans ever thought of inviting men to serve the public by great falaries or pensions. On the contrary, we know that all those offices that are of the true Saxon originals, such as fheriffs, pari/h offices, and most of our offices in cities and boroughs, are attended with an expence, inftead of being of any advantage to the officers. At least if they now make any advantage of them, it is by some innovation unknown to our ancestors, and such a one as they never would have allowed to be introduced. But the crown, having, by some means or other, got into its pofleffion the arbitrary dispofal of almost all offices and places, ministers soon found that the more valuable these offices and places were made, the more their power would be extended ; therefore they refolved to make them lucrative as weJl as honourable, and from that time they have been by degrees increafing, not only the number of offices and places, but alfo the profits and perquifites of each. Not only large falai ies ha; c been annexed to every place or office under the government, but many of the officers have been allowed to opprefs the subjeds by fale of the places under them, and by exacting extravagant and unreasonable fees, which have been so long fufFered, that thay are now looked on as the legal perquilitcs of the office. Nay, in many offices, they seem to have got a cuftomary right to defraud the 'public; and we know how careful some of our late ministers

have been to prevent or defeat any parliamentary enquiry into the conduct and management of any office. By these means, Sir, the expence of our,civil government is become so great, that it is hardly in die power of the people to support it. At least it is not in their power to support the expence of our civil government, and at the same time to support a foreign war with that vigour which is necefliry for bringing it to a happy and fpeedy conclufion. But this is not the only inconvenience that attends the multitude of offices and places under our government, and the large falaries and perquifites annexed to them : They not only render it impoflible for us to support or carry on a foreign war with vigour, but they render it impofsible for us to preserve our liberties without some great reformation in our constitution. The motion now before us does not therefore proceed from any extravagant spirit of reformation, but from a just sense of the danger we are exposed to, if we do not reform. As to the danger that threatens our liberties, I do not much wonder at our ministers net being affected with it; because from the whole courfe of our hiftory, as well as from late experience, I have observed that as soon as a gentleman becomes a minister, or, as he calls himself, a servant of the crown, he {hakes off all concern for the liberty of his country ; and whatever proseffions some of our present ministers may have formerly made, I am afraid it will be found, that they have no more virtue than their predecefiors. For this reason, I say, Sir, I do not wonder at our ministers not being affected with the danger our liberties may be in from the number of our officers, and the high falaries annexed to their several offices; but as to the danger we are exposed to by our in-

ability to support a foreign war, I wonder that even our ministers are not affected with it. My wonder does not arife, Sir, from any high notion I have of their virtue or love for their country, but from my being convinced that they have a great love for themselves, and a paramount regard for their own safety and interest.'

Mr, Sauthwel observes, that the ministry were in some danger, left the people, provoked on thinking how they are taxed, while the courtiers are wallowing in places and pensions, might make an infurrection to the danger of their plunderers. Then he goes on as follows :

' Men, Sir, who are capable of judging without prejudice, I am fure, must be fensible of the great danger our liberties are in from the vast influence the crown has of late years acquired by the multiplication of offices, and the increase of officers as well as the increase of their falaries and perquifttes; for furely no gentleman will say that our monarchy would continue to be a limited monarchy, if the crown were fure of having always a parliament at its devotion; and that this may be the case, that this will be the case, is I think abfolutely certain, if some effectual methods be not very soon taken to prevent it. A reformation therefore of some kind or other is becpme abfolutely neceflary, if we intend to preserve our liberties. A place-bill, and a bill for excluding officers of all ranks and degrees, with a very few exceptions, from voting at elections, would have some effect; but it js very certain that the most effectual method would be to diminifh the number and value of those gifts which the crown has a power to bestow; and the motion now before us, is, I think, the rnoft obvious ftep, and the first itcp we ought to take for this purpose. The motion

is in itself so reasonable, and the honourable gentle, man who made it has chosen such a feafonable and critical conjuncture for offering it to our consideration, that if it be not agreed to, I /hall defpair of ever feeing any effectual law made for preventing that corrupt influence which the crown has a power to make use of both in parliament and at elections. A new adminiftration may, in order to gain a little popularity, at their first entrance into power, connive at the introducing and palling, or may themselves introduce and promote, some bill, that has a specious appearance of being in favour of liberty; but I shall never expect an effectual bill from that quarter. I have such an opinion of ministers, that I cannot be eafily convinced, that they will ever confent to have their power effectually abridged ; therefore I must be of opinion, that if ever any such bill be pafled, it must make its way through this house against the power and influence of the adminiftration, and must be forced through the other two branches of the legislature, or one of them at least, by the obftinate virtue of this affembly. Thank God, we have ftill the power in our hands, in some measure, to compel a compliance with xvhat our constituents as well as ourselves think abfolutely neceflary for the preservation of our constitution. But in the case now before us, we have no occafion to make any extraordinary use of our power : no tacking is proposed : no refusal nor any delay of the supplies is defired : What my honourable friend has proposed, comes not only naturally but neceflarily into a supply-bill, and consequently must be agreed to by the other two branches of the legislature, or the whole of this branch of the supply must be loft. If therefore such a natural and such a well-judged propofal as

this in favour of our liberties be rejected by this house, can I fuppose that ever any other can make its way against the torrent of ministerial favour ?' Mr. Southwtl then goes on to shew the particular propriety of a faving scheme at a time,, when the nation was engaged in a war against France and Spain, with no allies, but such as were more a burden than an advantage, overloaded with debts and taxes, the incomes of the finking fund on the decline, foreign trade Jeflened, &c. Then he proceeds as follows: « In these circumstances, Sir, and when we are in so much danger of being run out before the war can be brought to a period, will any gentleman say, that we ought to allow our ministers, placemen, and pensioners, to enjoy the same falaries and pensions they were provided with in time of peace ? Or that we ought not to deduct some part of their falaries or pensions, or subjed them to some higher tax than any other fort of people ? But this, it is (aid, is the practice of arbitrary government, or of princes that are aiming at arbitrary power; and we ought not to make their conduit a precedent for ours. Can this be called reasoning ? Because an arbitrary government does a just or aright thing, therefore we are never to do fo. If we can find no precedent for this in any of the free governments of Europe, it is because their ministers and officers have either no falaries at all, or no more than is abfolutely neceflary for supporting the dignity of their office. But our ministers and officers have higher falaries and perquifites in proportion, than the ministers and officers even of any arbitrary government in Europe; and since we imitate them in granting high falaries and pensions, we ought to imitate them in making deductions, when we are involved in a foreign war. This

was done by the court of Spain, as soon as war was declared against us, if there is any credit to be given to our gazettes, and news-papers. In order to provide for the expence of the war, that court begaa with reducing the appointments of all their officers, both civil and military, and with annihilating the perquifites of many others. The same thing was done by the court of Henna, when they found themselves attacked by France and Spain. In Rvffia likewife, they made large deductions from the faiaries of their officers during the war with Sweden; and even lately in Denmark, when there was but the appearance of a war with Sweden, his Danijb roajefty began with laying a tax upon all falaries, in proportion to their yearly produce. If no such thing has been prac~Hfed by France, it is because the quality in that kingdom are proud of fer-ving the government both in the civil and military offices, especially the latter, without any considerable pecuniary reward. As many of our nobility and rich gentry are able enough to support the dignity of any public office, they can be preferred to, out of their own private fortunes, furely no man will say, that it would not be generous in them to do so at a time, when their country is in such danger anil diftrefs. And even when an officer has no private fortune of his own, but has a good falary from the public, furely it would be generous and right in him to contract his way of living, and give up one half of his falary in a time of public diltrefs. If our public officers will not voluntarily do •what is generous and right, they ought to be mau'e to do so by some public regulation, for which purpofc nothing better can I think be contrived, than the propofal now under consideration. The opposition made by our myiifters to this motion, is in

my opinion a fnoft convincing proof of the corrupt influence that proceeds from the lucrativenef, of our public offices and employments. This of itself alone, ought to be a prevailing argument with every lover of liberty, to render them less lucrative, even fuppofing that the public diftrefs did not make it neceflary. Minifters may perhaps think, that nothing but lucrative motives will prevail with men to accept of places or employments in the government of their country, because nothing but a mercenary spirit can prompt a man to accept of any such, upon the terms they are generally offered by ministers, I mean upon condition of betraying their country in parliament, or at elections; but if we have a mind to preserve our liberties, I am fure we ought not to enable the crown or its ministers, to get any servants upon such terms. If the country is to be f?rved by none but such as will agree to betray its liberties, I had rather chuse it should not be fcrved at all; for anarchy is better than an establishcd tyranny, because from confufion, order may be brought forth ; whereas from an established tyranny, nothing but irretrievable oppreffion is to be expected. Therefore, if it were true, that nothing but lucrative motives could in England prevail upon men to serve their country, it would with me be no argument against rendering the temptation less cogent; because a small falary may prevail upon a poor man to serve the public, and a poor man is not so able to support an oppreflive government, as an avaricious or luxurious rich man may be. But, Sir, whatever our ministers may think, whatever bad opinion they may have of their countrymen, I have no such opinion of them. If nothing but honourable services were required, men of honour would engage in the service of their country, with-

:i

out any pecuniary reward. And I do not think it In the least difficult to introduce such a cuftom, as would make it dishonourable in any man of fortune to defire or accept of a sordid pecuniary reward or falary, for any service he did, or could do his country. To talk of a man's right to a pecuniary reward for serving his country, is to talk in that vile jnercenary style, which has been designedly introduced of late years, in order to propagate rninifterial corruption; but to talkjustly, no man has a right to a pecuniary reward for any service he can do his country. Sir, the service of our country is like the service of God; when we have done all we can, we have done but our duty, and no man can have a right to a reward, for doing no more than his duty. The rewards therefore bestowed for public services, are not what any man has a right to demand, but such only as generoiity, charity, or prudence, may induce the country to bestow: and I am fure neither generofity, charity, nor prudence, can be pleaded for giving large, or indeed any pecuniary rewards, to those who are already poflefled of exorbitant riches; and when a country is itself in the utmost diftrefs, furely it ought not to grant such high pecuniary rewards, even to those that stand in need of them, as it may do when it is in affluent circumstances; but our conduct in this country, seems to have been directly contrary to these maxims. I am fure it cannot be said that we have been in affluent circumstances for these thirty years paft : I believe every impartial man will grant, that we have been for that whole time in a declining condition; and yet in that time, we have not only augmented very needlessly the number of our public officers and servants, but we have greatly augmented the fabrics

and perquifites of many of them. We may eafily guefs, Sir,- with what view these augmentations were made, and we may be convinced that the same view now creates an opposition to their being reduced. It is not the danger, Sir, of drawing men of fortune from the service of their country, but the danger of drawing men of fortune from the service of ministers, that creates an opposition to this motion; but this is so far from being a reason for me to oppose it, that it is one of the ftrongeft arguments I can think of for agreeing to it. I wi(h we could draw every man of fortune from that service, for none but men who are entirely governed by their avarice or luxury, will ever enter into the service of ministers, upon the terms they require; and in the hands of such men, neither the counfcls nor the treafure of the country can be safe. A poor man may be honest and faithful, but an avaricious man will be neither, if he can safely indulge his avarice by being otherwife. A poor man may live contented upon a small falary, but a luxurious man no income can fatisfy, therefore he will endeavour by any means to get a supply. Can we expect, Sir, that either the counsels or treafure of our country will be safe in the hands of those, who in order to get them into their hands, have agreed to betray the liberties of their country. Sir, if they do not fell the counsels of their country, it is because they cannot find a purchafer; and if they do not convert the treafure of their country to their own use, it is because they are afraid of punishment. There is more danger therefore, with regard to the public counsels or treafure, in having such men of fortune employed, than in having men of no fortune employed in the public service ; and with regard to our liberties, the danger is infinitely greater, because

men of no fortune could not betray the liberties of their country by getting into parliament, nor could they so powerfully aflift an oppreflive adminiftration in corrupting our elections. For this- reason, Sir, we ought not to provide any ministry with the means of tempting the avaricious or luxurious rich to accept of places or employments in the governmentj and" much smaller falaries or profits, than are annexed to most of these places, would be a- fuf&cient temptation, because they would be a sufficient support for gentlemen of no fortune. There is therefore no weight in the objection made to this propofal, That it would drive all gentlemen of fortune and character out of the public service; because it would drive no gentlemen of fortune out of the service, but such a» ought not to be allowed to enter into it; or who at least ought not to be tempted by lucrative confi» derations to enter into it, especially as long as such temptations are at the dispofal of our ministers, and as long as a. lucrative place in the government is no objection to a gentleman's being a member of this house. The only remaining objection I have heard made to this propofal is, That it would make but a very small addition to our public revenue, if we make those exceptions which judice and companion require. I have already fhewn, Sir, that justice has nothing to do in the question, because no man has a right to any pecuniary reward from the public; and as to companion, it cannot I am fure carry us farther, than the honourable gentleman who made the motion has mentioned. Suppose then we except all falaries and pensions of 50/. a year and under, will any gentleman say that 4;. in the pound upon all falaries and pensions above 50/. a year, would not produce a very considerable revenue ? I flull not pretend to

determine, or even to gueft at what it would produce; but I may fuppose that our falaries and pensions above 50!. a year amount to at least a million fterling; if I said two, I believe I ftiould not be miftaken ; but fuppose no more than one, it would produce an additional annual revenue of 2OO,ooo/. a year, without any additional charge } and such an additional revenue is I think far from being inconsiderable, at a time when our government finds itself under a necessity of indulging even the most destructive vice of the people,' [the drinking of gin under licence] * in order to raise money by taxing it.'

The court-fycophants pretend, that the dignity of the crown [the voracity of their extravagance, they ihould say] requires a great expence to support it, and particularly a numerous attendance at court. But the truth is, the greatness of a prince is never dlimated according to the fplendor of his court, unless it be by women and children. All mankind agree to pronounce him a -great prince, who makes his enemies fear him, and his allies and subjects love him. And this is done by a procedure directly oppofite to an unbounded expence laid out upon a set of idle hangers-on. But I shall have occafion to treat of regal parade hereafter. In the mean time, on the exorbitant number of placemen, let us observe in what light the court-lift exhibits that abuse. There we find places piled on places, to the height of the tower of Babel. There we find a mafter of the houfliold, treasurer of the houfliold, comptroller of the houfhold, cofferer of the houfliold, deputy-cofferer of the hou/hold, clerks of the houfliold, clerks comptrollers of the houfliold, clerks comptrollers deputy-clerks of the houfliold, office-keepers, chamber-keepers, necessary-house-keepcrs, purveyors of bread, purveyors of wine, purveyors

of fifli, purveyors of butter and eggs, purveyors of confectionary, deliverers of greens, coffee-women, fpicery-men, fpicery-men's afsistant-clerks, ewry-menj ewry-men's afsistant-clerks, kitchen-clerk-comptrollers, kitchen-clerk-comptroller's first clerks, kitchen-Clerk-comptroller's junior clerks, yeomen oftheiiiouth» under--yeomen of the mouth, grooms, grooms children, paftry-yeonjen, harbingers, harbingers-yeomen^ keepers of ice-houses, cart-takers, cart-takers grooms, bell-ringers, cock and cryer, table-deckers, water-engine-turners, ciftern-cleaners, keeper of fire-buckets, and a thousand or two of the same kind, which if I were to set down, I know not who would take the trouble of reading them over* Will any man say, and keep his countenance, that one in one hundred of these hangers-on is of any real use ? Cannot eur good king have a poached egg for his fupper, unless he keeps a purveyor of eggs, and his clsrks, and his clerk's deputy-clerks, at an expence of 500 /. a year? while the nation is finking in a bottomless ocean of debt ? Again, who are they, the yeomen of the mouth, and who are the under-yeomen of the mouth f What is their bufmefs f What is it to yeoman a kijig's mouth ? What is the necessity for a cofferer, where there is a treasurer ? And, where there is a cofferer, what occafion for a deputy-cofferer ? Why a neceflary-'house-keeper ? cannot a king have a water-elofet, and keep the key of it in his own pocket ? And my little cock and cryer, what can be his poft ? Does he come under the king's chamber window, and call the hour, mimicking the crowing of the cock ? This might be of use before clocks and watches, especially repeaters, were invented -, but seems as superfluous now, as the deliverer of greens, the coffee-women, fpicery-men's afliflant--

clerks, tine kitcboi-eonlptroller's first clerk* and junior plerks, the groom's children, the. harbinger's yeomen* fyc. Does the maintaining such a multitude of idlers iu.it the present state of pur finances f When will frugality be necessary, if not now ? Queen Aunt gave 100,000 A 4 year to the public servicet We pay debts on the civil lift of 600,000 /. in one article* without ajking how there comes to be a deficiency.

The pretence, that a king ought to have a numbei¹ of attendants about him, to keep up his state, and ftrike the people with an awe of government, wants no answer. Was ever the parade of government kept up at a higher expence than in our times ? Was eve* government more despised by the subjefts, than ours it now i Compare our times with those of Queen Elizabethi who refused supplies, when offered her, saying, the money was as well in the people's pocket* as in hers, till (he came to want it.

Julian reformed the Roman court, difmifling many thousands who had pensions for no service *. Yet we do not find, that he loft the gcod"will of the people on that account. Our courtiers cry, There is no poffibility of keeping things quiet without places and pensions. I own I am inclined to think there is another and better method of keeping things quiet, viz. By government's shewing, on all occafions, an unvarying uprightness and difinterestedness of conduit. And I am fure, that bribery is a very precarious instrument of government. For the more the court bribes, the more it must bribe. Nor is there «ny impoflibility in diimniihing the number of places. It is often done; though they are much oftener increased. In the year 1709, a third fecretary of ttate wa»

• ANT. UNIV. HIST. XTI. 249.

appointed, viz. the duke of £>ueenfttiry ', arid Rowe, the poet, was made under-feeretary *. The number was since reduced again to two, without bad consequence. But there is always a Hon m the way, when the: reformation of an abuse is proposed.

Sir Edw. Coke complains heavily, about the beginning of Ch. I. of new-mvented offices, with large fees, and usetefs old ones very chargeable; of a plurality of offices held by Angle persons ; of extravagance in the king's houfhold; of new tables set up in thft palace; of voluntary annuities and¹ pensions; of unneceffarjr charges in the king's Hying; of coftly diet, apparel^ buildings, &c. * Were he to fee the proceedings of our times, he would soon forget those of Ch. I.

The commons, addtefa the queen, A, D. 1708, that the number of the conuaLffionecs for paying the Scftoh equivalent money, be reduced; the greatest part of the business being done ^c«

CHAP. VI.

fbat Places, Penjionsy. Bribes, afld ati the Arts of Corruption^ art but faljie Polity, being endIffs and inefficient.

AFTER all the Ihocking accounts here given of the enormous expence the nation is put to by the villainous art of a fucceflion of ministers, it must be owned, that bribery and corruption are falfe polky at best, as being endless and inefFedual.

* 'find. CONTIR. *!(,. 119.

* PARL. HIST. vi. 363. ^c DEB. COM. iv. 130.

In the most antient of all writings, I mean, the facred, we find wisdom and virtue, fynonimous terms, and vice and folly put promifcuoufly for one another. Wifdom is purfuing the nobleft ends by the most promifing means. But the ends a corrupt minister has in view are raifing himself and his friends to power, and filling his own and their pockets. Are these the tyblejl ends a being formed for glory, honour, and immortality can propose to himself ? And is bribing the most promifmg scheme for obtaining these nobleft ends ? I trow not.

Ou y»f xaxwf, x. r. X. ' He was a flirewd observer, who remarked, that whoever first introduces treats and presents among a people, to obtain their favour, paves the way for the destru&ion of that people *.'

The free states of Greece were ruined by Philip of Mace Jon, more by bribery than the sword. The Afiatic riches gained by the Spartans, corrupted and ruined them. The Raman commonwealth was overfet by corruption, in consequence of Lucullut's conquests in the eaft. Till then honour was the reward of virtue; afterwards sordid wealth filled the place of honour in the minds of the Romans; which rapacity continued and increased, till the emperor's throne was fairly bought by Didius Julianas.

No prince ever bribed more than Philip of Macedon. But the persons he bribed were his enemies; or foreigners. When he underflood, that his fon Alexander was endeavouring to gain the affections of the Macedonians by gifts, he checked him feverely ^b.

Though, as a politician, he had a great opinion of the force of gold ; and was wont to say, that no city was impregnable, through the gates of which an afs

• tht< in CORIOL.

" Cic. DB OFF. u.

laden with that metal, could pafs; though he was accuftomed to retain pensioners in every state, and naturally lavish of his money to domestic flatterers; yet he checked this humour, as soon as he perceived it, in his fon. He wrote him a letter on the subjeA full of excellent philofophy. « How came you, young mail, said he, to reason so wretchedly with yourself, as to fancy those will serve you faithfully, whom daily you corrupt with money ? Do you this, tnat the Macedonians may hereafter take you, not for their king, but for their fteward or paymafter. If you difcharge these offices well, you mult make but a pitiful prince. They are fpoiled who take gifts, by being taught thereby an habit of taking.' Sylla, in the true spirit of a corruptor (of an EngHJb borough-candidate, I was going to say) feafts the whole Raman people ^a. Will any man pretend, that Sylla was at that expence for art honed purpofc I Some of our court-fycophants pretend, that our borough-hunters are no way blameable for the same, proceeding. But the sense of our wife ancestors was otherwife, who have made laws against giving victuals and drink to electors, as much as against bribing with hard money.

There never was a greater corruptor than Cafar, who dcftroyed the liberties of his country. He invented new pretences for feailing and bribing the people of the city. He gave unufuaUy magnificent Ihews, and largefles of corn without measure, presented many leading men with flaves and land estates, lent to needy fenators large Aims of money at low interest, or without; he descended so low as to bribe favourite flaves and freemen, and to crown all, he doubled the

» ANT. UNIT. HIST. xin. 94.

pay of (he army '. By these extravagancies he am himself into debt to the amount of above 250,000 A of our money, and he found, (hat bribing was endWs. At last the wages of iniquity were railed so high, that it coft h>m 310,625 /. to buy off £tnili\u Paulus^ the eonAll, from Pompey's party *.

When he ftood candidate for the confulfhip with, Lucceius, the patricians fearing, that two such confuls together (hould overfet the republic, agreed ta support Bibulus's interest against that of Lucceius, by buying votes with the public money; even Cato himself countenancing (he scheme ^c [»< Catone quidem abxuente~\. But did this temporary expedient fave the {late ? Could Cato think it would ? How, indeed, could he mifs feeing, that it mu,ft haften the ruin of liberty, because it haftened the destrudion of the people's virtue, without which no people ever prc-» served their liberty f

Brutus and Caflius found the Romans so deba/ed, tha{ they thought it neceflary to bribe on their part, as the triumviri did on theirs. And after all, the Roman legions (unworthy of the name of Romans!) basely deferted them to join the triumviri^d.

Ofiavius (afterwards Auguftm") gave undoubted an.d, repeated proofs of his cowardice. Yet his army, the Roman legions, the despisers of cowardice, ftood by him. Why; Because he bribed them with money, corn, and lands. See Lip/ius's chapter of the gifts of Avgujlus* &c»

» Stteton. IN JUL, § a6, 27. et paflf.

* ANT. UNIV. HJST. xm- >79. ¹ Suetott. IN JUL.

* A*T. UNIV. HIST. xui. 389.

The Riafa* legions, accuftomed to hare the public money diftributed among them, were much djfiatitfitfd with Galba fat kaving off that good old cuftom*. When princes once begin bribing, their tools will n6t fuier them to leave oflF. There never wac a better pretence (if any pretence were good) for bribing, than that of king William's ministry, vix. buying off the Jacobites. Yet who, that considered what a door it opened, would have advifcd fucb a meafMre ?

Ambitious and avaritious men are infatiable. At the beginning of the reign of Ch. VIII, of France, the duke of Lorrain made very high conditions for himself and his party. They were granted. He seemed for some time contented. But soon after, he, and the conftable dt Bourbon* and many others, begun to hatch mischief^b.

When the electors become univcrfally corrupt, as well as the elected, ' the fate of Retnt will be renewed in Britain. The grandeur of Ronu was the work of many centuries, the effed of much wisdom, and the price of much blood. She maintained ker grandeur while flje preferyed her virtue. But when luxury grew up to favour corruption, and corruption to nourifh luxury, then Ronu grew venal, the election of her magiftrates, the fentences of her judges, the decrees of her fenate, all was fold; for her liberty was fold when these were fold, and her riches, her honour, her glory, cp.uld. nx>t long furvive her liberty. She who had bean the envy, as well as. the miftrefs of nations, fell to. be. an object of their feorn, or their pity, They bad fieen and felt that ihe

* ANT. UNIV. HIST. xiv. 489.

* MOD. UNIV. HIST. x\iV. 8;.

governed other people by will, and her own by law. They beheld her governed herself by will; by the arbitrary will of the worft of her own citizens, of the worft of both fexes, of the worft of human kind; by Caligula, by Claudius, by Nero, by Ateffaltna, by Agrippina, by Pappoea, by NarcijJ'us, by Caltflus, by Pallas, by princes that were ftupid or mad; by women that were abandoned to ambition and to luft; by ministers, that were emancipated flaves, parafites, and panders, infolent and rapacious. In this miserable state the few, that retained some fparks of the old Roman spirit, had double cause to mourn in private; for it was not safe even to mourn in publick. They mourned the lofs of the liberty and grandeur of Rome, and they mourned that both should be facrificed to wretches whofe crimes would have been punished, and whofe talents would fcarce have recommended them to the meaneft offices, in the. virtuous and profperous ages of the commonwealth. Into such a state (the difference of times, and of other circumstances considered) at least into a state as miserable as this, will the people of Britain both fall and deserve to fall, if they fuffer, under any pretence, or by any hands, that constitution to be deftroyed, which cannot be deftroyed unless they fuffer it; unless they co-operate with the enemies of it, by renewing an exploded diftin&ion of parties; by electing those to represent them, who are hired to betray them; or by submitting tamely, when the mafic is taken off, or falls off, and the attempt to bring beggary and flavery is avowed, or can be no longer concealed. If ever this happens, the friends of liberty, should any such remain, will have one option ftijl left; and they will rather chuse no doubt

* to die the last of Britijh freemen, than bea,r to live « the first of Britijh flaves V

The members of the Palijh diet oppose the most falutary measures of the court, till they are bought off^b. The court ought not to have begun buying off. If they had not, the expectation of being bought off would never have come into the heads of the members. And their requiring unanimity, is a great difadvantage, as making each fingle vote of too much consequence. Indeed nothing can be more absurd than giving one a negative against one hundred, in any case, where the interest of all is concerned. Did ever any man in his wits think of putting one guinea, or one ounce, in the balance against one hundred guineas, or one hundred ounces ?

About the time when the ill-advifed measure of taking off the Jacobites by places and bribes was proposed to king William III. the earl of Braidalbin formed a scheme of quieting the highlanders by diftributing money among them. A fum of 15,000/. was fent him. It was offered to be diftributed among the chiefs of the clans. But it did not content them. On the contrary (as when a villain, inflead of being set at defiance, is pffered a bribe to prevent his fetting up a falfe accufation) they rofe in their demands. They thought their own importance must be very great, that the government should think it worth while to take them off. This is a weighty leflbn to all courts and ministers, not to begin bribing; for once begun, no one knows where it will end ; but to set the heads of parties at defiance, and trust, for the public approRation, and security in their places, not to bribes of

' DISSERT. UPON PARTIES, 213. > Jtfoo. UuJV. HIST, xxxiy. J2,

any kind, but to a clear conduct, which will always support them, or enable them to fink with a grace.

Moft fins are their own punifliment even in this life. The court-corruptor may read his fin in his punifliment, in the diftrefs and vexation he brings himself into by raifing a ncft of hornets about his own ears, by disappointing (for he must difappomt) a multitude of expectants. And every disappointed man becomes a mortal enemy; and one enemy docs him more mischief than ten friends do him servipe. Then he finds, all his measures, even his most laudable ones, einbar raffed.

Walpolt often said, the vacancy of every place gave him anxiety; for he could only oblige one (the peribn to whom he gave it) and must disappoint many. One would therefore imagine, that even the court itself ihould wi(h the number of places diininiflicd.

The market-price of a borough 30 years ago was, 1500 /. Now they are thought pennyworths at 30007. « He who undertakes to govern a free people by corruption, and to lead them by a falfe interest against their true interest, cannot boaft the honour of the invention. The expedient is as old as the world, and he can pretend to no other honour than that of being an humble imitator of the devil. To corrupt our parliaments hath been often attempted, as well as to divide our people in favour of prerogative, and. in order to set the'arbitrary will of our princes loofe from the restraiqts of law *,' * When pensions grow common, and are promifcuoufly given to those who have deserveJ them and those who have not, the demand and application for them will grow univerfal. Every one will efteem it a fort

* PISSE^T. ON PARTIES, 217.

of contempt to him to be left out, and think himself as well intitled as another who is not intitled at alt. So that what is taken¹ from the people's induftry and given for the people's protection, will be fquandered away to support laziness, prodigality and vice, and the bread of the children will be thrown to dogs V

⁽ As the prown never was, so it is ridiculous to believe it ever will be better for such irregular supplies. The demand upon it will rife in exact proportion to their fancied riches, and the weakness of the ministry. Every one will think he has a right to fliare in the profit who has had a (hare in the guilt; and cndless importunities must diftract the court, as well as exhauft the nation. Whereas a general good hufbandry will soon put an end to all wild and impertinent felicitations. No one will pretend to what no one has. Worthless men will not fpend their substance in hopes to repair themfclves out of the kingdom's ruin; but the direction of public affaire will fall naturally into hands who have no interest but in the publick happiness V * When it happens that the fprjng head shall be tainted, from whence are to be drawn the men of experience, action, and counsel; bufy pcrfons by different arts, fpme by abject flattery, others by perplexing matters to be bought off, will soon prevail to be let into many of the chief offices and dignities of the state, which they will so pollute with their foul dealings, and weaken and make contemptible by their ignorance, that cleaner and abler hands will afterwards be hardly invited in to restofe things, and give them » bcttef complexion, And in such times,

per^. TKACTS, i. 342.

* Ibid. ?3Q.

the worft of men, who infmuate best, and are ever the most active, will get into many pofts of trust and importance, and endeavour, if pofsible, to engrofs the whole commonwealth to themselves, and invade all her pofts, where they will lie ftrongly intrenched and watchful to opprefs virtue and merit of any kind, with which they are at open war; for if endowments of the mind, love to the nation, integrity, experience, conduct, and folid wisdom, should once obtain, get ground, and be taken notice of, they who fhine, and are recommended by no such qualities, must quit their holds and withdraw, or remain the univerfal contempt of that people, whofe affairs they are so little able to administer *.' « Bad men have ever given a falfe colour to their proceedings, and covered their ambition, corruption, and rapine, with the pretence of their matter's service; they make him believe their greatness advances him; whereas truly it tends to his diminution, and he is often weak for want of that wealth and power which they fhare among one another. Their riches have frequently brought envy upon the prince, but we can hardly meet with an instance of any who in his diftrefs has been afiifted from the purses of his ministers: for they are commonly the first who fly from his misfortunes, and though they pretend that his power is revered in them, and that they make him ftrong by the benefits he lets them bestow, yet a wife king/ fees through all this artifice, and knowp that he, who would reap any advantage from his favours in the opinions of men, must make them fensible that they owe them fmgly to his goodness, and not to the interceffion of those about him".'

• Davin. n. 58.

* Ibid. in. 20.

' Kings reduced to (heights either by their own or by the negligence of their predeceflbrs, have been always involved in dark and mean intrigues; they have been forced to court such as in their hearts they abhor, and to frown upon those whofe abilities and virtues they fecretly approve of and reverence. Indead of being heads of the whole commonwealth, as in law and reason they ought to be, they have often been compelled to put themselves in the frout sometimes of one and sometimes of another party, as they faw it prevalent, a policy in the end ever fatal to rulers. Being entangled, they have been conftrained to put into the chief adminiftration of their affairs, projectors and inventors of new taxes, who being hateful to the people, feldom fail of bringing odium upon their mafter; and these little fellows, whofe only (kill lies that way, when they become ministers, being commonly of the lower rank of understandings, manage accordingly; for their own ignorance in matters of government occafions more neceffities than their arts of raiflng money are able to supply V

' 111 conduct in money matters of itself is sufficient to raise a strength against them in power; and where parties are already formed, it renders those the bolder who dcfign mischief to the state, because they know how difficult it is for a government to resist its enemies, when it is without treafure, and has not the affections of the people; which was the case of Hen. III. of France, a prince full of natural valour, blefled with early victories, and adorned with eloquence, which was said to be irresistible; yet one of his own subje<5h, n?t of the royal blood, came to his capital city at the head of no more than feven persons, in

* Da-ven. in. 4.

order to begin a rebellion, which aimed at wresting the fceptre from htm. How came a man of the duke of Guife's caution and fagacity, to take in hand an enterprize at first fight so unlikely to fuccecoV but that he knew how low this king had brought himself by a long feries of mif-government; that France impoverished by taxes was grown weary of his rule; that the minds of the people were quite alienated from him ; that his riots and profufion had quite exhaufted that treafure wherewith his crown was to be defended. And without doubt, this view gave the house of Ltrrain, the council of fixteen at Paris, and the general fa&ion of the league, courage to begin that war *.'

* If it is afkcd, how it came to pafs that so many commonwealths and monarchies have been subverted, the answer is eafy; they did not fink under invafions, or perifli by foreign force, till the way to conquest had been first opened by their own mifgovernment, But to come to particulars, and to examine into the origin of these various mischiefsy which have difturbed government, whence is it that there have been factions in a state ? In commonwealths it was because they did not hold a &tt& hand over their great ones, and took no care to keep out cor-> ruption. Hereupon the manners of the common people were depraved, and they followed those whom they thought most willing and most able to support them in their vices; and this first divided Rome, In a monarchy, parties thus took their rife; either the prince was weak, unable to exert the regal authority, and so private men grew upon him, and not being in a condition to fupprefs both, he was

¹ Dawn. iv. 420.

compelled to court first one and then the other side, as his neceffities required; himself notirifliing that disease, which, in the end, wafted his power; or if he had falfe cunning, and meditated in his mind to overthrow the laws underhand, he encouraged par-* ties, kept them equally poifed, and fuffered them to confume their strength one against the other, in hopes they should be both so impaired by their mutual drivings, as to be unable to give him oppofi-* tion, and thus to become mailer of the whole at last. Whence came it, that countries have been ruined, by not confulting national intcrest ? Either the prince himself had bad defjgnj, or not being endowed with royal virtues, and deftitute of wisdom, he committed the adminiftration of hi* affairs to unflcilful or corrupt hands. Whence was it that affe&ing arbitrary rule has Co often thrown this kingdom into civil wars f The fault lay in th<r judges, who wrested law, and made it fenre the turns of power ; and in the ministers, who did not perform their duty in reprefcnting to the prince the danger of such measurcs. From whence have arifen those fchifrns by which the church has been fa often rent afunder, but, from neglect or unikilfulness in the general ad mini fixation ? From negled, when the temple was fuftered to be profaned by the licentious living, the pride, ignorance, and vices of the clergy, which might induce many to feparate from such wbofe lives, they thought, were a blemifli to their do&rine. From unfkilfulness, when the government has believed that diseases of long growth could admit of a fudden cure, that to (harp humours it was better to apply corroding medicines than lenitives, nnd that perfecution was the only way of reclaiming non-conformiUs from their errors. What

has most frequently been the cause of public wants, but a complication of mifmanagements, as well in the prince as in his ministers ? He omitted his part, which was to overlook them, and his negligence produced their corruption. They encouraged profuiion, as getting most by it, and he neglevied ceconomy, because it gave him present trouble. In governments ill adminiftred, public wants lead the way; but private poverty follows clofe after; and when both happen together, which must always be the case at last, then is ruin near at hand. Which way foever we look, when any thing has been out of order in a state, generally speaking, the mischief did proceed from some omiflion in the executive power, either from above or from below; when vice abounds, we find the laws have not been put in execution; when impiety and irreligion prevail, they have not been sufficiently difcountenanced; when there is an uncommon decay of trade, it is either not encouraged or not protected ; when the law is tedious and expenfive, some great corruption has been fuffered to creep into the courts of judice ; in naval matters, when good conduct and courage are wanting, negligence and cowardice have met with too much impunity. Thus, in these instances, and in many others, which have been ever the subjefts of complaint, as at fir It they were derived from a bad, so they are to be corrected by a better adminiftration of affairs V [Confequently not by bribery and corruption.]

* Much nobler it is to enjoy the praises of an univerfal people living in plenty and at their case, not burthened by taxes and duties, than to have the good

* Davea. v. 13.

words of a few flatterers, or those harpies which commonly haunt a court, to gripe all they can; who, when they are gorged themselves, pollute all the remainder with their obscene claws, so that nobody elfe defires to touch it. Besides, we have hardly an instance of any prince that in time of need was truly afltfted and defended by his minions, and the creatures of his bounty and favour; but a king beloved for wife, just, and careful government, has been, very feldom deferted by his people *.'

* I wish (says the excellent Mr. Trenchard) our dabblers in corruption would count their gains, and balance their lofles with their wicked advantages. Let them set down in one column their mercenary gifts and precarious dependencies; sometimes half purchafed with money, sometimes by dividing the profits with parafites, and always with the lofs of their integrity and reputation; and on the other side let them write down expenfive contentions, and conftant. attendance in town, to the neglect of their families and affairs, and a manner of living often unfuitable to their fortunes, and definitive to their health, and at least one fourth part of their estates mortgaged, and liable to the difcharge of the public debts; and above all the rest, the insecurity of what remains, which must be involved in every species of public misery. And then let them caft up the account, and fee where the balance lies^b.'

* Let them consider, on the other hand, (says he) what a figure they make in their several countries, among their neighbours, their acquaintance, their former friends, and often amongft thair own rela-

* Davcn. n. 263.

^k CATO'S LETT. in. 279.

tions. See Tiow they have been hunted and purfued from place to place, with reproaches and curfes from every honest man in England; how they have been rejected in counties and rich boroughs, and indeed only hoped for fuccefs any where, by the mere force of exorbitant corruption, which has fwallowed up a great part of their unjust extortions. Then let them set against all these evils, a good conscience, a clear reputation, a difengaged estate, and being the happy members of a free, powerful, and safe kingdom ; all which was once their case, and might have continued fo, if they had ailed with integrity. Sure it is worth no man's time, to change an estate of inheritance, fecured to him by fteady and impartial laws, for a precarious title to the greatest advantages, at the will of any man whatfoever V ' The public can never have a firm exiftence, unless all the different ranks of men co-operate to its preservation, not faintly, but with the utmost spirit and vigour. For if among those in high stations, there is not an affe&ion which warmly embraces the honour and interest of the commonwealth, and if the same genius does not univerfally pofless the inferior order of people, such fupine negligence and giddy adminiftration will creep into the state, as must be attended at last with fudden ruin. If it be the interest of a great many to promote diforder, the affairs of a country will proceed amifs, notwithstanding all the endeavours of a wife and virtuous prince, and a good fenate. Therefore, to mend things rightly, the whole people must be mended. To bring this about, in all likelihood, the bed ways are by precepts and examples to infpire as many as

* CATO'S LETT.'in. 280.

poflible with a true zeal and affe&ion to their native country; to cultivate in the minds of the common people, a due reverence to religion ; to advanqe morality among the better fort; to give all men in general, an honest interest } and to make virtue and merit the only road to greatness and preferment. It may perhaps be beneficial and safe in a tyranny, to let all things loofe, and deprave the manners of the people ; for the light is thereby extinguifhed, that would otherwife be troublesome and too difcerning; but it is not so with lawful governments, where the prince and people compose one body; since if the inferior members are there infefled, the disease will produce such unwholesome fumes and vapours, as may reach and hurt the head at last. After a country has been long affli&ed with calamities occafioned by foreign or civil wars, the minds of the people will take different turns, sometimes to great piety, and at other feafons to the height of vice. The Romansi after the Gauls had facked and burnt Pome, were presently kindled with new devotion. They revived their ancient justice and difcipline, they restored those old and almost obfolete laws, that were the chief strength of their constitution, and they reaflumed their former virtue. But after the civil wars in the times of Galba, Otbo, and Vitellius, they were not at all bettered by their miseries, (which is the worft fymptom of a depraved people) and rather plunged deeper into wickedness. For when Vefyafian's party seized the city, there were in some ftreets rapine and murders, and in others, feafting and proflitution; so that one and the same town, gave the view of a raging war, and a riotous peace. Wife lawgivers and directors of a people, may make advantage of a favourable crifis. As for example, when a long war is at an

end, they may take that time to feform the vices of the age; for at such a feafon, when poverty is grown upon them, men will probably be more willing to liften after virtue, and those methods, by which their condition is to be restored. Nothing prevails more with the multitude, nor operates better towards their amendment, than the example of the great ones; if such are seen to content themselves with moderate power, wealth, and honours, it teaches those below them to be temperate in their defires; by which means, faction may be quite rooted out, which in most foils is but a weed that grows from the disappointment of ambitious hopes; and where faction can be deftroyed, government is rendered much more, eafy to the rulers, and without doubt less expenfive ; for when that reigns, men expect to be highly courted, and largely paid, for looking after their own safety. Diflionefty has nothing in it so very charming, but that mankind might be perfuaded to lay if quite aside, at least in relation to the public, if they could do their bufmefs in the world with other aids, and by any other way. For why in the late reigns did so many protestants help on the designs of popery ? — Because it was the only means of obtain^ ing greatness and preferment. Why in former times were we betrayed by some persons ? — Because the court had made felling the peoples rights, a gainful traffic. But if men could have mounted up to wealth and honours by any other fteps, if those who were then at the helm, had employed and rewarded such as they had seen zealous for the religion of their country, jealous of its liberties, and careful of its safety; if general integrity had been taken notice of, and called into- the offices of the state,, by degrees the age would have mended of itself ; vice and folly

must have withdrawn, and been out of countenance, and virtue and good sense might perhaps, at last, have gotten the upper hand. Any body of men that have but one way to honours and advancement, will take that courfe, though it be never so much out of the road of honesty ; and if there is but one place where offices and dignities grow, and are gathered, thither men will get, whatever it fhall coft them. Any faculty of the mind, whether for use or for pleasure, which is in great vogue and eftimation, will be cultivated and improved; and men will bend their whole ftudy to excel, in what they fee most pleasmg or most advantageous. It is the same thing with vice and virtue, either of them thrive, as they are encouraged or difcountenanced. Bar but the gate to vice, and men will defire to enter and advance themselves in the world by courage, prudence, temperance, integrity, zeal for the public, magnanim.ity, and true wisdom ; but if another mark be set up, and all their aims directed thither, they will enendeavour to rife and profper as others have done, by fraud, servile compliance, treachery, artifice, bribery, tricks, and corrupted eloquence; and when a commonwealth is thus abandoned, even some of those in good efteem are contented to come in, and take their {hare of the plunder. In a free country, it is the concern and interest of princes, that virtue should be restored to her just value, and rightful dominion; and that vice should for ever be deposed, and especially banifhed from the place in which are bred up the men of action and counsel. When men quit the paths of virtue, which lead to true wisdom, they are presently bewildered in error; and 'till they get again into the right road, and observe her dictates and directions, nothing is to be expected but misery and

confufion. When men leave honesty, wisdom forfakes them, and mixes no longer in their counsels; and the general immoralities of a people, embolden weak and ill persons, to thruft themselves into the adminiftration of business, who, void of all fkill and art, caft the commonwealth upon rocks, where (he is like to fplit and perifh ; and in such a country, unless there be an univerfal tendency in the whole, to be guided by the principles of former honour, its affairs must impair daily, till at lad, in the courfe of a few years, it shall be quite loft, and utterly extinguiflied. In a free country, if a few of the nioft confpicuous persons, do but agree to lay to heart the honour and safety of the public, they will go very far towards its preservation, or at least keep off the evil day for a while. For when fortune had undertaken to deftroy the commonwealth of Rome, the fingle virtue of Cato held her long in play, and gave her a great deal of opposition; much more then, in a nation where many yet remain untainted, may these good patriots, if they will exert themselves, preserve its constitution again ft the attempts of designing men ; who are very far from having the wealth of Cro/us, the same of Pompey, or Ctefar's conduit, and who indeed refemble the subverters of the Roman liberty in nothing, but the luxury and rage of Clodius. When things go amifs in a state, men are apt to blame the ministers; though such errors, (the corruption of the people considered) per-haps were not to be avoided. For a country may have been so depraved, in a long procefs of time, that its affairs cannot fuddenly be capable of a good and found adminiftration. But if any corruptions are crept into the subordinate parts of this govern-

ment, they will be undoubtedly corrected in times of peace and .quiet.'

' Nor could it be difficult for former princes to corrupt both the electors and the elected; for in most kingdoms, the court has been a {hop with wares in it to fit all kinds of cuftomers; there is hope foe some, which feeds many at a small expence; i there are titles for the ambitious; pleasures for the young and wanton; places for the bufy; and bribes tq be clearly conveyed for such as defire to maintain an appearance of honesty, and to betray their trust but now and then in important matters. With these baits and allurements, princes might cafily draw into their net the unthinking gentry of the land, and thereby poifon the fountain head of the laws, and fap the very foundations of the political constitution *,.'

Let us hear, on this subject, Sir Francis Dajbwood in the house of commons, A. Z>. 1745 ^b.

* That there is a difference, Sir, between our constitution and eftabliflitnent, that under the latter the former may be deftroyed, and confcquently the people diverted of their rights and privileges, no one can deny, who conflders the fatal effects of corruption; nor can any man pretend, that the people are not fensible of this difference, if he reflects upon the instructions that have been given by the people in all parts of the united kingdom, to their representatives in this house. That the danger to which our constitution may be exposed by the fuccefs of the present rebellion is more imminent, no man, I believe, will openly deny; but that the danger to which it may be exposed by the fuccefs of corruption is more certain, every man must grant, who is not

' Dave*. 11.57. ^b Aim. DEB. COM. n. 331.

biafled by the port or pension by which his head is co^ founded, though his heart may not perhaps be as yet corrupted. Should the rebellion be crowned with fuccefs, which I think we are in very little danger of; our constitution may be preserved even by the good sense of the pretender himself^ if he has any, because a constitutionally limited monarchy is more fecure, and consequently more eligible to a king of good sense, than the most abfolqte one; but the fingular misfortune of corruption is, that a king may thereby be rendered abfolute, even without his designing or knowing any thing of it, till it becomes impoflible for him to govern by any other means. Gentlemen I fee, Sir, are furprized at such a new and extraordinary dodrine; but there is nothing more plain, if we consider, the nature of government, and the only two methods by which it can be supported. No man, I believe, ever fupposed that a government can be supported by a king or other supreme inagiftrate by himself alone. He must have a majority, or at least a great number of people, engaged with him to support the government, and these men must be engaged by the public interest, or each man by his own private interest. The multitude, I {hall grant, may be kept in awe by their fears; but the most abfolute, the most arbitrary tyrant must have a number of men engaged by their private interest sufficient to imprefs that fear. One fingle man may, by his authority, perfuade a multitude; but a fingle man never can frighten a multitude. Every government must therefore have a number of men for its support, and those men must be kept engaged to do so by the public, or by their private interest. When those who support the government are engaged to do so by the public interest alone, or by that chiefly, it is a free government,

even though by its form it be supremely administered by one fole monarch. But when they who support the government are engaged to do so by thejr private interest alone, or by that chiefly, it is an abfolute government, even though by its form it be supremely administered by a king, lords, and commons; and such a government can be supported no way but by corruption. If such a government be supremely administered by a fole monarch, he must have a mercenary army for his support, and money enough to hire or corrupt them; and if such a government be by its form supremely administered by a king and parliament, he must have money enough to hire or corrupt his mercenary parliament, as well as his mercenary army. To apply this, Sir, to our constitution, and to fhew that by corruption our king may, without his own knowledge, be rendered not only abfolute, but unable to govern by any other means"; it is very certain, that the freedom of our constitution consists in every man's being directed with refpeft to his voting both at elections, and in parliament, by the public interest alone, or by thai chiefly: Whilft this continues to be the case, our constitution will be preserved, and we fhall continue to be a free people. For this purpose, a public and difinterested spirit must be propagated and preserved among the people, and it will always be the king's interest to do fo, because he can have no interest feparate or diftinft from that of his people. But minilters hav? often a private interest which is diftincT: from, and oppofite to that of the people; and when any such man happens unfortunately to become the king's prime minister, he will make it hisbufincfs tp root out all public spirit, and to plant a selfifli fpiijt in its fiead. All the favours of the crown, and all the

pofts and offices in the kingdom will be bestowed, not upon those who deserve them, or are qualified for them, but upon those that vote in parliament, or at elections according to his direction, and without any regard to the national intercft. This a cunning minister may do without its being poflible for the king to difcover it; bccause the king can know the merits oj qualifications but of a very few of his subjects. By such means, a selfifli venal spirit may be introduced into parliament, and from thence propagated through the whole nation ; and then if the king has but monev enough, or lucrative places and offices enough at his dispofal, which a corrupt parliament will always take care to provide for him, he becomes, without his designing it, as abfolute as if he had no parliament at all, and may act in a more oppreffive manner than any fole monarch can venture to do, because he has the fanction of parliament for every thing he does, and has the principal families in the kingdom engaged tojustify his measures. Thus, Sir, our king may be made abfolute without his having ever entertained any design against our liberties; and the poifon being once thoroughly diftused, which it may by such a minister's continuing long at the head of the adminiftration, it will then be impoflible for the king to support his government without corruption ; for when the public interest is considered by no man, or but by a very few, when the whole or a great majority of the people are actuated by nothing but selfifli mercenary views, can the king expect to have his government supported by a majority in parliament, let his measures be never so much calculated for the public good, unless he makes it their private interest to do so ? While he can do this, he may expect to reign abfolute, and yet according to law ;

but. the moment he ceafes to do this, or ceafes being able to do it, he must either put an end to parliaments, or the parliament will put an end to his reign ; for all those who find they cannot make their market of him will join against him, in hopes of making a better market of his fucceflbr. I must therefore think, Sir, we cannot do a better service to our fovereign, than by paffing such laws as are necessary for putting a ftop to the progrefs of corruption, and reviving a public and difmterested spirit' among the people; and as the people have loudly called for some such laws being pafled, we cannot take a more proper opportunity for introducing them, because i.t will confirm and strengthen that spirit which now appears among the people without doors in favour of our present eftablimment, and will make them more ready to venture their lives in support of the government, should any future fuccefs of the rebels, or the landing of any foreign troops, make it neceflary for us to call for the aflistance of their hands as well as their purses. What our ministers may think, Sir, I do not know, having'little or no correspondence with any of themj but as they enjoy the greatest advantages under our present government, and as the people have so generally fhewn themselves zealous for supporting that government, under which they in particular enjoy so many advantages, I am fure every other man thinks they are in gratitude bound to give fatisfa&ion to the people wirh regard to those laws which they think so neceflary for fecuring their liberties against the fatal effects of corruption. Therefore I do expect in this feffion to fee a very extraordinary change in the conduct of pur ministers. Though in former feffions they have opposed every such law, yet now I hope they will

themselves be the introducers and tho promoters of every one of those laws which the people have so long called for hi vain; and if I Should have the pleasure of feeing such a change in their conduct:, I make no doubt of having the pleasure to fee every one of those bills parted imolaws? without any opposition in either house of parliament. Thefe, Sir, are the hopes 1 conceive from that spirit which has appeared among the people for supporting our present most excellent government, and our present molt wife adminiftration. This is the return of gratitude I expect frorn our ministers, who have always {hewn themselves most grateful to those who have servcd them in this house or at elections; and I hope they will not be less grateful to those who have shewn themselves ready to serve their king and country at a time of such imminent danger. This return, I am fur? the people expect; and I think we should take this first opportunity so give them some hopes of their not meeting with a disappointment. As we do no.t know how soon the rebels may enter England, as we do not know how soon an army of foreign troops may be landed amongft us, we ought not in prudence to let flip this first opportunity of convincing the people, that there is nothing they can defire for fecuring their liberties, but what they may expect from this government, and from this feffion of parliament, F°r this reason, Sir, I think itneceflary to add something to our addrefs on this occafion. Therefore I have prepared an additional paragraph ; and I mud humbly move, that it may be added to what the honourable gentleman has been pleased to propose. The additional paragraph I have prepared is in these words. *' And in order to the firmer establishment of his majefty's throne on the folid and truly glorious

bafis of his people's affections, it shall be our zealous and fpeedy care to frame such bills, as, if parted into laws, may prove most effectual for fecuring to his majefty's faithful subjects the perpetual enjoyment of their undoubted right to be freely and fairly represented in parliaments frequently chosen and exempted from undue influence of every kind. For eafing their minds in time to come of the apprehension they might entertain of feeing abuses in offices rendered perpetual without the feafonable interposition of parliament to reform them, and for raifing in every true lover of his king and country the pleasing hopes of beholding these realms once more restored to that .happy and flourifhing state, which may reflect the hi^heft honour on his majefty's reign, and cause posterity to look back with veneration and gratitude on the fource of their national felicity."

CHAP. VII.

Tie common Apologies for Corruption, as afupposed necessary Engine of Government, Jbewn to be falfe.

LORD tralpolt, in his speech, A. D. 1739, labours to shew, that * the fovereign's power of rewarding merit is one of the most fundamental and most useful parts of our cdnftitution:' [fo a learned bishop tells us, in his Alliance between Church and State, that an established provifion for the clergy is the very foundation-ftone of a church. I like those honest men, who fairly ownx that money is their great object.} « There are many forts ef public services'

(says lord Walpole) * which cannot be immediately explained, which it would be inconsistent with the public good to divulge; and yet, if this bill [the pension bill] * should pafs into a law, his majefty could reward no services in any member of the other house without explaining and divulging these services; nay, and putting it in the power of that house to judge, whether these services deserved such a reward, which might occafion disputes between that house and the crown, and would certainly difcourage every member of that house from rendering any fecret services to the public.' [The Dutch carry on their government very fuccefsfully without this wafte of the public money to reward fecret services.] * This, my lords, would be a great prejudice to our civil government; and the frequent oaths that are to be introduced by this bill would be of the most dangerous consequence, not only to our established religion, but even to natural religion itself. In our antient polity, both religious and civil, it was a wife maxim, never to oblige or allow a man to fwear in any case where self-interest was concerned, especially when the circumstances of the case were such as made it impoflible to convict him of perjury, even though he should be guilty of it; but this maxim seems to be quite overturned by this bill, and, therefore, 1 am convinced it will introduce amongft us an utter contempt of perjury, which is always followed by an utter contempt of religion *.' But will the unrestrained practice of peculation, without oaths, be found consident with religion and morality ? Government, we know,, never hesitates about expofing the merchant, tradefman, manufacturer, or

¹ DEB. LORDS, vi. 374.

fhipmafter to the danger of perjury for the fake of the

revenue.

Some of the tools of power insisted in Mr. Gordon's

time, A. D. 1722, as he tells us ", that « matters are come to that pafs that we must either receive the pretender, or keep him out with bribes and standing armies. That the nation is so corrupt, that there is no governing it by any other means. And, in short, that we mult submit to this great evil, to prevent a greater; as if any mischief could be more terrible than the highest and most terrible of all mischiefs, univerfal corruption and a military government. It is indeed impoflible for the subtilty of traitors, the malice of devils, or the cunning and cruelty of our most implacable enemies, to fuggeft ftronger motives for the undermining and overthrow of our excellent establishment, which is built upon the destrustion of tyranny, and can stand upon no other bottom. It is madness in extremity, to hope that a government founded upon liberty, and the free choice of the aflertors of it, can be supported by other principles; and whoever would maintain it by contrary ones, intends to blow it up, let him alledge what he will. This gives me every day new reasons to believe what I have long fufpe&ed; for if ever a question should arife, Whether a nation shall submit to certain ruin, or struggle for a remedy ? these gentlemen well know which side they will chuse, and certainly intend that which they must chuse. I am willing to think, that those impotent babblers speak not the sense of their superiors, but would make servile court to them from topicks which they abhor. Their superiors must know, that it

^a TRACTS, i. 335.

is raving and phrenzy to affirm, that a free people can be long governed by impotent terrors, that millions will confent to be ruined by the corruption of a few; or that those few will join in their ruin any longer than the corruption lasts. That every day new and greater demands will rife upon the corruptors; that no revenue, how great foevcrj will feed the voracioufness of the corrupted; and that every disappointment will make them turn upon the opprefTors of their country, and fall into its true interest and their own. That there is no way in nature to preserve a revolution in government but making the people eafy under it, and shewing them their interest in it; and that corruption, bribery, and terrors will make no lading friends, but infinite and implacable enemies; and that the best security of a prince amongft free people, is ihe affections of his people, which he can always gain by making their interest his own, and by shewing that all his views tend to their good. They will then, as they love thcmselves, love him, and defend him who defends them. Upon this faithful bafis, his safety will be better eftabliflied, than upon the ambitious and variable leaders of a few legions, who may be corrupted, difobliged, or furprized, and often have been fo; and hence great revolutions have been brought about, and great nations undone, only by the revolt of fingle regiments. Shew a nation their interest, and they will certainly fall into it. A whole people can have no ambition but to be governed justly, and when they are fo, the intrigues and diffatisfa&ions of particulars will fall upon their own heads. What has any of our former courts ever got by corruption, but to difaffedt the people, and weaken themfeives ? Let us now think of other

.1

methods, if it is only for the fake .of the experiment. The ways of corruption have been tried long enough in paft adminiftrations. Let us try, in this, what public bonefty will do, and not condemn it, before we have fully proved it, and found it ineffectual ; and it will be time enough to try other methods when this fails.'

* That all-beholding eye which controuls the univerfe, pierces through all difguifes, and perceives, that the diffufion of vice through this nation is derived from one fource, the corruption of the great; which, promoted by the most a&duous arts, and vindicated by venal eloquence, has, at length, abforbed all regard for the community into the two selfilh paflions of ambition and avarice. And when the most vigorous effort [by a place-bill] was mad« to purge that place [the house of commons] which, once cleanfed, would have transfused its own purity through all orders and degrees of men, did 'not the flagitious opposition to that attempt, so effential to the very being of virtue, arid folicited by the earned and univerfal cry of the whole people, produce an instance of supererogatory proftitution, which drew wonder from a minister ? For want of this barrier to confine corruption, honestjr has been put up to public fale, and found its price, to the coft of a nation twice betrayed; hence a loofe has been given to public profufion, and rapine, unchecked, and unchaftifed ; and the illicit gains have been as profusely fquandered by individuals, in luxury, fenfuality, and every unmanly gratification ; and hence the means of obtaining these ignominious emoluments have been purchafed by involving the nation in perjury, treachery, and a general diflblution of manners V

' Gord. TRACTS, n. 269.

Only able men are equal to the weight of just government. Every blockhead is capable of the scheme of government we have ken carried on in this country (not in the present incorrupt times) beeause every blockhead can pay a set of hirelings^ while he can find the afsets. To make ftraight what is crooked, to level mountains and raise vallies, to redrefs what is wrong, is matter of labour, as well as of genius, and ministers love eafe better than toil,, dnd the card-table and bottle of Burgundy better than reading and thinking. Then they cry out, You mud not expeft that statefmen should make themselves gally-flaves. Thus even laziness is dragged in as an apology for corruption. And then they pay on and drudge on in the beaten track, and all is well so long as they can hold their places ; for their pockets are growing fuller and fuller every day. But the excellent Daveaant fhews this manner of reckoning to be fallacious, and that statefmen could not make such conclufions, if their calculations were just.

' What great hazard is there for a minister to contend with the intrigues of here and there a courtier, difcontented because his immoderate hopes of getting are not gratified ? Or to fuffer the obloquies of a devouring crew, who may, perhaps, be angry because the public is no longer exposed to be their prey, and that they cannot make their wonted gains by the high interest of money, large premiums, and by difcounting tallies ? Is it not much more safe and eafy to bear all this, than to have an army mutinous for want of pay, feamen clamorous for their wages, the family officers' grumbling for the want of their arrears, and at the same time, the whole people groaning under the weight of heavy taxes? All

which are the fad effects of negligence .and profufion in a court".'

' It is true-, an honest and wife minister, who observes this conduct, and is more frugal for the public than in his own private affairs, cannot avoid railing many, enemies. -In a bad age it is a virtue not without its dangers. They who have been so long fed with corruption, that their ftomachs can digeft no other diet, will diflike such measures; and a man treading these fteps must arm himself with patience, for his temper must be often tried. They who would fteal the golden apples, will bate the watchful eyes that are upon them; and he who undertakes this poft, is to expecl that fecret malice will be working in the dark to undermine him: Perhaps he may be purfued by the most interested part of mankind with open clamours. Advantages will be taken of the least trip he makes. He must look for traverfes, to be traduced, and to have his actions fcanned and mifmterpreted. However, let him perT fevere, for if a state be not quite devoted to ruin, he who a&s thus uprightly for it, and with such care, will overcome all difficulties; and the wisdom and justice of his counsels will, at last, meet with univerfal approbation ^b.'

⁽ When such as have this poft are vigilant and frugal for the public, those in lower stations think it needful to tread in the same fteps. When they who. fit at helm have clean hands themselves, they can, compel those below them to be honest; and hope of reward, or fear of punifliment, working more than sense of duty, men begin to find it their interest to quit the ill courfes they were in, especially when

* Dawn. iv. 426,

^b Ibid. 425.

they fee they have not the corruption of those above them to refort to as a refuge. Thus great examples from chief ministers may, by degrees, restorc th» affairs of a whole kingdom. Besides, their vigilance and frugality give such credit, and add such real strength to any state, that they who rule it will soon be able to reform abuses. On the other hand, where there is a corrupt, negligent, and profufc adminiftration, does any thing go right i Is not the bad influence of it felt frpm top to bottom f Who is there that thinks it worth his while to serve well t When the public is exposed to plunder, does not almost every man forget the duties of his office, and employ his whole thoughts in contriving how he may have as large a fliare of the booty as any of his fellow robbers ? And do not the great thieves prote£t the less f In a state so difordered, what is there to induce men to difcharge their duty, but sometimes honour * ?'

* In the year 1711, when the tories were endeavouring to overturn the whig adminiftration, which, had reduced the power of France so low, and were prbje£Hn£ the infamous treaty of Utrecht, Burnet says', They 'finding the house of lords could not be brought to favour their designs, refolved to make'an experirt)e.h:ti which none of our princes ventured upon in'fdrm'et times; a resolution was taken of making twelve peers at once. What has been the conduct of the rnirtiftef under fimilar circumstances ? has he not advifed the creation of fixteen new peerages, not, indeed, at once; that would have been too explicit a declaration of his motives, but ail in the space of two years; and not content with

* Dave*, iv. 413.

this, he has likcwife advifed the giving pensions to a great number of that house, under the. denomina-. tion, indeed, of lords of the bed-chamber; but as the number of these lords has been increased in the present reign from twelve to twenty-two, the fad is, that by whatever name they are called, the king has so many more fcrvants jn his pay in that house, and the m — — — ha? the rod of deprivation hanging over their heads, which has Lately fallen most heavily upon those who have prefumed .to exercife. their freedom of voting against what he recommended. But in -the other house, and where it is more material, this measure has been carried much farther. We are informed hy hiftory, that from the time of the revolution, .it has been the chara&eriftic mark of those who opposed any increase .of power in the crown, to contrive by-Jaws, .and every other method, to prevent the influence .of the crpwn in that house. Several ads of parliament have been paiTed to limit the number of officers who received their places from the crown, to have Keats in the house of commons, and one particularly during the whjg adminiftration of queen Anne, which declares (hat no. person poflefled of an office, created after such a period, (hould be capable of a feat in that house; and this was afterwards enforced by another of i f?«, I. which was proposed by Mr. Stanhope, fecretary of state, and retrained persons having penfipns during pleasurr, from fitfifhg in the house pf commons. Thefe Jaws were pafled to be a feftraint on th« crown, they are now in force, and mean to provide for the liberty of the people, by preventing the crown from creating a dependance upon it in the reprefcntatives : but, like other human inftitutions, ihey haye been evaded; when a minister fliall pre-

fume to advife, in the teeth of those afts of parliament, the creation of such a number of grooms of the bed-chamber, clerks of the green tloth, and other officers of the houfhold, each with a falary of 500/. per annum, as to be double the number of these of his late majefty; and when some gentlemen have been removed from these employments with pensions, to make room for members of the house of commons, that the law might be only evaded, not openly violated ; and when We fee gentlemen of the first fortunes, and who have the two last reigns prided themselves in their independency, eagerly and meanly thrufting themselves into this pitiful pension; I say, when we consider these things, where is the security of laws, or upon what principles of the constitution can these measures be defended ? The reason, I understand, the minister gives for purfuing this measure, is the union of parties; the larger the fource of bounty in the crown> the more general will be its dues. This may be plausible reasoning, but the facl is, and of this I confefs myself jealous, that by these pensions, the crown has increased its influence in the house of commons; and with regard to the a<3 of queen Anne, if a lift of new erected places should, as was done the beginning of the late reign, be ordered to be laid upon the table of the house of commons, I cannot fee but that those of the supernumerary offices of the houfhold must be of the number; otherwife the crown may, in any future emergency, create as many as firall then be found neceflary to answer the purposes of the minister '.'

* CATO'S LETT. i. 51.

There arifes infinite mischief from die ambition of particulars. But what ambition ? The ambition of fhining in the eyes of men of difcernment ? Of excelling in knowledge, or in virtue ? Of being bleuings to their country, and tutelar gods to mankind ? Nothing less. Their ambition is only to get into ranks and places, which are diftinguifhed; not to be men of diftinguifhed cbaraRers in those ranks and places. They have not the sense to consider, that the cringing of the multitude is not to the man, but to the Jlar and garter, the long wig, or the lacquered chair.

Compare a true great man, with a mean man in a great place, an Epaminondas with an Alexander* a Scipio with a Ctefar, a Trajan with a Ch. V. the effect will be the same, as that of placing an oriental diamond by a Briflol ftone.

« When vanity,¹ luxury, and prodigality are in fafhion, the deftre of riches must neceflarily increase in proportion to them: and when the power is in the hands of base, mercenary persons, they will always (to use the courtiers phrase) make as much profit of their places as they can. Not only matters of favour, but of judice too, will be exposed to fale ; and no way will be open to honours or magiftracies, but paying largely for them. He that gets an office by these means, will not execute it gratis: he thinks he may fell what he has bought, and would not have entered .by corrupt ways, if he had not intended to deal corruptly *.'

* However we fhall venture to affirm, that if this nation should ever be under any great diforder, the trueft courfe to mend it, will be to plant in the

¹ CATO'S LETT. i. 201.

minds of the better forts morality, and the frame of doing ill to their ^country; and we {hall prefume to afiert, that observing the rules and dictates of virtue, does not only lead to heaven and a blefled state hereafter, but it is the best way of fecuring to a people in general, prosperity, peace, safety, and happiness, in this present world V

C H ^. P. VII.

Bills, Statutes, Resolutions, Sptecbes, csV. jkevo* in? the Sense of Mankind on the Evil of Placemen and Pen/toners in Parliament.

« fT^ H E general principle, says the author of the J, DISSERTATION UPON PARTIES, p. 198. That parliaments ought to be independent on the crown, hath not only been always the same, but i$ hath been always so declared in the mpft authentic and folemn manner; and parliaments have not been more intent on any national concern whatever* than on maintaining this principle, and fecuring the effects of it. I say, parliaments have been conftantly thus intent, and especially in the best times, during more than three centuries at least ; for I would not; go back too far, nor grope unneceflariJy in the dark, What elf<? did those laws mean, that were made in the time of the Lancajler kings to regulate the elections, and to prevent the influence, which Rich. II. had illegally and arbitrarily employed, and which there was room to fear that otfyer princes might employ? What elfe do all those resolutions, all those a£ts pf parliament mean, that have been made fo

' Pawn. it. 321.

often, and enforced so flrongly from time to time, and from those days to these, against the influence of the crown, either on the elections, or on the mem* bers of parliament ?'

* There is another question which I must aflc. If fhis be fo, what do these men mean, who are employed, or rather what does he mean' [fPalpde] * who employs them, to plead in all places and on all occafions, even the moil folemn, in favour of thia very influence, nay of the very worft fort of it; of that influence which is created immediately by corruption ; for to that their arguments reach, by undeniable consequence. Reafon is against him and, them, fmce it is a plain absurdity to fuppose a, controul on the crown, (and they have not yet ventured to fuppose the contrary that J know of) and to establish at the same time a power and even a right in the crpwn to render this controul useless. £xperience is against them, fmce the examples of other countries, and at some times (former times I mean) of our own, have proved that a prince may govern according to his arbitrary will, or that of his mere arbitrary minister, as abfolutely, and much more fecurely with, than without the concurrence of a parliament. Authority, even the uniform authority of our whole legislature is against them. The voice of our law gives them the lye. How then fhall we account for this proceeding; this ppen and defpera.te attack upon our constitution, and therefore upon our liberty ? Have these great men made any nice difcovery that escaped the fagacity of our ancestors, and is above the narrow conceptipns of ajl other men except themselves at this time ? Is it less fit now, than the wisdom of this nation hath judged it to be for so many ages, that kings should govern

under the constitutional controul of two other ef-

tates»?'

The XXXIft article of Magna Charta restrains the king's officers from holding pleas of the crown. Nulius viuconuty conjlabularius, &c.^b

So early as A. D. 1375, the commons were fensible of the necessity of a place-bill. For in that year, they petitioned the king, that no member for county, or city, be a collector of taxes^c.

The sense of our ancestors on pluralities, and incompatible places, appears by an a£t made, A. D. 1413, That no under-fheriff, fheriffs clerk, receiver, or bailiff, be attorney in the king's courts, while in any of those offices. At the same time was patted an a& to prevent frauds in elections *.

In the parliament of A. D. 1451, it was provided, that no member should be a commiflioner or collector ^e. « We know,' (says the brave Fletcher of Scotland) that the cuftoms have been taken from the farmers [the cuftoms were then farmed in Britain as now in France] * only to bestow the collectors places upon parliament men [ in Scotland."} Shall we make good such funds as are exhaufted by bribing men to betray our liberty ? If any justice were to be found in this nation, the advifers of such measures had long ago been brought to a fcaffold. There is no crime under heaven more enormous, more treacherous, and more destructive to the very nature of our government,

" DISSERTATION ON PARTIES, 198.

^k Brady, ii. Append, p. 134.

^c PARL. HIST. i. 337.

^d Rapin, i. 505.

⁰ PARL. HIST. n. 378.

' than that of bribing parliament*.' What would this ftaunch old Scot have said, if he had seen some hundreds of notorious placemen fitting in the Brttijh fenatc, and voting 600,000 /.'at once out of the pockets of the poor people, to make good deficiencies in the civil lift, exhaufted by * * hiatus * * ?

On occafion of the king's attorney being elected a member, A, D. 1614, Sir R»ger Owen said, No attorney had ever been chosen, nor antiently any privy counsellor, nor any who took livery of the king. That, 7 Rich. II. a knight banneret was put out of the house. Sir Thomas More, who had been himself chancellor, and speaker, says, ' The eye of a courtier can endure no colour, but one; the king's livery dazzling his fight.' He compares them to clouds gilded by the fun's rays, and to brafs coin, which the king's ftamp makes current. After fearching of precedents, it was refolved, That Noy should fit the remainder of the parliament; but no attorney-general after him ^b.

Pensioning was got to such a height, A. J). 1618, that an order was obtained from the king to the officers of the exchequer to pay no pension that he shall grant for the future^c.

Even the king-killing parliament ($>ue Dieu nfen conserve, the French say, when they are frightened, et la Jainte Vierge) proposed that no person serving for wages be a voter. How -atfurd then that members themselves be servants receiving wages of those whole interest it is to plunder and enflave their fellow subjects. They likewife exclude all members of councils

^a Fletcher, p. 357. * PARL. HIST. v. 295.

^c ACT. REC. iv. 305.

cf state, officers in army or garrifon, treasurers, or re» ceivers of public money, and lawyers, « to the end all

officers of state may be certainly accountable, and

no factious men to maintain corrupt interests.* They likewife propose very good regulations for carrying on ejections, and restrain their proposed parliament from several things, as impreffing men for foreign service, making void public fecurities, punifting ar^ bitrarily without authority of law, men before the jffence; giving up or taking away any of the common rights of the people *,

A. D. 1643, an attempt toward ft place-bill was made. There was no great want of it in those days, the court having few places to dispose of. Yet Ch. I. tells his Oxford parliament, that most of them were in his service. This probably gave rife to the self-denyT jng ordinance ^b.

The self-denying ordinance, A. D. 1645, was a fignal exhibition, and inflar omnium, of the sense of parliament, on this subjeft. It enacts by the authority of lords and commons, that all members of both houses be at the end of 40 days discharged from holding any place, civil or military, granted by parliament since Nov. 1640. All other officers, commanders, &c. to continue as before. The benefit of all offices, neither military nor judicial, hereafter to. be granted by parliament, $o go to such public use as parliament shall appoint, leaving to jhe pcrfons holding such offices only such a .competent falary as parliament shall appoint. Some plapes and offices are excepted % Bui: Mr. Prynne feverely accijfes the members of violating the self-denying ordinance, * There is fcarce one

• PARL. HIST, xvifi. «$, 527.

> Jbid. xii. 46^ « Ibid. xin. 441,

day, says he, or week at lead, doth pafs, but we are ftill bestowing some place or office upon members', for which we are cenfured In pamphlets,' iec. •

* What do the enemy say ? Nay, what do many say who were friends at the beginning of this parliament ? Even this, that the members of both housea have got great places and commands, and the sword into their hands. What by interest in parliament, what by power in the army, they will perpetually continue themselves in grandeur, and not permit the war fpeedily to end, left their own power should determine with it.' The words of Cromwel on the

self-denying ordinance ^b. The self-denying ordinance paiTes the commons, i» rejected by the lords, fent again to the lords, and parted by them after four months^e; which, says fPlittlcck, began the fatal difference between the two houses, which ended in cutting off the lords from parliament. Shameful that the lords with their great estates should be more greedy than the commons.

* Parliaments were thought by the known laws of our nation to advife and regulate unruly kings V

{Not then furely to hold places under kings.]

Leave was given, A. D, 1679, to bring in a bill for vacating the feat of members^ accepting places^e.

The commons concluded the year 1680 with a vote worthy to be inscribed in letters of gold on the rnoft confpicuous place in St. Stephen'* chapel; That no member of the house should accept of any office or place of profit from the crown, without leave of the house, nor promise of any such office, or place, of

⁴ PARL. HUT. xvin. 322.

* Rafin, ii. 513. « Ibid. a. 516.

* Milt. EIK. 22. • DEB. COM. i. 34*.

profit, during such time as he continued a member of the house^a.

Againft pensioners" in parliament, A, D. 1681, an anonymous speaker argues as follows.

* The name of a pensioner is diftafteful to every Englljh spirit; and all pensioners, I think, are sufficiently despised by their countrymen V He expatiates on a pensioner's breach of trust; his pocketing what is given by the people for the necefTary charges of government. He observes, that receiving a pension is plundering the peopl , and diftrefling the 'king, and putting him and his ministry on wicked fhifts, to fatisfy a set of blood-fuckers, which is endless; for the more the court gives, the more it must go on to give. That it naturally leads a king to think hardly of the most faithful counsellors, and incorrupt parliaments, who restrain the boundlcfs wafte of the public money. That it lays us open to our enemies abroad by exhaufting our treafure, which should arm us against them, and difables us for paying our heavy debts. He observes, that the pensioners of the pension-parliament called themselves the king's friends, and so they do now. That endeavours were used, but ineffectually, about 10 Rich. II. to get a corrupt parliament ^c. That there was another unfuccefsful attempt about A, D. 1459, ^or °°- That about 20 Hen. VIII, many of the king's dependents were in the house. But it does not appear that any parliament generally took money to vote, till the pension parliament, under Ch. II. [Every mischief must originate from a Stuart.] That parliament * perverted the very end of parlia-

* Rapin, II. 719.

^b DEB. COM. 11. 148. ^c Ibid. 150.

ments, which have been and are the great refuge of the nation, which cute.all its diseases, and. heal all its fores. But those men' [the pension-parliament] had made it a fnare to the nation, and at best had brought it to be a mere engine to get money.' Every parliament which allows this evil practice is partaker of this fin*. He proposes that the pensioners be obliged to confcfs their fault on their knees, before the house of commons, one by one, and that they refund. Our law, says he, does not allow a thief to keep what he has gotten by ftealth, but of courfe orders restitution. And £hall these proud robbers of the nation not restore their ill gotteagoods f' He then. proposes that every one of them be voted incapable .of fitting in parliament, or holding any office, civil or military; For it is not fit, that they who were so falfe and unjust in that trust, should ever be trailed again *.' He says there ought to be a ' sufficient mark of infamy set on them, that the people may know who has bought and fold them.' A debate in the house of commons, A.D. 1689, about excluding placemen from thence, proved warm and obftinate. Carried for the placemen, because otherwife the fitted persons for public employments would remain excluded, and be deprived of the opportunity of serving either king or country V Some lords protest, A. D. 1693, against the speaker of the commons being allowed to fit, though he had taken a place, because the speaker, if corrupt, could do more mischief than a private member ^d.

• DEB. COM. i. 151. " Ibid.

^c Ti/ut. CONTIN. I. Il6.

* DEB. LOKDS, i. 422.

A bill was feht from the commons, A. Z>. 1693; for incapacitating several persons holding places civil and military from fitting¹ in the house of commons* The court lords oppose it vehemently. The earl of Mulgravt (poke for it. It appears by the* speech* that the aft was not then made which vacates the! feat of a placeman, and obliges him to be re-elecled. The courtiers brought, inftead of this* a bill for the frequent meeting of parliaments/ But William having no mind to part with the present during the war, refuscd his aflent, though palled by both houses^a.

A bill was brought in, A. D. 1690, to enable commissioners to take an account of all public monies, to be nominated by the commons, and might be members; but none to be dependant onj or accountable to the king or queen. To be chosen by ballot. Every member to put into a glafs a lift of the nine gentlemen he judged the fitteib Sir Samuel Barnardi/lon being chosen, owned,, that he was one of the accountants to their majefties; on which another was pot in his room. Some time afterwards, however, a new set of commiflioners being to be chosen, Sir Samuel was one. Whether he kept his accountant's placa at the same time, does not appear ^t>.

One of the heads of the bill of fucceflion, made in king WilUan?s time, was, That no placeman or pensioner under the king shall be a member of the house of commons.

Rcfolvcd, A. D< 1699, That no person be a trustee for the forfeited Irijb estates, who has any place of

• DEB. LORD?, i. 417.

^k Dm. COM. u. 378, j3i, ;8S.

profit or trust, or js accountable to the king, or is a member of parliament *.

A bill was pafled by the commons, the same year, for restraining the number of officers in parliament ^b» Rejected by the lords.

Refolved, the same year, That no member of the house of Commons be a farmer, or manager of excife^e.

A bill, to prevent parliament men taking places, was fent to the lords, A. D. 1692'. It was proposed, that those who accepted places, should be incapacitated. The bill was committed by the lords to a grand committee. Thrown out in the house of peers by two voices. This parliament was called the officers parliament, from the great number of them in the house. The people began to be afraid of falling under military government. Ambitious men aimed pt popularity by promoting the place-bill. Government preferred them. They then went over to the court. Then the -cry was, That the court was corrupting the house. The bill was rejected by the lords for a profound reason. * It seemed to establish (they said) an opposition between the crown and the people, as if those who were employed by one, could not be trusted by the other.' And who can deny this ? The very idea of a representative should be, one wholly detached from every connexion with all but his constituents. Can a representative be too free ? Another employment is many times inconsistent with a feat in the house. An officer ought to be keeping his men in order. Or is the bufmefs of an officer in the army, like that of a church-officer? Some places

^a DEB. COM. in. 125, ^b Ibid. in. 94.

^c Ibid. in. 124.

depen* f«c their proita, «» the quantity of money given by parliament. Is not this a- temptation to vote away the people's money ? la ant parliamentary privilege enough for one personta hold, without his having a place and pension betides? Have not the nobility and che court power enough, without lording it in the houseof commons too? What good or lawful design can a king or minister have, in giving a place to a member t Will it attach him rnore to his: country's ioterest ? or to- that of the court f which two are almost aiway* oppofite. One vote may determine the fete of a nation^a»

William III. A. D. 169.3, ^rej^e<as ** ptwe-biM, though approved by both houses, and though it only hindered members taking places while members. The commons refolved, * That whoever gave the king advice to rcfuse the royal aficnt to a bill, which was to redrefs- a grievance,, and take off a scandal from the proceedings of the common* in parliament, is an enemy to king and country, &c.' A representarion to the king was drawn- up, in which wa» a paragraph (•Aerwards ajefted) figntfying that members of parliament are refyonsible to their constituents ; that the constituents wHI probably be offended at the refusal, and the commons knew not how to appeafe them, &c. Inftead of this, such was the prevalency of court-influence, that they put a paragraph, praying that for the future, the king would follow the advice of his parliament, and not that of private and interested persons. The king gives a general answer, the matter drops ^b.

The commons order in a bill, Dec.' 13, 1696, That no person be defied member of parliament, who holds any office, or employment of profit under the govcrn-

* 71W. CONTIN. i. 227, 229. ^b Ibid. i. 250.

anent, nor any member accept -a place or employment⁴.

There are two clausei, 12 and 13 Will. III. cap. 2. by which all offices of trust, and all pensions from the crown, are made disqualifications'". This is the very fahit we wanted. But (behold the misfortune 1) this excellent regulation never came to be in force: for it was not to take place before the arrival of a certain event (the Hanover family's fucceffion, I fuppafe) and was too good for this nation; therefore was repealed before that time. But the author of FACTION DETECTED says, the clause concerning pensions has been restored since, viz. A* D. 1715 ; by a ftatute in Which year a penalty was appointed of 20/. a day for any person fitting, or voting, who has a pension from the crown for any term, short of life.

The lords having by the regency-bill rejected the clause inserted in an a& pafled some years before for fettling the fucceffion, by which all civil and military officers were made incapable of fitting or voting in the houseof commons after'the queen's deceafe, and having fent down that bill to the commons, they feeing the barrier against court power thrown down, refolved in some measure to repair it by admitting only 47 civil and military officers into their house, and among them 10 privy counsellors; 5 flag officers, and as many generals. The bill thus amended, was fent up again to the lords, who (to shew themselves always friends to integrity, and enemies to corruption and tyranny) altered it, excluding only the commiflioners of tho prize-office, and all such new officers, as the court might create in time to come. Debates and conferences

* 7»W. CONTIN. i. 227. ^b STAT. AT LARGE, in. 508.

followed*. * The court party endeavoured to shew the injustice of excluding those, who were actually performing- services to the nation.' {If they were, how should they serve in the house of cemmons ?; That this would be a restraint on the liberty of- the counties and corporations, [it would restrain them indeed from injuring their country]; that it would difcourage brave men from serving their country in war, when they found they were to be disgraced by exclusion from the house of commons. The oppofite party argued, that a bad prince might make a bad use of his creatures and dependents in the house of commons. The bill was onee likely to be carried', poftponing some of the lords amendments, [»'. e. their amendments the wrong way] but the court party being reinforced by some coming round, who used to be on the contrary side, [bribed most probably] the lords amendments were approved with a few alterations,' to which the lords agreed ^b.

A. D. 1704. To mortify some members, who had taken places, a bill was brought in ' for excluding out of the house of commons, all persons in any offices or employments erected since Feb. 6, 1684, or to be erected^c.' Faffed the commons immediately, but the lords (who had nothing to do with it) must go to tinkering it, and the commons not liking (as they had not much rcafon) their amendments, the bill was loft. There was likewife another bill, immediately after, set on foot by the commons, * to prevent persons entitled' by their offices to receive any benefit by public annual taxes, to be granted, from being members of parliament: which being levelled against many brave and deserving members, who serv'd the nation by fea and land, occafioned some murmurs; to ftifle

» DEB. COM. in. 453. ^b Ibid. 454. ^c Ibid. 438.

which, the commons empowered their committee to receive a clause, for excepting flag officers and captains in the navy, and all general officers and colonels of the land forces and marines;' [a foolifli exception; they are • some of the most dangerous people in parliament.} The bill pafles in the negative.

A bill was brought into the Scotch parliament for fecuring the fucceffion, in case of queen dune's death. It proposed among other things, that no person shall have a vote in regulating the fucdeffion, who has any place, mediately, or immediately, under the crown. That all election be by ballot. A leffer baron to be added to parliament, for every new created nobleman, to balance the two houses. The crown not to have the power of making peace and war without parliament. All the males between 16 and 60 to be trained. No indemnity for state-crimes without confentof parliament. No place or pension in Scotland to be given, but by parliament'.

Motion in the Scotch parliament, 1704, by lord Anjlruther, that no officer of the cuftoms or excife, or collector, furveyor, manager of cuftoms, nor any farmer of any branch of the revenue, shall be a member of parliament^b ; which was afterwards enacted^c.

* A general self-denying bill was offered, A. D. 1705, by those very men, who, in the first feffion of parliament, when they hoped,for places themselves, had opposed the motion for such a bill with great indignation. Now the scene was a little altered. They faw they were not like to be favourites, and therefore pretended to be patriots. This

' DEB. LORDS, vn. 21. ^b Ibid. vii. 32.

^c Ibid. vn. 35.

looked so ftrangely in them, that it was rejected, but another bill of a more restrained nature pafied, difabling certain officers from serving in parliament.' To this a general clauie was added, which di fabled all who held any office created fmce 4- D. 1684, or any in future. Pafied readily the. commons. The lords thought it too comprehenfive. Altered it to Come particular difabilitics. The commons refute their alterations. The excellent bill drops. So tho public good is bandied from party to party *.

It was refolved, A. D. 1710, even under the tory-rniniftry, that no person be a commissioner (for Hating the public accounts) who has any office of profit, or is accountable to the fovereign ^b. So fufpicious were they of the effects of clashing interests. They allowed commissioners, however, to be chosen from the house of commons; not apprehending any effect from members holding such a fort of places, because they were not lucrative. They were chosen by ballot. One gentleman had 246 fuffrages.

A bill was ordered in, A. D, 1711, for fecuring the freedom of parliaments, by limiting the number of officers in the house^e.

A committee was appointed by the house, jf. D, 1711, to enquire what new offices or places of profit had been created or erected fmce the 3<Dth Off. 1705, and whether the number of commissioners for executing offices is increased, and to examine how the laws stand in refpeft of officers fitting in the house *,

A bill ( formerly often attempted) for difabling • members from holding places, was brought into the

» Tind. CONTIN. i. 685.

^b DEB. COM. iv. 196,

« Ibid, iv. 255. ' Ibid. 257.

tory parliament, A.D, 171 ij but dropped. The qualification of 600/. a year, for a knight of the {hire, 'and 300 /. for a burgefs, pafied. The design was to- exclude courtiers, military men, and merchants, and to increase the influence of the landed interest. The qualification was not extended to Satl*nd\

The bill for limiting the number of placemen in the house of common* was brought in and pafied, A. D. 1712. * The scandal of corruption was thought to be more flagrant than ever; for it was believed that men were not only bribed for a whole feffion( but had new bribes for particular votes.' Bill for fecuring- freedom of parliaments, by limiting the number of placemen in the house, read a fecond time, and committed. And because several bills for the same unquestionably (alutary tendency had been loft in the blefled house of peers, it was proposed to tack it to a money bill. Queftion put. Pafies in the negative, 160 against m. ^b This fmells ftrong of a collufion between the two houses, and that they both twifted the same cord, though fcemingly contrary ways and at oppofite ends.

The self-denying bill was brought into me house of commons, A. D. 1712, and pafled. Many of the lords being irritated at the late creation of twelve new peers at once, it was expected it would pafs their house too. But their lordfliips teemed fuddenly to alter their way of thinking of it ; and whereas it was drawn to take place after the present parliament, they altered it, to take place after the death of the queen; so that it was no more thought of^c.

* 7tW, CONTIN. i. zoo.

* DIB, COM. v. 12. < Burn. iv. 363.

The commons refolved themselves into a committee of the whole house, A. D. 1715, to consider of the several lifts of accounts, of annuities, pensions, bounties, &c. granted by the late queen, -or his present majefty. Several were mentioned by the difcontents [that is, those who had none themselves] which were bellowed on those who had no need of them. A motion made for an addrefs to the king against them [because we have no ihare}. When it was moved to addrefs the king to retrench unneceflary pensions ; Walpole (in character) said, ' You ought not to ftint the king's benevolence, nor debar his majefty [the minister] « from the exercife of the most glorious branch of his royal prerogative, which is to bestow his favours' [in sordid pelf, and paltry pay] * on such as diftinguifh themselves in his service %' [that is, in doing dirty work].

Walpah and Pulteney refign, A. £>. 1720, because lord Townfend was removed from his poft of lieutenant of Ireland; and it was thought he influenced several members to oppose the supply against Sweden^ which Walpole and Pulteney were for ^b. Walpolc and Pulteney took care, both of them, to let the house know they had refigned. What does this Ihew ? That places are odious, and the honour is to refign them. Why ? because of the filthy lucre attending them. Were they only laborious, or were men voted into them by their country for merit, it would be no brag to refign them ^c.

A. D. 1728, the famous self-denying bill pafled the commons, which provided, that no member should fit, till he had taken an oath, that he had no pension

^a DEB. COM. vi. 23.

^k Ibid. vi. 120. ^c Ibid. 120, 121.

during pleasure, .or for any number of years, nor any office in part, or in whole, from the crown, held by any person for his benefit, and that he would not receive any such emolument, during the time of his being a member, without giving notice to the house within 14 days after accepting the same, if parliament was fitting, or after its first fitting, on pain of wilful perjury, and incapacity of holding any office. Whoever refused, or neglected taking the oath, was to lofe his feat, and forfeit 30 /. each day he fate without taking the oath. It would have been very barefaced for the commons to have refused this bill; for it only enacted, that no member should be a court-tool without leave of the house. But, as the bill, if it had pafled into a law, might have been troublesome, it was contrived, that it should be thrown out by the lords.

* It was now the opinion of the public, and not without foundation, that the minister \_Walpole'] fuffered the pension-bill to pafs in the house of commons, only because he knew it would be thrown out in the house of lords V

The following is the oath to be taken by members, if the pension-bill, pafled, A. D. 1731, by the commons, and rejected by the lords, had pafled into a law ; ' J, A. B. do folemnly and sincerely fwear, that I have not, directly or indirectly, any pension during pleasure, or for any number of years, from the crown, nor any office in part, or in the whole, from the crown, held for me, or for my benefit, by any person whatfoever. And I do folemnly and sincerely promise and fwear that I will not receive,

* Tind. CONTIN. via. 101.

accept, or take, dire&ly or indirectly, during the time of my being a member of this parliament, any pension during pleasure, or for any number of years, or any other gratuity or reward whatever, &c. without fignifying the same to this house, within fourteen days after I have received or accepted the same, if the parliament be then fitting, or within fourteen days after the next meeting of the parliament. So help me God ',' Any member taking the oath, if found to have bad a peniion at the time, during pleasure, or for any number of years, &c. [as in the oath] without fignifying the same to the house, was to be held guilty of perjury, and to fuffer accordingly. Any member refuting to take the oath, was to lofe his feat; or fitting and voting, through overfight of the house, to forfeit 30/. each day, and to be incapacitated for holding any office, &c.

A motion was made in the house of peers, 4- D, 1730, to call for a lift of pensions payable by the crown. Pafles in the negative ^b. Several lords protested, Because no instance can be given, that tho lift of penfloners was denied, when called for by either house, * Because we conceive, the refusal will be mifinterpreted without doors, as it will raise a jealousy that there are too many members upon the lift, which afperfion ought to have been obviated, by producing thofc lifts, as in former times has been frequently done/ A. D, 1731, it was moved in the house of commons, that a committee be appointed to enquire, whether any members of this house have, directly

or indirectly, any pensions during pleasure, or for any number of years, or any offices from the crown, held on trust for them in part, or in the whole V Walpolt said, this was turning the house of commons into a court of inquifition: That if it was made effectual, it would oblige members to accuse themselves ^b. This, however, was trifling; for enquiry might have been made, and djfcoveries gained, as in all other cases of roguery, by means entirely eonsistent with liberty and the constitution.

Sandys moves, A. D, 1731, for a committee to en* quire whether any member had any pension, directly or indirectly, during pleasure, or for years, or any office from the crown, holden in trust for him in part or whole '. This motion was vigoroufly opposed, though the pension-bill met with no opposition. It was carried in the negative, 206 to 143.

They did not choofe, I fuppose, to have it known what knaves they were. So a prudent pickpocket, being accused of purloining a miffing watch in the company, where he was; declared himself very willing to purge himself by oath; but ftrongly refused standing tiiefeanh. It was observed, however, on that occafion, that many members fuspected to be on the black lift, voted for the enquiry, to fave appearances, well knowing that it would not proceed.

A motion was made in the house of peers, A. D, 1732, for restraining officers concerned in the falt-duty from interpofmg in elections. Faffed in the negative; though the same is established with respect to other duties. Nineteen lords protested, because the Officers of the cuftoms are immensely numerous, and

^a ?/></, CONTIN. vni. ipj, ^b Ibid,

* PEB. COM. vu. 8|.

• DEB. COM. viu. Append. ^b DEB. LO*Q«, iv, ?o,

have a prodigious influence in elections *. They form a fecond standing army, and often supply the place of the other, whofe attendance at an election would be too grofs a violation of the law. A house of commons influenced by the servants of the crown (it is obfcrved by their lordfliips) might be ' a representative of an adminiflration^ or of a minijltr; but could no longer be a true representative of the people' Parliaments are so great a check on ministers, that they have always endeavoured either to enable the crown to govern without them, or to influence their elections, or to corrupt them so thoroughly, that their efficiency Ihall be loft. The antiquity of the ftatutes for preventing these evils, shews how early they begun to prevail. There is little danger, since the revolution, of any attempt to govern without parliaments. * The wisdom of this house has seemed, by rejecting the penfron-bill three times fucceffively, to think the laws already in force sufficient to prevent corruption in the members, but the influence of the servants of the crown in elections, must, in our opinion, be looked upon as a growing danger, whofe consequences require the utmost watchfulness to prevent them, as the great multitude of the tax-gatherers are folely directed by the treafury. The number of these creatures of the court was too great before ; and by the new establishment of this duty, it is to be increased, and, at the same time, no restraint laid on their power, which is the more dangerous as it does no violence openly to parliaments; but operates fecretly, filently, and fecurely,' A pension-bill pafles the commons, ^.2X1733; Joft again among the worthy lords, as before ^b.

Several

• DEB. LORDS, iv. 85, et /ej.

* DEB. COM. vii. 285.

Several precedents were brought, A. D. 1733, of officers feats in the house vacated on their being promoted to governments of towns, forts, &c. Yet general Wade was allowed to fit after his acceptance of the government of three forts in Scotland². N. B. Wade was on the orthodox side.

Mr. Sandys moves, A. D. 1733, to bring in again the pension-bill thrown out by the lords^b. Which he said had pafled for two or three feffions without opposition, and had as often been thrown out by the lords; that it had been observed, that there never was any, thing brought into either house, that was in itself for the public good, but what by perfeverance was at last carried into a law. Truth and reason will prevail at last; which encouraged him again to renew this motion ; that the bill was ready, and he defired leave to bring it up. It was objected, That it was a new fort of motion to afk leave to bring up a bill. That the conftant cuftom had been to move for leave to bring in a bill. It was answered, that on occafion of the fufpension of the Habeas Corpus act, the bill was brought up ready drawn, and pafied without opposition. ' The remembrance of the excife scheme and the convention was revived [A. D. 1739.] and it wag fuggefted, that they might have been fatal to the minister [Walpole] had he not had a majority of placemen in parliament, and therefore it was necessary to obtain a bill for excluding placemen and pensioners from fitting in parliament^c.' Accordingly at a court at Guildhall, instructions were given the London members, ' that they (hould make the

^a Tliuf. CONTIN. VIII. iS^..

^b DEB. COM. vn. 261.

⁶ Tmd. CONTIN. viii. 435.

paffing of a place and pension-bill a previous ftep to the paffing of any money-bill whatfoever. The example of the city of Londan was followed by the cities of York and Sali/hojt and other great corp&rations all over England^ though many of their/ members were known to have voted always on the side of the minister V The year 1739 is, above all others, famous for the place-bill then brought in, which occafioned a thorough agitation of that question, and produced many of the nobleft harangues ever uttered in parliament or any where elfe; feme extracts from which I have placed in this chapter \

A. D. 1740, a motion was made in the house of commons for a place-bill, with exception of 150 places, which were to have leave to fit in the house. Rejected, 222 against 206 ^c.

In the Devonjbire instruAions, A. D. 1741, is the following article: ' Ufe your utmost endeavours to limit the number of placemen in, and to exclude penfiorrers from the house of commons *.' It was ordered, the same year, that leave be given to bring in a bill for making more effectual the laws for difabling persons from being chosen members of or fitting or voting in the house of commons, who have any pension during pleasure, or for any number of years, or any office held in trust for them ^e. A place-bill was fent up to the lords the same year^f.

A bill for limiting officers in the house of commons was read a fecond time in the house of peers,

¹ T/W. CONTIM. VIII. 435.

^b DEB. COM. xi. 202. et/ej.

^c TiuJ. CONTIN. VIM. 451.

^d DtB. COM. xii.

« Ibid. xin. 187. ' Ibid. 188.

Jl. D* 1741. Moved to commit it. Panes in the negative.

Several lords protested, became tney conceived that the cooftitution points out this bill as one of its principal fecuritiea to preserve the independency of the three several constituent parts of the uipreme legislative power ; for if any one of thcfe becomes dependent on the other, the confutation is dangeroufly altered: But if any two become dependent on the third, it is totally subverted, and .the wifcft eflablifhment that ever was formed of a free government, flu-inks and degenerates into a monarchical, an aristocratical, or democratical faftion; and should the number of employments continue to increase, we may live to fee a conftant majority of placemen, meeting under the name of a parliament to cftaWifh grievances inftead of redreffing them ; aad because the freedom of parliament is not fecund, by the law, which obliges a member who accepts a place to quit his feat, since experience shews, that he will be constantly re-ele&ed. They observed, wit* concern, that a bill of this nature, bad been thrice rejected by the commons. They said it was near the end of the present parliament, and therefore it was particularly feafonable, to provide for the freedom and independency of the next *.

A. D. 1760, foroe new regulations, were made by an ad) relating to a tax of one {hilling in the pound on all places above ioo/. a-year ; and the ministry took that opportunity of adding to the influence of the. crown, by erecting a needless new office, and officers, while the commissioners of the landrtax might have done all the new bufmefs, as before ^b.

* DIB. LORDS, *n. 736.

^b LONDON MAC. Ftl^ 1760. p. 72.

In a committee of the whole house on the state of the nation, A, D. 1770, it was proposed, * that leave be given to bring in a bill to difquaHfy certain officers of the excife and cuftoms for voting at elections for members of parliament*.' The ministry gravely opposed such a falutary bill, though it was observed to them, that our wife ancdtors had enacted, « that no commissioner of the cuftoms, or excife, should fit in the house of commons, or use interest in any election.' If this question could have been carried, it would have been productive of great advantage to the constitution, as the influence of the crown in elections is very alarming indeed : many fea-port boroughs are almost entirely carried by the numbers of little places the court disposes of there ; and even in cities and counties the antiministerial candidate feels the power of the crown an heavy weight against him. We are not Unprized at the court's carrying the question, but a good deal fo, that the country gentlemen, who have so long been exclaiming against the undue influence of the crown, should join with them in this vote ^b.' A. D, 1772, Mr. Sawbridge moved the house of commons that a new writ might be iflued for chufing a member for Warwick, as lord Greville, the member for that town, was, according to the Gazette, appointed a commissioner of trade, which,'- by 6 Anne, c. 7. § 26. vacated his feat. Tlwt young nobleman was in the house. The ministry would not let him answer, whether he had accepted the place, or not. Mr. SawbriJgc insisted, that his filence was sufficient reason for concluding, that he had accepted. That

• Aim. DEB. COM. vm. 230. ^b Ibid. 231.

it must often be difficult, if not impofsible, for the house to prove, that a member has accepted a place (raoft of them being finecures,) that therefore the house had a right to demand of the person, so charged, a categorical answer. ' As the ministry durft not give a flat .negative to the propofal, the words of the act being pretty clear, they were reduced to the Chicane, that legal proof was not before the house. On this ground the matter was left. The ministry then moved for the order of the day, and carried it against iffuing the writ, 117 to 7 V Had I been at Mr* Sawbridge's elbow, I should have defired him to move, that the Statutes, which lie upon the table before the speaker, might be immediately carried out and burnt.

A. D. 1773, Sir William Maynt, moved for leave to brii)g in a bill for limiting the number of placemen and pensioners in the parliament of Ireland, and for enquiring into charges of government in Ireland^ and what might be retrenched.

Placemen excluded from the house of commons, and not re-eligible by the laws now in being, fummed up by the author of FACTION DETECTED BY FACTS, are the following, viz.

Commiflioners, and farmers of excife; commissioners, comptrollers, auditors, of appeals; feven commiflioners of revenue in Ireland; feven commissionfcrs of the victualling office ; the commiflioner and clerk of the pells} att the deputies, inferior officers, and undcr-clerks of these offices; commiflioners of the treafury, exchequer, and admiralty; fecretaries of state, paymafter of the forces ; great part of the Gib-

» Alm.'Qfa. ix. 336.

Mftjf and Jk&Mrta eftabliflunents; aH new revenue-* efficera, cftabtiflud ftnce 5 IK and A/, all new placemen fine* 4 Awf except those in tfce army or navy > commissioners, sub-commifioners, fecretariea, receivers of prizes, comptrollers of the accounts of the army; commissioners of ttranfports, of fick and wounded} agents for regiments} commissioners for wine-licences; governors, and deputy-governors of plantation*} commissioners of the navy in the out-ports } pensioners of the crown during pleastire, or for a tern of yean. Riding, or fplitting of places, M contrary to law. 500 /. fine for fitting contrary to the law, by which places vacate feats. The fine recoverable by any person who shall foe. No revenue-officer of the poft-office is to perfuade, or difTuade, any voter, on pain of ioo/. penalty, by 9 Anne. A law, 9 Aniu^ against fraudulent conveyances, with a view to ete&kms, with oaths and penalties.

Ol| one hand, to view the number of places which exclude from the house, one would imagine then could be no placemen in it; on the other, to think of the number of placemen in the house, as appear* by the annual COURT CALENDAR, one would imagine there was no law for excluding placemen. How great then must the number of placemen in this country be upon the whole i

CHAP. VIII.

Speeches on the Danger of Placemen and Pensioners in Parliament.

FROM the ftrain of the following speeches in parliament^ and quotations from books, may be collected the sense of many of the ableft and best men of this country, on the danger of placemen and pensioners in the house of commons.

Hear Sir Francis fftnnington, in his speech on this subjeft, in the house of commons, A. D. 1680 *. * Mr. Speaker. Sir, The last house of commons being fensible how narrowly this nation escaped being ruined by a fort of monfters, called Pensioners, who fat in the late long parliament, had entered into a consideration how to prevent the like from coming into future parliaments; and in order thereto refolved, that they would feverely chaftife some of those that had been guilty, and make the best laws they could to prevent the like for the future; and for that purpose a committee was appointed, of which Mr. Sergeant Gregory, now Judge Gregory, was chairman, by which many papers relating to that affair came to his hands. Sir, I think it a business of so great importance, that it never ought to be forgotten, nor the prosecution of it deferred. I have often heard, that England can never be deftroyed but by itself; to have such parliaments was the mod likely way that ever yet was invented. I remember a great lawyer said in this house, when it Was debated in the last parliament, that it was trsa-

• DEB. COM. 11. 61.

fan; and he gave many learned arguments to make it out. Whether it be so or no, I will not now offer to debate ; but I think, for those that are the legislators of the nation to take bribes, to undermine the laws and government of this nation, that they ought to be chaftifed as traitors. It was my fortune to fit here a little while in the long parliament; I did observe that all those that had pensions, and most of those that had offices, voted all of a side, as they were dire&ed by some great officer, as exadHy as if their business in this house had been to preserve their pensions and offices, and not to make laws for the good of them that had fent them hither. How such persons could any way be useful for the support of the government, by preserving a fair understanding between the king and the people, or rather how likely to bring in arbitrary power and popery, I leave to every man's judgment. They were so far from being the true representatives of the people, that they were a diftindt interest from both king and people; and their chief business was to serve the ends of some great minister of state, though ever so oppofite to the true interest of the nation. Sir, this business ought never to fall (though there should be ever so many prorogations and difiolutions of parliaments) before something be done in it; I think it is the interest of the nation that it should be prosecutcd from parliament as if there were an impeachment against them. And therefore, Sir, I would humbly move you to fend some members of this house to Judge Gregory for the papers he hath in his cuftody relating to this affair, that so you may in convenient time proceed farther herein, as you shall think good. And, Sir, being there is a report that some of this house have now

made a bargain at court for great offices, in order to vitiate and corrupt their votes,in this house; which, though but a project to caft a reflection on such members, however, to fatisfy the world, I pray, Sir, let there be a vote paft that no member of this house {hall accept of any office under the crown during such time as he continues a member of this house.'

Lord Mulgrave in the house of peers, A. D. 1692, fpoke as follows on the subjeft of placemen in parliament.

⁽ My lords, I befeech you to consider the meaning of that word representative. Can representatives do any thing contrary to the mind of their constituents ? It would be absurd to propose it: And yet how can it be otherwife, if representatives, after being chosen, may change their dependency, and engage themselves in employments plainly inconsistent with the great trust reposed in them ? And that I will take the liberty to demonftrate to your lordfhips they now do, at least according to my conception of the matter, I will instance first in the least or lowest incapacity they must be under who so take employments. " Your lordfliips must know but too well what a general careleffness there appears every day more and more in the public business ; if fo, how is it likely that men should be as diligent in their duty in parliament as that business requires, when employments and other business fhall take up both their minds and their time ? But then, in some cases, it is worse, as in commands of the army and other employments of that kind, when they must have a divided duty : for it does admirably become an officer to fit voting away money in the house of commons, while his foldiers are perhaps taking it away at their quarters

For want of his pretence to mftraia them, and of better difcipline among them. Nay, perhaps Va, troop or regiment may b*. in feme action abroad, Mid he rouft either have the fltmae of being abfimt from, them at. such a time, or from that houie where he is entrust«4 with our liberties* To this I have heatd but one objection by a noble, lord, v»a. That if this ad should pafs, the king fa not allowed to mate » captain a colonel without difabling him to fit in parliament. Truly, if a captain has only deserved to be advanced for expofing himself in parliament, I think the nation would have no great lofs in the king's letting alone such a preferment. But, my lo/ds, there is another fort of incapacity ye^ worse than this; I mean that of parliament-meas having such places in the exchequer, the very profit of which depends on the money given tp the king in. parliament. Would any of your lordfhips fend and, entruA a man to. make a bargain for you, whofe very interest {hall be to make you give as much as he poffibly can ? It puts me in mind of a farce where an a&or holds a dialogue with himself, speaking first in one tpne, and then answering in another. Really, my lords, this is no farce. It is, no laughing matter to undo a nation ; but it is altogether as unnatural for a member of parliament to alk first in the king's, name for such a supply, give an account from him, how much is needful toward the paying such an. army, or such a fleet, and then immediately give by his ready vote what he had before aiked by his matter's order. Besides, my lords, there-is such a. neceflLty now for long fe&ons of parliamentj and the very privileges belonging to members are of so great extent, that it would be a little hard and unequal to.

.ether gentlemen <tat member* should bay? all tht place* be&ks.

* All the objections that have been mads any be re* atari to thefc: ¥&-, itic told ip, thath isadifrefpe& to the king, that His fcrvaau or oftcera Should be excluded the tauje. To this I defire it may be considered, that it is in this case as when a tenant fends up a pcrJbn to treat for him: Would any of your lordfhipa think k a difrefpeft i nay} would the king himself think it any, if the tenant would not wholly refer himself to one of your own servaatc, or the king's commissioners in the case of the crown ? And if he chuses rather some plain honcft friend of his own to supply his abfence here, will any man blame such a proceeding, or think it unmannerly) Another objection i§, That this »£k may by its con* fequence prolong this parliament, which they allow would be a very great grievance; and yet fuppofa the king capable of putting it upon u», which I have too much refpeft for him to admit of; though I am glad, however, that it is objeded by privy couniellors in favour, who consequently I hope will never advife a thing which they now exclaim at as so great a grievance. But pray, my lords, what should tempt the king to so ill a policy ? Can he fear a freedom of choice in the people, to whole good will he owes all his power, which tbde lords-fuppofc he may use to their prejudice ? Give me leave to say, as I must not fufpea him of so ill a design as the perpetuating this parliament, so he cannot, he ought not, to fufpe£t a nation so entirely, I wa* going to say so fondly devoted to him. My lords, no man is readier than myself to allow that we owe the crown all subraiffion as to the time of calling parliaments according to law. and appointing alfo where they {ball fit. But

with reverence be it fpoken, the king owes the nation entire freedom in chufing their representatives; and it is no less his duty than it is his true interest that such a fair and just proceeding should be used towards' us. Consider, my lords, of what mighty consequence it may be, that so many votes should be free, when upon one fingle vote may depend the whole security or lofs of this nation. By one fingle vote such points may be carried as I almost tremble to think of. 'By one fingle vote a general excife may be granted; and then we are all loft. By one fingle vote the crown may be impowered to name all the cominiflioners for raifing the taxes ; and then, furely, we should be in a fair way towards it. Nay, whatever has happened may again be apprehended ; and I hope those reverend prelates will reflect, that if they grow once obnoxious to a prevalent party, one fingle voice may be as dangerous to that bench, as a general diflatisfaction among the people proved to be once in a late experience: which I am far from saying by way of threatening, and mean it only by way of caution. My lords, we may think because this concerns not the house of lords, that we need not be so over careful of the matter; but there are noblemen in France, at least such as were so before they were enflaved, who that they might domineer over others, and serve a present tufn perhaps, let all things alone so long till the people were quite maftered, and the nobility themselves too, to bear them company. So that I never met a Frenchman even of the greatest rank (and some had 10,000 piftoles a year in employments) that did not envy us here for our freedom from that flavery which they groan under; and this I have observed univerfally, excepting Monfieur de Lottvois, Monfieur Colbert, or such people,

because they were the ministerg themselves who occafioned these complaints, and throve by the oppreffing

of others.'

See Danger of Mercenary Parliaments, first printed, A. D. 1698^a.

'Let us fee' (says that judicious writer) « whether a house'of commons full of officers and court-pensioners will answer those noble and laudable ends of their constitution. And here indeed I begin already to be ashamed of my undertaking ; the proof of the negative is so ridiculous, that it looks too much like a jeft to afk any one in his wits, whether a parliament filled,with delinquents will ever call themselves to an account, or what account will be given if they should ? Whether an affembl y of public robbers will fentence one another to be punished, or to make restitution ? Whether it is pofsible our grievances can be redrefled that are committed by persons from whom there is no higher power to appeal ? Whether there is any hope of justice, where the malefactors are the judges ? Whether his majefty can be rightly informed in affairs relating to himself or the public, when they are represented to him only by such persons who design to abuse him ? Whether the public accounts will be faithfully inspected by those, who embezzle our money to their own use? Whether the king's prerogative can be lawfully maintained by such who only pervert it to their own finifter ends and purposes ? Whether a.parliament can be a true balance where all the weight is only in one scale ? Or laflly, Whether a house of commons can vote freely, who are either prepoflefled with the hopes and

* STATE TRACTS, time of king William, 11. 638.

promises of enjoying places, or the. flsvifli fear* of lofing them ?'

The same writer goes on • faithfully to alarm his country against what was in those bafhful day* very alarming, because it was new. In our times (the prefcnt always excepted) as hackneyed wh — s, thieves, •mrdercr.1, and the like, are proof against Jhaine, we lead and bear arguments every day gravely brought in defence, or at least in alleviation of the very practice which alone can, and must ruin liberty, if it has pot already.

« Here I must confefs there are not many instances to be given; the project of corrupting parliament* being but of late date, a practice first set on foot within the compafs of our own memories, as the last and most dangerous ftratagcm that ever was invented by an encroaching king, to poifefs himself of the rights of a free born people; I mean Ch. II. who, we!) remembering with how little fuccefs both he and his father had made use of open arms and downright violence, to ftorm and batter down the bulwarks of our excellent constitution, had rcrcotirfe, at last, to thefc mean arts and under-, hand practices of bribing and corrupting with money those who were entrusted with die conservation of our laws, and the guardianfhip of Our liberties. And herein he so well fucceeded, that the mischiefs and calamities occafioned by that mercenary parliament, did not terminate with his life and reign; but the effects of them are continued and handed down, and fenfibjy felt by the nation to this very hour.'

• STATI TRACT*, time of king ITillian, ii. 637.

The same judicious writer goes on* to observe, that the parliament which fucceeded to the penfioaed parliament, was, fortunately for the nation, composed of different men, who accordingly purfued different raea(ures- That Jamts II. was greatly advantaged in his deiigns against liberty, by having a way paved for \um by the peofioned parliament. That he did not ftlpceed in his laudable endeavours to corrupt his parliament. That, accordingly he was precipitated from the throne, and driven, with his execrable race, into perpetual banifliment from his country, which made way for the revolution. That the revolution did pot produce the expected advantages, because its effect was blasted by corruption in parliament. We were filled' (says he ^b) « with golden dreams, not only of a bare security for our estates and lives ; but an iaexhaufted affluence of all manner of bleffings, a nation is capable of enjoying. But tho' we have dreamt the dreams, yet we have not seen the vifions. And the nation is by this time fadly fensible how wretchedly they have fallen short of their expected happiness, yet are they not all ac-f quainted with the true fpring and fountain from whence all their misfortunes flow, which is indeed no other than that barefaced and openly avowed corruption, which, like an univerfal leprofy, has so notoriously infected and overfpread both our court and parliament. 'Tis from hence are plainly derived all the calamities and diffractions under which the whole nation at present groans: 'tis this that has changed the very natures of Englijbmen, and of valiant men made (hem cowards, of eloquent dumb, and of honest men

¹ STATE TRACTS, tiote of King trillion, n. 641. > Ibid. 640.

villains. 'Tis this can make a whole house of commons eat their own words, and countervote what they had just before refolved on : 'tis this could fummon the mercenary members from all quarters of the town in an inftant, to vote their fellow criminals innocent: 'tis this that can make the parliament throw away the people's money with the utmost profufion, without enquiring into the management'of it: 'tis this that put a flop to the examination of that scandalous escape of the Toulon fleet into Breji: 'tis this that has incouraged the mifmanagement of the admiralty in relation to the lofs of so vast a number of men of war and merchant fhips, as well as other mifcarriages which were by all men judged not to proceed from their want of understanding in fea affairs: 'tis this that has hindered the paffing a bill so often brought into the house for incapacitating members to bear offices: 'tis this that could not only indemnify, but honour a leading member for his audacious procuring and accepting a grant of lands, which, by the parliament, had been set apart for the public service; a vote that fhall stand recorded in their own journals to the never dying infamy of that mercenary aflembly : 'tis this could make the same person most considently affirm, that he was fure the majority of the house would agree to what he was going to propose : 'tis this that could make men of peaceable dispositions and considerable estates, vote for a standing army : 'tis this that could bring admirals to confefs that our fleet under their command, was no security to us: 'tis this could make wife men aft against their own apparent interest. In short, 'tis this that has infatuated our prudence, ftaggered our conflancy, fullied our reputation, and introduced a

total defection from all true Englljb principles. Bribery is indeed so fure and unavoidable a. way to deftroy any nation, that we may all fit down and wonder that so much as the. very name of a free government is yet continued to us. And if by our wary choice of members we should happen to recover our antient constitution, we fhall with horror and amazement look back and reflect on the dreadful precipice we fhall have so narrowly escapcd.' The same patriotic writer observes *, that * the executive power ought not to be lodged in the house of commons, because it would deprive the kingdom of that which is the nobleft and most useful work of their representatives, the calling ill ministers to account, and the preserving a fleady adminiftration in the subordinate officers of the government. But in a house of commons abounding with officers, if any one of them be attacked, it alarms the whole fraternity, and they all engage to bring him off, though it be by the scandalous way of putting the question for candles, and carrying it in the negative. This was the case of the admiralty last parliament, and may be of the treafury this feffions, if fortune proves so propitious, that one of their members be made speaker. This point gained, the next will probably be to establish the army, and then to fufpend or repeal the triennial ad.' A, D. 1698* the following remarkable paragraphs appeared in the famous HUSH-MONEY PAPER, as it was called, publifhcd by John Lawten, Efq.

' Two hundred thousand pounds a year bestowed upon the parliament has already drawn out of the subjefts pockets more millions than all our kings

« STATE TRACTS, time of king William, it. 6jJ.

fmce tits conquest have ever had from this nation* And that this should be done without any rude complaint, is a proof, that if a king can manage well Mr. Guy's office, he may, without much ado, set up for abfolute. Venalit tft Anglia^ for Vtnale tft Parllemintmn. Heretofore, indeed* it was neceflary only that they ihould give reasonably* as Flamotk's rebellion, and others in Hen. Vllth's reign witness; and I believe our rolls will not furnifh us with many feffions, wherein money was given, and no one country bill granted. But our ancestors were wife enough to instrufi their members, and our constitution so regular that we had frequent elections. The house is now so officered, that by those who have places and pensions, together with their fons, brothers, and kinfmen, and those who are fed with the hopes of preferment, and the too great influence these have upon fbme honest miftaken country gentlemen (who are poffibly over frighted with the French) the king can baffle any bill, quafh all grievances, ftifle accounts, and ratify the articles of Limerick. When I find the money the nation gives to defend our liberties from foreigners abroad, is like to undermine them at home, in a word, when I fee neither the one nor the other house can withstand the power of gold; I say, when I perceive all this, it is time to give warning* it is time to look about us. If the members of parliament are to overlook all the ill husbandry of the government* that they may (hare in the profuseness and bribery of it; if our rights are to be set to fale by some and neglected by others, when the very being of the government depends upon our being fatisfied, what amendment, what confirmation shall we have of our ^: confutation, when all our dangers are over ? This is

a thought which deserves our most ferious reflections. I could name a certain gentleman, who exactly refembles Henry Guy, who the last feffiom, when the honfe was a little out of humour, disposed of no left thin sisteen thousand pounds in three days time for fecret service. Who are in places we may find out, but God knows who have pensions, yet every-man, that made the least observation, can remember, that some who opened loudly at .the beginning of the last feffions, who came up as eager as it is pofsible for reformation, had their mouths soon ftopped with hufh-money. It has been of some time whifpered, that if this will not at first pre-engage to do what will be exa&ed at their hands, we fliall have a parliament. I cannot tell whether a new parliament will not be pradifed upon by the Carmarthen art; however, it is our last and best remedy: for if this continues, God have mercy upon poor England, Hitherto we have been, and we are like, for ought I fee, to be repaid for all our expences of blood and treafure, with the'fmoke which Boccalini mentions in his advices from Paruaflas, whereby the enemies of the government have but too great advantage given them to ridicule us for our fodifh credulity ?' * If men are to make fortunes by being of our fenate house, says the same gentleman % we had better ourselves pay the difburfements of those we fend, we had better ourfelres allow them plentiful fabrics for fitting there; each particular county would fave by it in the public aflefTments, and find thsir account in it, whilst they preserve their members from the temptation, of being hired out of thefr interest, and consequently get good laws for what

• STATS TRACTS, time of king William, it. 370.

they give. We can, fcarce pay too much for good laws, and if we have not some that we have not yet, we shall not, when the war is over (let it end which way it will) be able to call what we have our own. In the late times, the city of London often petitioned for paffing of laws: will they always lend money now, and never expect a thorough alteration of the ininiftry, and fecurities for the future, against court projectors? In James Ift's time, there were certain fparks, who undertook for pa.iiaments, that were called undertakers ; and there is a certain fecret that has ftole out of our cabinet, that one of these, immediately on the king's rcfufing tiie triennial hill last feffions, undertook that it Humid be thrown out the next time they fat, with as much fcorn and contempt as was the judges bill. It'is time to have annual parliaments inftead of triennial, since privy councilors and lords of the treafury, (both which stations this person enjoys) can so perfectly feel the pulfe of a parliament during an interval,' Sir Charles Sedley in his speech, A. D. 1699, thus sets forth the danger from placemen in parliament. I believe, Mr. Speaker, when we come to consider of it, we {hall find that it is convenient not only to leffen the officers of the court and Mate in point of profit, but in point of number too. We have nine commiflioners of excife, feven of the admiralty, three of the poft-office, fix of the cuftoms. I know not why half may not do the business as well. But when I cgnsider, that all these, or most of them, are members of parliament, my wonder is over; for though it may be a dispute whether many heads are better than one, 'tis certainly true, that many vote* are better than one. Many of these gentlemen have two offices besides their feat in parliament, which re-

quire attendance in several places, and abilities of divers natures; but members of parliament, though well principled, have no privilege to be fit for any thing they please to undertake without practice, ftudy, or application. Sir, we are called by the king, and fent up by the people; and ought to regard no interests but theirs, which, as I told you before, are always the same: let us therefore proceed accordingly. The late propofals of the courtiers themselves to fave the king money was, by applying the profits, falaries, and fees of their places that exceed 800 /. per annum, to the war. Thus will the public charge lie eafier upon the people, and the present reign be more and more endeared to them. What is necessary we fhall chearfully supply, when we fee all men set their {boulders to the burden, and stand upon an equal footing for our common defence, and that what we give is applied to those uses for which we give, and the army paid. This offer, Sir, as I remember, began when an observation was made by you of the long accounts, and that a great part of the king's revenue remained in the hands of the receivers; to which a worthy member answered, It could not be helped, by reason some receivers were members of parliament, and flood upon, their privileges. To which another member answered, That we could not deprive members of their privileges ; but that to remedy the like for the future, we were ready to pafs a vote, that no member of parliament should be a receiver of the king's revenue. This alarmed the whole body of men in office; so that some ftood up, and to prevent the house from harping any longer upon that firing, said, They so little valued their own,profit, that they were willing to refign all their fees, falaries, and perquifitcs ex-

ceeding 300 /. per annum, towards the next yearly charge. This, if really intended,, was very generous; but if it were only a compliment, a flilft, or expedient to avoid the present vote we were upon, that no member of parliament flioukl be a receiver of the revenue, nothing was more difingenuous; nor could a greater abuse be offered to the house; for we proceeded so far as to vote, that judges, and feme others, (hould not be comprehended. People abroad, who received our votes, will think ftrangely of it* if after all tbefe preparations we do nothing in it, and fuffer ourselves to be thus gulled. But I hope better of the worthy gentlemen, and cannot but think they were in earned with this house upon so folemn a debate¹.'

Mr. Trenchard proposes, in order to check corruption, that parliament eftablUh a commission for enquiring, by oath, into all abases of the civil lift and other revenues; into useless offices, fabrics, perquifite*, bills of offices, pensions* &c. excepting only the king's privy-purse; report to be made to parliament. And that all members of parliament receiving pensions, purse's, &c. in a corrupt or clandeftme manner, be guilty of high treason ^k.

Thus harangues, on the same. subject, the excellent Hutcbefon, in the house of commons, A. D. 1716°. < In the late reigns, and particularly in the long, pensionary parliament in the reign of Ch. II. the nation became very fensible of the mischievous consequences which had already happened, and the more fatal which might (till refult,. from the dan-

' DEB. COM. in. 19;.

* Gordon'* TRACTS, i. 245.

* DEB, COM. vi. Append, p. 8»

gerous breach which had been made in our ancient constitution. It was now evident to the meaneft capacity, that a designing prince, who, with the affistance of a wicked miniitry, ihould be able, after several trials, at last to procure a parliament to his purpose, would have the liberties of the people entirely in his power, and might govern them at pleasure; from which state of flavery it was evident, that nothing less than a revolution could refcue them ; and if they failed in that experiment, that then their chains would be riveted for ever. Under this melancholy profpeft of affairs the nation groaned, and complaints were heard in every corner of our ftreets; and even the very pensioners in that parliament were not arrived to such a pitch of impiety as to take pleasure in the drudgery they had engaged in, but ac"led with relu&ancy and remorfe, and, as'we have been very lately told in this place, betrayed the cause they had so wickedly efpoused, and frequently gave notice to the friends of England of the attempts which were to be made on the liberties of their country. This pensionary parliament was at last diflblved, but with what view, and by what advice, I will not pretend to say. Certain it is, that that prince never had it afterwards in his power, in a parliamentary way, to deftroy the liberties of the people. The refumption of charters was then put in practice, with many other expedients towards the eftablimment of an abfolute monarchy, which had been long in view; but by the death of that prince, and the unlkilful conduit of his next fucceflbr, an end was put to these designs for that time, the people having unanimously applied the only remedy in such cases; and this brought about the late happy revolution/

In the year I734> as above-mentioned, a bill for fecuring the freedom of parliament, by limiting the number of officers in the house, was read twice; and when it was moved that it should be committed, and that motion opposed, Mr. Sandys fpoke as follows : * Sir, As this * bill met with no oppofuion, either when it was moved for, or when it was brought in and read the first time, I was very little apprehenfive that we should have had any debate upon it; and much less was I apprehenfive that our going into a committee upon it would have been opposed ; for as yet it cau be called little more than a blank ; it cannot well deserve the name of a bill, till it has gone through (he committee, where the many blanks which are now in it are properly to be rilled up. I was indeed furprized to hear the worthy gentleman, who fpoke iaft, say, that he thought it the most extraordinary and unreasonable bill that he had ever seen brought into this house; for if the gentleman will look into our Journals, he will fee that this very bill has been often brought in, and has almost always been palled in this house ;' [in considence of its being thrown out by the .lords, which looks more decent] « and I am fure, if ever it was thought reasonable by this houfr, it must now be thought much more fo, when the number of placemen is much greater in this house than it was heretofore. The worthy gentleman has likewife told us, that he thinks the bill unjust, both with refpcct to the crown, the people, and the gentlemen who have the honour to be employed by the crown. As to which I fhall take notice, ia general, that by the same method of reasoning he may pretend to fhew us,

^a DEB. COM. ui. 125.

that all the laws that were ever made for regulating elections were unjust, and were encroachments upon the rights of the people. I fhall readily agree with him, that the people are the properest judges who ought to be chosen by them for representatives in parliament; and I am consident, that were they left to a free choice, we should not fee so many civil and military officers brought into parliament. The people, I believe, would always think themselves more fecure in being represented by country-gentlemen, with whom they are wel\ acquainted, and who can have no interett feparate from them, than by clerks of offices, or such other persons, whom they perhaps never faw, or heard of, befpre they came down to be chosen their representatives, and whom probably they may never fee again, till they return to afk the same favour ; which every gentleman here knows to be often the case of many of our little boroughs in England. But to say that it would be any 'injustice to lay a restraint upon the people as to the choice of their representatives, seems to me very extraordinary, when we consider the laws now in being, by which the people are restrained from choofing any gentleman for their representative who is not poflefled of such an estate. Surely we may, with respeci to elections, without being guilty of any injustice, lay what restraints we think neceflary for the good of the public, and the preservation of our constitution ; for I am fure that whatever is for the benefit of the people cannot be justly said or thought to be injurious to the crown. It is extraordinary to say, that what is proposed by this bill would be an injustice done to those who are thereby to be made incapable of being elected } for have not

we already a law, by -which all the officers concerned in the collection' of the cuftoms and excife, are rendered incapable of being chosen members, of parliament, and yet I have never before heard it urged that there was any injustice done to those, gentlemen by excluding them from having feats in parliament as long as they ate in an office, which is. inconsistent with their being members of this house. I will allow, that the choice made by the burgefles. of a little borough, or by the freeholders of a county, if it falls upon an officer, civil or military, fhews; that the majority of those electors, at that time, did not think the office he then enjoyed incompatible or inconsistent with his being their representative; but I hope it will not be said that the burgefles of a^ little borough, or even, the freeholders of a cpunty, are better judges in this respect than the representatives of the whole people of Great Britain met in this house, especially when the opinion of this house is approved of and confirmed by the other twq branches of our legislature. As to the alternative pretended, that if this bill should pafs into a law, it would render either the officers civil and military contemptible, or this house contemptible, in the eyes of the people; I cannot imagine how it could produce either of these effects ; for as to. the officers, civil or military, is it to be imagined, that a fuccefsful general or admiral, a brave and experienced, captain by fea or land, or a civil officer, honefl^ expert, and diligent in the station he is in, would be contemned because he was not capable of being a member of this house ? Were the clergy ever brought into contempt by their being excluded the privilege of being chosen members of parliament ? On the contrary, I believe they never got any ho-

-nour by. being members of ekher house; and I believe there are very few officers, civil or military, in the kingdom, who ever gained much honour or much repute among the people by their being members of either house of parliament, unless when their being such was the occafion of their being turned out of the offices they enjoyed, and might have continued to enjoy to their own honour, and the advantage of their country, if they had not been members of parliament. As to the other part of the alternative, that this house may be rendered contemptible by what is now proposed, I am not in the least afraid of it; but I am very much afraid, that if some bill of this nature is not fpeedily patted into a law, thit house will become contemptible in the eyes, not only of our own people, but of the whole world. Gentlemen may pretend that no man is influenced in his way of thinking, or in his manner of acting, in this house, by the poft or the office he pofleffes, and from which he may be turned out, whenever a prime minister may have a mind ; but while men are men, I am convinced there will always be a great number, by far, I fear, the greatest number, who will rather vote according to the directions of the prime minister for the time being, than run the rifle of being turned out of the lucrative poft or office they then hold at the pleasure of the crown; and if ever a majority of this hoxife should happen to be composed of such men, I am fure it will become as contemptible aa ever the fenate of Rente was, after it became the political tool of their arbitrary and tyrannical emperors. ' I will likewife agree with the honourable gentlemen, that it may be necessary, at least it may be convenient, for this house always to have in it some of those gentlemen, who belong to, and are

coftverfant in, the methods of tranfa&ing business in the several great offices of the kingdom ; and therefore I am not for excluding from feats in parliament all those who are in offices, civil and military. I believe no gentleman in this house ever had any such thought in his head ; and if gentlemen will but peruse the bill, ,as it stands now, they will fee that there is to be an exception, which is now left blank, as in all such cases is ufual, in order that when we go into a committee, gentlemen may then propose the filling up in that blank as many officers, or as many forts of officers, as they have a mind. About this, indeed, I expefted there 'might have been some debates; bijt considering the great number of officers of all forts we have now in the house, considerrng how greatly the number may be encreased in times to come ; considering the great clamour already raised in the nation against so many officers being in this house ; I really did not expert that any gentleman would have opposed the committing of the bill, or would have pretended that the paffing of some such bill was not become neceflary, both for the honour of this house and the safety of our constitution. To conclude, the bill is at present but a blank ; but I am consident it may be made a good and reasonable bill, and agreeable to .every gentleman in this house; therefore, I hope, the house will agree to the going into a committee upon it, because, if gentlemen do not like it after the blanks are filled up, they may then drop it, or throw it out upon the third reading *.' In the famous year 1739, a place-bill, as above

mentioned, was propofcd to the commons by Mr.

Sandys in the following speech :

* DEB. COM. via. 122.

« Sir, I am now going to lay before' you a propofal which has already been several times made to you, without meeting with that fuccefs which I thought it deserved ; but as I think it a good one, and abfoJutely neceflary for the preservation of our constitution, I am far from being difcouraged by its former bad fuccefs, nor shall I be difcouraged from a future attempt, even though it should now meet with as bad a reception as heretofore, because I am fully convinced of the^ truth of that observation, which was Jong ago made by one of our best lawyers, That a good bill or motion once proposed in parliament, and entered upon our journals, can never die: It may at first meet with bad fuccefs : it may meet with repeated bad fuccefs; but, unless our constitution be abfolutely and irrecoverably deftroyed, it will by its own merits, at last force its way through the several branches of our legislature.' [This criterion, if applied to the present times, when we have reason to think no merits whatever would carry a bill through the houses, unless it were favoured by the ministry, is so {hocking, that it will hardly bear to be thought of. ] ' The propofal, I am to make, Sir, is plainly and in (hort, this, That criminals may not be allowed to be their own judges; and that our liberties may not be committed to the keeping of those who are retained to deftroy them. It i» the duty of parliament to redrefs all public grievances, and punish all high and heinous offenders, who have been artful or powerful enough to evade the laws of the kingdom. It is the duty of parliament to grant no more money for the public service than what is abfolutely necessary, and to fee that money properly applied and duly accounted for. And it is the duty of parliament to watch over the

liberties and privileges of the people, by taking care not to pafc any laws that are inconsistent with tho liberties i and privileges of the people, and by providing fpeedy and, effectual remedies against all encroachments that bare been, or may be, made by ambitious princes, or guilty miniftcrs. Thefe, Sir, are among the chief of the duties of parliament; but bow can we expe& a performance, if a majority of the members be fueb, wbofe self-preservation or security depends upon their neglecting or acting contrary to tbeie duties ? Can we expect, that public grievances will be redrefied, if a majority of parliament be (uch as have themselves been, or such as are the friends and confederates of thofc that have been the cause of these public grievances ? Can we expect that any high offender will be punUhed by parliament, if the majority of it be such as have been companions and fharers with him in his crimes, or fucb whofe chief subsistence depends upon fcreening him from justice ? Can we expect that any supply demanded by the crown will be refuted, if it is to be granted by those, whofe chief subsistence depends upon making the grant} or that the public money will be properly applied, or duly accounted for, if those who have applied or may apply it to their own use, are to be the only inspeclors of the public accounts ? Or, lastly, Sir, can we expert that a .parliament will guard against the encroachments, of an ambitious prince or guilty minuter, if the majority of that parliament be such as have the whole, qr a neccflary part of their subsistence, from the places-, or pension* they hold' at the arbitrary will of that ambitious prince, or guilty minister ? Thefe are questions, which, in my opinion, can be answered in the affirmative by no man who will

and daw Wk« use of bjs.reasonj and ye* w«ry one of tjiefe questwxs muiit, I think, b$ aofryered in the affirmative by those who •affirm, that «ur conftitutioA can. never be in any danger fan, a majority or near a majority of this, house being cowpcfed of such as bold places, and pennon* at the arbitrary will of the crown, I (ball grant, Sir* that it may be necefiary for us to have anongft us fqmq of the chief officers of the treafury, admiralty* and army, as well as ievcxal others of thofc that, are e»plqy,e4 by his majefty as, chief officers, in the executive part of our government. Thefe, I say, it may be ascc&iy to have- amongA us* in order to give us such information, as nay; often become neceflary in the several branches of business that come; regularly before this house.' [Here Mr. Sandys might have observed, that even, fuppofiag the prtfaxe of some of the officers of ftatQ neceflary occafiooally in the house of commons, it does not follow, that their voting is neceflary. The judges, fit in the upper house, as flailed in the law* ; but they do not vote.'] * But I am fure it is no way neceflary, but on the contrary, quite inconsistent with the dignity of this house, to have it filled with clerks of offices,, and inferior officers of our navy and army. I confefs I have the greatest regard for such of tho?9 as. we have at present amongft us; because I hope they have all so much honour, that they would di&lam to facrifce theirduty, as members of this house, to any selfiflx coqftderation; but we cannot be fure that those who fucceed them in their offices and employments will he gentlemen of so much honour} and as they may lilcewife.fucceed them with regard to their (cats/ in this house, our confutation may be thereby brought into the utmost danger; for if I were not

well allured of the honour of those officers we have now amongft us, we have already such a number, that 1 Qiould think our constitution upon the brink of destrustion; and as the number may increase so as, in a fliort time, to become the majority of this house, whilst we have it in our power, we 'ought to take care to provide against this danger by limiting the number of officers that are to have feats in this house; for if the majority of this house should once come to be composed of officers, and these officers such as had a greater regard to the places they pofless, or preferments they hope for, than to the liberties and constitution of their country, it would be ridiculous to think of getting the approbation of this house to any such regulation. Therefore, Sir, as this is not yet, I hope, our unfortunate case, I fliall beg leave to move, that leave may be given to bring in a bill for the better fecuring the freedom of parliament, by limiting the number of officers to fit in the house of commons '.' Mr. state lord) Lytttlton, fpoke in defence of it as follows.

' Sir, While this house is full of independent gentlemen, or of such placemen only whofe places are not so much the best of their property, that they cannot rifk the lofs of them without a spirit of martyrdom, who have something of their own sufficient to outweigh their employments, and while the number even of these shall be confined within some moderate bounds, a minister must regard this affembly as an awful tribunal, before which he is conftantly to account for his conduit: He must respect your judgments, he must dread your cenfures, he must feel

^a DEB. COM. xi. 202.

your superintendency. But we can imagine a future house of commons so crowded with placemen, that a fpeftator in the gallery might be apt to miftake and think himself at the levee of a minister inftead of a parliament. The benches here may be covered not only with officers of rank in the government, not only with the servants of the crown, but with the servants, perhaps, of their servants; and what sentiments, Sir, have we reason to think the fight of a house so filled would excite in a minister ? Would he think himself in the prefence of his country, or in the midft of a guard that would enable him to defy its justice, and deride its refentment. The poffibility of this happening hereafter is the ground of this bill, which therefore the people of England do not only consider as a fmgle point to be gained for them upon any present necessity, but as a general security against all they apprehend for the future. Sir, my worthy friend, who made you this motion, in the opening of it explained to you sufficiently, that there is no intent of running into any extremes. If I thought there was, I would oppose it as much as any man here. I know but one thing more prepofterous than such a general place-bill as would exclude all persons in office from a feat in this house, and that is to leave the number of them under no limitation at all. But for fear of ftarving, must we die of a furfeit ? Between these two absurdities, can no medium be found ? Cannot we continue those amongft us who arc of any use to the house, who can give any aflistance, any weight, any facility, any grace to our proceedings, and {hut the door against others, whom it is neither decent, nor safe, to admit ? Sir, the doing this is eafy; it will be done by this bill, it is what the wisdom of former parliaments would have

done long before now. But the reason they did it not was, It never entered into their thoughts to conceive that some, who have since fat in parliament, would attempt to come there, I do not mean, from any personal incapacity, but from the nature itself of their offices, incompatible almost with the very idea of a member of parliament. It is a furprizing thing} but it is verified • by what we fee every day, that the common practice of some ages goes beyond even the fears of the paft. We must, therefore, supplf from experience what our predeceflbrs failed to forefee; and we are called upon to do so by the unanimous voice of the nation. Sir, the greatest affairs before us are of less importance than this. It is better Spain should invade the freedom of the American feas, than the crown of England violate the independence of parliament. It is not Spanijh or Fnntb arms, but Spanijb and French maxims of government, that we should have most to fear from, if the vigilant caution, the jealous spirit of liberty in this house did not concur with the goodness, the natural goodness of his majefty, to fecure our free constitution. Let the cortes of Spain, let the parliament of Paris, be a warning to us; let them shew us what we may come to, if we do not prevent the growth of corruption, before it produces here the infensible, gradual, fatal change it did there. ' Sir, I am trying to recollect what objections have been made to this bill, and I protest I can find none that seem to me to want a reply. One chiefly inlifted upon is, That it carries an air of fufpicion. Sir, in all the states that I have read of antient and modern, the most fulpicious people have been always the latest enflaved. To fufpeft human frailty in totoptrng circumstanccf, is a very natural jealousy;

and a too fecure considence will hardly be thought a parliamentary virtue. It is painful indeed to be fuspected, but the greater the pain, the greater the dcfire should be to remove' that fufpicion. But, Sir, against the present house of commons, no such fufpicion can be conceived — Upon what grounds should it be founded? Upon what probability? Has the private difcourfe of such gentlemen here ever been different from their public behaviour i Have they ever talked one way and voted another ? Have there been any indications of a private interest, that of any one man ever prevailing over that of the nation, against fad, reason, or justice ? Have not the majority here conftantly {hewn the ftrongeft conviction, that their conducj was flrictly conformable to the most difinterested love of their country ? Such a house of commons ought not to be, is not fuspected: But granting such a doubt to have been formed, Is this the way to remove it ? Will the rejecting this bill clear our character, or can all the art and power of calumny give half the weight to an imputation of that kind as such a proceeding ? Sir, to those who treat this bill as a chimerical thing, an idle Speculative project, I will say but one word, That the most chimerical thing in nature is the notion of a free constitution, where the restraining powers, are not entirely exempt from dependency. Such liberty is indeed a speculation fit for fchool-boys; for what would terms and appearances avail, if independence were loft ? You might retain the vain eafigas of your former authority, but would they give you any dignity ? Would they be of any use to the public ? The mace there upon your table, what would it fignify i It might be borne before you with ridiculous pomp; but it would be what Cremvjtl called it once,

a mere bauble; or, if it had any weight, it would be only to opprefs, not to .protect. Sir, the prefene form of our government, keep it but free from corruption, is .fo wifely conftituted, the powers in it are so happily mixed, that it has all the advantages of a republic without the defeats and evils attending one. But, on the other side, I must say that if it ihould be corrupted, if the contracts of parliament should be bought off by the crown, the very reverfc would be true; and it would have all the defects, ali the evils of an abfolute monarchy, without the advantages ; it would be a more expenfive, and worse administered abfolute power. Sir, I hope it is underftood that in what I have said I am only contending for a provisional security against a mischief not yet felt in all its malignity, but yet of so incrcafing a nature, and such ruinous consequences, that we must be blind not to forcfee, and worse than careless, not to prevent them. I will only add, that every year we delay this security, may probably add both to the necessity and difficulty of obtaining it; and that people out of doors may be apt to doubt, from the fuccefs of this question to-day, whether even now it does not come a little too late *.'

Mr. Pulteney, on the same occafion, fpoke as follows.

* Sir, The opposition made to this motion, is, in my opinion, one of the ftrongeft arguments that can be made use of in its favour, and must I think appear so to every man, who considers the persons concerned in that opposition, and the arguments they make use of for supporting it. Who arc the persons that

» DEB. COM. xi. ac8.

oppose this motion ? Who were they that have always opposed such motions ? Placemen, min'ifters, and the favourites or pensioners of ministers. What tio they say for justifying thejp opposition ? They deny a principle, a maxim, which in all ages, in all countries has hitherto been acknowledged ; and upon which many of our laws now in being, are founded; That a gentleman's behaviour in this house may be influenced by a place or pension, is a nfarfm univerfally acknowledged, and in this kingdom'To much eftabliflied, that we have already by law excluded many of the former, and all the latter, from having feats in this house. We have, I say, already by law excluded all pensioners from having feats in this house, and I should be glad to know the difference between a pension of iooo/. a year, and a place with a falary of iooo/. a year. I know of none, fave only that the latter is generally more valuable than the former; and therefore a gentleman will be more loth to lofe it, or to give a vote in this house, that may difoblige a minister, who can take it from him. I say, Sir, that a place with a falary of iooo/. a year, is more valuable, than a pension of iooo/. a year; because a place furnimes a gentleman with an opportunity to fcrve his friends, and perhaps to provide some of them with little places, or offices under him. To which I must add, that a place often furnimes a gentleman who is not very fcrupulous, with an opportunity of plundering his country yearly, of twice, perhaps ten times, the value of his falary ; and this, I must observe, makes another very material difference, between a place and a pension. A placeman may very probably be a person, whofe conduct this house ought to enquire into. He may be a public criminal, and therefore he will certainly

be against an impartial and ftrict enquiry into the conduct of any miniftcr, officer, or placeman, left the enquiry fitouldsu last light upon himfclf. There is therefore greatej^rsafon for excluding all placemen, than for excluding all peniioncrs from having feats in this house. Our admitting foinc of the former, does not proceed from an opinion, that a gentknun's behaviour may not be influenced by a place, as much » Vy a pension, but from the necessity we are under of having fomc great officers amongft us, in order to give us proper information and direction in many affairs that must come under our consideration. For this reason, when I hear gentlemen who have very good places, gravely telling us, that no> gentleman of family or fortune can by any place he may enjoy, or expert, be induced to join in measures that may be of dangerous consequencc to the constitution or liberties of his country, I think it is a clear proof not only that the behaviour of a gentleman of family and fortune may be influenced by the pofts he enjoys or expects, butalfo that his judgment may be byaffed. He may thereby be induced to think those things indifferent, or of no moment, that are far from being fo. He may be thereby induced to think the liberties of his country in no danger, when they arc upon the very brink of destruction. Sir, let us confidcr that of the 513 members who represent England and Stiles, there are but 92 chosen by counties, and of the remaining 421, there are at least 350 chosen by cities, boroughs, and cinque ports, where the adminiftration would have the abfolute command and direction. If this should ever happen to be our unlu'cky fituation, can we fuppose that any gentleman would fct up to be a member of this houie,. or a representative even for any of our coun-

ties, but such as refolved to submit with regard to their behaviour here to the abfolute direction of the prime minister ? No gentleman of honour would put himself to expence, or expofK himself to the refentment of an all powerful minister, if by fetting up as a candidate at any election, he were absolutely certain that he could thereby do his country no service. Inftead of gentlemen of family, fortune, character, or interest in their country^ we should then fee this house filled with the lowest tools and vileft fycophants of abfolute power. Inftead of this house's being a check upon ministers, it would then, like the parliament of France, or the Roman fenates under their emperors, be an instrument for theoppreffions of ministers, and a cloak for their crimes. The mod rapacious plunderer, the most tyrannical oppreflbr would then infolently boaft, that he did nothing but according to law, that the public treafure was regularly accounted for in parliament, and that he was at all times ready to submit his conduct to a parliamentary enquiry. Surely, Sir, no gentleman can think that the liberties of this nation consist in our having the refemblance of a parliament. We may have a parliament, that parliament may be chosen once every feven years, may fit annually as it does now, may pafs laws, grant money, receive accounts, and even make enquiries, and yet we may have neither constitution, nor liberty left; for if it should once come to be in the power of the adminiftration to have always k majority in parliament, ready to obey the directions given them by the ministers, there would be no necessity for deftroying the form of our constitution, or for making a direct and abfolute furrender of our liberties. Without either of these, our fovereign would be as abfolute,

and might be more tyrannical, than the Grand Signlor himself. Such a parliament would grant him as many fpahis and janizaries as he thought neceflary, for keeping his flaves in subjectionj would give him any revenue he pleaied to demand, and would pafs whatever, laws he might please to propose; and the judges being under no 'parliamentary restraint, would in every part of his dominions give judgment according to the directions of the prime vizier, or governing bafbaw. Thus oppreflion would be countenanced by the forms of law, the people plundered, and the innocent murdered, by the adminiftration of judice. It is this fort of ruin, Sir, we have chiefly to apprehend, and this fort of ruin we may ftep by ftep be led into, without our being fensible of the several fteps. We {hall certainly be led into it, if we trust any longer the guardianfliip of our liberties to those whofe forefight is dimmed by the places they enjoy, or expect. If a minister were to propose a law for giving the crown a power of fending to every county, city, and borough in the kingdom, such a conge felire for the choice of members of parliament, as is now fent to a dean and chapter for the choice of a bilhop, I believe very few gentlemen of family or fortune, would, for the fake of any place, agree to it. But an equivalent power may be got by multiplying penal laws, and increafing the number and power of officers; and a gentleman of fortune, family, character, and interest in his country may, by a good place, be induced to believe, that such a law, or such an increase of the number and power of officers, is neceflary for preventing fraudulent practices, or the like; and may therefore agree to it, without feeing the danger our constitution may be thereby exposed to. Thus, by degrees, he may be made to agree to such propo-

fitions, one after another, till be has thereby established in the crown the abfolute direction of mostof the elections in the kingdom. This, Sir, would have been the certain consequence of the late excife scheme; and yet there were many gentlemen of family and fortune that approved of it. I am convinced they did not forefee this consequence; nay I have so much charity as to believe, that the chief patron of that scheme did not; but every impartial man in the kingdom is now, I believe, fensible of it. That scheme was indeed such a large ftep towards giving the crown the direction of most of our elections, and by good luck was so thoroughly considered before it was brought into this house, that most gentlemen became fensible of the danger before it was too late; and that was the cause of its meeting with the fate it deserved; but its fate will be a warning to future ministers not to attempt making such a large ftep at once: they will from thence fee that they must grafp at this power by little and little, which they will certainly do, and as certainly at last accomplifh, unless we take care to exclude from this house most of those who, by the places they enjoy, are induced to have a better opinion of ministers than any man ought to have, that is entrusted with the guardianfliip of the constitution and liberties of his country. The question is not, Sir, whether a gentleman may be induced by the office or place he holds or expects, to make at once, and in an open and direct manner, an abfolute furrender of the liberties of his country. No prince, or minister, of common sense will ever defire such a furrender, because, if he can get into his hands an uncontroulablc power over most of our elections, and conlequently the

direction of the parliaments chpfen by this uocontroulable power, his power will in every refpeft be as abfolute, and may be exercifed in a mote arbitrary manner, and with greater security to, himself, than it could be without the appearance of a parliamentary authority; for every unpopular and oppreffive measure would then be made the aft and deed of the parliament; and the lenity of the minister, in the execution of those penal laws ena&ed by

• . * • ' * J

parliament, or in the exercife of those powers granted him by parliament, would be set forth and extolled by his tools in a Gazetteer, or some such paper, published by his authority, and disperfed through the whole kingdom at the public expence. The question, therefore, now before us, is, Whether a gentleman's eyes may not, by a lucrative and honourable poft or employment, be so overclouded as to prevent his feeing through the plauftble pretences that may, from time to time, be made use of by an a,rtful minister, for getting into his hands, or into the hands of the crown, such an uncontroulable power as I have mentioned; and this question, even with refpedt to gentlemen of family and fortune, wiH, I am fure, be answered in the, affirmative by every man in this kingdom, who, does not poffefs or expect some poft or employment, or some of those titles of honour which, by our:, confutation, as it is now modelled, the crown has abfolutely at its dispofal. To tell us, Sir, that our liberties can never be in danger from a majority of placemen in this house, unkfs the people be generally abandoned as to all principles of virtue and public good, and unless the crown has, at the same time, formed designs against our liberties ; and that the only method for removing this danger, in case

we ftjodd *i any time be threatened with it, would be to take proper measures for restoring virtue and public spirit among die people, and for remaving evil counsellors from about the throne — to tell us this, I say, Sir, in a ferious manner, is something very extraordinary: It is miftaking the efie& for thecause, and defiling us to begin at the wrong end. Corruption, Sir, is not the effect, but the cause of a general depravity of manners among the people of any country, and has in all countries, as well as this, been first praftifed and encouraged by ministers and courtiers. It would therefore be ridiculous in us to think of restoring virtue among the people, till we have once made it impoffibje for •ministers and courtiers to corrupt them; and I am fure it would be ftill more ridiculous in us to think of removing an evil counsellor from about the throne, till we have once removed his creatures and tools out of this house. I hope, Sir, there are at present no evil counsellors about the throne; if there were, I am fure no such counsellor has a majority of his creatures and tools in this house* If this were the case, it would have been very ridiculous to have made such a motion as this now before us. I), would be very ridiculous to think of restoring our constitution by any legal method. It is this miffortune we intend to prevent by the bill now moved for. It is a misfortune now foreseen by all unprejudiced men in the kingdom. I hope it is not yet too late to think of preventing it by a legaj method ; for after we have once fallen into this misfortune, it will be impoflible to recover. If an ambitious minister should once get a majority of his creatures and tools into this house, can we fuppose they ¹ would confent to impeach or remove him from the

throne ? Can we fuppose they would ever confent to any bill that might tend to diftrefs the adminiftration of their matter ? Can we fuppose they would refuse any thing that might tend to prolong his adminiftration and increase his power ? Every attempt to restore the constitution would be branded with the. name of republicanifm., The difcontents of the people would be called difaffe&ion and jacobitifm ;. every opposition would be said to proceed from, malice and refentment; and the misfortune would be, that many honest well-meaning men, induced by their places to have a better opinion of ministers than they ought to have, would give credit to these pretences, and would believe that by agreeing to. the minister's arbitrary schemes, they were only strengthening the hands of the government against republicanifm, jacobitifm, and fedition. If it were pofiible to be merry in a debate of so great importance, it would be diverting to observe the contradidtion in the arguments made use of against this motion. By some our gentlemen of family and fortune are represented to be men of such ftrict honour and such clean heads, that no place or pension can miflead their judgment, or mifdirest their will; no selfifli consideration can make them overlook the danger our liberties may be exposed to, or confent to any thing they think may in the least endanger our constitution. By others, again, our gentlemen of family and fortune are represented as such selfifh mercenary creatures, that unless the government would give them pofts or pensions, they would refuse to confent to those things that are abfolutely neceflary for the ends of government and the preservation of their country. Now these two contradictory positions, though they cannot be equally

true, may be, and I believe they are, equally falfe. We have, I believe, some gentlemen amongft us whofe judgment cannot be byaffed, nor their will dire&ed by any selfifh consideration. Such men, I hope, we shall always have in some of our highest offices, and these are not designed by this bill to be excluded from having feats in this house; but their number will always be small, and therefore not sufficient by thcmselves alone to support the constitution against a combination of all the fools and knaves that may hereafter get into this house; therefore we must endeavour to prevent this combination, and this can only be done by such a bill as js now proposed. On the other hand, I believe, there may be some amongft us, who propose nothing by their service in this house, but their own private advantage; and whilst we have placemen and pensioners amongft us, such men will endeavour all they can to get into parliament: Nay, it may become so cuftomary for every man that votes with the court to have a place or a pension, that no man will do so without some such reward. But if ever this fclfifh spirit should get into parliament, our constitution will be undone; and to prevent this is the dcfign of the bill now moved for: If no man could, by being a member of parliament, propose to get any place, or office, or any advantage to himself, the mercenary and selfifh would feldom endeavour to get themselves chosen, at least they would never be at any expence for this purpose ; and as such men have feldom a great natural interest in any part of the kingdom, there would always be such a small number of them in parliament, that their opposition could never obstrucl: or retard any thing that seemed neceflary for thejust ends of government, or for the preservation

and happiness of the society. The public good would then be the only aim of ministers, as well as members, because neither of them could hope for fuccefs in any other; and as men of good sense and ftrict honour are the bcft judges, and the most ready to agree upon what is necessary for the public good, it would then be as much the bufmefs of ministers to get such men chosen, as it is now their bufmefs to get such members chosen as arc men of mercenary tempers or fhallow tmderstandings; for all ministers will have jobbs to do in parliament as long as they have any hopes of fuccefs, and the weak or mercenary will always be the most proper for this purpose. I am indeed furprifed, Sir, to hear it said by an honourable gentleman, whofe attachment to the present establishment is not to be doubted, that if most placemen were excluded from this house, there would soon be a majority of Jacobites in it. Such a fupposition is not to be made, without first fuppofing that a great majority of the people are Jacobites; and to fuppose this is, I am fure, no compliment to our present royal family, and much less to the king now upon our throne. As long as our parliaments are independent, and our elections free, there can never be any considerable number of Jacobites either in this house or in the nation; but if there should once come to be a majority of place-men and officers in the house, that majority would soon create a majority of Jacobites in the nation; and in that case, though the majority within doors might be a good security to ministers against parlia-^ mentary prosecutions, yet it would be but a bad security for the royal family against an infurrection of the whole people without doors. The army,

upon which we now seem so much to depend, or a great part of them, would probably join with the people, and the certain consequence would be the overthrow of our present eftablifliment. This danger, I know, a guilty minister will always choofe to expose his mailer to, rather than expose himself to a legal trial before a free and independent parliament; because, in a general conflagration, he may poffibly escape notice, or may perhaps be able to facrifice his mailer by way of an atonement for himself} but those who support him in thus expofing his matter, can have no great regard for their fovereign, and in such an event would certainly meet with the contempt and punishment they so highly deserved. For this reason, Sir, as I have a greater regard for the security of the royal family than I have for that of our present ministers, or of any set of ministers, that fhall ever get into the management of our public affairs, I {hall be for putting it out of the power of any future minister to over-turn our conititution, by getting a majority of placemen and penfiqners into this house. This, I think, is now become abfolutely neceflary for preventing our being brought under one of the worft fort of tyrannical governments that was ever contrived, or established. For this purpose the bill now moved for is one of the most certain, and one of the most obvious methods that can be thought of. It can be attended with no inconvenience. It is impofsible to Shew so much as a plausible reason against it; and therefore, if this motion be rejected, it must afford a most melancholy reflection to everyone that understands our constitution, and has a regard for the liberties of his country.'

It was urged by Mr. Southwell, and others, that the voice of the people called for this bill; and that yoice called for the ferious attention of a wife legislature ; and that voice would be heard, first or last, and will have its effect; that it could not-be fmothercd, much less rejected with contempt. In that house, they said, they ought to fee with the same eyes with their constituents, and ought to feel what the nation feels, which was a good rcafon for not admitting placemen or pensioners ; for the feeing and feeling of those who receive and those who pay will be very different. That they had heard it delivered in that house, that no man ought to be allowed to keep his place under the crown, who voted against the minister's measures, or jobbs, in parliament. It was said, that it was well known that many boroughs were so publicly venal, that their brokers dealt ns openly for the fale of them, as bawds for the fale of a proftitute.

* A poft in the army having fallen vacant, A. D. 1741, the gentleman, who had the next right to it, happened to be a member of parliament, and one that had opposed the court, which few officers do now-a-days : the ministers, as ufual, were against his preferment, Kcause he had opposed the king's [that is, their own] measures in parliament; but the king told them, the gentleman had always behaved well as an officer, and he had nothing to do with his behaviour in parliament; so gave him the commission he had by his rank a right to V The sense of the city of London, on this subject,

appears from the following instruction to their repre-

fentatives, A, D. 1741.

" DEB. COM. xm. 199.

' As nothing can effectually fecure the freedom of our happy constitution, except an uncorrupt, and independent representation of the people, we insist oil your utmost endeavours to procure a proper bill for¹ reducing and limiting the number of placemen irt the house of commons, especially as so many gentle* men, in a fituation of manifeft dependence, were known to have feats in the last parliament V A motion was made, A. D. 1742, by Mr. Cornwall, that leave be given to bring in a bill for the better fecuring the freedom of parliaments, by limiting the number of officers in the house of commons. Sir Watkln Williams Wynne feconded the motion to the following effect:

* Sir, As this motion was last feflion agreed to, and as the bill itself was brought in, and in every ftep approved of by this very house of commons, I should with great considence of fuccefs rife up to fecond this motion, if 1 did not, from experience, know, that gentlemen often change their sentiments with their fituation ; and that a gentleman, after he becomes a placeman, begins to entertain notions of the prerogatives of the crown, and the liberties of the people, very different from those he held whilst he was a plain honest country gentleman. If any thing like this should happen in the present debate, it may tend to disappoint the motion ; but with all those who are neither placemen nor pensioners, I am fure it ought to be an argument in its favour; and I hope it will prevail with some gentlemen, who, in former fefllons, opposed this motion, to alter their sentiments and their way of voting upon this occafion, when they have such a plain proof

* DEB. COM. xm. 16.

before their eyes, that if a place does not induce a man to vote against his honour and his conference, it at least byaffes his judgment, and makes him conclude that to be wrong which he before thought, and declared to be right. Another ftrong argument in favour of this motion, Sir, is, the melancholy and diftrefled condition which the'affairs of Europe, as well as of this nation, are now reduced to. We have, for near thirty years, been in a courfe of approving and supporting altnoft every political measure the crown seemed refolved to purfue. With regard to foreign affairs, we have approved and supported every one of them without exception. Thank God, I have had no concern in this general uninterrupted approbation. I have, at the refpefiive times, publicly declared my diflike of many of them, and yet I am far from thinking that any of those who approved voted at any time against the plain dictates of their conscience; but I am convinced that, many of them were biaffed in their judgments by the fears of lofing the places they poffefied, or the hopes of getting the titles, places, or preferments, they expected. In disputes on parti' cular subjefts in politics, it is very eafy to impose upon gentlemen who have never made that science their ftudy, and are never let into any fecrets of state, unless with a design to deceive them ; therefore, in all such cases, I have great charity for those who happen to differ from me in opinion. But when the wickedness or folly of the measures begins to appear from the fatal consequences they have produced, my charity begins to ceafe with respecl to those who perfevere in their opinions, and refuse coining into any method for preventing themselves or their fucceflbrs in this house from being deceived

by the same byafs towards a court. I have, Sir, as great an opinion, as any gentleman ought to have of the honour and impartiality of those who are members of either house of parliament; but it u arguing against common sense, and common experience to pretend that no member of this house will be byaffed in his opinion, or influenced in his voting by 500 or 1000, or perhaps, 5000/. a year. It has in all countries, and in all ages, been held as an established maxim, that no man ought to be allowed to fit as a judge, or even as a jury-man, in any cause where he is to get or lofe by the event of the fuit; and as we fit as judges almost in every case that can come before us between the people and their fovereign, or those employed by him in the executive part of our government, furely no maa ought to be allowed to fit here, who is to get or lofc the whole, or the chief part of his subsistencc by the judgment he pafles upon any affair depending in this house. In former times, Sir, when we had no standing army, nor' any officers of our army kept in continual pay; when we bad n» :xcife, nor excifemen; when we had few or no taxes* and as few tax-gatherers, it was not necessary to have any such law enacted; because no public officer then ever thought of getting himself chosea a member of parliament; whilst he remained ia pay, he was obliged to attend the duty of his office, and consequently could neither attend the business, nor be chosen a member of parliament. This is the true reason why the high-fheriff of a county cannot Even now be chosen a member of this house; and when this maxim was first established by common law, or, as the lawyers call it, common reason only, it fell by degrees into diftifc, and public officers of

•all ranks and degrees may be, and are, now chosen members of parliament except high fheriffs, and some few others, who have been difqualified by exprefs ftatute. Thus, Sir, our constitution stands ft present; and as the number of our public officers of all kinds, and in all stations, has been of late years vastly increased, and is every day increafmg; as their yearly profits and emoluments have been vastly augmented; and as their power is growing every year more and more extenfive, they have now a great fway in all our elections, especially those for our cities and boroughs; so that in a few years, we may, nay, we mv/1 expedt, that a majority of this house will always consist of such as hold or expeft offices, places, or private pensions at the pleasure of the crown; and what justice or mercy the people can expect from such a house of commons, common sense, I had almost said, common experience, may inrrru£t. For this reason, Sir, if we have a mind to preserve our constitution ; if we have a mind that parliament should ever be of any use to the king or his people; if we have a mind to prevent a parliament's being a cumbersome clog to a good king, and a cruel instrument of oppreflion in the V'.nds of a tyrannical one, we must pafs a law for limiting the number of officers in this house; and this we ought to be the more ardent to have fpcedily done, because if we are once caught in the fnare, it will be impoflible for us ever to escape; for if a majority of this house should ever once come to consist of officers and placemen, it is not to be fupposed they would pafs a bill for their own exclufion. On the contrary, if they should entertain the least jealousy of their not being able to get themselves, or a majo-

i rity of such as themselves, chosen at a hew election, they would, > by the authority of a late precedent, continue themselves, or they would pafs an excife-bill, or some such bill, for giving the court an abfolute command over a majority of our elections, and thereby establish an arbitrary power of the most^! extenfive, cruel, and tyrannical kind, I mean, an arbitrary power supported by a corrupt parliament and a numerous mercenary army. To prevent this, Sir, I rife up tofecond the motion made by, my worthy friend. I {hall always endeavour to prevent it by my vote in this house, and if ever it should become neceflary, by the rifk of my life and fortune in the field V There is a curious speech of lord Raymond on occafion of the fecond reading of this bill; in which he declares against a place-bill, because it would prevent young men of fortune from accepting employments, when they found they could not fit in parliament. [But the independent people do not choofe they should have places, and fit in parliament at the same time, because their places may biafs their votes, and the people do not approve of lay - pluralities and non-residence any more than of clerical.] He says, if young men of fortune do not accept employments, they will not understand business. [If they be mem'lers of parliament, and placemen at the same time, they will certainly understand neither the business of parliament nor that of their places.] He says, the bill will exclude all young men of fortune from the army. [The independent people would be glad, that there were no army., and that, inftead of it, we had a well regulated militia,'] He says, the security of the nation consists in having the army officered by men

* DE». COM. xiv. 33.

of fortune. (The security of a nation consists in the people'* being armed, and capable to defend themftlves against all enemies, foreign and domestic '.] Lord Sandwich, on this occafion, speaks as follows: ' In antient times, my lords, nay, I may say, tilt after the restoration, we had no occafion for such bills. The crown' had but a few lucrative employments to bestow, and many of those it had at its dispofal, were fr-ch -as were generally granted for life ; consequently, no mjnifter could hope by such means to gain, much less to prcserve, a corrupt majority in either house of parliament; and the impoffibility of fuccefs prevented their making any such attempt. We had then no mercenary standing army, nor had the crown any lucrative military commissions to dispose of. If an army was at any time raised for foreign service, no officer employed in that army could look upon his poft as an estate for life; therefore, though a commission in the army was considered as an honour, it was never looked upon as a favour; but on the contrary, those landed gentlemen who had acquired a character ih their country for conduct, courage, and military knowledge, were often folicited to accept of commiflions in the army which was to be raised, and when the service was over, they returned to live upon their estates in the country without being at any further expence to the public. We had then, my lords, but very few cuftoms, and no cxcifes; consequently a minister could not fpread his excife-men over the whole kingdom to influence elections in counties, or to govern them in most of our inland boroughs; and the falaries of cuftom-

* DEB. LORDS, vui. 107..

house-officers were so trifling, that no man of any great character or fortune would accept of them ; so that such officers had but very little influence i'n any of our fea-pbrt town's. But now, my lords, the case is quite altered ; the pftfts ih the army, and in the collection of the public revenues, and the other places in the dispofal of the crown, are become so numerous and so lucrative, that they must have a great influence upon the members of the other house, if there be no restraint upon the number of placemen allowed to have feats in that house. This, I say, must be the consequence, unless we fuppose, that men will judge and determine as impartially in a case where they are to get 500 /. or 1000 /. a year, as in a case where they are to get or lofe nothing by their judgment or determination; and to fuppose this is so contrary to the nature of mankind, and to the eftabliflied maxims of all focieties, that I am fure none of your lordfhips will make any such fuppositions. Parliaments, we know, are designed to be a check upon ministers ; we likewife know, that almost every poft in the dispofal of the crown, is left to the arbitrary dispofal of ministers; and we alfo know that no minister ever did or ever will give a lucrative poft or employment to a,man who opposes his measures in parliament. From late experience we know, that some of the highest officers in the kingdom have been difmifled for no other reason but because they difapproved of the measures purfued by our ministers, and had honour enough to declare their difapprobation in parliament. Can we then expect, my lords, that the other house will be a check upon the condu.fr. af our ministers, as long as there is a majority in that house who enjoy, or expect, lucrative and honour-

a,bje employments from ^bp, benevolence, of thefa veqr mipifters ? I /hail not say, .that in such a case tftCrjttetntar* v«oW all be corrupt in their determinations, bat 1 will say, (hat in many cases they would be iMaffed in their judjmejtts, and thereby induced to approve of what, in duty to their country, they ought to. have tfifapproved.'ofi or to put a negative upon what, in duty, to their country, they ougjtt'to have" given their confertt to. Therefore, my lords, if we intend that tne other hbuie should answer the end of its "inftlliitioh, by judging impartially, and determining wifely and justly in every case that comes before them, we must pafs this bill,, or such a bill as this ; or we must pafs a bill for taking from the crown the dispofal of those ports and employments that are neceflary for the executive part of our government; and furely those lords who seem so mighty jealous of any incroachment upon the prerogative of the crown, will agree to the former rather than to the latter of these two expedients. The latter, I fhall grant, would be an infringement of one of those prerogatives now enjoyed by. • the crown ; but I 'c&fhot, for my life, fee what the former Jias to''do-'with 'the prerogative of the ctoWn, not WO* I «6YiCefte 'now any one prerogative of dia"arc*wn^>"te t0 be-m the'Teaft afrcfted by this bill. *Ufe«"i4 n& Wiifinttrient, nor the least restraint, proptifedupjri'th* power" the king has to dispose of offices 'or employments. He may grant them as fuHy and frttly «" before: he may even grant them tb members of parliament, notwithstanding arty thing proposed to be -enacted by this bill ; aad ffie member may injby the office or employment so granted to him ; only if it be such a one as is not excepted in this 'bill, he is not to be re-

chosen. Is this, my lords, anlnfringement of any poerogathre of the crown f 'Has the king a power to tell the people whom they 'are to chuie, or whom they are not to chuse I No, my fordsj but the legislature has» and has already in many cases exercifed tbjui power. The people are already, by bwy restnunod from chufing i man ^w" th'dr' representative who is not poflefled of 600 /. or at least 300 /. a year: they are already restrained from chufing any man concerned in collecting the public revenue; they are already restrained from chufing the high-flieriff to far their representative ; and now they are to be restrained from chufing any placemen besides those excepted in die bill. This, 'tis granted, is a new restraint} but it can no morebesaid to be an infringement of the people's liberties, than confining a madman can be said>to be an infringement of his liberty; for if the people were not mad, or something worse, they never would chuse a man as the guardian of their liberties, who must either forfeit the lucrative poft he enjoys, or betray his trust to ministers*. who can, and probably will, take his poft from, bifli,,jf.Jie, does not; and who have always, by exRcpcnce, been found to be the greatest enemies to the liberties, of. the people.' — — * No inconvenience, ,but great benefit, hu accrued from that law which dibbles coproifficpers and. officers of our cultoms, pr excife, from b^Ing members of the other house. , Experience must therefore give a favourable oprnion of this bill. Can it be fiiid, that in the year 1693 we, were influenced by .any factious difcontents ? And yet in that year, such ft. bill as this, which was intitled, A Bill t/nubing Jret and impartial Procetdmgs in ParStment, pafTed both, houses ; but by the advice of the rninifters was refused the royal aflent; as several others had been

during the beginning of that reign. Can it be fup, posed, that in the yea,r 1701, we wer,e governed by any factious difcontents; and yet in the act then pafled, there was an expjrefs clause for excluding all placemen from having feats in the house of commons after the fettlement. then eftabliflied (hould take place; which clause met with the approbation not only of both houfcs of parliament, but of the crown itself. And furely no man will derogate so much from the known courage of king ffilliam, as to say, that he would have allowed himself to be bubbled by any faction or party into a regulation which he thought would ftrike at the root of our constitution, This clause, it is true, was afterwards in the queen's time repealed; but I wish the noble peers who were the promoters of that repeal had considered a little more their own characters as well as the constitution of their country; for if they had, they might perhaps have made some such exceptions as are contained in this bill; but I am fure they would never have agreed to and much less proposed a general and abfolute repeal of that clause V On occafion of the debate on the pension-biU, A. D, 1730-31, an oath was proposed to be taken by members, purging themselves of the guilt of receiving any pension from the crown. Several lords protested against its being rejected in their house; " because the bill would, if committed, have been regularly the subject of debate, and amendments might have been made as this house thought proper; and because the commons had patted the bill with so much honour to, themselves; and because this bill only enforces the observation, and prevents the eyafions of former laws.

³ DEB. LORDS, vi.ii. 107.

By one of these laws, no person who has a pension from the crown daring pleasure, can fit jix the house of commons; but the effect of this law was or might have been evaded, in great mcafure, by grants of pensions for certain terms of years. To remedy this abuse, it was enacted by another law; that no person who enjoys a pension for any number of years, {hall fit in that house, under certain penalties ; but the effect of this law may be evaded by giving gratuities, or making annual presents; and the commons would find it difficult to obtain those accounts which can alone shew what pensions are paid to particular persons. By the laws now in force, whoever accepts any office or employment under the crown, cannot fit in that house, till he has been re-elected. But an office may be held by some person who is not a member of that house, in trust for one who is. The arguments used for the necessity of preserving an influence to the crown by the power of rewarding; are not to the present purpose, or if applied, they prove what is not much to the ho'nour of this house; as rejecting this bill looks like approving all the evafions that have or can be invented or put in practice,"

" Strictly speaking, all influence over either house, except that which arifes from a sense of those duties which we owe to our king and country, is improper; for although this influence appears to be that of the crown, it may become virtually that of the minister ; and if ever a corrupt minister fbould have the disposition of places, and distribution of pensions, gratuities, and rewards, he may create such an influence, as shall effectually deprive the prince of the great advantage of knowing the true sense of the people, and a house of parliament being prevailed upon to approve such measures as the whole nation diflikes; he may, for the

fake of an unworthy servant, lofe the affections of his people, whilst he imagines that he both deserves and poflefTes them; and this improper influence will always be most exerted in the support of ill measures and weak ministers."

«^e The trust reposed in parliament is much greater than it was, in respect to those heavy taxes which have been for many years paft, and which must be, for all fucceeding times, [unless the national debt could be paid] annually laid by parliament, and alfo the immense debts which have been contracted."

" The service ofthehouse of commons was formerly a real service, therefore often declined, and always paid for by the people ; it is now no longer paid for, no longer declined, but fought after at a great expence. How far these considerations, with that of the vast increase of the civil-lift, and of the debts contracted on it, deserve to enforce the reasons for exacting some ftronger engagements, from members of the house of commons to those whogn they are chosen to reprefenr, is we think sufficiently obvious."

" Although the multiplying of oaths ought to be avoided, yet an oath being the most folemn engagement men can lay under, we judge it on that account the more proper to be imposed ; nor will the probability or" its being broke by the iniquity of mankind be an argument of greater force against this bill, than against any other law made for preventing any other crime^a."

* It is well known, my loids,' (says lord Cbejlerfield in the debate on a bill for making officers independent on the ministry, A. D. 1734^b.) ' that there are many

officers of the army who have nothing, or at least

very little to subnft on but their commiflions ; and it

* DEB, LORDS, iv. 29.

^b Ibid. 198.

is likewife well known that there are many gentlemen of the army now in both houses of parliament. There are now, my lords, more officers of the army in each house of parliament than there were when we had on foot an army of above 60,000 men ; Thefe are fafts which will not, I believe, be controverted. It is, "I do not know how, become of late years a prevailing opinion, that "the only way of getting prefer-, ment in the army is to have a feat in the other house of parliament: This, it ib true, my lords, must be an erroneous opinion. It is impofiible that any man can justly and honourably acquire any preferment in the army by his behaviour in either house of parliament, and therefore this must be an opinion for which I hope there never was any ground. I am fure there can be no ground for it under his present majefty; but erroneous as it is, it is become a general opinion, and we know that .mankind always were, and always will be governed and influenced by general opinions and prejudices; and according as the prevalence of this opinion increases, we may expect an increase of the number of officeis in both houses of parliament. We may expect, my lords, that in future times, as soon ai any gentleman has once got a commiflion in the army, he will next employ all his money and credit, and all his friends to procure himself a feat in parliament; he will perhaps pawn the last /hilling's worth he has in the world, bcficics his commiilion, in order to procure himself a le.it in the other house of parliament; and how dangerous it may be to our constitution to have such a man depending for the continuance of that commiflion upon some future enterpnzing miniftcr, I lea\e to your lordfhips to judge. No man has a better opinion than I have of the gentlemen who arc at present the

officers of our army; but I must say, that I think it too hard a trial even for their virtue, especially in this degenerate age, to have it in the power of a defperate mini ft er to tell them upon occafion of an important question in parliament, " If you do not vote, ** Sir, as I direct, you fhall ftarve."

In the debate on the famous pension-bill, A. D. 1739% lord Watyolt observed, that a bill with the same title had been four times fcnt up to the lords, and as often rejected. That it was an aftront to the lords to fend them the same bill five times. That it is dangerous to make alterations. [The bill, however, was no alteration, but intended to inforce an old law.] That the bill fupposes corruption in the other house, which is a stander on the house, and a reflexion on the government. That it is impoflible there should be any pensioning ; becaufc no pension can be granted but by warrant from his majefty, and all monies are to be accounted for to king and parliament. [So that, in short; corruption is, like the (tories of ghofts and goblins, a mere non-entity, at which only silly people arc feared,] That besides, the ministry have no inclination to corrupt the members of the house of commons. * I have the honour, says his lordfhip, to be nearly related to some of those employed in the adminiftration : from thence I have had an opportunity of knowing their most fecret thoughts; and from thence I have formed my opinion. Therefore, if it is neither in the inclination nor in the power of any one employed in the adminiftration to corrupt the members of the other house, \vhat occafion can we have, would it not be altogether imprudent in us to make an alteration in one of the most funda-

* DEB. LORps, vi. 372.

mental parts of our constitution, in order to guard against a grievance which is neither felt, nor can be, in his present majefty's reign, so much as fupposed ?' Lord Talbot answered lord Walpole, that the commons, by fending up the bill, {hewed, That they believed not only the poflibility, but the reality of corruption. That there were two ftatutes before calculated for the same purpose; but ' that ministerial craft working upon abandoned proftitution could evade them.' That the commons, if in earneft, might justly he offended, if the lords rejected the bill, which might produce a rupture between the houses, and might set the whole nation against the lords; if the commons meant only to delude their constituents by a pretended zeal against corruption, trusting, that the lords would throw out the bill, would it be consistent with the dignity of the house of peers to be acceflary to such abominable craft. That a private pension is not s. reward of merit, but a breach of trust; and to reject the b;ll wpuld be giving a fanction to breach of trust. That it could not be said, that'the lords paffing the bill was a flur on the commons, when the commons originated it. That a parliament 2 Hen, VIII, paffed an a£l to cancel all the debts the king had contracted upon loans; and the historians account for this iniquitous proceeding from that parliament's being filled with the king's servants, with whom justice had not so much weight as complaifance to the crown.

* The numbers of placemen in that parliament, (says his lordfhip) * are not specificd ; but I believe they did not amount to near three hundred in both houses; nor is there mention made of a fingle pensioner. The parliament, ftigmatized by the name of the oensionary parliament, proposed an expurgatory

oath to clear themfdves from that afperfion, containing many particulars, one of which was, that each member ihould fwear he had never given his vote in parliament for any reward or promise whatfbever. I fmcerely with, that to gratify the people the same or such another oath flioiild now be taken * and as the oath proposed by this bill will, I think, be rather more effectual, therefore, I am for the bill's being committed, and hope k will be paffed into a law⁴.'

* To pretend' [alluding to lord Walpoh's speechj that we are not at present in any danger from the private pensions that may be given to members of the other house, must appear absurd to every man that considers the nature of ministers, or the nature of mankind. My lords, it is a danger we can never be free from ; nor can we sufficiently guard against, as long as it is in the power of a minister to give, or of a member to receive. It is abfolutely neceflary for a minister to have the confent or approbation of parliament in almost every ftep qf his conduct. Therefore from the very nature of ministers, we may fuppose, that if he cannot obtain such confent or approbation by his authority, he will endeavour to obtain it by his power; and from the nature of mankind we must fuppose, that ampng such a number of men as are in the other house, the minister will always find some ready enough to proftitute their confent or approbation for a considerable brib,e, or annual pension. Thus we must always be exposej to this danger; and now we are a great deal more exposed to it, than ever we were heretofore; because our ministers now have infinitely more to give, and

* PEB. LORDS, vi. 375,

cuftom or example has, I am afraid, greatly added to the number of those, that are ready to receive *.' * By the very act of fettlement Uself, my Iprds, it was exprefsly enacted, arnongft other things, That no person having a pension from the crown, should serve as a membef of the house of commons; and though this clause was in general repealed by an act of the 4th and fth of queen Annt^ yet it was then again thought so reasonable to exclude pensioners from having feats in the'other house, that it was a-new enacted, That no person having a pension from the crown during pleasure, fhpuld be capable of being a member of any future house of commons; and by an act of the ift of the late.king, their incapacity was farther extended to all persons having any pension from the crown, for any term or number of years, either in their own names or in the name of any other person in trust for them, or for their benefit. Thus your lordfhips fee, that by the laws now in being, all persons who have pensions from the crown during pleasure, or for any term or number of years, are rendered incapable of having feats in/ the other house; and by these laws, great penalties are inflicted upon those who prefume to break through them. But as no provifion has been made by either of these laws for difcovering fecret offenders, and as every man must be fensible that such pensions may be given privately, the gentlemen of the other house have thought it, and I hope your lordfhips will think it neceflary, to provide the best remedy that can be thought of for this defect, which is the chief, and indeed the fole intention of this bill. I cannot help therefore being aftoniflied at its being pretended,

• ]?E3. LpRfts, vi. 383.

that this bill will occafion any alteration, or innovation in our constitution ; and there is nothing convinces me more of the necessity there is for pafling it, than the circumstances of the noble lords, who I find oppose it. To the honour of the administration in the first year of the late king, I must observe, that the law pa(Ted at that time for excluding pensioners from the other house, was introduced by a fecretary of state, and approved by mod of those in the adminiftration ; and it was prudent and right in them to do fo. A miniftef that has no intention to make use of bribery and corruption, has no occafion to oppose any bill that can be thought of, for preventing such infamous and illegal practices ; and therefore, when I find such a bill opposed, by those who are the known friends of a minister, it will always be a prevailing argument with me, not only to think that there is a present and preffing necessity for such a bill, but alfo, that the bill proposed will be in some measure effectual. It will at least raise the price of proftitutes, because the more rifle a man runs, the higher wages he will of courfe expect; and the higher-you raise the price of those who are liable to be corrupted, the more difficult will every future minister find it to corrupt, notwithstanding the many and great boons our miniftcrs have now to bestow; and then they must think of gaining the confent or approbation of parliament by their authority in perfuading, and not by their power in corrupting ».'

* I find (says the earl ofCarllfe) some lords are, upon this occafion, extremely apprehenfive of corrupting the morals of the people, by a multiplicity of new oaths.

' I wilh

DEB. LORD», vi. 384.

I wifli the same apprehensions had prevailed, when such an infinite number of oaths were contrived, for collecting our cuftoms and taxes. Moft of these oaths are to be taken by multitudes of people, and in cases where there are great temptations for perjury. The oath now proposed, is to be taken by none, but members of the other house; and the temptations to perjury can never be great or frequent, but when our constitution is in the utmost danger. It is therefore something ftrange, that we Should be so little apprehenfive of corrupting the morals of the people, by a multiplicity of oaths, when we are contriving methods for preserving the revenue of our fovereigns, and so very apprehenfive of the like effect, when we are contriving methods for preserving the constitution and liberties of OUF country. A foreigner, upon considering this behaviour, would be apt to judge we had very little concern about the latter, provided we could but enjoy a {hare of the former; and if we should reject this bill, without much better rcafons than I have yet heard against it, I fear most of our own people will join in forming the same f«Jfe opinion of this honourable and auguft affembly. Your lordihips must be all fcnsible how prevalent the jealousy at present is, of there being a great number of pensioners in parliament: the gentlemen of the other house have endeavoured to allay that jealousy, 'and to vindicate the honour of their affembly, by fending us up this bill. If it should be thrown out here, what will the nation think ? Will it not be generally fupposed that this is the house, in which the number of pensioners prevails, and that here the pensions have the most infallible effect ? Or perhaps it will be fupposed, that there are pensioners in the other house ¹ as well as in this, but that the pensioners in the

other, for the frit? of recommending themselves to their condiments, had leave from their matters to agree to this bill, becaufa their mailers-knew they could depend upon the number and. submiffion of their pensioners in this, for throwing it out. I am very fensible, my lords, there is no real ground for;ehher of these fuppositions; but those without doors, who do not know the reasons upon which your lordfliips proceed, when they find a bill rejected which makes no alteration in our constitution, which does not so much as make an alteration in any former law, which contains nothing but an enforcement of the laws in being against pensioners; such persons, I say, may think they'have rcafon to make one or other of these fuppositions; and should not we be extremely cautious of giving the least fhadow of reason for judging so unworthily of ouraflembly*}' * My lords, as the laws now in being for excluding pensioners from the other house, must to every man that considers them, appear to be altogether ineffectual, if this bill be rejected, 1 shall, even in my time, if I live but a very few years, expect to fee the other house full of pensioners. I fliall expect to* fee a minister in that house, out of a wantonness of power, by his'fingle veto, or the monofyllable NO, throw out a bill of the utmofl importance, without designing to give his flaves so much as one reason for what he obliges them to do. This indeed, if it should ever happen, I {hall look upon as a fign of his power, but not of his prudence; and I may prophefy, that if ever a minister ihould get such a power over the other house, his power in this will be as abfolute and equally infolent V

» DEB. LORDS, vi. 388, ^k Ibid. 389.

The bishop of Sail/hay [Skerhcke] opposed the bill, because it gave the commons the means of finding out tranfgreflbfs more effectually. Perhaps his good lordfhip might think this was taking the business of reforming mankind out Of the hands of the bishops, whofe indefatigable labours, in feafon and out of feafon, in word and doctrine, in teaching and preaching, are equal to the pulling down of any ftrong holds of Satan. See bishop Burnet's panegyric on the diligence of the clergy, at the conclufion of the HISTORY OF HIS OWN TIMES.

By this bill, says the bishop, the Commons are to become ' suberior to the chief branch of the legislature, to the crown itself; for they are to judge of the actions of the crown, and may determine, that a well-merited reward, given by the crown for the most eminent public services, was a corrupt reward, given for a gentleman's corrupt behaviour in their aflembly.'

Here his good lordfliip seems, with submiffion, to make a diftrefs where there is none. For the fupposed eminently serviteable gentleman had nothing to do but quit his feat in the house, and then the crown might give him a pension of 100,000 /. a year. But it does not seem eafy to under ft and why a bishop should be so zealous about this fupposed encroachment on the Crown, so long as it did not break in upon the power of the king to manufacture parfons into bishops. By what follows, one would imagine his lordfhip was disposed to be merry. ' If, says he, the other

* house should once render themselves superior to the

* crown, they would of courfe become superior to

* this house likewife, and would soon engrofs, as they

* have done before, the whole power of our govern-

« ment. They would either vote this houfc useless, [what a dreadful thing it would be if they should vote the ineftimable bishops useless!] * as they have once done already, or they would render it infignincant, by making it entirely subservient to them.' All this powr the commons would acquire by the • flngle circumstance of having power to demand an oath of their members, that they were not the minister's hirelings.

The bishop afterwards exprefles an anxiety about too many oaths, as if corruption were not as bad as perjury; but he says nothing about too many unintelligible and self-contradi&ory articles to be subscribed by the clergy. ' The laws of this kingdom, says the bishop, have always been extremely cautious of subjecttng a man to an oath, in any case where his interest may be concerned.' Therefore the good bishop ought to have been a great enemy to clerical subscription ; for that, furely, is subjeding a man to an oath, where his interest is concerned, (fo is his taking the oaths to the government.) Yet the language of the bishops is, Subscribe, or ftarve.

' The oath proposed by this bill, says the bishop, is, I think, such a one as can be underftood by no man.' [Is it more unintelligible, my good lord, than the Athanafum creed, or the doctrine of predeftination to eternal torments ; which is so full tf *sweett phafant, and comfortable matter •?']

Some readers may observe, that these remarks are rather ad hominem, than an Avers to the bishop's objections. True : but the bishop's objections are so frivolous, and befidcs so peculiarly unfuitable to the charafler of a bishop, who ought to have rejoiced in

* See the xvnth article.

an opportunity for letting his face against corruption, that my treating him and his objections with contempt, where every friend of virtue and his country has a right to exprefs indignation, ought to be considered as no small degree of candour. For the same reason I take no notice of his pretence, that it must be difficult to determine, what is a corrupt penGon; that the innocent would have been in danger from this bill; that there was no danger from placemen or pensioners in the house of commons ; that neither king nor ministry, were capable of corrupting any members of the commons ; that those who are for putting a flop to corruption, are enemies to the conftitutiou; that the opposers of Ch. Ift's tyranny, were only a difa&e&ed party, &c. So much for a specimen of pontifical politics — -Jic digerit emina Calchas. VIRG. ^f

JLord Carteret observed, that nothing would caft a worse flur upon the house of peers, than their rejecting this bill; that corruption cannot be too soon guarded against; for that the only time to guard against,it is, before it becomes prevalent, as after a majority in either house becomes corrupt, it will be impofsible to get a good bill against corruption pafTed ; thaf 99 persons in every hundred throughout the kingdom, thought there was real danger from corruption ; that the paffing of the bill would quiet the minds of the people, &c.

«I fhall conclude (says he) with observing to your lordfhips, that if you reject it, all those who think we are in danger from corruption, will conclude, that it is already become impofiible to guard against it by any legal means, and will therefore begin to think of some other method for preserving our confti-

* DEB. LORDS, vi. 400.

tution, which may; prbve of ^dangerous conftqaence to the Hluftrious fom%, nowMiportour throne/ On the fams- bceafion^ <)*».'duke of drgyte-(pake as follows:

* My lords, we awhow/upda'arWH, for putting an end to, or geJeaft preventing? jene'fcrr of jconwptkm in the other ^houfcj and'from the opposition'the/bill meets wJth heK»nandtbe imaginary dangers thatw^re fuggefted 'fbrtfiipportiflg, or irather excufing that oppofinonj; thoftwho are'rtot'pwfonally acquainted with the noble lords, who have /poke upon that side of the¹ qudbooj would I think be apt to foppoTe their opinion to be either, that corruption is now become a necefiary «vil, without which the forms of x>ur government could not be preferred, or that it is an evil of very little consequence, and not at all incompatible with the subMence of a.free government. Corruption my lords, has always hitherto been allowed to be vile, to be- dangerous. I have for my own part difcouraged it in all stations : I shall always difdain the obedience or the parafitical fort of anent, that is to be gained only by corruption, and I have always been forry, when I have observecl, it was not-¹ equally difcouraged by others; for if it were no way encouraged by -thole in high stations, it would never -be pofiible for the mode in any country to cover that infamy, which naturally attends the corrupted ; nor- would the quality of the offender ever atone for the wretched meanness of the offence. Corruption, my lords,-is of-all dangers the greatest our constitution can be expofcd to, and the rooft to be apprehended. Its approach is imperceptible, but its blow, if not prevented, is fatal ; and you cannot prevent its blow, unless you prevent its approach. The laws now in being for excluding

pcnfipoers from having Jeats in, the othnthouse, are deiigned as a safegaard agftinft corruption's entering in one fltape at least within the walla of that house; and when we are considering whether these laws ought, to be enforced, we, have -no occafion for examining into late measures, or for fuppofing that any late practices have been made use- of for corrupting the memUrs of either house. We have now as much reason to guard against the approach of'corruption as we had when these laws were made; therefore we are now to consider only the laws themselves, and if they appear infuf&cient, they ought to be amended, whether any corrupt practices have lately been made use of or not. That these laws are inefficient for the end. intended, mustyl think, appear to any one that peruses them. There are penalties, 'tis true, inflicled upon penfioaers that (ball prefume to fit or vote m the other house; but it is evident that these penalties can never be recovered, because the facl can never be proved. A pension or» bribe may be given in such a manner, that even .He who gives it can be no direct witnsfs against the receiver; and it is always given in fucb a fecret wanner that the criminal may have good reason to think his crime can never be difcovered. For this reason no penalty you can infli& will ever have a great effe<3 } and this makes it neceftary, in cases of fufpjcion, to require an oath from the party fufpe&ed. I fliall not say, my lords, that the oath required by this bill will have all the effeft that could be wished. There may be some so abandoned as to despise the religious ceremony of an oath ; but it will have an effect upon a great rnany ; and even the most abandoned will be fhy of denying their having a pension upoq oath in the

very (act, perhaps, of the man who pays them their petitions. Nay, even prudence itself will make men fljy of being guilty of perjury, kft the concealment of their crimes (hould afterwards be imputed to them as a favour, and made use of as a handle for obliging them to do as much dirty work afterwards, without a pcnfion, as they had dorte before for the fake of a pension. It is an old and a true proverb, That when I tf uft a man with my fecret, I make him my mailer. An avaritious, or an' extravagant and neceffitous man may accept of iniquitous wages from a minister, and yet he would not, perhaps, chuse to be such an abfolute Have to that minister, as he must be, should he put it in his power to conv\St him of perjury. Therefore the oath prescribed by this bill will certainly have a very great effeS; and as the laws proposed to be enforced by this bill evidently appear to be insufficient, this method of enforcing them ought to be chosen, at least till a more effectual one can be thought on V * My lords, I look upon the present question to be a trial of ikill, the fate of which is to determine whether or no our coriftitution is hereafter to be deftroyed by corruption, and the people reduced to the fatal necessity of endeavouring to restore it by the sword. If this should ever come to be the unlucky fate of this nation, those who now oppose our making use of legal means for fecuring our constitution, whilst it is yet in our'power, will have no great reason to rejoice in their paft conduit. Let us consider, my lords, the vast fums of money that are now at the disposel, or under the direction of the crown; the infinite number of lucrative pofts,

* DEB. LORDS, vj. 394..

places, and employments, most of then unknown to our ancestors, now depending upon the fele and arbitrary pleasure of the crown; and tht great variety of penal laws, by one or other of which the most innocent may be made to fuffer, the most cautious may be entrapped, and from which the molt guilty may be fcreened by virtue of that dispofing or mitigatory power, which, with refped to many of them, is now lodged in the officers of the crown. Let us, I say, my lords, consider these things, and we must acknowledge that the present danger we are in of having our parliaments converted into a furkijb divan, is far from being imaginary; and when we are under such well grounded apprehensions, fhall we rack our invention for vifionary dangers, in order to excuse our agreeing to any method for guarding against a danger so real, and which may, upon the fir ft change of ministers or measures, become inevitable and irresistible *.' * In the end of the late queen's reign, there was just such another bill brought into this house, which at that time met with so good a reception here, that it was thrown out by only one vote; and its meeting with that fate was occafioned by the fault of one noble lord, who, at the time the question was put, happened to be in the court of requests, with two proxies in his pocket V The duke of Ntwcoflle said, he thought this bill unneceflkry, as it was well known that the members of the other house were gentlemen of the best families and fortunes in the kingdom. The preservation of their estates, depended upon the preservation of the constitution ; and as bribing would deftroy the con-

* PEB. LORDS, vi. 396. ^b Ibid. 397.

ftitution,. a*id voider even, the, bribe precarious -t jno member cadd >be guihy of taking a bribe, b^cWe there could be no .tempjation ft) it. , And he tfwdight it wpold dKBinifc Jthe prerpgfltiyQJpf the croyrn, tbjsjcfore he ooulJf oat agree tux the hiH.

He was answered' by lord e*5/?itj£»W, that there was a fufpicion of fotne such practices; fcecause'that house'had frequently fent this bill toi'the lords. To pretend that this bill' encroaches upon the prerogative of the crown* isisomewhat ftrange. Has th.e crown a prerogative to infringe the- Jaws4 To say fo., is deftroying the^redit and authority of the crown; but the crown has nothing to do with peofions, it is the roinifter's affair. Men of family and fortune may be avaricious or luxurious, and may not think of the dangerous consequences of corruption ; certainly if they did, there would be no occafion to make laws Vgainft it; it would appear fo» hqrrible, that no man would allow it tp apprpach him, The corrupted ought ;o consider, that they do not fell their country only: fhat perhaps they may difregard; but they fell likewife fhemselves : they become the bond-flaves of the corruptor ; who corrupts them, not fojr their fakes, but for his own. Therefore if people would. bu{ oqn{\der, they would always rejeft the offer with, difdain. But hiftory fhews, tj>at to fatisfy the immediate cravings of some infamous appetite, the alluring bait is fwaU lowed, This n>akcs it neceiTary in gvery free state p contrive, if poflibk, to prevent corruptiqn. Th,e sooncr a remedy is.applied, the'less will be pur danger of falling into.that fatal djilemper; from which no free state, where. it has once become general, has ever yet recovered *,

' DEB. LORDS, vii. ^.09.

Jn the comautteewioa.ihfibiUiimttehgpUaouNUi penfioee,,^. Dt i^^Mr.^v^r^oluuwfelhmv * Sir, There- is * 4hort •butnauteriall MMndamtt which, I thH^,i<Aoi^te 1m^o>Itk».o^cftiw. It is so adapted to tbtf necefititsio/ tbe pnfeaftiiHm nod so mu«U,lor tte honour.ofr^fmuittlPnliia* I m.,fati«£ed it witf ,b« .agaeabfe ltei)K>H,!.a|ii & every other gewdernan.iwrew .W«W*ftawJibHbjtW}! as to enjoy, a ntoft. profound,.«a)mi wrth»m thpje^ ruffle of wk»d or weathfiT*/ Ail: qppoStioa -Jits hufljedj. but left,a ftprm StfiviA ieonvorUe,-1 «o» for making wfc of thi*. b«»ppy JMnc&se» this fa*owrk able opportunity, of prqiring m,ths .wwW thM.tbji* extraordinary unanimity does Jiof procted fromMjt feliifl) views qr. ejf peclatjon?, .but, fnom aotrye difinq terested public fplrit; and 4f ibpiiuwndnwnt which I fliall beg leave to offer, .Ibouli.pafs, yritk' tho same unanimity, .as, all other questioos haye. hitherto done, it will be a proof of.kj^eyond contradi^iojj. Sir, what I propose, is to by, «double ta» wpoa* places and pensions in case of tbe landed intc«ft.o£ this kingdom t and who is there io .this committea that can have any reasonabje objection against it? As for the gentlemen, in pjace,,th«y cannot .but be» fenfiblc what, an uncertain an.d precarious fitua^OA they are now ip; and that they hold their places, by the weakeft of all tenures, by n.oth.iqg but the (miles of a grea,t man, which, are. more fickle and ujconftanf than those of fortune Perhaps, it may. soon be proper for some of thcui to follow, the ex-,, ample of a noble earl, and refign ; therefore if can* not be worth their while to oppose it. BeQ.d.ea, it may be fpme confqlation to them that their landed estates will receive some benefits from their places which they th.emfelve> are so Ijkcly to Jpfci it is

impofsible, therefore, that a«y objection can come from diem. Aa for the gentlemen who are to fuc$eed them, if they are the same as I have heard mentioned, they are persona of such exalted notions of honour and patriotifm, that you could not put » higher affront upon them than to imagine, that th« sordid lucre of the place has any (hare in their thoughts. No, Sir, their patriotifm, like virtue, is its own reward, and the only one they defirej and therefore, it is equally certain, they will not oppose it. And as for the great man who has the dispofal of these places, it will be doing him a very fignal piece of service ; for by leflening the value of places, you will leflen the number of candidates, and so far take off from that iinmense trouble and fatigue, which he is forced daily, nay, hourly to undergo from innumerable felicitations, viflts, letters, mcffages, and importunities; and besides this, rt will be a great honour to his adminiftration, not to stand in need of the mean affistance of places to support it. Thofe gentlemen, therefore, who have any regard for his case or his honour, nraft all efpouse this motion. As for the rest of the house, they are country gentlemen, who feel too much the weight and burden of this tax upon their lands not to with for feme relief} it is, therefore, fairly to be concluded, that neither they nor any other gentlemen m the committee, can difapprove of this amendment. But, Sir, if all these reasons, ftrong as they are, more particularly at this juncture, were laid out of the case, the thing is so evidently right and just in itself, that it cannot be oppofcd. Sir, it is a fundamental rule of judice, as well as policy, that all taxes for the support of the government, should be laid with equality ; and how can it be pretended

that tfS. in the pound upon land, and 010 more upon places, is an equal tax ? The land is taxed in proportion to the rent, which is generally the full value, every body being defirous to let their estates for as much as they can get. The place is taxed in proportion to the falary, which is feldom a quarter part of the income, the fees and perquifites generally amounting to five or fix times as much. The rent is subjeft to deductions for repairs and lofles by the tenants; the falary is subjedk to neither. Nay, the land-owner is sometimes forced to pay the tar for rent which he does not receive; whereas the placeman never pays it, but upon the receipt of his falary. The land subjects the owner to the expence and trouble of serving many offices, particularly the" high-flierifF's, grand-jury-man's and others; -the place is so far from being liable to any of them, that it is of itself an indemnification and excuse against all. Then how can it be said, that this is acting fairly and impartially ? It is therefore high time for us to redtify this unequal oppreffive method of taxation; and if you lay 8*. in the pound upon places and pensions, it is very obvious how many advantages will flow from it. ift, It will in some measure operate as a place-bill; for by leflening the value of the places, it will leflen that undue influence which is fupposed to arife from them. 2dly, It will corroborate and strengthen that favourite law, the qualification a£t; for if it is neceflary that the members of this house should have an estate in land to a certain value, the less charge you lay upon the land, the more likely they Will be to fulfil and answer the intent of that good law. 3dly, It will in like manner fortify the laws of election; for if every freeholder is required to have 40 s. a year,

jto entitle him to *.vote» do no; .take away a sisth part of it from ^jni-.by.a tax 0^,4^. in the pound upon .the land* but rather lay it; upop placets and petition*, ln',(bqrt> Sir. alraoft a|l the good Jaws tpadq i for $he fire^dprn an,d independency of parlia.mfnt, will be in some. measure affijftcd by this amendment, i But I do,agree, that fom« places are of too small value to admit of a double tax, as the cxcife officers, and others, of 50 /. a year and under; but they might eafily he provided for out of the contingencies of the year} and a few other places are of too great importance and service to the state to undergo any diminution, I mean the judges, upon whom I am so far from levying a double tax, that I would rather except them from all taxes whatfoever, ;• fpr I think it a gre.it diihonour and reproach to any government not to support their magistrates with fplendor and dignity ; and if any other exceptions fnould b2 thought proper, they might all be provided for in the body of the bill. But upon places in general, a double tax is the true and just proportion to be observed; and that you may be fully uvtisfied that this amendment is HOE oqly founded upon reason but alfo upon precedent, I fliall beg leav« to refer you to an act of parliament made 29 and 30 Ch. II, when} for carrying on the war vigoroujly against France, i s. in the pound was laid upon personal eftatcs, and 3 s. upon pensions; and it is amazing to-me, how so wife and useful a law came to be so much neglected, Perhaps, Sir, fomc gentlemen might think it better to appropriate a gpehtec fnare of the profits of places and pensions to the feryice of the war, which I am far from difapproving of; and indeed I have heard, they have already done so iq Spain and furiey; but a,t present

I chuse rather to move it in this unexceptionable way to avoid all disputej- add to prefcrve that unanimity which has hitherto so happily subsisted amongft Us. The amendment,-therefore, that! beg leave to offer is, totnfertin the <jueftion, after tfcc 4;. in the pound upon lands, &c.' these words, " and the Aim of eight {hillings in the pound upon places and pensions."

CHAP. IX.

Of Qualifications for Members of Parliament.

TH E wisdom of our ancestors, and their anxiety about the safety of the state, put them upon endeavouring, by all pofsible means, to prevent the mischiefs likely to arife from bribery and corruption ; and, for that purpose, fuggefted the nccefiity of place and pension-bills, as we have seen in the foregoing chapter. To exclude corruption ftill more effectually, they added qualification-acts. They thought a member of parliament, who was himlllf a man of fortune, would both be less liable to ministerial influence, as being above want, and likcwife would be more felicitous about the fate of his country, as having himself a considerable prize at flake. On this subject, various views are to be taken, and various considerations to be attended to. Experience fhcws us, t,hat men are not always more or less obnoxious to corruption according to their circumfrances ; and that their greediness of the public money regulates more by their dispositions than their fortunes. The man, who loves money, whether with a view to hoard or to dissipate it, is the dangerous man, either as an elector or

a member. And of the two, the rpendtbrift is more likely to fell his country for Aoney, than the miser.

Again, it nuft be owned, that in the present difcrderly state of things, qualification-ads are likely to be of advantage; for every little check on corruption is wanted, and all too little.

Bat if representation were put upon an adequate foot, the power of commissioning legislators so divided, that it would be importable to fill the house by corrupt means (which it would be, if it were neceflary to bribe 206,000, the major half of 410,000, inftead of 5,723; fee vol. i. p. 39, et fey.) and if parliaments weme annual, with exclufion by rotation, &c. it would be of much less consequence, that ele&ors and members were men in independent circumstances, than as things are now.

No minister would find it for his advantage to tempt either eleftor, or member; and if there were no buyer, there could be no fellers. The only advantage, which would then appear to kings, lords, commons, rninifiers, electors, members, Sec. would be that of the public; and that advantage every man would plainly fee he might as well purfue as not; because his own advantage would be included in that of the public; and he would find that he could no other way feek his own private advantage, than by confulting that of the public.

The Romans, in the republican times, fhew, that they thought it useful to fee that those, who were entrusted with the care of the general safety, should be men of property. Accordingly, the qualification of a Reman fenator was 64587. 6s. 8</. raised by Augujlus to 9687 /. 10 J. — which if a fenator impaired, he loft his feat«.

* Suiton. IN AUG. Cic. xm. 5.

A qualification-bill was rejected fey the lords, Y. />. 1697. They thought the nation ihould be at liberty .to choofe honest men, though poor, and pay them

wages*.

The qualification-ad, requiring members for counties to be men of at least 6oo/. a year, and burgefle* of 300 /. in land, was pafied in the year 1711, when the majority of the common* were tories ^k. The deftgn, Burntt (ays, was to exclude merchants and traders. But that, he thinks, was bad policy, because landed men are generally no judges of the interests of commerce, which is an object of great importance.

It was enacted 9 Amu, that every member for a county should have an estate at least for his own life «f 600 A a year, and every member for city, or borough, 300/. (a most ridiculous difference ! as all members have equal weight in the bouse) and that every de&jon of a person not so qualified, should be void; every candidate, if called upon at his election, to be obliged to give in his estate upon oath. And the commons read twke a bill for explaining that aft, and increasing the qualification of members ^c. It was dropped,

A. D. 1713, the commons, in a grand committee, con/ldered the a& of the ninth year of her majefly's reign, intitled, Ait AB for ftcvring the Freedom ff PearKanuntS) by farther qualifying the Members to Jk ** the Hntfe of Comment; and came to the foUoving resolutions: — ' I. That aotwitbstandiag the oath taken by any candidate on or after any election, his qualification may be afterwards examined into. H. That the person whofe qualification is exprefsly objected to in any petition relating to his ele&iea, fhall, within sisteen days after the petition read, give

• Tiad. CONTIH. i. jjo.

^fc Sum. iv. 316. c DEB. CoMi x, 296<

to the clerk of the house of commons a paper figned by hhnself, containing a rental or particular of the lands, tenements, or hereditaments, whereby he makes out his qualification; of which any person concerned may have a copy. HI. That of such lands, tenements, or hereditaments, whereof the party hath been in poffeffion for three years before the election, he shall alfo insert in the same paper, from what person, and by what conveyance or aft in law, he claims and derives the same; and alfo the consideration if any paid, and the names and places of abode of the witnefles to such conveyance and payment. IV. That if a fitting member fliall think fit to question the qualification of a petitioner, he fliaH, within sisteen days after the petition read, leave notice thereof in writing with the clerk of the house of commons; and the petitioner fliall, within sisteen days after such notice, leave with the said clerk of the house the like account in writing of his qualification, as is required from A fitting member V The eldeft fons of peers, the members for the univerfities, and the 45 members for North Britain, are exempted from the qualification-law. Yet I should think, it would not be eafy to shew why any ma«, whether he be the foil of a duke or a cobler, should be trusted in a station, where he is likely to be tempted, if he is in circumstances which render him obnoxious to temptation. Nor is it eafy to imagine, why a member for Middlefex must fhew his circumstances to be above temptation, while a member for Clackmannan, whofe vote weighs as heavy as any other's, may be % dependent beggar.

» DEB. COM. v. 62.

Ajrvstate, or income,-for life only, is riot a security agoinft corruption. Yef it is "admitted as a qualificatiour" But a member may te tefflptetf to feet, fcy indirect meansj a provifion for'his family, who must come into tliftrefe'after fiis d6alh ; Jflhtffncome is for lifbtuiljr.

A. D. 1761, a bill" was brought into parliament, by which irwas proposed, it should be enacted, that ever/ member, before he fat, or voted, should be obliged to give into the hbuse Of commons a rental'or fchedute'of his estate, with all particulars, fignedand fworn to, on pain of a fevere fine in case of faliification, to be levied by any person fuing for the same as an action for debt, in spite of privilege,¹ &c. And, on every diminution of his annual income, during the fitting of parliament, to gIVe an account of the same to the house. Eldeft fons, or heirs apparent of peers or lords of parliament, members for the two univerfities, and for Scotland, (for no known reason) to be excepted from this falutary regulation'; as if'50 or 60 members obnoxious to bribery were no grievance.

But when this bill came-fo'be pa/Ted Into a law, it was so amended (the wrong way) that it might as well not have been pa/Ted. ' For, first, it was not to be in force, till the determination of the then fitting parliament} and besides, it was so whittled down, that a member might give¹ in a mock fchedule or rental to'the house, in the same manner as at his election; and he could not be challenged concerning, his qualification any more during that parliamentj Whereas by the bill, as first proposed, it would have been very dangerous to give a mock-qualification for feven years; and members would have been at any time liable to be accused of having reduced themfelveg to a condition obnoxious to bribery.

BOOK II.

Of taxing the Colonies.

CHAP. I.

That the Qljeft, our Minifters have bad in View in taxing the Colonies, was, enlarging the Power of the Court, by increafmg the Number of Places and Pensions for their Dependents.

THE subject of our late broil with our colonies, the greatest evil that has arifen in the state for these many centuries paft, is doubly entitled to a place in a work which contains an enquiry into public abuses, both as being itself one of the grosseft al/uses, and. alfo as being particularly the consequence of parliamentary corruption.

It is the exorbitant 1'oradoufness of the court-tools, the great number of those needy pcrfons, and the fear our ministers are conftantly subject to, from the hoftility of their opponents, with the confcioufness, that they hold their places by the tenure of inttrefl, and not of merit; that has lately mifled our ministry into the most fatal measure of laying taxes upon our colonies, who have no representation in the house of commons which taxes them. Our ministers have made a breach perhaps never to be clofed; they

have opened a wound perhaps -never more to be healed — all to get a few more places for their wretched dependents.

Upon the modern plan of government, viz. Buying every necessary vote, a Britijh ministry must be so diftrefled for money, as to be at any time ready to dig up the very foundations of Pandamonium, if they thought there were either gold or diamonds to be found in that foil. Yet, when Watyolc was at his wit's end for money to ftop the mouths of his harpies, it was fuggefted to him, that the colonies could afford to pay taxes as well as the mother country, and • that from thence a large income might in time be raised for the use of electioneering and pensioning, and that there might be many good pods and places established in the colonies for the advantage of the court-tools; even Walpole had, on that occafion, some consideration. He answered to those, who made this propofal, That the colontfts, by the profits of our trade with them, enabled us to pay our taxes, which was the same as paying taxes to the mother country; and that, by the redactions, under which we have laid their commerce, all their money comes to the mother-country; and the mother-country can at most have their all. His; fucceffors, however, have seen this object in a different light, and have considered a small advantage to themselves as of more consequence than a great benefit to the public. But so long as we fee such villainous uses made of the public money by our ministers, we ought to difcourage all the arts we fee them ufmg for bringing money into the treafury, or increafmg their own influence, and therefore we ought to oppose their taxing the colonies, as an abuse, in which we are deeply concerned, and which may prove fatal to us, as well as to the colonifts.

Bad ministers always fhew an inclination for multiplying taxes. Ib gives an opportunity, for them to embezzle; for in much handling of money,, forne wilE ftick to the fingers. And: a--bad ministry want, above all things, money, to dole about, in order to, keep in power. If they gain.their present point, the fpoils of the colonies will help up the- (applies, and the influence of the court will be increased>; they will have more trumpeters to defend their measures; fuccefa yiill fanftify rapine and bribery; the-free spirit of the colonifts (who seem zt present to pofless a larger measure of that virtue, than the mother-country) will be broken, by the iron rod of oppreffion; and Corruption, like another leud Cleopatra, as descrihed by. Dryden,

(Her galley down the Civet Cydnos row'd,

The tacklings filk; the dreamers wav'd in gold,, fcfr.) will fail in triumph through the whole Zfc/tyA. empire in Europe, Aftaand America; her falfe and fophifticate charms will bewitch all eyes, and debauch.all hearts, and all will be willing to fell their country, if a purchafer can be found.

It is not yet, but it will soon be, too late to wardioff this horrible ruin.

In the year 1754, when our profound government, always too, bufy in the wrong place, proposed to tax the colonies by acl: of parliament, and to dire& the governors to concert measures for •their defence against the French, inftead of leaving both to the colonifts themselves, this wife scheme was communicated by governor Shirley to a gentleman of Philadelphia, then in Bo/ion, who has very eminently dilUnguifhed himself, before and since that time, in the philofophical world, and whofe$ judgment, penetration and candour, as well as his

readiness and ability to fuggeft, or carry into execution every scheme of ^public utility, have most deservedly-endeared him, not only to his fellow-subject» ever the -whole American continent, but to multitudes on this side the Atlantic^ and now fuffers for that integrity which should have procured him reward. This fagacious gentleman (w-hpfe friendship the collector of thefc papers will ever account one of the most fortunate circumstances of his life) fent the governor a set of remarks, of which the following are the heads; and whkh do almost exhauft the subject.

That the people always bear the burden heft, when they have, or think they have, some mare in the direction.

That when public measures are generally diftafteful to the people, the wheels of government must move more heavily.

That excluding the people of America from all fliare in the choice of a grand council for their own. defence, and taxing them in parliament, where they have no representative, would probably give-extreme diflatisfa&ion. [How foundly this extraordinary person judged of the sentiments of the colonifts, let the hiftory of the subfequent proceedings of pur incorrigible government in attempting, in spite of this wife premonition, to tax them in parliament, bear witness. J

That there was no reason to doubt the willingness of the colonifts to contribute for their own defence.

That the people themselves, whofe all was at ftake, could better judge of the force neceflary for their defence, and of the means for raifing money for the purpose, than a Britijh parliament at so great 4 distance.

That natives of America would be as likely to confult wifely and faithfully for the fafcty of their native

country, as 'the governors Cent from Britain, whofe objedt is generally to make fortunes, and then return home, and who might therefore be expeded"to carry on the war, against. France rather in a way, by which themfetves were likely to be gainers, than for the greatest advantage of the cause.

That compelling the colonies to pay money for their own defence, without their confent, would shew a fufpicion of their loyalty, or of their regard for their country, or of their common sense, and would be treating them as conquered enemies, and not as free Britain, who hold it for their undoubted right not to be taxed but by their own confent, given through their representatives.

That parliamentary taxes, once laid on, are often continued after the necessity for laying them on, ceafes; but that, if the colonifts were trusted to tax themselves, they would remove the burden from the people, as soon as it should become unnecessary for them to bear it any longer.

That, if parliament is to tax the colonies, their affemblies of representatives may be difmified as useless.

That taxing the colonies in parliament for their own defence against the French, is not more just, than ic would be to oblige the cinque ports, and other coafts of Britain, to maintain a force against France, and to tax them for this purpose, without allowing them representatives in parliament.

That the colonifts have always been indirectly taxed by the mother country (besides paying the taxes neceflarily laid on by their own aflemblies) inafmuch as they are obi iged to purchafe the manufactures of Britain, •charged with innumerable heavy taxes; some of which

manufactures they could make, and others could purchafe cheaper at other markets.

That the colonifts are besides taxed by the motner country, by being obliged to carry great part of their produce to Britain, and accept a lower price than they might have at other markets. The difference is a tax paid to Britain.

That the whole wealth of the colonifts. centres at last in the mother country, which enables her to pay her taxes.

That the colonifts have, at the hazard of their lives and fortunes, extended the dominions, and increased the commerce and riches of the mother country, [fo much that in Jojh. Gee's time, it was reckoned, that our colony trade was almost the only commerce, by which we were gainers] that therefore the colonifts do not deserve to be deprived of the native right of Britons, the right of being taxed only by representatives chosen by themselves.

That an adequate representation in parliament would probably be acceptable to the colonifts, and would best unite the views and interests of the whole

empire.

A headftrong minister made afterwards so good use of these mafterly observations, as to improve upon the ftupidity of the blind pilots of 1754. For he almost set America in arms, by propofing to tax them in a time of peace, the money to be applied, not to their defence, but to the general purpose of all the Britijb taxes, the support of a standing army, and gorging the rapacity of the state-bloodfuckers. He had trie- influence afterwards to obtain a parliamentary confutation of the colonifts doctrine, and a declaration, that * the king and parliament of Great-Britain had, have, and of right ought to have, full power and authority to

makeJaw? and fta,tutes of sufficient force to bind the colonies, and his majefly's subjefts in them, in all wfes, whatfpever}' and consequently in the case of tsxa/ion without representation.. This was literally Fapt't d jv ine right of ggverning wrong, Aqd the worthy gendemao above referred to, being aflted in the house of commons, what he thought of the declaration, answered frankly,' He thought it, and fupposed that all ' the colonifts would think it, arbitrary and uojust.' Some of their blundering doings our profound ministers were afterwards obliged to undo, to the diyerfion of three kingdoms, and the cplpnifts.

Grenville would have considere.d> had he beeri a man of conceptions large enough fpr a tradefman's clerk, that by confining our cplpnifts to trade only with us, we make them pay our taxes, without dire£Uy laying upop them any internal tax. For, if half our manufacturers are maintained by them, do they not pay the taxes, which we charge upon those manufacturers ? Does not the confumer pay the whole charge of the article he confumes-? But that ihort-fighted politician exclaimed, that our chargeable colonies ought not to expect immunity from those taxes, which come fp heavy upon us, and of which charge a great part is cccafioned by the defence of our colonies. Would Grenville then have approved of our getting rid of this chargeable appendage ? I believe the French would have thanked him for a part of the incumbrance, and I believe his own countrymen would have torn him to pieces, if he had proposed alienating any part of what all considerate psrfons know to be of ineftimable aoV vantage to us, if we do not, by injustice and falfe policy^ disappoint ourselves of the advantage.

The objecl which a commercial nation ought to have always m view, is the enlargement and establish-

roent of its >c«mnen»; aoc is time pay plan ^opae peomjfing for this nwrnpfe,.fhaa that of jeolojnfiag, For cotonjfl? proceeding originally fnwi « motor (country, come Utto the wodi with a prejudice 4»£ that country, which will naturtlty kad them, in the cnnv duft of their iooqunercc, to favour'that coqotrpabove ^11 others; And this happy prejudice can only-be drminUhed, or eradicnted, by iitufigeon the put oFthe mother country. Nothing brooks a»nftraintii> Irttle as commerce: nothing i; mor« delicate, nothing more fpontanegus. Whatever fusoceedings pf the toother country thentfbee break in- trpon the freedom pf,oaamerce, defeat the very intention of cofanifiog, ;md overthrovr it to the fouaduioa. By th> rule !«• the wisdom of our ministerr in taxing ther coioniesr te judged of, or rather the diftrds they are io for a little rr^oney, .and a few -pofts and place* Jor their creatures.

CHAP, II,

Our Colonies of great Advantage, and therefore deserved better Treatment.

GRENVILLE's party, in order to defend their own folly in opening a breach between the mother-country and the colonies, endeavoured to depreciate the value of the colonies to Britain, and to shew, that were we even to lofe them, the damage would not be great. They pretended, that colonies are naturally prejudicial to die populoufness of a mother-country. But they only exposed' their own ignorance. Davenant, if they had ever read him, (and they must be deep politicians who never read that

capital author) would, have faved them the trouble of falling into this absurdity. « It will peradventure (says that mafterly writer) be a great security and encouragement to those induftrious people' [the colonifts] if a declaratory law were made, That Englijbmtn have right to all the laws of England, while they remain in countries subject to the dominion of this kingdom *, The colonifts, the noble difcoverers and fettlers of a new world, from whence, as from an endless fource, wealth and plenty, and the means of power and grandeur unknown to former ages, have been pouring into Europe these three hundred years !' What encouragement, what security do they not de. serve to enjoy ! With the design of fetting up, and keeping up a standard, in favour of civil and religious liberty, did the heroic ancestors of the colonifts fly from perfecution in their native country; they crofled the vast Atlantic; they pierced those woods where no humanifed foot from the creation had trodj they roused the deadly ferpent in his hole, the favage beaft in his den, and the brutal Indian in his thicket; they encountered all the danger and difficulties of forming those fettlements which have made the Britijh empire what it is.

* Generally speaking (says Davenant') our colonies, while they have English blood in their veins, and have relations in England, and while they can get by trading with us, the ftronger and greater they grow, the more this crown and kingdom will get by them; and nothing but such an arbitrary power as fliall make them defperate, can bring them to rebel.

Colonies do not naturally produce depopulation in the mother country; but rather the contrary. For

^a Daven. n. 36. ^b Ibid. u. 10.

many individuals emigrating, cause cheapness for those, who ftay behind. They marry, and carry on population. The mother country thus coming to fwarm with people, they find themselves obliged to cultivate trade and manufactures, &c.

Davenant accordingly {hews *, that England is grown both more populous and richer, since the improvement of the colonies, than before; that, particularly, from the restoration to the revolution, viz, 28 years, the number of inhabitants was increased 900,000. What indeed has increased the- wealth and power of the nation so much beyond queen Elizabeth's times, but the colonies ?

" We cannot but wonder, says that excellent author, at their policy who were the first promoters of that law in 1695, which puts a difficulty upon, and restrains the fale of any plantation or parcel of land in America to foreigners ; whereas indeed we should invite and encourage aliens to plant in the Weft-India* whereby the crown gains subjects, and the nation gets wealth by the labour of others. This ftatute does peradventure want revifmg. And countries that take no care to encourage an acceffion of strangers, in a courfe of time will find plantations of pernicious consequence. It may be computed that there have gone from England to the IVeJl-Indies for many years by a medium about 1800 persons annually; but then there is reason to think, that for some time the perfecutions abroad have brought over to us by a medium about 500 foreigners every year ; and there are grounds to believe, that for these last 20 years the Wefl-Indies

* ii. 2.

have ferrt us back annually about 300 persons of their offspring with this advantage, that the fathers went out poor, and the children came home rich. But if fiich measures should hereafter be taken as will hinder the acceffion of Grangers, or difcourage the planters from returning back -, then these colonies would drain us every year of 11800 persons.

* We fhall shew, that the plantations are a fpring of wealth to this nation; that they work for us; that their treafure centers aH here; and that the laws •have tied them faft enough to us; so that it must be through our own fault, and mifmanagement, if they become independent of England.' Sir Jtfiah Child thinks, the New-Englandtrs, in his times, confumed ten times the value, in Englljh manufa&uret, of what they .fent to England. Yet he reckons New-England the least advantageous of all the .colonies. He thinks, two-thirds of :all the English flipping was, in his time, employed in the American trade, meaning chiefly the continental colonies.

Poftleihwayte thinks half the English manufactures £O to America.

At the time of the ftamp-a&, it was computed, that the Americans owed Britain four millions fterling: A proof of a prodigious commerce.

The king, A. D. 1721, recommended encouraging the colonies to furnim naval ftores? which would not pnly be advantageous otherwife to both countries, but would divert the colonifts from fetting up, and carrying on manufactures, which dire&ly interfere with those of Britain*.

• Tittd. CotfTIN. I. 652.

At. D. 1723, the exports to Penfylvania wer,e 115,992/. In 1742, they were increased to 75,2957. From 1744 to 1748 inclufive, our whole Exports

to America. Northern Colonies. Weji-India JJIaitds.

£• £•

1744, 640,114 ------• 796,112

5, 534,3^l6 ------' 503.669

6, 754.945 ---------' 47^.994

7, 726,648 --------- 856,463

8, 830,243 --------- 734,095

Total 3,486,266 3>3⁶3>333 ------------Difference 122,933

Total 3,486,266

From 1754 to 1758, inclufive. Northern Colonies. Wtjt-ludia IJlands.

£• £-

1754, ,246,615 --------• 685,675

5, ,177,848 --------• 694,667-

6, ,428,720 ---------' 7335458

7, ,7²7>9²4 --------' 776,488

8, ,832,948 ---------• 877,571

Total 7,4H,055 3>767,859 ------------Difference 3,646,196

Total 7,414,055

From this view of our whole exports to our American colonies, it appears, that our trade to the iflands 27 years ago, viz. A, D. 1744, amounted to 796,112/. and thirteen years ago, viz. A. D. 1758, to 877,571 /.

That in 1744 our whole exports to the continent of America amounted to 640,114/. but in 1758 to 1,832,9487. So that in 14 years, viz. from 1744 to 1758, our ifland trade has been neither much increased nor diminished; but that our trade to the continent was in the same period increased almost three-fold. And in the year 1758, we had not got poflefiion of all North-Amer lea. For 'the peace, by which we have excluded the French from all that part of the continent, which is eaft of the MiJJijfippi, and are become mailers of a territory, whofe extent baffles arithmetic, was made in 1763. Suppofing our trade to the continent of America to increase at the same rate, which nothing was likely to hinder, but our enraging our colonifts by Grcnvi/le's mad and unjust project of taxing them, without reprcfcntation, it is evident, that this alone would have been an incxhauftibk, and endless fund of trade. For, if in the last of the above quoted years, viz. 1758, our trade was increased three-fold beyond what it was 14 years before, it was to be expected, that in another period of 14 years, viz. A. D. 1772, the present year, it should be again increased more than three-fold, because our dominion, and number of people in the continent, have received an addition from an extraordinary cause, viz. the peace of 1763. If fo, the amount of our exports to the continent of America^ in 1772, ought to be 5,498,8447. And in 14 years more 16,496,5327. So that, if the ratal Grenville had never been born,

------patria et Trojx communis Erinnys. l''^rg-

here was a fund of trade, which might hnve employed more manufacturing hands, than would have made this ifland as populous as Holland. For many ages will be pail, before manufactures can come to be cultivated in

America to any such effect as to superfede those of the mother-country. Because, for many ages to come, it will be more advantageous for the working people to take land, fettle, and marry, than to be journeymen manufacturers. Which likewife fccures a prodigious and ftill growing and accumulating increase of people. It is found, that, on the continent of America, the number of the people is at least doubled every twenty years. Therefore, if the number of Britijh people on the continent of America be now two millions, (I put the lowest computation) twenty years hence it will be four millions: Let the reader only consider one moment, what fort of head that man must have had, who could think of rifquing the lofs of four millions of cuftomers for the manufactures of his country — all for the fake — of making a few places for collectors, and commiflioners of duties and taxes, that he might-have somewhat to ftop the Cerberian barking of a pack of hungry court-curs. Statefmen have no right to expect our putting a more candid conflruction upon their proceedings. If they really meant the public good, we should fee them aiming at the public good; we should fee the national debt lefTened, the army reformed, the number of places and pensions reduced, &c. — But to return.

* More than one-fourth part of the English (hipping is fupposed to be employed in the trade to America V

The excellent Dr. Franklin says, the force of the American privateers in the last war, was greater, as to both rnen and guns, than all queen Elizabeths royal navy ^b. He thinks Britain can want no trade, but

* Hume, HIST. STUARTS, i. 125. ^k LETTERS, p. 20$.

vr'tth berdmerkan colonies, which must bt continually Increafing.

I am aware, that, in diminution of the value of our colonies, the Grenville party have alledged, that the colonifts are very deeply indebted to us, and that they have ever shewn a backwardness to acquit themselves of those just debts; so that our commerce with them is' much less to be deftred. But is it not notorious, that for many ages together the mother-country had no ftiadow of complaint of this kind against the colonies; and that the first cause of the interruption of payments from America was our minister's flopping the trade between our colonifts and the Spaniards in that part of the world.

Such have our colonies been to us, and such, and more than we can imagine, they would have been to us.

And now it is a favourite object with us, to enflave and deftroy those whom we ought both from gratitude: and prudence, to support and cherifli. For, whilst I am writing these lines, Hear, O Heavens, and give ear, O Earth; or rather may the memory of the tranfaftion be annihilated both from heaven and earth — At this very hour, we are meditating to deprive the city of Bo/Ion of its port during an unlimited period, by which 25,000 people are to be puniihed, many thousands utterly beggared, and a lofs of half a million brought upon the inhabitants of that great city, for a riot committed by certain individuals unknown ; the inhabitants offering to make up the damages. We are propofing to punifli the innocent with the guilty, and to punifli the guilty for acting somewhat outrageoufly, after we ourselves had by our tyranny put them out of their wits.

In the NEWS PAPERS of April, 1774, was publlihed the following compurifon between the proceed-

ings of government against Be/ion in New England, for a riot committed there by persons unknown, and the proceed ings of government against the city of Edinburgh, on account of a riot, A. D. 1737, in which captain Porteoui, of the town-guards, was, by persons to this hour unknown, taken out of prifon, and put to death, for the slaughter of several people at an execution, for which he was condemned as a murderer, and afterwards reprieved by the queen regent, the king being abroad.

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST

Edinburgh,

Began the xoth of Feb. 1737, and ended the 2ift of June, having continued near four months.

The provoft and magiftrates of Edinburgh, the judges of Scotland, and many other witnefles examined at the bar.

Counfel and evidence for the magiftrates and city fully heard at the bar.

Two members for Edinburgh, forty-five for Scotland in the lower house, and fixteen in the upper house.

Charge — An overt act of rebellion, and an atrocious murder — proved on a full hearing, and by competent evidence.

Bo/Ion,

Began the i4th, and ended the 3ift of March* 1774, being in all fcvcnteen days.

Witnefles examined at the privy council, and their evidence fuppreflcd.

The agent refused a hearing at the bar.

Not one member for Bo/Ion in either house, nor for all or any part of America, nor even a voice in electing one.

Charge — A riot and trefpafs — no evidence, and no hearing.

Edinburgh.

Frequent conferences held between the two houfcs to compare the evidence, &c.

Punifliment — A fine Of 2000/.

For proof, fee the JOURNALS 'of the Lords and Commons in 1737, and the BiLl against Edinburgh.

Bo/ion. Not one conference.

Punifliment — The lofs of their port, to the injury of the town, at the lowest and most favourable eftimate, of 500,000/. the restoration of their port, and of the use of their property, left at the king's mercy, after they {hall have paid for the tea the full price, and all damages, to the amount, we may prefume, of 30,000 /.

JOURNALS of the Lords and Commons 1774, and the BOSTON PORT BILL.

CHAP. III.

fbe Colonies^ tbougb ft "valuable to Britain, have been greatly opprejjed by the Mother Country.

« T7 VERY aft of authority of one man' [or "-* body of men] ' over another, for which there * is not an abfolute necessity, is tyrannical V

Our colonifts have long complained, that we have needlessly hampered and restri<fted their trade; that, like awkward parents, we have exerted too much authority over our children ; while the whole art of managing them consided in letting them alone.

The colonifts complain, that the governors we fend them are generally needy men, whom we fend thither chiefly to fill their pockets; that both governors and judges depend more upon the Britijh court than upon the people whom they are to govern and to judge; that our court gives authority to the commiflioners of cuftoms to appoint and pay, at the expence of the people, without their confent, as many officers as they please, to the multiplication of placemen, the plundering the people, and the danger of liberty; that the whole people of America are put to expence and trouble merely to put a little money in the pockets of a few Portuguezc merchants in England. The colonifts must not import direstly from Portugal even a little oil or fruit, without having them loaded with the expences of a voyage three thousand miles round by England, which, in war time, increases every article 30 per cent, and impoveriflies the colonies. They

* Beccaria, CRIMES AND PUN. p. 10,

must not make a nail, a penknife, or a hat. We empty our jails on them, and fill their country with our rogues and thieves. We oblige their afiemblies to provide quarters for our foldiers, and find them firing, bedding, candks, small beer, or rum, fait, vinegar, &c. at the expence of the provinces, in a time of profound peace, though they have little occafion for a military force at any time, being themselves all trained to arms. The colonifts were, however, so pleased at the removal of the ftamp-a£l, that they agreed to the quartering of troops, hoping that it would be only a temporary grievance. But that they might not give place to authority where it was unconstitutional, they made a£h of their own afiemblies, leaving out some of the small articles, as fait and vinegar. Even this was found to be rebellion, and the province of Nfui York had its affbmbly annihilated for the offence.

The house of representatives of MaJJacbusefi Bay petitioned the king to remove Sir Fr. Bernard, their governor; because, amongft other things, he had mifrepresented the colonifts to the ministry in such a manner, that it was thought necefiary to fend a military force among them (inflead of fending them foldiers, they should have removed, grievances.) Thofe military men turned the aflembly room into a barrack for the common loldiers, and planted the centinels in such a manner, that the councellors and judices of the courts were interrupted and challenged in pailing on their bufmefs. They endeavoured to quarter their troops in the town of Bof.on, while the barracks were useless. He diflblved the ^ffembly at the most improper time, and arbitrarily refused to call another, though often petitioned for ten months together.

The colonifls complain of general warrants, under which any officer or servaut of jthe cuftoms may

break open any man's house, clofet, cheft, &c. at pleasure ; of our court's establishing the arbitrary and oppreffive power of the excife laws in the cuftoms; of appointing judges, during pleasure, to try all revenue causes without jury ; of compelling his majefty's subjefts in all revenue-matters to take their trials in any of the colonies, however diftant from their refpe&ive habitations, where their characters are known ; of a fecretary of state's fending a requifition to the aflembly at Bo/ion, with threats, tending to force their determinations, which ought to be free; of threatening and punifliing the American aflemblies for pe'titioning the king, though the adt of fettlement exprefsly fecures this right to the subjeft ; of mifapplying several American revenues; of im powering the crown to seize and fend over to Britain, for trial, those of the colonifts who become obnoxious to the court, without legal indi&ment, or bill found by jury; of fufpending the legislative power of the province of New York, so as to deftroy that freedom of debate and determination which is the neceflary, unalienable, and constitutional right of such aflemblies, &c.

Governor Bernard complains heavily and repeatedly, that the election of the council at Boftan in New England, gives the people too much power^a. What idea, upon the principle of falus populi, can be formed of too much power in the hands of the people ? Suppose a people should choofe to keep all the power in their own hands, and delegate none ? Oh, then, we the court, must be content to be a part of the people, and have no opportunity of wallowing in wealth and pleasure, and raifing great fortunes from the fpoils of the induftrious.

* See his LETT. TO LORD SHELB-URNE.

So Watyok opposed all reformations of parliamentary abuses; because they tended to throw too much power into the hands of the people. This is the true spiritof courts and court-tools; and they, who cannot fee the cloven foot, when thus uncovered to the knee, must obftinately (hut their eyes.

Dr. Franklin, in his examination before the house of commons, declared, that the causes of the Britijb. parliament's having loft, in great part, the refped of the colonifts, were, * the restraints lately laid on their trade, by which the bringing of gold and filver intq the colonies was prevented, the prohibition of paper-money among themselves, and then demanding a new and heavy tax by ftarnps, taking away at the same time trial by juries, and refusing to receive and hear their humble petitions V Governor Bernard of New England, having refused. to call a legal aflembly of representatives, as above hinted, the people of a great many towns fent tp Boftsn commissioners to meet and treat of public affairs, and prevent anarchy and confufion ; but declaiming all authoritative or governmental designs or acts. This committee of convention petitioned governor Bernard for a regular aflembly as ufual. The governor would not receive the petition, because that would have been acknowledging the legality of the committee of convention, which drew it up. He afterwards fent them a meffage, that he could not fuffer them to continue fitting, after the aflembly of the province was, by authority, diflblved and forbidden to fit ; and that the committee of convention was, so all intents and purposes, an aflembly under a different name. He therefore warns them of the con-

* Aim. DEB. COM. vn, 113.

fequences. The committee of convention afterwards remonftrated to the governor against lodging troops in the city, while there were barracks fit for receiving them, and not full, as contrary to a& of parliament. The committee of convention afterwards publifhed a manifefto, fignifying, that the design of their meeting was to preserve the peace, and to petition the king in favour of the province, that a regular aflembly might be called, and grievances redrefled. The members of the council of the province of Maffachusets Bay addrefled general Gage, commander of the forces fent to Ba/lan, excufing their own conduct, and the difturbances in Bo/Ian, and begging that the military might be moved to the barracks.

I believe they, who are so violent for loading our poor fellow subjeds in America with taxes, would think themselves hardly used, if they were hampered in their manufactures and commerce by a people beyond the ocean, in the same manner as the colonifts are by us in many instances, fevere, useless, and impolitic. Such are our restraining them from the use of flitting-mills and freel-furnaces ; our prohibiting them the cutting of white pines; our regulations, which oblige them to bring to us all their pro* duds, though they might find better markets elfewhere; which is obliging them to fell to us all their produces at our own price; and those other regulations, by which they are prohibited manufacturing tnany neceflary articles, or purchafing them of other nations, only that they may be obliged to have them of us at an advanced price; for we can afford nq goods but at an advanced price, loaded as we are with 140 millions of debt, the interest of which, amounting to above 5 millions per annum, must be raised in great part out of the profits of our trade.

Tbus we make the poor colonifts fell to us as cheap as we please, and purchafe our goods as dear as we please. This alone is taxing them with a vengeance.

The Carthaginians obliged the people of Sardinia (vts viclis f) to buy corn of them exclufively, at the price they set upon it: but we do not hear that those tyrannical conquerors forced the enflaved Sardinians to fell them their products at a price of their own fixing; while we impose this law, not on the conquered Welch or Irijh, or the once restless and rebellious Scotch; but on our colonifts, our once tractable and obedient children, to whom we are under greater obligations than to Scotch, Irijh, and Welch, all put together.

The colonifts complain, that their trade is peculiarly restri£ted by laws made in a parliament, in which they are not represented ; that they ate taxed in the same parliament; therefore have no opportunity of giving, or with-holding, their confent; which produces a confufion of taxes, as their own affernblies are obliged to lay on taxes for defraying the neceflary expences of their respective provinces, at the same time that the mother-country may be laying on other taxes so heavy, that both together may be beyond the abilities of the people. They complain of being obliged to find quarters, firing, bedding, candles, rum, &c. for the army, though they are obliged to keep up a militia of their own. That their money raised without and contrary to their confent, 'is to be applied; likewife, without and contrary to their approbation, viz. in paying the falaries of governors, judges, and other officers appointed by the court, and removeable at its pleasure, They affirm, that several of their original charters are, by late laws, fetasidej so that the fettlers are deceived OMt of t^e

privileges, on the faith of which they first left thejr native country, .croffed the ocean, and eftabliflwd, those colonies, .which have been of so great value to the mother country. .. They complain of having been restrained by, the mioiftry from the privilege of petitioning against these oppreffions, and having (heir aiTemblies annihilated for doing what the Bill of Rights allows to every Englijbman; a ftretch of power very much refembling that of Ch. II. in seizing the charter of the city of London.

The act of parliament, by which the ftatnp-act was repealed, afferted » power in king, lords, and commons to tax the colonies. But it seems, the fecretery of state alone has power to diflblve, annihilate, and interdict their aflemblies. Thus, if our proceedings against America are viewed on one side, the colonifts are" subject to king, lords, and commons; if, on the other, the fccretary of Jlate alone is their mafter.

Can it be with a favourable design to the colonies, that the ministry always recommend to the governors, who are generally their creatures, to obtain permanent falaries for the government-offices ? Is there any better means for fecuring good behaviour in officers, than putting them upon the foot of quamdiuse. bene gejjisrint? Stopping supplies our ancestors thought the only fure way to obtain redrefs of grievances. Give the American governors and other officers permanent falaries, so as they shall be independent on the people, and you give them the hint to erect themselves into petty defpots and tyrants.

The colonifts have long complained, that we necdlessly hamper their trade with the ports of Europe. Why may not, say they, the colonifts be allowed to fetch and carry in their own (hips, to and from the {'cveral ports of Europe, whatever articles do not inter-

fere with the trade of the mother-country ? Are the people of Britain afraid, left the colonifts be too thriving ? They will only, in that case, be the better cuftomers to the mother-country. For the more luxurious they grow, the more they will want of the Britijb manufactures, unless we drive them to other {hops by our ill usage, or exorbitant prices. Nothing requires more to be free and unconfined than commerce.

The duty of 3 d. per gallon on melafles, they say, is more than the article will bear, and therefore operates as a prohibition; flopping their exportation of horses, lumber, flour, and fifh, to the French and Dutch colonies; and the vent for them in England and the Weft Indies is not sufficient to take them off. The flapping the exportation of melafles into the continental colonies, hinders their diftilling, and is a prejudice to the rum-trade with Africa, and throws it into the hands of the French, and hurts the fifhery. There used to be imported into Rhode-ijland only 1,150,000 gallons of melafles annually; the duty upon which is I4>3751- fterling, a larger fum than ever was in circulation at any one time in the colony. The pioney to be fent out, never to return. Hpw is this drain to be kept running ? If the colonies be, by our clumfy laws, difabled from purchasing Britijh manufactures, who will be- the gainers ? The restridting of the colonifts from fending their produces to better and more convenient markets, than Britain, is a lofs to Britain of all the difference; for all the profits, the colonifts get, have always come to Britain ; and the more considerable their profits, the better for the mother-country,

The courts of vice*admiralty, they say, are a great grievance, A cuftom-house-ofKcer may seize, for

what he calls probable cause, in Georgia, and carry the trial to Halifax, 1500 miles. The wifxnv tunate owner of the seized goods must follow. When arrived there, out of the reach of his friends and acquaintance, he must give bond, elfe he cannot reclaim his goods. If the judge, perhaps, with iniquitous views, pronounces, that there was probabk cause for seizing them, the unhappy, man, may be ruined, and all his comfort will be the same with that of the fick man, who dies, fecundum artem, of th* doctor, that he is undone according to act of parliament. The patience of the colonifts, for so many years, under such fevere laws, delerved at our hands pther treatment than we have lately regaled them with.

CHAP. IV.

Precedents refpefting Colonies*

THE conquered nations generally had each a, protector in the Roman fenate, as the Allobroges had for their patron ^uintius Fabius Sanga, and they were wont to fend ambafladors to Rome¹. Our American colonies, though not conquered countries, have, constitutionally, no person in our fenate to plead their cause, when we lay taxes on them, without knowing whether they are able to bear them. For the house of commons receives no petitions on money-bills, because it is to be fupposed, every place, that js taxed, is represented by a member, or members. The rebellions of the Germans, Pannonians, &c. in

¹ See ANT. UNIV. HIST. Vol. xin. p. 140-

jfugtt/ltts's time, were owing chiefly to the extortion of the governors fetover them, by the Romans. A leflbn for our instruction with respect to our colonies*. And fee Tally's orations against VERRES, praetor of

Sicily.

Xing John IV. of Portugal (formerly duke of Bragamta) confulting the states about raifing two millions for the war with Spain, for the preservation of their lately recovered liberties, they defired the king to give out an edict for raifing them in whatever way he pleased. But that magnanimous prince answered,

That he would have no money, but by the grant of his people.' The people immediately raised him four millions ^b.

The city of Ghent refused, about 200 years ago, to pay its Quota of a tax, laid on in the flatus of the united provinces, because, they pretended, they had a ftipulation with Charles's ancestors, phat they were to pay no tax, unless they gave their exprefs confent to fhe laying it on. It was answered, that the subfidy was granted by the states of Flanders, in which their representatives fat. They resist; and are totally deprived of their liberties by Charles^c.

The Spanijh Netherlands were taxed last century by the imperial court under the denomination of the circle of Burgundy. But this was thought unjust, because they were subject to the states of the united provinces, and were taxed by their'own government, as the Americans by their affemblies; so that they must have had the charges of two governments to defray, if they subinitted to the imperial tax; which was imposed on the

» ANT. UNIV. HIST. xiv. 19. * MOD. UNIV. HIST. xxn. 299. ^c Ro6ert/«n'& CH. V. n. 430, 441.

pretext, of their having a voice in the council of the empire ; whereas the Americans have no voice in the Britijh parliament. They refused to submit to the imperial taxation *.

The Spaniards do not make the best of their colonies. They give their gold to the induftrioas nations for those manufactures, which themselves should make, and which would have rendered them a great' maritime power". Philip II. by fending vast fums into the Netherlands when carrying on his wars, enriched those countries, and made them powerful against himself. Thus the Spaniards are only factors for the rest of Europe. The king and grandees only fee the gold, and then fpread it all over the induftrious nations, and their poor are the poorest in the world. The Spaniards have several times made attempts towards a spirit of manufactures, but wars have interrupted them. And now, 1771, it has been said, that the king has fent two merchants to travel through all Europe, and learn manufactures and commerce. The continual importation of metal into Europe, must in time defeat its own intention. Specie is now 32 times less valuable, than when the Spaniards difcovered America^c.

Batavia is more populous than Holland; yet continues subject to Holland, and of prodigious advantage to the mother country. Why then should we dread the defection or rebellion of our colonifts, unless we mean to force them upon it ?

' Portugal holds almost her exiftence by her pofieffions in Brafil^d.' Every nation in Europe gains by colonifmg, the Spaniards excepted.

^m MOD. UNIV. HIST. xxx. 428.

^b Ibid, xxxix. 213. >• Ibid. 214.

' Ibid, xxxvni. 2.

The once prodigious power of the Pottuguefe in the Soft) dwindled through the corrupt, effeminate, and snjust condu& of the viceroys they fent to Goa *.

The viceroy of Manilla continues in office only three years, His fucceflbr has power to examine him jigbfipufly. Sometimes the fucceflbr has let himself be tampered with ; to prevent which the people have token the trial and punifliment of wicked governors into their own hands'". If the people wish their tniftness done, the fure way is to do it themselves.

Davenmt, n. 8, thinks, the only danger we are to guard against, respecling our colonies is, their becoming powerful at fea; because, while we are their matters in naval force, we can fecure their obedience to our commercial laws. But furely, in all cases of* commerce, there is somewhat neceflary, besides mere eompulfory government. We may oblige our coloftifts to submit to our laws, and be very little the letter for our colonies, if there be not a cordiality kept up between them and us.

CHAP. V.

Of Taxation without Representation.

IT appears by Chap. III. above, that our colonrfts have at all times had sufficient ground of complaint against the mother-country ; and that if they had been of that turbulent disposition, and as defirous of fhaking off the connexion with us, as the Grcnviliians falfely •pretend, they must have given repeated proofs of those jba'd'dispositions. On the contrary, we know, that no

* MOD. UNIV. HIST. ix. 290. ^k Ibid. ix. 460.

people ever were more peaceable, or better affe&ed, than the colonifts have all along shewn themselves; 'till we bethought ourselves of infultiog them with taxes imposed upon them by our parliament, in which they have no representation, and with the direct design of raifmg money upon them for our own advantage.

To impose taxes, is one of the most dangerous parts of a king's, or government's business.

Periculofx plenum opus alese Traftas, et incedis per ignes

Suppofitos cineri dolofo. HOR.

New taxes have raised fundry rebellions, and difturbances in England^ as 9 Edw. III. 4 Rich. II. 9 Hen. VI. 4 Hen. VII. 16 Hen. VIII. &c. A parliament was fummoned, 39 Hen. III. A demand was made by the court. The commons thought it exorbitant. Would grant nothing, so much were they offended ; though they a/Tembled with the design of granting. So the people of Carolina lately, at the very time, when they were exprcffing great rage against the government's propofing to tax them without representation, voluntarily taxed themselves, to a considerable value, to make a present to a person in England^ whofe public conduit pleased them. The Roman fenate, when Hannibal was at their gates, knowing that people will do -more voluntarily, than by force, for carrying on the war, proposed, not a tax, but a benevolence. The consequcnce was, that the Menfarii (tellers) could not receive the money, it came in so faft.

Nothing produces so much ill-blood, as touching, people's money. The malt-tax, in Scotland, A. D. 1712, because thought contrary to the union, had almost broke the union, before it was ip wars old.

It was an unjufl: tax that produced the terrible infurredlion under Wat Tyler and °~jack Straw, which had almost overturned the state. It was an injudicious tax that put the whole kingdom of Naples in confufion under MaJJanlello the filherman. What efFe.fl the attempt to tax our own colonies may produce, remains to be seen — and felt. God forbid that it should equal the fears of wife and thoughtful men. To provoke three millions of people to their utmost rage, is no flight affair.

The two counties palatine of Chejier and Durham* had (says Petyt, RIGHT OF THE COM. 45.) parliaments of their own, before the conquest, and were not subjeft to any of the laws of the land, unless they agreed to them.

It was debated, A. D. 1621, whether the county palatine of Durham should have representation in parliament, as the rest of England. It was agreed, that it should; but it did not pafs into a law, 'till 25 Car. II. when it was fettled, that the county should have two members, and the city of Durham two ^a.

Time was, when the city of Chejier had no representation. The privilege of fending members was granted to that city, ' because (says the act 35 Hen. VIII. c. 13.) ' the inhabitants thereof have often beent touched and grieved with acts and ftatutes made in parliament, as were derogatory unto the mod antient jurifdiftion, liberties, and privileges thereof, as prejudicial unto the commonweal, quietness, and peace of his majefty's subjecls.'

In the same manner representation was granted tor the bishoprick of Durham ; and it was not taxed 'till jrepresented in parliament.

" PARL. HUT. v. 464.

Mr. Molyntux (the gentleman, I fuppose, with whom Mr. Locke corresponded) wrote a pamphlet, A. D. 1698, to prove, that Ireland (though a conquered country) ought not to be taxed by the Englijb parliament *. In our times it is not. How much less our brave colonifts, who never were conquered ? * In the reign of Hen. HI. says Davenant, we find where parliaments have not been confulted, they have not thought themselves obliged to pay the expence; for as we learn from Matbew Parti* king Hen. held a parliament at Wlnchefter* where he defued. an aid from his people, in regard his own treafure- had,been exhaufted with paying his fitter's portion to the Emperor, and by his own wedding. The parliament replied, That these things had been done without advifing with them, and without their confent; and feeing they were free from the fault, they ought not to participate of the punishment. The Peifltvias, to serve their own turn, had at another time engaged him in an unfeafonable war with France; upon which he called a parliament, and defired an aid. The barons told him, he had undertaken it unadvifedly; and that his parliament wondered, he would undertake so difficult and dangerous a bufmefs, without their advice and aiTent.'

In antient times, the lords have given the kings subftdies out of their own property. 13 Edw. III. the lords granted, for themselves, a'tenth of all the corn growing upon their demefnes, the commons granting nothing at that time. At other times the knights of the {hires, have granted feparately from the other commoners; and at other times, the representatives of cities and boroughs have granted by them-

» DEB. COM. in. 88.

selves. But ftill they granted only what was their own to grant. They did not grant the property of people at the distance of 3000 miles, who had not one representative among them.

Gee, in his excellent piece on trade, remon ft rates against all measures, which tend.to hamper our colonies. What would he have said, if he had been told, that the time would so soon come, when we should, with horror, fee our adminifrration eager to fend an armed force to dragoon them into subrr.iffion to unjust laws, by which their property was to be seized contrary to their own confent, and thofc brave people by authority declared traitors, feditious, rebels, &c. for defending iheir property ?

It has been said on the subjecl: of taxing the colonifts in parliament; Why may not the colonifts be taxed by the same aflembly, which has an unquestioned power of making laws for them ? But this is a confused and undiftinguilhing way of reasoning. It is hardfhip enough on the colonies to find their commerce hampered by laws, in the making of which they had no hand, nor could even remonftrate against them, while they were under consideration. But there may be pretexts for making laws, whofe operations may eventually bring inconvenience upon the colonifts; while no pretext can justify taxing them, so long as they continue unrepresented. Legiflation and taxation, are very different things. The lords cannot alter a letter in a money-bill, though they may amend any other. And it is always to the commons the king has recourfe for supplies, and to whom he returns thanks for them. The reason is plain. The lords have no power over the property of the people. The members of the house of commons are the representatives of the commons of England -t and as such have

a delegated power to grant supplies out ,of the property of the commons. The lords may at any time raise a fum of money for the crown out of their own property; but they/cannot grant out of the property of the commons, because the commons have given them no such power, and because they fit in parliament upon their own account, and not as representatives.

The Britijh house of commons propofing to tax the unrepresented colonies in America involves, therefore) in my opinion, some ftriking absurdities. What is, for instancti to be the bufmefs of the provincial aflemblies of representatives in America, if the power of taxing the colonies be in the Britijb parliament at Weflminfter ? Is it not obvious, that these two powers are incompatible ? It is notorious, that by their charters several, if not all the provinces have the right of laying on taxes. And how then is the provincial' aflembly of New-England, for example, to lay on a tax of half a crown in the pound, at the same time that, for ought that is known in New-England, the house of commons in Old England may be votirrg a tax upon the people of that province of feventeen and fixpence in the pound f If we may put any trust in the first rule in arithmetic, here is, the whole pound gone. Again : What could be more absurd than the commons giving and granting what was neither their own property, nor that of their constituents; what they had no more right to give and grant, (no man can give away a free subjedVs properly, but himself or his representative) than they had to give and grant the property of the people of Holland or France ? Again : The king was, according to cuftom, to thank the commons for granting the American tax. But how was he to thank them ? For fparing their own pockets, and taking out of those of the colonifts against their

confapti Or was he to thank the cdanifts, who we;* to pay the money? Certainly not. They were to pay it against their inclination.

The taxing of the unrepresentcd .colonies is so unjttft, that were it ever so prudent, it ought not to be dour. It is so impolitic, that were it ever so just, it ought not to be thought of.

* If the king is to take at his pleasure, what have * we to give ?' was the common argument against Ch. Ift's raifing money without content of parliament; and may, with equal propriety, be ufcd by our coJonifts against their being taxed by the Britijb parliament, in which they have no representation.

Edw. I. fummoning one of his parliaments, uses these words, Ut quod omtus tangit ab omnibus probeturt He would have them confult about public affairs, '.that what concerns all, may be approved by all/ A found maxim furely. But would our taxing the colonifts contrary to their approbation, be acting upon this principle ?

Some short-fighted defenders of the late oppreffive measures taken with our American brethren have attempted to wheedle them into a perfuafion, that their being taxed by the Britijb parliament, in which three millions have not one representative, is no greater hardship than what is fuffered by the mother-country, ift which, though representation, as I have shewn in the former volume, is as far from adequate, as can well be imagined; yet fix millions have 558 representatives, and in which every man, woman, and child, by living in one county or other, is represented by one or two members, who cannot tax them without taxing themftlvee, their children, their friends, dependants, tenants, &c. If the three millions of colonifts had 279 representatives >n parliament (the half of 558) it

might then be time to make comparisons between their case and that of the mother-country. Till then, or till they have some fliadow of representation, nothing can be more absurd.

Vv*e have lately seen all England befetting the throne with complaints, that one county is deprived not of representation,but of o»/particular favourite individual, as one of their two representatives, while they may chuse any other individual upon the ifland in his place; and this not to perpetuity^ but only during feven years at most; this we have lately seen, and we wonder, that three millions should complain, that they are to be taxed from age to age to whatever amount it may please the Britijb parliament to impose on them, in which they have not the fhadow of a representative. Would they be the j)ofterity of true Britons, if they did not complain of this ?

The firmness fhewn by the colonifts against what to them is precifely the same oppreffion as to us it would be to have taxes laid on us by an edict from the throne, has, by very high authority, been pronounced fedition and rebellion; but with all due submiffion to authority, ( — truth and justice are above all authority) when the illustrious Hampden refilled the lawful fovereign's unlawful demand of only three fliillings and four-pence, because he had no voice in confenting to the laying on the fhip-tax, was he too guilty of fedition and rebellion ? If he was, we are all rebels, but the Jacobites; and our gracious king Geo. III. (whom God preserve) is an usurper; for the revolution was brought about; with the direct design of preventing any man's property being seized without his confent given either in person or by representative, which makes it the same to our colonifts to be taxed by the parliament of Britain as by that of Paris.

Suppose the Britijb parliament (hould imagine a tax tp be paid excluftvely by those who have no wfe for members of parliament, as the people of Mancbcfter* Ely, &c. Would not this be univerfally decried as tb« most flagrant partiality ? Yet this would be more pl^usible than a Britijb parliament's taxing America; because the members cannot be fupposed competent judges of the abilities of the colonifts to bear taxes ; whereas they arc undoubtedly judges of the ability of their own countrymen, whether voters or not. Again: Suppose the parifhes in the county of MidMefex to fend two representatives each to a parliament, or legislative aflembly, excluding only that of Ijlington from representation. Suppose this legislative aflembly to lay taxes on the unrepresented parifh of f/Kngttn; Could it with any reason be exprdted, that the parifliioners of Ijlingtan {hould quietly submit to such grofs abuse ? Yet this would be less inconsistent with equity than a Britijb parliament's taxing America, because the representative* of the other parishes' of Middlefex must be fupposed competent judges of the ability of the I/Jingionians; whereas the members of the Britijb parliament fan be no judges of the ability of the colonifts.

Magna Charta, and the Bill of Rights, prohibit the taxing of the mother-country by prerogative, and without confent of those who are to be taxed. If the people of Britain are not to be taxed, but by parliament ; because otherwife they might be taxed without their own confent} does it not dire&ly follow, that the colonifts cannot, according to Magna Charta, and the bill of rights, be taxed by parliament, so long as fhey continue unrepresented ;' because otherwife they may be taxed without their own confent ?

At the time when the famous ftamp-a<ft of blefled memory was invented, the colonies were laid to be in-

debted to Britain to the amount of no less than four millions, occafioned by their want of ability to make remittances, the consequence chiefly of our fevere restraints on'their commerce. The colonifts are almbft all farmers, wholly dependant on the produce of their lands, contented, and consequently happy; but in no condition to bear taxes, otherwife than by enabling us to pay our taxes out of the produce of their tobacco, rice, indigo, corn, lumber, wood, fifh, furs, &c. How poor in cafh must those countries be, where the. fheriffs, in railing the annual taxes laid on by the aflemblies, are often obliged to make returns into the treafury, of houjhoid goods taken in execution for want of cafh ; which goods cannot be fold for want of money to purchafe them; where men of the best credit cannot raise cafli to pay debts jnconsiderable when compared with their estates ; where creditors, when they fue to execution, obtain orders for fair of lands and goods, and though they offer those lands and goods for almost nothing, they are nothing the nearer being reimburfed, because there arp no monied men to purchafe after repeated advertifements of the fajes. Thus the debtor is stripped, and the creditor pot paid, and they break one another all round. And thi$ very diftrefs has been increased by those very roinjfters, whofe taxation-schemes particularly required all me»fures to be used, which were likely to promote a circulation of cafh in the colonies. We have followed the example of the Egyptian taflc-mafters, demanding money of the poor colonifts at the same time that we put a flop to their trade with the Span;Jb colonies, the only means by-which they could obtain wherewith to fatisfy our demands. Here is a complication of blunders beyond the power of language to set forth in ail adequate manner.

Even .governor Bernard (no friend, to the colonifts.) owns their.inability to bear taxes. * I can (says he) readily recommend that part of the petition, which prays relief against those afls which are made for the purpose of drawing a revenue from the colonies. For they are so little able to bear drawing money from them, that they are unable at present to pay the charges of their support and protection V It was very fairly made out, that the colonifts were not, generally speaking, in circumstances to pay the, ftarr.p-duty. And to raise the price of judice so high, that the people {hall not be able to obtain it, is much the same as flatly denying them judice; while Magna Charta says, Nulll negabimus, nulli vtfldemui justitiam, &(.

By the Grenvillian politics, the American aflemblies were not only to be stripped of the power of giving their own; but of defending their own. The ftamp-duties were exprefsly declared to be for raifing a revenue for making a more certain and adequate provifion for the government of the colonies. As if the colonies had not common sense to confult for their own defence, and the administration of judice. Courts are always for over-governing. This was rendering the American. aflemblies useless. On this principle, any number of the creatures of a court might have been faddled upon the colonifts, with falaries to any amount, and all on, pretence of a certain and adequate provifion for the support of government and adminidration of judice. This is the ceconomy in Ireland; a conquered country. But the Grenvillian politics treat the colonies worse than Ireland, For we leave to the Irijh the power of

• Governor Bernard to lord HillJ&oreugb, July 16, 1768.

taxing themselves in their own parliament» wMe we tax the colonies in the Britijb parliament, whvt they have not one representative.

Before the taxing of the unrepresented colonies was thought of, the minidry ought to have reduced exorbitant falaries, abated, or aboli/hed exceffive perquifites, annihilated useless place*, flopped iniquitous pensions, with-held electioneering expences, andf bribes for votes in the house, reduced an odious and devouring army, and taxed vice, luxury, gaming, and public diverfions. This would have brought into thf treafury tea times more than Grenville could ever expe& from taxing, by force and authority, the unre* presented colonies.

Even a conquered city has time given it to raise the contribution laid upon it; and may raise it in its own way. We have treated our colonies worse thaa conquered countries. Neither Walts nor Inland are taxed unheard and unrepresented in the Britijb parliament, as the colonies. Waltt fends members to parliament; and Inland has done fo. And as Ireland is not now represented in the Britijh parliament, neither is it taxed in the Britijb parliament.

It is frivolous to alledge, that because the mother-country has been at expences for the colonies, therefore the Britijb parliament may tax them without allowing them any legal opportunity of remondrating againd the oppreffion. The mother-country has fpent her blood and her treafure in supporting, at different times, France againd Spain, and Spain against Francet PruJJia against Hungary, and Hungary against Prtijjia, and so on, without end. Does this give our parliament a right to tax all Europe?

What difference is there between the Britijb parliament's taxing America, antj the French court's lay-

ing England under contribution ? The French court could bur do this, if they had conquered England. Have we conquered our colonies ?

But are then the colonifts, it will be said, to be complimented with immunity 'from all fhare of the public burden, while they enjoy their fhare of the public protection ? How will the necessary uniformity of the. whole monarchy be preserved, if it be left to the difcretion of a sisth part of the whole people, whether they will contribute any thing, and how much, to the general supplies ?

The <}ueftion was not, Whether the colonifts Aould contribute to the public expence. The Grenvillians knew, that when requifition had been made by government, the colonifts had answered their demands; particularly in the years 1756, 7, 8, 9, 1/60, 61, and 62 ; they knew that the town of Bo/ion contributed for several years together twelve {hillings in the pound. Our government, therefore, thought it but just to reimburfe the colonies a part of their exceffive expences. But their fucceflbre, contrary to the sense of all mankind, thought it better to obtain by force, than with a good-will. ' Accordingly we find so early as A. D. 1765, immediately after the first of the colonifts shewed a little courage in refusing to subiriit to taxation without representation, orders were given to governor Bernard to employ the military under general Gage in fuppreffing the spirit of liberty *.

Where would have been the harm of making a fair and moderate propofal to the colonies ? If they raised the money in obedience to our requifition, as formerly, all was well. But furely it was soon enough

* Aim. DEB. COM. vn. 8;.

to propose levying money upon them by parliamentary taxation, when they refused to give upon requifition. Inftead of this, the court-language all ran in the Jmperatiye mood. * A spirit of fa&jbn in America — * ads of violence, and refistance to the execution of the law — state of difobedience to all law and government — measures subverfive of the constitution------,

a disposition to throw oft* all dependence on the mother-country — fteady perfeverance necessary to inforce the laws — turbulent and feditious persons, who, under falfe pretences, have deluded numbers in America, and whofe practices cannot fail, if fufr fered to prevail, to produce the most fatal consequences to the colonies immediately, and, in the end, to the whole Britijb dominions.' Thus did our

ministers put into the mouth of their amiable S------< — •

a language as remote from his disposition, as integrity js from theirs; fetting him before his people in the character of an eujltrn defpot, and not of the father of his subjeds. See a certain speech.

Could not Gttrgt Grenville have propofcd, That the colonies should fend over a certain number qf Agents who, by zSt of parliament, should have feffioa and fuffrage in our house of commons, during a certain period, in order to fettle what Ann the colonies fljould raise in proportion to the contribution raised by England — 'and to determine concerning the colonies fending, or not fending, members to subfequent parliaments? If it had been objected to this propofal, that the colonifts fending over a set of temporary members to our parliament was a thing wholly unprecedented, he might haye answered, that at the glorious revolution the cqrporatjon of London was introduced, and fat and voted in the house of commons; and the acis of jhj convention parliament were afterwards

eflabli/hed by a regular parliament composed in the ufuai manner, of king, lord*, and commons. And as to .the. quota, or contingent, to be raised by-thecolontfts, it knight have been made to regulate, as that of Scotland, by the contribution in England, in fuph a manner, that when the taxes raised in England amount to a certain Cum, Anurka fhall contribute a thirtieth, fortieth, or sistieth part of that Aim. The colonifts would naturally have fcnt over their ableft men and bcft patriots. They would have been prejudiced in favour of -what those men had agreed to; or those men would have futisned our parliament, that it could answer no good end to lay taxes upon the colonies ; as all their money centers at last in England, and the more we raise upon them by way of tax, the less we can gain by them in the way of commerce. The colonies could not then have complained of taxation without representation, or of having their money taken from them by force. This would have been treating them as England did Scotland at the union ; and furely no one will pretend that England is not under greater obligations to the colonies than to Scotland.

In the time of Edw. III. a parliament was directed to meet at several different parts of the country at the same time, because the whole parliament could not assemble fpeedily enough at Wejftminjler *. I fuppose the provincial meetings communicated their resolutions to that part of the parliament which met at the feat .of government; and those resolutions which were made by the greatest number of the provincial meetings were to pafs into laws. Suppose, that in imitation of this plan, a correspondent parliament had been formed in America-, their resolutions. communi-

cated to the Britijk parliament, would have regularly and constitutionally informed the latter, of the sense of the colonifts upon every important point; which cannot now be done in any constitutional way; as the house. of commons receives no petitions upon money bills, and. the colonifts have- no members in the house. The reader fees that various ways might have been proposed for raifmg taxes upon the colonies, if it had been found proper to raise such taxes, none of which. • ways would so have irritated the colonifts, or given* them such an opportunity of exclaiming againflr the injustice and rapacity of the mother-country.

On the contrary, such was the relentless fury of the ministry, A. D. 1768, against the colonifts, that they proposed to addrefs the king to fetch over any of them, who- had fhewn opposition to taxing without representation, to be tried in England, for that no jury in America would find them guilty, the people being all of one sentiment relating to that fuhject. This was fairly declaring, that they would rather fee the constitution (which requires that the accused be tried by persons of the vicinage, fupposed to know his character and behaviour) violated, than not fee the Americans puniflied ^a. And if such a law should ever be enacted, and the spirit of contention should be kept up, we may fuppose a difturbance to happen in every town of Ntrtb America, and that it will be neceflary t« fetch over half the people of the plantations as witnefles, or as attestors to the character of the accused persons. All the flapping that belongs to both mother-country and colonies, will be insufficient for bringing over and fending back the multitudes that will be wanted on such occafions. And how is this

* PARL. HIST. i. 30?.

* Aim* DEB. COM. vm. 43.

expence to be borne t the freight and charges, I mean, of so many hundred thousands of witnefies, as will be fummoned ? And how is the business of the colonifts to be carried on during their abfence in England? How are the damages anting from their abfence to be made up? How is the lofs of many¹ innocent lives to be made up ? For many of these fhips will of courfe be caft away, and many paflenge'rs will contract deadly diseases, by change of climate, tic. The objections to this fchcme are, in ftort, beyond reckoning, many of which will occur to every reader. An eminent member of the houfc of commons very lately declared in the house, that in his opinion, the whole proceedings of the ministry, with respecl to the colonies, are Frenzy. But, to proceed,

The ministry, in the same year 1768, infilled on at declaration against the colonifts founded upon, a fupposed illegal resolution of the aflembly of Boflon^ which resolution they could not produce when called upon, and which governor Pownal aflured the house had never been made in the aflembly of Btjlon, and that the fuppofuion of its having been made, was owing to a miftake, and shewed how the miftake arofe. ' The chorus-men, who, at proper times, call for the question, helped them at this dead lift, by an inceflant repetition of the qutftion, the quef-f tin? [that is, in plain EngHjb, Let us vote, right or wrong, as the ministry would have us.] * At length, at 4 o'clock in the morning, the whole house in confufion, the resolutions and addrefs were agreed to; upon which a member remarked, " That it was indecent to bring into the •^ house resolutions ready cut and dry, only for the " drudgery of pafling them. That it was more " indecent to pafs them in so coofused a manner ;

" but most indecent to answer all arguments .with " The qut/iion, tbi yufilt* *."

If the colontfts should object, that it will be very inconvenient for them to fend members from such a distance, it may be answered, that so it is for the northern parts of Scotland. All these matters of con-* venience must be as chance orders them. Nor can any two parts of a great kingdom enjoy prccifely the same advantages in all respecls.

Were parliaments mortened, were they restored to their c fficiency, and fee five from court-influence, .the colonifts might fend as representatives. any set of men poflefled of property and common umlerstandiug. Members would then have no interest to purfue, but that of their country. They would of courfe be honest, becaufc they would have no temptation to the contrary. And an honest parliament would make all people in public stations honest.

Some of the American colonifts charters exprefsly fecure to them the privilege of taxing themselves, It would be flagrant treachery for the mother-country to tax thuse colonies; for nothing, but abfolute necessity, and the safety of the whole, (which it would be ridiculous to mention on this subjelt) could justify deceiving the posterity of those people, who trusted to the faith of the mother-country, and fettled those colonies upon the exprefs ftipulation of not being taxed by parliament. If the colonifts charters give them the exclusive power of taxing themselves, the Erltifn parliament's taxing them, is deftroying their charters. If the American charters may be deftroyed, the charters of all the cities, and those by which all crown lands are held, may be annihilated.

* Aim. Dm. Cou. vm. 47.

The purport of all the colony-charters is, That all the emigrants, and their posterity, do enjoy for ever, all the privileges and liberties, which Englishmm do in England. And they were to pay to the king, a sisth part of all the gold and filver ore found in America* and no other tax. Is it allowing them the privileges of Englijbmen to tax them without giving them representation ? Is not every EngKJbman represented by his county-members.

The Britijb parliament cannot justly alter the charters of the colonies, without giving the colonifts indemnification for whatever they may fuffer in consequence of such alteration. And how fliall several millions of people be indemnified for being obliged to what they never expected, and, on the contrary, thought themselves, by their charters, fecured against. I mean, being taxed by those, whofe interest it is, in order to lighten their own shoulders, to lay a grievous burthen on theirs.

The Americans are already under the same grievance as the mother-country," viz. Of being unequally represented in their own aflemblies, which yet have power to tax them. To subjecl; them to be taxed by the Britijh parliament, would be subjecting them to two taxing powers. This would be an additional grievance, unknown in Britain, which is subjecl only to one; it would be an additional grievance, even fuppofmg America represented in parliament, in an adequate manner, as many parts of Britain are. But how would the injustice be doubled and trebled, if the Americans were taxed in the Britijb parliament, in which they have no representation adequate, or inadequate ! The Britijh parliament's taxing the colonies, Without representation, is treating them as papifts, or rebels. Nay it is treating them as France would treat

England, if, for our fins, we were become a conquered dominion under her.

A. D. 1772, governor PovJnal, upon lord Barrington's moving, that the report of the committee on the mutiny-bill might be read, requested the house, that, before it patted, its effects on the colonies might be considered. That the question was of no less importance, than, < Whether or not there shall remain eftabliflied by power against law and the constitution, a military government in America, exclufive of the supreme civil magiftrate. I am forry (says he) to find such a heedless inattention in gentleirtri to the concerns of public liberty *.' He then puts the house in mind of the remonftrances he had formerly offered on the same subjecl. « I stated (says he) the powers of the charters, and those of the military commimons. I shewed them to be incompatible and illegal.' He then affirms, that the case was noc fairly stated to the crown lawyers, who junified it^ nor, consequently, were their opinions law. He therefore defired to have an opportunity of calling for/ the opinion of the attorney and folicitor general, in order to bring on in form the consideration of that great question; and that the further reading of the report be adjourned. Lord Harrington oppofcd all consideration ; because the servants of the crown might come into cenfure. Governor John/lone pronounced the military commission illegal, impracticable, and self-contradiclory. Governor Pownal said, ' 1 know, it is to no purpose to prefs a motion, which a majority can refuse. But if those gentlemen will let us have the case and opinion, and by that means, a proper ground for debating the question, I am ready to meet

* Aim. DIB. ix. 337.

them on that ground. And as-1 fee in his place one of the learned gentlemen, who figned the opinion, [for the legality of the military commission] « if he will in his place rife up and defend the present efta* blifliment and pra&ice, I am ready for the argument,* The learned lawyer was afraid to engage with th* unlearned gentleman ; and the miniflry, as ufual, prevailed ji

Egregiam vero laudem, fpolia ampla rtfertn.

VXRGV

It has been thought, that our mifconduft witU jefpeft to our colonies has been the chief cause of the late unexampled' confufions in credit. The colonifts were accuftomed to take from Britain to- the value of 5,00,000 /. annually in teas. Our wife taxation-schemes put them upon refusing our teas all admiflioa into Americs. This prejudiced our Eafl-India company, and lowered the price of India stock; which gccafioned many adventurers in that flock, both in Britain and Ho'liattd, to fail. Such mischief a rapacious and blundering ministry can bring upon their country, in fcrambling after a little money to gratify their creatures.

I do not preiead to justify all the fteps that have keen taken by the colonifts. It is not eafy for the most ftoical individual to keep uj> his philofophy when provocation runs high, much less for a mixed muid-* tude of all forts of people. The f.rft aggreflbr* in all such cases, are chiefly to blame; though those who resist in an unjustifiable manner, are not innocent.

The Bojlonian proceeding, A. D. 1773, in deftr»y-» ing the tea, on account of the duty laid upon it, niuft be given up as inexcufable ; since all they had to do. wa» to keep firm in their resolution, not to buy or drink any

pf it*. But why did our government provoke the people of Bfjley* by fending them tbefe cargoes of tea, leaded with an invidious duty ?

Nothing is more peaceful by nature, than the element of water; yet we fee to what a height the waves upon «h« ocean are raifnd by the winds, with what fury they daft die ftrong feips of several thousand tons burden, and beat them to pieces. Nothing is more innocent than the cattk, of which so many hundreds are driven into this great metropolis every week, 'till they be provofcsd. A boy of sisteen may drive a whole herd of them before Mm ; but if a set of brutal butchers, with their ftieks an<f dogs, set themfclvw to eftrage thofi; pkcM animate, (hey immediately change their nature, and become as furious a» lions an4 tygers; they tofs with their horns whatever comes in their way, and happy n he that can make his escape. So our eolonifts had originally the vwy dispositions we could have wished; they had the most implkit respec) for the mother country. Our prim* minister's groy-goofe-quiW governed them, 'till that fatal hour in which the evil Genius of Britain wbifpered in the ear of George GrmvilU, * George! eceiJt ' thyself into a great financier.'

The ministry paid, from the beginning, no regard to the univerfal diflatisfadion occafioned by, and univerfal opposition made to taxing the unrepresented colonies.

A. D. 1765, Jan. 17, a petition was presented to the house of commons from the merchants of London trading to America, fetting forth, that the colony trade, of infinite advantage to Britain^ fuffered grieyoufly by

* WHITEHALL EVINIWC, March 15, 1774.

the colonifts being reduced to a state of inability to difcharge the debts owing by them to Britain, by means of taxes and restri&ions laid on them by government, particularly by the ftamp-adt. There came afterwards petitions to the same purpose from Briflol, Liverpool^ Halifax, Leeds, Lanca/ier, Mancbefler, Lticefler, and other great trading and manfaduring towns.

Here follow the heads of Mr. Pitt's speech in the house of commons on the same subjec~t.

He insisted, that every capital measure, the ministry had taken, was wrong. George Grenville, the American tax-mafter, fate by him. He says, he plainly difcovers the traces of an over-ruling influence in the conduit of the then present ministry. Observes, that a more important subject had not been before the house since the revolution. He acknowledges the foverainety of the mother-country over the colonies in all cases, but that of impofing taxes, which is no part of governing or legislative power. That in a free country the subjefts represented in parliament are fupposed to grant supplies voluntarily; but that the calonifts had no opportunity of giving voluntarily, having no representation in parliament to grant for them. That it is an absurdity in terms for the house of commons of Britain to pretend to give, or grant, to the king, what was not their property, but that of the colonifts. We, your majefty's commons of Great Britain, being unwilling to give or grant your majefty any farther supplies out of oar awn pockets, have made a law for obliging our fellow-subjeSs of America to pay, whether willingly or unwillingly, what they have no opportunity of granting voluntarily V

* LOND. MAC. 1766, p. 507.

Grenville in answer said, he could fee no difference between external taxation [meaning the mother-country's restri&ing the trade of the colonies, perhaps for the benefit of both] and internal [or ordering the ct>lonifts, in the style of conquerors, of robbers, I was going to say, to pay so much money, whether they choofe to grant it, or not.] He then, in a jefuitical manner, observes, that many individuals and bodies of men in England ate taxed in parliament who have no representation ; while he knew, that every man in England is represented by his county-members at least; and that, while parliament (ifunbribed) cannot over-tax the people without over-taxing themselves, on the contrary, the -greater burden they lay upon the Americans, the • less themselves will have to bear. He observes, that protection and obedience are reciprocal. That if Britain prote&s, America is obliged to obey [every just law; but not every unjust one.] He overlooks the great advantage Britain gains by America, by which flie is enabled to protedt herself, and her colonies, for \\Qtovmfake. He raves against the colonifts for fhcwing a little spirit in opposition to oppreflion ; but he takes m notice of their hardfhips in being taxed without representation, except that he mentions Chejler and Durham as having been taxed before they were represented, and accordingly they demanded, and immediately obtained representation. jS^ee the preamble to 34. and 35 Hen. VIII, in which the complaint of the people of the county palatine of Cbe/lerof the diiherifon and damages fuffered by them for want of representation in parliament, might, mutatis mutandis, be exhibited by our American colonifts.

Mr. Pitt went on afterwards, and applauded the spirit with which the colonifts had resisted tyranny. He affirms, that Britain gains 2,000,000/. annually

by her colonies. That by means of this advantage, estates which 60 years ago were let for 2000/. a year, now yielded 3000/. and lands now fold for thirty years purchafe inftsad of eighteen. That our profits by Amorica carried in triumphantly through the late war. ' And fhall a miserable financier come with a boaft, t&at be can fetch a pepper-corrt into the ex-r chequer to the lofs of millions to the nation' ?' Suppose the taxing of the colonies (hould fwell the treasury (which it will certainly not do, but the very contrary) we'should then only have the cplonHts all. That we have now. Then we {hould have it with a grudge. Without taxing them, we always have had, and, for many ages, fhall have, all the money they can raise. For they must have our manufactures. If we iasist on taxing them, and irritate them in fiich a manner as to diminish our commerce with them, who will be the gainers ? Such policy will neither fuit rainiftry nor people.

I have been told by pretty good authority, that the neat produce of our judicious taxes on our colonies, by which we have loft (to mention only one article) the fale of teas to the amount of 500,000 /. per ann. amounted last year, viz. 1J7%> to the refpedtable fum of 857. fterling money. Such is thewisdomof oui ministers!

Is this a time for us to leffen our public income ? Do we not, as we manage matters, find difficulty enough in defraying the public expence with the largest public revenue we can raise ? Have we been able tq case the nation of any part of the heavy load which lies upon our commerce f Have ten years of peace

* LOND. MAC. 1766, p. 511.

**tiaguifljed any part, worth mentioning, of the public <kbt ? Do not our Minifters know, that a cotnparifoa Between the preTent state of the Firemb finances and ours is enough to make an fhglfiihak's blood nut •cold? If Fnmee ffiould think of'taking this oppor* tunity to make an attack -upon us, are itt itt a condition to go to war with that formidable enemy; or does it fbew oar rhiniftiy to be endowed with cotnrflott sense, who can And no time but -this to support the mif-named dignity of government; to compel the" colortifts to what they call a -due submft&on to goverAflrent, tfc. Will the vindication of the prttende4 honour of government, if it were to be vindicated ty the proposed meafores, make up for the diminution it will produce in our trade and revenues? Will the conquest of our colonies indemnify us for Our being conquered by Prance f

Suppofing the effects of violent meafares with the. colonies to prove less fatal than the apprehenfrons of many, their lowest conseqtiCnces must be a ditmnutiott of our trade and revenues. This we are frdfn experience certain of; for we already ftel It. lh<t fuppofc tbofe effects to prove fufh ac may natnrafty be expected ; how will it be with us, when we tintfthe public revenue fall so fliort, that it will not ffrctch tf pay the public creditors their wnote dividends ? Wt»< nvitl a fct of falh and hot-lieadcd statefmen be able to Advance for defending themselves against the rage of many thoufaads stripped of, perhaps, half thejr Incomes.

The more violent of the anti-colonrftical party seem to build their, main hope" of reducing the Americans to Obedience on a military farct. But ic may be rernarked coiv:erning thrs-lcheAW, That it wM either prove fuccefc&ilf or noi: If (he Utcar, then wHl' the

impotence of our government appear more confpicuous to all Europe, Afta, Africa and America* and the adyifers of the meafijre will be afliamed of it, and wish jt had never been adopted, Jf, on the contrary, the colonifts should find themselves obliged to yield so much against their inclination to this military force, notwithstanding the many advantages they have above what the mother-country can boaft of for defeating a design upon their liberties — let the people of England consider with horror what a frightful hint this gives to the enemies of liberty for enflaving the mother-r country. J am myself a friend to liberty, and therefore will not explain more minutely. Thefe are hopeful politics, whofe consequences are too {hocking for a good citizen to explain.

In fliort; The new method of taxing our colonifts in parliament, where they have no representation, adequate or inadequate* is subverfive of liberty, annihilates property, is repugnant to the genius of the people, oppreflive to their indigence; it ftrikes at the root of their charters, as colonifts, and of their privileges as Britijb subjecls ever loyal and unoffending ; it is derogatory from the faith of government, ominous to the liberty of the Britijh empire, unjust in its principles, rigorous in jts execution, and pernicious in its pperation alike to the mother-country and the colonies. What public measure can the memory of man produce, deferring so many commendations ? Whether it is yet time to reverfe such proceedings, or whether it will be better policy to purfue ftill farther the measures, which have hitherto appeared so honourable, and proved so falutary, is humbly submitted.

To crown what I have to say on the grievance which makes the subject of this lid Book, 1 will subjoin a copy of the fpirjted PRQT — -T of eleven worthy

noblemen, who have endeavoured to ftop the torrent of ministerial fary against our abused colonies. I wifli it were in my power worthily to celebrate the praises of those illustrious personages. The consequences of the violent proceedings, they have so bravely opposed, will, I am horribly afraid, make their fame, as well as the disgrace of the first movers of all this mischief, but too lofting.

After the Prot — t, I will add a copy of a PETITION from the American gentlemen reudent in Laadem to both houses, imploring their forbearance and jitftia in a manner, which does the public spirit as well as the abilities of the petitioners the highest honour.

I have in my hands a manuscript copy of an humble Petition of several Natives of America to the K — 's most excellent M — — y, requesting the fufpension of the R — 1 aflent to the two fatal bills from which they apprehend the most lamentable consequences. But as this Petition is not yet presented, I do not think I can, with propriety, give it a place in these collections. It is but fliort, and the matter of it, mutatit mutandis, much the same with that of the other.

PROTEST against the bill * for the better regulating ' the government of the MaJJachuset's Bay, in New « England.'

DISSENTIENT,

" Because this bill, forming a principal part in a fyftem of punishment and regulation, has been carried through the house without a due regard to those indispensable rules of public proceeding, without the obferyance of which, no regulation can be prudently made, and no punishment justly inflicted. Before it can be pretended that those rights of the colony of Ma/acbuJet's Bay, in the election of counsellors, magiftrates,

and judges^ and in the return of jurors, which they derive from their charter, could with propriety be taken away, the definite legal offence, by which a forfeiture of that charter is inclined, ought to have been clearly stated and fully proved; notice of this adverfe proceeding ought to have been given to the parties affected; and they ought to have been heard in their own defence. Such a principle of proceeding •would have been inviolably observed in the courts below. It is not technical formality, but subitantial justice. When therefore the magnitudt of such a cause transfers it from the cognizance of the inferior courts to the high Judicature of parliament, the lords are so far from being authorized to reject this equitable principle, that we are bound to an extraordinary and religious ftriflness in the observance of it. The subje£t ought to bo indemnified by a more liberal and beneficial jwitice in parliament, for what he must inevitably fuft'er by being deprived of many of the forms which are wifely eliabHftied in the courts of ordinary refort for his protection against the dangerous prompt titude of arbitrary difcretion.

" adly, Because th,e neceffty alledged for this precipitate mode of judicial proceeding cannot exift. If the numerous land and marine forces, which are ordead to assemble in. MaJJacbusefs Bay, are not fuf-, ficient to keep that fingle colony in any tolerable state of order, until the cause of its charter can be fairly and equally tried, no regulation in this bill, or in any of those hitherto brought into the house, are sufficient for that purpose; and we conceive, that the mere celerity of a decifiort against the charter of that province, will not reconcile the minds of the people to that mode of government which is to be eftabliihed; upon its ruins,

" ?dly, Because Lords are not in a fttuation to de* termine how far the regulations, of which this bill it cortipofcd, agree, or difagree, with thofo parts of th* constitution of the colony that are not altered, with the circumstances of the people, and with the whole detail of their municipal initiations. Neither th« charter of the colony, nor any account whatfoever of jts courts and judicial proceedings, their mode, OF the exercife of their present powers, have been pro(Juced to the hoafe. The ftightest evidence concerning any one of the many inconveniences stated in the preamble of the bill to have arifen from the present constitution of the colony judicatures, has not been, produced, or even attempted. On the same general allegations of a declamatory preamble, any other right, or all the rights of this or any other public body, may be taken away, and any vifionary fchenie of government subftituted in their pfaee.

** 4-thly, Because we think, that the appointment of all the members of the council, which by this bill is veiled in the crown, is not a proper provifion for preserving the equilibrium of the colony conilitution* The power given to the crown of occafionally increafing or leflening the number of the council on the report of the governors, and at the pleasure of miniiters, must make these governors and ministers mailers of every question in that aflembly ; and by deftroying its freedom of deliberation, wit] wholly annihilate its use. The intention avowed In this bill, of bringing the council to the platform of other colonies, is not likely to answer it? own end; as the colonies, where the council is named by the crown, are not at all better dispoftd to a subraifliou to the practice of tax'rng for supply without their confent, than this of Majfachufcf's Bay. And no pretence of bringing it

to the model of the Englijb constitution can be Tupported, as none Of those American councils have the least refemblance to the house of peers. So that this new scheme of a. council stands upon no fort of foundation, which the proposers of it think proper to acknowledge.

*' fthly, Bccause the new constitution of judicature provided by this bill is improper, and incongruous with the plan of the administration of justice in Great Britain. All the judges are to be henceforth nominated (not by the crown, but) by the governor; and all (except the judges of the superior court) are to be removable at his pleasure, and exprefsly without the confent of that very council which has been nominated by the crown.

" The appointment of the fheriff is by the will of the governor only, and without requiring in the person appointed any local or other qualification. That fheriff, a magiftrate of great importance to the whole adminiftration and execution of all justice, civil and criminal, and who in England is not removcable even by the royal authority, during the continuance of the term of his office, is by this bill made changeable by the governor and council, as often, and for such purposes, as they {hall think expedient.

" The governor and council thus intrusted with powers, With which the Britijh constitution has not trusted his majefty and his privy-council, have the means of returning such a jury in each particular cause, as may best fuit with the gratification of their paffions and interests. The lives, liberties, and properties of'the subjeft are put into their hands without controul; and the invaluable right of trial by jury is turned into a fnare for the people, who have hithertp

looked upon it as their main security against the licentioufness of power.

" 6thly, Because we fee in this bill the same scheme of strengthening the authority of the officers and miniilers of state, at the expence of the rights and liberties of the subjetf, which was indicated by the inaufpicious aft for {hutting up the haibour of Bo/ion.

" By that aft,, which is immediately connected with this bill, the example was set of a large important city (containing vast multitudes of people, many of whom must be innocent, and all of whom are unheard), by an arbitrary fentence, deprived of the advantage of that port, upon which all their means of livelihood did immediately depend.

" This proscription is not made determinable on the payment of a fine for an offence, or a compenfation for an injury; but it is to continue until the ministers of the crown {hall think fit to advife the king in council to revoke it.

" The legal condition of the subjeft (standing untainted by conviftion for treason or felony) ought never to depend upon the arbitrary will of any person whatfocver.

" This aft, unexampled on the records of parliament, has been entered on the journals of this house as voted nemine diffentiente, and has been ft a ted in the debate of this day, to have been fent to the colonies, as pafTcd without a divifion in either house, and therefore as conveying the uncontroverted univerfal sense of the nation.

"The defpair of making effeftual opposition to an wijnji measure, has been construed into an approbation of it.

"An unfair advantage has been taken on the final question for paflin^ that penal bill, -of the abfcnce of

ifcoft lords who bad debated it for federal hours, and ilrongly diiTented from it on the fecond reading; that period oo which it is woft afuaj to debate the principle of a bill.

** If this proceeding were to pafa wkheut animadwrfion, lords might think themselves obliged to reiterate their debates at every ftage of every bill which they oppose, and to make a formal divHion whenever they debate.

Tthly, Because this bill, and the other proceedings that accompany if, are intended for the support of that unadvifcd scheme of taxing the colonies, in a manner new, and unfuitable to their fituation and constitutional circumstances.

" Parliament has aflerted the authority of the legislatiire of this kingdom, supreme and unlimited over aft the members of the Britijb empire.

" But the legal extent of this authority foraUbes no argument in favour of an unwarrantable uie of it.

" The sense of tbe nation on the repeal of the ft»mp-aci was, ' that io equity and found policy, the taxation

of the colonies for the ordinary purposes of supply,

ought to be forborn ;' and that this kingdom ought to iatlsfy itfislf with the advantages to be derived from 8 flgujridling and iocreafing trade, and with the free grants of the fourteen affemblies; as being far more beneficial, far more eafily obtained, less opprej&ve and jtuwe likely to be lading than any revenue to be acquired by parliamentary taxes, accompanied by a total alienation of the affections of those who were to pay them. This principle of repeal was nothing more than a return to the ancient standing policy pf this empire. The unhappy departure from it, has led to that courfe of Qiifting and contradictory measures,

which have since given rife to such continued diftraetiom > by which unadvifed plan, new dudes have been imposed in the very year after the former had been repealed ; these new duties afterwards in part repealed, and ia pert conthwed* in coRUadi3i«m to the pwociples upon which those repealed were given up; all which, with many weak, injudicious, and precipitate fte.ps taken to enforce a compliance^ have kept up that jealoyfy which, on the repeal of tbe ftamp-adt, was subfiding ; revived dangerous quciUons, and gradually eftranged the affections of the cojonks from the mother-country, without any object of advantage to either. If the force proposed should hav.e its full effect, that effect, we greatly apprehend, may not continue longer than whiltt the sword is held up. To render the colonies permanently advantageous, they niuil be fatisfied with their condition. That fatiffadioo we fee no chance of restoring, whatever measures may be purfued, except by recurring, ip the whole, to the wife and falutary principles on which the ftajnp-aft was repealed.

Richmond, Rockinghamt

Ptrtbmi, jtktrgaunpy,

Akingdon, Ltittjhrt

J&ng, Craiun,

Effingbam, Fitsnuittiatp. foaftnty,

*»* The bill pafTed. Contents, wixh their proxies •included, — — — 52

Not Contents, — — 20

Copy of a Petition from the American gentlemen, who happened to be resident in Londony to the two houses.

The bumble PETITION ofseveral Natives of America, Sheweth,

*' That your petitioners are conftrained to complain to this right honourable house of two bills, which, if carried into execution, will be fatal to the rights, liberties, and peace of all America.

" Your petitioners have already seen, with equal aftonilhment and grief, proceedings adopted against them, which, in violation of the first principles of justice, and of the laws of the land, inflift the feverest punifliments without hearing the accused.

«' Upon the same principle of injustice, a bill is now brought in, which, under the proseflion of better regulating the government of the Maffacbusetts Bay, is calculated to deprive a whole province, without any form of trial, of its chartered rights, folemnly fecurcd to it by mutual compact between the crown and the people.

" Your petitioners are well informed, that a charter so granted was never before altered or refumed, but upon a full and fair hearing ; that, therefore, the present proceeding is totally unconstitutional, and sets an example which renders every charter in Great Britain and America utterly infecure.

" The appointment and removal of the judges at the pleasure of the governor, with falaries payable by the crown, puts the property, liberty and life of the subjecl, depending upon judicial integrity, in his power.

" Your petitioners perceive a fyftem of judicial tyranny deliberately at this day imposed upon them,

which, from the bitter experience of it? intolerable injuries, has been abctlifted in this country.

** Of the same unexampled and alarming nature is the bill, which, under the title pf a mar? impartial «tdminiftration qf justicp in the province qf A4ejfa:fo fetu Bay, empowers the governor tQ witb&W Q|ieflr ders from judice; holding PUt to (he fojd.icry an ex-r emption from legal prosecution for rngrdsr; and. in cfFecl subjecling that colony to military exoc.ut.iop. Your petitioners intreat this right honourable hpu.fr fa considej what must be the e«nfequence of feinlin^ troops, not really under the controul pf fh? ciyij power, and unamenable to the law, where ifee crime is committed among 4 people whom they hgpe been induftrioufiy tau.ght, by th.e incen.djary arts of Vfipfei jTjen, to tegard as d.eferying every specjcs of inft^jt ?nd atyife. The Jpfults and ipjwries pf a lafirlef? fol. diery are fqch af no free peqple can lor»g en^fR; and your petitioners apprehend, jn th« conference; of (this bill, {he horrid outrages of military oppfefiion jfol|pwed by the defolation of civil CQmflwti«n»f

«« The dispensing pwer, whigh th,|s bjlj int<jn& ^ give to the governpr, advanced as. he is. ajreadj aboyf the law, and not Ijablc to any irppcachment frofli the people he may ppprefs; mu/l conftitute him an aMj* Jute tyrant.

"Your petitioners would be utterly unwurthy of the Lngnjn anccitry, wliifh \? their cUifii «n^ pride, if they did pot fee) a virtuous indignation ft fh« reprqach qf disafeflioH and rebej|ion, with whifb theif (CQijntrymep haye bpen cruelly afper^d. Tfcey qa«i with conhdence ftly no l^gutwt^ wa^ pvcr less d^. frrved, f J]cy appegj |o {he exncf ienpe ^f a century, i» which tfle gl^ry, {^ fceriour, the nrpfpep^y flf fvgltwd, haye. fejPM, ig tfw eftimwian. ibtur ow^i}

in which they have not only borne the burthen of provincial wars, but have fliared with this country in the danger and expence of every national war. Their zeal for the service of the crown, and the defence of the general empire, has prompted them, whenever it was required, to vote supplies of men and money to the utmost exertion of thejr abilities. The journals of parliament will bear witncfs to their extraordinary zeal and services during the last war ; and that but a very Ihort time before it was refolvcd here to take from them the right of giving and granting their own money.

** If difturbances have happened in the colonies, they intreat this right honourable house to consider the causes which have produced them among a people hitherto remarkable for their loyalty to the crown, and affection for this kingdom. No hiftory can shew, nor will human nature admit of an instance of general difcontent, but from a general sense of oppreflion.

" Your petitioners conceived, that when they had acquired property under all the restraints this country thought neceflary to impose upon their commerce, trade and manufactures, that property was facred and fecure. They felt a very material difference between being retrained in the acquifition of property, and holding it when acquired under those restraints at the dispofal of others. They understand subordination in the one, and flavery in the other.

" Your petitioners wifli they could poflibly perceive any difference between the most abject flavery, and such entire subjection to a legislature, in the constitution of which they have not a fingle voice, nor the least influence, and in which no one is present on their behalf. They regard the giving their property, by their own confent alone, as the unalienable right of the

subject, and the last facred bulwark of conftitutiorial liberty. If they 'are wrong in this, they have been mifled by the love of liberty, which is their dearest birth-right; by the most folemn ftatutes, and the refolves of this honourable house itself, declaratory of the inherent right of the subject; by the authority of all great constitutional writers, and by the uninterrupted practice of Ireland and America, who have ever voted their own supplies to the crown — all which combine to prove, that the property of an EngliJIi subject, being a freeman, or a freeholder, cannot be taken from him but by his own confent. To deprive the colonifts, therefore, of this right, is to reduce them to a state of villenage, leaving them nothing they can call their own, nor capable of any acquifition but for the benefit of others.

" It is with infinite and inexpreflible concern that your petitioners fee in these bills, and in the principles of-them, a direst tendency to reduce their countrymen to the dreadful alternative of being totally enflaved, or compelled into a contest the most fhocking and unnatural with a parent state, which has ever been the object of their veneration and their love. They intreat this right honourable house to consider that the restraints, which examples of such feyerity and injustjce impose, are ever attended with a most dangerous hatred.

" In a diftrefs of mind, which cannot be described, your petitioners conjure this right honourable house not to conveit that zeal and affection, which have hitherto united every American hand and heart in the interests of England, into paffions the most painful and pernicious. Moft earneftly they befeech this right honourable house not to attempt reducing them to a state of flavery, which the English principles of liberty,

they inherit from their mother country, will render worse than death — they, therefore, pray that this right honorable house will not by passing these bills overwhelm them with affliction, and reduce their countrymen to the most abject state of misery and humiliation, or drive them to the last resources of despair:

"And your petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray.["]

BOOK III. Of the Army.

CHAP. I.

General Reflections on standing Armies in free Countries in Times of Peace.

IN a survey of public abuses, it would be unpardonable to overlook that of a standing army in times of peace, one of the most hurtful, and most dangerous of abuses.

The very words, Army, War, Soldier ^a, &c. entering into a humane and christian ear, carry with them ideas of hatred, enmity, fighting, bloodshed, mangling, butchering, destroying, unpeopling, and whatever else is horrible, cruel, hellish. My inestimable friend, the late great and good Dr. Hales, was used to say, that if any thing might be called the peculiar

disgrace of human nature, and of our world, it is war; that a set of wretched worms, whose whole life, when it holds out the best, is but a moment, a dream, a vision of the night, should shorten this their short

^a The very word soldier, gives us the idea of a sordid Swiss, hired one time by one tyrant, and another time by another, to butcher mankind. It is derived from soldarius, and that from soldum, pay. See Spelm. voc. Soldarius.

span, should assemble by thousands and myriads, travel over vast countries, or cross unmeasurable oceans, armed with swords and spears and infernal fire, and when they meet immediately fall to butchering one another, only because a couple of frantic and mischievous fiends in human shape, commonly called kings, have fallen out they know not about what, and have ordered them to go and make havock of one another.

Yet such is the turn of mind of those who are at the head of the world, that they bestow more attention upon the art of war, that is, the art of destroying their fellow-creatures, than upon the improvement of all the liberal arts and sciences, and outvie one another in keeping up bands of those butchers of mankind commonly called standing armies, to the number of many thousands ; and so prevalent is this infatuation, that even we, though surrounded by the ocean, must mimick the kingdoms on the continent, and beggar ourselves by keeping up an army of near 50,000 in times of profound peace.

The whole art of war from beginning to end is, at best, but a scene of folly and absurdity. Two kings, already possessed of more territory than they know how to govern, fall out about a province. They immediately take up arms. Immediately half a continent is deluged in blood. They carry on their infernal hatred, while either of them can find in the purses of their beggared subjects any money to squander, or while they can find any more of their miserable people, who, being by the fell ravage of war stripped of all, are glad to throw themselves into the army, to get a morsel of bread. And when the two mighty belligerant powers, the two venomous worms, have carried on the contest almost to the destruction of both, the point in dispute remains undecided as before, or they see, that it might have been

infinitely better decided by arbitration of indifferent states, without the spilling of one drop of christian blood.

War is not a more proper method of deciding controversies between kings, than single combat between individuals. All that can be determined by fighting is, that the conqueror is the best fighter of the two;

not that he has justice on his side. As I should conclude that private person, who chose rather to decide a quarrel by a duel, than to appeal to the laws of his country, or stand to arbitration of a few friends, a ruffian and a murderer; so I do not hesitate to pronounce every king a butcher of mankind who chooses rather to appeal to the ratio ultima regum, than to arbitration of neutral princes.

Standing armies first became necessary, or the pretence of their necessity plausible, when the disbanded troops, called tard-venus, in France, took to plundering and mischief in times of peace. Then the neighbouring princes pretended they must be upon an equal foot with France. But what is that to England,

surrounded by the sea, and guarded by a fleet equal to all the maritime force of Europe?

In former times we had no mercenary army. It was the militia that went to the holy war, that conquered France, &c. So at Rome there was no mercenary army in the best times of the republic. Our Hen. VII. raised no small jealousy by his 100 yeomen of the guards, augmented by him from 50, the whole standing army of his times. In the days of Ch. II. the army was got to 5,000 ; in our times to near 50,000. There can no account be given of this alarming increase, but the increase of corruption, and decrease of attention to liberty. And now, our patriotic parlia-

rants have made* th« army * fttcrtd eftaBIfftitient, and the flaking fund* a temporary expedient,

Aa army, in a free country, says judge Bitukfoxe % ' ought 'orily to-' bs enlifted for a fbort and limited titne< The foldlers should live, intermixed with the ptesplei No ieparate carrip^ no barracks^, no inland fortreffts fitoald be allowed,' Yet it is notorious, that our fdldiers are erilifted for life, ort pain of death, if they defert; and that camps4 barracksy and inland forts, are very cornmon irt our pret«n«fed fret country. The mere ftavery of a foHier's Itfej and the rigorous difcipline, and furKijh feveritiesv so great a number of brave, and freeborn Englljb subjects are exposed to in the army, are sufficient to render it the abhorrence of every true Emgli/h fpint, and the peculiar disgrace of our countryt and our times. See BlackJionSs COMMENTARIES, i. 415, where the learned author (no malecontent) {hews the peculiar danger to liberty from enflaving femany subjefis, (and thereby exciting their envy against their countrymen,, who enjoy what they are far ever deprived of) and then* arming those flaves* to enable them to reduce the rest to their condition, of which ill policy hifiory £urnilhe» many terrible examples.

^ In a land of liberty it is extremely dangirout t* make a diftmdt order of the prose/fitrn of arms. In abfolute monarchies, this is necefiary for the safety of the prince, and arifei from the main principle of their eonftitution, which is, that of governing by fear: but in free states, the proseflion of a foldierr taken fingly and merely as a proseffion, is justly a» objeft of jealousy. — The Jaws, therefore, and eon* fhtution of tliefe kingdoms know no such state a»

* COMM. i. 413.

tftu bf a ptTpefeel itendihg fddier, fcraf up W m oth«r pr*feffi»n,-»*ttn ffiatof w*rV Yet westegen«e*ett brted u^ their fdris for the arrhy airegufilrly « for ftw) f)hyfici of trinity; arid, Whtfe fn J**rft; riW foiid bf (WV*s, tfe foHrery ire engaged 6hiy fbr i WrfckJA fleBe-, dWs ir6 for liffe; that fliey Way W »» ftddalty ftpwaWd from (he ^edpld, ind attifcntd W aft&tKtir ffRe^eft.

The }U8g* goW otl to fcew, that in the S**W> tnD«; fhfe mitoaty fbrtte was Under fte kftbluW cbnirWarrtl of tfte 'tHlte-, or htrctochs, whd were eJeft^d by ~th* pWplt. This the judge, as if ht weri falfcinated irt fttvour of prtrbg^tive¹, ft«s ih a fiarig«rcMs light. TftJs large mate of pbwer, says hrf, rHui (ibhfbfreti by tht p*op:Ie, thdugh intended to jifeftrve¹ the li* berty bf the subje'A, was perhaps uhreaTohibly fletrimwttal td «he pnfrtfgatlVfe of thfe croWn.* And then he mentions one inftarici bf its being abated* But Will drry ktiglijbfndn, Knde'fn*andihg wlkat he ftys, gravely declare, that he thinks ad armed foite safer, in rtfpeft of Irbtf ty, in thi hah^s of a ki)igy thari of i mirhber 6f subjeSs elefted by thfcfMffr * Yet thii very author prefers a militia to sin army. If all thI4 fee either cdnsistent with the^ fundamental prihciples of Kberty, W With Welf, it is to be ifnderilood hi foihe manner, which I own to be but 6f my reach.

* Thofe, i*tfab have th<J command of the a-fms in i cbWitry, fa"yis jtrijtttlt*, ai« mafters of the state, and have it ih th^r power tb make wh»t revolution* they please.' di T«J ofrXaw *up(o/, ii. f. A. The foTdiery are thetnfslves bound for life, under the most abjedt flavery. For what is more perfect flavery,

¹ Jilacltjt. COMM. i. 407.

* PotlT. VII. 9.

than for a man to be, without relief, obliged to obey the command of another, at the hazard of his life, if he obeys, and under the penalty of certain death if he difobeys, while the smalleft mifbehaviour may bring upon him the most painful and disgraceful punishment ? The sense of their own remediless condition may naturally be expected to excite in them the same disposition, which fhews itself in the negroes in Jamaica, and the eunuchs in the eaftern feraglios.

In the mutiny-ad, it is always mentioned, that keeping up an army in time of peace, without confent of parliament, is unlawful. But there is no such clause for keeping up marines. Yet marines' are as much an army as any other men ; are mostly at land -, and may, at any time, be applied to the cnflaving of the people, as readily as the foldiery. 'Tis true, their number is at present inconsiderable; but that is entirely at the dispofal of government.

Lord Hinton's arguments against a reduction of the army, A. D. 1738.

1. The army is only a change made in the management of the armed force of the nation, which was formerly kept up in the guife of a militia.

Anf. The army is the very creature of the court; and therefore likely to execute every order of the court. The army is detached from the people for life, and enflaved for life. A militia continues ftill a part of the people, and is to return aqd mix with the people again, which must keep upnin their minds both an awe and an afFe&ion for the people.

2. Now all the countries aljout have regular difeiplined armies.

Anf. This is no reason for our keeping up an army< who are feparated from all our neighbours. It is a reason for our keeping up a fleet, and a militia.

3. Our militia cannot be trusted. Our people are otherwife employed, than in learning military difcipline.

Anf, The army are, on no account, preferable to a militia, but their being more thoroughly trained. Let the militia then be thoroughly difciplined. Fifty days exercife at different times in the year, will train them thoroughly. Let them have pay for those days, and carry on their bufmefs the rest of the year as at present. And let every male be trained ; and then fee, whether enemies will invade, or tumults difturb. ' 4. The army has not yet enflaved us. Experience {hews us, that a standing army is not unfriendly to liberty.

Anf. We ought to depend on the conjlhutiin for the safety of .our liberties; not on the moderation of the individuals, who command our army. If our army has not yet enflaved us; we know, th.it the far greatest part of the world has been enfhved by armies. But it is much to be questioned, whether we are not already so far enflaved, that the people could not now obtain of government what they requcfted, though the undoubted sense of the people was known to government.

5. An annual army is different from a ftdnding army. The former m.iy be diHolved, whenever it pleases parliament to give over providing for it.

Anj. There is no difference, as to the liberty of the subjeft, whether the army be on one foot, or the other ; whether it be cftablifhed bylaw, or whether it be conftantly kept, and certainly never to be reduced.

6. An army is neceff.-ry to keep the peite. Turbulent people raise tumults about matters, vtuch

faire had evert the fancllon of parliament;) a» cftcifcs* turnpikes, fuppreffion df gin, Sit.

Anf. Good government is a furer Way to keep the peace, than keeping up a formidable and expenfive army. The people may judge wrong, or be ttifJed otcafionally. But it is mal-adminiftration th« few Up popular demagogues,-who could not excite th* people to tumults, if government did not afford fomfe oause for difcontent. The fandtion of parliament neithei' will nor ought to fatisfy th« people, unlefa the people be fatisfied of the independency of tho members, who compose it. So much for lord Hinttn's arguments.

* Whatever it may be called, that government la certainly, and neceflarily, a military government where the army is the ftrongeft power "in the country. And it is eternally true, that a free parlia* ment and a standing army are absolutely incompatible ».'

* It '• the interest of favourites to advife the king to govern by an army: for if he prevails (over his subjects) then they are fure to have what heart can wifli; and if he rail, yet they are but where they were ; they had nothing, and they canlofc nothing ^b.

Every officer in the army, almost, is an addition to the power and influence of the ministry. And every addition to their power and influence is a ftep toward ariftocracy or abfolute monarchy.

* All armies whatfoever, fjys Davenant, if they are

* over large, tend to the dispeopling of a country, of

* which our neighbour nation is a sufficient proof; « where in one of the best climates in Europe men are ¹ wanting to till the ground. For children do not

• CATO'S LETT. in. 285. ^b DEB. COM. n. 153.

pfpceed from intemperate. p)eafure$ (ake,n Jposely and at random, but from a regular way of Jiving, where the father of the family de(ire$ to rear up, and provide f9f the offspring he fliajl beget.".' When a country is tp be enflave.4, the army is the jnstrument to be used- No nation ever was enfla,ved but by an army. NQ nation, ever kept up an army in times pf peace, which did not; lafe its hberties. ' An army is so forcible, and, at the same time, so coarfe an instrument, that any hand, that wields it, may, without much dexterity, perform any operation, and gain any ascendancy in human society V Mr. Hume ^c calls the army a mortal diftemper in the tfritijb government, pf whjch it must at last Inevitably perifli.

It was Walpsle's cuftom, if a borough did not ele£l his map for their member, to fend them a meflenger pf Satan to buffet th,em, 9, company qf fpjdier? to live ppon them,

la this way a flaming army may be yfed as an jnftrwmcpt in thfi hand pf a wjpked minifUr for crufting liberty.

There is much ftrafr laid, by those, who would lull us asleep, that we may not fe? our danger from, th$ army, oi> the behaviour Qf that of Jaws II. who, on being put to the trial on fio^nfowrbfatb, whether they would stand by the tyra.nt, alj laid down their aims. But we rnuft b^ wsftk ip4eed, if we fuffer purselvw to bfl mifl^d by a pre.eede.nt fp little in ppint as this. The army were, all brought; up protestants, and Jagies wanted tQ make ufg of them \o establish P°P«ry, pf thp cruelties of wh.ic.h. h^ ha4 given them

* Davtnant, n. 189.

^ Hume, HIST. STUARTS, n. 91.

f Ess. n. 376.

a pretty specimen. Does it follow, that because a protefhnt army would not be the instruments of a 'tyrant in overthrowing the religion they were brought up in (even the foldiers had some zeal for religion in those days, though not a zeal according to knowledge ) and establishing one they -were from their infancy taught to dread above all earthly evils — does it follow, I say, that because an army would not do what must be so difagreeable to themselves, they would not do what may be fuppofcd agreeable to themfejves, that is, would not promote the establishing of a military gfcvernment? All hiftory confutes this reasoning. For all hiftory shews, that the foldiery have ever been rea'dy to enflave their fellow-subjects; and almost all nations have actually been enflaved by armies.

Lord Cl\ffar£% scheme for making Charles II. abfolute, was liberty of conscience; security of property; upright judges, to keep the people in good-humour} the fort of Tilbury to be made sufficient to bridle the city. Plymouth^ in the west ; Hull, in the north, made tenable. Some addition to the army, and 200,000 arms in each of the above forts, all which might be done imperceptibly ".

* The pretensions of a particular body of men, if not checked by some collateral power, will terminate in tyranny ".' No body of men are more likely to form pretensions unfavourable to liberty, than the military, nor is any body of men so hard to check, or restrain within due bounds.

Under such kings as the present (whom God preserve) we should have little to fear, with an army as

• Rap. n. 662.

* Ftrguf. HIST. Civ. Soc. p. 195.

numerous as that of France. But a tyrannical prince, or daring minister might bring this kingdom into dreadful confufion by having on his side an army of only 10,000 regulars; and we seem now to plead prcscription for keeping up a force of above four times that number.

« The people will grow always too hard for the prince, unless he is able to subdue and govern them by an army '.'

When a country is so circumstanced, > that frugality is peculiarly neceflary, a standing army is peculiarly improper. The annual charge of keeping up from 30 to 50,000 men is not small. And I think it impofsible to shew any occafion we have for 5000 men, if we were so wife as to keep the militia upon a proper foot. Upon this one article we might, if we had imitated the Dutch, have faved a fum much above half a million per annum, which would have kept the nation clear of this mountainous load of debt, which is now finking it into bankruptcy and ruin. We find, that when the army was about 18,000, the charge was above 5 or 600,000 /. ptr annum. From this it is eafy to compute what an expence the devouring army has coft, especially of late, since it has been so frightfully numerous.

The commons, in their remonftrancc, A. D. 1628, complain of the army in time of peace, and of Buckingham's standing commission as general. We cftablifh from year to year, a great army at an immense expence, while the nation is drowned in debt; and while no mortal can conceive from what quarter external danger can come upon us. 'We hold-it far beneath the heart of any free Englishman to think,

* Bur*. HIST. OWN TIMES, n. 10*.

« that this victorious nation feeu]d stand. in need «f f German fojdiers to defend their king and kingdom ».' The duke of Newtajllt and the whigTa.dminiftration' did not think it beneath them to bring pver Heffiaat and Hanoverians in the ytar 1756, to dafend the king and kingdom. Mr. Pitt fent them a packing, and without their hejp, over-cenquered the Fr^ngb. For he conquered them in G«rw»y ; whereas he ha<J ne occafion to do any thing, besides destroying their jwmmerce by fea, taking fheir 4merican continent and iflands, interrupting their sistery, arid haraifcng {heir coafts.

In the year 1697, when the fu,bje«fl: of the army was argued op both sides, the principal topick in. favour of it was taken from the pra&ee pf fhe nejghfcourjng nations, whose keeping up a standing force inakes it neceflary, fajd they, for m to do the same 1. £ut we know, it j« neither the interest, nor the in.cl|r pation, Pf any of the powers Q( £Hropf, but Pratt* pnly, tp give up any difturbance. And. we know, that the continental powers of Europf keep up armies With other views tha.n to us (Franc* excepted) ; why then should we keep up an army wit)i a view to any ef them, but France ? And why pn apcount pf Franat wlien we have naturally so great an advantage of France in our infular fituation, and pur powerful fleet ? And if these tWP be not fufficjent, it is certain, that a well regulated militia in the maritime countjps must render ajl thought of an jnvafion, from Franffy as an operation of w?r, rp^antic. ?nd absurd. Therp is »o reason to think thAt they, who fend MR for an army, dp ferioufly think it flecglfary for any other

¹ PARL. HIST. vin. 227.

" Burn, HJST. own TIMES, ui. 284.

purpose than to make a provision for a number pf persons who depend on the court, and thereby strengthen, ministerial interest.

'Though- there was, in the times when this debate was agitated, a pretender living, and under the declared support of Louis XIV. the inveterate enemy of king William and Britijh liberty, and though there was then a restless and powerful Jacobite party in the kingdom, our ancestors did not choofe to trust their illustrious deliverer with more than 10,000 horse and foot; and the whigs loir much reputation by (tickling for this fmali number, which, in the following year, was reduced to 7000. We keep up an army of above 40,000 in a time of profound peace, and without (hadow of use for one foldier, but for a few garrifons abroad.

' We think neither king nor parliament ought .to keep up an army in the field when the war is ended, to the vast expence and utter impoverifhment of the people. The trained-bands, which may be made use of with little charge, and the forces, which may be kept up in some chief garrifons, being sufficient to fupprefs any commotion or difturbance that is likely to arife from the occafions of the late trouble [Surely then we have had no occafion since for a standing army], ' and we conceive an army (hould only be kept up in case of a powerful infurrection within the kingdom, or of an invafion from abroad. [Even for those occafions a militia is incomparably preferable in an ifland.] ' To maintain a perpetual army in the bowels of the kingdom at the expence of the subjects, when there is no enemy to fight with, is but to cnflave the king and kingdom under military bondage.' Words of the Scotch commiflioners in their rcmonftrance to parliament for disbanding the Erglijb and

Scotch armies, A. D. 164.7 ^a. They add afterwards, Armies were raised in defence of religion, the king's person and authority, the privileges of parliament, and the liberty of the subject, and when they are no more useful for that end, and the houses may confult freely, and aft fecurely, without hoftile opposition, it is high time to diiband them, that the laws of the kingdom may take place; [/. e. because the laws are not likely to take place under the fear of a standing army] ' Some of our neig hbouring nations are neceffitated to keep up armies, because they have enemies that lie contiguous to their borders. But the fea is our bulwark.' [N. B. The English fleet was not then, nor before, to be compared with what it has been in our times,] * and if we keep up amity and peace among ourselves, we need not fear foreign invasions, &c ^b.' By this pafTage it appears, that the Sco*cb3 whom we have lately seen so blamed for their slavifti disposition, had, in those days, more of the spirit of liberty than the English shewed then, or since. In fa£t, the English people's shewing so little uneafiness under the grievances of a standing army, and the others of our times,' shews them to be but too ripe for flavery. ^c The raifing of one fingle regiment in Spain within these fix years, under colour of being a guard for the king's person, so inflamed the nation, that a rebellion had enfued, if they had not been disbanded fpeedily V Thus writes Mr. Vcrnon to the earH of Manebejler: We are more jealous of our constitution and liberty than of our bad neighbours, and therefore -have allowed but 350,000 /. for maintaining guards and garrifons this year, (1698) which we compute will

* PARL. HJST. xvi. 462. ^b Ibid.

^c DEB. LORDS, i. 291.

keep about 4000 horse and dragoons, and 6000

foot'.' ' Your royal progenitors have ever held their subjefb

hearts the best garrifon of this kingdom.' The speaker's speech, A. D. 1621, to Ch, I. againll billetting foldiers on private houses^b.

A numerous army always gives cause to fufpe& that the government is either afraid of the people, or has a design upon the people.

The commons refolve, A. D. 1673, that the continuance of any standing forces in the nation, besides the militia, is a great grievance and vexation to the people. They likewife refolve, that according to the laws of the land, the king has no guards but those called gentlemen-pensioners and yeomen of the guard; that an army has never been countenanced (but quite contrary) by parliament, which has always looked on them as a set of men unlawfully assembled, of vafl charge to king and kingdom; altogether useless to the nation, as appears from the peaceableness of the king's reign fincc the restoration. That the king accordingly was often without them; that guards, or standing armies, are only in use in arbitrary countries where princes govern more by fear than "love, as in France; that a lifeguard is a standing army in difguife, and that as Jong as they continue, the roots of a standing army will remain^c. What a wonderful illumination has opened the minds of our parliaments since those ignorant times. A standing army is now an effential of the constitution.

• Colt's, MEM. 9. ^b Rapin, II. 265. ^c Chandl. DEB. COM. i. 199.

Oxford (the friend of France and the pretender, the attainted Oxford) on the mutiny bill, says, « While fie has breath, he Will speak for the liberties of his country, and against courts martial, and a standing arrily in peace, as dangerous to the con'ftitutioh V

* The most likely way to restort the pretender, is maintaining a standing army to keep him out V

« Any man who would fuggeft to the king [William] that he could not be safe unless he were furrotrnded with guards, ought to be abhorred by every true Englishman V

The fagacious Fletcher of Scotland dropped the friendfhip of lord Sunderland, because he voted for the army ^d.

An army in time of peace, unless by parliamentary authority, is illegal, says the declaration of rights at king William'* acceffion ^e. If there be reason to fufpe& parliament of corruption, it may be added, that even with parliamentary authority, It is dangerous to liberty.

The throne of tyranny, which is upheld by an army, is in continual danger of being overthrown by the army. The Roman army dethroned and maffacred several emperors of their own fetting up. So do the Turktjh janizaries frotn time to time. Therefore the mailers of both have'been obliged to employ them as much as poftible in wars, on any pretence, to keep 'them from raifing feditions^f. Thus tyranny is not

^a DEB. LORDS, m, 78.

^b Trentbard. ^c Lord Somaurt.

^d CbaraQ. from a Manu/cript.

' Hume, HIST. STUARTS, n. 45.6.

^f MOD. UNIV. HIST, xiu, 5.

Chap. I. DISQUISITIONS. 357

only a curft to the people, who are immediately under ff, but to all the surrounding nations.

Robbers, says Sir S'boma.i More, often prove gallant foldiers ; but foldiers likewife often prove gallant robbers.

An able anonymous speaker in parliament, A. D. 1681, says, a king must govern either by a parliament or an army; and that when the parliament is laid aside, the ariiiy must come into its place. That honest gentleman did not think of the poflibility of bribing a parliament.

Lord Haverjham, in his speech on the occafional conformity-bill, A. D. 1703, complains heavily of the conduct of the war. « England, says he, is a ftrong afs crouching between two burdens, the navy and the army, and nothing material done for a great expence raised on the people ".* * I would fain know (says Flicker, p. 37.) if there be any other way of making a prince abfolute, than by allowing him a standing army; if by it all princes have not been made abfolute; if without it any. Whether our enemies shall conquer us is uncertain. But whether a standing army will enflave us, neither reason nor experience will fuffer us to doubt. Therefore no pretence of danger from abroad can be as argument for keeping up mercenary forces.'

The advocates for the army plead ftrongly for its usefulness in keeping the peace. Yet it is ceitain, that there have not been anywhere more terrible infurre&ions, than in countries where great standing armies have been kept up; as at Rome in the imperial times, where the majority of the emperors died violent deaths ; in Turkey, wheie the janizaries from time to time rife

•* D£B. LORDS, n. 65.

in a fury, and dethrone a grand fignor, or oblige him, to fave himself, to make a scape-goat, or rather a facrifice of his wazir; at Algiers, where it is almost the eftabliflied form of government for the dey to be murdered, and his murderer to fucceed him, &c.

« The barbarous common foldier' (says Wbltthti*y tin occafion of Sandforfa being plundered and killed by those of his own party at Cokhefter, A. D. 1648) will know no diftinftion between friends and foes,. The goods of either come alike to his rapine ; and upon a hafty word, he no more regards the blood of 2 friend, than of an enemy.' In the debate on the army ^b, lord Strafford said, he commanded a regiment of dragoons in the reign of king ffjlliaaiy and at that time there was not any such law as what was in this bill, that we had no yearly mutiny-bills; yet, in those days the men were as good, and as well difciplined as at any time since. If any of the foldiers committed any crime, they were fure tp be punished; the officers delivered them up to the civil power, to be dealt with according to law.

* The French and Swift troops are certainly as well difciplined as ours ; and ye? in France a foldier has a right in time of peace to his difcharge after fix years service; and in the Stuifs service their foldiers generally contraft for a certain number of years, after which they may return home if they please, which is the true cause of that country's being always full of difciplined foldiers^c.' Lord Egmant, in the year 1750, fpoke as follows in favour of our foldiery, and against martial law.

• MEM. 312. <• DEB. LORDS, iv. 58-64.

^e Aim, DBS. COM. iv. 285.

'Sir, The commander in chief of our army may make himself matter of many of our ejections; and where he cannot by such means make himself mailer, he- may do as Gaius Marius did at Rem*, he may give private orders to his foldiers to murder any one that fhall dare to set himself up a$ a candidate against the man he has recommended. For the first attempt that great and wicked Raman made against the liberties of his country, was to get his foldiers to murder the man who flood candidate for the tribunefhip in opposition to the person he patronized; and the Roman foldiers were even by that time become so abandoned, so loft to all sense of law or liberty, that they readily obeyed their general's orders, though he was then out of command, and though it was about 100 years after the end of the fecond Punic war, and not above 150 years after the Remans first began to keep the same army under military law for a number of years together. For though the Rtmans from the very first origin of their city were almeft continually engaged in wars, yet those wars were always for the first 500 years carried on by frefh armies; so that it feldom happened that any number of their troops were above a year without returning to enjoy the happiness of freedom and liberty. By this cuftom, their citizens continued all to be foldiers, and their foldiers to be citizens ; but soon after they began to keep up and carry on their wars by standing armies, their citizens loft that warlike spirit, and their foldiers that Jove of liberty by which alone the freedom of government can be preserved. For this reason, Sir, we ought to be careful not to give the meaneft foldier of our army an occafion to think that he is in a state of flavery: On the contrary, we ihould, as far as is consident with the nature of

rrtilitary service, furnim them with reafohs for rejoicing in their being English foldiers, and consequently in a condition much superior to that of the flavifh armies upon the continent.' Debate about martial law', A. D.> It was

moved, that the offences committed by the foldiery be cognizable and puniflied in time of peace by the civil magiftrate only. Carried for the martial law.

In flavilh countries the army is generally the molt numerous, and contrariwife in free countries.

The Roman army in Augujtus's time was 13 legions, fupposed of 5000 men each, or 65,000 men. In the emperor Alexander's time the Roman legions were 32, or 160,000 men, quartered in many different places ^b. In Turkey, the ordinary establishment is above 150,000 men⁰. Of their infolence to the prince and cruelty ito the people, fee Montalb. RER, TURC, COMMENT, p. 5. The Perfum army, when effe&ive, consists of 309,000 horse, and 40,000 foot^d.

The Chinefe army is fupposed to consist of 2,659,191 men'. Some of the inland kingdoms of Africa have raised armies of a million of men ^f. The Moguls iarmy consided in the beginning of last century, of no less than 1,068,248 horse *. The kings of Pegu in India, have had armies of a million, or a million and half of men ^h.

^a DEB. COM. vi. 177.

^b ANT. UNIV. HIST. xv. 361.

¹ Robert/. CH. V. I. 391.

* DE LAET. DESCR. PERS. 163.

f MOD. UNIV. HIST. vm. n.

^f Ibid. xvi. 470.

s COMM. DE IMP. MAGN. MOOOL. p. 146,

*> MOD. UNIV. HIST. vii. 64.

That of the king of Congo in Africa^ is said to coasist of 900,000 men» A. D. 1665 *. Pranjinofy, an Eaft Indian monarch, had an army of 1,700,000 men, besides 80,000 horse, and 1500 elephants. Yet he was conquered¹*. Tamerlane's army was. 800,009 men. According to some authors double the number. Bajaxefs not quite so numerous. In a HavUh country, the army is always an important object^e.

CHAP. II. Falts relMhig M -fix Any.

AL L wife states have been jealous, of the army. The 'Carthaginians had a council of eae JMindrai taken out of the fenate, whose office was to watch the conduct of the generals and officers ^d.

Pijijlratui having iprocured from the city of Atkaa sisty fellows armed only with cudgels -for the fecurrty of his worthless person from pretended dangers, improved'this handful into an army, and >with it onflawd •his country. When Tyndarides meditated the -ruin of the Syracujan liberty, one of his first fteps was to draw round him a multitude of needy and defperate ipeopie, by way of a guard '.

The Romani were ftartled at the-fight of .120 li&ozs, or peace-officers for the guard of the decemviri. Such an army was dangerous, they said, to liberty.

* MOD. UNIV. HIST. *vi. -6-3.

* Ibid. vii. 297. ^c Ibid. xil. 8l.

* ANT. UNIV. HIST. xvu. 258. f Ubb. Emm. n. 118.

What would those jealous old Romans, what would our ftern forefathers have said, had they seen 18,000 mercenary foldiers kept up in this free country (whose natural guard is a militia, and a fleet equal in force to that of all Europe put together) in a time of profound peace, in spite of all the repeated and continued remonitrances of all men of public spirit for ages, at the same time that our governors do not know how to defray the neceflary charges of government, and the pation is plunged in a bottomless fea of debt.

When Rome was thought to be in the utmost danger from the contest between Sylla and Marius, the confu) Oflavius was advifed to arm the flaves for the preservation of the republic. He rejected a propofal so unconstitutional. For the Romans thought it dangerous to put arms in the hands of flaves^a. Our free Brttijb policy directs us hardly to trust arms in any other hands than those of flaves. For we have no slaves in Britain, but the foldiery. That they are flaves — flaves for life — in the ftridtest sense of the word, will appear manifeft to every person, who attends to the proper definition of flavery, viz. being obliged to submit for life, to the abfolute command of another, to do or to fuffer whatever the superior imposes on him, without redrefs,

Sylla, on the contrary, gave liberty, citizenQiip, and arms, to 10,000 flaves, to attach them to his interest ; breaking through all principles of the constitution, to gain his own ambitious views. ,

It is ftrange, says Harrington, that kings should be so fond as they are of standing armies. No order of men has fuffered so much as they, by the foldiery.

* ANT. UNIV. HIST. xm. 61.

•The fons of Zeruiab, Joab captain of the hoflr, ^; and Abijbai his brother, were too ftrong for David', thus the kings of Ifrael and of Juda fell most of them by their captains or favourites, as I have elsewhere observed more particularly. Thus Brutus being standing captain of the guards, could caft out Tarquinj thus Sejanus had means to attempt against Tiberius; Otbo to be the rrval of Galba, Cafperius jElianus of Nerva, CaJJius of Antoninus, Pertnnis of Commodus, Maximinus of Alexander, PbiKppui of Gordian, Mmilianus of Callus, Ingebus of Lollianui, Aureolus of Gallienus, Magneftus of Conftantius, Maximus of Gratian, Arbogajies of Valentinan, Ruffinus of Arcadius, Stilico of Honortus. Go from the west into the eaft : upon the death of Marcianus, Afparis alone, having the command of the arms, could prefer Lea to the empire; Phocas deprived Mauritius of the same; Heraclius deposed Pbocas; Leo Ifaurus could do as much to Theodosius Adramytinus, as Nicephorus to /rent, Leo Armenius to Michael CuropalaUs, Romanus Lagapenus to Conflantin, Nicephorus Phocas to Romanus Puer, Johannes Zifmifces to Nicephorus Pbocas, Ifaac Comnenus to Michael Stratiaticus, Botoniates to Michael the fon of Dttcas, Alexius Comnenus to Bttoniate;; which work continued in such manner, 'till the destrustion of that empire. Go from the eaft to the north : Gujlavus attained to the kingdom of Sweden, by his power and command of an army; and thus Sececbus came near to supplant Eoleflaus III. of Poland. If JValleJlein had lived, what had become of his mafter ? In France the race of Pharamond was extinguiflied by Pefin; and that of Pepin in like manner, each by the major of the palace, a standing magiftracy of exorbitant trust. Go to the India : you {hall find a king of Pegu to have been thruft

out of the realm of Tangu, by his captain general, &c.'

Ctefar puts all Ramt, and Pompey himself, into a consternation, by approaching the city at the head of a terrible army. Domitius Abtnobarbu!t fearing Ctefar's vengeance, takes what he thinks to be poifon.

Sylla bribes the legions, who were (;he instrutnents of his tyranny, with the confifcated lands of the friends of liberty'.

The army is as fickle as the people. Often turns upon its matters, as the lion fqmetimes devours his keeper.

la the cootest between SyUa and Marius, the confular army was foeaetimes on one side, foraetimes on the other.

When Caf«r* .by every wicked art, procured the government of lllyricum for 5 years, with an army of 4 legions (not half the standing force now kept up by «ur .ministers) Goto told the Senators what they afterwards feverely fe.lt, That they were placing an armed tyrant in their citadel.

* Even the penuon-parliament, in Ch. IPs time, and James's first pafiive-obedience parliament, flopped fiior^, and turned upon those corrupt miniftries, when the .last .ftroke was levelled against liberty. They faw that-when they should be no longer necefJary, they would be used as traitors always are by those, who take advantage of their treason, that is, facrificed to the refentrnent of the people. And in iking IPilliam's time, the court party almost ruined themselves by speaking up for the army V Pompty brings home at one time fpoils of war to the value of 12 millions fterling, with which he bribed the

» ANT. UNIV. HIST. xm. 91. "* CATO'S LSTT. in. 278, 289.

army, to attach them to himself, giving the private men sisty pounds each, and large fums to the officers^a.

The greatest part of the Raman emperors set up by the praetorian guards. The same military men murdered the amiable Pertinnx, for attempting to restore difcipline ^b. * The foldiers would fuffer none to reign, ' but tyrants^c.'

The Roman legions were, by the triumviri, bribed against their country with the lands of their proscribed countrymen.

Augujlus disposed of the army, so as to have them always within call. Their number computed to be 170,650, of which 10,000 were always in the neighbourhood of Rome ^d.

Auguftus takes to himself the government of all the provinces, in which troops were, on pretence of infurre&ions, commonly kept; and leaves the others to be disposed of by the conscript fathers; thus cunningly keeping in his own hands the army, which lay in those provinces ^e.

Aurelius would not, like too many of his predeceffors and followers, enrich the army with the plunder of the people ^f.

Maximiriy and several others of the imperial tyrants, were maflacred by the same army which f,t them on the throne. The case has been the same in mod countries, where the prince rules by means of an armed force.

PbiHppus, the fupposed poifoner of the excellent emperor Gordian, chosen emperor by the army, writes

• ANT. UNIV. HIST. xui. 148. ^b Ibid. xv. 280. ^f Ibid. 281.

^d Ibid. xm. 490. ^c Ibid. 488.

^f Ibid. xv. 224.

home to the fenate to inform them. They are obliged to acquiefce •. And when Auretian was murdered, the fenat* did not dare to choofe a fucceflbr, though the army left it to them, left they should not make a choice agreeable to the army. Wretched Ramans ! could not even choofe their tyrant^b.

Claudius, and all the Roman emperors after him, gave the foldiers money on their acceffion^c. It was they, who dragged him from beh'rnd the tapeftry, where, through averfion to eminence, he had hid himself, and set him on the throne ^d. Nero was carried to the camp, to be received as emperor, before he was acknowledged by the people ^e. It was the prxtorian guards, who raised, at their pleasure, almost all the emperors to the throne.

The Raman legions, taken by the Gauls in Vefpaftan's time, fwear allegiance to them, and promise to give up their officers^f. So little does principle prevail in the army, and so little are they to be trusted by princes.

Nothing but a bribed army would have supported the villainous Raman emperors. Caracalla attempted In the fight of the legions to ftab his father the emperor Severus. He remonftrates to htm on his bloody and unnatural dispofuion. Caracalla shews no remorfe; on the contrary, he afterwards attempts to depose his father, and debauches, for that purpose, several of the officers. Murders his brother Get a immediately on his acceffion, and 20,000 of his domestics, and makes it death to utter his name. Murders in cold blood the whole youth of Noricum, and almost aft

the

• ANT. UNIV. Hist. xv. 409. ^b Ibid. 469. ^c Ibid. xiv. 322. ^d Ibid. 320.

• Ibid. 368. ^f Ibid. xv. 14,

the Alexandrians^ because they had lampooned him* Orders a tribune and foldiers to bring Cbila and murder him before his face. The people fave Chile. Caracalla, to appeafe the people, denies his having had any such design, and orders the tribune and foldiers to be put to death as the proposers of Chile's murder. Maflacres a daughter of Aurelius for expreffing some concern for the cruel fate of Get a, and several of the facred veftal virgins on the same account* Orders his foldiers to mafiacre a multitude of people in the theatre for not liking a charioteer in the Circenfian games, whom he approved. The military ruffians, not diftinguiihing the delinquents from the rest, fell indifferently upon all, sword in hand, and made a dreadful havock of the helpless unarmed multitude, fparing only such as redeemed their lives with money. He loaded the people with taxes in all the provinces, saying, While I wear this sword, I shall never wane money; and at Romt caused numbers to be put to death, sometimes out of revenge, for their cenfuring his tyrannical proceedings, sometimes for his diverfion merely; for his supreme delight was the fight of ftreaining blood, and the found of dying groans. No fex, rank, or age, cscaped his fury. He wrote to the fenate, that he knew, they difapproved his conduit ; but that he neither valued nor feared them, while he had an army at his command. Thefe are some ot Caracalla's feats. Yet this devil (and furely the most inveterate of the infernals, if he were to come up hot from the regions of fire and brimftone, could not outdo such a character) was, after his being put to death by order of Macrinus, his fucceflbr, manufactured, by the irresistible army, into a god, and Macrinus, the emperor, was obliged by the army

to give his order to the fenate for that purpose. Such are the bleffings of a Handing army *!

The danger of armies appeared in the Florentines war with the German banditti [mercenaries disbanded by making peace between the Florentines and Vifcanti"} who amounted to 8000 horfc, and 4000 foot, and plundered all Italy. Many towns paid whatever ranfotn those mifcreants imposed on them. * The fairest and most populous provinces in Italy were laid under contribution by a set of lawless ruffians, whose progrefs increased their numbers, as their barbarity did the horror in which they were held. Wherever they met with the least reststance, ruin to the inhabitants was the certain consequence : they demoliflied towns, defolated countries, Slaughtered people, and nothing but money could buy off their ravages. It was upon this occafton that the wisdom and magnanimity of the Florentines fhone out with a luftre, equal to that of the greatest states of antiquity. Irrftead of bejng intimidated by the example of their neighbours, or the numbers of the banditti, they considered them as monfters, and were determined to destroy them. The most refpeftable citizens of the Florentine allies came to Florence, to perfuade the people, and magiftrates, that they had no way to avoid certain destrudion but to fend deputies to treat with the ruffians ; and that they might buy their peace cheaper than their quarters for a fingle day wt>ukl coft them ; this aJvice was difdained by the Flareii'ines. Malatejla led his troops to the field rgainft the banditti, and offered them battle, but the robbers were ftartled at their valour, and retreated : the Florentines perfued them with fuccefs.

• ANT. UNIV. HIST. xv. 32: — 34z.

And now it appeared that true courage cannot animate a lawless set of men.

* The attention of all Italy had been employed for some time upon the firm conduit of the Florentines% and it now became their admiration. The most diftant states intcrested thcmselves in the fate and support of so much magnanimity, and wanted to (hare in the glory.

• Thus ended, to the immortal honour of Florence^ a danger that threatened great calamity to her ftatc ».'

Armies are dangerous, when kept up, and dangerous when disbanded.

So much is an army neceflary to tyranny, that all the defpotic power now in Eurcpe is owing to standing armies being formed, and was, till then, unknown. Ch. VII. of France (wh.'re the first standing army was established) was very abfolute, and Lewis XI. more. He humbled his nobles; divided them; increased his army and his revenue; and by threatening and bribing, biafled the aflembly of the states^b.

The revolution in which Elizabeth, daughter of Peter the Great, mounted the throne of Rujjia, was brought about by Elizabeth's being more in favour with the army, than the great duke, whom {he dethroned ^c.

When cardinal Ximenes's authority for governing the kingdom of Spain, during the minority of Ch. V. was questioned by some of the grandees, he brought out to them the will of Ferdinand, and ratification by Charles, appointing him regent. Afterwards drawing them to a balcony, from whence they could fee some troops exercifing, "* If, says he, you be not contented

* MOD. UMV. HIST, xxxvi. 126. ^k See Robert/. HIST. CH. V. i. 98. ^c MOD. UNIV. HIST. XLII. 344.

with the authority I have {hewn you, look there y by these I mean to keep up my power.' He was armed; they unarmed. Which was likely to prevail * ? Ximenes was a wife and good minister. But had he been the worft that ever was pofleffed of power, the army would probably have supported him. When the silly commons of Denmark, A. D. 1660, threw away their liberties (as children do the playthings they are tired of) the king at first told them, offering him abfolute power, that he had fcruples, Nola epifeopari; but he artfully (hut the city gates on pretence of keeping the peace; but in reality, because, having the army entirely in his power, it was impoflible for any of the nobility to retire to their estates without his leave, which brought his intrigues to a fpeedy iflue V In the great kingdom of Siam, the governors of the diftant provinces often engage the troops under them to revolt, and set up for themselves ^c.

When prince Maurice attempted to seize the liberties of Holland, he filled the roads and avenues with his foldiers ^d. ' It was impoflible for the cities of Holland to lave themselves, because the ftatholder had the army at command, and the states of Holland were wholly difarmed ^c.'

In this very year 1772, the Sviedijh army has enflaved that country.

Unfortunately for the peace of mankind, armies are but too eafily found, ready to fight for any caufc. Did not that mcft worthless prince Rich. III. find an army of Englisomen ready to fight for him against

liberty.

» Sec Ro&crt/. CH. V. n. 35.

^k MOD. UNIV. HIST. xxxn. zo. ^c Ibid. vn. 264.

⁴ Ibid. xxxi. 230. ^c Ibid. 232.

liberty* Did not Ch. I. find one ? Was not the army under Jam. II. willing to support his tyranny, till they came to understand, that he intended to disband them the first opportunity, and to replace them with an army of papifts ! And did he not find an army to fight for him afterwards in Ireland?

An army may be led on to any violence, however contrary to the general sentiments, if there is a profpe& of a plentiful harvest of fpoih Ladijlaus, king of Naples, A. D. 1413, though himself a papift, and every foldier in his army a papift, plundered the holy Father's holy chapel and palaces, stripped the holy churches, seized the holy jewels, and holy fhrines of the holy faints, and maflacred federal of the holy bishops *. Charlemagne, on the contrary, proposed to employ his foldiery in time of peace, in making canals and public works °. Ours are employed too in time of peace — in drinking, whoring, powdering for .the reviews, and maflacring the people.

The Turkijh janizaries and priefts rule all, and set up and pull down fultans at their pleasure. The Roman army, under the emperors, did the same. It is certain, that the janizaries and priefts in Turkey could at any time obtain a Magna Charta for their country, and that the Roman army under the emperors could have restored the republican liberty, when 'they pleased. But such is the nature of man. A king will ere<3 himself into a tyrant; and every common foldier is for supporting him, because ho himself is a petty tyrant under the great one; which pleasure he knows he must lofe, whenever general liberty is restored. Therefore he will certainly never promote a restoration of liberty.

* MOD. UNIV. HIST, xxviii. 213. ^k Ibid. jcxiii. 146.

⁽In two years we have seen the constitution of France, Sweden, and Poland overturned, and reduced to military governments *.' * By this,' (says ffhhehck ^b, speaking of the army's petition, A. D. 1646.) 'we may take notice how soon the officers and foldiers of an army, though ever so well difciplined, will, through want of action, [an army can have no aftion in time of peace], ' fall into difordec, and designs of trouble.' Again : ' Here it was observed [in the house] that a victorious army out of employment i» very inclinable to aflame power over their principals; and this occafioned the parliament's greater care for their employment in Ireland' He observes, on the two houses ordering their declaration agsinft the army to be erafed from their journals, That ' then the parliament begun to furrender themselves and their power into the hands of their own army.' When they removed the king from Holdenby, they acled altogether by their own authority; and when he aflced by what warrant, cornet Joyce answered, It was the pleasure of the army. Afterwards % the foldiery befet the house of commons, and extorted ordinances in their favour. Then parliament found it neccflary to enable the city to raise the militia for their defence against the army. The army advances. This report of their approach puts all in terror. The committee of safety is revived. The Iheriffs and common-council attend the house with letters from the army. A committee of both houses fits all night. Letters are fent from both houses requiring general Fairfax not to come nearer than 15 miles of London. The